CWE-798

Mitigation

Phase: Architecture and Design

Description:

• For outbound authentication: store passwords, keys, and other credentials outside of the code in a strongly-protected, encrypted configuration file or database that is protected from access by all outsiders, including other local users on the same system. Properly protect the key (CWE-320). If you cannot use encryption to protect the file, then make sure that the permissions are as restrictive as possible [REF-7].
• In Windows environments, the Encrypted File System (EFS) may provide some protection.

Mitigation

Phase: Architecture and Design

Description:

• For inbound authentication: Rather than hard-code a default username and password, key, or other authentication credentials for first time logins, utilize a "first login" mode that requires the user to enter a unique strong password or key.

Mitigation

Phase: Architecture and Design

Description:

• If the product must contain hard-coded credentials or they cannot be removed, perform access control checks and limit which entities can access the feature that requires the hard-coded credentials. For example, a feature might only be enabled through the system console instead of through a network connection.

Mitigation

Phase: Architecture and Design

Description:

• For inbound authentication using passwords: apply strong one-way hashes to passwords and store those hashes in a configuration file or database with appropriate access control. That way, theft of the file/database still requires the attacker to try to crack the password. When handling an incoming password during authentication, take the hash of the password and compare it to the saved hash.
• Use randomly assigned salts for each separate hash that is generated. This increases the amount of computation that an attacker needs to conduct a brute-force attack, possibly limiting the effectiveness of the rainbow table method.

Mitigation

Phase: Architecture and Design

Description:

• For front-end to back-end connections: Three solutions are possible, although none are complete.
• The first suggestion involves the use of generated passwords or keys that are changed automatically and must be entered at given time intervals by a system administrator. These passwords will be held in memory and only be valid for the time intervals.
• Next, the passwords or keys should be limited at the back end to only performing actions valid for the front end, as opposed to having full access.
• Finally, the messages sent should be tagged and checksummed with time sensitive values so as to prevent replay-style attacks.

CAPEC-191: Read Sensitive Constants Within an Executable

An adversary engages in activities to discover any sensitive constants present within the compiled code of an executable. These constants may include literal ASCII strings within the file itself, or possibly strings hard-coded into particular routines that can be revealed by code refactoring methods including static and dynamic analysis.

CAPEC-70: Try Common or Default Usernames and Passwords

An adversary may try certain common or default usernames and passwords to gain access into the system and perform unauthorized actions. An adversary may try an intelligent brute force using empty passwords, known vendor default credentials, as well as a dictionary of common usernames and passwords. Many vendor products come preconfigured with default (and thus well-known) usernames and passwords that should be deleted prior to usage in a production environment. It is a common mistake to forget to remove these default login credentials. Another problem is that users would pick very simple (common) passwords (e.g. "secret" or "password") that make it easier for the attacker to gain access to the system compared to using a brute force attack or even a dictionary attack using a full dictionary.