CWE-287

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-56764"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-204",
      "CWE-287"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-09-29T20:15:33Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Trivision NC-227WF firmware 5.80 (build 20141010) login mechanism reveals whether a username exists or not by returning different error messages (\"Unknown user\" vs. \"Wrong password\"), allowing an attacker to enumerate valid usernames.",
  "id": "GHSA-c22h-wwm4-7x2j",
  "modified": "2025-11-11T21:30:27Z",
  "published": "2025-09-29T21:30:26Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-56764"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Remenis/CVE-2025-56764"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Remenis/CVE-2025-56764-trivision-nc227wf"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2004-2736"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-287"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2004-12-31T05:00:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Polar HelpDesk 3.0 allows remote attackers to bypass authentication by setting the UserId and UserType values in a cookie.",
  "id": "GHSA-c246-vh69-9f94",
  "modified": "2022-04-29T03:02:00Z",
  "published": "2022-04-29T03:02:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2004-2736"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/16778"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/12120"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.osvdb.org/8168"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securiteam.com/windowsntfocus/5OP0K0ADGA.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/10775"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.5.3"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "xml-crypto"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.0.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-287"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2020-10-27T20:35:52Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nAn attacker can inject an HMAC-SHA1 signature that is valid using only knowledge of the RSA public key. This allows bypassing signature validation.\n\n### Patches\nVersion 2.0.0 has the fix.\n\n### Workarounds\nThe recommendation is to upgrade. In case that is not possible remove the \u0027http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#hmac-sha1\u0027 entry from SignedXml.SignatureAlgorithms.",
  "id": "GHSA-c27r-x354-4m68",
  "modified": "2022-08-02T20:03:05Z",
  "published": "2020-10-27T20:39:46Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/yaronn/xml-crypto/security/advisories/GHSA-c27r-x354-4m68"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/yaronn/xml-crypto/commit/3d9db712e6232c765cd2ad6bd2902b88a0d22100"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/yaronn/xml-crypto"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/xml-crypto"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [],
  "summary": "xml-crypto\u0027s HMAC-SHA1 signatures can bypass validation via key confusion"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2013-6360"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-287"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2020-02-13T23:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "TRENDnet TS-S402 has a backdoor to enable TELNET.",
  "id": "GHSA-c2f3-qm3g-qj54",
  "modified": "2024-04-03T23:58:11Z",
  "published": "2022-05-05T00:29:38Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-6360"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://firmware.re/usenixsec14"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://firmware.re/vulns/acsa-2013-014.php"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-42038"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-287"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-08-08T10:15:08Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Vulnerability of PIN enhancement failures in the screen lock module\nImpact: Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may affect service confidentiality, integrity, and availability.",
  "id": "GHSA-c2fg-vqvf-qqcj",
  "modified": "2024-08-08T12:30:34Z",
  "published": "2024-08-08T12:30:34Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-42038"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://consumer.huawei.com/en/support/bulletin/2024/8"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-7763"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-287"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-10-24T21:15:15Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "In WhatsUp Gold versions released before 2024.0.0,\u00a0\n\nan Authentication Bypass issue exists which allows an attacker to obtain encrypted user credentials.",
  "id": "GHSA-c2hr-6qhm-xv9r",
  "modified": "2024-10-30T15:30:45Z",
  "published": "2024-10-24T21:31:04Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-7763"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://community.progress.com/s/article/WhatsUp-Gold-Security-Bulletin-August-2024"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.progress.com/network-monitoring"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "fastmcp"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.13.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-287"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-10-29T15:38:07Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nFastMCP documentation [covers the scenario](https://gofastmcp.com/integrations/azure) where it is possible to use Entra ID or other providers for authentication. In this context, because Entra ID does not support Dynamic Client Registration (DCR), the FastMCP-hosted MCP server is acting as the authorization provider, as declared in the Protected Resource Metadata (PRM) document hosted on the server.\n\nFor example, on a local MCP server, it may be hosted here:\n\n```http\nhttp://localhost:8000/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource\n```\n\nAnd the JSON representation of the PRM document:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"resource\": \"http://localhost:8000/mcp\",\n  \"authorization_servers\": [\n    \"http://localhost:8000/\"\n  ],\n  \"scopes_supported\": [\n    \"User.Read\",\n    \"email\",\n    \"openid\",\n    \"profile\"\n  ],\n  \"bearer_methods_supported\": [\n    \"header\"\n  ]\n}\n```\n\nNotice that the `authorization_servers` field contains the MCP server itself - it acts as an **OAuth Client** to the downstream authorization server (e.g., Entra ID) and as a **Authorization Server** (AS) to the MCP client.\n\nThe FastMCP server also hosts the AS metadata:\n\n```bash\nhttp://localhost:8000/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server\n```\n\nWith the following content:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"issuer\": \"http://localhost:8000/\",\n  \"authorization_endpoint\": \"http://localhost:8000/authorize\",\n  \"token_endpoint\": \"http://localhost:8000/token\",\n  \"registration_endpoint\": \"http://localhost:8000/register\",\n  \"scopes_supported\": [\n    \"User.Read\",\n    \"email\",\n    \"openid\",\n    \"profile\"\n  ],\n  \"response_types_supported\": [\n    \"code\"\n  ],\n  \"grant_types_supported\": [\n    \"authorization_code\",\n    \"refresh_token\"\n  ],\n  \"token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported\": [\n    \"client_secret_post\"\n  ],\n  \"code_challenge_methods_supported\": [\n    \"S256\"\n  ]\n}\n```\n\nAll of this confirms that the FastMCP server is, in fact, handling the client-to-server authorization and then delegating the downstream effects (i.e., authorization with Entra ID) to its own redirect logic, with a call like this (as seen through MCP Inspector):\n\n```http\nhttp://localhost:8000/authorize?response_type=code\u0026client_id=fdec0bb8-3423-40d0-aa2a-73de26bf6f93\u0026code_challenge=2a9ZxAEr5NEsKPwFWuEFA1W-kFMXc-02u6qc8aLf_g4\u0026code_challenge_method=S256\u0026redirect_uri=http%3A%2F%2Flocalhost%3A6274%2Foauth%2Fcallback%2Fdebug\u0026state=9f23fd47e2b8786b502f116bdbfd6ae3d7d2801167e24fea82f608bb52312bbd\u0026scope=User.Read+email+openid+profile\u0026resource=http%3A%2F%2Flocalhost%3A8000%2Fmcp\n```\n\nWhen using the built-in FastMCP `/authorize` endpoint, and in the example above, FastMCP server configured with Entra ID, it will then redirect the user here:\n\n```http\nhttps://login.microsoftonline.com/412e93fe-74e5-4ee6-9b67-1eeb1c79550e/oauth2/v2.0/authorize?response_type=code\u0026client_id=7bac43f2-ca62-4148-93a5-fd5686cb16c0\u0026redirect_uri=http%3A%2F%2Flocalhost%3A8000%2Fauth%2Fcallback\u0026state=Tcv7bbg_v0Qi69RHbCzqR4tQHSHKPQuDDxjuo0wu5qU\u0026scope=User.Read+email+openid+profile\u0026code_challenge=bxICFAJDViuTTHIPUPdSXGLKbNbgPwiB-0ITXUJkjYM\u0026code_challenge_method=S256\u0026resource=http%3A%2F%2Flocalhost%3A8000%2Fmcp\n```\n\n\u003e[!NOTE]\n\u003eIn the scenario above, the app registration in Entra ID is set up in the FastMCP server, as outlined in the PoC below.\n\n\u003cimg width=\"2725\" height=\"630\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/7ea612bf-a49e-44da-bd79-236c26bb42f3\" /\u003e\n\nNotice that the client ID and redirect URIs in the `login.microsoftonline.com` call are different than the initial `/authorize` call - that\u0027s because we\u0027re now switching to using the MCP server\u0027s **static app registration** instead of the DCR client details.\n\nCompleting the authorization flow here for the first time for a user would trigger the Entra ID consent flow:\n\n\u003cimg width=\"751\" height=\"952\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/2cc4b7ee-c110-4623-8f86-438821f4addf\" /\u003e\n\nThis consent flow is **only showed the first time the user needs to use this application**. Once the consent is set, they will never be prompted for this unless revoked.\n\nThis is where the vulnerability comes in. After the user consented and is authorized, Entra ID will set a browser cookie capturing the authorization state. This helps prevent nagging re-authorization prompts.\n\nWith the user consented to the **static client for Entra ID** that the FastMCP server exposes, they will now not be prompted the next time they need to use the same application ID.\n\nNow, an attacker comes in - in **their own MCP client** (i.e., they maintain one at `https://evil.example.com`) they start the authorization with the same remote MCP server and get to the point where the server produces **their own** authorization URI for this client ID:\n\n```http\nhttp://localhost:8000/authorize?response_type=code\u0026client_id=9a5d63d0-3aa3-465c-b097-0e2e196392dd\u0026code_challenge=2F4Lbfppwd7xuynLT1y4Cy2Dac-S6HOO2B84itAwppw\u0026code_challenge_method=S256\u0026redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fevil.example.com%3A6274%2Foauth%2Fcallback%2Fdebug\u0026state=221fab2ccdc1481511639c110ee7382445930e22be25396b01f32d973d7176dc\u0026scope=User.Read+email+openid+profile\u0026resource=http%3A%2F%2Flocalhost%3A8000%2Fmcp\n```\n\n\u003e[!IMPORTANT]\n\u003eNote that the redirect URI above points to the `https://evil.example.com` client.\n\nAt this point - they grab the URL and **coerce the victim** (user that already authenticated with Entra ID on their machine) to click on this link. This could be done through spam, spear-phishing, or any other traditional link sharing approaches. The moment the victim clicks on this link, they will be taken to the browser, where there is already a cookie set by Entra ID for the **static Entra ID client that the MCP server is using**. The DCR-d **registered client ID** that the FastMCP server is handling now got linked to the internal FastMCP authorization server, and the authorization code is returned to `https://evil.example.com`.\n\nThe user will be automatically speed-ran through the authorization flow (no prompts) and they will effectively give access to the MCP server to the attacker with their account. Attacker can now exchange the authorization code for a token and access the remote MCP server as the victim.\n\n### Details\n\nSee above - the outline covers the attack vector.\n\n### PoC\n\nStandard documented sample that uses Entra ID:\n\n```python\nfrom fastmcp import FastMCP\nfrom fastmcp.server.auth.providers.azure import AzureProvider\n\n# The AzureProvider handles Azure\u0027s token format and validation\nauth_provider = AzureProvider(\n    client_id=\"f527ed01-9725-45bd-8173-8d3a017ba02f\",  # Your Azure App Client ID\n    client_secret=\"#####~######_#######\",                 # Your Azure App Client Secret\n    tenant_id=\"412e93fe-74e5-4ee6-9b67-1eeb1c79550e\", # Your Azure Tenant ID (REQUIRED)\n    base_url=\"http://localhost:8000\",                   # Must match your App registration\n    required_scopes=[\"User.Read\", \"email\", \"openid\", \"profile\"],  # Microsoft Graph permissions\n    # redirect_path=\"/auth/callback\"                  # Default value, customize if needed\n)\n\nmcp = FastMCP(name=\"Azure Secured App\", auth=auth_provider)\n\n# Add a protected tool to test authentication\n@mcp.tool\nasync def get_user_info() -\u003e dict:\n    \"\"\"Returns information about the authenticated Azure user.\"\"\"\n    from fastmcp.server.dependencies import get_access_token\n    \n    token = get_access_token()\n    # The AzureProvider stores user data in token claims\n    return {\n        \"azure_id\": token.claims.get(\"sub\"),\n        \"email\": token.claims.get(\"email\"),\n        \"name\": token.claims.get(\"name\"),\n        \"job_title\": token.claims.get(\"job_title\"),\n        \"office_location\": token.claims.get(\"office_location\")\n    }\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nPotential for server account compromise.",
  "id": "GHSA-c2jp-c369-7pvx",
  "modified": "2026-01-21T21:56:44Z",
  "published": "2025-10-29T15:38:07Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/jlowin/fastmcp/security/advisories/GHSA-c2jp-c369-7pvx"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/jlowin/fastmcp"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "FastMCP Auth Integration Allows for Confused Deputy Account Takeover"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-5437"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-287"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-06-02T09:15:21Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability classified as critical has been found in Multilaser Sirius RE016 MLT1.0. Affected is an unknown function of the file /cgi-bin/cstecgi.cgi of the component Password Change Handler. The manipulation leads to improper authentication. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.",
  "id": "GHSA-c2r2-9576-9q36",
  "modified": "2025-06-02T09:31:02Z",
  "published": "2025-06-02T09:31:02Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-5437"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/DefaultCh40s/RE016/blob/main/re016.py"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.310770"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.310770"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.584325"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.28.3"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "mantisbt/mantisbt"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.28.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-47156"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-287",
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-15T16:45:22Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "MantisBT 2.28.3 and earlier contains a critical authentication bypass in the SOAP API\u0027s mci_check_login() function. Any user knowing any valid cookie_string can authenticate as any other user (knowing their username), including the administrator, without knowing the target\u0027s password.\n\nThe vulnerability is exploitable with zero prior access on default MantisBT installations because self-registration is enabled by default ($g_allow_signup = ON). A self-registered user can use their own cookie_string (readable from their browser\u0027s MANTIS_STRING_COOKIE cookie after login) to impersonate the administrator via the SOAP API.\n\nThe REST API is NOT affected. The REST API\u0027s AuthMiddleware derives the username server-side from the API token or session cookie, so the username cannot be spoofed.\n\nThe Web UI is NOT affected. The Web UI authenticates via PHP session cookies (PHPSESSID) and validates the MANTIS_STRING_COOKIE against the logged-in user through auth_is_cookie_valid(). The username is derived server-side from the cookie, not supplied by the client.\n\n### Impact\n- Full administrator access to the SOAP API from zero prior access (with self-registration enabled, which is the default)\n- Read/write all issues including private issues and notes across all projects\n- Full data exfiltration of all bug reports, attachments, user accounts (id, name, email), and non-private configuration values via the 71 SOAP operations available\n- Destructive operations: delete projects, issues, attachments, tags, categories, and versions\n- Data manipulation: create/modify issues, impersonate reporters, manage project structure\n- Chains with other vulnerabilities: the SOAP admin access enables exploitation of SOAP vulnerabilities that require administrator privileges\n\n### Patches\n- https://github.com/mantisbt/mantisbt/commit/e3571c319b1721b41b0dc4b5b5203cbdcbe0c2ee\n\n### Workarounds\nNone\n\n### Resources\n- https://mantisbt.org/bugs/view.php?id=37121\n\n### Credits\nMantisBT would like to thank McCaulay Hudson ([@_McCaulay](https://x.com/_mccaulay)) of [watchTowr](https://labs.watchtowr.com/) for originally identifying and responsibly reporting the issue.\n\nThe vulnerability  was subsequently discovered by other researchers, while the team was working on fixing and preparing the release. MantisBT credits them here, in chronological order of their reports: \n- Keitaro Yamazaki (@tyage) \n- Harrison Keating (@voraci0us)\n- Chandler Johnson (@chndlrx)\n- Bharat Devasani (@bharatdevasani)",
  "id": "GHSA-c2xg-qjqw-2v98",
  "modified": "2026-07-15T16:45:22Z",
  "published": "2026-07-15T16:45:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mantisbt/mantisbt/security/advisories/GHSA-c2xg-qjqw-2v98"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mantisbt/mantisbt/commit/e3571c319b1721b41b0dc4b5b5203cbdcbe0c2ee"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/mantisbt/mantisbt"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://mantisbt.org/bugs/view.php?id=37121"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "MantisBT: SOAP API Authentication Bypass with Privilege Escalation to Administrator"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "RubyGems",
        "name": "jwt"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.2.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "RubyGems",
        "name": "jwt"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.10.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-45363"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1391",
      "CWE-287",
      "CWE-326"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-18T17:24:55Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "`JWT.decode(token, \u0027\u0027, true, algorithm: \u0027HS256\u0027)` accepts an attacker-forged token.\n`OpenSSL::HMAC.digest(\u0027SHA256\u0027, \u0027\u0027, payload)` returns a valid digest under an empty key, and no `raise\n  InvalidKeyError if key.empty?` precondition exists in the HMAC algorithm.\n\n```\nJWT.decode(token, \"\", true, algorithm: \u0027HS256\u0027)\n  -\u003e JWA::Hmac.verify(verification_key: \"\", ...)\n  -\u003e OpenSSL::HMAC.digest(\u0027SHA256\u0027, \"\", signing_input) == signature\n```\n\nThe same path is reached when a keyfinder block or key_finder: argument returns \"\", nil, or an\narray containing nil for an unknown key. JWT::Decode#find_key only rejects literal nil and empty\narrays, and JWT::JWA::Hmac silently coerces nil to \"\" (signing_key ||= \u0027\u0027) before signing.\n\n```\nJWT.decode(token, nil, true, algorithms: [\u0027HS256\u0027]) { |_h| \"\" }\n  -\u003e find_key returns \"\"               # \"\" \u0026\u0026 !Array(\"\").empty? == true\n  -\u003e JWA::Hmac.verify(verification_key: \"\", ...)\n  -\u003e verifies\n```\nCommon application patterns that produce the unsafe value: `redis.get(\"kid:#{kid}\").to_s`, ORM string columns with `default: \u0027\u0027`, `ENV[\u0027SECRET\u0027] || \u0027\u0027, Hash.new(\u0027\u0027)` lookups, [primary, fallback] where fallback may be nil. Applications passing a non-empty static key:, or whose keyfinder returns nil / raises on miss, are not affected.\n\nThe existing `enforce_hmac_key_length` option would block this but defaults to false. On OpenSSL \u2265 3.5 the empty-key HMAC.digest call no longer raises, so the OpenSSL-3.0 rescue in JWA::Hmac#sign does not fire.\n\nAffects HS256/HS384/HS512 via both JWT.decode (positional key and block keyfinder) and\n`JWT::EncodedToken#verify_signature!(key_finder:)`",
  "id": "GHSA-c32j-vqhx-rx3x",
  "modified": "2026-06-02T22:12:50Z",
  "published": "2026-05-18T17:24:55Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/jwt/ruby-jwt/security/advisories/GHSA-c32j-vqhx-rx3x"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/jwt/ruby-jwt/issues/724"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/jwt/ruby-jwt/commit/db560b769a07bd9724e77ff505011ac01872106f"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/jwt/ruby-jwt"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/jwt/ruby-jwt/releases/tag/v2.10.3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/jwt/ruby-jwt/releases/tag/v3.2.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/blob/master/gems/jwt/CVE-2026-45363.yml"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-45363"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "ruby-jwt: Empty-key HMAC bypass; cross-language sibling of CVE-2026-44351"
}