CWE-285
DiscouragedImproper Authorization
Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft
The product does not perform or incorrectly performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action.
2307 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-Q3XH-HC27-QV32
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-11-03 09:32 – Updated: 2023-11-03 09:32Improper Authorization in GitHub repository teamamaze/amazefileutilities prior to 1.91.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-5948"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-11-03T07:15:14Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Improper Authorization in GitHub repository teamamaze/amazefileutilities prior to 1.91.",
"id": "GHSA-q3xh-hc27-qv32",
"modified": "2023-11-03T09:32:49Z",
"published": "2023-11-03T09:32:49Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-5948"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/teamamaze/amazefileutilities/commit/62d02204d452603ab85c50d43c7c680e4256c7d7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://huntr.com/bounties/ac1363b5-207b-40d9-aac5-e66d6213f692"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-Q4RM-M6XH-5PV7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-02 19:23 – Updated: 2026-07-02 19:23Summary
The Mysqls.add API command (lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Mysqls.php) accepts a customer-controlled mysql_server parameter and only validates that the value is numeric and that the server index exists in userdata.inc.php. It never checks the value against the calling customer's allowed_mysqlserver allowlist. A customer can therefore create a database, plus a MySQL user with a password they choose, on any MySQL server the operator has configured — including servers that were explicitly excluded from that customer (e.g. a separate cluster, premium-tier host, or another tenant pool). The same allowed_mysqlserver check is correctly enforced in MysqlServer::get() / MysqlServer::listing() and in the customer-facing UI (customer_mysql.php), confirming the omission is a bug, not by-design.
Details
Vulnerable code path — lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Mysqls.php:69-99 (add()):
public function add()
{
if (($this->getUserDetail('mysqls_used') < $this->getUserDetail('mysqls') || ...) {
...
$customer = $this->getCustomerData('mysqls'); // line 80
$dbserver = $this->getParam('mysql_server', true, // line 81 — user-controlled
$this->getDefaultMySqlServer($customer));
...
$dbserver = Validate::validate($dbserver, ..., '/^[0-9]+$/', ...); // line 92 — numeric only
Database::needRoot(true, $dbserver, false); // line 93 — root ctx for ANY index
Database::needSqlData();
$sql_root = Database::getSqlData();
Database::needRoot(false);
if (!is_array($sql_root)) { // line 97 — only existence check
throw new Exception("Database server with index #" . $dbserver . " is unknown", 404);
}
...
$username = $dbm->createDatabase($newdb_params['loginname'], $password,
$dbserver, ...); // line 116/118 — DB+user created
...
Database::pexecute($stmt, ["customerid"=>$customer['customerid'], ..., "dbserver"=>$dbserver], ...);
}
}
The $customer['allowed_mysqlserver'] field IS read on line 80 but is only consumed by getDefaultMySqlServer() (lines 566-573) to compute a default when the request omits mysql_server. As soon as the client supplies the parameter, the default path is skipped and no further authorization gate runs.
Cross-file evidence the check is intended elsewhere:
lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/MysqlServer.php:319-323—get()rejects with HTTP 405 when$dbserveris not inallowed_mysqlserver:php if ($this->isAdmin() == false) { $allowed_mysqls = json_decode($this->getUserDetail('allowed_mysqlserver'), true); if ($allowed_mysqls === false || empty($allowed_mysqls) || !in_array($dbserver, $allowed_mysqls)) { throw new Exception("You cannot access this resource", 405); } ... }lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/MysqlServer.php:252-257— same allowlist filter onlisting().customer_mysql.php:222— UI rejects withResponse::dynamicError('No permission')whenempty($allowed_mysqlservers).
Chain of execution (attacker → impact):
- Customer authenticates to
api.phpwith apikey/secret. The only API gate iscust_api_allowed;allowed_mysqlserveris not consulted at auth time. - Customer sends JSON
{"command":"Mysqls.add","params":{"mysql_password":"<valid>","mysql_server":<disallowed_idx>}}. Mysqls.php:71quota check passes (mysqls_used < mysqls).Mysqls.php:80getCustomerData('mysqls')returns the caller's own row.Mysqls.php:81$dbserveris set from the request (default-fallback path skipped).Mysqls.php:92numeric regex passes.Mysqls.php:93-99Database::needRoot(true, $dbserver, false)switches to the root context of the attacker-chosen server; existence check passes.Mysqls.php:116/118DbManager::createDatabase(...)runs against the disallowed server using stored root credentials, creating the DB and granting the supplied password to<loginname>_<sqlN>(DbManager.php:177-218).Mysqls.php:127-141inserts a row intoTABLE_PANEL_DATABASESwith the attacker'scustomeridand the disalloweddbserver, allowing later management viaMysqls.get/update/delete(which only filter bycustomeridfor non-admins, e.g.Mysqls.php:282).
PoC
Preconditions on the target instance:
- ≥2 MySQL servers configured in lib/userdata.inc.php (e.g. index 0 default, index 1 internal/premium).
- Customer X with allowed_mysqlserver=[0], cust_api_allowed=1, mysqls > 0, and an issued API key (apikey:secret).
Request — customer creates a database on server 1, which is not in their allowlist:
curl -k -u 'CUST_APIKEY:CUST_SECRET' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-X POST \
-d '{"command":"Mysqls.add","params":{"mysql_password":"ValidP@ssw0rd!","mysql_server":1}}' \
https://froxlor.example.com/api.php
Expected (mirroring MysqlServer.get() behaviour): HTTP 405 — "You cannot access this resource".
Actual: HTTP 200 with the full database record, e.g.:
{"data":{"id":42,"customerid":<cust_id>,"databasename":"<loginname>_sql1","dbserver":1,...}}
Verify the credentials work on the forbidden server:
mysql -h server1.host -u <loginname>_sql1 -p # password: ValidP@ssw0rd!
mysql> SHOW DATABASES; # the new DB is present
mysql> USE <loginname>_sql1; # full access to the newly-created DB
The customer can subsequently manage the DB via Mysqls.get, Mysqls.update, and Mysqls.delete — those non-admin code paths filter only by customerid (Mysqls.php:282-289, Mysqls.php:380-391), which matches.
Impact
- Bypass of the per-customer MySQL-server allowlist (
allowed_mysqlserver) enforced by the admin/reseller. The authorization model is fully defeated for theaddoperation. - The customer obtains valid MySQL credentials on a server the operator explicitly excluded for them — possibly an internal/separate cluster, billing tier, premium-only host, or a server provisioned for a different tenant pool.
- The customer can persist a DB on the forbidden server (resource and policy bypass), then read/write data there, and continue to manage it through
Mysqls.update/Mysqls.delete. - Impact is bounded: privileges granted by
DbManager::grantPrivilegesToapply only to the new<loginname>_sqlNdatabase, so no cross-tenant data exposure on the forbidden server. The damage is policy bypass, resource consumption on the forbidden server, and credential persistence there.
Recommended Fix
Mirror the allowlist check already present in MysqlServer::get(). After the numeric validation on Mysqls.php:92, before Database::needRoot(...), add for non-admin callers:
// validate whether the dbserver exists
$dbserver = Validate::validate($dbserver, html_entity_decode(lng('mysql.mysql_server')), '/^[0-9]+$/', '', 0, true);
// enforce per-customer allowed_mysqlserver allowlist (parity with MysqlServer::get())
if (!$this->isAdmin()) {
$allowed = json_decode($customer['allowed_mysqlserver'] ?? '[]', true);
if (!is_array($allowed) || empty($allowed)
|| !in_array((int)$dbserver, array_map('intval', $allowed), true)) {
throw new Exception('You cannot access this resource', 405);
}
}
Database::needRoot(true, $dbserver, false);
Audit Mysqls::update(), Mysqls::delete(), and Mysqls::get() for the same gap: those endpoints accept mysql_server and ultimately call Database::needRoot(true, $result['dbserver'], false) on the row's stored value. Once the row exists with a forbidden dbserver, those paths execute against the forbidden server unchallenged. Consider rejecting any non-admin operation whose target row's dbserver is outside allowed_mysqlserver, even if the row already exists, to defend in depth.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.3.6"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "froxlor/froxlor"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.3.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-02T19:23:49Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThe `Mysqls.add` API command (`lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Mysqls.php`) accepts a customer-controlled `mysql_server` parameter and only validates that the value is numeric and that the server index exists in `userdata.inc.php`. It never checks the value against the calling customer\u0027s `allowed_mysqlserver` allowlist. A customer can therefore create a database, plus a MySQL user with a password they choose, on any MySQL server the operator has configured \u2014 including servers that were explicitly excluded from that customer (e.g. a separate cluster, premium-tier host, or another tenant pool). The same `allowed_mysqlserver` check is correctly enforced in `MysqlServer::get()` / `MysqlServer::listing()` and in the customer-facing UI (`customer_mysql.php`), confirming the omission is a bug, not by-design.\n\n## Details\n\n**Vulnerable code path** \u2014 `lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Mysqls.php:69-99` (`add()`):\n\n```php\npublic function add()\n{\n if (($this-\u003egetUserDetail(\u0027mysqls_used\u0027) \u003c $this-\u003egetUserDetail(\u0027mysqls\u0027) || ...) {\n ...\n $customer = $this-\u003egetCustomerData(\u0027mysqls\u0027); // line 80\n $dbserver = $this-\u003egetParam(\u0027mysql_server\u0027, true, // line 81 \u2014 user-controlled\n $this-\u003egetDefaultMySqlServer($customer));\n ...\n $dbserver = Validate::validate($dbserver, ..., \u0027/^[0-9]+$/\u0027, ...); // line 92 \u2014 numeric only\n Database::needRoot(true, $dbserver, false); // line 93 \u2014 root ctx for ANY index\n Database::needSqlData();\n $sql_root = Database::getSqlData();\n Database::needRoot(false);\n if (!is_array($sql_root)) { // line 97 \u2014 only existence check\n throw new Exception(\"Database server with index #\" . $dbserver . \" is unknown\", 404);\n }\n ...\n $username = $dbm-\u003ecreateDatabase($newdb_params[\u0027loginname\u0027], $password,\n $dbserver, ...); // line 116/118 \u2014 DB+user created\n ...\n Database::pexecute($stmt, [\"customerid\"=\u003e$customer[\u0027customerid\u0027], ..., \"dbserver\"=\u003e$dbserver], ...);\n }\n}\n```\n\nThe `$customer[\u0027allowed_mysqlserver\u0027]` field IS read on line 80 but is only consumed by `getDefaultMySqlServer()` (lines 566-573) to compute a default when the request omits `mysql_server`. As soon as the client supplies the parameter, the default path is skipped and no further authorization gate runs.\n\n**Cross-file evidence the check is intended elsewhere:**\n\n- `lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/MysqlServer.php:319-323` \u2014 `get()` rejects with HTTP 405 when `$dbserver` is not in `allowed_mysqlserver`:\n ```php\n if ($this-\u003eisAdmin() == false) {\n $allowed_mysqls = json_decode($this-\u003egetUserDetail(\u0027allowed_mysqlserver\u0027), true);\n if ($allowed_mysqls === false || empty($allowed_mysqls) || !in_array($dbserver, $allowed_mysqls)) {\n throw new Exception(\"You cannot access this resource\", 405);\n }\n ...\n }\n ```\n- `lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/MysqlServer.php:252-257` \u2014 same allowlist filter on `listing()`.\n- `customer_mysql.php:222` \u2014 UI rejects with `Response::dynamicError(\u0027No permission\u0027)` when `empty($allowed_mysqlservers)`.\n\n**Chain of execution (attacker \u2192 impact):**\n\n1. Customer authenticates to `api.php` with apikey/secret. The only API gate is `cust_api_allowed`; `allowed_mysqlserver` is not consulted at auth time.\n2. Customer sends JSON `{\"command\":\"Mysqls.add\",\"params\":{\"mysql_password\":\"\u003cvalid\u003e\",\"mysql_server\":\u003cdisallowed_idx\u003e}}`.\n3. `Mysqls.php:71` quota check passes (`mysqls_used \u003c mysqls`).\n4. `Mysqls.php:80` `getCustomerData(\u0027mysqls\u0027)` returns the caller\u0027s own row.\n5. `Mysqls.php:81` `$dbserver` is set from the request (default-fallback path skipped).\n6. `Mysqls.php:92` numeric regex passes.\n7. `Mysqls.php:93-99` `Database::needRoot(true, $dbserver, false)` switches to the root context of the attacker-chosen server; existence check passes.\n8. `Mysqls.php:116/118` `DbManager::createDatabase(...)` runs against the disallowed server using stored root credentials, creating the DB and granting the supplied password to `\u003cloginname\u003e_\u003csqlN\u003e` (DbManager.php:177-218).\n9. `Mysqls.php:127-141` inserts a row into `TABLE_PANEL_DATABASES` with the attacker\u0027s `customerid` and the disallowed `dbserver`, allowing later management via `Mysqls.get/update/delete` (which only filter by `customerid` for non-admins, e.g. `Mysqls.php:282`).\n\n## PoC\n\nPreconditions on the target instance:\n- \u22652 MySQL servers configured in `lib/userdata.inc.php` (e.g. index 0 default, index 1 internal/premium).\n- Customer X with `allowed_mysqlserver=[0]`, `cust_api_allowed=1`, `mysqls \u003e 0`, and an issued API key (`apikey:secret`).\n\nRequest \u2014 customer creates a database on server `1`, which is *not* in their allowlist:\n\n```bash\ncurl -k -u \u0027CUST_APIKEY:CUST_SECRET\u0027 \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n -X POST \\\n -d \u0027{\"command\":\"Mysqls.add\",\"params\":{\"mysql_password\":\"ValidP@ssw0rd!\",\"mysql_server\":1}}\u0027 \\\n https://froxlor.example.com/api.php\n```\n\nExpected (mirroring `MysqlServer.get()` behaviour): `HTTP 405 \u2014 \"You cannot access this resource\"`.\nActual: `HTTP 200` with the full database record, e.g.:\n\n```json\n{\"data\":{\"id\":42,\"customerid\":\u003ccust_id\u003e,\"databasename\":\"\u003cloginname\u003e_sql1\",\"dbserver\":1,...}}\n```\n\nVerify the credentials work on the forbidden server:\n\n```bash\nmysql -h server1.host -u \u003cloginname\u003e_sql1 -p # password: ValidP@ssw0rd!\nmysql\u003e SHOW DATABASES; # the new DB is present\nmysql\u003e USE \u003cloginname\u003e_sql1; # full access to the newly-created DB\n```\n\nThe customer can subsequently manage the DB via `Mysqls.get`, `Mysqls.update`, and `Mysqls.delete` \u2014 those non-admin code paths filter only by `customerid` (`Mysqls.php:282-289`, `Mysqls.php:380-391`), which matches.\n\n## Impact\n\n- Bypass of the per-customer MySQL-server allowlist (`allowed_mysqlserver`) enforced by the admin/reseller. The authorization model is fully defeated for the `add` operation.\n- The customer obtains valid MySQL credentials on a server the operator explicitly excluded for them \u2014 possibly an internal/separate cluster, billing tier, premium-only host, or a server provisioned for a different tenant pool.\n- The customer can persist a DB on the forbidden server (resource and policy bypass), then read/write data there, and continue to manage it through `Mysqls.update` / `Mysqls.delete`.\n- Impact is bounded: privileges granted by `DbManager::grantPrivilegesTo` apply only to the new `\u003cloginname\u003e_sqlN` database, so no cross-tenant data exposure on the forbidden server. The damage is policy bypass, resource consumption on the forbidden server, and credential persistence there.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nMirror the allowlist check already present in `MysqlServer::get()`. After the numeric validation on `Mysqls.php:92`, before `Database::needRoot(...)`, add for non-admin callers:\n\n```php\n// validate whether the dbserver exists\n$dbserver = Validate::validate($dbserver, html_entity_decode(lng(\u0027mysql.mysql_server\u0027)), \u0027/^[0-9]+$/\u0027, \u0027\u0027, 0, true);\n\n// enforce per-customer allowed_mysqlserver allowlist (parity with MysqlServer::get())\nif (!$this-\u003eisAdmin()) {\n $allowed = json_decode($customer[\u0027allowed_mysqlserver\u0027] ?? \u0027[]\u0027, true);\n if (!is_array($allowed) || empty($allowed)\n || !in_array((int)$dbserver, array_map(\u0027intval\u0027, $allowed), true)) {\n throw new Exception(\u0027You cannot access this resource\u0027, 405);\n }\n}\n\nDatabase::needRoot(true, $dbserver, false);\n```\n\nAudit `Mysqls::update()`, `Mysqls::delete()`, and `Mysqls::get()` for the same gap: those endpoints accept `mysql_server` and ultimately call `Database::needRoot(true, $result[\u0027dbserver\u0027], false)` on the row\u0027s stored value. Once the row exists with a forbidden `dbserver`, those paths execute against the forbidden server unchallenged. Consider rejecting any non-admin operation whose target row\u0027s `dbserver` is outside `allowed_mysqlserver`, even if the row already exists, to defend in depth.",
"id": "GHSA-q4rm-m6xh-5pv7",
"modified": "2026-07-02T19:23:49Z",
"published": "2026-07-02T19:23:49Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/security/advisories/GHSA-q4rm-m6xh-5pv7"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Froxlor customer can create MySQL databases on disallowed servers via Mysqls.add API"
}
GHSA-Q4X3-4F53-MG6Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-01 21:30 – Updated: 2026-06-03 21:30In addInputMethodListener of com.android.server.inputmethod.InputMethodManagerService, there is a missing permission check. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-0072"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-01T19:16:19Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "In addInputMethodListener of com.android.server.inputmethod.InputMethodManagerService, there is a missing permission check. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.",
"id": "GHSA-q4x3-4f53-mg6q",
"modified": "2026-06-03T21:30:25Z",
"published": "2026-06-01T21:30:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-0072"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://source.android.com/docs/security/bulletin/xr/2026/2026-06-01"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-Q53V-392R-55MW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-08-25 00:00 – Updated: 2022-08-29 20:06A logic issue was addressed with improved state management. This issue is fixed in macOS Monterey 12.5, macOS Big Sur 11.6.8, Security Update 2022-005 Catalina, iOS 15.6 and iPadOS 15.6. An app may be able to read arbitrary files.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-32838"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-08-24T20:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A logic issue was addressed with improved state management. This issue is fixed in macOS Monterey 12.5, macOS Big Sur 11.6.8, Security Update 2022-005 Catalina, iOS 15.6 and iPadOS 15.6. An app may be able to read arbitrary files.",
"id": "GHSA-q53v-392r-55mw",
"modified": "2022-08-29T20:06:49Z",
"published": "2022-08-25T00:00:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-32838"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT213343"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT213344"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT213345"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT213346"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-Q5P3-6VWG-RF7J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-07 15:38 – Updated: 2026-05-09 00:31The Optoma CinemaX P2 projector (firmware TVOS-04.24.010.04.01, Android 8.0.0) exposes Android Debug Bridge (ADB) on TCP port 5555 over the network without requiring authentication. The device is configured with ro.adb.secure=0, which disables RSA key verification. Additionally, a functional su binary exists at /system/xbin/su that grants root privileges without authentication. An attacker on the same network can connect to the device via ADB, obtain a shell, and escalate to root privileges, gaining complete control of the device. This allows extraction of stored WiFi credentials, installation of persistent malware, and access to all device data.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-30495"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-07T14:16:01Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The Optoma CinemaX P2 projector (firmware TVOS-04.24.010.04.01, Android 8.0.0) exposes Android Debug Bridge (ADB) on TCP port 5555 over the network without requiring authentication. The device is configured with ro.adb.secure=0, which disables RSA key verification. Additionally, a functional su binary exists at /system/xbin/su that grants root privileges without authentication. An attacker on the same network can connect to the device via ADB, obtain a shell, and escalate to root privileges, gaining complete control of the device. This allows extraction of stored WiFi credentials, installation of persistent malware, and access to all device data.",
"id": "GHSA-q5p3-6vwg-rf7j",
"modified": "2026-05-09T00:31:52Z",
"published": "2026-05-07T15:38:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-30495"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://whitelabel.org/security/2026-02-01-smart-projector"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-Q5VH-6WHW-X745
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-08-13 20:16 – Updated: 2024-10-07 16:44Impact
Starting with OneFuzz 2.12.0 or greater, an incomplete authorization check allows an authenticated user from any Azure Active Directory tenant to make authorized API calls to a vulnerable OneFuzz instance.
To be vulnerable, a OneFuzz deployment must be:
* Version 2.12.0 or greater
* Deployed with the non-default --multi_tenant_domain option
This can result in read/write access to private data such as: * Software vulnerability and crash information * Security testing tools * Proprietary code and symbols
Via authorized API calls, this also enables tampering with existing data and unauthorized code execution on Azure compute resources.
Patches
This issue is resolved starting in release 2.31.0, via the addition of application-level check of the bearer token's issuer against an administrator-configured allowlist.
Workarounds
Users can restrict access to the tenant of a deployed OneFuzz instance < 2.31.0 by redeploying in the default configuration, which omits the --multi_tenant_domain option.
References
You can find an overview of the Microsoft Identity Platform here. This vulnerability applies to the multi-tenant application pattern, as described here.
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue in OneFuzz * Email us at fuzzing@microsoft.com
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "onefuzz"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.12.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.31.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-37705"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285",
"CWE-346",
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-08-13T20:16:08Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2021-08-13T21:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "## Impact\n\nStarting with OneFuzz 2.12.0 or greater, an incomplete authorization check allows an authenticated user from any Azure Active Directory tenant to make authorized API calls to a vulnerable OneFuzz instance.\n\nTo be vulnerable, a OneFuzz deployment must be:\n* Version 2.12.0 or greater\n* Deployed with the non-default [`--multi_tenant_domain`](https://github.com/microsoft/onefuzz/blob/2.30.0/src/deployment/deploy.py#L1021) option\n\nThis can result in read/write access to private data such as:\n* Software vulnerability and crash information\n* Security testing tools\n* Proprietary code and symbols\n\nVia authorized API calls, this also enables tampering with existing data and unauthorized code execution on Azure compute resources.\n\n## Patches\n\nThis issue is resolved starting in release 2.31.0, via the addition of application-level check of the bearer token\u0027s `issuer` against an administrator-configured allowlist.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nUsers can restrict access to the tenant of a deployed OneFuzz instance \u003c 2.31.0 by redeploying in the default configuration, which omits the `--multi_tenant_domain` option.\n\n## References\n\nYou can find an overview of the Microsoft Identity Platform [here](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/v2-overview). This vulnerability applies to the multi-tenant application pattern, as described [here](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/howto-convert-app-to-be-multi-tenant).\n\n## For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n* Open an issue in [OneFuzz](https://github.com/microsoft/onefuzz)\n* Email us at [fuzzing@microsoft.com](mailto:fuzzing@microsoft.com)",
"id": "GHSA-q5vh-6whw-x745",
"modified": "2024-10-07T16:44:37Z",
"published": "2021-08-13T20:16:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/microsoft/onefuzz/security/advisories/GHSA-q5vh-6whw-x745"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-37705"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/microsoft/onefuzz/pull/1153"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/microsoft/onefuzz/commit/2fcb4998887959b4fa11894a068d689189742cb1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/microsoft/onefuzz"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/microsoft/onefuzz/releases/tag/2.31.0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/onefuzz/PYSEC-2021-344.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://pypi.org/project/onefuzz"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:H/SI:H/SA:L",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Improper Authorization and Origin Validation Error in OneFuzz"
}
GHSA-Q5XQ-RVPH-WWGR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-03 00:31 – Updated: 2026-04-03 00:31Improper authorization in Microsoft Azure Kubernetes Service allows an unauthorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-33105"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285",
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-03T00:16:05Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Improper authorization in Microsoft Azure Kubernetes Service allows an unauthorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network.",
"id": "GHSA-q5xq-rvph-wwgr",
"modified": "2026-04-03T00:31:09Z",
"published": "2026-04-03T00:31:09Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33105"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-33105"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-Q6HV-WCJR-WP8H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-26 15:00 – Updated: 2025-10-23 20:15Impact
Because UPDATE validation is not being applied, it is possible for an actor with access to an instance of the initializingworkspaces virtual workspace to run arbitrary patches on the status field of LogicalCluster objects while the workspace is initializing.
This allows to add or remove any initializers as well as changing the phase of a LogicalCluster (to "Ready" for example).
As this effectively allows to skip certain initializers or the entire initialization phase, potential integrations with external systems such as billing or security could be affected. Their initializers could be skipped by a WorkspaceType that adds another initializer and grants permissions to the virtual workspace to a rogue or compromised entity.
Who is impacted?
- Impacts other owners of
WorkspaceTypeswith initializers that are inherited by otherWorkspaceTypes. - Impacts developers using the
virtual/frameworkpackage to create their own virtualworkspaces if they are using UpdateFuncs in their custom storageWrappers.
Details
The issue occurs because the rest.ValidateObjectUpdateFunc is not being called within the DefaultDynamicDelegatedStoreFuncs. As a result, the intended status overwrite protection from initializers never gets called, allowing arbitrary logicalcluster status patches.
Patches
The problem has been patched in #3599 and is available in kcp 0.28.3 and higher.
Workarounds
- Further limit access to the
initializeverb onWorkspaceTypeobjects (see documentation for details). - Only use trusted
WorkspaceTypeobjects.
References
See the pull request (#3599).
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.28.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/kcp-dev/kcp"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.28.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-09-26T15:00:19Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nBecause UPDATE validation is not being applied, it is possible for an actor with access to an instance of the [initializingworkspaces virtual workspace](https://docs.kcp.io/kcp/latest/concepts/workspaces/workspace-initialization/) to run arbitrary patches on the status field of `LogicalCluster` objects while the workspace is initializing.\n\nThis allows to add or remove any initializers as well as changing the phase of a `LogicalCluster` (to \"Ready\" for example).\n\nAs this effectively allows to skip certain initializers or the entire initialization phase, potential integrations with external systems such as billing or security could be affected. Their initializers could be skipped by a `WorkspaceType` that adds another initializer and grants permissions to the virtual workspace to a rogue or compromised entity.\n\n_Who is impacted?_\n\n* Impacts other owners of `WorkspaceTypes` with initializers that are inherited by other `WorkspaceTypes`.\n* Impacts developers using the `virtual/framework` package to create their own virtualworkspaces if they are using UpdateFuncs in their custom storageWrappers.\n\n### Details\n\nThe issue occurs because the [rest.ValidateObjectUpdateFunc](https://github.com/kcp-dev/kcp/blob/cli/v0.28.1/pkg/virtual/framework/forwardingregistry/store.go#L174) is not being called within the DefaultDynamicDelegatedStoreFuncs. As a result, the intended status overwrite protection from initializers never gets called, allowing arbitrary logicalcluster status patches.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe problem has been patched in #3599 and is available in kcp 0.28.3 and higher.\n\n### Workarounds\n\n- Further limit access to the `initialize` verb on `WorkspaceType` objects (see [documentation](https://docs.kcp.io/kcp/v0.28/concepts/workspaces/workspace-initialization/#enforcing-permissions-for-initializers) for details).\n- Only use trusted `WorkspaceType` objects.\n\n### References\n\nSee the pull request (#3599).",
"id": "GHSA-q6hv-wcjr-wp8h",
"modified": "2025-10-23T20:15:01Z",
"published": "2025-09-26T15:00:19Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/kcp-dev/kcp/security/advisories/GHSA-q6hv-wcjr-wp8h"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/kcp-dev/kcp/pull/3599"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/kcp-dev/kcp/commit/02134a2a51d33652ab288cccd7a13539b59c7584"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/kcp-dev/kcp"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/kcp-dev/kcp/releases/tag/v0.28.3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2025-3985"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "kcp is missing update validation allows arbitrary LogicalCluster status patches through initializingworkspaces Virtual Workspace"
}
GHSA-Q6MF-WWWR-3HG2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 16:52 – Updated: 2024-04-04 01:28cPanel before 11.54.0.4 allows arbitrary file-overwrite operations in scripts/quotacheck (SEC-81).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2016-10848"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2019-08-01T16:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "cPanel before 11.54.0.4 allows arbitrary file-overwrite operations in scripts/quotacheck (SEC-81).",
"id": "GHSA-q6mf-wwwr-3hg2",
"modified": "2024-04-04T01:28:08Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T16:52:07Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-10848"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://documentation.cpanel.net/display/CL/54+Change+Log"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://news.cpanel.com/cpanel-tsr-2016-0001-full-disclosure"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-Q6MV-M62H-7Q28
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 16:52 – Updated: 2024-04-04 01:35A vulnerability in the web management interface of Cisco Small Business 220 Series Smart Switches could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to upload arbitrary files. The vulnerability is due to incomplete authorization checks in the web management interface. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a malicious request to certain parts of the web management interface. Depending on the configuration of the affected switch, the malicious request must be sent via HTTP or HTTPS. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to modify the configuration of an affected device or to inject a reverse shell. This vulnerability affects Cisco Small Business 220 Series Smart Switches running firmware versions prior to 1.1.4.4 with the web management interface enabled. The web management interface is enabled via both HTTP and HTTPS by default.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-1912"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285",
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2019-08-07T06:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "A vulnerability in the web management interface of Cisco Small Business 220 Series Smart Switches could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to upload arbitrary files. The vulnerability is due to incomplete authorization checks in the web management interface. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a malicious request to certain parts of the web management interface. Depending on the configuration of the affected switch, the malicious request must be sent via HTTP or HTTPS. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to modify the configuration of an affected device or to inject a reverse shell. This vulnerability affects Cisco Small Business 220 Series Smart Switches running firmware versions prior to 1.1.4.4 with the web management interface enabled. The web management interface is enabled via both HTTP and HTTPS by default.",
"id": "GHSA-q6mv-m62h-7q28",
"modified": "2024-04-04T01:35:09Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T16:52:51Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-1912"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20190806-sb220-auth_bypass"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/154667/Realtek-Managed-Switch-Controller-RTL83xx-Stack-Overflow.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
- Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries.
- Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
Mitigation
Ensure that you perform access control checks related to your business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that you apply to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor.
Mitigation MIT-4.4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
Mitigation
- For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page.
- One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
Mitigation
Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.
CAPEC-1: Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs
In applications, particularly web applications, access to functionality is mitigated by an authorization framework. This framework maps Access Control Lists (ACLs) to elements of the application's functionality; particularly URL's for web apps. In the case that the administrator failed to specify an ACL for a particular element, an attacker may be able to access it with impunity. An attacker with the ability to access functionality not properly constrained by ACLs can obtain sensitive information and possibly compromise the entire application. Such an attacker can access resources that must be available only to users at a higher privilege level, can access management sections of the application, or can run queries for data that they otherwise not supposed to.
CAPEC-104: Cross Zone Scripting
An attacker is able to cause a victim to load content into their web-browser that bypasses security zone controls and gain access to increased privileges to execute scripting code or other web objects such as unsigned ActiveX controls or applets. This is a privilege elevation attack targeted at zone-based web-browser security.
CAPEC-127: Directory Indexing
An adversary crafts a request to a target that results in the target listing/indexing the content of a directory as output. One common method of triggering directory contents as output is to construct a request containing a path that terminates in a directory name rather than a file name since many applications are configured to provide a list of the directory's contents when such a request is received. An adversary can use this to explore the directory tree on a target as well as learn the names of files. This can often end up revealing test files, backup files, temporary files, hidden files, configuration files, user accounts, script contents, as well as naming conventions, all of which can be used by an attacker to mount additional attacks.
CAPEC-13: Subverting Environment Variable Values
The adversary directly or indirectly modifies environment variables used by or controlling the target software. The adversary's goal is to cause the target software to deviate from its expected operation in a manner that benefits the adversary.
CAPEC-17: Using Malicious Files
An attack of this type exploits a system's configuration that allows an adversary to either directly access an executable file, for example through shell access; or in a possible worst case allows an adversary to upload a file and then execute it. Web servers, ftp servers, and message oriented middleware systems which have many integration points are particularly vulnerable, because both the programmers and the administrators must be in synch regarding the interfaces and the correct privileges for each interface.
CAPEC-39: Manipulating Opaque Client-based Data Tokens
In circumstances where an application holds important data client-side in tokens (cookies, URLs, data files, and so forth) that data can be manipulated. If client or server-side application components reinterpret that data as authentication tokens or data (such as store item pricing or wallet information) then even opaquely manipulating that data may bear fruit for an Attacker. In this pattern an attacker undermines the assumption that client side tokens have been adequately protected from tampering through use of encryption or obfuscation.
CAPEC-402: Bypassing ATA Password Security
An adversary exploits a weakness in ATA security on a drive to gain access to the information the drive contains without supplying the proper credentials. ATA Security is often employed to protect hard disk information from unauthorized access. The mechanism requires the user to type in a password before the BIOS is allowed access to drive contents. Some implementations of ATA security will accept the ATA command to update the password without the user having authenticated with the BIOS. This occurs because the security mechanism assumes the user has first authenticated via the BIOS prior to sending commands to the drive. Various methods exist for exploiting this flaw, the most common being installing the ATA protected drive into a system lacking ATA security features (a.k.a. hot swapping). Once the drive is installed into the new system the BIOS can be used to reset the drive password.
CAPEC-45: Buffer Overflow via Symbolic Links
This type of attack leverages the use of symbolic links to cause buffer overflows. An adversary can try to create or manipulate a symbolic link file such that its contents result in out of bounds data. When the target software processes the symbolic link file, it could potentially overflow internal buffers with insufficient bounds checking.
CAPEC-5: Blue Boxing
This type of attack against older telephone switches and trunks has been around for decades. A tone is sent by an adversary to impersonate a supervisor signal which has the effect of rerouting or usurping command of the line. While the US infrastructure proper may not contain widespread vulnerabilities to this type of attack, many companies are connected globally through call centers and business process outsourcing. These international systems may be operated in countries which have not upgraded Telco infrastructure and so are vulnerable to Blue boxing. Blue boxing is a result of failure on the part of the system to enforce strong authorization for administrative functions. While the infrastructure is different than standard current applications like web applications, there are historical lessons to be learned to upgrade the access control for administrative functions.
{'xhtml:b': 'This attack pattern is included in CAPEC for historical purposes.'}
CAPEC-51: Poison Web Service Registry
SOA and Web Services often use a registry to perform look up, get schema information, and metadata about services. A poisoned registry can redirect (think phishing for servers) the service requester to a malicious service provider, provide incorrect information in schema or metadata, and delete information about service provider interfaces.
CAPEC-59: Session Credential Falsification through Prediction
This attack targets predictable session ID in order to gain privileges. The attacker can predict the session ID used during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking.
CAPEC-60: Reusing Session IDs (aka Session Replay)
This attack targets the reuse of valid session ID to spoof the target system in order to gain privileges. The attacker tries to reuse a stolen session ID used previously during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking. Another name for this type of attack is Session Replay.
CAPEC-647: Collect Data from Registries
An adversary exploits a weakness in authorization to gather system-specific data and sensitive information within a registry (e.g., Windows Registry, Mac plist). These contain information about the system configuration, software, operating system, and security. The adversary can leverage information gathered in order to carry out further attacks.
CAPEC-668: Key Negotiation of Bluetooth Attack (KNOB)
An adversary can exploit a flaw in Bluetooth key negotiation allowing them to decrypt information sent between two devices communicating via Bluetooth. The adversary uses an Adversary in the Middle setup to modify packets sent between the two devices during the authentication process, specifically the entropy bits. Knowledge of the number of entropy bits will allow the attacker to easily decrypt information passing over the line of communication.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-77: Manipulating User-Controlled Variables
This attack targets user controlled variables (DEBUG=1, PHP Globals, and So Forth). An adversary can override variables leveraging user-supplied, untrusted query variables directly used on the application server without any data sanitization. In extreme cases, the adversary can change variables controlling the business logic of the application. For instance, in languages like PHP, a number of poorly set default configurations may allow the user to override variables.
CAPEC-87: Forceful Browsing
An attacker employs forceful browsing (direct URL entry) to access portions of a website that are otherwise unreachable. Usually, a front controller or similar design pattern is employed to protect access to portions of a web application. Forceful browsing enables an attacker to access information, perform privileged operations and otherwise reach sections of the web application that have been improperly protected.