GHSA-P279-2CQP-84JG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-24 21:46 – Updated: 2026-08-13 17:52
VLAI
Summary
OpenDJ SASL PLAIN authzid bypassing the proxy ACI scope check
Details

Summary

When a SASL PLAIN bind supplies an authorization identity (authzid) that resolves to a different user, PlainSASLMechanismHandler verified only the PROXIED_AUTH privilege and never evaluated the "proxy" access-control right (the mayProxy ACI scope check). As a result, any account holding the proxied-auth privilege could assume any resolvable non-root identity without being granted a proxy ACI for that target.

This diverges from every other proxy path in OpenDJ — the proxied-authorization controls (RFC 4370) and the DIGEST-MD5 / GSSAPI authzid handlers all require both the privilege and the mayProxy scope grant.

Impact

Privilege escalation / authorization bypass: a holder of proxied-auth can act as arbitrary directory users beyond the scope intended by the deployment's proxy ACIs, defeating the ACI-based restriction on which identities may be impersonated. Root/Directory Manager is not assumable this way.

Fix

Enforce the mayProxy scope check on the SASL PLAIN authzid path (both dn: and u:/bare forms), sharing one hasProxyAccess helper with the DIGEST-MD5/GSSAPI path. Denial returns INVALID_CREDENTIALS (49) before password verification — matching DIGEST-MD5/GSSAPI — so an unauthenticated client cannot distinguish a missing privilege from a missing ACI grant.

Workaround

Restrict or revoke the proxied-auth privilege until upgraded.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.1.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.openidentityplatform.opendj:opendj-server-legacy"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.1.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-73644"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-285",
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-24T21:46:39Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nWhen a SASL PLAIN bind supplies an authorization identity (authzid) that resolves to a **different** user, PlainSASLMechanismHandler verified only the PROXIED_AUTH privilege and never evaluated the \"proxy\" access-control right (the mayProxy ACI scope check). As a result, any account holding the proxied-auth privilege could assume **any resolvable non-root identity** without being granted a proxy ACI for that target.\n\nThis diverges from every other proxy path in OpenDJ \u2014 the proxied-authorization controls (RFC 4370) and the DIGEST-MD5 / GSSAPI authzid handlers all require **both** the privilege **and** the mayProxy scope grant.\n\n### Impact\nPrivilege escalation / authorization bypass: a holder of proxied-auth can act as arbitrary directory users beyond the scope intended by the deployment\u0027s proxy ACIs, defeating the ACI-based restriction on *which* identities may be impersonated. Root/Directory Manager is not assumable this way.\n\n### Fix\nEnforce the mayProxy scope check on the SASL PLAIN authzid path (both dn: and u:/bare forms), sharing one hasProxyAccess helper with the DIGEST-MD5/GSSAPI path. Denial returns INVALID_CREDENTIALS (49) **before** password verification \u2014 matching DIGEST-MD5/GSSAPI \u2014 so an unauthenticated client cannot distinguish a missing privilege from a missing ACI grant.\n\n### Workaround\nRestrict or revoke the proxied-auth privilege until upgraded.",
  "id": "GHSA-p279-2cqp-84jg",
  "modified": "2026-08-13T17:52:54Z",
  "published": "2026-07-24T21:46:39Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/OpenIdentityPlatform/OpenDJ/security/advisories/GHSA-p279-2cqp-84jg"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/OpenIdentityPlatform/OpenDJ/commit/5c326850f1ab945cfca7ac9c5aaf77d1052c6bed"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/OpenIdentityPlatform/OpenDJ"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/OpenIdentityPlatform/OpenDJ/releases/tag/5.1.2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenDJ SASL PLAIN authzid bypassing the proxy ACI scope check"
}



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