CWE-22
Allowed-with-ReviewImproper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
14066 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-4RC7-R4RW-QRQP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-01 23:47 – Updated: 2022-05-01 23:47Multiple directory traversal vulnerabilities in Project-Based Calendaring System (PBCS) 0.7.1-1 allow remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the filename parameter to (1) src/yopy_sync.php and (2) system-logger/print_logs.php.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2008-2215"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2008-05-14T18:20:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Multiple directory traversal vulnerabilities in Project-Based Calendaring System (PBCS) 0.7.1-1 allow remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the filename parameter to (1) src/yopy_sync.php and (2) system-logger/print_logs.php.",
"id": "GHSA-4rc7-r4rw-qrqp",
"modified": "2022-05-01T23:47:53Z",
"published": "2022-05-01T23:47:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-2215"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/42106"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/5523"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/30015"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/28991"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-4RGH-W8FP-573J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 04:07 – Updated: 2025-04-12 12:51Directory traversal vulnerability in zhtml.cgi in NEOJAPAN desknet NEO 2.0R1.0 through 2.5R1.4 allows remote authenticated users to read arbitrary files via a crafted parameter.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2015-2990"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2015-09-05T02:59:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in zhtml.cgi in NEOJAPAN desknet NEO 2.0R1.0 through 2.5R1.4 allows remote authenticated users to read arbitrary files via a crafted parameter.",
"id": "GHSA-4rgh-w8fp-573j",
"modified": "2025-04-12T12:51:39Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T04:07:43Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-2990"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://jvn.jp/en/jp/JVN09283606/index.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://jvndb.jvn.jp/jvndb/JVNDB-2015-000122"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.desknets.com/neo/support/mainte/2590"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-4RH5-MVP3-PQM7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-07-09 09:30 – Updated: 2026-04-08 18:33The Panda Video plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Local File Inclusion in all versions up to, and including, 1.4.0 via the 'selected_button' parameter. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Contributor-level access and above, to include and execute arbitrary files on the server, allowing the execution of any PHP code in those files. This can be used to bypass access controls, obtain sensitive data, or achieve code execution in cases where images and other “safe” file types can be uploaded and included.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-5456"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-07-09T09:15:06Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The Panda Video plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Local File Inclusion in all versions up to, and including, 1.4.0 via the \u0027selected_button\u0027 parameter. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Contributor-level access and above, to include and execute arbitrary files on the server, allowing the execution of any PHP code in those files. This can be used to bypass access controls, obtain sensitive data, or achieve code execution in cases where images and other \u201csafe\u201d file types can be uploaded and included.",
"id": "GHSA-4rh5-mvp3-pqm7",
"modified": "2026-04-08T18:33:32Z",
"published": "2024-07-09T09:30:56Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-5456"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/pandavideo/trunk/includes/widgets/PandaButton.php#L237"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?old_path=/pandavideo/tags/1.4.0\u0026new_path=/pandavideo/tags/1.4.1\u0026sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail=#file8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/94ab250a-387c-431e-9b75-16ede94bf0ef?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-4RJ6-VRWV-WR8M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-24 16:11 – Updated: 2026-08-17 14:54Summary
Microsoft Kiota honors a poisoned .kiota/workspace.json — the workspace configuration that Kiota's
documented team workflow has developers commit to their repository — unvalidated on
kiota client generate / kiota plugin generate. A repository (or pull request) containing a malicious
per-client / per-plugin outputPath causes Kiota, when a developer or CI runs the documented regenerate
command, to (CWE-22) write the entire generated client to an arbitrary path outside the workspace — the
outputPath was not confined to the workspace root and absolute paths were accepted.
Confirmed on Kiota 1.32.4 (KIOTA_CONFIG_PREVIEW=true, the self-contained linux-x64 release binary).
Details
// .kiota/workspace.json (committed to the repo)
"clients": { "MyClient": {
"outputPath": "/abs/path/outside/repo/pwned_client" // -> generated client written here (CWE-22)
}}
Running kiota client generate --client-name MyClient in the repo writes MyClient.cs,
P/PRequestBuilder.cs, … to the attacker-chosen outputPath (verified outside the working tree).
Note on descriptionLocation
The per-consumer descriptionLocation is intentionally fetched at generation time — this is how Kiota knows
where to pull an updated description from when refreshing a client, the same way any other value in a
committed lock/config file is honored. It is not treated as a vulnerability and is unchanged; only
outputPath is now confined.
Impact
A malicious or compromised repository — or a malicious PR that edits .kiota/workspace.json — leads to
arbitrary file write on the developer's or CI host's filesystem (overwrite source/build files, drop files in
auto-loaded locations) whenever a teammate clones/pulls and runs the documented kiota client generate /
kiota plugin generate to refresh the client. CWE-22.
This is a different trust boundary from the OpenAPI-description-based findings: the malicious input is the Kiota config, not the spec.
Patches
Fixed in 1.29.1 and 1.32.5 (https://github.com/microsoft/kiota/pull/7885). On loading a workspace configuration,
each client/plugin outputPath is validated to be a relative subdirectory of the workspace: null/empty,
rooted paths (POSIX /, UNC \\ / //, Windows drive X:\), and any .. traversal segment are rejected,
and the resolved full path must stay under the workspace root. Generation aborts with an error if any
consumer's outputPath escapes the workspace.
Remediation
Upgrade to Kiota 1.29.1, 1.32.5 or later. Review any committed workspace configs for outputPath values that
point outside the workspace.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Microsoft.OpenApi.Kiota"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.30.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.32.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Microsoft.OpenApi.Kiota.Builder"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.30.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.32.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Microsoft.OpenApi.Kiota"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.29.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Microsoft.OpenApi.Kiota.Builder"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.29.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-59863"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-829",
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-24T16:11:24Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-16T15:16:35Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nMicrosoft Kiota honors a poisoned `.kiota/workspace.json` \u2014 the workspace configuration that Kiota\u0027s\ndocumented team workflow has developers commit to their repository \u2014 **unvalidated** on\n`kiota client generate` / `kiota plugin generate`. A repository (or pull request) containing a malicious\nper-client / per-plugin `outputPath` causes Kiota, when a developer or CI runs the documented regenerate\ncommand, to **(CWE-22) write the entire generated client to an arbitrary path outside the workspace** \u2014 the\n`outputPath` was not confined to the workspace root and absolute paths were accepted.\n\nConfirmed on Kiota **1.32.4** (`KIOTA_CONFIG_PREVIEW=true`, the self-contained `linux-x64` release binary).\n\n### Details\n\n```jsonc\n// .kiota/workspace.json (committed to the repo)\n\"clients\": { \"MyClient\": {\n \"outputPath\": \"/abs/path/outside/repo/pwned_client\" // -\u003e generated client written here (CWE-22)\n}}\n```\n\nRunning `kiota client generate --client-name MyClient` in the repo writes `MyClient.cs`,\n`P/PRequestBuilder.cs`, \u2026 to the attacker-chosen `outputPath` (verified outside the working tree).\n\n#### Note on `descriptionLocation`\n\nThe per-consumer `descriptionLocation` is intentionally fetched at generation time \u2014 this is how Kiota knows\nwhere to pull an updated description from when refreshing a client, the same way any other value in a\ncommitted lock/config file is honored. It is **not** treated as a vulnerability and is unchanged; only\n`outputPath` is now confined.\n\n### Impact\n\nA malicious or compromised repository \u2014 or a malicious PR that edits `.kiota/workspace.json` \u2014 leads to\narbitrary file write on the developer\u0027s or CI host\u0027s filesystem (overwrite source/build files, drop files in\nauto-loaded locations) whenever a teammate clones/pulls and runs the documented `kiota client generate` /\n`kiota plugin generate` to refresh the client. CWE-22.\n\nThis is a different trust boundary from the OpenAPI-description-based findings: the malicious input is the\nKiota **config**, not the spec.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in **1.29.1 and 1.32.5** (https://github.com/microsoft/kiota/pull/7885). On loading a workspace configuration,\neach client/plugin `outputPath` is validated to be a relative subdirectory of the workspace: null/empty,\nrooted paths (POSIX `/`, UNC `\\\\` / `//`, Windows drive `X:\\`), and any `..` traversal segment are rejected,\nand the resolved full path must stay under the workspace root. Generation aborts with an error if any\nconsumer\u0027s `outputPath` escapes the workspace.\n\n### Remediation\n\nUpgrade to Kiota **1.29.1, 1.32.5** or later. Review any committed workspace configs for `outputPath` values that\npoint outside the workspace.",
"id": "GHSA-4rj6-vrwv-wr8m",
"modified": "2026-08-17T14:54:18Z",
"published": "2026-07-24T16:11:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/microsoft/kiota/security/advisories/GHSA-4rj6-vrwv-wr8m"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59863"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/microsoft/kiota/pull/7885"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/microsoft/kiota/commit/4049327872db7846ace35c9003774d3e3878e4e9"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/microsoft/kiota"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/microsoft/kiota/releases/tag/v1.32.5"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:L/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Microsoft Kiota Workspace-config poisoning: out-of-repo file write + generation-time SSRF"
}
GHSA-4RQF-8PFM-P36R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-20 12:32 – Updated: 2025-03-21 03:21A path traversal vulnerability exists in mlflow/mlflow version 2.15.1. When users configure and use the dbfs service, concatenating the URL directly into the file protocol results in an arbitrary file read vulnerability. This issue occurs because only the path part of the URL is checked, while parts such as query and parameters are not handled. The vulnerability is triggered if the user has configured the dbfs service, and during usage, the service is mounted to a local directory.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "mlflow"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.17.0rc0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-8859"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-29"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-03-21T03:21:56Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-03-20T10:15:44Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A path traversal vulnerability exists in mlflow/mlflow version 2.15.1. When users configure and use the dbfs service, concatenating the URL directly into the file protocol results in an arbitrary file read vulnerability. This issue occurs because only the path part of the URL is checked, while parts such as query and parameters are not handled. The vulnerability is triggered if the user has configured the dbfs service, and during usage, the service is mounted to a local directory.",
"id": "GHSA-4rqf-8pfm-p36r",
"modified": "2025-03-21T03:21:56Z",
"published": "2025-03-20T12:32:49Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-8859"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mlflow/mlflow/commit/7791b8cdd595f21b5f179c7b17e4b5eb5cbbe654"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/mlflow/mlflow"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://huntr.com/bounties/2259b88b-a0c6-4c7c-b434-6aacf6056dcb"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "MLflow has a Local File Read/Path Traversal in dbfs"
}
GHSA-4RQM-JP2R-7WR9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-09-01 00:00 – Updated: 2022-09-08 00:00Dell Command Integration Suite for System Center, versions prior to 6.2.0, contains arbitrary file write vulnerability. A locally authenticated malicious user could potentially exploit this vulnerability in order to perform an arbitrary write as system.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-34373"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-08-31T20:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Dell Command Integration Suite for System Center, versions prior to 6.2.0, contains arbitrary file write vulnerability. A locally authenticated malicious user could potentially exploit this vulnerability in order to perform an arbitrary write as system.",
"id": "GHSA-4rqm-jp2r-7wr9",
"modified": "2022-09-08T00:00:32Z",
"published": "2022-09-01T00:00:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-34373"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.dell.com/support/kbdoc/000201877"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-4RVG-955W-H68Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2018-07-26 14:47 – Updated: 2023-03-01 01:19Affected versions of angular-http-server are vulnerable to path traversal allowing a remote attacker to read files from the server that uses angular-http-server.
Recommendation
Update to version 1.6.0 or later.
:exclamation: Note: This was originally thought to be fixed in version 1.4.3, though according to this issue the vulnerability was not completely fixed until version 1.6.0.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "angular-http-server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.6.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-3713"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2020-06-16T20:59:07Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2018-06-07T02:29:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Affected versions of `angular-http-server` are vulnerable to path traversal allowing a remote attacker to read files from the server that uses `angular-http-server`.\n\n## Recommendation\n\nUpdate to version 1.6.0 or later.\n\n:exclamation: Note: This was originally thought to be fixed in version 1.4.3, though according to [this issue](https://github.com/ossf-cve-benchmark/ossf-cve-benchmark/issues/117#issuecomment-803872454) the vulnerability was not completely fixed until version 1.6.0.",
"id": "GHSA-4rvg-955w-h68q",
"modified": "2023-03-01T01:19:07Z",
"published": "2018-07-26T14:47:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-3713"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/simonh1000/angular-http-server/pull/21"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/simonh1000/angular-http-server/commit/34d4bd0cd0f00c46db30855a8c4aabae27eb0ac8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://hackerone.com/reports/309120"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-4rvg-955w-h68q"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/advisories/589"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Path Traversal in angular-http-server"
}
GHSA-4RWX-MRF5-WX33
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-02-20 03:30 – Updated: 2024-05-01 18:30Node.js depends on multiple built-in utility functions to normalize paths provided to node:fs functions, which can be overwitten with user-defined implementations leading to filesystem permission model bypass through path traversal attack. This vulnerability affects all users using the experimental permission model in Node.js 20 and Node.js 21. Please note that at the time this CVE was issued, the permission model is an experimental feature of Node.js.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-21891"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-02-20T02:15:50Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Node.js depends on multiple built-in utility functions to normalize paths provided to node:fs functions, which can be overwitten with user-defined implementations leading to filesystem permission model bypass through path traversal attack.\nThis vulnerability affects all users using the experimental permission model in Node.js 20 and Node.js 21.\nPlease note that at the time this CVE was issued, the permission model is an experimental feature of Node.js.",
"id": "GHSA-4rwx-mrf5-wx33",
"modified": "2024-05-01T18:30:35Z",
"published": "2024-02-20T03:30:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-21891"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://hackerone.com/reports/2259914"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20240315-0005"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/03/11/1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-4RX2-PVMR-H2R3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-07-26 15:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 06:22The SolarWinds Network Configuration Manager was susceptible to the Directory Traversal Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows users with administrative access to SolarWinds Web Console to execute arbitrary commands.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-23842"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-07-26T15:15:10Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The SolarWinds Network Configuration Manager was susceptible to the Directory Traversal Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows users with administrative access to SolarWinds Web Console to execute arbitrary commands.",
"id": "GHSA-4rx2-pvmr-h2r3",
"modified": "2024-04-04T06:22:02Z",
"published": "2023-07-26T15:30:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-23842"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://documentation.solarwinds.com/en/success_center/ncm/content/release_notes/ncm_2023-3_release_notes.htm"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.solarwinds.com/trust-center/security-advisories/CVE-2023-23842"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-4RX4-4R3X-6534
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-06 23:09 – Updated: 2026-04-07 22:10Summary
PraisonAI's recipe registry pull flow extracts attacker-controlled .praison tar archives with tar.extractall() and does not validate archive member paths before extraction. A malicious publisher can upload a recipe bundle that contains ../ traversal entries and any user who later pulls that recipe will write files outside the output directory they selected.
This is a path traversal / arbitrary file write vulnerability on the client side of the recipe registry workflow. It affects both the local registry pull path and the HTTP registry pull path. The checksum verification does not prevent exploitation because the malicious traversal payload is part of the signed bundle itself.
Details
The issue is caused by unsafe extraction of tar archive contents during recipe pull.
- A malicious publisher creates a valid
.praisonbundle whosemanifest.jsonis benign enough to pass publish, but whose tar members include traversal entries such as:
../../escape-http.txt
-
LocalRegistry.publish()insrc/praisonai/praisonai/recipe/registry.py:214-287only readsmanifest.json, calculates a checksum, and stores the uploaded bundle. It does not inspect or sanitize the rest of the tar members before saving the archive. -
When a victim later pulls the recipe from a local registry,
LocalRegistry.pull()insrc/praisonai/praisonai/recipe/registry.py:289-345extracts the tarball directly:
recipe_dir = output_dir / name
recipe_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
with tarfile.open(bundle_path, "r:gz") as tar:
tar.extractall(recipe_dir)
- The HTTP client path is also vulnerable.
HttpRegistry.pull()insrc/praisonai/praisonai/recipe/registry.py:691-739downloads the bundle and then performs the same unsafe extraction:
recipe_dir = output_dir / name
recipe_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
with tarfile.open(bundle_path, "r:gz") as tar:
tar.extractall(recipe_dir)
- Because no archive member validation is performed, traversal entries escape
recipe_dirand create files elsewhere on disk.
Verified vulnerable behavior:
- Published recipe name:
evil-http - Victim-selected output directory:
/tmp/praisonai-pull-traversal-poc/victim-output - Artifact created outside that directory:
/tmp/praisonai-pull-traversal-poc/escape-http.txt - Artifact contents:
owned over http
This demonstrates that a remote publisher can cause filesystem writes outside the pull destination chosen by another user.
PoC
Run the single verification script from the checked-out repository:
cd "/Users/r1zzg0d/Documents/CVE hunting/targets/PraisonAI"
python3 tmp/pocs/poc2.py
Expected vulnerable output:
[+] Publish result: {'ok': True, 'name': 'evil-http', 'version': '1.0.0', ...}
[+] Pull result: {'name': 'evil-http', 'version': '1.0.0', ...}
[+] Outside artifact exists: True
[+] Artifact also inside output dir: False
[+] Outside artifact content: 'owned over http\n'
[+] RESULT: VULNERABLE - pulling the recipe created a file outside the chosen output directory.
Then verify the created file manually:
ls -l /tmp/praisonai-pull-traversal-poc/escape-http.txt
cat /tmp/praisonai-pull-traversal-poc/escape-http.txt
find /tmp/praisonai-pull-traversal-poc -maxdepth 3 | sort
What the script does internally:
- Starts a local PraisonAI recipe registry server.
- Builds a malicious
.praisonbundle containing the tar entry../../escape-http.txt. - Publishes the malicious bundle to the local HTTP registry.
- Simulates a victim pulling that recipe into
/tmp/praisonai-pull-traversal-poc/victim-output. - Confirms that the file is created outside the chosen output directory.
Impact
This is a path traversal / arbitrary file write vulnerability in the recipe pull workflow.
Impacted parties:
- Users who pull recipes from an untrusted or shared PraisonAI registry.
- Teams running internal registries where one publisher can influence what other users pull.
- Automated systems or CI jobs that fetch recipes into working directories near sensitive project files.
Security impact:
- Integrity impact is high because an attacker can create or overwrite files outside the expected extraction directory.
- Availability impact is significant if the overwritten target is a config file, project file, startup script, or another operational artifact.
- The issue crosses a real security boundary because the attacker only needs to publish a malicious recipe, while the victim triggers the write by pulling it.
Remediation
-
Replace raw
tar.extractall()with a safe extraction routine that validates everyTarInfomember before extraction. Reject absolute paths,..segments, and any resolved path that escapes the intended extraction directory. -
Apply the same archive member validation in both
LocalRegistry.pull()andHttpRegistry.pull()so that local and remote registry clients share the same safety guarantees. -
Consider validating tar contents during publish as well, so malicious bundles are rejected before they ever enter the registry and cannot be served to downstream users.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.5.112"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "PraisonAI"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.5.113"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-39306"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-06T23:09:12Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-07T17:16:36Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nPraisonAI\u0027s recipe registry pull flow extracts attacker-controlled `.praison` tar archives with `tar.extractall()` and does not validate archive member paths before extraction. A malicious publisher can upload a recipe bundle that contains `../` traversal entries and any user who later pulls that recipe will write files outside the output directory they selected.\n\nThis is a path traversal / arbitrary file write vulnerability on the client side of the recipe registry workflow. It affects both the local registry pull path and the HTTP registry pull path. The checksum verification does not prevent exploitation because the malicious traversal payload is part of the signed bundle itself.\n\n### Details\n\nThe issue is caused by unsafe extraction of tar archive contents during recipe pull.\n\n1. A malicious publisher creates a valid `.praison` bundle whose `manifest.json` is benign enough to pass publish, but whose tar members include traversal entries such as:\n\n```text\n../../escape-http.txt\n```\n\n2. `LocalRegistry.publish()` in `src/praisonai/praisonai/recipe/registry.py:214-287` only reads `manifest.json`, calculates a checksum, and stores the uploaded bundle. It does not inspect or sanitize the rest of the tar members before saving the archive.\n\n3. When a victim later pulls the recipe from a local registry, `LocalRegistry.pull()` in `src/praisonai/praisonai/recipe/registry.py:289-345` extracts the tarball directly:\n\n```python\nrecipe_dir = output_dir / name\nrecipe_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)\n\nwith tarfile.open(bundle_path, \"r:gz\") as tar:\n tar.extractall(recipe_dir)\n```\n\n4. The HTTP client path is also vulnerable. `HttpRegistry.pull()` in `src/praisonai/praisonai/recipe/registry.py:691-739` downloads the bundle and then performs the same unsafe extraction:\n\n```python\nrecipe_dir = output_dir / name\nrecipe_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)\n\nwith tarfile.open(bundle_path, \"r:gz\") as tar:\n tar.extractall(recipe_dir)\n```\n\n5. Because no archive member validation is performed, traversal entries escape `recipe_dir` and create files elsewhere on disk.\n\nVerified vulnerable behavior:\n\n- Published recipe name: `evil-http`\n- Victim-selected output directory: `/tmp/praisonai-pull-traversal-poc/victim-output`\n- Artifact created outside that directory: `/tmp/praisonai-pull-traversal-poc/escape-http.txt`\n- Artifact contents: `owned over http`\n\nThis demonstrates that a remote publisher can cause filesystem writes outside the pull destination chosen by another user.\n\n### PoC\n\nRun the single verification script from the checked-out repository:\n\n```bash\ncd \"/Users/r1zzg0d/Documents/CVE hunting/targets/PraisonAI\"\npython3 tmp/pocs/poc2.py\n```\n\nExpected vulnerable output:\n\n```text\n[+] Publish result: {\u0027ok\u0027: True, \u0027name\u0027: \u0027evil-http\u0027, \u0027version\u0027: \u00271.0.0\u0027, ...}\n[+] Pull result: {\u0027name\u0027: \u0027evil-http\u0027, \u0027version\u0027: \u00271.0.0\u0027, ...}\n[+] Outside artifact exists: True\n[+] Artifact also inside output dir: False\n[+] Outside artifact content: \u0027owned over http\\n\u0027\n[+] RESULT: VULNERABLE - pulling the recipe created a file outside the chosen output directory.\n```\n\nThen verify the created file manually:\n\n```bash\nls -l /tmp/praisonai-pull-traversal-poc/escape-http.txt\ncat /tmp/praisonai-pull-traversal-poc/escape-http.txt\nfind /tmp/praisonai-pull-traversal-poc -maxdepth 3 | sort\n```\n\nWhat the script does internally:\n\n1. Starts a local PraisonAI recipe registry server.\n2. Builds a malicious `.praison` bundle containing the tar entry `../../escape-http.txt`.\n3. Publishes the malicious bundle to the local HTTP registry.\n4. Simulates a victim pulling that recipe into `/tmp/praisonai-pull-traversal-poc/victim-output`.\n5. Confirms that the file is created outside the chosen output directory.\n\n### Impact\n\nThis is a path traversal / arbitrary file write vulnerability in the recipe pull workflow.\n\nImpacted parties:\n\n- Users who pull recipes from an untrusted or shared PraisonAI registry.\n- Teams running internal registries where one publisher can influence what other users pull.\n- Automated systems or CI jobs that fetch recipes into working directories near sensitive project files.\n\nSecurity impact:\n\n- Integrity impact is high because an attacker can create or overwrite files outside the expected extraction directory.\n- Availability impact is significant if the overwritten target is a config file, project file, startup script, or another operational artifact.\n- The issue crosses a real security boundary because the attacker only needs to publish a malicious recipe, while the victim triggers the write by pulling it.\n\n### Remediation\n\n1. Replace raw `tar.extractall()` with a safe extraction routine that validates every `TarInfo` member before extraction. Reject absolute paths, `..` segments, and any resolved path that escapes the intended extraction directory.\n\n2. Apply the same archive member validation in both `LocalRegistry.pull()` and `HttpRegistry.pull()` so that local and remote registry clients share the same safety guarantees.\n\n3. Consider validating tar contents during publish as well, so malicious bundles are rejected before they ever enter the registry and cannot be served to downstream users.",
"id": "GHSA-4rx4-4r3x-6534",
"modified": "2026-04-07T22:10:07Z",
"published": "2026-04-06T23:09:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-4rx4-4r3x-6534"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39306"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/releases/tag/v4.5.113"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "PraisonAI recipe registry pull path traversal writes files outside the chosen output directory"
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-20.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
- Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
- realpath() in C
- getCanonicalPath() in Java
- GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
- realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
- realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-21.1
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
- When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
- This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-126: Path Traversal
An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.