CWE-693
DiscouragedProtection Mechanism Failure
Abstraction: Pillar · Status: Draft
The product does not use or incorrectly uses a protection mechanism that provides sufficient defense against directed attacks against the product.
978 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-MH46-WJ9J-83VR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-07-09 18:30 – Updated: 2024-07-09 18:30Windows LockDown Policy (WLDP) Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-38070"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-693"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-07-09T17:15:40Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Windows LockDown Policy (WLDP) Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability",
"id": "GHSA-mh46-wj9j-83vr",
"modified": "2024-07-09T18:30:52Z",
"published": "2024-07-09T18:30:52Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38070"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2024-38070"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-MJQP-26HC-GRXG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-10 19:50 – Updated: 2026-06-06 14:43Summary
Picklescan's ability to scan ZIP archives for malicious pickle files is compromised when the archive contains a file with a bad Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC). Instead of attempting to scan the files within the archive, whatever the CRC is, Picklescan fails in error and returns no results. This allows attackers to potentially hide malicious pickle payloads within ZIP archives that PyTorch might still be able to load (as PyTorch often disables CRC checks).
Details
Picklescan likely utilizes Python's built-in zipfile module to handle ZIP archives. When zipfile encounters a file within an archive that has a mismatch between the declared CRC and the calculated CRC, it can raise an exception (e.g., BadZipFile or a related error). It appears that Picklescan does not try to scan the files whatever the CRC is. This behavior contrasts with PyTorch's model loading capabilities, which in many cases might bypass CRC checks for ZIP archives - whatever the configuration is. This discrepancy creates a blind spot where a malicious model packaged in a ZIP with a bad CRC could be loaded by PyTorch while being completely missed by Picklescan.
PoC
- Download an existing Pytorch model with a bad CRC
wget <https://huggingface.co/jinaai/jina-embeddings-v2-base-en/resolve/main/pytorch_model.bin?download=true> -O pytorch_model.bin
- Attempt to scan the corrupted ZIP file with PickleScan:
# Assuming you have Picklescan installed and in your PATH
picklescan -p pytorch_model.bin
Observed Result: Picklescan returns no results and presents an error message indicating a problem with the ZIP file, but it doesn’t attempt to scan any potentially valid pickle files within the archive.
Expected Result: Picklescan should either:
- Attempt to extract and scan other valid files within the ZIP archive, even if some have CRC errors.
- Report a warning indicating that the ZIP archive has CRC errors and might be incomplete or corrupted, but still attempt to scan any accessible content.
Impact
Severity: High
Affected Users: Any organization or individual using Picklescan to analyze PyTorch models or other files distributed as ZIP archives for malicious pickle content.
Impact Details: Attackers can craft malicious PyTorch models containing embedded pickle payloads, package them into ZIP archives, and intentionally introduce CRC errors. This would cause Picklescan to fail to analyze the archive, while PyTorch is still able to load the model (depending on its configuration regarding CRC checks). This creates a significant vulnerability where malicious code can be distributed and potentially executed without detection by Picklescan.
Ex: Picklescan on HuggingFace goes into error (https://huggingface.co/jinaai/jina-embeddings-v2-base-en/tree/main)
Recommendations: Picklescan should not fail on Bad CRC check, especially if Pytorch is not checking CRC. Relaxed Zipfile is perfect to fix this issue:
--- picklescan/src/picklescan/relaxed_zipfile.py
+++ picklescan/src/picklescan/relaxed_zipfile.py
@@ class RelaxedZipFile(zipfile.ZipFile):
try:
# Skip the file header:
fheader = zef_file.read(sizeFileHeader)
if len(fheader) != sizeFileHeader:
raise zipfile.BadZipFile("Truncated file header")
fheader = struct.unpack(structFileHeader, fheader)
if fheader[_FH_SIGNATURE] != stringFileHeader:
raise zipfile.BadZipFile("Bad magic number for file header")
zef_file.read(fheader[_FH_FILENAME_LENGTH])
if fheader[_FH_EXTRA_FIELD_LENGTH]:
zef_file.read(fheader[_FH_EXTRA_FIELD_LENGTH])
- return zipfile.ZipExtFile(zef_file, mode, zinfo, pwd, True)
+
+ # Create the ZipExtFile and disable CRC check
+ ext_file = zipfile.ZipExtFile(zef_file, mode, zinfo, pwd)
+ # Monkey-patch to skip CRC validation
+ ext_file._expected_crc = None
+ return ext_file
except BaseException:
zef_file.close()
raise
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.0.30"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "picklescan"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.0.31"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-10156"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-693",
"CWE-755"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-09-10T19:50:46Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Summary\nPicklescan\u0027s ability to scan ZIP archives for malicious pickle files is compromised when the archive contains a file with a bad Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC). Instead of attempting to scan the files within the archive, whatever the CRC is, Picklescan fails in error and returns no results. This allows attackers to potentially hide malicious pickle payloads within ZIP archives that PyTorch might still be able to load (as PyTorch often disables CRC checks).\n\n\n### Details\nPicklescan likely utilizes Python\u0027s built-in zipfile module to handle ZIP archives. When zipfile encounters a file within an archive that has a mismatch between the declared CRC and the calculated CRC, it can raise an exception (e.g., BadZipFile or a related error). It appears that Picklescan does not try to scan the files whatever the CRC is.\nThis behavior contrasts with PyTorch\u0027s model loading capabilities, which in many cases might bypass CRC checks for ZIP archives - whatever the configuration is. This discrepancy creates a blind spot where a malicious model packaged in a ZIP with a bad CRC could be loaded by PyTorch while being completely missed by Picklescan.\n\n### PoC\n\n1. Download an existing Pytorch model with a bad CRC\n\n`wget \u003chttps://huggingface.co/jinaai/jina-embeddings-v2-base-en/resolve/main/pytorch_model.bin?download=true\u003e -O pytorch_model.bin`\n\n2. Attempt to scan the corrupted ZIP file with PickleScan:\n\n```\n# Assuming you have Picklescan installed and in your PATH\npicklescan -p pytorch_model.bin\n```\n\n\n**Observed Result**: Picklescan returns no results and presents an error message indicating a problem with the ZIP file, but it doesn\u2019t attempt to scan any potentially valid pickle files within the archive.\n\n**Expected Result:** Picklescan should either:\n\n- Attempt to extract and scan other valid files within the ZIP archive, even if some have CRC errors.\n- Report a warning indicating that the ZIP archive has CRC errors and might be incomplete or corrupted, but still attempt to scan any accessible content.\n\n### Impact\n**Severity**: High \n**Affected Users**: Any organization or individual using Picklescan to analyze PyTorch models or other files distributed as ZIP archives for malicious pickle content.\n**Impact Details**: Attackers can craft malicious PyTorch models containing embedded pickle payloads, package them into ZIP archives, and intentionally introduce CRC errors. This would cause Picklescan to fail to analyze the archive, while PyTorch is still able to load the model (depending on its configuration regarding CRC checks). This creates a significant vulnerability where malicious code can be distributed and potentially executed without detection by Picklescan.\n**Ex: Picklescan on HuggingFace goes into error** (https://huggingface.co/jinaai/jina-embeddings-v2-base-en/tree/main)\n\n\n**Recommendations:**\nPicklescan should not fail on Bad CRC check, especially if Pytorch is not checking CRC.\nRelaxed Zipfile is perfect to fix this issue:\n```\n--- picklescan/src/picklescan/relaxed_zipfile.py\n+++ picklescan/src/picklescan/relaxed_zipfile.py\n@@ class RelaxedZipFile(zipfile.ZipFile):\n try:\n # Skip the file header:\n fheader = zef_file.read(sizeFileHeader)\n if len(fheader) != sizeFileHeader:\n raise zipfile.BadZipFile(\"Truncated file header\")\n\n fheader = struct.unpack(structFileHeader, fheader)\n if fheader[_FH_SIGNATURE] != stringFileHeader:\n raise zipfile.BadZipFile(\"Bad magic number for file header\")\n\n zef_file.read(fheader[_FH_FILENAME_LENGTH])\n if fheader[_FH_EXTRA_FIELD_LENGTH]:\n zef_file.read(fheader[_FH_EXTRA_FIELD_LENGTH])\n\n- return zipfile.ZipExtFile(zef_file, mode, zinfo, pwd, True)\n+\n+ # Create the ZipExtFile and disable CRC check\n+ ext_file = zipfile.ZipExtFile(zef_file, mode, zinfo, pwd)\n+ # Monkey-patch to skip CRC validation\n+ ext_file._expected_crc = None\n+ return ext_file\n\n except BaseException:\n zef_file.close()\n raise\n```",
"id": "GHSA-mjqp-26hc-grxg",
"modified": "2026-06-06T14:43:36Z",
"published": "2025-09-10T19:50:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/security/advisories/GHSA-mjqp-26hc-grxg"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-10156"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/commit/28a7b4ef753466572bda3313737116eeb9b4e5c5"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/blob/v0.0.29/src/picklescan/relaxed_zipfile.py#L35"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/picklescan/PYSEC-2025-152.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://huggingface.co/jinaai/jina-embeddings-v2-base-en/resolve/main/pytorch_model.bin?download=true"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://huggingface.co/jinaai/jina-embeddings-v2-base-en/tree/main"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Picklescan: ZIP archive scan bypass is possible through non-exhaustive Cyclic Redundancy Check"
}
GHSA-MM48-WJ9H-VG49
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-31 21:31 – Updated: 2025-10-31 21:31Protection mechanism failure in Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-60711"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-693"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-10-31T20:15:52Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Protection mechanism failure in Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network.",
"id": "GHSA-mm48-wj9h-vg49",
"modified": "2025-10-31T21:31:03Z",
"published": "2025-10-31T21:31:03Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-60711"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2025-60711"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-MM6W-GR99-P3JJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-21 21:30 – Updated: 2026-05-21 21:30Description
The object-destructuring assignment syntax introduced in Twig 3.24.0 generates a call to CoreExtension::getAttribute() with the $sandboxed argument hardcoded to false, regardless of whether a SandboxExtension is active. This permanently disables the sandbox's property and method policy checks for every destructuring expression.
ObjectDestructuringSetBinary::compile() emits:
CoreExtension::getAttribute($this->env, $this->source, ..., \Twig\Template::ANY_CALL, false, false, false, ...);
// ^^^^^
// sandbox check never runs
Whereas GetAttrExpression::compile() correctly passes $env->hasExtension(SandboxExtension::class).
An attacker with write access to a sandboxed Twig template can read any public property or invoke any public getter on objects passed to the template engine, bypassing SecurityPolicy restrictions. The exploit requires only the {% do %} tag to be in allowedTags, which is a common configuration.
Resolution
The destructuring compiler now forwards the active sandbox flag to getAttribute() so property/method allowlists are enforced.
Credits
Twig would like to thank Anvil Secure in collaboration with Claude and Anthropic Research for reporting and fixing the issue.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "twig/twig"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.24.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.26.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-46639"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-693"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-21T21:30:49Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Description\n\nThe object-destructuring assignment syntax introduced in Twig 3.24.0 generates a call to `CoreExtension::getAttribute()` with the `$sandboxed` argument hardcoded to `false`, regardless of whether a `SandboxExtension` is active. This permanently disables the sandbox\u0027s property and method policy checks for every destructuring expression.\n\n`ObjectDestructuringSetBinary::compile()` emits:\n\n```php\nCoreExtension::getAttribute($this-\u003eenv, $this-\u003esource, ..., \\Twig\\Template::ANY_CALL, false, false, false, ...);\n// ^^^^^\n// sandbox check never runs\n```\n\nWhereas `GetAttrExpression::compile()` correctly passes `$env-\u003ehasExtension(SandboxExtension::class)`.\n\nAn attacker with write access to a sandboxed Twig template can read any public property or invoke any public getter on objects passed to the template engine, bypassing `SecurityPolicy` restrictions. The exploit requires only the `{% do %}` tag to be in `allowedTags`, which is a common configuration.\n\n### Resolution\n\nThe destructuring compiler now forwards the active sandbox flag to `getAttribute()` so property/method allowlists are enforced.\n\n### Credits\n\nTwig would like to thank Anvil Secure in collaboration with Claude and Anthropic Research for reporting and fixing the issue.",
"id": "GHSA-mm6w-gr99-p3jj",
"modified": "2026-05-21T21:30:49Z",
"published": "2026-05-21T21:30:49Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/twigphp/Twig/security/advisories/GHSA-mm6w-gr99-p3jj"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/twig/twig/CVE-2026-46639.yaml"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/twigphp/Twig"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://symfony.com/cve-2026-46639"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Twig: Sandbox property and method bypass via object-destructuring assignment"
}
GHSA-MPF8-4HX2-7CJG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-07 04:29 – Updated: 2026-05-14 20:36Summary
A sandbox boundary violation in vm2 allows host object identity to cross into the sandbox through host Promise resolution.
When a host-side Promise that resolves to a host object is exposed to the sandbox, the value delivered to the sandbox .then() callback preserves host identity. This allows the sandbox to interact with the host object directly, including:
- Performing identity checks using host-side
WeakMap - Mutating host object state from inside the sandbox
This behavior occurs because the Promise fulfillment wrapper uses ensureThis() instead of the stronger cross-realm conversion path (from() / proxy wrapping). If no prototype mapping is found, ensureThis() returns the original object.
As a result, objects resolved by host Promises can cross the sandbox boundary without proper isolation.
Details
In setup-sandbox.js, vm2 wraps Promise.prototype.then:
```js globalPromise.prototype.then = function then(onFulfilled, onRejected) { resetPromiseSpecies(this);
if (typeof onFulfilled === 'function') { const origOnFulfilled = onFulfilled; onFulfilled = function onFulfilled(value) { value = ensureThis(value); return apply(origOnFulfilled, this, [value]); }; }
return apply(globalPromiseThen, this, [onFulfilled, onRejected]); };
The wrapper calls ensureThis(value) before invoking the sandbox callback.
However, ensureThis is implemented in bridge.js as thisEnsureThis():
function thisEnsureThis(other) { const type = typeof other;
switch (type) { case 'object': if (other === null) return null;
case 'function':
let proto = thisReflectGetPrototypeOf(other);
if (!proto) {
return other;
}
while (proto) {
const mapping = thisReflectApply(thisMapGet, protoMappings, [proto]);
if (mapping) {
const mapped = thisReflectApply(thisWeakMapGet, mappingOtherToThis, [other]);
if (mapped) return mapped;
return mapping(defaultFactory, other);
}
proto = thisReflectGetPrototypeOf(proto);
}
return other;
If no prototype mapping is found, ensureThis() simply returns the original object:
return other;
This means the sandbox receives the original host object instead of a proxied or sanitized representation.
Because of this behavior, values resolved by host Promises can cross the host–sandbox boundary with identity preserved.
PoC
The following Proof of Concept demonstrates that an object resolved by a host Promise can be used as a valid key in a host-side WeakMap from inside the sandbox.
WeakMap keys rely on reference identity, so a successful lookup proves that the sandbox received the host object identity.
PoC Code import {VM} from "./index.js";
const hostObj = {tag: "HOST_OBJ"}; const hostPromise = Promise.resolve(hostObj);
// WeakMap created on the host const wm = new WeakMap([[hostObj, "HIT"]]);
const vm = new VM({ sandbox: {hostPromise, wm}, timeout: 1000, eval: false, wasm: false, });
const code = hostPromise.then(v => ({
weakMapGet: wm.get(v),
typeofV: typeof v,
tag: v.tag
}));
const result = await vm.run(code);
console.log("VM RESULT:", result); console.log("HOST SAME KEY STILL:", wm.get(hostObj)); Output VM RESULT: { weakMapGet: 'HIT', typeofV: 'object', tag: 'HOST_OBJ' } HOST SAME KEY STILL: HIT
This confirms that the object delivered to the sandbox callback retains host identity.
Additional Demonstration: Host Object Mutation
The sandbox can also mutate host object state through the resolved Promise value.
import {VM} from "./index.js";
const hostObj = {tag: "HOST_OBJ", nested: {x: 1}}; const hostPromise = Promise.resolve(hostObj);
const vm = new VM({ sandbox: {hostPromise}, timeout: 1000, eval: false, wasm: false, });
const code = hostPromise.then(v => {
v.nested.x = 999;
v.tag = "MUTATED";
return { seenTag: v.tag, seenX: v.nested.x };
});
const result = await vm.run(code);
console.log("VM RESULT:", result); console.log("HOST AFTER:", hostObj);
Output: VM RESULT: { seenTag: 'MUTATED', seenX: 999 } HOST AFTER: { tag: 'MUTATED', nested: { x: 999 } }
This demonstrates write-through mutation of a host object from sandbox code.
Impact This vulnerability allows host object references to cross the vm2 sandbox boundary via Promise resolution.
Consequences include:
Host object identity disclosure
Write-through mutation of host objects
WeakMap / WeakSet identity oracle across the boundary
Potential capability leaks if sensitive host objects are reachable via Promises
Applications that expose host Promises to sandboxed code may unintentionally grant the sandbox direct access to host objects.
This weakens the intended isolation guarantees of vm2.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.10.5"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "vm2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.11.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-44000"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-668",
"CWE-693"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-07T04:29:22Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-13T18:16:16Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nA sandbox boundary violation in **vm2** allows host object identity to cross into the sandbox through host Promise resolution.\n\nWhen a host-side Promise that resolves to a host object is exposed to the sandbox, the value delivered to the sandbox `.then()` callback preserves host identity. This allows the sandbox to interact with the host object directly, including:\n\n- Performing identity checks using host-side `WeakMap`\n- Mutating host object state from inside the sandbox\n\nThis behavior occurs because the Promise fulfillment wrapper uses `ensureThis()` instead of the stronger cross-realm conversion path (`from()` / proxy wrapping). If no prototype mapping is found, `ensureThis()` returns the original object.\n\nAs a result, objects resolved by host Promises can cross the sandbox boundary without proper isolation.\n\n---\n\n### Details\n\nIn `setup-sandbox.js`, vm2 wraps `Promise.prototype.then`:\n\n```js\nglobalPromise.prototype.then = function then(onFulfilled, onRejected) {\n resetPromiseSpecies(this);\n\n if (typeof onFulfilled === \u0027function\u0027) {\n const origOnFulfilled = onFulfilled;\n onFulfilled = function onFulfilled(value) {\n value = ensureThis(value);\n return apply(origOnFulfilled, this, [value]);\n };\n }\n\n return apply(globalPromiseThen, this, [onFulfilled, onRejected]);\n};\n\n\nThe wrapper calls ensureThis(value) before invoking the sandbox callback.\n\nHowever, ensureThis is implemented in bridge.js as thisEnsureThis():\n\nfunction thisEnsureThis(other) {\n const type = typeof other;\n\n switch (type) {\n case \u0027object\u0027:\n if (other === null) return null;\n\n case \u0027function\u0027:\n let proto = thisReflectGetPrototypeOf(other);\n\n if (!proto) {\n return other;\n }\n\n while (proto) {\n const mapping = thisReflectApply(thisMapGet, protoMappings, [proto]);\n\n if (mapping) {\n const mapped = thisReflectApply(thisWeakMapGet, mappingOtherToThis, [other]);\n if (mapped) return mapped;\n return mapping(defaultFactory, other);\n }\n\n proto = thisReflectGetPrototypeOf(proto);\n }\n\n return other;\n\nIf no prototype mapping is found, ensureThis() simply returns the original object:\n\nreturn other;\n\nThis means the sandbox receives the original host object instead of a proxied or sanitized representation.\n\nBecause of this behavior, values resolved by host Promises can cross the host\u2013sandbox boundary with identity preserved.\n\nPoC\n\nThe following Proof of Concept demonstrates that an object resolved by a host Promise can be used as a valid key in a host-side WeakMap from inside the sandbox.\n\nWeakMap keys rely on reference identity, so a successful lookup proves that the sandbox received the host object identity.\n\nPoC Code\nimport {VM} from \"./index.js\";\n\nconst hostObj = {tag: \"HOST_OBJ\"};\nconst hostPromise = Promise.resolve(hostObj);\n\n// WeakMap created on the host\nconst wm = new WeakMap([[hostObj, \"HIT\"]]);\n\nconst vm = new VM({\n sandbox: {hostPromise, wm},\n timeout: 1000,\n eval: false,\n wasm: false,\n});\n\nconst code = `\n hostPromise.then(v =\u003e ({\n weakMapGet: wm.get(v),\n typeofV: typeof v,\n tag: v.tag\n }))\n`;\n\nconst result = await vm.run(code);\n\nconsole.log(\"VM RESULT:\", result);\nconsole.log(\"HOST SAME KEY STILL:\", wm.get(hostObj));\nOutput\nVM RESULT: { weakMapGet: \u0027HIT\u0027, typeofV: \u0027object\u0027, tag: \u0027HOST_OBJ\u0027 }\nHOST SAME KEY STILL: HIT\n\nThis confirms that the object delivered to the sandbox callback retains host identity.\n\nAdditional Demonstration: Host Object Mutation\n\nThe sandbox can also mutate host object state through the resolved Promise value.\n\nimport {VM} from \"./index.js\";\n\nconst hostObj = {tag: \"HOST_OBJ\", nested: {x: 1}};\nconst hostPromise = Promise.resolve(hostObj);\n\nconst vm = new VM({\n sandbox: {hostPromise},\n timeout: 1000,\n eval: false,\n wasm: false,\n});\n\nconst code = `\n hostPromise.then(v =\u003e {\n v.nested.x = 999;\n v.tag = \"MUTATED\";\n return { seenTag: v.tag, seenX: v.nested.x };\n })\n`;\n\nconst result = await vm.run(code);\n\nconsole.log(\"VM RESULT:\", result);\nconsole.log(\"HOST AFTER:\", hostObj);\n\n**Output:**\nVM RESULT: { seenTag: \u0027MUTATED\u0027, seenX: 999 }\nHOST AFTER: { tag: \u0027MUTATED\u0027, nested: { x: 999 } }\n\nThis demonstrates write-through mutation of a host object from sandbox code.\n\n**Impact**\nThis vulnerability allows host object references to cross the vm2 sandbox boundary via Promise resolution.\n\nConsequences include:\n\nHost object identity disclosure\n\nWrite-through mutation of host objects\n\nWeakMap / WeakSet identity oracle across the boundary\n\nPotential capability leaks if sensitive host objects are reachable via Promises\n\nApplications that expose host Promises to sandboxed code may unintentionally grant the sandbox direct access to host objects.\n\nThis weakens the intended isolation guarantees of vm2.",
"id": "GHSA-mpf8-4hx2-7cjg",
"modified": "2026-05-14T20:36:48Z",
"published": "2026-05-07T04:29:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/security/advisories/GHSA-mpf8-4hx2-7cjg"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44000"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/releases/tag/v3.11.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "vm2 Host Promise Resolution Preserves Object Identity Across Sandbox Boundary"
}
GHSA-MPQ2-R2JC-4WMR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-01-10 21:30 – Updated: 2023-01-13 15:30Insufficient policy enforcement in CORS in Google Chrome prior to 109.0.5414.74 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Low)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-0141"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-693"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-01-10T20:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Insufficient policy enforcement in CORS in Google Chrome prior to 109.0.5414.74 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Low)",
"id": "GHSA-mpq2-r2jc-4wmr",
"modified": "2023-01-13T15:30:26Z",
"published": "2023-01-10T21:30:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-0141"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2023/01/stable-channel-update-for-desktop.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://crbug.com/1362331"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/202305-10"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/202311-11"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-MQ3M-HJX5-G783
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-03-24 21:30 – Updated: 2023-03-30 15:30In maybeFinish of FallbackHome.java, there is a possible delay of lockdown screen due to logic error. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.Product: AndroidVersions: Android-13Android ID: A-246543238
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-21024"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-693"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-03-24T20:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In maybeFinish of FallbackHome.java, there is a possible delay of lockdown screen due to logic error. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.Product: AndroidVersions: Android-13Android ID: A-246543238",
"id": "GHSA-mq3m-hjx5-g783",
"modified": "2023-03-30T15:30:19Z",
"published": "2023-03-24T21:30:51Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-21024"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://source.android.com/security/bulletin/pixel/2023-03-01"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-MQ42-J95V-P3GQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-11 18:31 – Updated: 2026-06-11 18:31KanaDojo before 0.1.18 contains a sandbox escape vulnerability that allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code by exploiting the explicit passing of the global require function into a Node.js vm.runInNewContext() sandbox context in the issue-auto-respond.yml workflow. Attackers can submit a pull request modifying messages.cjs to import arbitrary Node.js modules, bypassing sandbox restrictions and achieving remote code execution with full GitHub Actions runner privileges including access to AUTOMATION_PR_TOKEN.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-48546"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-693"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-11T18:16:26Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "KanaDojo before 0.1.18 contains a sandbox escape vulnerability that allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code by exploiting the explicit passing of the global require function into a Node.js vm.runInNewContext() sandbox context in the issue-auto-respond.yml workflow. Attackers can submit a pull request modifying messages.cjs to import arbitrary Node.js modules, bypassing sandbox restrictions and achieving remote code execution with full GitHub Actions runner privileges including access to AUTOMATION_PR_TOKEN.",
"id": "GHSA-mq42-j95v-p3gq",
"modified": "2026-06-11T18:31:35Z",
"published": "2026-06-11T18:31:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48546"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/lingdojo/kana-dojo/commit/31b85a5d7c4b323ddeba3b2dc5e7807558710544"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/lingdojo/kana-dojo/releases/tag/v0.1.18"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/kanadojo-sandbox-escape-rce-via-messages-cjs"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-MQC2-W9R8-MMXM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-10-19 19:00 – Updated: 2022-10-22 01:13A sandbox bypass vulnerability involving various casts performed implicitly by the Groovy language runtime in Jenkins Pipeline: Groovy Plugin 2802.v5ea_628154b_c2 and earlier allows attackers with permission to define and run sandboxed scripts, including Pipelines, to bypass the sandbox protection and execute arbitrary code in the context of the Jenkins controller JVM. Pipeline: Groovy Plugin 2803.v1a_f77ffcc773 intercepts Groovy casts performed implicitly by the Groovy language runtime
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c 2803.v1a"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.jenkins-ci.plugins.workflow:workflow-cps"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2803.v1a_f77ffcc773"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-43402"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-693"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2022-10-19T22:04:22Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2022-10-19T16:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "A sandbox bypass vulnerability involving various casts performed implicitly by the Groovy language runtime in Jenkins Pipeline: Groovy Plugin 2802.v5ea_628154b_c2 and earlier allows attackers with permission to define and run sandboxed scripts, including Pipelines, to bypass the sandbox protection and execute arbitrary code in the context of the Jenkins controller JVM. Pipeline: Groovy Plugin 2803.v1a_f77ffcc773 intercepts Groovy casts performed implicitly by the Groovy language runtime",
"id": "GHSA-mqc2-w9r8-mmxm",
"modified": "2022-10-22T01:13:25Z",
"published": "2022-10-19T19:00:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-43402"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.jenkins.io/security/advisory/2022-10-19/#SECURITY-2824%20(1)"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2022/10/19/3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Jenkins Pipeline: Groovy Plugin allows sandbox protection bypass and arbitrary code execution"
}
GHSA-MR9P-7CC9-FH7R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-01 00:34 – Updated: 2026-07-01 15:35Insufficient policy enforcement in DevTools in Google Chrome prior to 150.0.7871.47 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to potentially perform a sandbox escape via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-13909"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-693"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-30T23:17:04Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Insufficient policy enforcement in DevTools in Google Chrome prior to 150.0.7871.47 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to potentially perform a sandbox escape via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium)",
"id": "GHSA-mr9p-7cc9-fh7r",
"modified": "2026-07-01T15:35:02Z",
"published": "2026-07-01T00:34:06Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-13909"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2026/06/stable-channel-update-for-desktop_0175352312.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://issues.chromium.org/issues/505933538"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
No mitigation information available for this CWE.
CAPEC-1: Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs
In applications, particularly web applications, access to functionality is mitigated by an authorization framework. This framework maps Access Control Lists (ACLs) to elements of the application's functionality; particularly URL's for web apps. In the case that the administrator failed to specify an ACL for a particular element, an attacker may be able to access it with impunity. An attacker with the ability to access functionality not properly constrained by ACLs can obtain sensitive information and possibly compromise the entire application. Such an attacker can access resources that must be available only to users at a higher privilege level, can access management sections of the application, or can run queries for data that they otherwise not supposed to.
CAPEC-107: Cross Site Tracing
Cross Site Tracing (XST) enables an adversary to steal the victim's session cookie and possibly other authentication credentials transmitted in the header of the HTTP request when the victim's browser communicates to a destination system's web server.
CAPEC-127: Directory Indexing
An adversary crafts a request to a target that results in the target listing/indexing the content of a directory as output. One common method of triggering directory contents as output is to construct a request containing a path that terminates in a directory name rather than a file name since many applications are configured to provide a list of the directory's contents when such a request is received. An adversary can use this to explore the directory tree on a target as well as learn the names of files. This can often end up revealing test files, backup files, temporary files, hidden files, configuration files, user accounts, script contents, as well as naming conventions, all of which can be used by an attacker to mount additional attacks.
CAPEC-17: Using Malicious Files
An attack of this type exploits a system's configuration that allows an adversary to either directly access an executable file, for example through shell access; or in a possible worst case allows an adversary to upload a file and then execute it. Web servers, ftp servers, and message oriented middleware systems which have many integration points are particularly vulnerable, because both the programmers and the administrators must be in synch regarding the interfaces and the correct privileges for each interface.
CAPEC-20: Encryption Brute Forcing
An attacker, armed with the cipher text and the encryption algorithm used, performs an exhaustive (brute force) search on the key space to determine the key that decrypts the cipher text to obtain the plaintext.
CAPEC-22: Exploiting Trust in Client
An attack of this type exploits vulnerabilities in client/server communication channel authentication and data integrity. It leverages the implicit trust a server places in the client, or more importantly, that which the server believes is the client. An attacker executes this type of attack by communicating directly with the server where the server believes it is communicating only with a valid client. There are numerous variations of this type of attack.
CAPEC-237: Escaping a Sandbox by Calling Code in Another Language
The attacker may submit malicious code of another language to obtain access to privileges that were not intentionally exposed by the sandbox, thus escaping the sandbox. For instance, Java code cannot perform unsafe operations, such as modifying arbitrary memory locations, due to restrictions placed on it by the Byte code Verifier and the JVM. If allowed, Java code can call directly into native C code, which may perform unsafe operations, such as call system calls and modify arbitrary memory locations on their behalf. To provide isolation, Java does not grant untrusted code with unmediated access to native C code. Instead, the sandboxed code is typically allowed to call some subset of the pre-existing native code that is part of standard libraries.
CAPEC-36: Using Unpublished Interfaces or Functionality
An adversary searches for and invokes interfaces or functionality that the target system designers did not intend to be publicly available. If interfaces fail to authenticate requests, the attacker may be able to invoke functionality they are not authorized for.
CAPEC-477: Signature Spoofing by Mixing Signed and Unsigned Content
An attacker exploits the underlying complexity of a data structure that allows for both signed and unsigned content, to cause unsigned data to be processed as though it were signed data.
CAPEC-480: Escaping Virtualization
An adversary gains access to an application, service, or device with the privileges of an authorized or privileged user by escaping the confines of a virtualized environment. The adversary is then able to access resources or execute unauthorized code within the host environment, generally with the privileges of the user running the virtualized process. Successfully executing an attack of this type is often the first step in executing more complex attacks.
CAPEC-51: Poison Web Service Registry
SOA and Web Services often use a registry to perform look up, get schema information, and metadata about services. A poisoned registry can redirect (think phishing for servers) the service requester to a malicious service provider, provide incorrect information in schema or metadata, and delete information about service provider interfaces.
CAPEC-57: Utilizing REST's Trust in the System Resource to Obtain Sensitive Data
This attack utilizes a REST(REpresentational State Transfer)-style applications' trust in the system resources and environment to obtain sensitive data once SSL is terminated.
CAPEC-59: Session Credential Falsification through Prediction
This attack targets predictable session ID in order to gain privileges. The attacker can predict the session ID used during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking.
CAPEC-65: Sniff Application Code
An adversary passively sniffs network communications and captures application code bound for an authorized client. Once obtained, they can use it as-is, or through reverse-engineering glean sensitive information or exploit the trust relationship between the client and server. Such code may belong to a dynamic update to the client, a patch being applied to a client component or any such interaction where the client is authorized to communicate with the server.
CAPEC-668: Key Negotiation of Bluetooth Attack (KNOB)
An adversary can exploit a flaw in Bluetooth key negotiation allowing them to decrypt information sent between two devices communicating via Bluetooth. The adversary uses an Adversary in the Middle setup to modify packets sent between the two devices during the authentication process, specifically the entropy bits. Knowledge of the number of entropy bits will allow the attacker to easily decrypt information passing over the line of communication.
CAPEC-74: Manipulating State
The adversary modifies state information maintained by the target software or causes a state transition in hardware. If successful, the target will use this tainted state and execute in an unintended manner.
State management is an important function within a software application. User state maintained by the application can include usernames, payment information, browsing history as well as application-specific contents such as items in a shopping cart. Manipulating user state can be employed by an adversary to elevate privilege, conduct fraudulent transactions or otherwise modify the flow of the application to derive certain benefits.
If there is a hardware logic error in a finite state machine, the adversary can use this to put the system in an undefined state which could cause a denial of service or exposure of secure data.
CAPEC-87: Forceful Browsing
An attacker employs forceful browsing (direct URL entry) to access portions of a website that are otherwise unreachable. Usually, a front controller or similar design pattern is employed to protect access to portions of a web application. Forceful browsing enables an attacker to access information, perform privileged operations and otherwise reach sections of the web application that have been improperly protected.