Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-306

Allowed

Missing Authentication for Critical Function

Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft

API response cwe.mitre.org

The product does not perform any authentication for functionality that requires a provable user identity or consumes a significant amount of resources.

3442 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-WXRW-GVG8-FQJP

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-06 22:52 – Updated: 2026-02-09 22:39
VLAI
Summary
Sliver has DNS C2 OTP Bypass that Allows Unauthenticated Session Flooding and Denial of Service
Details

Summary

The DNS C2 listener accepts unauthenticated TOTP bootstrap messages and allocates server-side DNS sessions without validating OTP values, even when EnforceOTP is enabled. Because sessions are stored without a cleanup/expiry path in this flow, an unauthenticated remote actor can repeatedly create sessions and drive memory exhaustion.

Vulnerable Component

  • server/c2/dns.go:84-90 (EnforceOTP stored but not enforced in bootstrap)
  • server/c2/dns.go:378-390 (TOTP requests routed directly to bootstrap)
  • server/c2/dns.go:490-521 (handleHello allocates session without OTP validation)
  • server/c2/dns.go:495 (sessions.Store with no lifecycle control in this path)
  • client/command/jobs/dns.go:46-52 (operator-facing EnforceOTP control implies auth gate)
  • implant/sliver/transports/dnsclient/dnsclient.go:896-900 (otpMsg sends TOTP with ID=0)
  • protobuf/dnspb/dns.proto:22 (documents TOTP in ID field)

Attack Vector

  • Network-accessible DNS listener
  • No authentication required
  • Low-complexity repeated DNS query loop
  • Trigger path: DNSMessageType_TOTP bootstrap handling

Proof of Concept

Preconditions

  • DNS listener is reachable
  • DNS C2 job is active

Reproduction Steps

  1. Send repeated DNS queries with a minimal protobuf message of type TOTP.
  2. Observe repeated session allocation/issuance behavior.
  3. Continue requests to increase active in-memory session state.

Example

while true; do
  dig +short @<DNS_C2_IP> baa8.<parent-domain> A >/dev/null
done

baa8 is a base32 payload for a minimal TOTP-type protobuf message.

Observable Indicators

  • Repeated bootstrap/session-allocation log entries from handleHello
  • Rising memory usage in the Sliver server process
  • Service slowdown or instability under sustained request volume

Impact

  • Unauthenticated remote denial of service (availability)
  • Resource exhaustion through unbounded session growth in DNS bootstrap path
  • Estimated CVSS v3.1: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H (7.5 High)
Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.6.11"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/bishopfox/sliver"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.6.12"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-25791"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306",
      "CWE-400"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-06T22:52:00Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-09T21:15:49Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\nThe DNS C2 listener accepts unauthenticated `TOTP` bootstrap messages and allocates server-side DNS sessions without validating OTP values, even when `EnforceOTP` is enabled. Because sessions are stored without a cleanup/expiry path in this flow, an unauthenticated remote actor can repeatedly create sessions and drive memory exhaustion.\n\n## Vulnerable Component\n- `server/c2/dns.go:84-90` (`EnforceOTP` stored but not enforced in bootstrap)\n- `server/c2/dns.go:378-390` (`TOTP` requests routed directly to bootstrap)\n- `server/c2/dns.go:490-521` (`handleHello` allocates session without OTP validation)\n- `server/c2/dns.go:495` (`sessions.Store` with no lifecycle control in this path)\n- `client/command/jobs/dns.go:46-52` (operator-facing `EnforceOTP` control implies auth gate)\n- `implant/sliver/transports/dnsclient/dnsclient.go:896-900` (`otpMsg` sends `TOTP` with `ID=0`)\n- `protobuf/dnspb/dns.proto:22` (documents TOTP in `ID` field)\n\n## Attack Vector\n- Network-accessible DNS listener\n- No authentication required\n- Low-complexity repeated DNS query loop\n- Trigger path: `DNSMessageType_TOTP` bootstrap handling\n\n## Proof of Concept\n### Preconditions\n- DNS listener is reachable\n- DNS C2 job is active\n\n### Reproduction Steps\n1. Send repeated DNS queries with a minimal protobuf message of type `TOTP`.\n2. Observe repeated session allocation/issuance behavior.\n3. Continue requests to increase active in-memory session state.\n\n### Example\n```bash\nwhile true; do\n  dig +short @\u003cDNS_C2_IP\u003e baa8.\u003cparent-domain\u003e A \u003e/dev/null\ndone\n```\n\n`baa8` is a base32 payload for a minimal TOTP-type protobuf message.\n\n### Observable Indicators\n- Repeated bootstrap/session-allocation log entries from `handleHello`\n- Rising memory usage in the Sliver server process\n- Service slowdown or instability under sustained request volume\n\n## Impact\n- Unauthenticated remote denial of service (availability)\n- Resource exhaustion through unbounded session growth in DNS bootstrap path\n- Estimated CVSS v3.1: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H` (**7.5 High**)",
  "id": "GHSA-wxrw-gvg8-fqjp",
  "modified": "2026-02-09T22:39:50Z",
  "published": "2026-02-06T22:52:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/BishopFox/sliver/security/advisories/GHSA-wxrw-gvg8-fqjp"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25791"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/BishopFox/sliver/commit/2b65089b27c553e79e69f1067cad1339e4f3d937"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/BishopFox/sliver"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/BishopFox/sliver/releases/tag/v1.7.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Sliver has DNS C2 OTP Bypass that Allows Unauthenticated Session Flooding and Denial of Service"
}

GHSA-WXRX-6XJQ-JFGP

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-11-27 00:30 – Updated: 2025-11-27 00:30
VLAI
Details

ACE SECURITY WIP-90113 HD cameras contain an unauthenticated configuration disclosure vulnerability in the /web/cgi-bin/hi3510/backup.cgi endpoint. The endpoint permits remote download of a compressed configuration backup without requiring authentication or authorization. The exposed backup may include administrative credentials and other sensitive device settings, enabling an unauthenticated remote attacker to obtain information that could facilitate further compromise of the camera or connected network.

Severity
8.7 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-36874"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-11-26T23:15:47Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "ACE SECURITY WIP-90113 HD cameras contain an unauthenticated configuration disclosure vulnerability in the /web/cgi-bin/hi3510/backup.cgi endpoint. The endpoint permits remote download of a compressed configuration backup without requiring authentication or authorization. The exposed backup may include administrative credentials and other sensitive device settings, enabling an unauthenticated remote attacker to obtain information that could facilitate further compromise of the camera or connected network.",
  "id": "GHSA-wxrx-6xjq-jfgp",
  "modified": "2025-11-27T00:30:27Z",
  "published": "2025-11-27T00:30:27Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-36874"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://acesecurity.jp/support/top/wip_series/wip-90113"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cxsecurity.com/issue/WLB-2020020137"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://packetstorm.news/files/id/156497"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/ace-security-wip90113-unauthenticated-config-disclosure"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-X223-P2GF-V735

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-17 18:43 – Updated: 2026-06-17 18:43
VLAI
Summary
Langflow: Unauthenticated file upload leads to DoS (space exhaustion) and information leak
Details

Summary

Unauthenticated users can upload any amount of data to the server without any limitations. No need for any prior knowledge, only network access to Langflow.

This can lead to space exhaustion on the server.

In adition, in the response, the absolute path of the uploaded file is reported to the attacker, which is an information leak that can assist in chaining other primitives.

Tested on commit 2d67402b1dbaefcbce85a244d4a6cd5e4bda1cfe

Details

Code is in langflow/api/v1/[endpoints.py](http://endpoints.py/):

@router.post(
    "/upload/{flow_id}",
    status_code=HTTPStatus.CREATED,
    deprecated=True,
)
async def create_upload_file(
    file: UploadFile,
    flow_id: UUID,
) -> UploadFileResponse:
...

As can be seen above, there is no authentication. There is not validation over flow_id as well, unlike other endpoints:

        flow_id_str = str(flow_id)
        file_path = await asyncio.to_thread(save_uploaded_file, file, folder_name=flow_id_str)

Function save_uploaded_file saves the file to local file-system. Suggested fix: 1. Add authentication to route. 2. Only return relative path or filename.

PoC

PoC:

curl 'http://localhost:7860/api/v1/upload/<any_uuid>' -F "file=@<any_file>"

Example:

# curl 'http://localhost:7860/api/v1/upload/11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111' -F "file=@/tmp/dummy.txt"
{"flowId":"11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111","file_path":"/Users/ori/Library/Caches/langflow/11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111/9d63c3b5b7623d1fa3dc7fd1547313b9546c6d0fbbb6773a420613b7a17995c8.txt"}

Impact

  1. Space exhaustion on server that can lead to Denial-of-Service.
  2. Information leak - leakage of absolute path of langflow's cache directory in server.

Patches

Fixed in 1.9.1 via PR #12831. The deprecated POST /api/v1/upload/{flow_id} endpoint now uses the get_flow dependency, requiring an authenticated user and flow ownership (returns 404 for missing or cross-user flows), and enforces the max_file_size_upload limit (HTTP 413) — closing the unauthenticated upload and disk-exhaustion vectors. Upgrade to 1.9.1 or later.

Note: the response still returns the file's absolute path (file_path); after this fix it is only disclosed to the authenticated owner of the flow.

Ori Lahav Security Researcher @ Rubrik Inc.

Severity
9.3 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "langflow"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.9.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-55450"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-200",
      "CWE-306",
      "CWE-400"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-17T18:43:12Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nUnauthenticated users can upload any amount of data to the server without any limitations. No need for any prior knowledge, only network access to Langflow.\n\nThis can lead to space exhaustion on the server.\n\nIn adition, in the response, the absolute path of the uploaded file is reported to the attacker, which is an information leak that can assist in chaining other primitives.\n\nTested on commit 2d67402b1dbaefcbce85a244d4a6cd5e4bda1cfe\n\n### Details\nCode is in `langflow/api/v1/[endpoints.py](http://endpoints.py/)`:\n```python\n@router.post(\n    \"/upload/{flow_id}\",\n    status_code=HTTPStatus.CREATED,\n    deprecated=True,\n)\nasync def create_upload_file(\n    file: UploadFile,\n    flow_id: UUID,\n) -\u003e UploadFileResponse:\n...\n```\nAs can be seen above, there is no authentication. There is not validation over `flow_id` as well, unlike other endpoints:\n```\n        flow_id_str = str(flow_id)\n        file_path = await asyncio.to_thread(save_uploaded_file, file, folder_name=flow_id_str)\n```\nFunction `save_uploaded_file` saves the file to local file-system.\nSuggested fix:\n1. Add authentication to route.\n2. Only return relative path or filename.\n\n### PoC\nPoC:\n```bash\ncurl \u0027http://localhost:7860/api/v1/upload/\u003cany_uuid\u003e\u0027 -F \"file=@\u003cany_file\u003e\"\n```\n\nExample:\n```bash\n# curl \u0027http://localhost:7860/api/v1/upload/11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111\u0027 -F \"file=@/tmp/dummy.txt\"\n{\"flowId\":\"11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111\",\"file_path\":\"/Users/ori/Library/Caches/langflow/11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111/9d63c3b5b7623d1fa3dc7fd1547313b9546c6d0fbbb6773a420613b7a17995c8.txt\"}\n```\n\n### Impact\n1. Space exhaustion on server that can lead to Denial-of-Service.\n2. Information leak - leakage of absolute path of langflow\u0027s cache directory in server.\n\n\n\n\n\n### Patches\nFixed in **1.9.1** via PR [#12831](https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/pull/12831). The deprecated `POST /api/v1/upload/{flow_id}` endpoint now uses the `get_flow` dependency, requiring an authenticated user and flow ownership (returns `404` for missing or cross-user flows), and enforces the `max_file_size_upload` limit (`HTTP 413`) \u2014 closing the unauthenticated upload and disk-exhaustion vectors. Upgrade to **1.9.1 or later**.\n\nNote: the response still returns the file\u0027s absolute path (`file_path`); after this fix it is only disclosed to the authenticated owner of the flow.\n\n\nOri Lahav\nSecurity Researcher @ Rubrik Inc.",
  "id": "GHSA-x223-p2gf-v735",
  "modified": "2026-06-17T18:43:12Z",
  "published": "2026-06-17T18:43:12Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/security/advisories/GHSA-x223-p2gf-v735"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/pull/12831"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Langflow: Unauthenticated file upload leads to DoS (space exhaustion) and information leak"
}

GHSA-X227-PF99-VFFG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-18 13:55 – Updated: 2026-06-18 13:55
VLAI
Summary
PraisonAI: MCP SSE transport binds 0.0.0.0 with no authentication and no Origin validation; bundled SecurityConfig is never wired in
Details

The MCP SSE server started via ToolsMCPServer.run_sse() / launch_tools_mcp_server(transport="sse") binds to 0.0.0.0 by default and builds its Starlette application with no authentication middleware and no Origin-header validation. The module mcp/mcp_security.py provides exactly the needed controls (origin validation, DNS-rebinding detection, auth-header enforcement, a SecurityConfig), but none of these functions are ever called by any transport — they are dead code. Any host that can reach the port can list and invoke every registered tool with no credentials, and a victim's browser can drive the same calls against a localhost instance via DNS rebinding.

Affected code: src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/mcp/mcp_server.py - run_sse defaults host to all interfaces (line 245) and builds the app with only debug and routes - no middleware= and no per-route auth/origin gate (lines ~271-289): app = Starlette(debug=self._debug, routes=[ Route(sse_path, endpoint=handle_sse), # "/sse" Mount(messages_path, app=sse_transport.handle_post_message), # "/messages/" ]) uvicorn.run(app, host=host, port=port) - launch_tools_mcp_server also defaults host="0.0.0.0" (line 301).

src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/mcp/mcp_security.py defines but the transports never call: - is_valid_origin (line 30), is_potential_dns_rebinding (line 110), validate_auth_header (line 167), SecurityConfig.is_origin_allowed (line 236). These symbols are referenced only inside mcp_security.py and the init re-export. (mcp_websocket.py's auth references are CLIENT-side, not server validation.)

Impact: launch_tools_mcp_server(transport="sse") is the documented path for exposing tools over MCP. With the defaults above it is an unauthenticated, network-reachable tool-execution endpoint. Blast radius equals the capabilities of the registered tools; with file/shell/code-exec tools this is RCE. With no Origin check, a malicious page the victim merely visits can rebind its hostname to 127.0.0.1 and issue the JSON-RPC calls cross-origin against a developer's local server.

Proof of concept: Static proof (AST analysis of unmodified source): Check 1 - run_sse(host='0.0.0.0'); launch_tools_mcp_server(host='0.0.0.0') -> EXPOSED Check 2 - Starlette(...) kwargs: ['debug','routes'] -> NO middleware= (no auth/origin gate) Check 3 - is_valid_origin / is_potential_dns_rebinding / validate_auth_header / SecurityConfig never called by any transport -> DEAD CODE Live exploitation against a running server: curl -N http://VICTIM:8080/sse # event: endpoint / data: /messages/?session_id= curl -X POST "http://VICTIM:8080/messages/?session_id=" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"initialize","params":{"protocolVersion":"2024-11-05", "capabilities":{},"clientInfo":{"name":"x","version":"1"}}}' curl -X POST "http://VICTIM:8080/messages/?session_id=" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":2,"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"","arguments":{...}}}' No Authorization header anywhere. Browser DNS-rebinding variant drives the same calls cross-origin.

Remediation: Wire in the existing mcp_security.py controls and fix defaults: - Default run_sse(host="127.0.0.1"); require explicit opt-in to bind 0.0.0.0. - Attach Starlette middleware calling is_valid_origin / is_potential_dns_rebinding; reject bad origins. - Enforce validate_auth_header when SecurityConfig.require_auth; default require_auth=True (and allow_missing_origin=False) for any non-loopback bind.

Distinct from prior advisories: The accepted MCP advisories are tool-handler bugs — tools/call path traversal -> .pth RCE (GHSA-9mqq-jqxf-grvw) and unauthenticated file read via workflow.show/validate (GHSA-9cr9-25q5-8prj). This is a transport-layer missing-auth/exposure: the SSE server never enforces auth or Origin validation and ignores the security module the codebase ships. Closest in spirit to the default-insecure pattern (GHSA-8444 / 86qc) but a different server and a different root cause (unwired controls, not an unset env var).

Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "praisonaiagents"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.6.59"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1327",
      "CWE-306",
      "CWE-350"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-18T13:55:54Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "The MCP SSE server started via ToolsMCPServer.run_sse() / launch_tools_mcp_server(transport=\"sse\")\nbinds to 0.0.0.0 by default and builds its Starlette application with no authentication middleware\nand no Origin-header validation. The module mcp/mcp_security.py provides exactly the needed controls\n(origin validation, DNS-rebinding detection, auth-header enforcement, a SecurityConfig), but none of\nthese functions are ever called by any transport \u2014 they are dead code. Any host that can reach the\nport can list and invoke every registered tool with no credentials, and a victim\u0027s browser can drive\nthe same calls against a localhost instance via DNS rebinding.\n\nAffected code: src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/mcp/mcp_server.py\n- run_sse defaults host to all interfaces (line 245) and builds the app with only `debug` and `routes`\n  - no `middleware=` and no per-route auth/origin gate (lines ~271-289):\n      app = Starlette(debug=self._debug, routes=[\n          Route(sse_path, endpoint=handle_sse),                          # \"/sse\"\n          Mount(messages_path, app=sse_transport.handle_post_message),   # \"/messages/\"\n      ])\n      uvicorn.run(app, host=host, port=port)\n- launch_tools_mcp_server also defaults host=\"0.0.0.0\" (line 301).\n\nsrc/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/mcp/mcp_security.py defines but the transports never call:\n- is_valid_origin (line 30), is_potential_dns_rebinding (line 110), validate_auth_header (line 167),\n  SecurityConfig.is_origin_allowed (line 236). These symbols are referenced only inside mcp_security.py\n  and the __init__ re-export. (mcp_websocket.py\u0027s auth references are CLIENT-side, not server validation.)\n\nImpact:\nlaunch_tools_mcp_server(transport=\"sse\") is the documented path for exposing tools over MCP. With the\ndefaults above it is an unauthenticated, network-reachable tool-execution endpoint. Blast radius equals\nthe capabilities of the registered tools; with file/shell/code-exec tools this is RCE. With no Origin\ncheck, a malicious page the victim merely visits can rebind its hostname to 127.0.0.1 and issue the\nJSON-RPC calls cross-origin against a developer\u0027s local server.\n\nProof of concept:\nStatic proof (AST analysis of unmodified source):\n  Check 1 - run_sse(host=\u00270.0.0.0\u0027); launch_tools_mcp_server(host=\u00270.0.0.0\u0027)  -\u003e EXPOSED\n  Check 2 - Starlette(...) kwargs: [\u0027debug\u0027,\u0027routes\u0027]  -\u003e NO middleware= (no auth/origin gate)\n  Check 3 - is_valid_origin / is_potential_dns_rebinding / validate_auth_header / SecurityConfig\n            never called by any transport  -\u003e DEAD CODE\nLive exploitation against a running server:\n  curl -N http://VICTIM:8080/sse\n  #   event: endpoint  / data: /messages/?session_id=\u003csid\u003e\n  curl -X POST \"http://VICTIM:8080/messages/?session_id=\u003csid\u003e\" -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n    -d \u0027{\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"id\":1,\"method\":\"initialize\",\"params\":{\"protocolVersion\":\"2024-11-05\",\n         \"capabilities\":{},\"clientInfo\":{\"name\":\"x\",\"version\":\"1\"}}}\u0027\n  curl -X POST \"http://VICTIM:8080/messages/?session_id=\u003csid\u003e\" -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n    -d \u0027{\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"id\":2,\"method\":\"tools/call\",\"params\":{\"name\":\"\u003ctool\u003e\",\"arguments\":{...}}}\u0027\nNo Authorization header anywhere. Browser DNS-rebinding variant drives the same calls cross-origin.\n\nRemediation:\nWire in the existing mcp_security.py controls and fix defaults:\n- Default run_sse(host=\"127.0.0.1\"); require explicit opt-in to bind 0.0.0.0.\n- Attach Starlette middleware calling is_valid_origin / is_potential_dns_rebinding; reject bad origins.\n- Enforce validate_auth_header when SecurityConfig.require_auth; default require_auth=True (and\n  allow_missing_origin=False) for any non-loopback bind.\n\nDistinct from prior advisories:\nThe accepted MCP advisories are tool-handler bugs \u2014 tools/call path traversal -\u003e .pth RCE\n(GHSA-9mqq-jqxf-grvw) and unauthenticated file read via workflow.show/validate (GHSA-9cr9-25q5-8prj).\nThis is a transport-layer missing-auth/exposure: the SSE server never enforces auth or Origin validation\nand ignores the security module the codebase ships. Closest in spirit to the default-insecure pattern\n(GHSA-8444 / 86qc) but a different server and a different root cause (unwired controls, not an unset env var).",
  "id": "GHSA-x227-pf99-vffg",
  "modified": "2026-06-18T13:55:54Z",
  "published": "2026-06-18T13:55:54Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-x227-pf99-vffg"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "PraisonAI: MCP SSE transport binds 0.0.0.0 with no authentication and no Origin validation; bundled SecurityConfig is never wired in"
}

GHSA-X286-C2GQ-HHF2

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:17 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:17
VLAI
Details

Moxa Service in Moxa NPort 5150A firmware version 1.5 and earlier allows attackers to obtain sensitive configuration values via a crafted packet to UDP port 4800. NOTE: Moxa Service is an unauthenticated service that runs upon a first-time installation but can be disabled without ill effect.

Severity
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-12117"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-200",
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2020-05-01T14:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Moxa Service in Moxa NPort 5150A firmware version 1.5 and earlier allows attackers to obtain sensitive configuration values via a crafted packet to UDP port 4800. NOTE: Moxa Service is an unauthenticated service that runs upon a first-time installation but can be disabled without ill effect.",
  "id": "GHSA-x286-c2gq-hhf2",
  "modified": "2022-05-24T17:17:02Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T17:17:02Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-12117"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://blog.scadafence.com/technical-blog-cve-2020-12117-industrial-iot-insecure-default-configurations"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.moxa.com/en/support/support/security-advisory/nport-5100a-series-serial-device-servers-vulnerability"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-X2VM-WMH3-5VX3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-03-03 15:30 – Updated: 2023-03-10 21:30
VLAI
Details

An issue discovered in Shenzhen Zhiboton Electronics ZBT WE1626 Router v 21.06.18 allows attackers to escalate privileges via WGET command to the Network Diagnosis endpoint.

Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-45551"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-03-03T13:15:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "An issue discovered in Shenzhen Zhiboton Electronics ZBT WE1626 Router v 21.06.18 allows attackers to escalate privileges via WGET command to the Network Diagnosis endpoint.",
  "id": "GHSA-x2vm-wmh3-5vx3",
  "modified": "2023-03-10T21:30:25Z",
  "published": "2023-03-03T15:30:24Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-45551"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://blog.prodefense.io/zbt-we1626-wireless-router-cve-disclosures-b3534484d97d"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://shenzhen.com"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://zbt.com"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-X39M-3393-3QP4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-11-14 20:56 – Updated: 2025-11-14 20:56
VLAI
Summary
Flowise doesn't Prevent Bypass of Password Confirmation through Unverified Email Change (credentials)
Details

Summary

Unverified Email Change - Email as part of Credential / Unverified Account Recovery Channel Change

The application allows changing the account email address (used as a login identifier and/or password recovery address) without verifying the requester’s authority to make that change (no confirmation to the old email, no authentication step). Because email often functions as a credential or recovery channel, unverified email changes enable attackers to take over accounts by switching the account’s recovery/login address.

Details

Occurence - code: https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/blob/main/packages/ui/src/views/account/index.jsx#L211

Remote and physical scenarios can be considered.

PoC

Repro steps: 1. As logged in user https://cloud.flowiseai.com/account scroll down to 'Profile' section 2. Change email to the new email 3. Notice Unverified Password Change (authenticated change without current password)

Later this email is needed as credentials to log in or reset password feature.

POC: Email changed, and notice "Profile updated" message.

Screenshot secbug

Impact

Full account takeover (ATO) of affected accounts (loss of confidentiality and integrity of account data). User account recovery mechanisms (password reset flows tied to email) can be bypassed or abused if combined with this issue and the second one which I've reported (similar security issue with the password - part of credentials). (gain persistence)

Severity
8.3 (High)
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "flowise-ui"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.0.10"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306",
      "CWE-620"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-11-14T20:56:02Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nUnverified Email Change - Email as part of Credential / Unverified Account Recovery Channel Change\n\nThe application allows changing the account email address (used as a login identifier and/or password recovery address) without verifying the requester\u2019s authority to make that change (no confirmation to the old email, no authentication step). Because email often functions as a credential or recovery channel, unverified email changes enable attackers to take over accounts by switching the account\u2019s recovery/login address.\n\n### Details\nOccurence - code:\nhttps://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/blob/main/packages/ui/src/views/account/index.jsx#L211\n\nRemote and physical scenarios can be considered.\n\n### PoC\n**Repro steps:**\n1. As logged in user https://cloud.flowiseai.com/account scroll down to \u0027Profile\u0027 section\n2. Change email to the new email\n3. Notice Unverified Password Change (authenticated change without current password)\n\nLater this email is needed as credentials to log in or reset password feature.\n\n**POC:**\nEmail changed, and notice \"Profile updated\" message.\n\n**Screenshot**\n\u003cimg width=\"329\" height=\"357\" alt=\"secbug\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/d3c77835-35bb-47dc-8cd2-83e4e266e5a4\" /\u003e\n\n\n### Impact\nFull account takeover (ATO) of affected accounts (loss of confidentiality and integrity of account data).\nUser account recovery mechanisms (password reset flows tied to email) can be bypassed or abused if combined with this issue and the second one which I\u0027ve reported (similar security issue with the password - part of credentials). (gain persistence)",
  "id": "GHSA-x39m-3393-3qp4",
  "modified": "2025-11-14T20:56:02Z",
  "published": "2025-11-14T20:56:02Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/security/advisories/GHSA-x39m-3393-3qp4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/pull/5294"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/releases/tag/flowise%403.0.10"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Flowise doesn\u0027t Prevent Bypass of Password Confirmation through Unverified Email Change (credentials)"
}

GHSA-X3J6-H5JV-F97W

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-24 21:30 – Updated: 2025-12-24 21:30
VLAI
Details

Rifatron 5brid DVR contains an unauthenticated vulnerability in the animate.cgi script that allows unauthorized access to live video streams. Attackers can exploit the Mobile Web Viewer module by specifying channel numbers to retrieve sequential video snapshots without authentication.

Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
8.7 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2019-25240"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-12-24T20:15:51Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Rifatron 5brid DVR contains an unauthenticated vulnerability in the animate.cgi script that allows unauthorized access to live video streams. Attackers can exploit the Mobile Web Viewer module by specifying channel numbers to retrieve sequential video snapshots without authentication.",
  "id": "GHSA-x3j6-h5jv-f97w",
  "modified": "2025-12-24T21:30:33Z",
  "published": "2025-12-24T21:30:33Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-25240"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/47368"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.zeroscience.mk/en/vulnerabilities/ZSL-2019-5532.php"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.rifatron.com"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-X3JV-936G-XQJ4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-01-20 00:01 – Updated: 2025-10-22 00:32
VLAI
Details

Vulnerability in the Oracle Access Manager product of Oracle Fusion Middleware (component: OpenSSO Agent). Supported versions that are affected are 11.1.2.3.0, 12.2.1.3.0 and 12.2.1.4.0. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows unauthenticated attacker with network access via HTTP to compromise Oracle Access Manager. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in takeover of Oracle Access Manager. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 9.8 (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).

Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-35587"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-01-19T12:15:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "Vulnerability in the Oracle Access Manager product of Oracle Fusion Middleware (component: OpenSSO Agent). Supported versions that are affected are 11.1.2.3.0, 12.2.1.3.0 and 12.2.1.4.0. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows unauthenticated attacker with network access via HTTP to compromise Oracle Access Manager. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in takeover of Oracle Access Manager. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 9.8 (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).",
  "id": "GHSA-x3jv-936g-xqj4",
  "modified": "2025-10-22T00:32:28Z",
  "published": "2022-01-20T00:01:49Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-35587"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2021-35587"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpujan2022.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-X46H-6FMR-M5FR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-01-29 00:00 – Updated: 2025-04-17 18:31
VLAI
Details

A specially crafted script could cause the DeltaV Distributed Control System Controllers (All Versions) to restart and cause a denial-of-service condition.

Severity
5.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-26264"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-01-28T20:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A specially crafted script could cause the DeltaV Distributed Control System Controllers (All Versions) to restart and cause a denial-of-service condition.",
  "id": "GHSA-x46h-6fmr-m5fr",
  "modified": "2025-04-17T18:31:00Z",
  "published": "2022-01-29T00:00:44Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26264"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ics/advisories/icsa-21-355-04"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}
Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • Divide the software into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Identify which of these areas require a proven user identity, and use a centralized authentication capability.
  • Identify all potential communication channels, or other means of interaction with the software, to ensure that all channels are appropriately protected, including those channels that are assumed to be accessible only by authorized parties. Developers sometimes perform authentication at the primary channel, but open up a secondary channel that is assumed to be private. For example, a login mechanism may be listening on one network port, but after successful authentication, it may open up a second port where it waits for the connection, but avoids authentication because it assumes that only the authenticated party will connect to the port.
  • In general, if the software or protocol allows a single session or user state to persist across multiple connections or channels, authentication and appropriate credential management need to be used throughout.
Mitigation MIT-15
Architecture and Design

For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • Where possible, avoid implementing custom, "grow-your-own" authentication routines and consider using authentication capabilities as provided by the surrounding framework, operating system, or environment. These capabilities may avoid common weaknesses that are unique to authentication; support automatic auditing and tracking; and make it easier to provide a clear separation between authentication tasks and authorization tasks.
  • In environments such as the World Wide Web, the line between authentication and authorization is sometimes blurred. If custom authentication routines are required instead of those provided by the server, then these routines must be applied to every single page, since these pages could be requested directly.
Mitigation MIT-4.5
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

  • Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
  • For example, consider using libraries with authentication capabilities such as OpenSSL or the ESAPI Authenticator [REF-45].
Mitigation
Implementation System Configuration Operation

When storing data in the cloud (e.g., S3 buckets, Azure blobs, Google Cloud Storage, etc.), use the provider's controls to require strong authentication for users who should be allowed to access the data [REF-1297] [REF-1298] [REF-1302].

CAPEC-12: Choosing Message Identifier

This pattern of attack is defined by the selection of messages distributed via multicast or public information channels that are intended for another client by determining the parameter value assigned to that client. This attack allows the adversary to gain access to potentially privileged information, and to possibly perpetrate other attacks through the distribution means by impersonation. If the channel/message being manipulated is an input rather than output mechanism for the system, (such as a command bus), this style of attack could be used to change the adversary's identifier to more a privileged one.

CAPEC-166: Force the System to Reset Values

An attacker forces the target into a previous state in order to leverage potential weaknesses in the target dependent upon a prior configuration or state-dependent factors. Even in cases where an attacker may not be able to directly control the configuration of the targeted application, they may be able to reset the configuration to a prior state since many applications implement reset functions.

CAPEC-216: Communication Channel Manipulation

An adversary manipulates a setting or parameter on communications channel in order to compromise its security. This can result in information exposure, insertion/removal of information from the communications stream, and/or potentially system compromise.

CAPEC-36: Using Unpublished Interfaces or Functionality

An adversary searches for and invokes interfaces or functionality that the target system designers did not intend to be publicly available. If interfaces fail to authenticate requests, the attacker may be able to invoke functionality they are not authorized for.

CAPEC-62: Cross Site Request Forgery

An attacker crafts malicious web links and distributes them (via web pages, email, etc.), typically in a targeted manner, hoping to induce users to click on the link and execute the malicious action against some third-party application. If successful, the action embedded in the malicious link will be processed and accepted by the targeted application with the users' privilege level. This type of attack leverages the persistence and implicit trust placed in user session cookies by many web applications today. In such an architecture, once the user authenticates to an application and a session cookie is created on the user's system, all following transactions for that session are authenticated using that cookie including potential actions initiated by an attacker and simply "riding" the existing session cookie.

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