CWE-306
AllowedMissing Authentication for Critical Function
Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft
The product does not perform any authentication for functionality that requires a provable user identity or consumes a significant amount of resources.
3437 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-XC58-G4FH-RFXP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-10-23 00:31 – Updated: 2024-10-23 18:33An issue in Casa Systems NTC-221 version 2.0.99.0 and before allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via a crafted payload to the /www/cgi-bin/nas.cgi component.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-26519"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-10-22T22:15:04Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "An issue in Casa Systems NTC-221 version 2.0.99.0 and before allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via a crafted payload to the /www/cgi-bin/nas.cgi component.",
"id": "GHSA-xc58-g4fh-rfxp",
"modified": "2024-10-23T18:33:07Z",
"published": "2024-10-23T00:31:43Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-26519"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cybercx.com.au/blog/zero-day-rce-in-netcomm-ntc-221-industrial-iot-m2m-lte-4g-router"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-XC7W-V5X6-CC87
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-17 17:14 – Updated: 2026-03-06 01:00Summary
The BlueBubbles webhook handler previously treated any request whose socket remoteAddress was loopback (127.0.0.1, ::1, ::ffff:127.0.0.1) as authenticated. When OpenClaw Gateway is behind a reverse proxy (Tailscale Serve/Funnel, nginx, Cloudflare Tunnel, ngrok), the proxy typically connects to the gateway over loopback, allowing unauthenticated remote requests to bypass the configured webhook password.
This could allow an attacker who can reach the proxy endpoint to inject arbitrary inbound BlueBubbles message/reaction events.
Affected Packages / Versions
- Package:
openclaw(npm) - Affected versions:
< 2026.2.12 - Patched versions:
>= 2026.2.12
Exposure / Configuration
- BlueBubbles is an optional channel plugin (intended to eventually replace the legacy iMessage plugin, which is also optional). It is not enabled by default and is not part of a standard OpenClaw configuration.
- Only deployments with the BlueBubbles webhook endpoint exposed through a reverse proxy are impacted.
Details
The BlueBubbles webhook handler accepts inbound events via an HTTP POST endpoint under the configured BlueBubbles webhook path.
In vulnerable versions, the handler would accept requests as authenticated if req.socket.remoteAddress is loopback, without validating forwarding headers. With common reverse-proxy setups, the gateway sees the proxy as the direct client (loopback), even when the original request is remote.
Fix
- Primary fix (released in
2026.2.12): remove loopback-based authentication bypass and require the configured webhook secret. - Defense-in-depth follow-up (next release after commit below): treat requests with forwarding headers as proxied and never accept passwordless webhooks through a proxy.
Fix Commit(s)
f836c385ffc746cb954e8ee409f99d079bfdcd2f(released in2026.2.12)743f4b28495cdeb0d5bf76f6ebf4af01f6a02e5a(defense-in-depth follow-up)
Mitigations
- Ensure a BlueBubbles webhook password is configured.
- Do not expose the gateway webhook endpoint publicly without authentication.
Thanks @simecek for reporting.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "openclaw"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.2.12"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-29613"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-17T17:14:00Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-05T22:16:24Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThe BlueBubbles webhook handler previously treated any request whose socket `remoteAddress` was loopback (`127.0.0.1`, `::1`, `::ffff:127.0.0.1`) as authenticated. When OpenClaw Gateway is behind a reverse proxy (Tailscale Serve/Funnel, nginx, Cloudflare Tunnel, ngrok), the proxy typically connects to the gateway over loopback, allowing unauthenticated remote requests to bypass the configured webhook password.\n\nThis could allow an attacker who can reach the proxy endpoint to inject arbitrary inbound BlueBubbles message/reaction events.\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Affected versions: `\u003c 2026.2.12`\n- Patched versions: `\u003e= 2026.2.12`\n\n## Exposure / Configuration\n\n- BlueBubbles is an optional channel plugin (intended to eventually replace the legacy iMessage plugin, which is also optional). It is not enabled by default and is not part of a standard OpenClaw configuration.\n- Only deployments with the BlueBubbles webhook endpoint exposed through a reverse proxy are impacted.\n\n## Details\n\nThe BlueBubbles webhook handler accepts inbound events via an HTTP POST endpoint under the configured BlueBubbles webhook path.\n\nIn vulnerable versions, the handler would accept requests as authenticated if `req.socket.remoteAddress` is loopback, without validating forwarding headers. With common reverse-proxy setups, the gateway sees the proxy as the direct client (loopback), even when the original request is remote.\n\n## Fix\n\n- Primary fix (released in `2026.2.12`): remove loopback-based authentication bypass and require the configured webhook secret.\n- Defense-in-depth follow-up (next release after commit below): treat requests with forwarding headers as proxied and never accept passwordless webhooks through a proxy.\n\n## Fix Commit(s)\n\n- [`f836c385ffc746cb954e8ee409f99d079bfdcd2f`](https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/f836c385ffc746cb954e8ee409f99d079bfdcd2f) (released in `2026.2.12`)\n- [`743f4b28495cdeb0d5bf76f6ebf4af01f6a02e5a`](https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/743f4b28495cdeb0d5bf76f6ebf4af01f6a02e5a) (defense-in-depth follow-up)\n\n## Mitigations\n\n- Ensure a BlueBubbles webhook password is configured.\n- Do not expose the gateway webhook endpoint publicly without authentication.\n\nThanks @simecek for reporting.",
"id": "GHSA-xc7w-v5x6-cc87",
"modified": "2026-03-06T01:00:29Z",
"published": "2026-02-17T17:14:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-xc7w-v5x6-cc87"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-29613"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/743f4b28495cdeb0d5bf76f6ebf4af01f6a02e5a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/f836c385ffc746cb954e8ee409f99d079bfdcd2f"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/releases/tag/v2026.2.12"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-webhook-authentication-bypass-via-loopback-remoteaddress-trust"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaw has a webhook auth bypass when gateway is behind a reverse proxy (loopback remoteAddress trust)"
}
GHSA-XCF7-G637-P7F5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-06-29 18:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 05:17STW (aka Sensor-Technik Wiedemann) TCG-4 Connectivity Module DeploymentPackage_v3.03r0-Impala and DeploymentPackage_v3.04r2-Jellyfish and TCG-4lite Connectivity Module DeploymentPackage_v3.04r2-Jellyfish allow an attacker to gain full remote access with root privileges without the need for authentication, giving an attacker arbitrary remote code execution over LTE / 4G network via SMS.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-35830"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-06-29T16:15:09Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "STW (aka Sensor-Technik Wiedemann) TCG-4 Connectivity Module DeploymentPackage_v3.03r0-Impala and DeploymentPackage_v3.04r2-Jellyfish and TCG-4lite Connectivity Module DeploymentPackage_v3.04r2-Jellyfish allow an attacker to gain full remote access with root privileges without the need for authentication, giving an attacker arbitrary remote code execution over LTE / 4G network via SMS.",
"id": "GHSA-xcf7-g637-p7f5",
"modified": "2024-04-04T05:17:53Z",
"published": "2023-06-29T18:30:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-35830"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.stw-mobile-machines.com/fileadmin/user_upload/content/STW/PSIRT/STW-IR-23-001.pdf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.stw-mobile-machines.com/psirt"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-XF46-8VVP-4HXX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-03-12 21:33 – Updated: 2023-09-07 18:44A flaw was found in Keycloak 12.0.0 where re-authentication does not occur while updating the password. This flaw allows an attacker to take over an account if they can obtain temporary, physical access to a user’s browser. The highest threat from this vulnerability is to confidentiality, integrity, as well as system availability.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.keycloak:keycloak-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "12.0.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-20262"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-03-12T19:13:32Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2021-03-09T18:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A flaw was found in Keycloak 12.0.0 where re-authentication does not occur while updating the password. This flaw allows an attacker to take over an account if they can obtain temporary, physical access to a user\u2019s browser. The highest threat from this vulnerability is to confidentiality, integrity, as well as system availability.",
"id": "GHSA-xf46-8vvp-4hxx",
"modified": "2023-09-07T18:44:23Z",
"published": "2021-03-12T21:33:42Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-20262"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1933639"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Keycloak Missing authentication for critical function"
}
GHSA-XFCH-MQ3G-X27H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-29 21:30 – Updated: 2025-10-09 18:30Vasion Print (formerly PrinterLogic) Virtual Appliance Host prior to version 22.0.1049 and Application prior to version 20.0.2786 (VA/SaaS deployments) contain a default admin account and an installation‑time endpoint at /admin/query/update_database.php that can be accessed without authentication. An attacker who can reach the installation web interface can POST arbitrary root_user and root_password values, causing the script to replace the default admin credentials with attacker‑controlled ones. The script also contains hard‑coded SHA‑512 and SHA‑1 hashes of the default password, allowing the attacker to bypass password‑policy validation. As a result, an unauthenticated remote attacker can obtain full administrative control of the system during the initial setup. This vulnerability has been identified by the vendor as: V-2024-022 — Insecure Installation Credentials.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-34223"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-09-29T21:15:36Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Vasion Print (formerly PrinterLogic) Virtual Appliance Host prior to version 22.0.1049\u00a0and Application prior to version 20.0.2786\u00a0(VA/SaaS deployments) contain\u00a0a default admin account\u00a0and an installation\u2011time endpoint at `/admin/query/update_database.php` that can be accessed without authentication. An attacker who can reach the installation web interface can POST arbitrary `root_user` and `root_password` values, causing the script to replace the default admin credentials with attacker\u2011controlled ones. The script also contains hard\u2011coded SHA\u2011512 and SHA\u20111 hashes of the default password, allowing the attacker to bypass password\u2011policy validation. As a result, an unauthenticated remote attacker can obtain full administrative control of the system during the initial setup.\u00a0This vulnerability has been identified by the vendor as: V-2024-022 \u2014 Insecure Installation Credentials.",
"id": "GHSA-xfch-mq3g-x27h",
"modified": "2025-10-09T18:30:27Z",
"published": "2025-09-29T21:30:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-34223"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://help.printerlogic.com/saas/Print/Security/Security-Bulletins.htm"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://help.printerlogic.com/va/Print/Security/Security-Bulletins.htm"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://pierrekim.github.io/blog/2025-04-08-vasion-printerlogic-83-vulnerabilities.html#va-insecure-credentials-installation"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/vasion-print-printerlogic-insecure-installation-credentials"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-XFQJ-R5QW-8G4J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-16 22:47 – Updated: 2026-04-16 22:47Summary
Several API endpoints in authenticated mode have no authentication at all. They respond to completely unauthenticated requests with sensitive data or allow state-changing operations. No account, no session, no API key needed.
Verified against the latest version.
Discord: sagi03581
Steps to Reproduce
1. Unauthenticated issue data access
GET /api/heartbeat-runs/:runId/issues returns issue data for a heartbeat run with zero authentication. Every other endpoint in server/src/routes/activity.ts calls assertCompanyAccess, but this one was missed.
curl -s http://<target>:3100/api/heartbeat-runs/00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001/issues
# -> [] (HTTP 200, not 401 or 403)
If an attacker obtains a valid run UUID (from logs, error messages, shared URLs, or by probing), they can read issue data without any credentials.
2. Unauthenticated CLI auth challenge creation
POST /api/cli-auth/challenges creates a CLI authentication challenge with no actor check at all. The handler at server/src/routes/access.ts:1638-1659 skips any auth verification.
curl -s -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"command":"test"}' \
http://<target>:3100/api/cli-auth/challenges
# returns challenge ID, token, and a pre-generated board API key
The response includes a boardApiToken that becomes active once the challenge is approved. Combined with open registration (separate report), this enables persistent API key generation.
3. Unauthenticated agent instruction / system prompt leakage
These endpoints in server/src/routes/access.ts require no authentication:
curl -s http://<target>:3100/api/skills/index
# returns all available skill endpoints
curl -s http://<target>:3100/api/skills/paperclip
# returns the FULL agent heartbeat procedure including:
# - every API endpoint and its parameters
# - authentication mechanism (env var names, header formats)
# - the complete agent coordination protocol
# - the agent creation/hiring workflow
curl -s http://<target>:3100/api/skills/paperclip-create-agent
# returns the full agent creation workflow with adapter configs
This hands an attacker a complete map of the internal API without authenticating. It also leaks how agents authenticate, how heartbeats work, and what adapter configurations are available.
4. Unauthenticated deployment configuration disclosure
GET /api/health returns deployment mode, exposure setting, auth status, bootstrap status, version, and feature flags.
curl -s http://<target>:3100/api/health
# {
# "deploymentMode": "authenticated",
# "deploymentExposure": "public",
# "authReady": true,
# "bootstrapStatus": "ready",
# "version": "2026.403.0",
# ...
# }
Tells an attacker exactly how the instance is configured, whether registration is available, and what version is running.
Impact
- Data exposure: heartbeat run issues accessible without credentials. Agent instructions and full API structure exposed to anyone.
- Reconnaissance: an attacker can fingerprint the deployment (mode, version, features) and map the entire internal API before attempting anything else.
- Auth bypass stepping stone: unauthenticated CLI challenge creation is a building block for the full RCE chain (reported separately).
Suggested Fixes
- Add authentication to heartbeat run issues in
server/src/routes/activity.ts: -
GET /api/heartbeat-runs/:runId/issues-- addassertCompanyAccesslike every other endpoint in the same file -
Add authentication to CLI challenge creation in
server/src/routes/access.ts: -
POST /api/cli-auth/challenges-- addassertBoardat minimum -
Add authentication to skill endpoints in
server/src/routes/access.ts: GET /api/skills/availableGET /api/skills/index-
GET /api/skills/:skillName -
Reduce health endpoint information -- consider removing
deploymentMode,deploymentExposure, andversionfrom the unauthenticated response, or gating the full response behindassertBoard -
Consider a global auth rejection middleware for all
/api/*routes inauthenticatedmode. Currently unauthenticated requests getactor: { type: "none" }and pass through tonext(), relying on each route handler to check individually. A missing check means an open endpoint. Rejectingtype: "none"at the middleware level for all routes except an explicit public allowlist (health, sign-in, sign-up, webhooks) would prevent this class of bug entirely.
Contact
Discord: sagi03581
Happy to help verify fixes or provide additional details.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@paperclipai/server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.416.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-16T22:47:05Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nSeveral API endpoints in `authenticated` mode have no authentication at all. They respond to completely unauthenticated requests with sensitive data or allow state-changing operations. No account, no session, no API key needed.\n\nVerified against the latest version.\n\nDiscord: sagi03581\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n\n### 1. Unauthenticated issue data access\n\n`GET /api/heartbeat-runs/:runId/issues` returns issue data for a heartbeat run with zero authentication. Every other endpoint in `server/src/routes/activity.ts` calls `assertCompanyAccess`, but this one was missed.\n\n```bash\ncurl -s http://\u003ctarget\u003e:3100/api/heartbeat-runs/00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001/issues\n# -\u003e [] (HTTP 200, not 401 or 403)\n```\n\nIf an attacker obtains a valid run UUID (from logs, error messages, shared URLs, or by probing), they can read issue data without any credentials.\n\n### 2. Unauthenticated CLI auth challenge creation\n\n`POST /api/cli-auth/challenges` creates a CLI authentication challenge with no actor check at all. The handler at `server/src/routes/access.ts:1638-1659` skips any auth verification.\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -X POST -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d \u0027{\"command\":\"test\"}\u0027 \\\n http://\u003ctarget\u003e:3100/api/cli-auth/challenges\n# returns challenge ID, token, and a pre-generated board API key\n```\n\nThe response includes a `boardApiToken` that becomes active once the challenge is approved. Combined with open registration (separate report), this enables persistent API key generation.\n\n### 3. Unauthenticated agent instruction / system prompt leakage\n\nThese endpoints in `server/src/routes/access.ts` require no authentication:\n\n```bash\ncurl -s http://\u003ctarget\u003e:3100/api/skills/index\n# returns all available skill endpoints\n\ncurl -s http://\u003ctarget\u003e:3100/api/skills/paperclip\n# returns the FULL agent heartbeat procedure including:\n# - every API endpoint and its parameters\n# - authentication mechanism (env var names, header formats)\n# - the complete agent coordination protocol\n# - the agent creation/hiring workflow\n\ncurl -s http://\u003ctarget\u003e:3100/api/skills/paperclip-create-agent\n# returns the full agent creation workflow with adapter configs\n```\n\nThis hands an attacker a complete map of the internal API without authenticating. It also leaks how agents authenticate, how heartbeats work, and what adapter configurations are available.\n\n### 4. Unauthenticated deployment configuration disclosure\n\n`GET /api/health` returns deployment mode, exposure setting, auth status, bootstrap status, version, and feature flags.\n\n```bash\ncurl -s http://\u003ctarget\u003e:3100/api/health\n# {\n# \"deploymentMode\": \"authenticated\",\n# \"deploymentExposure\": \"public\",\n# \"authReady\": true,\n# \"bootstrapStatus\": \"ready\",\n# \"version\": \"2026.403.0\",\n# ...\n# }\n```\n\nTells an attacker exactly how the instance is configured, whether registration is available, and what version is running.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Data exposure**: heartbeat run issues accessible without credentials. Agent instructions and full API structure exposed to anyone.\n- **Reconnaissance**: an attacker can fingerprint the deployment (mode, version, features) and map the entire internal API before attempting anything else.\n- **Auth bypass stepping stone**: unauthenticated CLI challenge creation is a building block for the full RCE chain (reported separately).\n\n## Suggested Fixes\n\n1. **Add authentication to heartbeat run issues** in `server/src/routes/activity.ts`:\n - `GET /api/heartbeat-runs/:runId/issues` -- add `assertCompanyAccess` like every other endpoint in the same file\n\n2. **Add authentication to CLI challenge creation** in `server/src/routes/access.ts`:\n - `POST /api/cli-auth/challenges` -- add `assertBoard` at minimum\n\n3. **Add authentication to skill endpoints** in `server/src/routes/access.ts`:\n - `GET /api/skills/available`\n - `GET /api/skills/index`\n - `GET /api/skills/:skillName`\n\n4. **Reduce health endpoint information** -- consider removing `deploymentMode`, `deploymentExposure`, and `version` from the unauthenticated response, or gating the full response behind `assertBoard`\n\n5. Consider a **global auth rejection middleware** for all `/api/*` routes in `authenticated` mode. Currently unauthenticated requests get `actor: { type: \"none\" }` and pass through to `next()`, relying on each route handler to check individually. A missing check means an open endpoint. Rejecting `type: \"none\"` at the middleware level for all routes except an explicit public allowlist (health, sign-in, sign-up, webhooks) would prevent this class of bug entirely.\n\n## Contact\n\nDiscord: sagi03581\n\nHappy to help verify fixes or provide additional details.",
"id": "GHSA-xfqj-r5qw-8g4j",
"modified": "2026-04-16T22:47:05Z",
"published": "2026-04-16T22:47:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/security/advisories/GHSA-xfqj-r5qw-8g4j"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Paperclip: Unauthenticated Access to Multiple API Endpoints in Authenticated Mode"
}
GHSA-XGJ7-GRXR-PRRP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-08 00:37 – Updated: 2026-07-08 00:37mem0's openmemory/api component contains an unauthenticated access vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to read, write, and delete arbitrary user memories by accessing API routers registered without authentication middleware. Attackers can supply arbitrary user_id parameters or directly access memory retrieval endpoints to expose private memory content, or invoke pause endpoints with global_pause=true to cause denial-of-service across all users.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-59705"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-07T23:16:55Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "mem0\u0027s openmemory/api component contains an unauthenticated access vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to read, write, and delete arbitrary user memories by accessing API routers registered without authentication middleware. Attackers can supply arbitrary user_id parameters or directly access memory retrieval endpoints to expose private memory content, or invoke pause endpoints with global_pause=true to cause denial-of-service across all users.",
"id": "GHSA-xgj7-grxr-prrp",
"modified": "2026-07-08T00:37:57Z",
"published": "2026-07-08T00:37:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59705"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mem0ai/mem0/issues/6080"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mem0ai/mem0/commit/a3154d59e52386d4e1189c1f5f44819868f76514"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mem0ai/mem0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/mem0-openmemory-api-unauthenticated-access-via-memory-endpoints"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-XGJG-Q85M-VVMX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-07-27 00:00 – Updated: 2022-08-03 00:00Bently Nevada condition monitoring equipment through 2022-04-29 mishandles authentication. It utilizes the TDI command and data protocols (60005/TCP, 60007/TCP) for communications between the monitoring controller and System 1 and/or Bently Nevada Monitor Configuration (BNMC) software. These protocols provide configuration management and historical data related functionality. Neither protocol has any authentication features, allowing any attacker capable of communicating with the ports in question to invoke (a subset of) desired functionality.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-29952"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-07-26T22:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Bently Nevada condition monitoring equipment through 2022-04-29 mishandles authentication. It utilizes the TDI command and data protocols (60005/TCP, 60007/TCP) for communications between the monitoring controller and System 1 and/or Bently Nevada Monitor Configuration (BNMC) software. These protocols provide configuration management and historical data related functionality. Neither protocol has any authentication features, allowing any attacker capable of communicating with the ports in question to invoke (a subset of) desired functionality.",
"id": "GHSA-xgjg-q85m-vvmx",
"modified": "2022-08-03T00:00:53Z",
"published": "2022-07-27T00:00:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-29952"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ics/advisories/icsa-22-188-02"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.forescout.com/blog"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-XGM5-JH99-WC4V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-10 18:31 – Updated: 2026-06-18 18:35In Splunk Enterprise versions below 10.2.4 and 10.0.7, and Splunk Cloud Platform versions below 10.4.2604.3 and 10.2.2510.14, an unauthenticated user could create or truncate arbitrary files through a PostgreSQL sidecar service endpoint.
The vulnerability exists because the PostgreSQL sidecar service endpoint lacks authentication controls, allowing any network-reachable user to invoke file operations without credentials.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-20253"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-10T18:16:40Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "In Splunk Enterprise versions below 10.2.4 and 10.0.7, and Splunk Cloud Platform versions below 10.4.2604.3 and 10.2.2510.14, an unauthenticated user could create or truncate arbitrary files through a PostgreSQL sidecar service endpoint.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThe vulnerability exists because the PostgreSQL sidecar service endpoint lacks authentication controls, allowing any network-reachable user to invoke file operations without credentials.",
"id": "GHSA-xgm5-jh99-wc4v",
"modified": "2026-06-18T18:35:17Z",
"published": "2026-06-10T18:31:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20253"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://advisory.splunk.com/advisories/SVD-2026-0603"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://labs.watchtowr.com/why-use-app-level-auth-when-every-database-has-auth-splunk-enterprise-cve-2026-20253-pre-auth-rce"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-20253"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-XGM7-5784-5CXV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-10-25 18:32 – Updated: 2024-09-25 12:30Missing authentication in the StudentPopupDetails_StudentDetails method in IDAttend’s IDWeb application 3.1.052 and earlier allows extraction of sensitive student data by unauthenticated attackers.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-27376"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-287",
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-10-25T18:17:26Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Missing authentication in the StudentPopupDetails_StudentDetails method in IDAttend\u2019s IDWeb application 3.1.052 and earlier allows extraction of sensitive student data by unauthenticated attackers. ",
"id": "GHSA-xgm7-5784-5cxv",
"modified": "2024-09-25T12:30:40Z",
"published": "2023-10-25T18:32:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-27376"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.themissinglink.com.au/security-advisories/cve-2023-27376"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
- Divide the software into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Identify which of these areas require a proven user identity, and use a centralized authentication capability.
- Identify all potential communication channels, or other means of interaction with the software, to ensure that all channels are appropriately protected, including those channels that are assumed to be accessible only by authorized parties. Developers sometimes perform authentication at the primary channel, but open up a secondary channel that is assumed to be private. For example, a login mechanism may be listening on one network port, but after successful authentication, it may open up a second port where it waits for the connection, but avoids authentication because it assumes that only the authenticated party will connect to the port.
- In general, if the software or protocol allows a single session or user state to persist across multiple connections or channels, authentication and appropriate credential management need to be used throughout.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation
- Where possible, avoid implementing custom, "grow-your-own" authentication routines and consider using authentication capabilities as provided by the surrounding framework, operating system, or environment. These capabilities may avoid common weaknesses that are unique to authentication; support automatic auditing and tracking; and make it easier to provide a clear separation between authentication tasks and authorization tasks.
- In environments such as the World Wide Web, the line between authentication and authorization is sometimes blurred. If custom authentication routines are required instead of those provided by the server, then these routines must be applied to every single page, since these pages could be requested directly.
Mitigation MIT-4.5
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, consider using libraries with authentication capabilities such as OpenSSL or the ESAPI Authenticator [REF-45].
Mitigation
When storing data in the cloud (e.g., S3 buckets, Azure blobs, Google Cloud Storage, etc.), use the provider's controls to require strong authentication for users who should be allowed to access the data [REF-1297] [REF-1298] [REF-1302].
CAPEC-12: Choosing Message Identifier
This pattern of attack is defined by the selection of messages distributed via multicast or public information channels that are intended for another client by determining the parameter value assigned to that client. This attack allows the adversary to gain access to potentially privileged information, and to possibly perpetrate other attacks through the distribution means by impersonation. If the channel/message being manipulated is an input rather than output mechanism for the system, (such as a command bus), this style of attack could be used to change the adversary's identifier to more a privileged one.
CAPEC-166: Force the System to Reset Values
An attacker forces the target into a previous state in order to leverage potential weaknesses in the target dependent upon a prior configuration or state-dependent factors. Even in cases where an attacker may not be able to directly control the configuration of the targeted application, they may be able to reset the configuration to a prior state since many applications implement reset functions.
CAPEC-216: Communication Channel Manipulation
An adversary manipulates a setting or parameter on communications channel in order to compromise its security. This can result in information exposure, insertion/removal of information from the communications stream, and/or potentially system compromise.
CAPEC-36: Using Unpublished Interfaces or Functionality
An adversary searches for and invokes interfaces or functionality that the target system designers did not intend to be publicly available. If interfaces fail to authenticate requests, the attacker may be able to invoke functionality they are not authorized for.
CAPEC-62: Cross Site Request Forgery
An attacker crafts malicious web links and distributes them (via web pages, email, etc.), typically in a targeted manner, hoping to induce users to click on the link and execute the malicious action against some third-party application. If successful, the action embedded in the malicious link will be processed and accepted by the targeted application with the users' privilege level. This type of attack leverages the persistence and implicit trust placed in user session cookies by many web applications today. In such an architecture, once the user authenticates to an application and a session cookie is created on the user's system, all following transactions for that session are authenticated using that cookie including potential actions initiated by an attacker and simply "riding" the existing session cookie.