Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-1278

Weakness Allowed

Missing Protection Against Hardware Reverse Engineering Using Integrated Circuit (IC) Imaging Techniques

Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete

Information stored in hardware may be recovered by an attacker with the capability to capture and analyze images of the integrated circuit using techniques such as scanning electron microscopy.

These secrets may be stored in non-volatile memory or in the circuit netlist. Memory technologies such as masked ROM make it easier to extract secrets than One-time Programmable (OTP) memory.

Dimensions

  • Behavior-Type: Protection
  • Behavior-Property: Missing
  • Technology: Hardware
  • Attack: Reverse Engineering
  • Technology: Integrated Circuit
  • Acronym: (IC)
  • Attack: Imaging Techniques
Mapping guidance

This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.

Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.

Relationships and members
ChildOf: CWE-693 · View CWE-1000
Modes of introduction
Architecture and Design
Notes

Maintenance

This entry is still under development and will continue to see updates and content improvements. It is more attack-oriented, so it might be more suited for CAPEC.

Content history
Submission: Nicole Fern · Cycuity (originally submitted as Tortuga Logic) · 2020-05-20 · CWE 4.1
Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2020-08-20 · CWE 4.2

updated Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Modes_of_Introduction, Potential_Mitigations, References, Related_Attack_Patterns

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2021-03-15 · CWE 4.4

updated Maintenance_Notes

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2022-04-28 · CWE 4.7

updated Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2022-06-28 · CWE 4.8

updated Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2022-10-13 · CWE 4.9

updated Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2023-01-31 · CWE 4.10

updated Related_Attack_Patterns

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2023-04-27 · CWE 4.11

updated References, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2023-06-29 · CWE 4.12

updated Mapping_Notes

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2025-12-11 · CWE 4.19

updated Weakness_Ordinalities

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2026-10-28 · CWE 5.0

updated Common_Consequences, Description, Dimensions

2 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

CVE-2021-38394 (GCVE-0-2021-38394)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2021-10-04 17:34 – Updated: 2024-09-16 18:59
VLAI
Title
Missing Protection against Hardware Reverse Engineering Using Integrated Circuit Imaging Techniques for Boston Scientific Zoom Latitude
Summary
An attacker with physical access to the device can extract the binary that checks for the hardware key and reverse engineer it, which could be used to create a physical duplicate of a valid hardware key. The hardware key allows access to special settings when inserted.
CWE
Assigner
icscert CNA under the icscert root
CNA scorecard B 75/100 over 343 records in the last 180 days details
References
Impacted products
Date Public
2021-09-30 00:00
Show details on NVD website

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GHSA-C3HF-72HW-FVR7

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:16 – Updated: 2022-05-24 19:16
VLAI
Details

An attacker with physical access to the device can extract the binary that checks for the hardware key and reverse engineer it, which could be used to create a physical duplicate of a valid hardware key. The hardware key allows access to special settings when inserted.

Show details on source website

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Mitigation
Architecture and Design

The cost of secret extraction via IC reverse engineering should outweigh the potential value of the secrets being extracted. Threat model and value of secrets should be used to choose the technology used to safeguard those secrets. Examples include IC camouflaging and obfuscation, tamper-proof packaging, active shielding, and physical tampering detection information erasure.

CAPEC-188: Reverse Engineering

An adversary discovers the structure, function, and composition of an object, resource, or system by using a variety of analysis techniques to effectively determine how the analyzed entity was constructed or operates. The goal of reverse engineering is often to duplicate the function, or a part of the function, of an object in order to duplicate or "back engineer" some aspect of its functioning. Reverse engineering techniques can be applied to mechanical objects, electronic devices, or software, although the methodology and techniques involved in each type of analysis differ widely.

CAPEC-37: Retrieve Embedded Sensitive Data

An attacker examines a target system to find sensitive data that has been embedded within it. This information can reveal confidential contents, such as account numbers or individual keys/credentials that can be used as an intermediate step in a larger attack.

CAPEC-545: Pull Data from System Resources

An adversary who is authorized or has the ability to search known system resources, does so with the intention of gathering useful information. System resources include files, memory, and other aspects of the target system. In this pattern of attack, the adversary does not necessarily know what they are going to find when they start pulling data. This is different than CAPEC-150 where the adversary knows what they are looking for due to the common location.