CWE-22
Allowed-with-ReviewImproper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
13354 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-MPVW-RMRV-GJVW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-06-04 00:30 – Updated: 2025-06-04 00:30A vulnerability was found in aaluoxiang oa_system up to 5b445a6227b51cee287bd0c7c33ed94b801a82a5. It has been rated as problematic. Affected by this issue is the function image of the file src/main/java/cn/gson/oasys/controller/user/UserpanelController.java. The manipulation leads to path traversal. The attack may be launched remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. Continious delivery with rolling releases is used by this product. Therefore, no version details of affected nor updated releases are available.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-5544"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-06-03T23:15:21Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability was found in aaluoxiang oa_system up to 5b445a6227b51cee287bd0c7c33ed94b801a82a5. It has been rated as problematic. Affected by this issue is the function image of the file src/main/java/cn/gson/oasys/controller/user/UserpanelController.java. The manipulation leads to path traversal. The attack may be launched remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. Continious delivery with rolling releases is used by this product. Therefore, no version details of affected nor updated releases are available.",
"id": "GHSA-mpvw-rmrv-gjvw",
"modified": "2025-06-04T00:30:26Z",
"published": "2025-06-04T00:30:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-5544"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/honorseclab/vulns/blob/main/aaluoxiang_oasystem/ArbitaryFileRead01.md"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.310994"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.310994"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.585884"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-MPWR-28XV-5HW9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-30 21:31 – Updated: 2025-01-30 21:31Sante PACS Server Web Portal DCM File Parsing Directory Traversal Arbitrary File Write Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to create arbitrary files on affected installations of Sante PACS Server. Authentication is required to exploit this vulnerability.
The specific flaw exists within the parsing of DCM files. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of a user-supplied path prior to using it in file operations. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to write files in the context of the current user. Was ZDI-CAN-25308.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-0572"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-01-30T21:15:14Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Sante PACS Server Web Portal DCM File Parsing Directory Traversal Arbitrary File Write Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to create arbitrary files on affected installations of Sante PACS Server. Authentication is required to exploit this vulnerability.\n\nThe specific flaw exists within the parsing of DCM files. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of a user-supplied path prior to using it in file operations. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to write files in the context of the current user. Was ZDI-CAN-25308.",
"id": "GHSA-mpwr-28xv-5hw9",
"modified": "2025-01-30T21:31:23Z",
"published": "2025-01-30T21:31:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-0572"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-25-054"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-MQ27-JWR8-PXHJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 02:34 – Updated: 2022-05-17 02:34A vulnerability in the web framework of the Cisco TelePresence IX5000 Series could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to access arbitrary files on an affected device. The vulnerability is due to insufficient input validation. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by using directory traversal techniques to read files within the Cisco TelePresence IX5000 Series filesystem. This vulnerability affects Cisco TelePresence IX5000 Series devices running software version 8.2.0. Cisco Bug IDs: CSCvc52325.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-6652"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-20",
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2017-05-18T19:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A vulnerability in the web framework of the Cisco TelePresence IX5000 Series could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to access arbitrary files on an affected device. The vulnerability is due to insufficient input validation. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by using directory traversal techniques to read files within the Cisco TelePresence IX5000 Series filesystem. This vulnerability affects Cisco TelePresence IX5000 Series devices running software version 8.2.0. Cisco Bug IDs: CSCvc52325.",
"id": "GHSA-mq27-jwr8-pxhj",
"modified": "2022-05-17T02:34:28Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T02:34:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-6652"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20170517-telepresence-ix5000"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/98519"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1038509"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-MQ35-X99R-54FC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-04-24 20:00 – Updated: 2024-04-24 20:00This affects all versions of package github.com/u-root/u-root/pkg/cpio up to and including 7.0.0. It is vulnerable to leading, non-leading relative path traversal attacks and symlink based (relative and absolute) path traversal attacks in cpio file extraction.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/u-root/u-root/pkg/cpio"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "7.0.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-7666"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-04-24T20:00:38Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "This affects all versions of package github.com/u-root/u-root/pkg/cpio up to and including 7.0.0. It is vulnerable to leading, non-leading relative path traversal attacks and symlink based (relative and absolute) path traversal attacks in cpio file extraction.",
"id": "GHSA-mq35-x99r-54fc",
"modified": "2024-04-24T20:00:38Z",
"published": "2024-04-24T20:00:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-7666"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/u-root/u-root/pull/1817"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-GOLANG-GITHUBCOMUROOTUROOTPKGCPIO-570440"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "github.com/u-root/u-root/pkg/cpio Arbitrary File Write via Archive Extraction (Zip Slip)"
}
GHSA-MQ3F-4X6V-59HG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-11-14 21:31 – Updated: 2023-11-14 21:31Path transversal in some Intel(R) NUC Uniwill Service Driver for Intel(R) NUC M15 Laptop Kits - LAPRC510 & LAPRC710 Uniwill Service Driver installation software before version 1.0.1.7 for Intel(R) NUC Software Studio may allow an authenticated user to potentially enable escalation of privilege via local access.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-32278"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-11-14T19:15:25Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Path transversal in some Intel(R) NUC Uniwill Service Driver for Intel(R) NUC M15 Laptop Kits - LAPRC510 \u0026 LAPRC710 Uniwill Service Driver installation software before version 1.0.1.7 for Intel(R) NUC Software Studio may allow an authenticated user to potentially enable escalation of privilege via local access.",
"id": "GHSA-mq3f-4x6v-59hg",
"modified": "2023-11-14T21:31:02Z",
"published": "2023-11-14T21:31:02Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-32278"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/advisory/intel-sa-00908.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-MQ3P-R846-C5MX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-11-12 18:30 – Updated: 2024-11-18 18:30Path traversal in Ivanti Endpoint Manager before 2024 November Security Update or 2022 SU6 November Security Update allows a remote authenticated attacker with admin privileges to achieve remote code execution.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-50324"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-11-12T16:15:24Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Path traversal in Ivanti Endpoint Manager before 2024 November Security Update or 2022 SU6 November Security Update\u00a0allows a remote authenticated attacker with admin privileges to achieve remote code execution.",
"id": "GHSA-mq3p-r846-c5mx",
"modified": "2024-11-18T18:30:48Z",
"published": "2024-11-12T18:30:56Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-50324"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://forums.ivanti.com/s/article/Security-Advisory-EPM-November-2024-for-EPM-2024-and-EPM-2022"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-MQ47-6WWV-V79W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-03-04 00:00 – Updated: 2022-03-18 23:23A directory traversal vulnerability was found in the ClairCore engine of Clair. An attacker can exploit this by supplying a crafted container image which, when scanned by Clair, allows for arbitrary file write on the filesystem, potentially allowing for remote code execution.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/quay/claircore"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.4.8"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/quay/claircore"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.1.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/quay/claircore"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.5.0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.5.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-3762"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2022-03-18T23:23:02Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2022-03-03T22:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A directory traversal vulnerability was found in the ClairCore engine of Clair. An attacker can exploit this by supplying a crafted container image which, when scanned by Clair, allows for arbitrary file write on the filesystem, potentially allowing for remote code execution.",
"id": "GHSA-mq47-6wwv-v79w",
"modified": "2022-03-18T23:23:02Z",
"published": "2022-03-04T00:00:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-3762"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/quay/clair/pull/1379"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/quay/clair/pull/1380"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/quay/claircore/pull/478"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/quay/claircore/commit/691f2023a1720a0579e688b69a2f4bfe1f4b7821"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/quay/claircore/commit/dff671c665141f126c072de8a744855d4916c9c7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/quay/claircore/commit/ed5f52aec1c82746725e9cc23e98316eab8be25a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2000795"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/quay/claircore"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/quay/claircore/commits/v0.4.8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/quay/claircore/commits/v0.5.5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/quay/claircore/commits/v1.1.0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2022-0346"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vulmon.com/exploitdetails?qidtp=maillist_oss_security\u0026qid=d19fce9ede06e13dfb5630ece7f14f83"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Path traversal in claircore"
}
GHSA-MQ4G-WGCM-5X8J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 03:40 – Updated: 2022-05-17 03:40Directory traversal vulnerability on Accellion Kiteworks appliances before kw2016.03.00 allows remote attackers to read files via a crafted URI.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2016-5664"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2016-08-26T19:59:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability on Accellion Kiteworks appliances before kw2016.03.00 allows remote attackers to read files via a crafted URI.",
"id": "GHSA-mq4g-wgcm-5x8j",
"modified": "2022-05-17T03:40:28Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T03:40:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-5664"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/305607"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/92662"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-MQ5J-PW29-JCV3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-15 18:25 – Updated: 2026-05-15 23:50Summary
Microsoft APM contains a Windows-specific archive extraction boundary failure in the legacy-bundle probe used by apm install <bundle> on supported Python 3.10 and 3.11 runtimes. When apm install is given a local .tar.gz that is not recognized as a plugin-format bundle, APM probes whether it is a legacy --format apm bundle. On Python versions earlier than 3.12, that probe extracts untrusted tar members with raw tar.extractall() without rejecting Windows absolute member names such as D:/....
This issue is still present on the latest main commit at review time (2b7a931d58a73cbfc0bcf086cea332d204075e27) and on the latest release (v0.12.4). In both cases, a crafted legacy-looking tarball caused an external file to be created or overwritten outside the temporary extraction root before apm install finished rejecting the bundle with the expected legacy-format usage error.
This report is scoped narrowly to Windows installations running Python 3.10 or 3.11.
Details
The broken trust boundary is the boundary between an untrusted local bundle artifact and the host filesystem state that APM is allowed to modify while probing that artifact. The attacker-controlled input is the tar member name inside the .tar.gz bundle. A crafted archive can include a member whose name is a Windows absolute path such as D:/apm/run-main-install/outside/legacy-probe-outside-main.txt.
The current install caller path still reaches the legacy probe for .tar.gz inputs that are not recognized as plugin-format bundles. In src/apm_cli/commands/install.py, the local-bundle branch first calls detect_local_bundle(). If the path exists, is a tarball, and is not recognized as a plugin-format bundle, the caller still invokes _looks_like_legacy_apm_bundle() to distinguish a legacy bundle from an arbitrary tarball and to choose the error message.
The root cause is in src/apm_cli/bundle/local_bundle.py. _looks_like_legacy_apm_bundle():
- opens the tarball,
- rejects only symlink and hardlink members,
- and on Python versions earlier than 3.12 calls raw
tar.extractall(tmp).
That helper does not reject Windows absolute member names and does not perform the Windows-aware containment checks already present elsewhere in the same module.
This is particularly clear because the adjacent detect_local_bundle() path in the same file already contains safer pre-extraction validation. It rejects:
PureWindowsPath(name).drivePureWindowsPath(name).is_absolute()- path traversal via
validate_path_segments(...)
That safer validation is not reused by _looks_like_legacy_apm_bundle().
On Python versions earlier than 3.12, _looks_like_legacy_apm_bundle() performs extraction before legacy-format rejection is raised, so archive member names become filesystem writes during bundle classification rather than during an accepted install step. The write occurs before command rejection because the legacy probe must extract the tarball in order to look for apm.lock.yaml at the bundle root and confirm that plugin.json is absent. As a result, the out-of-root write happens during classification, before the caller raises the legacy-format usage error.
The issue is not limited to creating new files. On both latest main and latest release, the same vulnerable path overwrote an already-existing writable target file with attacker-controlled contents before the command finished legacy-format rejection. It was further verified the same overwrite primitive against a pre-existing project workflow file at .github/workflows/ci.yml, replacing its YAML contents before rejection.
This is a security issue rather than intended package-manager behavior. The user is asking APM to inspect or install a local bundle. The expected behavior is that bundle contents are handled within the extraction sandbox used for that operation. Writing to an arbitrary host path outside the extraction root during pre-install probing is not part of expected local-bundle behavior, and it happens even when APM ultimately rejects the tarball.
This issue is also distinct from the prior public APM plugin path-escape issue. The prior public issue involved manifest-controlled path escape during plugin normalization in plugin_parser.py, where attacker-controlled manifest entries were resolved outside the plugin root during install. This issue is different in input, timing, and code path: it is an archive-member extraction bug in src/apm_cli/bundle/local_bundle.py during legacy-bundle probing, before bundle classification completes and before apm install rejects the bundle. No manifest processing is required to trigger it.
As additional same-family scope information, the same Windows absolute-path extraction weakness is also reproducible in apm unpack.In src/apm_cli/bundle/unpacker.py, the unpacker rejects / and .. but still misses Windows absolute tar member names before calling tar.extractall() on Python versions earlier than 3.12. Because apm unpack is deprecated, I am not presenting it as a second standalone vulnerability title; I am including it only as additional affected surface from the same validation family.
PoC
Validation environment used for the included proof:
- Windows 11 Pro
- Python 3.11.9 x64
- Latest
maincommit:2b7a931d58a73cbfc0bcf086cea332d204075e27 - Latest release commit:
6aceef72be490a9c716547f600a2659f3f2826b7(v0.12.4)
Minimal malicious archive contents:
bundle/apm.lock.yamlD:/apm/run-main-install/outside/legacy-probe-outside-main.txt
The first member makes the archive look like a legacy APM bundle. The second member proves the out-of-root write. The outside target path must be writable by the user running APM. The proof uses a user-controlled directory for that reason.
One straightforward way to build this input is to use Python's tarfile module directly and add:
bundle/apm.lock.yamlTarInfo("D:/apm/run-main-install/outside/legacy-probe-outside-main.txt")
with file content such as:
outside write via install main
Reproduction steps for latest main:
- Check out
microsoft/apmat2b7a931d58a73cbfc0bcf086cea332d204075e27. - Use a real Windows Python 3.11 runtime.
- Ensure the
apm_cliimport resolves to the checked-out tree. - Create the malicious legacy-looking tarball described above.
- Run:
python -m apm_cli.cli install D:\apm\run-main-install\input\legacy-bundle.tar.gz
Expected safe behavior:
- APM rejects the tarball without creating or overwriting any host file outside the temporary extraction root.
Observed result on latest main:
- the import path resolved to the checked-out
maintree, - the command ended with the expected legacy-format rejection,
- the process exit code was
2, - and the file below had already been created outside the temporary extraction root:
D:\apm\run-main-install\outside\legacy-probe-outside-main.txt
The file contained:
outside write via install main
I also verified overwrite, not just creation, by pre-creating a writable target file and then running the same install path. The existing file contents changed from ORIGINAL-MAIN to OVERWRITTEN-MAIN before rejection.
I further verified overwrite of a pre-existing project workflow file. Before the run, the target file contained:
name: safe
on: [push]
jobs:
build:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- run: echo safe
After the run, the same file contained attacker-controlled replacement YAML:
name: overwritten
on: [push]
jobs:
build:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- run: echo overwritten-by-archive
Observed command output on latest main:
[!] Install interrupted after 0.0s.
Usage: python -m apm_cli.cli install [OPTIONS] [PACKAGES]...
Try 'python -m apm_cli.cli install --help' for help.
Error: 'D:\apm\run-main-install\input\legacy-bundle.tar.gz' was packed with '--format apm' (legacy format). 'apm install <bundle>' requires the plugin format. Repack with 'apm pack --format plugin --archive', or use 'apm unpack' to deploy the legacy bundle.
Reproduction steps for latest release v0.12.4:
- Check out tag
v0.12.4/ commit6aceef72be490a9c716547f600a2659f3f2826b7. - Use the same Windows Python 3.11 runtime.
- Ensure the
apm_cliimport resolves to thev0.12.4tree. - Create the same malicious tarball shape, for example with:
D:/apm/run-release-install/outside/legacy-probe-outside-release.txt
- Run:
python -m apm_cli.cli install D:\apm\run-release-install\input\legacy-bundle.tar.gz
Observed result on latest release:
- the import path resolved to the checked-out
v0.12.4tree, - the command ended with the expected legacy-format rejection,
- the process exit code was
2, - and the file below had already been created outside the temporary extraction root:
D:\apm\run-release-install\outside\legacy-probe-outside-release.txt
The file contained:
outside write via install release
I also verified overwrite, not just creation, on the latest release by pre-creating a writable target file. The existing file contents changed from ORIGINAL-RELEASE to OVERWRITTEN-RELEASE before rejection. The same workflow-file overwrite pattern was also reproducible on the latest release.
Observed command output on latest release:
[!] Install interrupted after 0.0s.
Usage: python -m apm_cli.cli install [OPTIONS] [PACKAGES]...
Try 'python -m apm_cli.cli install --help' for help.
Error: 'D:\apm\run-release-install\input\legacy-bundle.tar.gz' was packed with '--format apm' (legacy format). 'apm install <bundle>' requires the plugin format. Repack with 'apm pack --format plugin --archive', or use 'apm unpack' to deploy the legacy bundle.
Additional same-family affected surface:
apm unpackon latestmainand latest release also created an outside file when given a tarball containing a Windows absolute member name.- In that path the command completed successfully with exit code
0, which further confirms that the Windows absolute-path validation gap is present outside the primary install probe as well.
Impact
This is an arbitrary local file overwrite outside the intended extraction root during a current APM install path. The impacted population is Windows users running APM on supported Python 3.10 or 3.11 runtimes. The attacker capability required is the ability to supply a crafted local bundle and induce the victim to run apm install on it.
The strongest demonstrated real-world consequence is attacker-controlled overwrite of an existing writable file at an attacker-selected Windows path outside the extraction root, using the privileges of the user running APM. An overwrite of a project-controlled GitHub Actions workflow file with attacker-controlled YAML before rejection was verified. Workflow execution from this report hasn't been claimed; the demonstrated consequence is high-integrity modification of a trusted automation file outside the intended extraction boundary.
The issue is currently reachable on:
- latest
mainat2b7a931d58a73cbfc0bcf086cea332d204075e27 - latest release
v0.12.4
Mitigation
- Reuse the existing pre-extraction validation already implemented in
detect_local_bundle()for_looks_like_legacy_apm_bundle(). - Reject Windows absolute member names before any extraction step.
- Apply equivalent Windows absolute-path validation to the unpacker in
src/apm_cli/bundle/unpacker.py. - Add regression tests for:
- Windows absolute member paths in the legacy-bundle probe path
- Windows absolute member paths in the unpack path
- confirmation that no host write occurs before the legacy-format rejection is raised
Attachment
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.12.4"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "apm-cli"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.13.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-46383"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-15T18:25:34Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-15T17:16:49Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nMicrosoft APM contains a Windows-specific archive extraction boundary failure in the legacy-bundle probe used by `apm install \u003cbundle\u003e` on supported Python 3.10 and 3.11 runtimes. When `apm install` is given a local `.tar.gz` that is not recognized as a plugin-format bundle, APM probes whether it is a legacy `--format apm` bundle. On Python versions earlier than 3.12, that probe extracts untrusted tar members with raw `tar.extractall()` without rejecting Windows absolute member names such as `D:/...`.\n\nThis issue is still present on the latest `main` commit at review time (`2b7a931d58a73cbfc0bcf086cea332d204075e27`) and on the latest release (`v0.12.4`). In both cases, a crafted legacy-looking tarball caused an external file to be created or overwritten outside the temporary extraction root before `apm install` finished rejecting the bundle with the expected legacy-format usage error.\n\nThis report is scoped narrowly to Windows installations running Python 3.10 or 3.11.\n\n### Details\n\nThe broken trust boundary is the boundary between an untrusted local bundle artifact and the host filesystem state that APM is allowed to modify while probing that artifact. The attacker-controlled input is the tar member name inside the `.tar.gz` bundle. A crafted archive can include a member whose name is a Windows absolute path such as `D:/apm/run-main-install/outside/legacy-probe-outside-main.txt`.\n\nThe current install caller path still reaches the legacy probe for `.tar.gz` inputs that are not recognized as plugin-format bundles. In `src/apm_cli/commands/install.py`, the local-bundle branch first calls `detect_local_bundle()`. If the path exists, is a tarball, and is not recognized as a plugin-format bundle, the caller still invokes `_looks_like_legacy_apm_bundle()` to distinguish a legacy bundle from an arbitrary tarball and to choose the error message.\n\nThe root cause is in `src/apm_cli/bundle/local_bundle.py`. `_looks_like_legacy_apm_bundle()`:\n\n- opens the tarball,\n- rejects only symlink and hardlink members,\n- and on Python versions earlier than 3.12 calls raw `tar.extractall(tmp)`.\n\nThat helper does not reject Windows absolute member names and does not perform the Windows-aware containment checks already present elsewhere in the same module.\n\nThis is particularly clear because the adjacent `detect_local_bundle()` path in the same file already contains safer pre-extraction validation. It rejects:\n\n- `PureWindowsPath(name).drive`\n- `PureWindowsPath(name).is_absolute()`\n- path traversal via `validate_path_segments(...)`\n\nThat safer validation is not reused by `_looks_like_legacy_apm_bundle()`.\n\nOn Python versions earlier than 3.12, `_looks_like_legacy_apm_bundle()` performs extraction before legacy-format rejection is raised, so archive member names become filesystem writes during bundle classification rather than during an accepted install step. The write occurs before command rejection because the legacy probe must extract the tarball in order to look for `apm.lock.yaml` at the bundle root and confirm that `plugin.json` is absent. As a result, the out-of-root write happens during classification, before the caller raises the legacy-format usage error.\n\nThe issue is not limited to creating new files. On both latest `main` and latest release, the same vulnerable path overwrote an already-existing writable target file with attacker-controlled contents before the command finished legacy-format rejection. It was further verified the same overwrite primitive against a pre-existing project workflow file at `.github/workflows/ci.yml`, replacing its YAML contents before rejection.\n\nThis is a security issue rather than intended package-manager behavior. The user is asking APM to inspect or install a local bundle. The expected behavior is that bundle contents are handled within the extraction sandbox used for that operation. Writing to an arbitrary host path outside the extraction root during pre-install probing is not part of expected local-bundle behavior, and it happens even when APM ultimately rejects the tarball.\n\nThis issue is also distinct from the prior public APM plugin path-escape issue. The prior public issue involved manifest-controlled path escape during plugin normalization in `plugin_parser.py`, where attacker-controlled manifest entries were resolved outside the plugin root during install. This issue is different in input, timing, and code path: it is an archive-member extraction bug in `src/apm_cli/bundle/local_bundle.py` during legacy-bundle probing, before bundle classification completes and before `apm install` rejects the bundle. No manifest processing is required to trigger it.\n\nAs additional same-family scope information, the same Windows absolute-path extraction weakness is also reproducible in apm unpack.In `src/apm_cli/bundle/unpacker.py`, the unpacker rejects `/` and `..` but still misses Windows absolute tar member names before calling `tar.extractall()` on Python versions earlier than 3.12. Because `apm unpack` is deprecated, I am not presenting it as a second standalone vulnerability title; I am including it only as additional affected surface from the same validation family.\n\n### PoC\n\nValidation environment used for the included proof:\n\n- Windows 11 Pro\n- Python 3.11.9 x64\n- Latest `main` commit: `2b7a931d58a73cbfc0bcf086cea332d204075e27`\n- Latest release commit: `6aceef72be490a9c716547f600a2659f3f2826b7` (`v0.12.4`)\n\nMinimal malicious archive contents:\n\n- `bundle/apm.lock.yaml`\n- `D:/apm/run-main-install/outside/legacy-probe-outside-main.txt`\n\nThe first member makes the archive look like a legacy APM bundle. The second member proves the out-of-root write. The outside target path must be writable by the user running APM. The proof uses a user-controlled directory for that reason.\n\nOne straightforward way to build this input is to use Python\u0027s `tarfile` module directly and add:\n\n- `bundle/apm.lock.yaml`\n- `TarInfo(\"D:/apm/run-main-install/outside/legacy-probe-outside-main.txt\")`\n\nwith file content such as:\n\n```text\noutside write via install main\n```\n\nReproduction steps for latest `main`:\n\n1. Check out `microsoft/apm` at `2b7a931d58a73cbfc0bcf086cea332d204075e27`.\n2. Use a real Windows Python 3.11 runtime.\n3. Ensure the `apm_cli` import resolves to the checked-out tree.\n4. Create the malicious legacy-looking tarball described above.\n5. Run:\n\n```powershell\npython -m apm_cli.cli install D:\\apm\\run-main-install\\input\\legacy-bundle.tar.gz\n```\n\nExpected safe behavior:\n\n- APM rejects the tarball without creating or overwriting any host file outside the temporary extraction root.\n\nObserved result on latest `main`:\n\n- the import path resolved to the checked-out `main` tree,\n- the command ended with the expected legacy-format rejection,\n- the process exit code was `2`,\n- and the file below had already been created outside the temporary extraction root:\n\n```text\nD:\\apm\\run-main-install\\outside\\legacy-probe-outside-main.txt\n```\n\nThe file contained:\n\n```text\noutside write via install main\n```\n\nI also verified overwrite, not just creation, by pre-creating a writable target file and then running the same install path. The existing file contents changed from `ORIGINAL-MAIN` to `OVERWRITTEN-MAIN` before rejection.\n\nI further verified overwrite of a pre-existing project workflow file. Before the run, the target file contained:\n\n```yaml\nname: safe\non: [push]\njobs:\n build:\n runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n steps:\n - run: echo safe\n```\n\nAfter the run, the same file contained attacker-controlled replacement YAML:\n\n```yaml\nname: overwritten\non: [push]\njobs:\n build:\n runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n steps:\n - run: echo overwritten-by-archive\n```\n\nObserved command output on latest `main`:\n\n```text\n[!] Install interrupted after 0.0s.\nUsage: python -m apm_cli.cli install [OPTIONS] [PACKAGES]...\nTry \u0027python -m apm_cli.cli install --help\u0027 for help.\n\nError: \u0027D:\\apm\\run-main-install\\input\\legacy-bundle.tar.gz\u0027 was packed with \u0027--format apm\u0027 (legacy format). \u0027apm install \u003cbundle\u003e\u0027 requires the plugin format. Repack with \u0027apm pack --format plugin --archive\u0027, or use \u0027apm unpack\u0027 to deploy the legacy bundle.\n```\n\nReproduction steps for latest release `v0.12.4`:\n\n1. Check out tag `v0.12.4` / commit `6aceef72be490a9c716547f600a2659f3f2826b7`.\n2. Use the same Windows Python 3.11 runtime.\n3. Ensure the `apm_cli` import resolves to the `v0.12.4` tree.\n4. Create the same malicious tarball shape, for example with:\n\n```text\nD:/apm/run-release-install/outside/legacy-probe-outside-release.txt\n```\n\n5. Run:\n\n```powershell\npython -m apm_cli.cli install D:\\apm\\run-release-install\\input\\legacy-bundle.tar.gz\n```\n\nObserved result on latest release:\n\n- the import path resolved to the checked-out `v0.12.4` tree,\n- the command ended with the expected legacy-format rejection,\n- the process exit code was `2`,\n- and the file below had already been created outside the temporary extraction root:\n\n```text\nD:\\apm\\run-release-install\\outside\\legacy-probe-outside-release.txt\n```\n\nThe file contained:\n\n```text\noutside write via install release\n```\n\nI also verified overwrite, not just creation, on the latest release by pre-creating a writable target file. The existing file contents changed from `ORIGINAL-RELEASE` to `OVERWRITTEN-RELEASE` before rejection. The same workflow-file overwrite pattern was also reproducible on the latest release.\n\nObserved command output on latest release:\n\n```text\n[!] Install interrupted after 0.0s.\nUsage: python -m apm_cli.cli install [OPTIONS] [PACKAGES]...\nTry \u0027python -m apm_cli.cli install --help\u0027 for help.\n\nError: \u0027D:\\apm\\run-release-install\\input\\legacy-bundle.tar.gz\u0027 was packed with \u0027--format apm\u0027 (legacy format). \u0027apm install \u003cbundle\u003e\u0027 requires the plugin format. Repack with \u0027apm pack --format plugin --archive\u0027, or use \u0027apm unpack\u0027 to deploy the legacy bundle.\n```\n\nAdditional same-family affected surface:\n\n- `apm unpack` on latest `main` and latest release also created an outside file when given a tarball containing a Windows absolute member name.\n- In that path the command completed successfully with exit code `0`, which further confirms that the Windows absolute-path validation gap is present outside the primary install probe as well.\n\n### Impact\n\nThis is an arbitrary local file overwrite outside the intended extraction root during a current APM install path. The impacted population is Windows users running APM on supported Python 3.10 or 3.11 runtimes. The attacker capability required is the ability to supply a crafted local bundle and induce the victim to run `apm install` on it.\n\nThe strongest demonstrated real-world consequence is attacker-controlled overwrite of an existing writable file at an attacker-selected Windows path outside the extraction root, using the privileges of the user running APM. An overwrite of a project-controlled GitHub Actions workflow file with attacker-controlled YAML before rejection was verified. Workflow execution from this report hasn\u0027t been claimed; the demonstrated consequence is high-integrity modification of a trusted automation file outside the intended extraction boundary.\n\nThe issue is currently reachable on:\n\n- latest `main` at `2b7a931d58a73cbfc0bcf086cea332d204075e27`\n- latest release `v0.12.4`\n\n### Mitigation\n\n1. Reuse the existing pre-extraction validation already implemented in `detect_local_bundle()` for `_looks_like_legacy_apm_bundle()`.\n2. Reject Windows absolute member names before any extraction step.\n3. Apply equivalent Windows absolute-path validation to the unpacker in `src/apm_cli/bundle/unpacker.py`.\n4. Add regression tests for:\n - Windows absolute member paths in the legacy-bundle probe path\n - Windows absolute member paths in the unpack path\n - confirmation that no host write occurs before the legacy-format rejection is raised\n\n### Attachment\n[apm-legacy-probe-windows-absolute-path-write-20260511.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/27578792/apm-legacy-probe-windows-absolute-path-write-20260511.zip)",
"id": "GHSA-mq5j-pw29-jcv3",
"modified": "2026-05-15T23:50:07Z",
"published": "2026-05-15T18:25:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/microsoft/apm/security/advisories/GHSA-mq5j-pw29-jcv3"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46383"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/microsoft/apm/commit/77d1dda8303c8d7ccb6148788a6274fdece98499"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/microsoft/apm"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/microsoft/apm/releases/tag/v0.13.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Microsoft APM: Windows absolute-path tar member overwrite during legacy-bundle probing in `apm install`"
}
GHSA-MQ5W-2WF5-2JF4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-01 06:52 – Updated: 2022-05-01 06:52Directory traversal vulnerability in PHPList 2.10.2 and earlier allows remote attackers to include arbitrary local files via the (1) GLOBALS[database_module] or (2) GLOBALS[language_module] parameters, which overwrite the underlying $GLOBALS variable.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2006-1746"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2006-04-12T22:02:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in PHPList 2.10.2 and earlier allows remote attackers to include arbitrary local files via the (1) GLOBALS[database_module] or (2) GLOBALS[language_module] parameters, which overwrite the underlying $GLOBALS variable.",
"id": "GHSA-mq5w-2wf5-2jf4",
"modified": "2022-05-01T06:52:22Z",
"published": "2022-05-01T06:52:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2006-1746"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/25701"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://downloads.securityfocus.com/vulnerabilities/exploits/PHPList-lfi.php"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://securitytracker.com/id?1015889"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://tincan.co.uk/?lid=851"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/430475/30/30/threaded"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/430597"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/448411"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/17429"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.vupen.com/english/advisories/2006/1296"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-20.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
- Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
- realpath() in C
- getCanonicalPath() in Java
- GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
- realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
- realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-21.1
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
- When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
- This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-126: Path Traversal
An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.