CWE-770
AllowedAllocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete
The product allocates a reusable resource or group of resources on behalf of an actor without imposing any intended restrictions on the size or number of resources that can be allocated.
3021 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-6VWX-X7RH-Q2GJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-13 00:32 – Updated: 2026-02-13 00:32Centova Cast 3.2.12 contains a denial of service vulnerability that allows attackers to overwhelm the system by repeatedly calling the database export API endpoint. Attackers can trigger 100% CPU load by sending multiple concurrent requests to the /api.php endpoint with crafted parameters.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-25342"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-12T23:16:08Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Centova Cast 3.2.12 contains a denial of service vulnerability that allows attackers to overwhelm the system by repeatedly calling the database export API endpoint. Attackers can trigger 100% CPU load by sending multiple concurrent requests to the /api.php endpoint with crafted parameters.",
"id": "GHSA-6vwx-x7rh-q2gj",
"modified": "2026-02-13T00:32:52Z",
"published": "2026-02-13T00:32:52Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-25342"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://centova.com"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/47677"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/centova-cast-denial-of-service"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-6W7J-H94F-MM6R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-11-18 21:32 – Updated: 2025-11-19 15:31In Ascertia SigningHub through 8.6.8, there is a lack of rate limiting on the invite user function, leading to an email bombing vulnerability. An authenticated attacker can exploit this by automating invite requests.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-54320"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-11-18T19:15:48Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In Ascertia SigningHub through 8.6.8, there is a lack of rate limiting on the invite user function, leading to an email bombing vulnerability. An authenticated attacker can exploit this by automating invite requests.",
"id": "GHSA-6w7j-h94f-mm6r",
"modified": "2025-11-19T15:31:38Z",
"published": "2025-11-18T21:32:30Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-54320"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/saykino/CVE-2025-54320"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.ascertia.com/company/vulnerability-disclosure-policy"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-6WVC-6PWW-QR4R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-07-11 21:06 – Updated: 2022-07-11 21:06Impact
A large response received by the viaduct WSClient can cause a DoS from memory exhaustion. The entire body of the response is being read into memory which could allow an attacker to send a request that returns a response with a large body.
The consequence of the exhaustion is that the process which invokes a WSClient will be in a denial of service. It will be affected If users which are authenticated to the edge side and connect from the edge side to cloudhub through WebSocket protocol.
Patches
This bug has been fixed in Kubeedge 1.11.1, 1.10.2, 1.9.4. Users should update to these versions to resolve the issue.
Workarounds
At the time of writing, no workaround exists.
References
NA
Credits
Thanks David Korczynski and Adam Korczynski of ADA Logics for responsibly disclosing this issue in accordance with the kubeedge security policy during a security audit sponsored by CNCF and facilitated by OSTIF.
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue in KubeEdge repo * To make a vulnerability report, email your vulnerability to the private cncf-kubeedge-security@lists.cncf.io list with the security details and the details expected for KubeEdge bug reports.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/kubeedge/kubeedge"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.11.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.11.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/kubeedge/kubeedge"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.10.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.10.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/kubeedge/kubeedge"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.9.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-31080"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2022-07-11T21:06:28Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2022-07-11T21:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\nA large response received by the viaduct WSClient can cause a DoS from memory exhaustion. The entire body of the response is being read into memory which could allow an attacker to send a request that returns a response with a large body.\nThe consequence of the exhaustion is that the process which invokes a WSClient will be in a denial of service. It will be affected If users which are authenticated to the edge side and connect from the edge side to `cloudhub` through WebSocket protocol.\n\n### Patches\nThis bug has been fixed in Kubeedge 1.11.1, 1.10.2, 1.9.4. Users should update to these versions to resolve the issue.\n\n### Workarounds\nAt the time of writing, no workaround exists.\n\n### References\nNA\n\n### Credits\nThanks David Korczynski and Adam Korczynski of ADA Logics for responsibly disclosing this issue in accordance with the [kubeedge security policy](https://github.com/kubeedge/kubeedge/security/policy) during a security audit sponsored by CNCF and facilitated by OSTIF.\n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n* Open an issue in [KubeEdge repo](https://github.com/kubeedge/kubeedge/issues/new/choose)\n* To make a vulnerability report, email your vulnerability to the private [cncf-kubeedge-security@lists.cncf.io](mailto:cncf-kubeedge-security@lists.cncf.io) list with the security details and the details expected for [KubeEdge bug reports](https://github.com/kubeedge/kubeedge/blob/master/.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/bug-report.md).\n",
"id": "GHSA-6wvc-6pww-qr4r",
"modified": "2022-07-11T21:06:28Z",
"published": "2022-07-11T21:06:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/kubeedge/kubeedge/security/advisories/GHSA-6wvc-6pww-qr4r"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-31080"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "github.com/kubeedge/kubeedge"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "DoS in KubeEdge\u0027s Websocket Client in package Viaduct"
}
GHSA-6XJ4-VCHF-PFCC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-28 00:32 – Updated: 2025-11-03 21:32The issue was addressed with improved checks. This issue is fixed in iPadOS 17.7.4, macOS Ventura 13.7.3, macOS Sonoma 14.7.3, visionOS 2.2, tvOS 18.2, watchOS 11.2, iOS 18.2 and iPadOS 18.2, macOS Sequoia 15.2. Processing web content may lead to a denial-of-service.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-54497"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-01-27T22:15:12Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The issue was addressed with improved checks. This issue is fixed in iPadOS 17.7.4, macOS Ventura 13.7.3, macOS Sonoma 14.7.3, visionOS 2.2, tvOS 18.2, watchOS 11.2, iOS 18.2 and iPadOS 18.2, macOS Sequoia 15.2. Processing web content may lead to a denial-of-service.",
"id": "GHSA-6xj4-vchf-pfcc",
"modified": "2025-11-03T21:32:24Z",
"published": "2025-01-28T00:32:13Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-54497"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/121837"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/121839"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/121843"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/121844"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/121845"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/122067"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/122069"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/122070"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2025/Jan/14"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2025/Jan/16"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2025/Jan/17"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-72HV-8253-57QQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-28 02:01 – Updated: 2026-04-07 16:30Summary
The non-blocking (async) JSON parser in jackson-core bypasses the maxNumberLength constraint (default: 1000 characters) defined in StreamReadConstraints. This allows an attacker to send JSON with arbitrarily long numbers through the async parser API, leading to excessive memory allocation and potential CPU exhaustion, resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS).
The standard synchronous parser correctly enforces this limit, but the async parser fails to do so, creating an inconsistent enforcement policy.
Details
The root cause is that the async parsing path in NonBlockingUtf8JsonParserBase (and related classes) does not call the methods responsible for number length validation.
- The number parsing methods (e.g.,
_finishNumberIntegralPart) accumulate digits into theTextBufferwithout any length checks. - After parsing, they call
_valueComplete(), which finalizes the token but does not callresetInt()orresetFloat(). - The
resetInt()/resetFloat()methods inParserBaseare where thevalidateIntegerLength()andvalidateFPLength()checks are performed. - Because this validation step is skipped, the
maxNumberLengthconstraint is never enforced in the async code path.
PoC
The following JUnit 5 test demonstrates the vulnerability. It shows that the async parser accepts a 5,000-digit number, whereas the limit should be 1,000.
package tools.jackson.core.unittest.dos;
import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
import tools.jackson.core.*;
import tools.jackson.core.exc.StreamConstraintsException;
import tools.jackson.core.json.JsonFactory;
import tools.jackson.core.json.async.NonBlockingByteArrayJsonParser;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.*;
/**
* POC: Number Length Constraint Bypass in Non-Blocking (Async) JSON Parsers
*
* Authors: sprabhav7, rohan-repos
*
* maxNumberLength default = 1000 characters (digits).
* A number with more than 1000 digits should be rejected by any parser.
*
* BUG: The async parser never calls resetInt()/resetFloat() which is where
* validateIntegerLength()/validateFPLength() lives. Instead it calls
* _valueComplete() which skips all number length validation.
*
* CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
*/
class AsyncParserNumberLengthBypassTest {
private static final int MAX_NUMBER_LENGTH = 1000;
private static final int TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH = 5000;
private final JsonFactory factory = new JsonFactory();
// CONTROL: Sync parser correctly rejects a number exceeding maxNumberLength
@Test
void syncParserRejectsLongNumber() throws Exception {
byte[] payload = buildPayloadWithLongInteger(TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH);
// Output to console
System.out.println("[SYNC] Parsing " + TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH + "-digit number (limit: " + MAX_NUMBER_LENGTH + ")");
try {
try (JsonParser p = factory.createParser(ObjectReadContext.empty(), payload)) {
while (p.nextToken() != null) {
if (p.currentToken() == JsonToken.VALUE_NUMBER_INT) {
System.out.println("[SYNC] Accepted number with " + p.getText().length() + " digits — UNEXPECTED");
}
}
}
fail("Sync parser must reject a " + TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH + "-digit number");
} catch (StreamConstraintsException e) {
System.out.println("[SYNC] Rejected with StreamConstraintsException: " + e.getMessage());
}
}
// VULNERABILITY: Async parser accepts the SAME number that sync rejects
@Test
void asyncParserAcceptsLongNumber() throws Exception {
byte[] payload = buildPayloadWithLongInteger(TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH);
NonBlockingByteArrayJsonParser p =
(NonBlockingByteArrayJsonParser) factory.createNonBlockingByteArrayParser(ObjectReadContext.empty());
p.feedInput(payload, 0, payload.length);
p.endOfInput();
boolean foundNumber = false;
try {
while (p.nextToken() != null) {
if (p.currentToken() == JsonToken.VALUE_NUMBER_INT) {
foundNumber = true;
String numberText = p.getText();
assertEquals(TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH, numberText.length(),
"Async parser silently accepted all " + TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH + " digits");
}
}
// Output to console
System.out.println("[ASYNC INT] Accepted number with " + TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH + " digits — BUG CONFIRMED");
assertTrue(foundNumber, "Parser should have produced a VALUE_NUMBER_INT token");
} catch (StreamConstraintsException e) {
fail("Bug is fixed — async parser now correctly rejects long numbers: " + e.getMessage());
}
p.close();
}
private byte[] buildPayloadWithLongInteger(int numDigits) {
StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder(numDigits + 10);
sb.append("{\"v\":");
for (int i = 0; i < numDigits; i++) {
sb.append((char) ('1' + (i % 9)));
}
sb.append('}');
return sb.toString().getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8);
}
}
Impact
A malicious actor can send a JSON document with an arbitrarily long number to an application using the async parser (e.g., in a Spring WebFlux or other reactive application). This can cause:
1. Memory Exhaustion: Unbounded allocation of memory in the TextBuffer to store the number's digits, leading to an OutOfMemoryError.
2. CPU Exhaustion: If the application subsequently calls getBigIntegerValue() or getDecimalValue(), the JVM can be tied up in O(n^2) BigInteger parsing operations, leading to a CPU-based DoS.
Suggested Remediation
The async parsing path should be updated to respect the maxNumberLength constraint. The simplest fix appears to ensure that _valueComplete() or a similar method in the async path calls the appropriate validation methods (resetInt() or resetFloat()) already present in ParserBase, mirroring the behavior of the synchronous parsers.
NOTE: This research was performed in collaboration with rohan-repos
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "tools.jackson.core:jackson-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.1.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.19.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.21.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.18.5"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.18.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-28T02:01:05Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nThe non-blocking (async) JSON parser in `jackson-core` bypasses the `maxNumberLength` constraint (default: 1000 characters) defined in `StreamReadConstraints`. This allows an attacker to send JSON with arbitrarily long numbers through the async parser API, leading to excessive memory allocation and potential CPU exhaustion, resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS).\n\nThe standard synchronous parser correctly enforces this limit, but the async parser fails to do so, creating an inconsistent enforcement policy.\n\n### Details\nThe root cause is that the async parsing path in `NonBlockingUtf8JsonParserBase` (and related classes) does not call the methods responsible for number length validation.\n\n- The number parsing methods (e.g., `_finishNumberIntegralPart`) accumulate digits into the `TextBuffer` without any length checks.\n- After parsing, they call `_valueComplete()`, which finalizes the token but does **not** call `resetInt()` or `resetFloat()`.\n- The `resetInt()`/`resetFloat()` methods in `ParserBase` are where the `validateIntegerLength()` and `validateFPLength()` checks are performed.\n- Because this validation step is skipped, the `maxNumberLength` constraint is never enforced in the async code path.\n\n### PoC\nThe following JUnit 5 test demonstrates the vulnerability. It shows that the async parser accepts a 5,000-digit number, whereas the limit should be 1,000.\n\n```java\npackage tools.jackson.core.unittest.dos;\n\nimport java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets;\n\nimport org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;\n\nimport tools.jackson.core.*;\nimport tools.jackson.core.exc.StreamConstraintsException;\nimport tools.jackson.core.json.JsonFactory;\nimport tools.jackson.core.json.async.NonBlockingByteArrayJsonParser;\n\nimport static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.*;\n\n/**\n * POC: Number Length Constraint Bypass in Non-Blocking (Async) JSON Parsers\n *\n * Authors: sprabhav7, rohan-repos\n * \n * maxNumberLength default = 1000 characters (digits).\n * A number with more than 1000 digits should be rejected by any parser.\n *\n * BUG: The async parser never calls resetInt()/resetFloat() which is where\n * validateIntegerLength()/validateFPLength() lives. Instead it calls\n * _valueComplete() which skips all number length validation.\n *\n * CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling\n */\nclass AsyncParserNumberLengthBypassTest {\n\n private static final int MAX_NUMBER_LENGTH = 1000;\n private static final int TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH = 5000;\n\n private final JsonFactory factory = new JsonFactory();\n\n // CONTROL: Sync parser correctly rejects a number exceeding maxNumberLength\n @Test\n void syncParserRejectsLongNumber() throws Exception {\n byte[] payload = buildPayloadWithLongInteger(TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH);\n\t\t\n\t\t// Output to console\n System.out.println(\"[SYNC] Parsing \" + TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH + \"-digit number (limit: \" + MAX_NUMBER_LENGTH + \")\");\n try {\n try (JsonParser p = factory.createParser(ObjectReadContext.empty(), payload)) {\n while (p.nextToken() != null) {\n if (p.currentToken() == JsonToken.VALUE_NUMBER_INT) {\n System.out.println(\"[SYNC] Accepted number with \" + p.getText().length() + \" digits \u2014 UNEXPECTED\");\n }\n }\n }\n fail(\"Sync parser must reject a \" + TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH + \"-digit number\");\n } catch (StreamConstraintsException e) {\n System.out.println(\"[SYNC] Rejected with StreamConstraintsException: \" + e.getMessage());\n }\n }\n\n // VULNERABILITY: Async parser accepts the SAME number that sync rejects\n @Test\n void asyncParserAcceptsLongNumber() throws Exception {\n byte[] payload = buildPayloadWithLongInteger(TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH);\n\n NonBlockingByteArrayJsonParser p =\n (NonBlockingByteArrayJsonParser) factory.createNonBlockingByteArrayParser(ObjectReadContext.empty());\n p.feedInput(payload, 0, payload.length);\n p.endOfInput();\n\n boolean foundNumber = false;\n try {\n while (p.nextToken() != null) {\n if (p.currentToken() == JsonToken.VALUE_NUMBER_INT) {\n foundNumber = true;\n String numberText = p.getText();\n assertEquals(TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH, numberText.length(),\n \"Async parser silently accepted all \" + TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH + \" digits\");\n }\n }\n // Output to console\n System.out.println(\"[ASYNC INT] Accepted number with \" + TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH + \" digits \u2014 BUG CONFIRMED\");\n assertTrue(foundNumber, \"Parser should have produced a VALUE_NUMBER_INT token\");\n } catch (StreamConstraintsException e) {\n fail(\"Bug is fixed \u2014 async parser now correctly rejects long numbers: \" + e.getMessage());\n }\n p.close();\n }\n\n private byte[] buildPayloadWithLongInteger(int numDigits) {\n StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder(numDigits + 10);\n sb.append(\"{\\\"v\\\":\");\n for (int i = 0; i \u003c numDigits; i++) {\n sb.append((char) (\u00271\u0027 + (i % 9)));\n }\n sb.append(\u0027}\u0027);\n return sb.toString().getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8);\n }\n}\n\n```\n\n\n### Impact\nA malicious actor can send a JSON document with an arbitrarily long number to an application using the async parser (e.g., in a Spring WebFlux or other reactive application). This can cause:\n1. **Memory Exhaustion:** Unbounded allocation of memory in the `TextBuffer` to store the number\u0027s digits, leading to an `OutOfMemoryError`.\n2. **CPU Exhaustion:** If the application subsequently calls `getBigIntegerValue()` or `getDecimalValue()`, the JVM can be tied up in O(n^2) `BigInteger` parsing operations, leading to a CPU-based DoS.\n\n### Suggested Remediation\n\nThe async parsing path should be updated to respect the `maxNumberLength` constraint. The simplest fix appears to ensure that `_valueComplete()` or a similar method in the async path calls the appropriate validation methods (`resetInt()` or `resetFloat()`) already present in `ParserBase`, mirroring the behavior of the synchronous parsers.\n\n**NOTE:** This research was performed in collaboration with [rohan-repos](https://github.com/rohan-repos)",
"id": "GHSA-72hv-8253-57qq",
"modified": "2026-04-07T16:30:17Z",
"published": "2026-02-28T02:01:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core/security/advisories/GHSA-72hv-8253-57qq"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core/pull/1555"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core/commit/b0c428e6f993e1b5ece5c1c3cb2523e887cd52cf"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "jackson-core: Number Length Constraint Bypass in Async Parser Leads to Potential DoS Condition"
}
GHSA-72W5-64XJ-W84Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-03 18:30 – Updated: 2026-02-04 18:30An issue was discovered in the Wi-Fi driver in Samsung Mobile Processor and Wearable Processor Exynos 980, 850, 1080, 1280, 2200, 1330, 1380, 1480, 1580, W920, W930, and W1000. There is unbounded memory allocation in a /proc/driver/unifi0/conn_log_event_burst_to_us write operation, leading to kernel memory exhaustion.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-58344"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-03T18:16:13Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "An issue was discovered in the Wi-Fi driver in Samsung Mobile Processor and Wearable Processor Exynos 980, 850, 1080, 1280, 2200, 1330, 1380, 1480, 1580, W920, W930, and W1000. There is unbounded memory allocation in a /proc/driver/unifi0/conn_log_event_burst_to_us write operation, leading to kernel memory exhaustion.",
"id": "GHSA-72w5-64xj-w84q",
"modified": "2026-02-04T18:30:30Z",
"published": "2026-02-03T18:30:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-58344"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://semiconductor.samsung.com/support/quality-support/product-security-updates"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://semiconductor.samsung.com/support/quality-support/product-security-updates/cve-2025-58344"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-733H-C5C6-MQJ2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-21 21:30 – Updated: 2025-11-03 21:32Vulnerability in the MySQL Server product of Oracle MySQL (component: InnoDB). Supported versions that are affected are 8.0.40 and prior, 8.4.3 and prior and 9.1.0 and prior. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows high privileged attacker with network access via multiple protocols to compromise MySQL Server. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in unauthorized ability to cause a hang or frequently repeatable crash (complete DOS) of MySQL Server. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 4.9 (Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-21491"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-01-21T21:15:13Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Vulnerability in the MySQL Server product of Oracle MySQL (component: InnoDB). Supported versions that are affected are 8.0.40 and prior, 8.4.3 and prior and 9.1.0 and prior. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows high privileged attacker with network access via multiple protocols to compromise MySQL Server. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in unauthorized ability to cause a hang or frequently repeatable crash (complete DOS) of MySQL Server. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 4.9 (Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H).",
"id": "GHSA-733h-c5c6-mqj2",
"modified": "2025-11-03T21:32:17Z",
"published": "2025-01-21T21:30:54Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-21491"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20250131-0004"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpujan2025.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-733V-P3H5-QPQ7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-25 15:14 – Updated: 2025-04-29 16:45Summary
A query cost restriction using the cost-limit can be bypassed if ignoreIntrospection is enabled (which is the default configuration) by naming your query/fragment __schema.
Details
At the start of the computeComplexity function, we have the following check for ignoreIntrospection option:
if (this.config.ignoreIntrospection && 'name' in node && node.name?.value === '__schema') {
return 0;
}
However, the node can be FieldNode | FragmentDefinitionNode | InlineFragmentNode | OperationDefinitionNode | FragmentSpreadNode
So, for example, sending the following query
query hello {
books {
title
}
}
would create an OperationDefinitionNode with node.name.value == 'hello'
The proper way to handle this would be to check for the __schema field, which would create a FieldNode.
The fix is
if (
this.config.ignoreIntrospection &&
'name' in node &&
node.name?.value === '__schema' &&
node.kind === Kind.FIELD
) {
return 0;
}
to assert that the node must be a FieldNode
PoC
query {
...__schema
}
fragment __schema on Query {
books {
title
author
}
}
query __schema {
books {
title
author
}
}
Impact
Applications using GraphQL Armor Cost Limit plugin with ignoreIntrospection enabled.
Fix:
Fixed on 772. A quick patch would be to set ignoreIntrospection to false.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@escape.tech/graphql-armor-cost-limit"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.4.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-04-25T15:14:36Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nA query cost restriction using the `cost-limit` can be bypassed if `ignoreIntrospection` is enabled (which is the default configuration) by naming your query/fragment `__schema`.\n\n### Details\nAt the start of the `computeComplexity` function, we have the following check for `ignoreIntrospection` option:\n\n```ts\n if (this.config.ignoreIntrospection \u0026\u0026 \u0027name\u0027 in node \u0026\u0026 node.name?.value === \u0027__schema\u0027) {\n return 0;\n }\n```\n\nHowever, the `node` can be `FieldNode | FragmentDefinitionNode | InlineFragmentNode | OperationDefinitionNode | FragmentSpreadNode`\n\nSo, for example, sending the following query\n\n```gql\nquery hello {\n books {\n title\n }\n}\n```\n\nwould create an `OperationDefinitionNode` with `node.name.value == \u0027hello\u0027`\n\nThe proper way to handle this would be to check for the `__schema` field, which would create a `FieldNode`.\n\nThe fix is\n\n```ts\n if (\n this.config.ignoreIntrospection \u0026\u0026\n \u0027name\u0027 in node \u0026\u0026\n node.name?.value === \u0027__schema\u0027 \u0026\u0026\n node.kind === Kind.FIELD\n ) {\n return 0;\n }\n```\n\nto assert that the node must be a `FieldNode`\n\n### PoC\n```gql\nquery {\n ...__schema\n}\n\nfragment __schema on Query {\n books {\n title\n author\n }\n}\n```\n\n```gql\nquery __schema {\n books {\n title\n author\n }\n}\n```\n\n### Impact\nApplications using GraphQL Armor Cost Limit plugin with `ignoreIntrospection` enabled.\n\n### Fix:\nFixed on [772](https://github.com/Escape-Technologies/graphql-armor/pull/772). A quick patch would be to set `ignoreIntrospection` to false.",
"id": "GHSA-733v-p3h5-qpq7",
"modified": "2025-04-29T16:45:56Z",
"published": "2025-04-25T15:14:36Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Escape-Technologies/graphql-armor/security/advisories/GHSA-733v-p3h5-qpq7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Escape-Technologies/graphql-armor/pull/772"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Escape-Technologies/graphql-armor/commit/5a329541cf32a359ee1f69748738f91231b26eba"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/Escape-Technologies/graphql-armor"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "GraphQL Armor Cost-Limit Plugin Bypass via Introspection Query Obfuscation"
}
GHSA-73JW-FP74-P77X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-15 18:31 – Updated: 2026-07-15 18:31ws before 8.21.1 contains a memory exhaustion vulnerability in lib/receiver.js where the fragment guard only triggers when fragment count reaches maxFragments, allowing attackers to exhaust memory by sending incomplete fragmented WebSocket messages. Attackers can send a text frame with FIN=0 followed by continuation frames without completing the sequence, causing each fragment to be stored as a separate Buffer object with significant overhead, enabling denial of service through heap exhaustion.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-62389"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-15T18:16:49Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "ws before 8.21.1 contains a memory exhaustion vulnerability in lib/receiver.js where the fragment guard only triggers when fragment count reaches maxFragments, allowing attackers to exhaust memory by sending incomplete fragmented WebSocket messages. Attackers can send a text frame with FIN=0 followed by continuation frames without completing the sequence, causing each fragment to be stored as a separate Buffer object with significant overhead, enabling denial of service through heap exhaustion.",
"id": "GHSA-73jw-fp74-p77x",
"modified": "2026-07-15T18:31:58Z",
"published": "2026-07-15T18:31:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-62389"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/websockets/ws/issues/2331"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/websockets/ws/commit/f197ac65140920bdcecdab74bfc69c2d7858e55d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/websockets/ws/releases/tag/8.21.1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/ws-default-maxfragments-allows-memory-exhaustion-dos"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-745F-48GC-258Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-20 12:32 – Updated: 2025-03-20 12:32A vulnerability in haotian-liu/llava v1.2.0 allows an attacker to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) by appending a large number of characters to the end of a multipart boundary in a file upload request. This causes the server to continuously process each character, rendering the application inaccessible.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-10225"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-03-20T10:15:15Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A vulnerability in haotian-liu/llava v1.2.0 allows an attacker to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) by appending a large number of characters to the end of a multipart boundary in a file upload request. This causes the server to continuously process each character, rendering the application inaccessible.",
"id": "GHSA-745f-48gc-258q",
"modified": "2025-03-20T12:32:38Z",
"published": "2025-03-20T12:32:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-10225"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://huntr.com/bounties/cd793f83-f122-432b-83e7-1cc8c78817b7"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
Clearly specify the minimum and maximum expectations for capabilities, and dictate which behaviors are acceptable when resource allocation reaches limits.
Mitigation
Limit the amount of resources that are accessible to unprivileged users. Set per-user limits for resources. Allow the system administrator to define these limits. Be careful to avoid CWE-410.
Mitigation
Design throttling mechanisms into the system architecture. The best protection is to limit the amount of resources that an unauthorized user can cause to be expended. A strong authentication and access control model will help prevent such attacks from occurring in the first place, and it will help the administrator to identify who is committing the abuse. The login application should be protected against DoS attacks as much as possible. Limiting the database access, perhaps by caching result sets, can help minimize the resources expended. To further limit the potential for a DoS attack, consider tracking the rate of requests received from users and blocking requests that exceed a defined rate threshold.
Mitigation MIT-5
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation
- Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either:
- The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question.
- The second solution can be difficult to effectively institute -- and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply requires more resources on the part of the attacker.
- recognizes the attack and denies that user further access for a given amount of time, typically by using increasing time delays
- uniformly throttles all requests in order to make it more difficult to consume resources more quickly than they can again be freed.
Mitigation
Ensure that protocols have specific limits of scale placed on them.
Mitigation MIT-38.1
- If the program must fail, ensure that it fails gracefully (fails closed). There may be a temptation to simply let the program fail poorly in cases such as low memory conditions, but an attacker may be able to assert control before the software has fully exited. Alternately, an uncontrolled failure could cause cascading problems with other downstream components; for example, the program could send a signal to a downstream process so the process immediately knows that a problem has occurred and has a better chance of recovery.
- Ensure that all failures in resource allocation place the system into a safe posture.
Mitigation MIT-47
Strategy: Resource Limitation
- Use quotas or other resource-limiting settings provided by the operating system or environment. For example, when managing system resources in POSIX, setrlimit() can be used to set limits for certain types of resources, and getrlimit() can determine how many resources are available. However, these functions are not available on all operating systems.
- When the current levels get close to the maximum that is defined for the application (see CWE-770), then limit the allocation of further resources to privileged users; alternately, begin releasing resources for less-privileged users. While this mitigation may protect the system from attack, it will not necessarily stop attackers from adversely impacting other users.
- Ensure that the application performs the appropriate error checks and error handling in case resources become unavailable (CWE-703).
CAPEC-125: Flooding
An adversary consumes the resources of a target by rapidly engaging in a large number of interactions with the target. This type of attack generally exposes a weakness in rate limiting or flow. When successful this attack prevents legitimate users from accessing the service and can cause the target to crash. This attack differs from resource depletion through leaks or allocations in that the latter attacks do not rely on the volume of requests made to the target but instead focus on manipulation of the target's operations. The key factor in a flooding attack is the number of requests the adversary can make in a given period of time. The greater this number, the more likely an attack is to succeed against a given target.
CAPEC-130: Excessive Allocation
An adversary causes the target to allocate excessive resources to servicing the attackers' request, thereby reducing the resources available for legitimate services and degrading or denying services. Usually, this attack focuses on memory allocation, but any finite resource on the target could be the attacked, including bandwidth, processing cycles, or other resources. This attack does not attempt to force this allocation through a large number of requests (that would be Resource Depletion through Flooding) but instead uses one or a small number of requests that are carefully formatted to force the target to allocate excessive resources to service this request(s). Often this attack takes advantage of a bug in the target to cause the target to allocate resources vastly beyond what would be needed for a normal request.
CAPEC-147: XML Ping of the Death
An attacker initiates a resource depletion attack where a large number of small XML messages are delivered at a sufficiently rapid rate to cause a denial of service or crash of the target. Transactions such as repetitive SOAP transactions can deplete resources faster than a simple flooding attack because of the additional resources used by the SOAP protocol and the resources necessary to process SOAP messages. The transactions used are immaterial as long as they cause resource utilization on the target. In other words, this is a normal flooding attack augmented by using messages that will require extra processing on the target.
CAPEC-197: Exponential Data Expansion
An adversary submits data to a target application which contains nested exponential data expansion to produce excessively large output. Many data format languages allow the definition of macro-like structures that can be used to simplify the creation of complex structures. However, this capability can be abused to create excessive demands on a processor's CPU and memory. A small number of nested expansions can result in an exponential growth in demands on memory.
CAPEC-229: Serialized Data Parameter Blowup
This attack exploits certain serialized data parsers (e.g., XML, YAML, etc.) which manage data in an inefficient manner. The attacker crafts an serialized data file with multiple configuration parameters in the same dataset. In a vulnerable parser, this results in a denial of service condition where CPU resources are exhausted because of the parsing algorithm. The weakness being exploited is tied to parser implementation and not language specific.
CAPEC-230: Serialized Data with Nested Payloads
Applications often need to transform data in and out of a data format (e.g., XML and YAML) by using a parser. It may be possible for an adversary to inject data that may have an adverse effect on the parser when it is being processed. Many data format languages allow the definition of macro-like structures that can be used to simplify the creation of complex structures. By nesting these structures, causing the data to be repeatedly substituted, an adversary can cause the parser to consume more resources while processing, causing excessive memory consumption and CPU utilization.
CAPEC-231: Oversized Serialized Data Payloads
An adversary injects oversized serialized data payloads into a parser during data processing to produce adverse effects upon the parser such as exhausting system resources and arbitrary code execution.
CAPEC-469: HTTP DoS
An attacker performs flooding at the HTTP level to bring down only a particular web application rather than anything listening on a TCP/IP connection. This denial of service attack requires substantially fewer packets to be sent which makes DoS harder to detect. This is an equivalent of SYN flood in HTTP. The idea is to keep the HTTP session alive indefinitely and then repeat that hundreds of times. This attack targets resource depletion weaknesses in web server software. The web server will wait to attacker's responses on the initiated HTTP sessions while the connection threads are being exhausted.
CAPEC-482: TCP Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the TCP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service. These attacks exploit the weakness within the TCP protocol where there is some state information for the connection the server needs to maintain. This often involves the use of TCP SYN messages.
CAPEC-486: UDP Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the UDP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming the available network bandwidth. Additionally, firewalls often open a port for each UDP connection destined for a service with an open UDP port, meaning the firewalls in essence save the connection state thus the high packet nature of a UDP flood can also overwhelm resources allocated to the firewall. UDP attacks can also target services like DNS or VoIP which utilize these protocols. Additionally, due to the session-less nature of the UDP protocol, the source of a packet is easily spoofed making it difficult to find the source of the attack.
CAPEC-487: ICMP Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the ICMP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming the available network bandwidth. A typical attack involves a victim server receiving ICMP packets at a high rate from a wide range of source addresses. Additionally, due to the session-less nature of the ICMP protocol, the source of a packet is easily spoofed making it difficult to find the source of the attack.
CAPEC-488: HTTP Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the HTTP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming resources at the application layer such as web services and their infrastructure. These attacks use legitimate session-based HTTP GET requests designed to consume large amounts of a server's resources. Since these are legitimate sessions this attack is very difficult to detect.
CAPEC-489: SSL Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the SSL protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming all the available resources on the server side. These attacks take advantage of the asymmetric relationship between the processing power used by the client and the processing power used by the server to create a secure connection. In this manner the attacker can make a large number of HTTPS requests on a low provisioned machine to tie up a disproportionately large number of resources on the server. The clients then continue to keep renegotiating the SSL connection. When multiplied by a large number of attacking machines, this attack can result in a crash or loss of service to legitimate users.
CAPEC-490: Amplification
An adversary may execute an amplification where the size of a response is far greater than that of the request that generates it. The goal of this attack is to use a relatively few resources to create a large amount of traffic against a target server. To execute this attack, an adversary send a request to a 3rd party service, spoofing the source address to be that of the target server. The larger response that is generated by the 3rd party service is then sent to the target server. By sending a large number of initial requests, the adversary can generate a tremendous amount of traffic directed at the target. The greater the discrepancy in size between the initial request and the final payload delivered to the target increased the effectiveness of this attack.
CAPEC-491: Quadratic Data Expansion
An adversary exploits macro-like substitution to cause a denial of service situation due to excessive memory being allocated to fully expand the data. The result of this denial of service could cause the application to freeze or crash. This involves defining a very large entity and using it multiple times in a single entity substitution. CAPEC-197 is a similar attack pattern, but it is easier to discover and defend against. This attack pattern does not perform multi-level substitution and therefore does not obviously appear to consume extensive resources.
CAPEC-493: SOAP Array Blowup
An adversary may execute an attack on a web service that uses SOAP messages in communication. By sending a very large SOAP array declaration to the web service, the attacker forces the web service to allocate space for the array elements before they are parsed by the XML parser. The attacker message is typically small in size containing a large array declaration of say 1,000,000 elements and a couple of array elements. This attack targets exhaustion of the memory resources of the web service.
CAPEC-494: TCP Fragmentation
An adversary may execute a TCP Fragmentation attack against a target with the intention of avoiding filtering rules of network controls, by attempting to fragment the TCP packet such that the headers flag field is pushed into the second fragment which typically is not filtered.
CAPEC-495: UDP Fragmentation
An attacker may execute a UDP Fragmentation attack against a target server in an attempt to consume resources such as bandwidth and CPU. IP fragmentation occurs when an IP datagram is larger than the MTU of the route the datagram has to traverse. Typically the attacker will use large UDP packets over 1500 bytes of data which forces fragmentation as ethernet MTU is 1500 bytes. This attack is a variation on a typical UDP flood but it enables more network bandwidth to be consumed with fewer packets. Additionally it has the potential to consume server CPU resources and fill memory buffers associated with the processing and reassembling of fragmented packets.
CAPEC-496: ICMP Fragmentation
An attacker may execute a ICMP Fragmentation attack against a target with the intention of consuming resources or causing a crash. The attacker crafts a large number of identical fragmented IP packets containing a portion of a fragmented ICMP message. The attacker these sends these messages to a target host which causes the host to become non-responsive. Another vector may be sending a fragmented ICMP message to a target host with incorrect sizes in the header which causes the host to hang.
CAPEC-528: XML Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using XML messages with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a web service. These attacks are accomplished by sending a large number of XML based requests and letting the service attempt to parse each one. In many cases this type of an attack will result in a XML Denial of Service (XDoS) due to an application becoming unstable, freezing, or crashing.