CWE-22
Allowed-with-ReviewImproper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
13215 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-V23M-CCFG-PQ9H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-26 23:54 – Updated: 2026-06-26 23:54Summary
The staged-tarball filename traversal reported as GHSA-v23m-ccfg-pq9h / CAND-PNPM-038 is fixed on main by pnpm/pnpm#12303, merged as 65443f4bdf1f0db9c8c7dc58fee25252607e9234.
Before the fix, pnpm stage download derived a local filename from registry-controlled package name and version fields. A crafted manifest could escape the selected download directory and overwrite another reachable file. The merged fix validates both fields, derives one safe filename, and verifies the final destination before writing.
Security boundary
- Package names and semantic versions are validated before they can influence a local filename.
- POSIX and Windows path separators are rejected by basename checks.
- Stage download and tarball summary paths use the same filename helper.
- The resolved output path must remain an immediate child of the selected download directory.
- The stage identifier is already constrained to a UUID.
Exploit replay
Before 65443f4bdf, a traversal-bearing manifest version could make the command write outside the selected directory. After the fix, malicious package names fail with ERR_PNPM_INVALID_PACKAGE_NAME, malicious versions fail with ERR_PNPM_INVALID_PACKAGE_VERSION, no outside file is created, and the download directory remains empty.
Files changed
releasing/commands/src/tarball/safeTarballFilename.tsvalidates manifest identity and rejects cross-platform path separators.releasing/commands/src/stage/download.tsverifies the resolved destination before writing.releasing/commands/src/tarball/summarizeTarball.tsuses the same filename contract.releasing/commands/test/stage.test.tscovers traversal through both package name and version..changeset/stale-stage-tarballs.mdincludes patch bumps for@pnpm/releasing.commandsandpnpm.
Patch
- Merged PR: https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/pull/12303
- Fix commit:
65443f4bdf1f0db9c8c7dc58fee25252607e9234 - The private candidate branch was not submitted because it conflicts with and is superseded by the merged fix. The upstream patch is slightly stronger because it covers malicious package names as well as versions.
Commands run
$ git diff --check 65443f4bdf^ 65443f4bdf
PASS
$ gh pr view 12303 --repo pnpm/pnpm --json state,mergeCommit,statusCheckRollup
MERGED as 65443f4bdf
Validation
- Upstream regression coverage rejects traversal through both manifest name and version and verifies that no outside file is created.
- Compile and lint, dependency audit, Linux Node.js 22/24/26, CodeQL, and zizmor checks passed on the merged public PR.
- The Windows Node.js 22 full-suite job timed out in the unrelated
pnpm/test/dlx.tscache test after 512 other tests passed. The PR was merged by the maintainer; the failure did not involve the staging code. - The earlier private candidate's focused exploit regression, positive control, package compile, ESLint, and
git diff --checkalso passed.
Compatibility
Staging and release commands are TypeScript-only. Pacquet does not expose this command family, so no Rust-side port is required.
Remaining risk
The final fs.writeFile follows a pre-existing symlink at the exact in-directory output name. That requires separate local filesystem access and is not controllable through the registry manifest traversal described here.
Written by an agent (Codex, GPT-5).
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "pnpm"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "11.3.0"
},
{
"fixed": "11.5.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-55700"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-26T23:54:52Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-25T18:16:41Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThe staged-tarball filename traversal reported as GHSA-v23m-ccfg-pq9h / CAND-PNPM-038 is fixed on `main` by [pnpm/pnpm#12303](https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/pull/12303), merged as `65443f4bdf1f0db9c8c7dc58fee25252607e9234`.\n\nBefore the fix, `pnpm stage download` derived a local filename from registry-controlled package name and version fields. A crafted manifest could escape the selected download directory and overwrite another reachable file. The merged fix validates both fields, derives one safe filename, and verifies the final destination before writing.\n\n## Security boundary\n\n- Package names and semantic versions are validated before they can influence a local filename.\n- POSIX and Windows path separators are rejected by basename checks.\n- Stage download and tarball summary paths use the same filename helper.\n- The resolved output path must remain an immediate child of the selected download directory.\n- The stage identifier is already constrained to a UUID.\n\n## Exploit replay\n\nBefore `65443f4bdf`, a traversal-bearing manifest version could make the command write outside the selected directory. After the fix, malicious package names fail with `ERR_PNPM_INVALID_PACKAGE_NAME`, malicious versions fail with `ERR_PNPM_INVALID_PACKAGE_VERSION`, no outside file is created, and the download directory remains empty.\n\n## Files changed\n\n- `releasing/commands/src/tarball/safeTarballFilename.ts` validates manifest identity and rejects cross-platform path separators.\n- `releasing/commands/src/stage/download.ts` verifies the resolved destination before writing.\n- `releasing/commands/src/tarball/summarizeTarball.ts` uses the same filename contract.\n- `releasing/commands/test/stage.test.ts` covers traversal through both package name and version.\n- `.changeset/stale-stage-tarballs.md` includes patch bumps for `@pnpm/releasing.commands` and `pnpm`.\n\n## Patch\n\n- Merged PR: https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/pull/12303\n- Fix commit: `65443f4bdf1f0db9c8c7dc58fee25252607e9234`\n- The private candidate branch was not submitted because it conflicts with and is superseded by the merged fix. The upstream patch is slightly stronger because it covers malicious package names as well as versions.\n\n## Commands run\n\n```text\n$ git diff --check 65443f4bdf^ 65443f4bdf\nPASS\n$ gh pr view 12303 --repo pnpm/pnpm --json state,mergeCommit,statusCheckRollup\nMERGED as 65443f4bdf\n```\n\n## Validation\n\n- Upstream regression coverage rejects traversal through both manifest name and version and verifies that no outside file is created.\n- Compile and lint, dependency audit, Linux Node.js 22/24/26, CodeQL, and zizmor checks passed on the merged public PR.\n- The Windows Node.js 22 full-suite job timed out in the unrelated `pnpm/test/dlx.ts` cache test after 512 other tests passed. The PR was merged by the maintainer; the failure did not involve the staging code.\n- The earlier private candidate\u0027s focused exploit regression, positive control, package compile, ESLint, and `git diff --check` also passed.\n\n## Compatibility\n\nStaging and release commands are TypeScript-only. Pacquet does not expose this command family, so no Rust-side port is required.\n\n## Remaining risk\n\nThe final `fs.writeFile` follows a pre-existing symlink at the exact in-directory output name. That requires separate local filesystem access and is not controllable through the registry manifest traversal described here.\n\n---\nWritten by an agent (Codex, GPT-5).",
"id": "GHSA-v23m-ccfg-pq9h",
"modified": "2026-06-26T23:54:52Z",
"published": "2026-06-26T23:54:52Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/security/advisories/GHSA-v23m-ccfg-pq9h"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55700"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/pull/12303"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "pnpm: `stage download`\u00a0writes outside its destination directory via manifest name/version traversal"
}
GHSA-V23V-Q365-PJWR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-07-12 00:00 – Updated: 2022-07-16 00:00The idayrus/evoting repository before 2022-05-08 on GitHub allows absolute path traversal because the Flask send_file function is used unsafely.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-31508"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-07-11T01:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "The idayrus/evoting repository before 2022-05-08 on GitHub allows absolute path traversal because the Flask send_file function is used unsafely.",
"id": "GHSA-v23v-q365-pjwr",
"modified": "2022-07-16T00:00:32Z",
"published": "2022-07-12T00:00:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-31508"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/github/securitylab/issues/669#issuecomment-1117265726"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/idayrus/evoting/commit/241d92a4d68f524365a6322b5bbcfaa7d9abc8a3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-V24J-R79F-W838
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-01 23:54 – Updated: 2022-05-01 23:54Directory traversal vulnerability in index.php in FireAnt 1.3 allows remote attackers to include and execute arbitrary local files via a .. (dot dot) in the page parameter.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2008-2896"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2008-06-27T18:41:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in index.php in FireAnt 1.3 allows remote attackers to include and execute arbitrary local files via a .. (dot dot) in the page parameter.",
"id": "GHSA-v24j-r79f-w838",
"modified": "2022-05-01T23:54:35Z",
"published": "2022-05-01T23:54:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-2896"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/43229"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/5871"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/29843"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-V253-RJ99-JWPQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-26 21:29 – Updated: 2026-01-26 21:29Summary
When pnpm processes a package's directories.bin field, it uses path.join() without validating the result stays within the package root. A malicious npm package can specify "directories": {"bin": "../../../../tmp"} to escape the package directory, causing pnpm to chmod 755 files at arbitrary locations.
Note: Only affects Unix/Linux/macOS. Windows is not affected (fixBin gated by EXECUTABLE_SHEBANG_SUPPORTED).
Details
Vulnerable code in pkg-manager/package-bins/src/index.ts:15-21:
if (manifest.directories?.bin) {
const binDir = path.join(pkgPath, manifest.directories.bin) // NO VALIDATION
const files = await findFiles(binDir)
// ... files outside package returned, then chmod 755'd
}
The bin field IS protected with isSubdir() at line 53, but directories.bin lacks this check.
PoC
# Create malicious package
mkdir /tmp/malicious-pkg
echo '{"name":"malicious","version":"1.0.0","directories":{"bin":"../../../../tmp/target"}}' > /tmp/malicious-pkg/package.json
# Create sensitive file
mkdir -p /tmp/target
echo "secret" > /tmp/target/secret.sh
chmod 600 /tmp/target/secret.sh # Private
# Install
pnpm add file:/tmp/malicious-pkg
# Check permissions
ls -la /tmp/target/secret.sh # Now 755 (world-readable)
Impact
- Supply-chain attack via npm packages
- File permissions changed from 600 to 755 (world-readable)
- Affects non-dotfiles in predictable paths (dotfiles excluded by tinyglobby default)
Suggested Fix
Add isSubdir validation for directories.bin paths in pkg-manager/package-bins/src/index.ts, matching the existing validation in commandsFromBin():
if (manifest.directories?.bin) {
const binDir = path.join(pkgPath, manifest.directories.bin)
if (!isSubdir(pkgPath, binDir)) {
return [] // Reject paths outside package
}
// ...
}
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "pnpm"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "10.28.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-24131"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-732"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-01-26T21:29:58Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nWhen pnpm processes a package\u0027s `directories.bin` field, it uses `path.join()` without validating the result stays within the package root. A malicious npm package can specify `\"directories\": {\"bin\": \"../../../../tmp\"}` to escape the package directory, causing pnpm to chmod 755 files at arbitrary locations.\n\n**Note:** Only affects Unix/Linux/macOS. Windows is not affected (`fixBin` gated by `EXECUTABLE_SHEBANG_SUPPORTED`).\n\n### Details\nVulnerable code in `pkg-manager/package-bins/src/index.ts:15-21`:\n\n```typescript\nif (manifest.directories?.bin) {\n const binDir = path.join(pkgPath, manifest.directories.bin) // NO VALIDATION\n const files = await findFiles(binDir)\n // ... files outside package returned, then chmod 755\u0027d\n}\n```\n\nThe `bin` field IS protected with `isSubdir()` at line 53, but `directories.bin` lacks this check.\n\n### PoC\n```bash\n# Create malicious package\nmkdir /tmp/malicious-pkg\necho \u0027{\"name\":\"malicious\",\"version\":\"1.0.0\",\"directories\":{\"bin\":\"../../../../tmp/target\"}}\u0027 \u003e /tmp/malicious-pkg/package.json\n\n# Create sensitive file\nmkdir -p /tmp/target\necho \"secret\" \u003e /tmp/target/secret.sh\nchmod 600 /tmp/target/secret.sh # Private\n\n# Install\npnpm add file:/tmp/malicious-pkg\n\n# Check permissions\nls -la /tmp/target/secret.sh # Now 755 (world-readable)\n```\n\n### Impact\n- Supply-chain attack via npm packages\n- File permissions changed from 600 to 755 (world-readable)\n- Affects non-dotfiles in predictable paths (dotfiles excluded by tinyglobby default)\n\n### Suggested Fix\nAdd `isSubdir` validation for `directories.bin` paths in `pkg-manager/package-bins/src/index.ts`, matching the existing validation in `commandsFromBin()`:\n\n```typescript\nif (manifest.directories?.bin) {\n const binDir = path.join(pkgPath, manifest.directories.bin)\n if (!isSubdir(pkgPath, binDir)) {\n return [] // Reject paths outside package\n }\n // ...\n}\n```",
"id": "GHSA-v253-rj99-jwpq",
"modified": "2026-01-26T21:29:58Z",
"published": "2026-01-26T21:29:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/security/advisories/GHSA-v253-rj99-jwpq"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/commit/17432ad5bbed5c2e77255ca6d56a1449bbcfd943"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/releases/tag/v10.28.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "pnpm has Path Traversal via arbitrary file permission modification "
}
GHSA-V255-VHCG-3FCJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-16 15:30 – Updated: 2025-12-22 21:30WaveView client allows users to execute restricted set of predefined commands and scripts on the connected WaveStore Server. A malicious attacker with high-privileges is able to read or delete any file on the server using path traversal in the ilog script. This script is being run with root privileges.
This issue was fixed in version 6.44.44
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-65076"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-16T13:15:58Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "WaveView client allows users to execute restricted set of predefined commands and scripts on the connected WaveStore Server. A malicious attacker with high-privileges is able to read or delete any file on the server using path traversal in the\u00a0ilog script. This script is being run with root privileges.\n\nThis issue was fixed in version 6.44.44",
"id": "GHSA-v255-vhcg-3fcj",
"modified": "2025-12-22T21:30:32Z",
"published": "2025-12-16T15:30:42Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-65076"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert.pl/en/posts/2025/12/CVE-2025-65074"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wavestore.com/products/video-management-software"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-V268-P4CF-JCXH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-01 18:33 – Updated: 2022-05-01 18:33Directory traversal vulnerability in wxis.exe in WWWISIS 7.1 allows local users to read arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the IsisScript parameter to iah.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2007-5484"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2007-10-16T23:17:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in wxis.exe in WWWISIS 7.1 allows local users to read arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the IsisScript parameter to iah.",
"id": "GHSA-v268-p4cf-jcxh",
"modified": "2022-05-01T18:33:39Z",
"published": "2022-05-01T18:33:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2007-5484"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/37215"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/4529"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://osvdb.org/40170"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/27198"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/482356/100/0/threaded"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/26079"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-V269-XM2P-CP2H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-06-06 18:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 04:36CloudPanel v2.2.2 allows attackers to execute a path traversal.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-33747"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-06-06T18:15:11Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "CloudPanel v2.2.2 allows attackers to execute a path traversal.",
"id": "GHSA-v269-xm2p-cp2h",
"modified": "2024-04-04T04:36:23Z",
"published": "2023-06-06T18:30:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-33747"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/264.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/269.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/35.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/EagleTube/CloudPanel"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cloudpanel.io/docs/v2/changelog"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/172768/CloudPanel-2.2.2-Privilege-Escalation-Path-Traversal.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-V273-448J-V4QJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-08 15:04 – Updated: 2026-04-09 14:29liquidjs 10.25.0 documents root as constraining filenames passed to renderFile() and parseFile(), but top-level file loads do not enforce that boundary.
The published npm package liquidjs@10.25.0 on Linux 6.17.0 with Node v22.22.1. A Liquid instance configured with an empty temporary directory as root still returned the contents of /etc/hosts when renderFile('/etc/hosts') was called. I have not exhaustively checked older releases yet; 10.25.0 is the latest tested version.
Root cause:
- src/parser/parser.ts:83-85 calls loader.lookup(file, LookupType.Root, ...) and then reads the returned file.
- src/fs/loader.ts:38 passes type !== LookupType.Root into candidates().
- For LookupType.Root, enforceRoot is false, so src/fs/loader.ts:47-66 accepts resolved absolute paths and fallback results without any contains() check.
This appears adjacent to the March 10, 2026 fix for CVE-2026-30952, which hardened include / render / layout but not the top-level file-loading APIs.
Proof of concept:
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
const path = require('path');
const { Liquid } = require('liquidjs');
const safeRoot = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'liquidjs-safe-root-'));
const engine = new Liquid({ root: [safeRoot], extname: '.liquid' });
engine.renderFile('/etc/hosts').then(console.log);
Expected result: a path outside root should be rejected.
Actual result: /etc/hosts is rendered successfully.
Impact: any application that treats root as a sandbox boundary and forwards attacker-controlled template names into renderFile() or parseFile() can disclose arbitrary local files readable by the server process.
Suggested fix: apply the same containment checks used for partial/layout lookups to LookupType.Root, and reject absolute or fallback paths unless they remain within an allowed root. A regression test should verify that renderFile('/etc/hosts') fails when root points to an unrelated directory.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 10.25.4"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "liquidjs"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "10.25.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-39859"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-08T15:04:44Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-08T20:16:26Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "`liquidjs` 10.25.0 documents `root` as constraining filenames passed to `renderFile()` and `parseFile()`, but top-level file loads do not enforce that boundary.\n\nThe published npm package `liquidjs@10.25.0` on Linux 6.17.0 with Node v22.22.1. A `Liquid` instance configured with an empty temporary directory as `root` still returned the contents of `/etc/hosts` when `renderFile(\u0027/etc/hosts\u0027)` was called. I have not exhaustively checked older releases yet; 10.25.0 is the latest tested version.\n\nRoot cause:\n- `src/parser/parser.ts:83-85` calls `loader.lookup(file, LookupType.Root, ...)` and then reads the returned file.\n- `src/fs/loader.ts:38` passes `type !== LookupType.Root` into `candidates()`.\n- For `LookupType.Root`, `enforceRoot` is false, so `src/fs/loader.ts:47-66` accepts resolved absolute paths and fallback results without any `contains()` check.\n\nThis appears adjacent to the March 10, 2026 fix for CVE-2026-30952, which hardened `include` / `render` / `layout` but not the top-level file-loading APIs.\n\nProof of concept:\n```javascript\nconst fs = require(\u0027fs\u0027);\nconst os = require(\u0027os\u0027);\nconst path = require(\u0027path\u0027);\nconst { Liquid } = require(\u0027liquidjs\u0027);\n\nconst safeRoot = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), \u0027liquidjs-safe-root-\u0027));\nconst engine = new Liquid({ root: [safeRoot], extname: \u0027.liquid\u0027 });\n\nengine.renderFile(\u0027/etc/hosts\u0027).then(console.log);\n```\n\nExpected result: a path outside `root` should be rejected.\nActual result: `/etc/hosts` is rendered successfully.\n\nImpact: any application that treats `root` as a sandbox boundary and forwards attacker-controlled template names into `renderFile()` or `parseFile()` can disclose arbitrary local files readable by the server process.\n\nSuggested fix: apply the same containment checks used for partial/layout lookups to `LookupType.Root`, and reject absolute or fallback paths unless they remain within an allowed root. A regression test should verify that `renderFile(\u0027/etc/hosts\u0027)` fails when `root` points to an unrelated directory.",
"id": "GHSA-v273-448j-v4qj",
"modified": "2026-04-09T14:29:19Z",
"published": "2026-04-08T15:04:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/harttle/liquidjs/security/advisories/GHSA-v273-448j-v4qj"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39859"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/harttle/liquidjs/pull/870"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/harttle/liquidjs/commit/f41c1fc02fe901598f3328118b42b13bc6bc9b04"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/harttle/liquidjs"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/harttle/liquidjs/releases/tag/v10.25.5"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "LiquidJS: `renderFile()` / `parseFile()` bypass configured `root` and allow arbitrary file read"
}
GHSA-V28W-VH2W-263G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-10-19 06:30 – Updated: 2023-12-22 21:30The AI ChatBot for WordPress is vulnerable to Directory Traversal in versions up to, and including, 4.8.9 via the qcld_openai_upload_pagetraining_file function. This allows subscriber-level attackers to append "<?php" to any existing file on the server resulting in potential DoS when appended to critical files such as wp-config.php.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-5241"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-10-19T06:15:11Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The AI ChatBot for WordPress is vulnerable to Directory Traversal in versions up to, and including, 4.8.9 via the qcld_openai_upload_pagetraining_file function. This allows subscriber-level attackers to append \"\u003c?php\" to any existing file on the server resulting in potential DoS when appended to critical files such as wp-config.php.",
"id": "GHSA-v28w-vh2w-263g",
"modified": "2023-12-22T21:30:21Z",
"published": "2023-10-19T06:30:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-5241"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/chatbot/trunk/includes/openai/qcld-bot-openai.php#L376"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail=\u0026reponame=\u0026new=2977505%40chatbot%2Ftrunk\u0026old=2967435%40chatbot%2Ftrunk\u0026sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail="
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/25199281-5286-4d75-8d27-26ce215e0993?source=cve"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/175371/WordPress-AI-ChatBot-4.8.9-SQL-Injection-Traversal-File-Deletion.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-V2G5-92J4-QQ7Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-12-14 21:30 – Updated: 2023-01-26 21:30vRealize Network Insight (vRNI) directory traversal vulnerability in vRNI REST API. A malicious actor with network access to the vRNI REST API can read arbitrary files from the server.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-31703"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-12-14T19:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "vRealize Network Insight (vRNI) directory traversal vulnerability in vRNI REST API. A malicious actor with network access to the vRNI REST API can read arbitrary files from the server.",
"id": "GHSA-v2g5-92j4-qq7q",
"modified": "2023-01-26T21:30:25Z",
"published": "2022-12-14T21:30:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-31703"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vmware.com/security/advisories/VMSA-2022-0031.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vmware.com/security/advisories/VMSA-2023-0001.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-20.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
- Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
- realpath() in C
- getCanonicalPath() in Java
- GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
- realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
- realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-21.1
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
- When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
- This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-126: Path Traversal
An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.