CWE-345
DiscouragedInsufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft
The product does not sufficiently verify the origin or authenticity of data, in a way that causes it to accept invalid data.
949 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-37WC-H8XC-5HC4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-02-10 17:46 – Updated: 2025-02-10 19:51Summary
The DNSSEC validation routines treat entire RRsets of DNSKEY records as trusted once they have established trust in only one of the DNSKEYs. As a result, if a zone includes a DNSKEY with a public key that matches a configured trust anchor, all keys in that zone will be trusted to authenticate other records in the zone. There is a second variant of this vulnerability involving DS records, where an authenticated DS record covering one DNSKEY leads to trust in signatures made by an unrelated DNSKEY in the same zone.
Details
verify_dnskey_rrset() will return Ok(true) if any record's public key matches a trust anchor. This results in verify_rrset() returning a Secure proof. This ultimately results in successfully verifying a response containing DNSKEY records. verify_default_rrset() looks up DNSKEY records by calling handle.lookup(), which takes the above code path. There's a comment following this that says "DNSKEYs were already validated by the inner query in the above lookup", but this is not the case. To fully verify the whole RRset of DNSKEYs, it would be necessary to check self-signatures by the trusted key over the other keys. Later in verify_default_rrset(), verify_rrset_with_dnskey() is called multiple times with different keys and signatures, and if any call succeeds, then its Proof is returned.
Similarly, verify_dnskey_rrset() returns Ok(false) if any DNSKEY record is covered by a DS record. A comment says "If all the keys are valid, then we are secure", but this is only checking that one key is authenticated by a DS in the parent zone's delegation point. This time, after control flow returns to verify_rrset(), it will call verify_default_rrset(). The special handling for DNSKEYs in verify_default_rrset() will then call verify_rrset_with_dnskey() using each KSK DNSKEY record, and if one call succeeds, return its Proof. If there are multiple KSK DNSKEYs in the RRset, then this leads to another authentication break. We need to either pass the authenticated DNSKEYs from the DS covering check to the RRSIG validation, or we need to perform this RRSIG validation of the DNSKEY RRset inside verify_dnskey_rrset() and cut verify_default_rrset() out of DNSKEY RRset validation entirely.
PoC
The proof of concepts have been integrated into the conformance test suite, as resolver::dnssec::scenarios::bogus::bogus_zone_plus_trust_anchor_dnskey and resolver::dnssec::scenarios::bogus::bogus_zone_plus_ds_covered_dnskey.
Impact
This impacts Hickory DNS users relying on DNSSEC verification in the client library, stub resolver, or recursive resolver.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "hickory-proto"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.8.0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.24.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-25188"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-02-10T17:46:00Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-02-10T18:15:35Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nThe DNSSEC validation routines treat entire RRsets of DNSKEY records as trusted once they have established trust in only one of the DNSKEYs. As a result, if a zone includes a DNSKEY with a public key that matches a configured trust anchor, all keys in that zone will be trusted to authenticate other records in the zone. There is a second variant of this vulnerability involving DS records, where an authenticated DS record covering one DNSKEY leads to trust in signatures made by an unrelated DNSKEY in the same zone.\n\n### Details\n`verify_dnskey_rrset()` will return `Ok(true)` if any record\u0027s public key matches a trust anchor. This results in `verify_rrset()` returning a `Secure` proof. This ultimately results in successfully verifying a response containing DNSKEY records. `verify_default_rrset()` looks up DNSKEY records by calling `handle.lookup()`, which takes the above code path. There\u0027s a comment following this that says \"DNSKEYs were already validated by the inner query in the above lookup\", but this is not the case. To fully verify the whole RRset of DNSKEYs, it would be necessary to check self-signatures by the trusted key over the other keys. Later in `verify_default_rrset()`, `verify_rrset_with_dnskey()` is called multiple times with different keys and signatures, and if any call succeeds, then its `Proof` is returned.\n\nSimilarly, `verify_dnskey_rrset()` returns `Ok(false)` if any DNSKEY record is covered by a DS record. A comment says \"If all the keys are valid, then we are secure\", but this is only checking that one key is authenticated by a DS in the parent zone\u0027s delegation point. This time, after control flow returns to `verify_rrset()`, it will call `verify_default_rrset()`. The special handling for DNSKEYs in `verify_default_rrset()` will then call `verify_rrset_with_dnskey()` using each KSK DNSKEY record, and if one call succeeds, return its `Proof`. If there are multiple KSK DNSKEYs in the RRset, then this leads to another authentication break. We need to either pass the authenticated DNSKEYs from the DS covering check to the RRSIG validation, or we need to perform this RRSIG validation of the DNSKEY RRset inside `verify_dnskey_rrset()` and cut `verify_default_rrset()` out of DNSKEY RRset validation entirely.\n\n### PoC\nThe proof of concepts have been integrated into the conformance test suite, as `resolver::dnssec::scenarios::bogus::bogus_zone_plus_trust_anchor_dnskey` and `resolver::dnssec::scenarios::bogus::bogus_zone_plus_ds_covered_dnskey`.\n\n### Impact\nThis impacts Hickory DNS users relying on DNSSEC verification in the client library, stub resolver, or recursive resolver.",
"id": "GHSA-37wc-h8xc-5hc4",
"modified": "2025-02-10T19:51:23Z",
"published": "2025-02-10T17:46:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/security/advisories/GHSA-37wc-h8xc-5hc4"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-25188"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/commit/e118c6eec569f4340421f86ee0686714010c63e9"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Hickory DNS\u0027s DNSSEC validation may accept broken authentication chains"
}
GHSA-389R-GV7P-R3RP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-11 14:48 – Updated: 2026-06-08 23:42Impact
go-git may parse malformed Git objects in a way that differs from upstream Git. When commit or tag objects contain ambiguous or malformed headers, go-git’s decoded representation may expose values differently from how Git itself would interpret or reject the same object.
Additionally, go-git’s commit signing and verification logic operates over commit data reconstructed from go-git’s parsed representation rather than the original raw object bytes. As a result, go-git may sign or verify a commit payload that is not byte-for-byte equivalent to the object stored in the repository.
This can cause a signature to appear valid for a commit whose displayed or effective metadata differs from the object that was intended to be signed.
Patches
Users should upgrade to a patched version in order to mitigate this vulnerability. Versions prior to v5 are likely to be affected, users are recommended to upgrade to a supported go-git version.
Credit
Thanks to @bugbunny-research (https://bugbunny.ai/) for reporting this to sigstore/gitsign, and to @wlynch, @patzielinski and @adityasaky for coordinating the disclosure with the go-git project. :bow: :1st_place_medal:
Thanks to @wayphinder for reporting this to the go-git project. :bow:
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 6.0.0-alpha.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/go-git/go-git/v6"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "6.0.0-alpha.1"
},
{
"fixed": "6.0.0-alpha.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/go-git/go-git/v5"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.19.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-45022"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-180",
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-11T14:48:12Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-27T15:16:29Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\n`go-git` may parse malformed Git objects in a way that differs from upstream Git. When `commit` or `tag` objects contain ambiguous or malformed headers, `go-git`\u2019s decoded representation may expose values differently from how Git itself would interpret or reject the same object.\n\nAdditionally, `go-git`\u2019s commit signing and verification logic operates over commit data reconstructed from `go-git`\u2019s parsed representation rather than the original raw object bytes. As a result, `go-git` may sign or verify a commit payload that is not byte-for-byte equivalent to the object stored in the repository.\n\nThis can cause a signature to appear valid for a commit whose displayed or effective metadata differs from the object that was intended to be signed.\n\n### Patches\nUsers should upgrade to a patched version in order to mitigate this vulnerability. Versions prior to v5 are likely to be affected, users are recommended to upgrade to a supported `go-git` version.\n\n### Credit\n\nThanks to @bugbunny-research (https://bugbunny.ai/) for reporting this to `sigstore/gitsign`, and to @wlynch, @patzielinski and @adityasaky for coordinating the disclosure with the `go-git` project. :bow: :1st_place_medal: \n\nThanks to @wayphinder for reporting this to the `go-git` project. :bow:",
"id": "GHSA-389r-gv7p-r3rp",
"modified": "2026-06-08T23:42:41Z",
"published": "2026-05-11T14:48:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/go-git/go-git/security/advisories/GHSA-389r-gv7p-r3rp"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45022"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/go-git/go-git"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:H/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "go-git\u0027s improper parsing of specially crafted objects may lead to inconsistent interpretation compared to upstream Git"
}
GHSA-38CG-GG9J-Q9J9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2019-06-27 17:25 – Updated: 2021-08-17 15:33A vulnerability was found in keycloak before 6.0.2. The X.509 authenticator supports the verification of client certificates through the CRL, where the CRL list can be obtained from the URL provided in the certificate itself (CDP) or through the separately configured path. The CRL are often available over the network through unsecured protocols ('http' or 'ldap') and hence the caller should verify the signature and possibly the certification path. Keycloak currently doesn't validate signatures on CRL, which can result in a possibility of various attacks like man-in-the-middle.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.keycloak:keycloak-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "6.0.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-3875"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-295",
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2019-06-27T15:43:10Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2019-06-12T14:29:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability was found in keycloak before 6.0.2. The X.509 authenticator supports the verification of client certificates through the CRL, where the CRL list can be obtained from the URL provided in the certificate itself (CDP) or through the separately configured path. The CRL are often available over the network through unsecured protocols (\u0027http\u0027 or \u0027ldap\u0027) and hence the caller should verify the signature and possibly the certification path. Keycloak currently doesn\u0027t validate signatures on CRL, which can result in a possibility of various attacks like man-in-the-middle.",
"id": "GHSA-38cg-gg9j-q9j9",
"modified": "2021-08-17T15:33:33Z",
"published": "2019-06-27T17:25:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-3875"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2019-3875"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Improper Certificate Validation and Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity in Keycloak"
}
GHSA-38X5-MX6X-V39W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-11-25 00:31 – Updated: 2024-12-03 18:31Affected devices beacon to eCharge cloud infrastructure asking if there are any command they should run. This communication is established over an insecure channel since peer verification is disabled everywhere. Therefore, remote unauthenticated users suitably positioned on the network between an EV charger controller and eCharge infrastructure can execute arbitrary commands with elevated privileges on affected devices.
This issue affects cph2_echarge_firmware: through 2.0.4.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-11666"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-11-24T23:15:04Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Affected devices beacon to eCharge cloud infrastructure asking if there are any command they should run. This communication is established over an insecure channel since peer verification is disabled everywhere. Therefore, remote unauthenticated users\u00a0 suitably positioned on the network between an EV charger controller and eCharge infrastructure can execute arbitrary commands with elevated privileges on affected devices.\n\nThis issue affects cph2_echarge_firmware: through 2.0.4.",
"id": "GHSA-38x5-mx6x-v39w",
"modified": "2024-12-03T18:31:02Z",
"published": "2024-11-25T00:31:54Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-11666"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.onekey.com/resource/critical-vulnerabilities-in-ev-charging-stations-analysis-of-echarge-controllers"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-39G5-2Q66-34FM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-05 18:31 – Updated: 2026-03-25 18:31A vulnerability in rustdesk-client RustDesk Client rustdesk-client on Windows, MacOS, Linux, iOS, Android, WebClient (Strategy sync, HTTP API client, config options engine modules) allows Application API Message Manipulation via Man-in-the-Middle. This vulnerability is associated with program files src/hbbs_http/sync.Rs, hbb_common/src/config.Rs and program routines Strategy merge loop in sync.Rs, Config::set_options().
This issue affects RustDesk Client: through 1.4.5.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-30792"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345",
"CWE-657"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-05T16:16:19Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "A vulnerability in rustdesk-client RustDesk Client rustdesk-client on Windows, MacOS, Linux, iOS, Android, WebClient (Strategy sync, HTTP API client, config options engine modules) allows Application API Message Manipulation via Man-in-the-Middle. This vulnerability is associated with program files src/hbbs_http/sync.Rs, hbb_common/src/config.Rs and program routines Strategy merge loop in sync.Rs, Config::set_options().\n\nThis issue affects RustDesk Client: through 1.4.5.",
"id": "GHSA-39g5-2q66-34fm",
"modified": "2026-03-25T18:31:36Z",
"published": "2026-03-05T18:31:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-30792"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://docs.google.com/document/d/e/2PACX-1vSds6jjpd38oO_yIAyd1HYtKNUuea-I-ozAPpGhYI7QgAU-QGJ7D8a4rOZVj1vmiUXV1EcdRHf9aZAW/pub"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://rustdesk.com/docs/en/self-host/client-configuration/advanced-settings"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulsec.org"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-39PV-4J6C-2G6V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-15 17:24 – Updated: 2026-07-15 22:03Angular's HttpTransferCache caches HTTP requests made during Server-Side Rendering (SSR) so that they can be reused during client-side hydration. This avoids repeating the same HTTP requests on the client. The cached responses are stored in TransferState using a cache key generated by hashing request properties (method, response type, mapped URL, serialized body, and sorted query parameters).
The cache keys are generated using a weak 32-bit DJB2-like polynomial rolling hash. The 32-bit hash space is extremely small, allowing attackers to find hash collisions.
An attacker can easily find a query parameter string (e.g., q=aaCAZMMM for a search request) that produces the exact same 32-bit hash as a sensitive endpoint (e.g., /api/user/profile). When a victim visits a crafted link containing the colliding parameter, the SSR process executes both the search request and the profile request. Due to the hash collision, the search response overwrites the profile response in the TransferState cache.
Impact
When the application attempts to retrieve the cached response for the sensitive endpoint (such as the user's profile), it receives the attacker-controlled response instead. This results in:
- State Poisoning: The application runs with attacker-forged data, which can lead to bypassing client-side security controls or DOM-based Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) if the data is rendered unsafely.
- Information Leakage: If the sensitive response is mistakenly associated with the attacker's search results and rendered on the page, the victim's sensitive data may be disclosed to the attacker.
Patched Versions
- 22.0.1
- 21.2.17
- 20.3.25
Framework-Level Fix
The logic has been updated to use a cryptographically secure SHA-256 hash algorithm for generating TransferState cache keys in HttpTransferCache. The cache keys are now 256-bit hexadecimal strings.
Workarounds
If you cannot upgrade immediately, configure your HttpClient requests to skip transfer caching for sensitive endpoints:
this.http.get('/api/user/profile', {
transferCache: false
});
Alternatively, disable the HTTP transfer cache globally in your application bootstrap config:
import { provideClientHydration, withNoHttpTransferCache } from '@angular/platform-browser';
export const appConfig = {
providers: [
provideClientHydration(
withNoHttpTransferCache()
)
]
};
Credits
This vulnerability was discovered and reported by CodeMender from Google DeepMind.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@angular/common"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "22.0.0-next.0"
},
{
"fixed": "22.0.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@angular/common"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "21.0.0-next.0"
},
{
"fixed": "21.2.17"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@angular/common"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "20.0.0-next.0"
},
{
"fixed": "20.3.25"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@angular/common"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "19.2.25"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-54266"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-328",
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-15T17:24:02Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-22T16:16:39Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Angular\u0027s `HttpTransferCache` caches HTTP requests made during Server-Side Rendering (SSR) so that they can be reused during client-side hydration. This avoids repeating the same HTTP requests on the client. The cached responses are stored in `TransferState` using a cache key generated by hashing request properties (method, response type, mapped URL, serialized body, and sorted query parameters).\n\nThe cache keys are generated using a weak 32-bit DJB2-like polynomial rolling hash. The 32-bit hash space is extremely small, allowing attackers to find hash collisions.\n\nAn attacker can easily find a query parameter string (e.g., `q=aaCAZMMM` for a search request) that produces the exact same 32-bit hash as a sensitive endpoint (e.g., `/api/user/profile`). When a victim visits a crafted link containing the colliding parameter, the SSR process executes both the search request and the profile request. Due to the hash collision, the search response overwrites the profile response in the `TransferState` cache.\n\n### Impact\n\nWhen the application attempts to retrieve the cached response for the sensitive endpoint (such as the user\u0027s profile), it receives the attacker-controlled response instead. This results in:\n\n* **State Poisoning**: The application runs with attacker-forged data, which can lead to bypassing client-side security controls or DOM-based Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) if the data is rendered unsafely. \n* **Information Leakage**: If the sensitive response is mistakenly associated with the attacker\u0027s search results and rendered on the page, the victim\u0027s sensitive data may be disclosed to the attacker.\n\n### Patched Versions\n* 22.0.1 \n* 21.2.17 \n* 20.3.25\n\n### Framework-Level Fix\n\nThe logic has been updated to use a cryptographically secure **SHA-256** hash algorithm for generating `TransferState` cache keys in `HttpTransferCache`. The cache keys are now 256-bit hexadecimal strings.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nIf you cannot upgrade immediately, configure your `HttpClient` requests to skip transfer caching for sensitive endpoints:\n\n```ts\nthis.http.get(\u0027/api/user/profile\u0027, {\n transferCache: false\n});\n```\n\nAlternatively, disable the HTTP transfer cache globally in your application bootstrap config:\n\n```ts\n\nimport { provideClientHydration, withNoHttpTransferCache } from \u0027@angular/platform-browser\u0027;\n\nexport const appConfig = {\n providers: [\n provideClientHydration(\n withNoHttpTransferCache()\n )\n ]\n};\n\n```\n\n### Credits\nThis vulnerability was discovered and reported by [CodeMender from Google DeepMind](https://deepmind.google/blog/introducing-codemender-an-ai-agent-for-code-security/).",
"id": "GHSA-39pv-4j6c-2g6v",
"modified": "2026-07-15T22:03:56Z",
"published": "2026-06-15T17:24:02Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/angular/angular/security/advisories/GHSA-39pv-4j6c-2g6v"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54266"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/angular/angular/pull/69153"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/angular/angular/commit/5f36274da3f961430ae72865159afa02a1dd9133"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/angular/angular"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "@angular/common: Weak 32-Bit Cache Key Hashing in `HttpTransferCache` Leading to Cross-Request Data Leakage and State Poisoning"
}
GHSA-39VM-H38V-J867
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:25 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:25IP address spoofing when proxying using mod_remoteip and mod_rewrite For configurations using proxying with mod_remoteip and certain mod_rewrite rules, an attacker could spoof their IP address for logging and PHP scripts. Note this issue was fixed in Apache HTTP Server 2.4.24 but was retrospectively allocated a low severity CVE in 2020.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-11985"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2020-08-07T16:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "IP address spoofing when proxying using mod_remoteip and mod_rewrite For configurations using proxying with mod_remoteip and certain mod_rewrite rules, an attacker could spoof their IP address for logging and PHP scripts. Note this issue was fixed in Apache HTTP Server 2.4.24 but was retrospectively allocated a low severity CVE in 2020.",
"id": "GHSA-39vm-h38v-j867",
"modified": "2022-05-24T17:25:02Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:25:02Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-11985"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpujan2021.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20200827-0002"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/202008-04"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/HYVYE2ZERFXDV6RMKK3I5SDSDQLPSEIQ"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/A2RN46PRBJE7E7OPD4YZX5SVWV5QKGV5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/rf6449464fd8b7437704c55f88361b66f12d5b5f90bcce66af4be4ba9@%3Ccvs.httpd.apache.org%3E"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/rd336919f655b7ff309385e34a143e41c503e133da80414485b3abcc9@%3Ccvs.httpd.apache.org%3E"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/rcc44594d4d6579b90deccd4536b5d31f099ef563df39b094be286b9e@%3Ccvs.httpd.apache.org%3E"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/rc998b18880df98bafaade071346690c2bc1444adaa1a1ea464b93f0a@%3Ccvs.httpd.apache.org%3E"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r9f93cf6dde308d42a9c807784e8102600d0397f5f834890708bf6920@%3Ccvs.httpd.apache.org%3E"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r76142b8c5119df2178be7c2dba88fde552eedeec37ea993dfce68d1d@%3Ccvs.httpd.apache.org%3E"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r476d175be0aaf4a17680ef98c5153b4d336eaef76fb2224cc94c463a@%3Ccvs.httpd.apache.org%3E"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r3c5c3104813c1c5508b55564b66546933079250a46ce50eee90b2e36@%3Ccvs.httpd.apache.org%3E"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r09bb998baee74a2c316446bd1a41ae7f8d7049d09d9ff991471e8775@%3Ccvs.httpd.apache.org%3E"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r03ee478b3dda3e381fd6189366fa7af97c980d2f602846eef935277d@%3Ccvs.httpd.apache.org%3E"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://httpd.apache.org/security/vulnerabilities_24.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-3CJ6-X6GM-3HC5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-11-25 09:30 – Updated: 2024-11-25 09:30IPP software versions prior to v1.71 do not sufficiently verify the authenticity of data, in a way that causes it to accept invalid data.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-33861"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-11-25T09:15:05Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "IPP software versions prior to v1.71 do not sufficiently verify the authenticity of data, in a\nway that causes it to accept invalid data.",
"id": "GHSA-3cj6-x6gm-3hc5",
"modified": "2024-11-25T09:30:59Z",
"published": "2024-11-25T09:30:59Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-33861"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.eaton.com/content/dam/eaton/company/news-insights/cybersecurity/ETN-VA-2022-1011.pdf"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-3F32-JC9W-78M7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-09-26 18:31 – Updated: 2024-09-26 21:31The goTenna Pro series use AES CTR mode for short, encrypted messages without any additional integrity checking mechanisms. This leaves messages malleable to any attacker that can access the message.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-47123"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345",
"CWE-353"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-09-26T18:15:09Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The goTenna Pro series use AES CTR mode for short, encrypted messages without any additional integrity checking mechanisms. This leaves messages malleable to any attacker that can access the message.",
"id": "GHSA-3f32-jc9w-78m7",
"modified": "2024-09-26T21:31:11Z",
"published": "2024-09-26T18:31:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-47123"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-24-270-04"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-3FXJ-6JH8-HVHX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-25 18:21 – Updated: 2026-06-25 18:21Summary
The RealIP middleware in go-chi/chi is vulnerable to IP spoofing because it blindly trusts the first (leftmost) element of the X-Forwarded-For HTTP header. This allows a remote attacker to bypass IP-based access control lists (ACLs) and rate-limiting mechanisms by providing a spoofed IP address in the header.
Details
In middleware/realip.go, the realIP function parses the X-Forwarded-For header and extracts the first comma-separated value:
func realIP(r *http.Request) string {
// ...
} else if xff := r.Header.Get(xForwardedFor); xff != "" {
ip, _, _ = strings.Cut(xff, ",")
}
// ...
}
Standard practice for X-Forwarded-For is that each proxy appends the client's IP to the end of the list. However, since the client can also provide this header, the leftmost values are untrusted. A client can send a header like X-Forwarded-For: <spoofed_ip>, <actual_proxy_ip>, and go-chi/chi will treat <spoofed_ip> as the source of the request.
Proof of Concept (PoC)
The following code demonstrates how an attacker can bypass an IP-based restriction.
package main
import (
"fmt"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware"
)
func main() {
r := chi.NewRouter()
// Enable the vulnerable RealIP middleware
r.Use(middleware.RealIP)
// An endpoint that should be restricted to a specific administrator IP (1.2.3.4)
r.Get("/admin/secret", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
clientIP := r.RemoteAddr
fmt.Printf("[Server] Request received from IP: %s\n", clientIP)
// Simulate IP-based access control
if clientIP == "1.2.3.4" {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
w.Write([]byte("CONFIDENTIAL: The secret code is 42\n"))
} else {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusForbidden)
w.Write([]byte("Access Denied: You are not an administrator.\n"))
}
})
// --- Attack Simulation ---
fmt.Println("--- PoC: IP Spoofing Attack on chi/middleware.RealIP ---")
// 1. Normal Request (Should be denied)
req1, _ := http.NewRequest("GET", "/admin/secret", nil)
rr1 := httptest.NewRecorder()
r.ServeHTTP(rr1, req1)
fmt.Printf("[Client] Normal Request -> Status: %d, Body: %s", rr1.Code, rr1.Body.String())
// 2. Spoofed Request (Using X-Forwarded-For)
// Attacker claims to be '1.2.3.4'
req2, _ := http.NewRequest("GET", "/admin/secret", nil)
req2.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-For", "1.2.3.4, 5.6.7.8") // 5.6.7.8 is a fake proxy IP
rr2 := httptest.NewRecorder()
r.ServeHTTP(rr2, req2)
fmt.Printf("[Client] Spoofed Request -> Status: %d, Body: %s", rr2.Code, rr2.Body.String())
}
Impact
An attacker can masquerade as any IP address. This can lead to:
- Bypass of Authentication/Authorization: Accessing administrative panels or private APIs restricted by IP.
- Rate Limiting Evasion: Circumbeting rate limiters that use RemoteAddr as a key.
- Log Forgery: Causing incorrect IP addresses to be recorded in security logs.
CWE
- CWE-290: Authentication Bypass by Spoofing
- CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
CVSS Score
- CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N (6.9 Moderate)
Affected Versions
github.com/go-chi/chi/v5<=v5.2.1(and all previous versions)
Recommendation
- Stop using
middleware.RealIPif you cannot guarantee that the incoming request headers are from a trusted source and have been sanitized by a proxy. - Implement a trust-based IP extraction mechanism that verifies the chain of proxies.
- Use the
X-Forwarded-Forheader by traversing it from right to left and stopping at the first IP address that is not in your list of trusted proxies.
Suggested Fix
A secure implementation of RealIP should allow developers to specify a list of trusted proxy IP ranges (CIDRs). Below is a conceptual example of how to fix this by traversing the X-Forwarded-For header from right to left:
func GetClientIP(r *http.Request, trustedProxies []net.IPNet) string {
xff := r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-For")
if xff == "" {
return r.RemoteAddr
}
ips := strings.Split(xff, ",")
// Traverse from right to left
for i := len(ips) - 1; i >= 0; i-- {
ipStr := strings.TrimSpace(ips[i])
ip := net.ParseIP(ipStr)
if ip == nil {
continue
}
if !isTrustedProxy(ip, trustedProxies) {
return ipStr
}
}
return r.RemoteAddr
}
func isTrustedProxy(ip net.IP, trustedProxies []net.IPNet) bool {
for _, network := range trustedProxies {
if network.Contains(ip) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
By providing a configuration like middleware.RealIPWithConfig(Config{TrustedProxies: []string{"10.0.0.0/8"}}) , the middleware can safely identify the true client IP even in complex proxy environments.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.2.1"
},
{
"fixed": "5.3.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-290",
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-25T18:21:37Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\nThe `RealIP` middleware in `go-chi/chi` is vulnerable to IP spoofing because it blindly trusts the first (leftmost) element of the `X-Forwarded-For` HTTP header. This allows a remote attacker to bypass IP-based access control lists (ACLs) and rate-limiting mechanisms by providing a spoofed IP address in the header.\n\n## Details\nIn `middleware/realip.go`, the `realIP` function parses the `X-Forwarded-For` header and extracts the first comma-separated value:\n\n```go\nfunc realIP(r *http.Request) string {\n // ...\n } else if xff := r.Header.Get(xForwardedFor); xff != \"\" {\n ip, _, _ = strings.Cut(xff, \",\")\n }\n // ...\n}\n```\n\nStandard practice for `X-Forwarded-For` is that each proxy appends the client\u0027s IP to the end of the list. However, since the client can also provide this header, the leftmost values are untrusted. A client can send a header like `X-Forwarded-For: \u003cspoofed_ip\u003e, \u003cactual_proxy_ip\u003e`, and `go-chi/chi` will treat `\u003cspoofed_ip\u003e` as the source of the request.\n\n## Proof of Concept (PoC)\nThe following code demonstrates how an attacker can bypass an IP-based restriction.\n\n```go\npackage main\n\nimport (\n \"fmt\"\n \"net/http\"\n \"net/http/httptest\"\n\n \"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5\"\n \"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware\"\n)\n\nfunc main() {\n r := chi.NewRouter()\n\n // Enable the vulnerable RealIP middleware\n r.Use(middleware.RealIP)\n\n // An endpoint that should be restricted to a specific administrator IP (1.2.3.4)\n r.Get(\"/admin/secret\", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n clientIP := r.RemoteAddr\n fmt.Printf(\"[Server] Request received from IP: %s\\n\", clientIP)\n\n // Simulate IP-based access control\n if clientIP == \"1.2.3.4\" {\n w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)\n w.Write([]byte(\"CONFIDENTIAL: The secret code is 42\\n\"))\n } else {\n w.WriteHeader(http.StatusForbidden)\n w.Write([]byte(\"Access Denied: You are not an administrator.\\n\"))\n }\n })\n\n // --- Attack Simulation ---\n fmt.Println(\"--- PoC: IP Spoofing Attack on chi/middleware.RealIP ---\")\n\n // 1. Normal Request (Should be denied)\n req1, _ := http.NewRequest(\"GET\", \"/admin/secret\", nil)\n rr1 := httptest.NewRecorder()\n r.ServeHTTP(rr1, req1)\n fmt.Printf(\"[Client] Normal Request -\u003e Status: %d, Body: %s\", rr1.Code, rr1.Body.String())\n\n // 2. Spoofed Request (Using X-Forwarded-For)\n // Attacker claims to be \u00271.2.3.4\u0027\n req2, _ := http.NewRequest(\"GET\", \"/admin/secret\", nil)\n req2.Header.Set(\"X-Forwarded-For\", \"1.2.3.4, 5.6.7.8\") // 5.6.7.8 is a fake proxy IP\n rr2 := httptest.NewRecorder()\n r.ServeHTTP(rr2, req2)\n fmt.Printf(\"[Client] Spoofed Request -\u003e Status: %d, Body: %s\", rr2.Code, rr2.Body.String())\n}\n```\n\n## Impact\nAn attacker can masquerade as any IP address. This can lead to:\n- **Bypass of Authentication/Authorization:** Accessing administrative panels or private APIs restricted by IP.\n- **Rate Limiting Evasion:** Circumbeting rate limiters that use `RemoteAddr` as a key.\n- **Log Forgery:** Causing incorrect IP addresses to be recorded in security logs.\n\n## CWE\n- **CWE-290:** Authentication Bypass by Spoofing\n- **CWE-345:** Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity\n\n## CVSS Score\n- **CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N** (6.9 Moderate)\n\n## Affected Versions\n- `github.com/go-chi/chi/v5` \u003c= `v5.2.1` (and all previous versions)\n\n## Recommendation\n1. **Stop using `middleware.RealIP`** if you cannot guarantee that the incoming request headers are from a trusted source and have been sanitized by a proxy.\n2. Implement a trust-based IP extraction mechanism that verifies the chain of proxies.\n3. Use the `X-Forwarded-For` header by traversing it from **right to left** and stopping at the first IP address that is not in your list of trusted proxies.\n\n## Suggested Fix\nA secure implementation of `RealIP` should allow developers to specify a list of trusted proxy IP ranges (CIDRs). Below is a conceptual example of how to fix this by traversing the `X-Forwarded-For` header from right to left:\n\n```go\nfunc GetClientIP(r *http.Request, trustedProxies []net.IPNet) string {\n xff := r.Header.Get(\"X-Forwarded-For\")\n if xff == \"\" {\n return r.RemoteAddr\n }\n\n ips := strings.Split(xff, \",\")\n // Traverse from right to left\n for i := len(ips) - 1; i \u003e= 0; i-- {\n ipStr := strings.TrimSpace(ips[i])\n ip := net.ParseIP(ipStr)\n if ip == nil {\n continue\n }\n\n if !isTrustedProxy(ip, trustedProxies) {\n return ipStr\n }\n }\n\n return r.RemoteAddr\n}\n\nfunc isTrustedProxy(ip net.IP, trustedProxies []net.IPNet) bool {\n for _, network := range trustedProxies {\n if network.Contains(ip) {\n return true\n }\n }\n return false\n}\n```\n\nBy providing a configuration like `middleware.RealIPWithConfig(Config{TrustedProxies: []string{\"10.0.0.0/8\"}})` , the middleware can safely identify the true client IP even in complex proxy environments.",
"id": "GHSA-3fxj-6jh8-hvhx",
"modified": "2026-06-25T18:21:38Z",
"published": "2026-06-25T18:21:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/go-chi/chi/security/advisories/GHSA-3fxj-6jh8-hvhx"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/go-chi/chi"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "chi Has an IP Spoofing Vulnerability in `middleware.RealIP`"
}
No mitigation information available for this CWE.
CAPEC-111: JSON Hijacking (aka JavaScript Hijacking)
An attacker targets a system that uses JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) as a transport mechanism between the client and the server (common in Web 2.0 systems using AJAX) to steal possibly confidential information transmitted from the server back to the client inside the JSON object by taking advantage of the loophole in the browser's Same Origin Policy that does not prohibit JavaScript from one website to be included and executed in the context of another website.
CAPEC-141: Cache Poisoning
An attacker exploits the functionality of cache technologies to cause specific data to be cached that aids the attackers' objectives. This describes any attack whereby an attacker places incorrect or harmful material in cache. The targeted cache can be an application's cache (e.g. a web browser cache) or a public cache (e.g. a DNS or ARP cache). Until the cache is refreshed, most applications or clients will treat the corrupted cache value as valid. This can lead to a wide range of exploits including redirecting web browsers towards sites that install malware and repeatedly incorrect calculations based on the incorrect value.
CAPEC-142: DNS Cache Poisoning
A domain name server translates a domain name (such as www.example.com) into an IP address that Internet hosts use to contact Internet resources. An adversary modifies a public DNS cache to cause certain names to resolve to incorrect addresses that the adversary specifies. The result is that client applications that rely upon the targeted cache for domain name resolution will be directed not to the actual address of the specified domain name but to some other address. Adversaries can use this to herd clients to sites that install malware on the victim's computer or to masquerade as part of a Pharming attack.
CAPEC-148: Content Spoofing
An adversary modifies content to make it contain something other than what the original content producer intended while keeping the apparent source of the content unchanged. The term content spoofing is most often used to describe modification of web pages hosted by a target to display the adversary's content instead of the owner's content. However, any content can be spoofed, including the content of email messages, file transfers, or the content of other network communication protocols. Content can be modified at the source (e.g. modifying the source file for a web page) or in transit (e.g. intercepting and modifying a message between the sender and recipient). Usually, the adversary will attempt to hide the fact that the content has been modified, but in some cases, such as with web site defacement, this is not necessary. Content Spoofing can lead to malware exposure, financial fraud (if the content governs financial transactions), privacy violations, and other unwanted outcomes.
CAPEC-218: Spoofing of UDDI/ebXML Messages
An attacker spoofs a UDDI, ebXML, or similar message in order to impersonate a service provider in an e-business transaction. UDDI, ebXML, and similar standards are used to identify businesses in e-business transactions. Among other things, they identify a particular participant, WSDL information for SOAP transactions, and supported communication protocols, including security protocols. By spoofing one of these messages an attacker could impersonate a legitimate business in a transaction or could manipulate the protocols used between a client and business. This could result in disclosure of sensitive information, loss of message integrity, or even financial fraud.
CAPEC-384: Application API Message Manipulation via Man-in-the-Middle
An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the content of messages. Performing this attack can allow the attacker to gain unauthorized privileges within the application, or conduct attacks such as phishing, deceptive strategies to spread malware, or traditional web-application attacks. The techniques require use of specialized software that allow the attacker to perform adversary-in-the-middle (CAPEC-94) communications between the web browser and the remote system. Despite the use of AiTH software, the attack is actually directed at the server, as the client is one node in a series of content brokers that pass information along to the application framework. Additionally, it is not true "Adversary-in-the-Middle" attack at the network layer, but an application-layer attack the root cause of which is the master applications trust in the integrity of code supplied by the client.
CAPEC-385: Transaction or Event Tampering via Application API Manipulation
An attacker hosts or joins an event or transaction within an application framework in order to change the content of messages or items that are being exchanged. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that look authentic but may contain deceptive links, substitute one item or another, spoof an existing item and conduct a false exchange, or otherwise change the amounts or identity of what is being exchanged. The techniques require use of specialized software that allow the attacker to man-in-the-middle communications between the web browser and the remote system in order to change the content of various application elements. Often, items exchanged in game can be monetized via sales for coin, virtual dollars, etc. The purpose of the attack is for the attack to scam the victim by trapping the data packets involved the exchange and altering the integrity of the transfer process.
CAPEC-386: Application API Navigation Remapping
An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the destination and/or content of links/buttons displayed to a user within API messages. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that looks authentic but contains links/buttons that point to an attacker controlled destination. Some applications make navigation remapping more difficult to detect because the actual HREF values of images, profile elements, and links/buttons are masked. One example would be to place an image in a user's photo gallery that when clicked upon redirected the user to an off-site location. Also, traditional web vulnerabilities (such as CSRF) can be constructed with remapped buttons or links. In some cases navigation remapping can be used for Phishing attacks or even means to artificially boost the page view, user site reputation, or click-fraud.
CAPEC-387: Navigation Remapping To Propagate Malicious Content
An adversary manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the content of messages and thereby circumvent the expected application logic.
CAPEC-388: Application API Button Hijacking
An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the destination and/or content of buttons displayed to a user within API messages. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that looks authentic but contains buttons that point to an attacker controlled destination.
CAPEC-665: Exploitation of Thunderbolt Protection Flaws
An adversary leverages a firmware weakness within the Thunderbolt protocol, on a computing device to manipulate Thunderbolt controller firmware in order to exploit vulnerabilities in the implementation of authorization and verification schemes within Thunderbolt protection mechanisms. Upon gaining physical access to a target device, the adversary conducts high-level firmware manipulation of the victim Thunderbolt controller SPI (Serial Peripheral Interface) flash, through the use of a SPI Programing device and an external Thunderbolt device, typically as the target device is booting up. If successful, this allows the adversary to modify memory, subvert authentication mechanisms, spoof identities and content, and extract data and memory from the target device. Currently 7 major vulnerabilities exist within Thunderbolt protocol with 9 attack vectors as noted in the Execution Flow.
CAPEC-701: Browser in the Middle (BiTM)
An adversary exploits the inherent functionalities of a web browser, in order to establish an unnoticed remote desktop connection in the victim's browser to the adversary's system. The adversary must deploy a web client with a remote desktop session that the victim can access.