CWE-285
DiscouragedImproper Authorization
Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft
The product does not perform or incorrectly performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action.
2304 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-VPR3-RC99-2WPR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-06-05 15:01 – Updated: 2024-06-05 15:01The TYPO3 backend module stores the username of an authenticated backend user in its cache files. By guessing the file path to the cache files it is possible to receive valid backend usernames.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "typo3/cms"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "6.2.0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.2.26"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "typo3/cms"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "7.6.0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.6.10"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "typo3/cms"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "8.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "8.2.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-06-05T15:01:46Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The TYPO3 backend module stores the username of an authenticated backend user in its cache files. By guessing the file path to the cache files it is possible to receive valid backend usernames.",
"id": "GHSA-vpr3-rc99-2wpr",
"modified": "2024-06-05T15:01:46Z",
"published": "2024-06-05T15:01:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/typo3/cms/2016-07-19-4.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://typo3.org/security/advisory/typo3-core-sa-2016-017"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://typo3.org/teams/security/security-bulletins/typo3-core/typo3-core-sa-2016-017"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Information Disclosure in TYPO3 Backend"
}
GHSA-VQ3H-P7J6-HWJW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-04-28 12:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 03:43This vulnerability exists in Milesight 4K/H.265 Series NVR models (MS-Nxxxx-xxG, MS-Nxxxx-xxE, MS-Nxxxx-xxT, MS-Nxxxx-xxH and MS-Nxxxx-xxC), due to improper authorization at the Milesight NVR web-based management interface. A remote attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a specially crafted http requests on the targeted device.
Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could allow remote attacker to perform unauthorized activities on the targeted device.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-30467"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285",
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-04-28T11:15:09Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "This vulnerability exists in Milesight 4K/H.265 Series NVR models (MS-Nxxxx-xxG, MS-Nxxxx-xxE, MS-Nxxxx-xxT, MS-Nxxxx-xxH and MS-Nxxxx-xxC), due to improper authorization at the Milesight NVR web-based management interface. A remote attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a specially crafted http requests on the targeted device.\n\nSuccessful exploitation of this vulnerability could allow remote attacker to perform unauthorized activities on the targeted device.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n",
"id": "GHSA-vq3h-p7j6-hwjw",
"modified": "2024-04-04T03:43:26Z",
"published": "2023-04-28T12:30:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-30467"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cert-in.org.in/s2cMainServlet?pageid=PUBVLNOTES01\u0026VLCODE=CIVN-2023-0121"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-VQJC-H5M3-4Q6J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-02-19 00:01 – Updated: 2023-07-24 15:30MMP: All versions prior to v1.0.3, PTP C-series: Device versions prior to v2.8.6.1, and PTMP C-series and A5x: Device versions prior to v2.5.4.1 does not perform proper authorization and authentication checks on multiple API routes. An attacker may gain access to these API routes and achieve remote code execution, create a denial-of-service condition, and obtain sensitive information.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-21196"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285",
"CWE-287",
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-02-18T18:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "MMP: All versions prior to v1.0.3, PTP C-series: Device versions prior to v2.8.6.1, and PTMP C-series and A5x: Device versions prior to v2.5.4.1 does not perform proper authorization and authentication checks on multiple API routes. An attacker may gain access to these API routes and achieve remote code execution, create a denial-of-service condition, and obtain sensitive information.",
"id": "GHSA-vqjc-h5m3-4q6j",
"modified": "2023-07-24T15:30:19Z",
"published": "2022-02-19T00:01:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-21196"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ics/advisories/icsa-22-034-02"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-VQV5-385R-2HF8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-02-05 21:30 – Updated: 2025-02-06 18:05Impact
Recovering coordinators do not verify the seed provided by the recovering party. This allows an attacker to set up a coordinator with a manifest that passes validation, but with a secret seed controlled by the attacker.
If network traffic is redirected from the legitimate coordinator to the attacker's coordinator, a workload owner is susceptible to impersonation if either
- they
seta new manifest and don't compare the root CA cert with the existing one (this is the default of thecontrastCLI) or - they
verifythe coordinator and don't compare the root CA cert with a trusted reference.
Under these circumstances, the attacker can:
- Issue certificates that chain back to the attacker coordinator's root CA.
- Recover arbitrary workload secrets of workloads deployed after the attack.
This issue does not affect the following:
- secrets of the legitimate coordinator (seed, workload secrets, CA)
- integrity of workloads, even when used with the rogue coordinator
- certificates chaining back to the mesh CA
Patches
This issue is patched in Contrast v1.4.1.
Workarounds
The issue can be avoided by verifying the coordinator root CA cert against expectations.
- At the first
setcall, keep a copy of the CA cert returned by the coordinator. - After subsequent
setorverifycalls, compare the returned CA cert with the backup copy. If it matches bit-for-bit, the coordinator is legitimate.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.4.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/edgelesssys/contrast"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.4.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-02-05T21:30:35Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nRecovering coordinators do not verify the seed provided by the recovering party. This allows an attacker to set up a coordinator with a manifest that passes validation, but with a secret seed controlled by the attacker. \n\nIf network traffic is redirected from the legitimate coordinator to the attacker\u0027s coordinator, a workload owner is susceptible to impersonation if either \n\n* they `set` a new manifest and don\u0027t compare the root CA cert with the existing one (this is the default of the `contrast` CLI) or\n* they `verify` the coordinator and don\u0027t compare the root CA cert with a trusted reference.\n\nUnder these circumstances, the attacker can:\n\n* Issue certificates that chain back to the attacker coordinator\u0027s root CA.\n* Recover arbitrary workload secrets of workloads deployed after the attack.\n\nThis issue does **not** affect the following:\n\n* secrets of the legitimate coordinator (seed, workload secrets, CA)\n* integrity of workloads, even when used with the rogue coordinator\n* certificates chaining back to the mesh CA\n\n### Patches\n\nThis issue is patched in Contrast v1.4.1.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nThe issue can be avoided by verifying the coordinator root CA cert against expectations.\n\n* At the first `set` call, keep a copy of the CA cert returned by the coordinator.\n* After subsequent `set` or `verify` calls, compare the returned CA cert with the backup copy. If it matches bit-for-bit, the coordinator is legitimate.",
"id": "GHSA-vqv5-385r-2hf8",
"modified": "2025-02-06T18:05:15Z",
"published": "2025-02-05T21:30:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/edgelesssys/contrast/security/advisories/GHSA-vqv5-385r-2hf8"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/edgelesssys/contrast"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2025-3455"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Contrast\u0027s unauthenticated recovery allows Coordinator impersonation"
}
GHSA-VRMH-5MMX-HJWX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-10 13:39 – Updated: 2026-06-26 21:29Private services (EnableShowInService: false) are enumerable via per-server endpoints, leaking name and timing data
CWE: CWE-285 (Improper Authorization) via CWE-200 (Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor) and CWE-863 (Incorrect Authorization — inconsistent gating across data-reader paths)
CVSS v3.1: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N → 5.3 (Medium)
Summary
The EnableShowInService flag on a Service is meant to gate that service's visibility from the public dashboard. The main service-listing endpoint (GET /api/v1/service → showService) correctly filters services with EnableShowInService: false via ServiceSentinel.CopyStats() (service/singleton/servicesentinel.go:421-438). However, two adjacent reader endpoints retrieve service objects through code paths that do not honor the same flag:
GET /api/v1/server/:id/service(listServerServices) iteratesServiceSentinel.GetSortedList()(which returns every service regardless of visibility) and emits service ID, name, and timing data for any service monitoring the queried server.GET /api/v1/service/:id/history(getServiceHistory) callsServiceSentinel.Get(serviceID)directly and emits the service name (and aggregated per-server stats for servers the viewer can see).
Both endpoints are mounted on the optionalAuth group, so an unauthenticated visitor can enumerate hidden services as long as they can guess a public server ID (linear scan over a small numeric ID space) or a service ID (likewise). The service owner's intent — "hide this from the public" via EnableShowInService: false — is silently bypassed.
Affected
- nezha
masterat HEAD636f4a99e6c3d8d75f17fdf7ad55d4ee0f73f1c0(the audit checkout) - All recent 2.x releases that share this code path (post the
EnableShowInServicefilter introduction atCopyStats)
Vulnerability details
[A] — single-source-of-truth filter exists at the listing site
service/singleton/servicesentinel.go:421-438:
func (ss *ServiceSentinel) CopyStats() map[uint64]model.ServiceResponseItem {
var stats map[uint64]*serviceResponseItem
copier.Copy(&stats, ss.LoadStats())
sri := make(map[uint64]model.ServiceResponseItem)
for k, service := range stats {
if !service.service.EnableShowInService { // [A] filter here
delete(stats, k)
continue
}
service.ServiceName = service.service.Name
sri[k] = service.ServiceResponseItem
}
return sri
}
CopyStats() is the only reader that respects EnableShowInService. Get() and GetSortedList() immediately below it return the raw services with no such filter:
func (ss *ServiceSentinel) Get(id uint64) (s *model.Service, ok bool) {
ss.servicesLock.RLock(); defer ss.servicesLock.RUnlock()
s, ok = ss.services[id]
return // [A'] no EnableShowInService check
}
[B] — listServerServices iterates GetSortedList() and emits hidden services
cmd/dashboard/controller/service.go:258-340 (GET /api/v1/server/:id/service):
func listServerServices(c *gin.Context) ([]*model.ServiceInfos, error) {
// ... server existence + userCanViewServer check ...
services := singleton.ServiceSentinelShared.GetSortedList() // [B] all services, no filter
for _, service := range services {
if service.Cover == model.ServiceCoverAll {
if service.SkipServers[serverID] { continue }
} else {
if !service.SkipServers[serverID] { continue }
}
// ... fetch history ...
infos := &model.ServiceInfos{
ServiceID: service.ID,
ServerID: serverID,
ServiceName: service.Name, // [B'] leaked
ServerName: server.Name,
// ... timing data ...
}
result = append(result, infos)
}
return result, nil
}
The DB-fallback path at queryServerServicesFromDB (service.go:340-) has the same structure: iterates services (the same GetSortedList() output) and emits ServiceName for any service monitoring serverID.
[C] — getServiceHistory returns the service name for any ID
cmd/dashboard/controller/service.go:126-180 (GET /api/v1/service/:id/history):
func getServiceHistory(c *gin.Context) (*model.ServiceHistoryResponse, error) {
serviceID, _ := strconv.ParseUint(c.Param("id"), 10, 64)
service, ok := singleton.ServiceSentinelShared.Get(serviceID) // [C] no filter
if !ok || service == nil {
return nil, singleton.Localizer.ErrorT("service not found")
}
// period restriction for guests (1d only) — but the service exists,
// and ServiceName is set unconditionally:
response := &model.ServiceHistoryResponse{
ServiceID: serviceID,
ServiceName: service.Name, // [C'] leaked
Servers: make([]model.ServerServiceStats, 0),
}
// ... per-server data is filtered via userCanViewServer — that part is correct ...
return response, nil
}
The per-server data inside the response IS correctly filtered via userCanViewServer. The service NAME is not.
The mismatch
[A] (CopyStats) gates by EnableShowInService because that's the listing endpoint's contract. [A'] (Get) / GetSortedList() return the raw data because they're "internal" accessors. But [B] and [C] are public-reachable endpoints that use those raw accessors and emit identifying information about services the owner marked as private. The visibility flag exists; it just isn't enforced at every reader of the same data.
A correct guard would either:
- Move the EnableShowInService filter into Get() / GetSortedList() themselves, gated by "caller is admin or service owner"
- Re-check EnableShowInService at every endpoint that emits service identity (name/id/timing)
Proof of concept
Setup (any nezha 2.x deployment):
1. User A (member) creates a Service "Internal-CRM-Health" with EnableShowInService: false, monitoring server S which is public (HideForGuest: false).
2. The service does not appear in GET /api/v1/service (the main listing correctly hides it).
Enumeration as an unauthenticated guest:
# Find services that monitor server S
curl -s 'https://nezha.example/api/v1/server/'"$S_ID"'/service'
# →
# {"success":true,"data":[
# {"service_id":42,"server_id":1,"service_name":"Internal-CRM-Health","server_name":"web-01",
# "display_index":0,"created_at":[...],"avg_delay":[...]}
# ]}
#
# Hidden service is leaked: ID, name, and per-server timing data are all visible.
Confirmation via the second endpoint:
curl -s 'https://nezha.example/api/v1/service/42/history?period=1d'
# →
# {"success":true,"data":{
# "service_id":42,
# "service_name":"Internal-CRM-Health", ← leaked even for direct ID lookup
# "servers":[] ← per-server data correctly hidden
# }}
A scripted enumeration over public server IDs (a low-cardinality numeric space — typical nezha deployments have <1000 servers) trivially recovers the full set of hidden services that monitor any public server, along with their names and timing patterns.
Impact
Direct
Service names in nezha deployments are frequently descriptive of the underlying business asset they monitor: "Production CRM Monitor", "Internal Wiki Health", "Backup-Vault Connectivity", "Stripe Webhook Latency". The leak therefore:
- Discloses the existence and purpose of internal services that the owner explicitly hid from the public dashboard.
- Exposes timing/latency data for the monitored relationship between a private service and any public server it touches — sufficient for a competitor or attacker to infer business activity patterns, outage windows, and probable backend topology.
- Confirms presence/absence of a service ID via the second endpoint — an oracle that lets an unauthenticated visitor enumerate the service-id namespace and learn the deployment's service count and naming convention even when no public servers exist as enumeration vectors.
Indirect / second-order
- Affects multi-tenant public dashboards: nezha is frequently deployed as a public status page with a private "internal" tier in the same dashboard. The bypass collapses the privacy boundary between these tiers.
- Composability with prior advisories: the recent fixes for
GHSA-rxf6-wjh4-jfj6(cross-user trigger-task firing),GHSA-hvv7-hfrh-7gxj(WS server-stream cross-tenant leak), andGHSA-4g6j-g789-rghm(forged monitor results) all address the cross-tenant visibility model. This finding is a sibling that closes one more reader gap in the same model.
Suggested fix
Either of:
- Centralize the filter in
ServiceSentinel— changeGet(id)andGetSortedList()to accept the*gin.Context(or a viewer context) and apply theEnableShowInServicefilter plus an admin-or-owner override. This guarantees every reader inherits the gate:
go
func (ss *ServiceSentinel) GetForViewer(c *gin.Context, id uint64) (*model.Service, bool) {
s, ok := ss.Get(id)
if !ok { return nil, false }
if !s.EnableShowInService && !callerIsAdminOrOwns(c, s) {
return nil, false
}
return s, true
}
- Recheck at every endpoint that emits service identity — add the EnableShowInService + ownership check at the top of
listServerServices,getServiceHistory, and anywhere elseGetSortedList()/Get()results flow to a response. More surgical but easier to miss next time.
Option (1) is symmetric with how userCanViewServer centralizes the server-visibility decision; the same pattern at the service layer would close this class once.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/nezhahq/nezha"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.0.14"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-49397"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-285",
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-10T13:39:24Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-12T22:16:51Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "# Private services (`EnableShowInService: false`) are enumerable via per-server endpoints, leaking name and timing data\n\n**CWE**: CWE-285 (Improper Authorization) via CWE-200 (Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor) and CWE-863 (Incorrect Authorization \u2014 inconsistent gating across data-reader paths)\n\n**CVSS v3.1**: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N` \u2192 5.3 (Medium)\n\n## Summary\n\nThe `EnableShowInService` flag on a `Service` is meant to gate that service\u0027s visibility from the public dashboard. The main service-listing endpoint (`GET /api/v1/service` \u2192 `showService`) correctly filters services with `EnableShowInService: false` via `ServiceSentinel.CopyStats()` (`service/singleton/servicesentinel.go:421-438`). However, two adjacent reader endpoints retrieve service objects through code paths that do not honor the same flag:\n\n- `GET /api/v1/server/:id/service` (`listServerServices`) iterates `ServiceSentinel.GetSortedList()` (which returns every service regardless of visibility) and emits service ID, name, and timing data for any service monitoring the queried server.\n- `GET /api/v1/service/:id/history` (`getServiceHistory`) calls `ServiceSentinel.Get(serviceID)` directly and emits the service name (and aggregated per-server stats for servers the viewer can see).\n\nBoth endpoints are mounted on the `optionalAuth` group, so an unauthenticated visitor can enumerate hidden services as long as they can guess a public server ID (linear scan over a small numeric ID space) or a service ID (likewise). The service owner\u0027s intent \u2014 \"hide this from the public\" via `EnableShowInService: false` \u2014 is silently bypassed.\n\n## Affected\n\n- nezha `master` at HEAD `636f4a99e6c3d8d75f17fdf7ad55d4ee0f73f1c0` (the audit checkout)\n- All recent 2.x releases that share this code path (post the `EnableShowInService` filter introduction at `CopyStats`)\n\n## Vulnerability details\n\n### [A] \u2014 single-source-of-truth filter exists at the listing site\n\n`service/singleton/servicesentinel.go:421-438`:\n\n```go\nfunc (ss *ServiceSentinel) CopyStats() map[uint64]model.ServiceResponseItem {\n var stats map[uint64]*serviceResponseItem\n copier.Copy(\u0026stats, ss.LoadStats())\n\n sri := make(map[uint64]model.ServiceResponseItem)\n for k, service := range stats {\n if !service.service.EnableShowInService { // [A] filter here\n delete(stats, k)\n continue\n }\n service.ServiceName = service.service.Name\n sri[k] = service.ServiceResponseItem\n }\n return sri\n}\n```\n\n`CopyStats()` is the only reader that respects `EnableShowInService`. `Get()` and `GetSortedList()` immediately below it return the raw services with no such filter:\n\n```go\nfunc (ss *ServiceSentinel) Get(id uint64) (s *model.Service, ok bool) {\n ss.servicesLock.RLock(); defer ss.servicesLock.RUnlock()\n s, ok = ss.services[id]\n return // [A\u0027] no EnableShowInService check\n}\n```\n\n### [B] \u2014 `listServerServices` iterates `GetSortedList()` and emits hidden services\n\n`cmd/dashboard/controller/service.go:258-340` (`GET /api/v1/server/:id/service`):\n\n```go\nfunc listServerServices(c *gin.Context) ([]*model.ServiceInfos, error) {\n // ... server existence + userCanViewServer check ...\n services := singleton.ServiceSentinelShared.GetSortedList() // [B] all services, no filter\n\n for _, service := range services {\n if service.Cover == model.ServiceCoverAll {\n if service.SkipServers[serverID] { continue }\n } else {\n if !service.SkipServers[serverID] { continue }\n }\n // ... fetch history ...\n infos := \u0026model.ServiceInfos{\n ServiceID: service.ID,\n ServerID: serverID,\n ServiceName: service.Name, // [B\u0027] leaked\n ServerName: server.Name,\n // ... timing data ...\n }\n result = append(result, infos)\n }\n return result, nil\n}\n```\n\nThe DB-fallback path at `queryServerServicesFromDB` (`service.go:340-`) has the same structure: iterates `services` (the same `GetSortedList()` output) and emits ServiceName for any service monitoring `serverID`.\n\n### [C] \u2014 `getServiceHistory` returns the service name for any ID\n\n`cmd/dashboard/controller/service.go:126-180` (`GET /api/v1/service/:id/history`):\n\n```go\nfunc getServiceHistory(c *gin.Context) (*model.ServiceHistoryResponse, error) {\n serviceID, _ := strconv.ParseUint(c.Param(\"id\"), 10, 64)\n service, ok := singleton.ServiceSentinelShared.Get(serviceID) // [C] no filter\n if !ok || service == nil {\n return nil, singleton.Localizer.ErrorT(\"service not found\")\n }\n // period restriction for guests (1d only) \u2014 but the service exists,\n // and ServiceName is set unconditionally:\n response := \u0026model.ServiceHistoryResponse{\n ServiceID: serviceID,\n ServiceName: service.Name, // [C\u0027] leaked\n Servers: make([]model.ServerServiceStats, 0),\n }\n // ... per-server data is filtered via userCanViewServer \u2014 that part is correct ...\n return response, nil\n}\n```\n\nThe per-server data inside the response IS correctly filtered via `userCanViewServer`. The service NAME is not.\n\n### The mismatch\n\n[A] (`CopyStats`) gates by `EnableShowInService` because that\u0027s the listing endpoint\u0027s contract. [A\u0027] (`Get`) / `GetSortedList()` return the raw data because they\u0027re \"internal\" accessors. But [B] and [C] are public-reachable endpoints that use those raw accessors and emit identifying information about services the owner marked as private. The visibility flag exists; it just isn\u0027t enforced at every reader of the same data.\n\nA correct guard would either:\n- Move the `EnableShowInService` filter into `Get()` / `GetSortedList()` themselves, gated by \"caller is admin or service owner\"\n- Re-check `EnableShowInService` at every endpoint that emits service identity (name/id/timing)\n\n## Proof of concept\n\nSetup (any nezha 2.x deployment):\n1. User A (member) creates a Service \"Internal-CRM-Health\" with `EnableShowInService: false`, monitoring server `S` which is public (`HideForGuest: false`).\n2. The service does not appear in `GET /api/v1/service` (the main listing correctly hides it).\n\nEnumeration as an unauthenticated guest:\n\n```bash\n# Find services that monitor server S\ncurl -s \u0027https://nezha.example/api/v1/server/\u0027\"$S_ID\"\u0027/service\u0027\n# \u2192\n# {\"success\":true,\"data\":[\n# {\"service_id\":42,\"server_id\":1,\"service_name\":\"Internal-CRM-Health\",\"server_name\":\"web-01\",\n# \"display_index\":0,\"created_at\":[...],\"avg_delay\":[...]}\n# ]}\n#\n# Hidden service is leaked: ID, name, and per-server timing data are all visible.\n```\n\nConfirmation via the second endpoint:\n\n```bash\ncurl -s \u0027https://nezha.example/api/v1/service/42/history?period=1d\u0027\n# \u2192\n# {\"success\":true,\"data\":{\n# \"service_id\":42,\n# \"service_name\":\"Internal-CRM-Health\", \u2190 leaked even for direct ID lookup\n# \"servers\":[] \u2190 per-server data correctly hidden\n# }}\n```\n\nA scripted enumeration over public server IDs (a low-cardinality numeric space \u2014 typical nezha deployments have \u003c1000 servers) trivially recovers the full set of hidden services that monitor any public server, along with their names and timing patterns.\n\n## Impact\n\n### Direct\n\nService names in nezha deployments are frequently descriptive of the underlying business asset they monitor: `\"Production CRM Monitor\"`, `\"Internal Wiki Health\"`, `\"Backup-Vault Connectivity\"`, `\"Stripe Webhook Latency\"`. The leak therefore:\n\n- **Discloses the existence and purpose of internal services** that the owner explicitly hid from the public dashboard.\n- **Exposes timing/latency data** for the monitored relationship between a private service and any public server it touches \u2014 sufficient for a competitor or attacker to infer business activity patterns, outage windows, and probable backend topology.\n- **Confirms presence/absence of a service ID** via the second endpoint \u2014 an oracle that lets an unauthenticated visitor enumerate the service-id namespace and learn the deployment\u0027s service count and naming convention even when no public servers exist as enumeration vectors.\n\n### Indirect / second-order\n\n- **Affects multi-tenant public dashboards**: nezha is frequently deployed as a public status page with a private \"internal\" tier in the same dashboard. The bypass collapses the privacy boundary between these tiers.\n- **Composability with prior advisories**: the recent fixes for `GHSA-rxf6-wjh4-jfj6` (cross-user trigger-task firing), `GHSA-hvv7-hfrh-7gxj` (WS server-stream cross-tenant leak), and `GHSA-4g6j-g789-rghm` (forged monitor results) all address the cross-tenant visibility model. This finding is a sibling that closes one more reader gap in the same model.\n\n## Suggested fix\n\nEither of:\n\n1. **Centralize the filter in `ServiceSentinel`** \u2014 change `Get(id)` and `GetSortedList()` to accept the `*gin.Context` (or a viewer context) and apply the `EnableShowInService` filter plus an admin-or-owner override. This guarantees every reader inherits the gate:\n\n ```go\n func (ss *ServiceSentinel) GetForViewer(c *gin.Context, id uint64) (*model.Service, bool) {\n s, ok := ss.Get(id)\n if !ok { return nil, false }\n if !s.EnableShowInService \u0026\u0026 !callerIsAdminOrOwns(c, s) {\n return nil, false\n }\n return s, true\n }\n ```\n\n2. **Recheck at every endpoint that emits service identity** \u2014 add the EnableShowInService + ownership check at the top of `listServerServices`, `getServiceHistory`, and anywhere else `GetSortedList()`/`Get()` results flow to a response. More surgical but easier to miss next time.\n\nOption (1) is symmetric with how `userCanViewServer` centralizes the server-visibility decision; the same pattern at the service layer would close this class once.",
"id": "GHSA-vrmh-5mmx-hjwx",
"modified": "2026-06-26T21:29:08Z",
"published": "2026-06-10T13:39:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nezhahq/nezha/security/advisories/GHSA-vrmh-5mmx-hjwx"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-49397"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/nezhahq/nezha"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Nezha\u0027s private services (`EnableShowInService: false`) are enumerable via per-server endpoints, leaking name and timing data"
}
GHSA-VRQ2-W7R7-3FP2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:12 – Updated: 2025-11-07 23:21Magento Commerce versions 2.4.2 (and earlier), 2.4.2-p1 (and earlier) and 2.3.7 (and earlier) are affected by an improper authorization vulnerability. An authenticated attacker could leverage this vulnerability to achieve sensitive information disclosure.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "magento/project-community-edition"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "2.0.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "magento/community-edition"
},
"versions": [
"2.4.2"
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "magento/community-edition"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.4.2-p1"
},
{
"fixed": "2.4.2-p2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "magento/community-edition"
},
"versions": [
"2.3.7"
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "magento/community-edition"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.3.7-p1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-36037"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285",
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-11-07T23:21:19Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2021-09-01T15:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Magento Commerce versions 2.4.2 (and earlier), 2.4.2-p1 (and earlier) and 2.3.7 (and earlier) are affected by an improper authorization vulnerability. An authenticated attacker could leverage this vulnerability to achieve sensitive information disclosure.",
"id": "GHSA-vrq2-w7r7-3fp2",
"modified": "2025-11-07T23:21:19Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T19:12:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-36037"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/magento/magento2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/magento/apsb21-64.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Magento is affected by an improper authorization vulnerability"
}
GHSA-VRXH-CCH4-M6VG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-18 09:30 – Updated: 2025-10-18 09:30The Kognetiks Chatbot plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized modification of data due to a missing capability check on several functions in all versions up to, and including, 2.3.5. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to upload limited safe files and erase conversations.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-11256"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-10-18T08:15:33Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The Kognetiks Chatbot plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized modification of data due to a missing capability check on several functions in all versions up to, and including, 2.3.5. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to upload limited safe files and erase conversations.",
"id": "GHSA-vrxh-cch4-m6vg",
"modified": "2025-10-18T09:30:51Z",
"published": "2025-10-18T09:30:51Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-11256"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail=\u0026reponame=\u0026old=3380313%40chatbot-chatgpt\u0026new=3380313%40chatbot-chatgpt\u0026sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail="
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail=\u0026reponame=\u0026old=3380317%40chatbot-chatgpt\u0026new=3380317%40chatbot-chatgpt\u0026sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail="
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/1c8fe389-ff44-4be3-889b-0006977f4f3c?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-VV32-HV6M-3H59
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-16 00:30 – Updated: 2025-11-03 21:34A logic issue was addressed with improved checks. This issue is fixed in macOS Sonoma 14.8. An app may be able to access user-sensitive data.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-43231"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-09-15T23:15:30Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A logic issue was addressed with improved checks. This issue is fixed in macOS Sonoma 14.8. An app may be able to access user-sensitive data.",
"id": "GHSA-vv32-hv6m-3h59",
"modified": "2025-11-03T21:34:28Z",
"published": "2025-09-16T00:30:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-43231"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/125112"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2025/Sep/55"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-VV89-XGGX-QQH2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:17 – Updated: 2022-12-16 22:58Copy Artifact Plugin 1.43.1 and earlier performs improper permission checks when determining whether a build can copy artifacts from another project build. This allows attackers, usually with Job/Configure permission, to configure jobs to copy artifacts from jobs they have no permission to access.
Copy Artifact Plugin 1.44 now properly performs permission checks when copying artifacts. When updating the plugin from a previous version, the previous behavior is retained (\"Migration mode\"). To enable the additional protections, switch to the new \"Production mode\". Doing so may cause existing jobs to fail to copy artifacts. For more information see the plugin documentation.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.43.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.jenkins-ci.plugins:copyartifact"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.44"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-2183"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-276",
"CWE-285"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2022-12-16T22:58:06Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2020-05-06T13:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Copy Artifact Plugin 1.43.1 and earlier performs improper permission checks when determining whether a build can copy artifacts from another project build. This allows attackers, usually with Job/Configure permission, to configure jobs to copy artifacts from jobs they have no permission to access.\n\nCopy Artifact Plugin 1.44 now properly performs permission checks when copying artifacts. When updating the plugin from a previous version, the previous behavior is retained (\\\"Migration mode\\\"). To enable the additional protections, switch to the new \\\"Production mode\\\". Doing so may cause existing jobs to fail to copy artifacts. For more information see the [plugin documentation](https://github.com/jenkinsci/copyartifact-plugin).",
"id": "GHSA-vv89-xggx-qqh2",
"modified": "2022-12-16T22:58:06Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:17:14Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-2183"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jenkinsci/copyartifact-plugin/commit/dc87de169604cb9b6706c5328e2e4aeb2c6652d6"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/jenkinsci/copyartifact-plugin"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://jenkins.io/security/advisory/2020-05-06/#SECURITY-988"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2020/05/06/3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Improper permission checks in Jenkins Copy Artifact Plugin"
}
GHSA-VVF7-Q7RC-3M2M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-08 18:30 – Updated: 2024-08-01 21:31TOTOLINK EX1800T V9.1.0cu.2112_B20220316 has a vulnerability in the apcliEncrypType parameter that allows unauthorized execution of arbitrary commands, allowing an attacker to obtain device administrator privileges.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-34257"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-05-08T17:15:07Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "TOTOLINK EX1800T V9.1.0cu.2112_B20220316 has a vulnerability in the apcliEncrypType parameter that allows unauthorized execution of arbitrary commands, allowing an attacker to obtain device administrator privileges.",
"id": "GHSA-vvf7-q7rc-3m2m",
"modified": "2024-08-01T21:31:40Z",
"published": "2024-05-08T18:30:49Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-34257"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ZackSecurity/VulnerReport/blob/cve/totolink/EX1800T/1.md"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://immense-mirror-b42.notion.site/TOTOLINK-EX1800T-has-an-unauthorized-arbitrary-command-execution-vulnerability-2f3e308f5e1d45a2b8a64f198cacc350"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
- Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries.
- Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
Mitigation
Ensure that you perform access control checks related to your business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that you apply to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor.
Mitigation MIT-4.4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
Mitigation
- For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page.
- One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
Mitigation
Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.
CAPEC-1: Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs
In applications, particularly web applications, access to functionality is mitigated by an authorization framework. This framework maps Access Control Lists (ACLs) to elements of the application's functionality; particularly URL's for web apps. In the case that the administrator failed to specify an ACL for a particular element, an attacker may be able to access it with impunity. An attacker with the ability to access functionality not properly constrained by ACLs can obtain sensitive information and possibly compromise the entire application. Such an attacker can access resources that must be available only to users at a higher privilege level, can access management sections of the application, or can run queries for data that they otherwise not supposed to.
CAPEC-104: Cross Zone Scripting
An attacker is able to cause a victim to load content into their web-browser that bypasses security zone controls and gain access to increased privileges to execute scripting code or other web objects such as unsigned ActiveX controls or applets. This is a privilege elevation attack targeted at zone-based web-browser security.
CAPEC-127: Directory Indexing
An adversary crafts a request to a target that results in the target listing/indexing the content of a directory as output. One common method of triggering directory contents as output is to construct a request containing a path that terminates in a directory name rather than a file name since many applications are configured to provide a list of the directory's contents when such a request is received. An adversary can use this to explore the directory tree on a target as well as learn the names of files. This can often end up revealing test files, backup files, temporary files, hidden files, configuration files, user accounts, script contents, as well as naming conventions, all of which can be used by an attacker to mount additional attacks.
CAPEC-13: Subverting Environment Variable Values
The adversary directly or indirectly modifies environment variables used by or controlling the target software. The adversary's goal is to cause the target software to deviate from its expected operation in a manner that benefits the adversary.
CAPEC-17: Using Malicious Files
An attack of this type exploits a system's configuration that allows an adversary to either directly access an executable file, for example through shell access; or in a possible worst case allows an adversary to upload a file and then execute it. Web servers, ftp servers, and message oriented middleware systems which have many integration points are particularly vulnerable, because both the programmers and the administrators must be in synch regarding the interfaces and the correct privileges for each interface.
CAPEC-39: Manipulating Opaque Client-based Data Tokens
In circumstances where an application holds important data client-side in tokens (cookies, URLs, data files, and so forth) that data can be manipulated. If client or server-side application components reinterpret that data as authentication tokens or data (such as store item pricing or wallet information) then even opaquely manipulating that data may bear fruit for an Attacker. In this pattern an attacker undermines the assumption that client side tokens have been adequately protected from tampering through use of encryption or obfuscation.
CAPEC-402: Bypassing ATA Password Security
An adversary exploits a weakness in ATA security on a drive to gain access to the information the drive contains without supplying the proper credentials. ATA Security is often employed to protect hard disk information from unauthorized access. The mechanism requires the user to type in a password before the BIOS is allowed access to drive contents. Some implementations of ATA security will accept the ATA command to update the password without the user having authenticated with the BIOS. This occurs because the security mechanism assumes the user has first authenticated via the BIOS prior to sending commands to the drive. Various methods exist for exploiting this flaw, the most common being installing the ATA protected drive into a system lacking ATA security features (a.k.a. hot swapping). Once the drive is installed into the new system the BIOS can be used to reset the drive password.
CAPEC-45: Buffer Overflow via Symbolic Links
This type of attack leverages the use of symbolic links to cause buffer overflows. An adversary can try to create or manipulate a symbolic link file such that its contents result in out of bounds data. When the target software processes the symbolic link file, it could potentially overflow internal buffers with insufficient bounds checking.
CAPEC-5: Blue Boxing
This type of attack against older telephone switches and trunks has been around for decades. A tone is sent by an adversary to impersonate a supervisor signal which has the effect of rerouting or usurping command of the line. While the US infrastructure proper may not contain widespread vulnerabilities to this type of attack, many companies are connected globally through call centers and business process outsourcing. These international systems may be operated in countries which have not upgraded Telco infrastructure and so are vulnerable to Blue boxing. Blue boxing is a result of failure on the part of the system to enforce strong authorization for administrative functions. While the infrastructure is different than standard current applications like web applications, there are historical lessons to be learned to upgrade the access control for administrative functions.
{'xhtml:b': 'This attack pattern is included in CAPEC for historical purposes.'}
CAPEC-51: Poison Web Service Registry
SOA and Web Services often use a registry to perform look up, get schema information, and metadata about services. A poisoned registry can redirect (think phishing for servers) the service requester to a malicious service provider, provide incorrect information in schema or metadata, and delete information about service provider interfaces.
CAPEC-59: Session Credential Falsification through Prediction
This attack targets predictable session ID in order to gain privileges. The attacker can predict the session ID used during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking.
CAPEC-60: Reusing Session IDs (aka Session Replay)
This attack targets the reuse of valid session ID to spoof the target system in order to gain privileges. The attacker tries to reuse a stolen session ID used previously during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking. Another name for this type of attack is Session Replay.
CAPEC-647: Collect Data from Registries
An adversary exploits a weakness in authorization to gather system-specific data and sensitive information within a registry (e.g., Windows Registry, Mac plist). These contain information about the system configuration, software, operating system, and security. The adversary can leverage information gathered in order to carry out further attacks.
CAPEC-668: Key Negotiation of Bluetooth Attack (KNOB)
An adversary can exploit a flaw in Bluetooth key negotiation allowing them to decrypt information sent between two devices communicating via Bluetooth. The adversary uses an Adversary in the Middle setup to modify packets sent between the two devices during the authentication process, specifically the entropy bits. Knowledge of the number of entropy bits will allow the attacker to easily decrypt information passing over the line of communication.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-77: Manipulating User-Controlled Variables
This attack targets user controlled variables (DEBUG=1, PHP Globals, and So Forth). An adversary can override variables leveraging user-supplied, untrusted query variables directly used on the application server without any data sanitization. In extreme cases, the adversary can change variables controlling the business logic of the application. For instance, in languages like PHP, a number of poorly set default configurations may allow the user to override variables.
CAPEC-87: Forceful Browsing
An attacker employs forceful browsing (direct URL entry) to access portions of a website that are otherwise unreachable. Usually, a front controller or similar design pattern is employed to protect access to portions of a web application. Forceful browsing enables an attacker to access information, perform privileged operations and otherwise reach sections of the web application that have been improperly protected.