CWE-284
DiscouragedImproper Access Control
Abstraction: Pillar · Status: Incomplete
The product does not restrict or incorrectly restricts access to a resource from an unauthorized actor.
8585 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-7JVP-HJ45-2F2M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-06 17:30 – Updated: 2026-07-06 17:30Description
When a host pushes a CLR object into a Scriban TemplateContext via the standard, documented pattern —
var so = new ScriptObject();
so["user"] = currentUser; // direct CLR reference
context.PushGlobal(so);
— TypedObjectAccessor exposes every public-getter property for both reading and writing, and writes land on the live host object and persist after Render() returns. The write path performs no CanWrite and no setter-visibility check, producing two related but distinct weaknesses:
(A) Mass assignment of public setters — CWE-915 (originally F-002). Any { get; set; } property is writable from template code ({{ user.is_admin = true }}, {{ order.total_price = 0 }}). This is "surprising but technically consistent with the setter being public" — and crucially, Scriban offers no way to expose such a property read-only, because MemberFilter is read/write-symmetric.
(B) Access-modifier bypass — CWE-284 (originally F-007). Properties the developer deliberately restricted are also writable, because reflection ignores C# accessibility:
| Declaration | Developer intent | Actual behavior |
|---|---|---|
| { get; set; } | writable | writable (mass assignment — A) |
| { get; private set; } | only the owning class writes | template writes freely |
| { get; internal set; } | only the declaring assembly writes | template writes freely |
| { get; init; } | immutable after construction (C# 9 language guarantee) | template writes freely post-construction |
The init-only post-construction write — the highest false-positive risk — was explicitly confirmed against the shipped 7.2.1 package.
Affected Versions
All releases that ship TypedObjectAccessor (<= 7.2.1). PrepareMembers has used the getter-only filter since the accessor was introduced, and TrySetValue has never checked the setter. The init bypass applies on .NET 5+; private set / internal set apply on every supported runtime. No patched version exists.
Steps to Reproduce
Copy-paste. Run from the engagement root (the folder containing both
scriban/andreports/).
Prereqs:
test -d scriban || { echo "scriban source missing"; exit 1; }
( command -v dotnet >/dev/null && dotnet --list-sdks | grep -q '^10\.' ) \
|| ( "$HOME/.dotnet/dotnet" --list-sdks | grep -q '^10\.' ) \
|| { echo ".NET 10 SDK missing"; exit 1; }
export PATH="$HOME/.dotnet:$PATH"
Run both PoCs (native):
( cd reports/f002/poc && dotnet run -c Release ) # (A) public-setter mass assignment
( cd reports/f007/poc && dotnet run -c Release ) # (B) private/internal/init bypass
Docker fallback (no native SDK required):
docker run --rm -v "$PWD":/work -w /work/reports/f007/poc \
mcr.microsoft.com/dotnet/sdk:10.0 bash -lc "dotnet run -c Release"
Confirm the published package is affected (not just master): swap the ProjectReference in reports/f007/poc/poc.csproj for <PackageReference Include="Scriban" Version="7.2.1" /> and re-run — the four bypasses still succeed.
Each PoC prints [1] original CLR values, [2] template output (reads originals → writes → reads back), and [3] the C#-side read after Render() proving the live host object was permanently altered.
Remediation
Fixes are listed flat. Note that (B) has a clean, clearly-correct code fix; (A) requires a new control because public-setter writes are otherwise by-design.
- Fix 1 — block restricted setters in
TrySetValue(TypedObjectAccessor.csL108–L123). Fixes (B). Before the L120SetValue, require a public, non-initsetter:
A plainvar setM = propertyAccessor.GetSetMethod(nonPublic: false); if (setM is null) return false; // private / internal / protected setters if (setM.ReturnParameter.GetRequiredCustomModifiers() .Any(m => m.FullName == "System.Runtime.CompilerServices.IsExternalInit")) return false; // init-only: setter IS public, so the IsExternalInit check is REQUIREDGetSetMethod(nonPublic:false) != nullcheck is not sufficient forinit— the init setter is public; only theIsExternalInitmodreq distinguishes it. - Fix 2 — give hosts a read/write distinction (addresses (A)). Add a
MemberWriteFilteronTemplateContext(separate fromMemberFilter) and/or a[ScriptMemberReadOnly]attribute, and split_membersinto_readableMembers/_writableMembersinPrepareMembers(L126–L186). Public-settable mass assignment cannot be blocked without one of these, becauseMemberFilteris read/write-symmetric today. - Fix 3 — restore read-only-by-default on
ScriptObject.Import(ScriptObjectExtensions.csL320–L324). Gate the Liquid-compatibility relaxation behind an explicit opt-in instead of removing write protection globally. - Fix 4 — documentation (
site/docs/runtime/safe-runtime.md). State explicitly that templates can write CLR properties via reflection (includingprivate/internal/initsetters), and thatMemberFilterdoes not separate read from write. - Fix 5 — regression tests (
src/Scriban.Tests/). Assertprivate set/internal set/initare non-writable from templates, thatMemberWriteFilter/[ScriptMemberReadOnly]gate writes, and that only publicsetis writable.
References
- Vulnerable write path (no setter check):
scriban/src/Scriban/Runtime/Accessors/TypedObjectAccessor.csL108–L123 (TrySetValue), sink at L120propertyAccessor.SetValue(target, context.ToObject(span, value, propertyAccessor.PropertyType)); - Getter-only member filter:
TypedObjectAccessor.csL126–L186 (PrepareMembers), enumeration at L150, gate at L156; same_membersconsumed byTryGetValue(L66–L83) - Member-assignment dispatch:
scriban/src/Scriban/ScribanAsync.generated.cs:2297(accessor.TrySetValue(...)) and the synchronous evaluator - No read/write separation:
MemberFilterdeclaredTemplateContext.cs:286, appliedTemplateContext.cs:1026;ScriptObject.Importread-only removalScriptObjectExtensions.cs:320–324 - .NET reflection bypasses access modifiers: https://learn.microsoft.com/dotnet/api/system.reflection.propertyinfo.setvalue
initaccessors (C# 9): https://learn.microsoft.com/dotnet/csharp/language-reference/proposals/csharp-9.0/init- CWE-915 — https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/915.html
- CWE-284 — https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/284.html
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 7.2.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Scriban"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.2.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284",
"CWE-915"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-06T17:30:17Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "\u003c!-- obsidian --\u003e\u003ch2 data-heading=\"Description\"\u003eDescription\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWhen a host pushes a CLR object into a Scriban \u003ccode\u003eTemplateContext\u003c/code\u003e via the standard, documented pattern \u2014\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cpre\u003e\u003ccode class=\"language-csharp\"\u003evar so = new ScriptObject();\nso[\"user\"] = currentUser; // direct CLR reference\ncontext.PushGlobal(so);\n\u003c/code\u003e\u003c/pre\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u2014 \u003ccode\u003eTypedObjectAccessor\u003c/code\u003e exposes every public-getter property for \u003cstrong\u003eboth reading and writing\u003c/strong\u003e, and writes land on the live host object and \u003cstrong\u003epersist after \u003ccode\u003eRender()\u003c/code\u003e returns\u003c/strong\u003e. The write path performs no \u003ccode\u003eCanWrite\u003c/code\u003e and no setter-visibility check, producing two related but distinct weaknesses:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e(A) Mass assignment of public setters \u2014 CWE-915 (originally F-002).\u003c/strong\u003e Any \u003ccode\u003e{ get; set; }\u003c/code\u003e property is writable from template code (\u003ccode\u003e{{ user.is_admin = true }}\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003e{{ order.total_price = 0 }}\u003c/code\u003e). This is \"surprising but technically consistent with the setter being public\" \u2014 and crucially, Scriban offers \u003cstrong\u003eno way to expose such a property read-only\u003c/strong\u003e, because \u003ccode\u003eMemberFilter\u003c/code\u003e is read/write-symmetric.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e(B) Access-modifier bypass \u2014 CWE-284 (originally F-007).\u003c/strong\u003e Properties the developer \u003cstrong\u003edeliberately\u003c/strong\u003e restricted are also writable, because reflection ignores C# accessibility:\u003c/p\u003e\n\nDeclaration | Developer intent | Actual behavior\n-- | -- | --\n{ get; set; } | writable | writable (mass assignment \u2014 A)\n{ get; private set; } | only the owning class writes | template writes freely\n{ get; internal set; } | only the declaring assembly writes | template writes freely\n{ get; init; } | immutable after construction (C# 9 language guarantee) | template writes freely post-construction\n\n\n\u003cp\u003eThe \u003ccode\u003einit\u003c/code\u003e-only post-construction write \u2014 the highest false-positive risk \u2014 was explicitly confirmed against the shipped 7.2.1 package.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 data-heading=\"Affected Versions\"\u003eAffected Versions\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAll releases that ship \u003ccode\u003eTypedObjectAccessor\u003c/code\u003e (\u003ccode\u003e\u0026#x3C;= 7.2.1\u003c/code\u003e). \u003ccode\u003ePrepareMembers\u003c/code\u003e has used the getter-only filter since the accessor was introduced, and \u003ccode\u003eTrySetValue\u003c/code\u003e has never checked the setter. The \u003ccode\u003einit\u003c/code\u003e bypass applies on .NET 5+; \u003ccode\u003eprivate set\u003c/code\u003e / \u003ccode\u003einternal set\u003c/code\u003e apply on every supported runtime. No patched version exists.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 data-heading=\"Steps to Reproduce\"\u003eSteps to Reproduce\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eCopy-paste. Run from the engagement root (the folder containing both \u003ccode\u003escriban/\u003c/code\u003e and \u003ccode\u003ereports/\u003c/code\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003c/blockquote\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003ePrereqs:\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cpre\u003e\u003ccode class=\"language-bash\"\u003etest -d scriban || { echo \"scriban source missing\"; exit 1; }\n( command -v dotnet \u003e/dev/null \u0026#x26;\u0026#x26; dotnet --list-sdks | grep -q \u0027^10\\.\u0027 ) \\\n || ( \"$HOME/.dotnet/dotnet\" --list-sdks | grep -q \u0027^10\\.\u0027 ) \\\n || { echo \".NET 10 SDK missing\"; exit 1; }\nexport PATH=\"$HOME/.dotnet:$PATH\"\n\u003c/code\u003e\u003c/pre\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eRun both PoCs (native):\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cpre\u003e\u003ccode class=\"language-bash\"\u003e( cd reports/f002/poc \u0026#x26;\u0026#x26; dotnet run -c Release ) # (A) public-setter mass assignment\n( cd reports/f007/poc \u0026#x26;\u0026#x26; dotnet run -c Release ) # (B) private/internal/init bypass\n\u003c/code\u003e\u003c/pre\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eDocker fallback (no native SDK required):\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cpre\u003e\u003ccode class=\"language-bash\"\u003edocker run --rm -v \"$PWD\":/work -w /work/reports/f007/poc \\\n mcr.microsoft.com/dotnet/sdk:10.0 bash -lc \"dotnet run -c Release\"\n\u003c/code\u003e\u003c/pre\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eConfirm the published package is affected (not just master):\u003c/strong\u003e swap the \u003ccode\u003eProjectReference\u003c/code\u003e in \u003ccode\u003ereports/f007/poc/poc.csproj\u003c/code\u003e for \u003ccode\u003e\u0026#x3C;PackageReference Include=\"Scriban\" Version=\"7.2.1\" /\u003e\u003c/code\u003e and re-run \u2014 the four bypasses still succeed.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eEach PoC prints \u003ccode\u003e[1]\u003c/code\u003e original CLR values, \u003ccode\u003e[2]\u003c/code\u003e template output (reads originals \u2192 writes \u2192 reads back), and \u003ccode\u003e[3]\u003c/code\u003e the \u003cstrong\u003eC#-side\u003c/strong\u003e read after \u003ccode\u003eRender()\u003c/code\u003e proving the live host object was permanently altered.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2 data-heading=\"Remediation\"\u003eRemediation\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eFixes are listed flat. Note that (B) has a clean, clearly-correct code fix; (A) requires a \u003cem\u003enew control\u003c/em\u003e because public-setter writes are otherwise by-design.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eFix 1 \u2014 block restricted setters in \u003ccode\u003eTrySetValue\u003c/code\u003e (\u003ccode\u003eTypedObjectAccessor.cs\u003c/code\u003e L108\u2013L123). Fixes (B).\u003c/strong\u003e Before the L120 \u003ccode\u003eSetValue\u003c/code\u003e, require a public, non-\u003ccode\u003einit\u003c/code\u003e setter:\n\u003cpre\u003e\u003ccode class=\"language-csharp\"\u003evar setM = propertyAccessor.GetSetMethod(nonPublic: false);\nif (setM is null) return false; // private / internal / protected setters\nif (setM.ReturnParameter.GetRequiredCustomModifiers()\n .Any(m =\u003e m.FullName == \"System.Runtime.CompilerServices.IsExternalInit\"))\n return false; // init-only: setter IS public, so the IsExternalInit check is REQUIRED\n\u003c/code\u003e\u003c/pre\u003e\nA plain \u003ccode\u003eGetSetMethod(nonPublic:false) != null\u003c/code\u003e check is \u003cstrong\u003enot\u003c/strong\u003e sufficient for \u003ccode\u003einit\u003c/code\u003e \u2014 the init setter is public; only the \u003ccode\u003eIsExternalInit\u003c/code\u003e modreq distinguishes it.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eFix 2 \u2014 give hosts a read/write distinction (addresses (A)).\u003c/strong\u003e Add a \u003ccode\u003eMemberWriteFilter\u003c/code\u003e on \u003ccode\u003eTemplateContext\u003c/code\u003e (separate from \u003ccode\u003eMemberFilter\u003c/code\u003e) and/or a \u003ccode\u003e[ScriptMemberReadOnly]\u003c/code\u003e attribute, and split \u003ccode\u003e_members\u003c/code\u003e into \u003ccode\u003e_readableMembers\u003c/code\u003e / \u003ccode\u003e_writableMembers\u003c/code\u003e in \u003ccode\u003ePrepareMembers\u003c/code\u003e (L126\u2013L186). Public-settable mass assignment cannot be blocked without one of these, because \u003ccode\u003eMemberFilter\u003c/code\u003e is read/write-symmetric today.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eFix 3 \u2014 restore read-only-by-default on \u003ccode\u003eScriptObject.Import\u003c/code\u003e (\u003ccode\u003eScriptObjectExtensions.cs\u003c/code\u003e L320\u2013L324).\u003c/strong\u003e Gate the Liquid-compatibility relaxation behind an explicit opt-in instead of removing write protection globally.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eFix 4 \u2014 documentation (\u003ccode\u003esite/docs/runtime/safe-runtime.md\u003c/code\u003e).\u003c/strong\u003e State explicitly that templates can write CLR properties via reflection (including \u003ccode\u003eprivate\u003c/code\u003e/\u003ccode\u003einternal\u003c/code\u003e/\u003ccode\u003einit\u003c/code\u003e setters), and that \u003ccode\u003eMemberFilter\u003c/code\u003e does not separate read from write.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eFix 5 \u2014 regression tests (\u003ccode\u003esrc/Scriban.Tests/\u003c/code\u003e).\u003c/strong\u003e Assert \u003ccode\u003eprivate set\u003c/code\u003e / \u003ccode\u003einternal set\u003c/code\u003e / \u003ccode\u003einit\u003c/code\u003e are non-writable from templates, that \u003ccode\u003eMemberWriteFilter\u003c/code\u003e / \u003ccode\u003e[ScriptMemberReadOnly]\u003c/code\u003e gate writes, and that only public \u003ccode\u003eset\u003c/code\u003e is writable.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n\u003ch2 data-heading=\"References\"\u003eReferences\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eVulnerable write path (no setter check): \u003ccode\u003escriban/src/Scriban/Runtime/Accessors/TypedObjectAccessor.cs\u003c/code\u003e L108\u2013L123 (\u003ccode\u003eTrySetValue\u003c/code\u003e), sink at L120 \u003ccode\u003epropertyAccessor.SetValue(target, context.ToObject(span, value, propertyAccessor.PropertyType));\u003c/code\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eGetter-only member filter: \u003ccode\u003eTypedObjectAccessor.cs\u003c/code\u003e L126\u2013L186 (\u003ccode\u003ePrepareMembers\u003c/code\u003e), enumeration at L150, gate at L156; same \u003ccode\u003e_members\u003c/code\u003e consumed by \u003ccode\u003eTryGetValue\u003c/code\u003e (L66\u2013L83)\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eMember-assignment dispatch: \u003ccode\u003escriban/src/Scriban/ScribanAsync.generated.cs:2297\u003c/code\u003e (\u003ccode\u003eaccessor.TrySetValue(...)\u003c/code\u003e) and the synchronous evaluator\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eNo read/write separation: \u003ccode\u003eMemberFilter\u003c/code\u003e declared \u003ccode\u003eTemplateContext.cs:286\u003c/code\u003e, applied \u003ccode\u003eTemplateContext.cs:1026\u003c/code\u003e; \u003ccode\u003eScriptObject.Import\u003c/code\u003e read-only removal \u003ccode\u003eScriptObjectExtensions.cs:320\u2013324\u003c/code\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e.NET reflection bypasses access modifiers: \u003ca href=\"https://learn.microsoft.com/dotnet/api/system.reflection.propertyinfo.setvalue\" class=\"external-link\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener nofollow\"\u003ehttps://learn.microsoft.com/dotnet/api/system.reflection.propertyinfo.setvalue\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003ccode\u003einit\u003c/code\u003e accessors (C# 9): \u003ca href=\"https://learn.microsoft.com/dotnet/csharp/language-reference/proposals/csharp-9.0/init\" class=\"external-link\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener nofollow\"\u003ehttps://learn.microsoft.com/dotnet/csharp/language-reference/proposals/csharp-9.0/init\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eCWE-915 \u2014 \u003ca href=\"https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/915.html\" class=\"external-link\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener nofollow\"\u003ehttps://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/915.html\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eCWE-284 \u2014 \u003ca href=\"https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/284.html\" class=\"external-link\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener nofollow\"\u003ehttps://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/284.html\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e",
"id": "GHSA-7jvp-hj45-2f2m",
"modified": "2026-07-06T17:30:17Z",
"published": "2026-07-06T17:30:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/scriban/scriban/security/advisories/GHSA-7jvp-hj45-2f2m"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/scriban/scriban"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Scriban: Template Writes to Arbitrary CLR Properties via `TypedObjectAccessor` (Mass Assignment + `private` / `init` / `internal` Setter Bypass)"
}
GHSA-7JX6-R36G-7PWQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-25 03:31 – Updated: 2026-03-25 21:30A validation issue existed in the entitlement verification. This issue was addressed with improved validation of the process entitlement. This issue is fixed in macOS Sequoia 15.7.5, macOS Sonoma 14.8.5, macOS Tahoe 26.4. An app may be able to gain elevated privileges.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-28821"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-20",
"CWE-284"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-25T01:17:07Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A validation issue existed in the entitlement verification. This issue was addressed with improved validation of the process entitlement. This issue is fixed in macOS Sequoia 15.7.5, macOS Sonoma 14.8.5, macOS Tahoe 26.4. An app may be able to gain elevated privileges.",
"id": "GHSA-7jx6-r36g-7pwq",
"modified": "2026-03-25T21:30:28Z",
"published": "2026-03-25T03:31:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-28821"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/126794"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/126795"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/126796"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-7JXV-2XPM-95JX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:16 – Updated: 2022-05-24 19:16ECOA BAS controller is vulnerable to insecure direct object references that occur when the application provides direct access to objects based on user-supplied input. As a result of this vulnerability, attackers with general user's privilege can remotely bypass authorization and access the hidden resources in the system and execute privileged functionalities.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-41298"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284",
"CWE-639"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-09-30T11:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "ECOA BAS controller is vulnerable to insecure direct object references that occur when the application provides direct access to objects based on user-supplied input. As a result of this vulnerability, attackers with general user\u0027s privilege can remotely bypass authorization and access the hidden resources in the system and execute privileged functionalities.",
"id": "GHSA-7jxv-2xpm-95jx",
"modified": "2022-05-24T19:16:13Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T19:16:13Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-41298"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.twcert.org.tw/tw/cp-132-5134-39f74-1.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-7M2H-7XMJ-FM47
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 02:22 – Updated: 2025-04-12 13:06Virtual Hard Disk Driver in Microsoft Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 Gold and R2, Windows RT 8.1, Windows 10 Gold, 1511, and 1607, and Windows Server 2016 does not properly restrict access to files, which allows local users to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka "VHD Driver Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability."
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2016-7224"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2016-11-10T06:59:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Virtual Hard Disk Driver in Microsoft Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 Gold and R2, Windows RT 8.1, Windows 10 Gold, 1511, and 1607, and Windows Server 2016 does not properly restrict access to files, which allows local users to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka \"VHD Driver Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability.\"",
"id": "GHSA-7m2h-7xmj-fm47",
"modified": "2025-04-12T13:06:24Z",
"published": "2022-05-14T02:22:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-7224"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/security-updates/securitybulletins/2016/ms16-138"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/40765"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/94017"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1037248"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-7M47-R75R-CX8V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-08-28 14:40 – Updated: 2025-08-28 18:51Impact
The table access voter in the back end doesn't check if a user is allowed to access the corresponding module.
Patches
Update to Contao 5.3.38 or 5.6.1.
Workarounds
Do not rely solely on the voter and additionally check USER_CAN_ACCESS_MODULE.
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, open an issue in contao/contao.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "contao/core-bundle"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.3.38"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "contao/core-bundle"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.4.0-RC1"
},
{
"fixed": "5.6.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "contao/contao"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.3.38"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "contao/contao"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.4.0-RC1"
},
{
"fixed": "5.6.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-57758"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-08-28T14:40:45Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-08-28T17:15:36Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nThe table access voter in the back end doesn\u0027t check if a user is allowed to access the corresponding module.\n\n### Patches\n\nUpdate to Contao 5.3.38 or 5.6.1.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nDo not rely solely on the voter and additionally check `USER_CAN_ACCESS_MODULE`.\n\n### For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory, open an issue in [contao/contao](https://github.com/contao/contao/issues/new/choose).",
"id": "GHSA-7m47-r75r-cx8v",
"modified": "2025-08-28T18:51:52Z",
"published": "2025-08-28T14:40:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/contao/contao/security/advisories/GHSA-7m47-r75r-cx8v"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-57758"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/contao/contao/commit/3f05c603e1c94d34819f837f060df5d66447d0d7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://contao.org/en/security-advisories/improper-access-control-in-the-back-end-voters"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/contao/contao"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Contao applies improper access control in the back end voters"
}
GHSA-7M6G-3FPV-8GMX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-11-18 21:32 – Updated: 2025-11-19 15:31Incorrect access control in mihomo v1.19.11 allows authenticated attackers with low-level privileges to read arbitrary files with elevated privileges via obtaining the external control key from the config file.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-56499"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-11-18T19:15:49Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Incorrect access control in mihomo v1.19.11 allows authenticated attackers with low-level privileges to read arbitrary files with elevated privileges via obtaining the external control key from the config file.",
"id": "GHSA-7m6g-3fpv-8gmx",
"modified": "2025-11-19T15:31:38Z",
"published": "2025-11-18T21:32:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-56499"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Cherrling/CVE-2025-56499"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/MetaCubeX/mihomo/tree/v1.19.11"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-7M6X-H8VX-F72M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-12-01 09:30 – Updated: 2023-12-01 09:30An issue has been discovered in GitLab affecting all versions starting from 13.2 before 16.4.3, all versions starting from 16.5 before 16.5.3, all versions starting from 16.6 before 16.6.1. It was possible for users to access composer packages on public projects that have package registry disabled in the project settings.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-3964"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284",
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-12-01T07:15:09Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "An issue has been discovered in GitLab affecting all versions starting from 13.2 before 16.4.3, all versions starting from 16.5 before 16.5.3, all versions starting from 16.6 before 16.6.1. It was possible for users to access composer packages on public projects that have package registry disabled in the project settings.",
"id": "GHSA-7m6x-h8vx-f72m",
"modified": "2023-12-01T09:30:43Z",
"published": "2023-12-01T09:30:43Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-3964"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://hackerone.com/reports/2037316"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/issues/419857"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-7M72-MH5R-6J3R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-01-25 19:35 – Updated: 2023-02-15 22:01Impact
An issue was discovered in Rancher versions from 2.5.0 up to and including 2.5.16 and from 2.6.0 up to and including 2.6.9, where an authorization logic flaw allows privilege escalation via project role template binding (PRTB) and -promoted roles. This issue is not present in Rancher 2.7 releases.
Note: Consult Rancher documentation for more information about cluster and project roles and KB 000020097 for information about -promoted roles.
This privilege escalation is possible for users with access to the escalate verb on PRTBs (projectroletemplatebindings.management.cattle.io), including users with * verbs on PRTBs (see notes below for more information). These users can escalate permissions for any -promoted resource (see the table below for a full enumeration) in any cluster where they have a PRTB granting such permissions in at least one project in the cluster.
On a default Rancher setup, only the following roles have such permissions:
- Project Owner
- Manage Project Members
These roles have permissions to affect the following resources:
| Resource | API Group | Affected Rancher version |
|---|---|---|
| navlinks | ui.cattle.io | 2.6 |
| nodes | "" | 2.6 |
| persistentvolumes | "" | 2.5, 2.6 |
| persistentvolumes | core | 2.5, 2.6 |
| storageclasses | storage.k8s.io | 2.5, 2.6 |
| apiservices | apiregistration.k8s.io | 2.5, 2.6 |
| clusterrepos | catalog.cattle.io | 2.5, 2.6 |
clusters (local only) |
management.cattle.io | 2.5, 2.6 |
Notes:
- During the calculation of the CVSS score,
privileges requiredwas considered ashighbecause, by default,standard useranduser-baseusers in Rancher do not havecreate,patchandupdatepermissions onroletemplates. - If a role template with access to those objects was already created by another user in the cluster, then this issue can be exploited by users without the mentioned permissions from point 1.
Workarounds
If updating Rancher to a patched version is not possible, then the following workarounds must be observed to mitigate this issue:
- Only grant Project Owner and Manage Project Members roles to trusted users.
- Minimize the creation of custom roles that contain the
escalate,*or write verbs (create,delete,patch,update) onprojectroletemplatebindingsresource, and only grant such custom roles to trusted users. - Minimize the number of users that have permissions to
create,patchandupdateroletemplates.
Patches
Patched versions include releases 2.5.17 and 2.6.10 and later versions. This issue is not present in Rancher 2.7 releases.
Detection
The following script was developed to list role template bindings that give written access to the affected resources listed above. It is highly recommended to run the script in your environment and review the list of identified roles and role template bindings for possible signs of exploitation of this issue. The script requires jq installed and a kubeconfig with access to Rancher local cluster; it can also be executed in Rancher's kubectl shell.
#!/bin/bash
help="
Usage: bash find_promoted_resource.sh \n \n
Requires: \n
- jq installed and on path \n
- A kubeconfig pointing at rancher's local cluster (can also run from rancher's kubectl shell) \n \n
Outputs a list of roletemplates and roletemplate bindings which give write access to promoted resources.
"
if [[ $1 == "-h" || $1 == "--help" ]]
then
echo -e $help
exit 0
fi
# first, get the current roletemplates so that we only issue a get once
kubectl get roletemplates.management.cattle.io -o json >> script_templates.json
# find roles which have write access to a promoted resource. Filter on roleTemplates which fulfill all requirements:
# Have a project context
# Have some rules
# Have one/more of the target api groups, or a * in the api groups
# Have one/more of the target resources, or a * in the resources
# Have a verb that is not read access (i.e. a verb that is not get/list/watch)
roles=$(jq --argjson apiGroups '["", "ui.cattle.io", "core", "storage.k8s.io", "apiregistration.k8s.io", "catalog.cattle.io", "management.cattle.io"]' --argjson resources '["navlinks", "persistentvolumes", "nodes", "storageclasses", "apiservices", "clusterrepos", "clusters"]' --argjson verbs '["get", "list", "watch"]' '.items[] | select(.context=="project" and (.rules | length >= 1)) | select( .rules[] | select( (($apiGroups - .apiGroups | length < 7) or (.apiGroups | index("*"))) and (($resources - .resources | length < 7) or (.resources | index("*"))) and (.verbs - $verbs | length > 0)) | length >= 1 ) | .metadata.name' script_templates.json | jq -s )
# log promoted roles which give direct write access so they can be easily fixed
echo "The following role templates give direct write access to a promoted resource:"
echo $roles
echo -e ""
# find any roles which inherit first-level roles. Mostly a BFS which radiates outward from the known bad roles
old_roles="[]"
new_roles="$roles"
old_length=$(echo $old_roles | jq 'length')
new_length=$(echo $new_roles | jq 'length')
# if our last loop found nothing new, it's safe to stop
while [[ $old_length != $new_length ]];
do
# set old values to what we currently know about
old_roles=$new_roles
old_length=$new_length
# update new values with anything that inherits a "bad" role we know about
new_roles=$(jq --argjson roles "$old_roles" --argjson roleLen "$old_length" '.items[] | .metadata.name as $NAME | select (( $roles | index($NAME)) or ((.roleTemplateNames | length > 0 ) and ($roles - .roleTemplateNames | length < $roleLen))) | .metadata.name ' script_templates.json | jq -s)
new_length=$(echo $new_roles | jq 'length')
done
roles=$new_roles
# log all roles which can give write access, even if it's not first level
echo -e "The following role templates give write access to a promoted resource directly or through inheritance:"
echo $roles
echo -e ""
kubectl get projectroletemplatebindings.management.cattle.io -A -o json >> script_bindings.json
role_template_bindings=$(jq --argjson roleTemplates "$roles" '.items[] | .roleTemplateName as $TemplateName | select($roleTemplates | index($TemplateName)) | .metadata.name' script_bindings.json | jq -s)
# since these bindings could be for users or groups, we need to include all fields which could help identify the subject. But they won't all be present, which makes the list look less pretty
echo -e "The following is a list of bindings which give access to promoted resource, with the format of: bindingName, projectName, userName, userPrincipalName, groupName, groupPrincipalName: "
echo $(jq --argjson bindings "$role_template_bindings" '.items[] | .metadata.name as $BindingName | select ( $bindings | index($BindingName)) | .metadata.name, .projectName, .userName?, .userPrincipalName?, .groupName?, .groupPrincipalName?' script_bindings.json | jq -s)
unset old_roles
unset new_roles
unset roles
unset role_template_bindings
rm script_templates.json
rm script_bindings.json
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
- Reach out to SUSE Rancher Security team for security related inquiries.
- Open an issue in Rancher repository.
- Verify our support matrix and product support lifecycle
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/rancher/rancher"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.5.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.5.17"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/rancher/rancher"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.6.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.6.10"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-43759"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-269",
"CWE-284"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-01-25T19:35:02Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-02-07T13:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nAn issue was discovered in Rancher versions from 2.5.0 up to and including 2.5.16 and from 2.6.0 up to and including 2.6.9, where an authorization logic flaw allows privilege escalation via project role template binding (PRTB) and `-promoted` roles. This issue is not present in Rancher 2.7 releases.\n\nNote: Consult Rancher [documentation](https://ranchermanager.docs.rancher.com/how-to-guides/new-user-guides/authentication-permissions-and-global-configuration/manage-role-based-access-control-rbac/cluster-and-project-roles) for more information about cluster and project roles and [KB 000020097](https://www.suse.com/support/kb/doc/?id=000020097) for information about `-promoted` roles.\n\nThis privilege escalation is possible for users with access to the `escalate` verb on PRTBs (`projectroletemplatebindings.management.cattle.io`), including users with `*` verbs on PRTBs (see notes below for more information). These users can escalate permissions for any `-promoted` resource (see the table below for a full enumeration) in any cluster where they have a PRTB granting such permissions in at least one project in the cluster.\n\nOn a default Rancher setup, only the following roles have such permissions:\n\n1. Project Owner\n2. Manage Project Members\n\nThese roles have permissions to affect the following resources:\n\n| Resource | API Group | Affected Rancher version |\n| - | - | - |\n| navlinks | ui.cattle.io | 2.6 |\n| nodes | \"\" | 2.6 |\n| persistentvolumes | \"\" | 2.5, 2.6 |\n| persistentvolumes | core | 2.5, 2.6 |\n| storageclasses | storage.k8s.io | 2.5, 2.6 |\n| apiservices | apiregistration.k8s.io | 2.5, 2.6 |\n| clusterrepos | catalog.cattle.io | 2.5, 2.6 |\n| clusters (`local` only) | management.cattle.io | 2.5, 2.6 |\n\nNotes:\n\n1. During the calculation of the CVSS score, `privileges required` was considered as `high` because, by default, `standard user` and `user-base` users in Rancher do not have `create`, `patch` and `update` permissions on `roletemplates`.\n2. If a role template with access to those objects was already created by another user in the cluster, then this issue can be exploited by users without the mentioned permissions from point 1.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nIf updating Rancher to a patched version is not possible, then the following workarounds must be observed to mitigate this issue:\n\n1. Only grant Project Owner and Manage Project Members roles to trusted users.\n5. Minimize the creation of custom roles that contain the `escalate`, `*` or write verbs (`create`, `delete`, `patch`, `update`) on `projectroletemplatebindings` resource, and only grant such custom roles to trusted users.\n6. Minimize the number of users that have permissions to `create`, `patch` and `update` `roletemplates`.\n\n### Patches\n\nPatched versions include releases 2.5.17 and 2.6.10 and later versions. This issue is not present in Rancher 2.7 releases.\n\n### Detection\n\nThe following script was developed to list role template bindings that give written access to the affected resources listed above. It is highly recommended to run the script in your environment and review the list of identified roles and role template bindings for possible signs of exploitation of this issue. The script requires `jq` installed and a `kubeconfig` with access to Rancher local cluster; it can also be executed in Rancher\u0027s kubectl shell.\n\n```shell\n#!/bin/bash\n\nhelp=\"\nUsage: bash find_promoted_resource.sh \\n \\n\n\nRequires: \\n\n- jq installed and on path \\n\n- A kubeconfig pointing at rancher\u0027s local cluster (can also run from rancher\u0027s kubectl shell) \\n \\n\n\nOutputs a list of roletemplates and roletemplate bindings which give write access to promoted resources.\n\"\n\nif [[ $1 == \"-h\" || $1 == \"--help\" ]]\nthen\n\techo -e $help\n\texit 0\nfi\n\n# first, get the current roletemplates so that we only issue a get once\nkubectl get roletemplates.management.cattle.io -o json \u003e\u003e script_templates.json\n\n# find roles which have write access to a promoted resource. Filter on roleTemplates which fulfill all requirements:\n# Have a project context\n# Have some rules\n# Have one/more of the target api groups, or a * in the api groups\n# Have one/more of the target resources, or a * in the resources\n# Have a verb that is not read access (i.e. a verb that is not get/list/watch)\nroles=$(jq --argjson apiGroups \u0027[\"\", \"ui.cattle.io\", \"core\", \"storage.k8s.io\", \"apiregistration.k8s.io\", \"catalog.cattle.io\", \"management.cattle.io\"]\u0027 --argjson resources \u0027[\"navlinks\", \"persistentvolumes\", \"nodes\", \"storageclasses\", \"apiservices\", \"clusterrepos\", \"clusters\"]\u0027 --argjson verbs \u0027[\"get\", \"list\", \"watch\"]\u0027 \u0027.items[] | select(.context==\"project\" and (.rules | length \u003e= 1)) | select( .rules[] | select( (($apiGroups - .apiGroups | length \u003c 7) or (.apiGroups | index(\"*\"))) and (($resources - .resources | length \u003c 7) or (.resources | index(\"*\"))) and (.verbs - $verbs | length \u003e 0)) | length \u003e= 1 ) | .metadata.name\u0027 script_templates.json | jq -s )\n\n# log promoted roles which give direct write access so they can be easily fixed\necho \"The following role templates give direct write access to a promoted resource:\"\necho $roles\necho -e \"\"\n\n# find any roles which inherit first-level roles. Mostly a BFS which radiates outward from the known bad roles \nold_roles=\"[]\"\nnew_roles=\"$roles\"\nold_length=$(echo $old_roles | jq \u0027length\u0027)\nnew_length=$(echo $new_roles | jq \u0027length\u0027)\n# if our last loop found nothing new, it\u0027s safe to stop\nwhile [[ $old_length != $new_length ]];\ndo\n\t# set old values to what we currently know about\n\told_roles=$new_roles\n\told_length=$new_length\n\t# update new values with anything that inherits a \"bad\" role we know about\n\tnew_roles=$(jq --argjson roles \"$old_roles\" --argjson roleLen \"$old_length\" \u0027.items[] | .metadata.name as $NAME | select (( $roles | index($NAME)) or ((.roleTemplateNames | length \u003e 0 ) and ($roles - .roleTemplateNames | length \u003c $roleLen))) | .metadata.name \u0027 script_templates.json | jq -s)\n\tnew_length=$(echo $new_roles | jq \u0027length\u0027)\ndone\n\nroles=$new_roles\n\n# log all roles which can give write access, even if it\u0027s not first level\necho -e \"The following role templates give write access to a promoted resource directly or through inheritance:\"\necho $roles\necho -e \"\"\n\nkubectl get projectroletemplatebindings.management.cattle.io -A -o json \u003e\u003e script_bindings.json\nrole_template_bindings=$(jq --argjson roleTemplates \"$roles\" \u0027.items[] | .roleTemplateName as $TemplateName | select($roleTemplates | index($TemplateName)) | .metadata.name\u0027 script_bindings.json | jq -s)\n\n# since these bindings could be for users or groups, we need to include all fields which could help identify the subject. But they won\u0027t all be present, which makes the list look less pretty\necho -e \"The following is a list of bindings which give access to promoted resource, with the format of: bindingName, projectName, userName, userPrincipalName, groupName, groupPrincipalName: \"\necho $(jq --argjson bindings \"$role_template_bindings\" \u0027.items[] | .metadata.name as $BindingName | select ( $bindings | index($BindingName)) | .metadata.name, .projectName, .userName?, .userPrincipalName?, .groupName?, .groupPrincipalName?\u0027 script_bindings.json | jq -s)\n\nunset old_roles\nunset new_roles\nunset roles\nunset role_template_bindings\nrm script_templates.json\nrm script_bindings.json\n```\n\n### For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n\n* Reach out to [SUSE Rancher Security team](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/security/policy) for security related inquiries.\n* Open an issue in [Rancher](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/issues/new/choose) repository.\n* Verify our [support matrix](https://www.suse.com/suse-rancher/support-matrix/all-supported-versions/) and [product support lifecycle](https://www.suse.com/lifecycle/)",
"id": "GHSA-7m72-mh5r-6j3r",
"modified": "2023-02-15T22:01:37Z",
"published": "2023-01-25T19:35:02Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rancher/rancher/security/advisories/GHSA-7m72-mh5r-6j3r"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-43759"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1205293"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/rancher/rancher"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Privilege escalation in project role template binding (PRTB) and -promoted roles"
}
GHSA-7M82-M7X6-RVMX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 03:54 – Updated: 2022-05-17 03:54Environmental Systems Corporation (ESC) 8832 Data Controller 3.02 and earlier mishandles sessions, which allows remote attackers to bypass authentication and make arbitrary configuration changes via unspecified vectors.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2016-4501"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2016-05-31T01:59:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Environmental Systems Corporation (ESC) 8832 Data Controller 3.02 and earlier mishandles sessions, which allows remote attackers to bypass authentication and make arbitrary configuration changes via unspecified vectors.",
"id": "GHSA-7m82-m7x6-rvmx",
"modified": "2022-05-17T03:54:29Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T03:54:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-4501"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-16-147-01"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-7M84-QCMG-4CH2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-11-25 18:32 – Updated: 2025-11-25 21:32Primakon Pi Portal 1.0.18 REST /api/v2/user/register endpoint suffers from a Broken Access Control vulnerability. The endpoint fails to implement any authorization checks, allowing unauthenticated attackers to perform POST requests to register new user accounts in the application's local database. This bypasses the intended security architecture, which relies on an external Identity Provider for initial user registration and assumes that internal user creation is an administrative-only function. This vector can also be chained with other vulnerabilities for privilege escalation and complete compromise of application. This specific request can be used to also enumerate already registered user accounts, aiding in social engineering or further targeted attacks.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-64066"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-11-25T18:15:54Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Primakon Pi Portal 1.0.18 REST /api/v2/user/register endpoint suffers from a Broken Access Control vulnerability. The endpoint fails to implement any authorization checks, allowing unauthenticated attackers to perform POST requests to register new user accounts in the application\u0027s local database. This bypasses the intended security architecture, which relies on an external Identity Provider for initial user registration and assumes that internal user creation is an administrative-only function. This vector can also be chained with other vulnerabilities for privilege escalation and complete compromise of application. This specific request can be used to also enumerate already registered user accounts, aiding in social engineering or further targeted attacks.",
"id": "GHSA-7m84-qcmg-4ch2",
"modified": "2025-11-25T21:32:06Z",
"published": "2025-11-25T18:32:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-64066"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/n3k7ar91/Vulnerabilites/blob/main/Primakon/CVE-2025-64066.md"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.primakon.com/rjesenja/primakon-pcm"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation MIT-1
Very carefully manage the setting, management, and handling of privileges. Explicitly manage trust zones in the software.
Mitigation MIT-46
Strategy: Separation of Privilege
- Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area.
- Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.
CAPEC-19: Embedding Scripts within Scripts
An adversary leverages the capability to execute their own script by embedding it within other scripts that the target software is likely to execute due to programs' vulnerabilities that are brought on by allowing remote hosts to execute scripts.
CAPEC-441: Malicious Logic Insertion
An adversary installs or adds malicious logic (also known as malware) into a seemingly benign component of a fielded system. This logic is often hidden from the user of the system and works behind the scenes to achieve negative impacts. With the proliferation of mass digital storage and inexpensive multimedia devices, Bluetooth and 802.11 support, new attack vectors for spreading malware are emerging for things we once thought of as innocuous greeting cards, picture frames, or digital projectors. This pattern of attack focuses on systems already fielded and used in operation as opposed to systems and their components that are still under development and part of the supply chain.
CAPEC-478: Modification of Windows Service Configuration
An adversary exploits a weakness in access control to modify the execution parameters of a Windows service. The goal of this attack is to execute a malicious binary in place of an existing service.
CAPEC-479: Malicious Root Certificate
An adversary exploits a weakness in authorization and installs a new root certificate on a compromised system. Certificates are commonly used for establishing secure TLS/SSL communications within a web browser. When a user attempts to browse a website that presents a certificate that is not trusted an error message will be displayed to warn the user of the security risk. Depending on the security settings, the browser may not allow the user to establish a connection to the website. Adversaries have used this technique to avoid security warnings prompting users when compromised systems connect over HTTPS to adversary controlled web servers that spoof legitimate websites in order to collect login credentials.
CAPEC-502: Intent Spoof
An adversary, through a previously installed malicious application, issues an intent directed toward a specific trusted application's component in an attempt to achieve a variety of different objectives including modification of data, information disclosure, and data injection. Components that have been unintentionally exported and made public are subject to this type of an attack. If the component trusts the intent's action without verififcation, then the target application performs the functionality at the adversary's request, helping the adversary achieve the desired negative technical impact.
CAPEC-503: WebView Exposure
An adversary, through a malicious web page, accesses application specific functionality by leveraging interfaces registered through WebView's addJavascriptInterface API. Once an interface is registered to WebView through addJavascriptInterface, it becomes global and all pages loaded in the WebView can call this interface.
CAPEC-536: Data Injected During Configuration
An attacker with access to data files and processes on a victim's system injects malicious data into critical operational data during configuration or recalibration, causing the victim's system to perform in a suboptimal manner that benefits the adversary.
CAPEC-546: Incomplete Data Deletion in a Multi-Tenant Environment
An adversary obtains unauthorized information due to insecure or incomplete data deletion in a multi-tenant environment. If a cloud provider fails to completely delete storage and data from former cloud tenants' systems/resources, once these resources are allocated to new, potentially malicious tenants, the latter can probe the provided resources for sensitive information still there.
CAPEC-550: Install New Service
When an operating system starts, it also starts programs called services or daemons. Adversaries may install a new service which will be executed at startup (on a Windows system, by modifying the registry). The service name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software. Services are usually run with elevated privileges.
CAPEC-551: Modify Existing Service
When an operating system starts, it also starts programs called services or daemons. Modifying existing services may break existing services or may enable services that are disabled/not commonly used.
CAPEC-552: Install Rootkit
An adversary exploits a weakness in authentication to install malware that alters the functionality and information provide by targeted operating system API calls. Often referred to as rootkits, it is often used to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components.
CAPEC-556: Replace File Extension Handlers
When a file is opened, its file handler is checked to determine which program opens the file. File handlers are configuration properties of many operating systems. Applications can modify the file handler for a given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened.
CAPEC-558: Replace Trusted Executable
An adversary exploits weaknesses in privilege management or access control to replace a trusted executable with a malicious version and enable the execution of malware when that trusted executable is called.
CAPEC-562: Modify Shared File
An adversary manipulates the files in a shared location by adding malicious programs, scripts, or exploit code to valid content. Once a user opens the shared content, the tainted content is executed.
CAPEC-563: Add Malicious File to Shared Webroot
An adversaries may add malicious content to a website through the open file share and then browse to that content with a web browser to cause the server to execute the content. The malicious content will typically run under the context and permissions of the web server process, often resulting in local system or administrative privileges depending on how the web server is configured.
CAPEC-564: Run Software at Logon
Operating system allows logon scripts to be run whenever a specific user or users logon to a system. If adversaries can access these scripts, they may insert additional code into the logon script. This code can allow them to maintain persistence or move laterally within an enclave because it is executed every time the affected user or users logon to a computer. Modifying logon scripts can effectively bypass workstation and enclave firewalls. Depending on the access configuration of the logon scripts, either local credentials or a remote administrative account may be necessary.
CAPEC-578: Disable Security Software
An adversary exploits a weakness in access control to disable security tools so that detection does not occur. This can take the form of killing processes, deleting registry keys so that tools do not start at run time, deleting log files, or other methods.