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A flaw was found in Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform's automation- controller. The bulk job launch endpoint builds workflow job nodes from client input using a serializer that leaves the node's job reference -- a field normally set by the workflow task manager after it spawns a child job -- writable and does not include it in the permission validation performed for the other node fields. An authenticated user with permission to execute a single job template can submit a bulk job launch whose node references the identifier of any unified job in any organization, including jobs they cannot access. The node then exposes that job's metadata, and cancelling the attacker's workflow cancels the referenced job through the workflow cancellation cascade, without any per-job authorization check. Repeated, this allows a low-privileged user to cancel running jobs, project and inventory syncs, ad hoc commands, and system jobs across all organizations, denying automation service platform-wide.

A flaw was found in Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform's automation- controller. The bulk job launch endpoint builds workflow job nodes from client input using a serializer that leaves the node's job reference -- a field normally set by the workflow task manager after it spawns a child job -- writable and does not include it in the permission validation performed for the other node fields. An authenticated user with permission to execute a single job template can submit a bulk job launch whose node references the identifier of any unified job in any organization, including jobs they cannot access. The node then exposes that job's metadata, and cancelling the attacker's workflow cancels the referenced job through the workflow cancellation cascade, without any per-job authorization check. Repeated, this allows a low-privileged user to cancel running jobs, project and inventory syncs, ad hoc commands, and system jobs across all organizations, denying automation service platform-wide.

A flaw was found in Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform's automation- controller. The bulk job launch endpoint builds workflow job nodes from client input using a serializer that leaves the node's job reference -- a field normally set by the workflow task manager after it spawns a child job -- writable and does not include it in the permission validation performed for the other node fields. An authenticated user with permission to execute a single job template can submit a bulk job launch whose node references the identifier of any unified job in any organization, including jobs they cannot access. The node then exposes that job's metadata, and cancelling the attacker's workflow cancels the referenced job through the workflow cancellation cascade, without any per-job authorization check. Repeated, this allows a low-privileged user to cancel running jobs, project and inventory syncs, ad hoc commands, and system jobs across all organizations, denying automation service platform-wide.

A flaw was found in Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform's automation- controller. The bulk job launch endpoint builds workflow job nodes from client input using a serializer that leaves the node's job reference -- a field normally set by the workflow task manager after it spawns a child job -- writable and does not include it in the permission validation performed for the other node fields. An authenticated user with permission to execute a single job template can submit a bulk job launch whose node references the identifier of any unified job in any organization, including jobs they cannot access. The node then exposes that job's metadata, and cancelling the attacker's workflow cancels the referenced job through the workflow cancellation cascade, without any per-job authorization check. Repeated, this allows a low-privileged user to cancel running jobs, project and inventory syncs, ad hoc commands, and system jobs across all organizations, denying automation service platform-wide.