Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-285

Discouraged

Improper Authorization

Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft

The product does not perform or incorrectly performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action.

2767 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-MV9J-6XHH-G383

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-17 21:31 – Updated: 2026-03-06 00:58
VLAI
Summary
OpenClaw's unauthenticated Nostr profile HTTP endpoints allow remote profile/config tampering
Details

Summary

The OpenClaw Nostr channel plugin (optional, disabled by default, installed separately) exposes profile management HTTP endpoints under /api/channels/nostr/:accountId/profile (GET/PUT) and /api/channels/nostr/:accountId/profile/import (POST). In affected versions, these routes were dispatched via the gateway plugin HTTP layer without requiring gateway authentication, allowing unauthenticated remote callers to read or mutate the Nostr profile and persist changes to the gateway config. Profile updates are also published as a signed Nostr kind:0 event using the bot's private key.

Deployments that do not have the Nostr plugin installed and enabled are not impacted.

Affected Packages / Versions

  • Package: openclaw (npm)
  • Affected versions: <= 2026.2.9
  • Fixed versions: >= 2026.2.12
  • Scope note: only affects deployments with the optional @openclaw/nostr plugin installed and enabled

Details

This is exploitable when the gateway HTTP port is reachable beyond localhost (for example: bound to 0.0.0.0, exposed on a LAN, behind a reverse proxy, or via Tailscale Funnel/Serve).

Unauthenticated callers could update the Nostr profile and persist the new profile in the gateway config.

Mitigation

Upgrade to openclaw 2026.2.12 or later.

As a temporary mitigation, restrict gateway HTTP exposure (bind loopback-only and/or enforce network-layer access controls) until upgraded.

Fix

Gateway now requires gateway authentication for plugin HTTP requests under /api/channels/* before dispatching to plugin handlers.

Fix commit(s): - 647d929c9d0fd114249230d939a5cb3b36dc70e7

Thanks @simecek for reporting.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "openclaw"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.2.12"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-28450"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-285",
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-17T21:31:17Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-05T22:16:17Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\nThe OpenClaw Nostr channel plugin (optional, disabled by default, installed separately) exposes profile management HTTP endpoints under `/api/channels/nostr/:accountId/profile` (GET/PUT) and `/api/channels/nostr/:accountId/profile/import` (POST). In affected versions, these routes were dispatched via the gateway plugin HTTP layer without requiring gateway authentication, allowing unauthenticated remote callers to read or mutate the Nostr profile and persist changes to the gateway config. Profile updates are also published as a signed Nostr kind:0 event using the bot\u0027s private key.\n\nDeployments that do not have the Nostr plugin installed and enabled are not impacted.\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Affected versions: `\u003c= 2026.2.9`\n- Fixed versions: `\u003e= 2026.2.12`\n- Scope note: only affects deployments with the optional `@openclaw/nostr` plugin installed and enabled\n\n## Details\nThis is exploitable when the gateway HTTP port is reachable beyond localhost (for example: bound to `0.0.0.0`, exposed on a LAN, behind a reverse proxy, or via Tailscale Funnel/Serve).\n\nUnauthenticated callers could update the Nostr profile and persist the new profile in the gateway config.\n\n## Mitigation\nUpgrade to `openclaw` `2026.2.12` or later.\n\nAs a temporary mitigation, restrict gateway HTTP exposure (bind loopback-only and/or enforce network-layer access controls) until upgraded.\n\n## Fix\nGateway now requires gateway authentication for plugin HTTP requests under `/api/channels/*` before dispatching to plugin handlers.\n\nFix commit(s):\n- 647d929c9d0fd114249230d939a5cb3b36dc70e7\n\nThanks @simecek for reporting.",
  "id": "GHSA-mv9j-6xhh-g383",
  "modified": "2026-03-06T00:58:42Z",
  "published": "2026-02-17T21:31:17Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-mv9j-6xhh-g383"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-28450"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/647d929c9d0fd114249230d939a5cb3b36dc70e7"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/releases/tag/v2026.2.12"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-unauthenticated-profile-tampering-via-nostr-plugin-http-endpoints"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw\u0027s unauthenticated Nostr profile HTTP endpoints allow remote profile/config tampering"
}

GHSA-MVM6-8M33-3FX6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-14 09:31 – Updated: 2026-09-14 09:31
VLAI
Details

A vulnerability was identified in SourceCodester Inventory Management System 1.0. This affects an unknown part of the file invoice.php. The manipulation of the argument ID leads to authorization bypass. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The exploit is publicly available and might be used.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-90697"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-285"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-14T09:17:02Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability was identified in SourceCodester Inventory Management System 1.0. This affects an unknown part of the file invoice.php. The manipulation of the argument ID leads to authorization bypass. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The exploit is publicly available and might be used.",
  "id": "GHSA-mvm6-8m33-3fx6",
  "modified": "2026-09-14T09:31:03Z",
  "published": "2026-09-14T09:31:03Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-90697"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://gist.github.com/fhewm98/079112d415afa63ed1368a798a352665"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/cve/CVE-2026-90697"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/submit/916047"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/403230"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/403230/cti"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.sourcecodester.com"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-MVX4-532P-XFM9

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-24 16:55 – Updated: 2026-07-24 16:55
VLAI
Summary
Open WebUI: Scheduled automations continue after pending-user deactivation and stored model ACL revocation
Details

Title: Scheduled automations continue after pending-user deactivation and stored model ACL revocation

Summary

Open WebUI documents pending as a zero-access role used for new sign-ups and deactivated users, and normal HTTP routes enforce that with get_verified_user() (which rejects pending), while automation create/update/run routes additionally require the features.automations permission. Two paths missed that lifecycle gate, so a deactivated (pending) account could keep acting through the background automation scheduler:

  1. Scheduler did not re-gate the owner. When a stored automation became due, execute_automation() rehydrated the owner with Users.get_user_by_id(...) and re-entered the chat completion pipeline without re-checking that the owner was still user/admin or still held features.automations. A still-active automation therefore kept running after its owner was deactivated.
  2. Model ACL only enforced for exact role user. check_model_access() applied private-model grants only when user.role == "user", so a pending principal fell through a branch that denies a normal non-owner user.

Net effect: a deactivated account could continue scheduled chat generation through the background worker, consuming the operator's configured model-provider credentials and reaching a stored automation model ID that its current role/ACL state would no longer permit through normal routes.

Impact

A pending/deactivated account continues to execute due scheduled automations after its access has been revoked, consuming the operator's provider credentials, quota and shared capacity, and bypassing the private-model ACL for the automation's stored model ID. Exploitation requires a previously created active automation and a later transition to pending (deactivation or approval rollback), so it is bounded and not interactive. It does not grant unauthenticated access, account takeover, code execution, or cross-user data exfiltration.

Patched

In 0.10.0:

  • execute_automation() aborts and records an error unless the rehydrated owner is still user or admin and (for non-admins) still holds features.automations, so a deactivated or de-permissioned owner's due automation no longer runs.
  • check_model_access() enforces model ACLs for every non-admin role rather than only the exact role user, so a pending or otherwise unrecognised role no longer falls through.

Credits

@rexpository

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "open-webui"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.9.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.10.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-59226"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-285",
      "CWE-862",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-24T16:55:30Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-09T17:17:04Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "**Title:** Scheduled automations continue after pending-user deactivation and stored model ACL revocation\n\n### Summary\n\nOpen WebUI documents `pending` as a zero-access role used for new sign-ups and deactivated users, and normal HTTP routes enforce that with `get_verified_user()` (which rejects `pending`), while automation create/update/run routes additionally require the `features.automations` permission. Two paths missed that lifecycle gate, so a deactivated (`pending`) account could keep acting through the background automation scheduler:\n\n1. **Scheduler did not re-gate the owner.** When a stored automation became due, `execute_automation()` rehydrated the owner with `Users.get_user_by_id(...)` and re-entered the chat completion pipeline without re-checking that the owner was still `user`/`admin` or still held `features.automations`. A still-active automation therefore kept running after its owner was deactivated.\n2. **Model ACL only enforced for exact role `user`.** `check_model_access()` applied private-model grants only when `user.role == \"user\"`, so a `pending` principal fell through a branch that denies a normal non-owner `user`.\n\nNet effect: a deactivated account could continue scheduled chat generation through the background worker, consuming the operator\u0027s configured model-provider credentials and reaching a stored automation model ID that its current role/ACL state would no longer permit through normal routes.\n\n### Impact\n\nA `pending`/deactivated account continues to execute due scheduled automations after its access has been revoked, consuming the operator\u0027s provider credentials, quota and shared capacity, and bypassing the private-model ACL for the automation\u0027s stored model ID. Exploitation requires a previously created active automation and a later transition to `pending` (deactivation or approval rollback), so it is bounded and not interactive. It does not grant unauthenticated access, account takeover, code execution, or cross-user data exfiltration.\n\n### Patched\n\nIn 0.10.0:\n\n- `execute_automation()` aborts and records an error unless the rehydrated owner is still `user` or `admin` and (for non-admins) still holds `features.automations`, so a deactivated or de-permissioned owner\u0027s due automation no longer runs.\n- `check_model_access()` enforces model ACLs for every non-admin role rather than only the exact role `user`, so a `pending` or otherwise unrecognised role no longer falls through.\n\n### Credits\n\n@rexpository",
  "id": "GHSA-mvx4-532p-xfm9",
  "modified": "2026-07-24T16:55:30Z",
  "published": "2026-07-24T16:55:30Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-mvx4-532p-xfm9"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59226"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/pull/26047"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/commit/920b655f4689e2118de928fbc936f6ebd4fed396"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/releases/tag/v0.10.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Open WebUI: Scheduled automations continue after pending-user deactivation and stored model ACL revocation"
}

GHSA-MWPH-VXWQ-72M7

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-24 00:33 – Updated: 2026-08-24 00:33
VLAI
Details

A vulnerability was found in code-projects Barangay Resident Profiling Management System 1.0. This impacts an unknown function of the file /archived_records.php of the component Restore/Delete. The manipulation of the argument resident_id results in authorization bypass. The attack may be launched remotely. The exploit has been made public and could be used.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-78142"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-285"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-23T22:16:32Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability was found in code-projects Barangay Resident Profiling Management System 1.0. This impacts an unknown function of the file /archived_records.php of the component Restore/Delete. The manipulation of the argument resident_id results in authorization bypass. The attack may be launched remotely. The exploit has been made public and could be used.",
  "id": "GHSA-mwph-vxwq-72m7",
  "modified": "2026-08-24T00:33:11Z",
  "published": "2026-08-24T00:33:10Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-78142"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://code-projects.org"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://gist.github.com/c4ttr4ck/190b532b4b239fdc8f6fb72d89bde2c8"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/cve/CVE-2026-78142"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/submit/882422"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/394525"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/394525/cti"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-MWR2-WMGP-CRJ6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-19 21:42 – Updated: 2026-06-19 21:42
VLAI
Summary
OpenBao's System Backend allows Unauthorized Management of the containing Namespace
Details

Summary

A user that is granted namespace management (/sys/namespaces) capabilities within a non-root namespace ("the victim namespace") can abuse special handling of the literal path "root" in namespace path canonicalization to manage the victim namespace itself.

Details

Several endpoints under /sys/namespaces/* accept a namespace path segment that is canonicalized and then appended to the path of the sys mount's containing namespace (set via path prefix or X-Vault-Namespace header) to determine the absolute path of the namespace to operate on.

Given the special namespace path "root" canonicalizes to en empty path (""), when passed as /sys/namespaces/root, the resulting absolute namespace path remains equal to the sys mount's containing namespace. Given ACLs are evaluated before namespace path canonicalization, this allows users with capabilities on /sys/namespaces/root within any given namespace to operate on the namespace itself instead.

Impact

Users that were granted the required capabilities can abuse this vulnerability to:

  • Look up
  • Delete
  • Lock
  • Patch custom metadata

against the namespace containing the system backend they can manage sys/namespaces/root in. The exact range of operations that can be performed depends on the specific capabilities granted on said path and any sub-paths such as /api-lock.

Notably, the root namespace is immutable and cannot be modified, deleted or locked, and is thus unaffected. Also note that users can only abuse this vulnerability to operate on the direct parent or "containing" namespace relative to their capabilities, not arbitrary namespaces.

Patch

This will be fixed in OpenBao v2.5.5.

PoC

Start a development server:

bao server -dev

Create a namespace:

bao namespace create victim

This will be the namespace we gain unauthorized management of.

Create a policy that allows management of namespaces, inside of the victim namespace.

bao policy write -namespace=victim namespace-management - <<EOF
path "sys/namespaces/*" {
    capabilities = ["read", "update", "patch", "delete"]
}
EOF

Then create a token with above policy attached:

export BAO_TOKEN=$(bao token create -namespace=victim -policy=namespace-management -field=token)

Operate on the victim's namespace using the token, for example by outright deleting it:

bao namespace delete -namespace=victim root
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/openbao/openbao"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.0.0-20260617103935-d3c1cc64b1ae"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/openbao/openbao"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.1.0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "2.5.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-55775"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-285"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-19T21:42:06Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nA user that is granted namespace management (`/sys/namespaces`) capabilities within a non-root namespace (\"the victim namespace\") can abuse special handling of the literal path `\"root\"` in namespace path canonicalization to manage the victim namespace itself. \n\n### Details\n\nSeveral endpoints under `/sys/namespaces/*` accept a namespace path segment that is canonicalized and then appended to the path of the sys mount\u0027s containing namespace (set via path prefix or `X-Vault-Namespace` header) to determine the absolute path of the namespace to operate on.\n\nGiven the special namespace path `\"root\"` canonicalizes to en empty path (`\"\"`), when passed as `/sys/namespaces/root`, the resulting absolute namespace path remains equal to the sys mount\u0027s containing namespace. Given ACLs are evaluated before namespace path canonicalization, this allows users with capabilities on `/sys/namespaces/root` within any given namespace to operate on the namespace itself instead.\n\n### Impact\n\nUsers that were granted the required capabilities can abuse this vulnerability to:\n\n- Look up\n- Delete\n- Lock\n- Patch custom metadata\n\nagainst the namespace containing the system backend they can manage `sys/namespaces/root` in. The exact range of operations that can be performed depends on the specific capabilities granted on said path and any sub-paths such as `/api-lock`.\n\nNotably, the root namespace is immutable and cannot be modified, deleted or locked, and is thus unaffected. Also note that users can only abuse this vulnerability to operate on the direct parent or \"containing\" namespace relative to their capabilities, not arbitrary namespaces.\n\n### Patch\n\nThis will be fixed in OpenBao v2.5.5.\n\n### PoC\n\nStart a development server:\n\n```sh\nbao server -dev\n```\n\nCreate a namespace:\n\n```sh\nbao namespace create victim\n```\n\nThis will be the namespace we gain unauthorized management of.\n\nCreate a policy that allows management of namespaces, _inside_ of the victim\nnamespace.\n\n```sh\nbao policy write -namespace=victim namespace-management - \u003c\u003cEOF\npath \"sys/namespaces/*\" {\n\tcapabilities = [\"read\", \"update\", \"patch\", \"delete\"]\n}\nEOF\n```\n\nThen create a token with above policy attached:\n\n```sh\nexport BAO_TOKEN=$(bao token create -namespace=victim -policy=namespace-management -field=token)\n```\n\nOperate on the victim\u0027s namespace using the token, for example by outright deleting it:\n\n```sh\nbao namespace delete -namespace=victim root\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-mwr2-wmgp-crj6",
  "modified": "2026-06-19T21:42:06Z",
  "published": "2026-06-19T21:42:06Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openbao/openbao/security/advisories/GHSA-mwr2-wmgp-crj6"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openbao/openbao/commit/d3c1cc64b1ae7f9868b5c3e80b8b11671f0d97ae"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openbao/openbao"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openbao/openbao/releases/tag/v2.5.5"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenBao\u0027s System Backend allows Unauthorized Management of the containing Namespace"
}

GHSA-MXGQ-9HHC-GF5W

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-04-17 00:30 – Updated: 2024-04-17 00:30
VLAI
Details

Vulnerability in the Oracle Complex Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul product of Oracle E-Business Suite (component: LOV). Supported versions that are affected are 12.2.3-12.2.13. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows unauthenticated attacker with network access via HTTP to compromise Oracle Complex Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul. Successful attacks require human interaction from a person other than the attacker and while the vulnerability is in Oracle Complex Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul, attacks may significantly impact additional products (scope change). Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in unauthorized update, insert or delete access to some of Oracle Complex Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul accessible data as well as unauthorized read access to a subset of Oracle Complex Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul accessible data. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 6.1 (Confidentiality and Integrity impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N).

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-21026"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-285"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-04-16T22:15:18Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Vulnerability in the Oracle Complex Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul product of Oracle E-Business Suite (component: LOV).  Supported versions that are affected are 12.2.3-12.2.13. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows unauthenticated attacker with network access via HTTP to compromise Oracle Complex Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul.  Successful attacks require human interaction from a person other than the attacker and while the vulnerability is in Oracle Complex Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul, attacks may significantly impact additional products (scope change). Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in  unauthorized update, insert or delete access to some of Oracle Complex Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul accessible data as well as  unauthorized read access to a subset of Oracle Complex Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul accessible data. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 6.1 (Confidentiality and Integrity impacts).  CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N).",
  "id": "GHSA-mxgq-9hhc-gf5w",
  "modified": "2024-04-17T00:30:55Z",
  "published": "2024-04-17T00:30:55Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-21026"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpuapr2024.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-MXP6-9C6H-3W2R

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-13 21:36 – Updated: 2026-08-13 21:36
VLAI
Details

IBM i 7.6, 7.5, 7.4, and 7.3 could allow a local authenticated attacker to gain privilege escalation via the Navigator for i debugger. This could allow the attacker to access or manipulate sensitive data on the system, or create new profiles with elevated privileges on the IBM i system.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-18509"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-285"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-13T21:17:45Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "IBM i 7.6, 7.5, 7.4, and 7.3 could allow a local authenticated attacker to gain privilege escalation via the Navigator for i debugger. This could allow the attacker to access or manipulate sensitive data on the system, or create new profiles with elevated privileges on the IBM i system.",
  "id": "GHSA-mxp6-9c6h-3w2r",
  "modified": "2026-08-13T21:36:14Z",
  "published": "2026-08-13T21:36:14Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-18509"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7283279"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-MXQ5-WXJQ-C9CC

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-08-02 00:00 – Updated: 2022-08-06 00:00
VLAI
Details

Improper Authorization in GitHub repository kromitgmbh/titra prior to 0.79.1.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-2595"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-285"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-08-01T15:15:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "Improper Authorization in GitHub repository kromitgmbh/titra prior to 0.79.1.",
  "id": "GHSA-mxq5-wxjq-c9cc",
  "modified": "2022-08-06T00:00:53Z",
  "published": "2022-08-02T00:00:25Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-2595"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/kromitgmbh/titra/commit/fe8c3cdeb70e53b9f38f1022186ab16324d332c5"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://huntr.dev/bounties/1c6afb84-2025-46d8-9e9f-cbfc20e5d04d"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-P279-2CQP-84JG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-24 21:46 – Updated: 2026-08-13 17:52
VLAI
Summary
OpenDJ SASL PLAIN authzid bypassing the proxy ACI scope check
Details

Summary

When a SASL PLAIN bind supplies an authorization identity (authzid) that resolves to a different user, PlainSASLMechanismHandler verified only the PROXIED_AUTH privilege and never evaluated the "proxy" access-control right (the mayProxy ACI scope check). As a result, any account holding the proxied-auth privilege could assume any resolvable non-root identity without being granted a proxy ACI for that target.

This diverges from every other proxy path in OpenDJ — the proxied-authorization controls (RFC 4370) and the DIGEST-MD5 / GSSAPI authzid handlers all require both the privilege and the mayProxy scope grant.

Impact

Privilege escalation / authorization bypass: a holder of proxied-auth can act as arbitrary directory users beyond the scope intended by the deployment's proxy ACIs, defeating the ACI-based restriction on which identities may be impersonated. Root/Directory Manager is not assumable this way.

Fix

Enforce the mayProxy scope check on the SASL PLAIN authzid path (both dn: and u:/bare forms), sharing one hasProxyAccess helper with the DIGEST-MD5/GSSAPI path. Denial returns INVALID_CREDENTIALS (49) before password verification — matching DIGEST-MD5/GSSAPI — so an unauthenticated client cannot distinguish a missing privilege from a missing ACI grant.

Workaround

Restrict or revoke the proxied-auth privilege until upgraded.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.1.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.openidentityplatform.opendj:opendj-server-legacy"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.1.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-73644"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-285",
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-24T21:46:39Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nWhen a SASL PLAIN bind supplies an authorization identity (authzid) that resolves to a **different** user, PlainSASLMechanismHandler verified only the PROXIED_AUTH privilege and never evaluated the \"proxy\" access-control right (the mayProxy ACI scope check). As a result, any account holding the proxied-auth privilege could assume **any resolvable non-root identity** without being granted a proxy ACI for that target.\n\nThis diverges from every other proxy path in OpenDJ \u2014 the proxied-authorization controls (RFC 4370) and the DIGEST-MD5 / GSSAPI authzid handlers all require **both** the privilege **and** the mayProxy scope grant.\n\n### Impact\nPrivilege escalation / authorization bypass: a holder of proxied-auth can act as arbitrary directory users beyond the scope intended by the deployment\u0027s proxy ACIs, defeating the ACI-based restriction on *which* identities may be impersonated. Root/Directory Manager is not assumable this way.\n\n### Fix\nEnforce the mayProxy scope check on the SASL PLAIN authzid path (both dn: and u:/bare forms), sharing one hasProxyAccess helper with the DIGEST-MD5/GSSAPI path. Denial returns INVALID_CREDENTIALS (49) **before** password verification \u2014 matching DIGEST-MD5/GSSAPI \u2014 so an unauthenticated client cannot distinguish a missing privilege from a missing ACI grant.\n\n### Workaround\nRestrict or revoke the proxied-auth privilege until upgraded.",
  "id": "GHSA-p279-2cqp-84jg",
  "modified": "2026-08-13T17:52:54Z",
  "published": "2026-07-24T21:46:39Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/OpenIdentityPlatform/OpenDJ/security/advisories/GHSA-p279-2cqp-84jg"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/OpenIdentityPlatform/OpenDJ/commit/5c326850f1ab945cfca7ac9c5aaf77d1052c6bed"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/OpenIdentityPlatform/OpenDJ"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/OpenIdentityPlatform/OpenDJ/releases/tag/5.1.2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenDJ SASL PLAIN authzid bypassing the proxy ACI scope check"
}

GHSA-P286-R3VC-Q86Q

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-06 15:31 – Updated: 2026-09-07 09:31
VLAI
Details

MISP's UiBeta theme collection view (app/View/Themed/UiBeta/Collections/view.ctp) performed a secondary query of member events by UUID without applying the caller's access control list (ACL). The CollectionsController::view() action correctly resolved collection element UUIDs through Event::fetchSimpleEvents($user, ...), which enforces per-user event ACL. However, the view template independently re-queried the same UUIDs using only an Event.uuid IN (...) condition, omitting the createEventConditions() authorization filter. Because collection element UUIDs are stored without server-side authorization against the referenced event (CollectionElementsController::add() accepts whatever UUID the collection owner posts), an authenticated user with view access to a collection could retrieve full details of events they are not permitted to read. The exposed data included event identifiers, info, dates, timestamps, creator organization, all event tags, and galaxy clusters (the latter attached via a cluster-scoped rather than event-scoped ACL check). This constitutes an authorization bypass at the presentation layer, allowing horizontal privilege escalation across event boundaries within the MISP instance.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-86283"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-285"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-06T15:17:24Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "MISP\u0027s UiBeta theme collection view (app/View/Themed/UiBeta/Collections/view.ctp) performed a secondary query of member events by UUID without applying the caller\u0027s access control list (ACL). The CollectionsController::view() action correctly resolved collection element UUIDs through Event::fetchSimpleEvents($user, ...), which enforces per-user event ACL. However, the view template independently re-queried the same UUIDs using only an Event.uuid IN (...) condition, omitting the createEventConditions() authorization filter. Because collection element UUIDs are stored without server-side authorization against the referenced event (CollectionElementsController::add() accepts whatever UUID the collection owner posts), an authenticated user with view access to a collection could retrieve full details of events they are not permitted to read. The exposed data included event identifiers, info, dates, timestamps, creator organization, all event tags, and galaxy clusters (the latter attached via a cluster-scoped rather than event-scoped ACL check). This constitutes an authorization bypass at the presentation layer, allowing horizontal privilege escalation across event boundaries within the MISP instance.",
  "id": "GHSA-p286-r3vc-q86q",
  "modified": "2026-09-07T09:31:38Z",
  "published": "2026-09-06T15:31:07Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-86283"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/44573e4a8"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/44573e4a8.patch"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries.
  • Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Ensure that you perform access control checks related to your business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that you apply to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor.

Mitigation MIT-4.4
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

  • Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
  • For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page.
  • One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
Mitigation
System Configuration Installation

Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.

CAPEC-1: Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs

In applications, particularly web applications, access to functionality is mitigated by an authorization framework. This framework maps Access Control Lists (ACLs) to elements of the application's functionality; particularly URL's for web apps. In the case that the administrator failed to specify an ACL for a particular element, an attacker may be able to access it with impunity. An attacker with the ability to access functionality not properly constrained by ACLs can obtain sensitive information and possibly compromise the entire application. Such an attacker can access resources that must be available only to users at a higher privilege level, can access management sections of the application, or can run queries for data that they otherwise not supposed to.

CAPEC-104: Cross Zone Scripting

An attacker is able to cause a victim to load content into their web-browser that bypasses security zone controls and gain access to increased privileges to execute scripting code or other web objects such as unsigned ActiveX controls or applets. This is a privilege elevation attack targeted at zone-based web-browser security.

CAPEC-127: Directory Indexing

An adversary crafts a request to a target that results in the target listing/indexing the content of a directory as output. One common method of triggering directory contents as output is to construct a request containing a path that terminates in a directory name rather than a file name since many applications are configured to provide a list of the directory's contents when such a request is received. An adversary can use this to explore the directory tree on a target as well as learn the names of files. This can often end up revealing test files, backup files, temporary files, hidden files, configuration files, user accounts, script contents, as well as naming conventions, all of which can be used by an attacker to mount additional attacks.

CAPEC-13: Subverting Environment Variable Values

The adversary directly or indirectly modifies environment variables used by or controlling the target software. The adversary's goal is to cause the target software to deviate from its expected operation in a manner that benefits the adversary.

CAPEC-17: Using Malicious Files

An attack of this type exploits a system's configuration that allows an adversary to either directly access an executable file, for example through shell access; or in a possible worst case allows an adversary to upload a file and then execute it. Web servers, ftp servers, and message oriented middleware systems which have many integration points are particularly vulnerable, because both the programmers and the administrators must be in synch regarding the interfaces and the correct privileges for each interface.

CAPEC-39: Manipulating Opaque Client-based Data Tokens

In circumstances where an application holds important data client-side in tokens (cookies, URLs, data files, and so forth) that data can be manipulated. If client or server-side application components reinterpret that data as authentication tokens or data (such as store item pricing or wallet information) then even opaquely manipulating that data may bear fruit for an Attacker. In this pattern an attacker undermines the assumption that client side tokens have been adequately protected from tampering through use of encryption or obfuscation.

CAPEC-402: Bypassing ATA Password Security

An adversary exploits a weakness in ATA security on a drive to gain access to the information the drive contains without supplying the proper credentials. ATA Security is often employed to protect hard disk information from unauthorized access. The mechanism requires the user to type in a password before the BIOS is allowed access to drive contents. Some implementations of ATA security will accept the ATA command to update the password without the user having authenticated with the BIOS. This occurs because the security mechanism assumes the user has first authenticated via the BIOS prior to sending commands to the drive. Various methods exist for exploiting this flaw, the most common being installing the ATA protected drive into a system lacking ATA security features (a.k.a. hot swapping). Once the drive is installed into the new system the BIOS can be used to reset the drive password.

CAPEC-45: Buffer Overflow via Symbolic Links

This type of attack leverages the use of symbolic links to cause buffer overflows. An adversary can try to create or manipulate a symbolic link file such that its contents result in out of bounds data. When the target software processes the symbolic link file, it could potentially overflow internal buffers with insufficient bounds checking.

CAPEC-5: Blue Boxing

This type of attack against older telephone switches and trunks has been around for decades. A tone is sent by an adversary to impersonate a supervisor signal which has the effect of rerouting or usurping command of the line. While the US infrastructure proper may not contain widespread vulnerabilities to this type of attack, many companies are connected globally through call centers and business process outsourcing. These international systems may be operated in countries which have not upgraded Telco infrastructure and so are vulnerable to Blue boxing. Blue boxing is a result of failure on the part of the system to enforce strong authorization for administrative functions. While the infrastructure is different than standard current applications like web applications, there are historical lessons to be learned to upgrade the access control for administrative functions.

{'xhtml:b': 'This attack pattern is included in CAPEC for historical purposes.'}

CAPEC-51: Poison Web Service Registry

SOA and Web Services often use a registry to perform look up, get schema information, and metadata about services. A poisoned registry can redirect (think phishing for servers) the service requester to a malicious service provider, provide incorrect information in schema or metadata, and delete information about service provider interfaces.

CAPEC-59: Session Credential Falsification through Prediction

This attack targets predictable session ID in order to gain privileges. The attacker can predict the session ID used during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking.

CAPEC-60: Reusing Session IDs (aka Session Replay)

This attack targets the reuse of valid session ID to spoof the target system in order to gain privileges. The attacker tries to reuse a stolen session ID used previously during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking. Another name for this type of attack is Session Replay.

CAPEC-647: Collect Data from Registries

An adversary exploits a weakness in authorization to gather system-specific data and sensitive information within a registry (e.g., Windows Registry, Mac plist). These contain information about the system configuration, software, operating system, and security. The adversary can leverage information gathered in order to carry out further attacks.

CAPEC-668: Key Negotiation of Bluetooth Attack (KNOB)

An adversary can exploit a flaw in Bluetooth key negotiation allowing them to decrypt information sent between two devices communicating via Bluetooth. The adversary uses an Adversary in the Middle setup to modify packets sent between the two devices during the authentication process, specifically the entropy bits. Knowledge of the number of entropy bits will allow the attacker to easily decrypt information passing over the line of communication.

CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls

An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.

CAPEC-77: Manipulating User-Controlled Variables

This attack targets user controlled variables (DEBUG=1, PHP Globals, and So Forth). An adversary can override variables leveraging user-supplied, untrusted query variables directly used on the application server without any data sanitization. In extreme cases, the adversary can change variables controlling the business logic of the application. For instance, in languages like PHP, a number of poorly set default configurations may allow the user to override variables.

CAPEC-87: Forceful Browsing

An attacker employs forceful browsing (direct URL entry) to access portions of a website that are otherwise unreachable. Usually, a front controller or similar design pattern is employed to protect access to portions of a web application. Forceful browsing enables an attacker to access information, perform privileged operations and otherwise reach sections of the web application that have been improperly protected.