Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-639

Allowed

Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key

Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete

API response cwe.mitre.org

The system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data.

4553 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-5JRM-J79M-QQVM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-05-04 21:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 03:49
VLAI
Details

Insecure permissions in the updateUserInfo function of newbee-mall before commit 1f2c2dfy allows attackers to obtain user account information.

Severity
5.4 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-30216"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-05-04T21:15:11Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Insecure permissions in the updateUserInfo function of newbee-mall before commit 1f2c2dfy allows attackers to obtain user account information.",
  "id": "GHSA-5jrm-j79m-qqvm",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T03:49:02Z",
  "published": "2023-05-04T21:30:29Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-30216"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/newbee-ltd/newbee-mall/issues/76"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-5JVJ-HXMH-6H6J

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-29 15:46 – Updated: 2026-04-10 17:26
VLAI
Summary
OpenClaw: Gateway HTTP Session History Route Bypasses Operator Read Scope
Details

Summary

Gateway HTTP Session History Route Bypasses Operator Read Scope

Affected Packages / Versions

  • Package: openclaw
  • Affected versions: <= 2026.3.24
  • First patched version: 2026.3.25
  • Latest published npm version at verification time: 2026.3.24

Details

The HTTP /sessions/:sessionKey/history route previously authenticated bearer tokens but skipped the same operator.read check used by chat.history over WebSocket. Commit 1c45123231516fa50f8cf8522ba5ff2fb2ca7aea makes HTTP callers declare operator scopes and rejects history reads that do not include operator.read.

Verified vulnerable on tag v2026.3.24 and fixed on main by commit 1c45123231516fa50f8cf8522ba5ff2fb2ca7aea.

Fix Commit(s)

  • 1c45123231516fa50f8cf8522ba5ff2fb2ca7aea
Severity
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2026.3.24"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "openclaw"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.3.25"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-35657"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-29T15:46:40Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nGateway HTTP Session History Route Bypasses Operator Read Scope\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n\n- Package: `openclaw`\n- Affected versions: `\u003c= 2026.3.24`\n- First patched version: `2026.3.25`\n- Latest published npm version at verification time: `2026.3.24`\n\n## Details\n\nThe HTTP `/sessions/:sessionKey/history` route previously authenticated bearer tokens but skipped the same `operator.read` check used by `chat.history` over WebSocket. Commit `1c45123231516fa50f8cf8522ba5ff2fb2ca7aea` makes HTTP callers declare operator scopes and rejects history reads that do not include `operator.read`.\n\nVerified vulnerable on tag `v2026.3.24` and fixed on `main` by commit `1c45123231516fa50f8cf8522ba5ff2fb2ca7aea`.\n\n## Fix Commit(s)\n\n- `1c45123231516fa50f8cf8522ba5ff2fb2ca7aea`",
  "id": "GHSA-5jvj-hxmh-6h6j",
  "modified": "2026-04-10T17:26:09Z",
  "published": "2026-03-29T15:46:40Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-5jvj-hxmh-6h6j"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/1c45123231516fa50f8cf8522ba5ff2fb2ca7aea"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw: Gateway HTTP Session History Route Bypasses Operator Read Scope"
}

GHSA-5JX9-W35F-VP65

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-29 22:51 – Updated: 2026-05-29 22:51
VLAI
Summary
praisonai-platform: Label endpoints' unchecked label_id/issue_id enable cross-workspace label IDOR (edit, delete, link)
Details

Summary

Type: Insecure Direct Object Reference. Five label endpoints — PATCH /workspaces/{workspace_id}/labels/{label_id}, DELETE .../labels/{label_id}, POST .../issues/{issue_id}/labels/{label_id}, DELETE .../issues/{issue_id}/labels/{label_id}, GET .../issues/{issue_id}/labels — gate access on require_workspace_member(workspace_id) only and pass URL-supplied label_id and issue_id straight through to LabelService without verifying either belongs to the workspace. File: src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/services/label_service.py, lines 35-100; route handlers at src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/labels.py, lines 42-106. Root cause: identical pattern to the agent / issue / project / comment IDORs in this codebase: the route's workspace_id is used as a membership predicate but never threaded through to the service layer. LabelService.get(label_id) runs session.get(IssueLabel, label_id) with no workspace filter; update/delete inherit the gap; add_to_issue(issue_id, label_id) and remove_from_issue(issue_id, label_id) write/delete association rows without verifying either ID belongs to the membership-checked workspace; list_for_issue(issue_id) reads them.

Affected Code

File 1: src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/services/label_service.py, lines 35-100.

class LabelService:
    ...

    async def get(self, label_id: str) -> Optional[IssueLabel]:
        return await self._session.get(IssueLabel, label_id)         # <-- BUG: no workspace_id predicate

    async def update(
        self,
        label_id: str,
        ...
    ) -> Optional[IssueLabel]:
        label = await self.get(label_id)                             # <-- inherits the gap
        ...

    async def delete(self, label_id: str) -> bool:
        label = await self.get(label_id)                             # <-- inherits the gap
        ...

    async def add_to_issue(self, issue_id: str, label_id: str) -> None:
        # writes a row in issue_label association table; no workspace check on either id

    async def remove_from_issue(self, issue_id: str, label_id: str) -> None:
        # deletes from association table; no workspace check on either id

    async def list_for_issue(self, issue_id: str) -> list[IssueLabel]:
        # reads from association table; no workspace check on issue_id

File 2: src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/labels.py, lines 42-106.

@router.patch("/labels/{label_id}", response_model=LabelResponse)
async def update_label(workspace_id: str, label_id: str, body: LabelUpdate, ...):
    svc = LabelService(session)
    label = await svc.update(label_id, body.name, body.color)        # <-- writes any label in the DB
    ...

@router.delete("/labels/{label_id}", ...)
async def delete_label(workspace_id: str, label_id: str, ...):
    deleted = await svc.delete(label_id)                             # <-- deletes any label in the DB
    ...

@router.post("/issues/{issue_id}/labels/{label_id}", ...)
async def add_label_to_issue(workspace_id: str, issue_id: str, label_id: str, ...):
    await svc.add_to_issue(issue_id, label_id)                       # <-- attaches any label to any issue cross-workspace

@router.delete("/issues/{issue_id}/labels/{label_id}", ...)
async def remove_label_from_issue(workspace_id: str, issue_id: str, label_id: str, ...):
    await svc.remove_from_issue(issue_id, label_id)                  # <-- detaches any label from any issue cross-workspace

@router.get("/issues/{issue_id}/labels", ...)
async def list_issue_labels(workspace_id: str, issue_id: str, ...):
    labels = await svc.list_for_issue(issue_id)                      # <-- reads label assignments for any issue

Why it's wrong: the workspace_id URL segment is treated as a UI hint; the actual label_id and issue_id lookups query the database without a workspace constraint. The MemberService in this same codebase uses a composite key correctly; the label service does not. The add_to_issue and remove_from_issue paths are particularly nasty because they touch two unverified IDs at once: an attacker can attach a foreign workspace's label to a foreign workspace's issue (or detach the legitimate labels), corrupting both sides of an association the attacker has no business touching.

Exploit Chain

  1. Attacker registers a workspace W_attacker (member) and harvests a foreign-workspace label_id L_T and a foreign-workspace issue_id I_T. Both leak via list_labels responses (which include label IDs — but only for W_attacker; for the target the IDs come from issue records that include label associations, activity feeds, exported dumps, error messages). State: attacker holds L_T and I_T.
  2. Attacker authenticates and sends PATCH /workspaces/W_attacker/labels/L_T with {"name": "<deleted>", "color": "#000000"}. require_workspace_member(W_attacker, attacker) passes. LabelService.update(L_T, ...) loads the foreign label and renames it. State: every issue across the foreign workspace that bears this label now displays the attacker-chosen name and colour.
  3. Attacker sends DELETE /workspaces/W_attacker/labels/L_T. LabelService.delete(L_T) deletes the foreign label, dropping every issue-label association row that referenced it (cascade or orphan, depending on schema). State: foreign workspace's labels are gone or corrupted.
  4. Attacker sends POST /workspaces/W_attacker/issues/I_T/labels/L_T2 to attach foreign label L_T2 to foreign issue I_T. LabelService.add_to_issue(I_T, L_T2) writes the association row regardless of either ID's workspace. State: the foreign issue now carries an arbitrary attacker-chosen label, which surfaces in every filter/search/board view in the foreign workspace's UI.
  5. Attacker sends DELETE /workspaces/W_attacker/issues/I_T/labels/L_legit to strip the legitimate label off the foreign issue. State: triagers can no longer find the issue via label filters.
  6. Attacker sends GET /workspaces/W_attacker/issues/I_T/labels to read the current label set on any foreign issue. State: the attacker fingerprints the foreign workspace's triage taxonomy.
  7. Final state: with one workspace-member token plus harvested foreign IDs, the attacker rewrites and deletes other workspaces' labels, attaches/detaches arbitrary labels on other workspaces' issues, and reads triage state across the deployment.

Security Impact

Severity: sec-moderate. CVSS 6.3: network attack, low complexity, low privileges, no user interaction, scope unchanged. The integrity damage is high (rename/delete of foreign labels is permanent and silent; cross-workspace label-attachment corrupts UI filters), confidentiality is low (label names are not the most sensitive field but do leak triage taxonomy), availability low (foreign workspaces may lose triage visibility into their own issues until the labels are restored). Attacker capability: rename and delete any label in the multi-tenant deployment; attach any label to any issue; detach any label from any issue; list label assignments for any issue. Combined with the companion IssueService IDOR (separate advisory), the attacker can also modify the underlying issue, making the cross-workspace tampering very difficult to detect. Preconditions: praisonai-platform is deployed multi-tenant; the attacker has any membership token; target IDs are known or guessable. Differential: source-inspection-verified end-to-end. The asymmetry between LabelService.list_for_workspace(workspace_id) (correctly workspace-scoped) and LabelService.get(label_id) / add_to_issue(issue_id, label_id) (no workspace check) confirms the gap. With the suggested fix below, label and issue IDs that do not belong to the membership-checked workspace return 404, and the attacker cannot touch them.

Suggested Fix

Make every single-row label lookup take the workspace predicate; verify both issue_id and label_id belong to workspace_id for the association routes.

--- a/src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/services/label_service.py
+++ b/src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/services/label_service.py
@@ -33,7 +33,12 @@ class LabelService:
         return label

-    async def get(self, label_id: str) -> Optional[IssueLabel]:
-        return await self._session.get(IssueLabel, label_id)
+    async def get(self, workspace_id: str, label_id: str) -> Optional[IssueLabel]:
+        stmt = select(IssueLabel).where(
+            IssueLabel.id == label_id,
+            IssueLabel.workspace_id == workspace_id,
+        )
+        return (await self._session.execute(stmt)).scalar_one_or_none()

-    async def add_to_issue(self, issue_id: str, label_id: str) -> None:
+    async def add_to_issue(self, workspace_id: str, issue_id: str, label_id: str) -> None:
+        # Verify both ids belong to workspace_id before writing the association row.

Then update the route handlers in routes/labels.py to thread workspace_id through every call. The same single-key-lookup pattern is filed separately for AgentService, IssueService, ProjectService, and CommentService — each is its own exploitable IDOR.

Severity
7.6 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:L
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.1.2"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "praisonai-platform"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.1.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-47414"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-29T22:51:07Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\n**Type:** Insecure Direct Object Reference. Five label endpoints \u2014 `PATCH /workspaces/{workspace_id}/labels/{label_id}`, `DELETE .../labels/{label_id}`, `POST .../issues/{issue_id}/labels/{label_id}`, `DELETE .../issues/{issue_id}/labels/{label_id}`, `GET .../issues/{issue_id}/labels` \u2014 gate access on `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` only and pass URL-supplied `label_id` and `issue_id` straight through to `LabelService` without verifying either belongs to the workspace.\n**File:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/services/label_service.py`, lines 35-100; route handlers at `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/labels.py`, lines 42-106.\n**Root cause:** identical pattern to the agent / issue / project / comment IDORs in this codebase: the route\u0027s `workspace_id` is used as a membership predicate but never threaded through to the service layer. `LabelService.get(label_id)` runs `session.get(IssueLabel, label_id)` with no workspace filter; `update`/`delete` inherit the gap; `add_to_issue(issue_id, label_id)` and `remove_from_issue(issue_id, label_id)` write/delete association rows without verifying either ID belongs to the membership-checked workspace; `list_for_issue(issue_id)` reads them.\n\n## Affected Code\n\n**File 1:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/services/label_service.py`, lines 35-100.\n\n```python\nclass LabelService:\n    ...\n\n    async def get(self, label_id: str) -\u003e Optional[IssueLabel]:\n        return await self._session.get(IssueLabel, label_id)         # \u003c-- BUG: no workspace_id predicate\n\n    async def update(\n        self,\n        label_id: str,\n        ...\n    ) -\u003e Optional[IssueLabel]:\n        label = await self.get(label_id)                             # \u003c-- inherits the gap\n        ...\n\n    async def delete(self, label_id: str) -\u003e bool:\n        label = await self.get(label_id)                             # \u003c-- inherits the gap\n        ...\n\n    async def add_to_issue(self, issue_id: str, label_id: str) -\u003e None:\n        # writes a row in issue_label association table; no workspace check on either id\n\n    async def remove_from_issue(self, issue_id: str, label_id: str) -\u003e None:\n        # deletes from association table; no workspace check on either id\n\n    async def list_for_issue(self, issue_id: str) -\u003e list[IssueLabel]:\n        # reads from association table; no workspace check on issue_id\n```\n\n**File 2:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/labels.py`, lines 42-106.\n\n```python\n@router.patch(\"/labels/{label_id}\", response_model=LabelResponse)\nasync def update_label(workspace_id: str, label_id: str, body: LabelUpdate, ...):\n    svc = LabelService(session)\n    label = await svc.update(label_id, body.name, body.color)        # \u003c-- writes any label in the DB\n    ...\n\n@router.delete(\"/labels/{label_id}\", ...)\nasync def delete_label(workspace_id: str, label_id: str, ...):\n    deleted = await svc.delete(label_id)                             # \u003c-- deletes any label in the DB\n    ...\n\n@router.post(\"/issues/{issue_id}/labels/{label_id}\", ...)\nasync def add_label_to_issue(workspace_id: str, issue_id: str, label_id: str, ...):\n    await svc.add_to_issue(issue_id, label_id)                       # \u003c-- attaches any label to any issue cross-workspace\n\n@router.delete(\"/issues/{issue_id}/labels/{label_id}\", ...)\nasync def remove_label_from_issue(workspace_id: str, issue_id: str, label_id: str, ...):\n    await svc.remove_from_issue(issue_id, label_id)                  # \u003c-- detaches any label from any issue cross-workspace\n\n@router.get(\"/issues/{issue_id}/labels\", ...)\nasync def list_issue_labels(workspace_id: str, issue_id: str, ...):\n    labels = await svc.list_for_issue(issue_id)                      # \u003c-- reads label assignments for any issue\n```\n\n**Why it\u0027s wrong:** the `workspace_id` URL segment is treated as a UI hint; the actual `label_id` and `issue_id` lookups query the database without a workspace constraint. The `MemberService` in this same codebase uses a composite key correctly; the label service does not. The `add_to_issue` and `remove_from_issue` paths are particularly nasty because they touch *two* unverified IDs at once: an attacker can attach a foreign workspace\u0027s label to a foreign workspace\u0027s issue (or detach the legitimate labels), corrupting both sides of an association the attacker has no business touching.\n\n## Exploit Chain\n\n1. Attacker registers a workspace `W_attacker` (member) and harvests a foreign-workspace `label_id` `L_T` and a foreign-workspace `issue_id` `I_T`. Both leak via `list_labels` responses (which include label IDs \u2014 but only for `W_attacker`; for the target the IDs come from issue records that include label associations, activity feeds, exported dumps, error messages). State: attacker holds `L_T` and `I_T`.\n2. Attacker authenticates and sends `PATCH /workspaces/W_attacker/labels/L_T` with `{\"name\": \"\u003cdeleted\u003e\", \"color\": \"#000000\"}`. `require_workspace_member(W_attacker, attacker)` passes. `LabelService.update(L_T, ...)` loads the foreign label and renames it. State: every issue across the foreign workspace that bears this label now displays the attacker-chosen name and colour.\n3. Attacker sends `DELETE /workspaces/W_attacker/labels/L_T`. `LabelService.delete(L_T)` deletes the foreign label, dropping every issue-label association row that referenced it (cascade or orphan, depending on schema). State: foreign workspace\u0027s labels are gone or corrupted.\n4. Attacker sends `POST /workspaces/W_attacker/issues/I_T/labels/L_T2` to attach foreign label `L_T2` to foreign issue `I_T`. `LabelService.add_to_issue(I_T, L_T2)` writes the association row regardless of either ID\u0027s workspace. State: the foreign issue now carries an arbitrary attacker-chosen label, which surfaces in every filter/search/board view in the foreign workspace\u0027s UI.\n5. Attacker sends `DELETE /workspaces/W_attacker/issues/I_T/labels/L_legit` to strip the legitimate label off the foreign issue. State: triagers can no longer find the issue via label filters.\n6. Attacker sends `GET /workspaces/W_attacker/issues/I_T/labels` to read the current label set on any foreign issue. State: the attacker fingerprints the foreign workspace\u0027s triage taxonomy.\n7. Final state: with one workspace-member token plus harvested foreign IDs, the attacker rewrites and deletes other workspaces\u0027 labels, attaches/detaches arbitrary labels on other workspaces\u0027 issues, and reads triage state across the deployment.\n\n## Security Impact\n\n**Severity:** sec-moderate. CVSS 6.3: network attack, low complexity, low privileges, no user interaction, scope unchanged. The integrity damage is high (rename/delete of foreign labels is permanent and silent; cross-workspace label-attachment corrupts UI filters), confidentiality is low (label names are not the most sensitive field but do leak triage taxonomy), availability low (foreign workspaces may lose triage visibility into their own issues until the labels are restored).\n**Attacker capability:** rename and delete any label in the multi-tenant deployment; attach any label to any issue; detach any label from any issue; list label assignments for any issue. Combined with the companion `IssueService` IDOR (separate advisory), the attacker can also modify the underlying issue, making the cross-workspace tampering very difficult to detect.\n**Preconditions:** `praisonai-platform` is deployed multi-tenant; the attacker has any membership token; target IDs are known or guessable.\n**Differential:** source-inspection-verified end-to-end. The asymmetry between `LabelService.list_for_workspace(workspace_id)` (correctly workspace-scoped) and `LabelService.get(label_id) / add_to_issue(issue_id, label_id)` (no workspace check) confirms the gap. With the suggested fix below, label and issue IDs that do not belong to the membership-checked workspace return 404, and the attacker cannot touch them.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nMake every single-row label lookup take the workspace predicate; verify both `issue_id` and `label_id` belong to `workspace_id` for the association routes.\n\n```diff\n--- a/src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/services/label_service.py\n+++ b/src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/services/label_service.py\n@@ -33,7 +33,12 @@ class LabelService:\n         return label\n\n-    async def get(self, label_id: str) -\u003e Optional[IssueLabel]:\n-        return await self._session.get(IssueLabel, label_id)\n+    async def get(self, workspace_id: str, label_id: str) -\u003e Optional[IssueLabel]:\n+        stmt = select(IssueLabel).where(\n+            IssueLabel.id == label_id,\n+            IssueLabel.workspace_id == workspace_id,\n+        )\n+        return (await self._session.execute(stmt)).scalar_one_or_none()\n\n-    async def add_to_issue(self, issue_id: str, label_id: str) -\u003e None:\n+    async def add_to_issue(self, workspace_id: str, issue_id: str, label_id: str) -\u003e None:\n+        # Verify both ids belong to workspace_id before writing the association row.\n```\n\nThen update the route handlers in `routes/labels.py` to thread `workspace_id` through every call. The same single-key-lookup pattern is filed separately for `AgentService`, `IssueService`, `ProjectService`, and `CommentService` \u2014 each is its own exploitable IDOR.",
  "id": "GHSA-5jx9-w35f-vp65",
  "modified": "2026-05-29T22:51:07Z",
  "published": "2026-05-29T22:51:07Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-5jx9-w35f-vp65"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "praisonai-platform: Label endpoints\u0027 unchecked label_id/issue_id enable cross-workspace label IDOR (edit, delete, link)"
}

GHSA-5M2R-V35X-JHHX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-27 03:30 – Updated: 2025-11-13 12:31
VLAI
Details

Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in mediavine Create by Mediavine mediavine-create allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects Create by Mediavine: from n/a through <= 1.9.14.

Severity
8.1 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-62893"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-10-27T02:15:48Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in mediavine Create by Mediavine mediavine-create allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects Create by Mediavine: from n/a through \u003c= 1.9.14.",
  "id": "GHSA-5m2r-v35x-jhhx",
  "modified": "2025-11-13T12:31:28Z",
  "published": "2025-10-27T03:30:37Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-62893"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vdp.patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Plugin/mediavine-create/vulnerability/wordpress-create-by-mediavine-plugin-1-9-14-insecure-direct-object-references-idor-vulnerability"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vdp.patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Plugin/mediavine-create/vulnerability/wordpress-create-by-mediavine-plugin-1-9-14-insecure-direct-object-references-idor-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-5M34-QPJQ-HJHF

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-01-17 21:30 – Updated: 2024-01-17 21:30
VLAI
Details

Insecure Direct Object Reference vulnerabilities were discovered in the Avaya Aura Experience Portal Manager which may allow partial information disclosure to an authenticated non-privileged user. Affected versions include 8.0.x and 8.1.x, prior to 8.1.2 patch 0402. Versions prior to 8.0 are end of manufacturer support.

Severity
5.7 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-7031"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-200",
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-01-17T19:15:08Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Insecure Direct Object Reference vulnerabilities were discovered in the Avaya Aura Experience Portal Manager which may allow partial information disclosure to an authenticated non-privileged user. Affected versions include 8.0.x and 8.1.x, prior to 8.1.2 patch 0402. Versions prior to 8.0 are end of manufacturer support.",
  "id": "GHSA-5m34-qpjq-hjhf",
  "modified": "2024-01-17T21:30:20Z",
  "published": "2024-01-17T21:30:20Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-7031"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.avaya.com/css/public/documents/101088063"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-5MV2-W7GR-RP48

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-02-17 12:30 – Updated: 2026-06-01 15:30
VLAI
Details

Improper Input Validation, Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in Kron Tech Single Connect on Windows allows Privilege Abuse. This issue affects Single Connect: 2.16.

Severity
8.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-0882"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-02-17T10:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Improper Input Validation, Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in Kron Tech Single Connect on Windows allows Privilege Abuse. This issue affects Single Connect: 2.16.",
  "id": "GHSA-5mv2-w7gr-rp48",
  "modified": "2026-06-01T15:30:28Z",
  "published": "2023-02-17T12:30:17Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-0882"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://docs.krontech.com/singleconnect-2-16/update-patch-rdp-proxy-idor-vulnerability"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://siberguvenlik.gov.tr/guvenlik-bildirimleri/detay/tr-23-0092"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.usom.gov.tr/bildirim/tr-23-0092"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-5MVV-43FH-86FQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-30 06:32 – Updated: 2026-07-30 21:31
VLAI
Details

The Eventin WordPress plugin before 4.1.16 does not properly authorize order creation and accepts an attacker-supplied order status, allowing unauthenticated users to create orders marked as paid without completing any payment.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-13178"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-30T06:24:59Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The Eventin  WordPress plugin before 4.1.16 does not properly authorize order creation and accepts an attacker-supplied order status, allowing unauthenticated users to create orders marked as paid without completing any payment.",
  "id": "GHSA-5mvv-43fh-86fq",
  "modified": "2026-07-30T21:31:43Z",
  "published": "2026-07-30T06:32:36Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-13178"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://wpscan.com/vulnerability/09d6135f-b38c-4cfe-8a9f-5d79552c720c"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-5P7F-47WP-86C5

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:50 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:50
VLAI
Details

In Monstra CMS 3.0.4, an attacker with 'Editor' privileges can change the password of the administrator via an admin/index.php?id=users&action=edit&user_id=1, Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR).

Severity
8.8 (High)
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2018-16608"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2018-09-10T13:29:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In Monstra CMS 3.0.4, an attacker with \u0027Editor\u0027 privileges can change the password of the administrator via an admin/index.php?id=users\u0026action=edit\u0026user_id=1, Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR).",
  "id": "GHSA-5p7f-47wp-86c5",
  "modified": "2022-05-13T01:50:23Z",
  "published": "2022-05-13T01:50:23Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-16608"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/monstra-cms/monstra/issues/453"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-5P7V-X4Q4-6428

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-21 09:31 – Updated: 2026-07-21 18:31
VLAI
Details

The Academy LMS WordPress plugin before 3.8.1 does not verify ownership of a user-supplied user identifier in several of its lesson AJAX handlers, allowing authenticated users with subscriber-level access to read and modify other users' lesson notes and mark other users' lesson content as completed.

Severity
5.4 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-14184"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-21T07:16:34Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The Academy LMS WordPress plugin before 3.8.1 does not verify ownership of a user-supplied user identifier in several of its lesson AJAX handlers, allowing authenticated users with subscriber-level access to read and modify other users\u0027 lesson notes and mark other users\u0027 lesson content as completed.",
  "id": "GHSA-5p7v-x4q4-6428",
  "modified": "2026-07-21T18:31:00Z",
  "published": "2026-07-21T09:31:42Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-14184"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://wpscan.com/vulnerability/56a5b91b-1e1a-429d-b9e9-a1a107183124"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-5P8J-X73F-MFW4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-05 15:30 – Updated: 2026-09-05 15:30
VLAI
Details

SiYuan versions before v3.8.2 contain an information disclosure vulnerability in the getAttributeViewKeysByID endpoint that allows publish readers to enumerate private attribute view key definitions without verifying parent database visibility. Attackers can access the endpoint to retrieve complete key schemas including sensitive field names and relation definitions from hidden databases.

Severity
4.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-86191"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-05T13:18:14Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "SiYuan versions before v3.8.2 contain an information disclosure vulnerability in the getAttributeViewKeysByID endpoint that allows publish readers to enumerate private attribute view key definitions without verifying parent database visibility. Attackers can access the endpoint to retrieve complete key schemas including sensitive field names and relation definitions from hidden databases.",
  "id": "GHSA-5p8j-x73f-mfw4",
  "modified": "2026-09-05T15:30:25Z",
  "published": "2026-09-05T15:30:25Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-j4qq-w6qx-6839"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-86191"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/siyuan-before-3.8.2-private-attribute-view-key-enumeration"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}
Mitigation
Architecture and Design

For each and every data access, ensure that the user has sufficient privilege to access the record that is being requested.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design Implementation

Make sure that the key that is used in the lookup of a specific user's record is not controllable externally by the user or that any tampering can be detected.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Use encryption in order to make it more difficult to guess other legitimate values of the key or associate a digital signature with the key so that the server can verify that there has been no tampering.

No CAPEC attack patterns related to this CWE.

← Back to the CWE list