Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-770

Allowed

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling

Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete

API response cwe.mitre.org

The product allocates a reusable resource or group of resources on behalf of an actor without imposing any intended restrictions on the size or number of resources that can be allocated.

3025 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-RP28-W34F-G6RM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-07-05 09:33 – Updated: 2026-05-12 12:31
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

bcache: fix variable length array abuse in btree_iter

btree_iter is used in two ways: either allocated on the stack with a fixed size MAX_BSETS, or from a mempool with a dynamic size based on the specific cache set. Previously, the struct had a fixed-length array of size MAX_BSETS which was indexed out-of-bounds for the dynamically-sized iterators, which causes UBSAN to complain.

This patch uses the same approach as in bcachefs's sort_iter and splits the iterator into a btree_iter with a flexible array member and a btree_iter_stack which embeds a btree_iter as well as a fixed-length data array.

Severity
5.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-39482"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-07-05T07:15:10Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbcache: fix variable length array abuse in btree_iter\n\nbtree_iter is used in two ways: either allocated on the stack with a\nfixed size MAX_BSETS, or from a mempool with a dynamic size based on the\nspecific cache set. Previously, the struct had a fixed-length array of\nsize MAX_BSETS which was indexed out-of-bounds for the dynamically-sized\niterators, which causes UBSAN to complain.\n\nThis patch uses the same approach as in bcachefs\u0027s sort_iter and splits\nthe iterator into a btree_iter with a flexible array member and a\nbtree_iter_stack which embeds a btree_iter as well as a fixed-length\ndata array.",
  "id": "GHSA-rp28-w34f-g6rm",
  "modified": "2026-05-12T12:31:58Z",
  "published": "2024-07-05T09:33:44Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-39482"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-265688.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-355557.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-613116.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0c31344e22dd8d6b1394c6e4c41d639015bdc671"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2c3d7b03b658dc8bfa6112b194b67b92a87e081b"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3a861560ccb35f2a4f0a4b8207fa7c2a35fc7f31"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5a1922adc5798b7ec894cd3f197afb6f9591b023"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6479b9f41583b013041943c4602e1ad61cec8148"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/934e1e4331859183a861f396d7dfaf33cb5afb02"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-RP42-5VXX-QPWR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-16 21:37 – Updated: 2026-04-24 21:02
VLAI
Summary
basic-ftp vulnerable to denial of service via unbounded memory consumption in Client.list()
Details

Summary

basic-ftp@5.2.2 is vulnerable to denial of service through unbounded memory growth while processing directory listings from a remote FTP server. A malicious or compromised server can send an extremely large or never-ending listing response to Client.list(), causing the client process to consume memory until it becomes unstable or crashes.

Details

The issue is in the package's default directory listing flow.

Client.list() reaches dist/Client.js, where the full listing response is downloaded into a StringWriter before parsing:

File: dist/Client.js:516-527

async _requestListWithCommand(command) {
    const buffer = new StringWriter_1.StringWriter();
    await (0, transfer_1.downloadTo)(buffer, {
        ftp: this.ftp,
        tracker: this._progressTracker,
        command,
        remotePath: "",
        type: "list"
    });
    const text = buffer.getText(this.ftp.encoding);
    this.ftp.log(text);
    return this.parseList(text);
}

The vulnerable sink is StringWriter, which grows an in-memory Buffer with no limit:

File: dist/StringWriter.js:5-20

class StringWriter extends stream_1.Writable {
    constructor() {
        super(...arguments);
        this.buf = Buffer.alloc(0);
    }
    _write(chunk, _, callback) {
        if (chunk instanceof Buffer) {
            this.buf = Buffer.concat([this.buf, chunk]);
            callback(null);
        }
        else {
            callback(new Error("StringWriter expects chunks of type 'Buffer'."));
        }
    }
    getText(encoding) {
        return this.buf.toString(encoding);
    }
}

The critical operation is:

this.buf = Buffer.concat([this.buf, chunk]);

There is no maximum size check, no truncation, and no streaming parser. Because the remote FTP server controls the listing response, it can force the client to keep allocating memory until the process is terminated.

How it happens:

  1. An application connects to an attacker-controlled or compromised FTP server.
  2. The application calls client.list().
  3. The server returns an extremely large or unbounded directory listing.
  4. basic-ftp buffers the full response in StringWriter.
  5. Memory grows without bound due to repeated Buffer.concat(...) calls.

PoC

The following PoC exercises the vulnerable buffering primitive directly:

const { StringWriter } = require("basic-ftp/dist/StringWriter.js");

function mb(n) {
  return Math.round(n / 1024 / 1024) + "MB";
}

const writer = new StringWriter();
let wrote = 0;

for (let i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
  const chunk = Buffer.alloc(4 * 1024 * 1024, 0x41);
  writer.write(chunk);
  wrote += chunk.length;

  if ((i + 1) % 8 === 0) {
    const m = process.memoryUsage();
    console.log("written", mb(wrote), "rss", mb(m.rss), "heap", mb(m.heapUsed), "buf", mb(m.arrayBuffers));
  }
}

console.log("final text len", writer.getText("utf8").length);

Observed output:

written 32MB rss 116MB heap 4MB buf 64MB
written 64MB rss 296MB heap 4MB buf 240MB
written 96MB rss 340MB heap 3MB buf 284MB
written 128MB rss 436MB heap 3MB buf 376MB
final text len 134217728

This demonstrates sustained memory growth in the same code path used to buffer directory listing data.

Supporting files saved alongside this report:

  • poc.js
  • poc_output.txt

Impact

This is a denial-of-service vulnerability affecting applications that use basic-ftp to list directories from remote FTP servers.

  • Vulnerability class: Memory exhaustion / Denial of Service
  • Attack precondition: The victim connects to a malicious or compromised FTP server and performs Client.list()
  • Impacted users: Any application or service using basic-ftp@5.2.2 against untrusted FTP endpoints
  • Security effect: The attacker can cause excessive memory consumption, process instability, and potential process termination

Recommended remediation:

  1. Enforce a maximum listing size.
  2. Abort transfers that exceed the configured limit.
  3. Prefer incremental or streaming parsing over full-response buffering.

Example defensive check:

if (this.buf.length + chunk.length > MAX_LISTING_BYTES) {
    callback(new Error("FTP listing exceeds maximum allowed size."));
    return;
}
this.buf = Buffer.concat([this.buf, chunk]);
Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.2.2"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "basic-ftp"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.3.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-41324"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400",
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-16T21:37:48Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-24T04:16:20Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n`basic-ftp@5.2.2` is vulnerable to denial of service through unbounded memory growth while processing directory listings from a remote FTP server. A malicious or compromised server can send an extremely large or never-ending listing response to `Client.list()`, causing the client process to consume memory until it becomes unstable or crashes.\n\n### Details\nThe issue is in the package\u0027s default directory listing flow.\n\n`Client.list()` reaches `dist/Client.js`, where the full listing response is downloaded into a `StringWriter` before parsing:\n\nFile: `dist/Client.js:516-527`\n\n```js\nasync _requestListWithCommand(command) {\n    const buffer = new StringWriter_1.StringWriter();\n    await (0, transfer_1.downloadTo)(buffer, {\n        ftp: this.ftp,\n        tracker: this._progressTracker,\n        command,\n        remotePath: \"\",\n        type: \"list\"\n    });\n    const text = buffer.getText(this.ftp.encoding);\n    this.ftp.log(text);\n    return this.parseList(text);\n}\n```\n\nThe vulnerable sink is `StringWriter`, which grows an in-memory `Buffer` with no limit:\n\nFile: `dist/StringWriter.js:5-20`\n\n```js\nclass StringWriter extends stream_1.Writable {\n    constructor() {\n        super(...arguments);\n        this.buf = Buffer.alloc(0);\n    }\n    _write(chunk, _, callback) {\n        if (chunk instanceof Buffer) {\n            this.buf = Buffer.concat([this.buf, chunk]);\n            callback(null);\n        }\n        else {\n            callback(new Error(\"StringWriter expects chunks of type \u0027Buffer\u0027.\"));\n        }\n    }\n    getText(encoding) {\n        return this.buf.toString(encoding);\n    }\n}\n```\n\nThe critical operation is:\n\n```js\nthis.buf = Buffer.concat([this.buf, chunk]);\n```\n\nThere is no maximum size check, no truncation, and no streaming parser. Because the remote FTP server controls the listing response, it can force the client to keep allocating memory until the process is terminated.\n\nHow it happens:\n\n1. An application connects to an attacker-controlled or compromised FTP server.\n2. The application calls `client.list()`.\n3. The server returns an extremely large or unbounded directory listing.\n4. `basic-ftp` buffers the full response in `StringWriter`.\n5. Memory grows without bound due to repeated `Buffer.concat(...)` calls.\n\n### PoC\nThe following PoC exercises the vulnerable buffering primitive directly:\n\n```js\nconst { StringWriter } = require(\"basic-ftp/dist/StringWriter.js\");\n\nfunction mb(n) {\n  return Math.round(n / 1024 / 1024) + \"MB\";\n}\n\nconst writer = new StringWriter();\nlet wrote = 0;\n\nfor (let i = 0; i \u003c 32; i++) {\n  const chunk = Buffer.alloc(4 * 1024 * 1024, 0x41);\n  writer.write(chunk);\n  wrote += chunk.length;\n\n  if ((i + 1) % 8 === 0) {\n    const m = process.memoryUsage();\n    console.log(\"written\", mb(wrote), \"rss\", mb(m.rss), \"heap\", mb(m.heapUsed), \"buf\", mb(m.arrayBuffers));\n  }\n}\n\nconsole.log(\"final text len\", writer.getText(\"utf8\").length);\n```\n\nObserved output:\n\n```text\nwritten 32MB rss 116MB heap 4MB buf 64MB\nwritten 64MB rss 296MB heap 4MB buf 240MB\nwritten 96MB rss 340MB heap 3MB buf 284MB\nwritten 128MB rss 436MB heap 3MB buf 376MB\nfinal text len 134217728\n```\n\nThis demonstrates sustained memory growth in the same code path used to buffer directory listing data.\n\nSupporting files saved alongside this report:\n\n- `poc.js`\n- `poc_output.txt`\n\n### Impact\nThis is a denial-of-service vulnerability affecting applications that use `basic-ftp` to list directories from remote FTP servers.\n\n- Vulnerability class: Memory exhaustion / Denial of Service\n- Attack precondition: The victim connects to a malicious or compromised FTP server and performs `Client.list()`\n- Impacted users: Any application or service using `basic-ftp@5.2.2` against untrusted FTP endpoints\n- Security effect: The attacker can cause excessive memory consumption, process instability, and potential process termination\n\nRecommended remediation:\n\n1. Enforce a maximum listing size.\n2. Abort transfers that exceed the configured limit.\n3. Prefer incremental or streaming parsing over full-response buffering.\n\nExample defensive check:\n\n```js\nif (this.buf.length + chunk.length \u003e MAX_LISTING_BYTES) {\n    callback(new Error(\"FTP listing exceeds maximum allowed size.\"));\n    return;\n}\nthis.buf = Buffer.concat([this.buf, chunk]);\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-rp42-5vxx-qpwr",
  "modified": "2026-04-24T21:02:13Z",
  "published": "2026-04-16T21:37:48Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/patrickjuchli/basic-ftp/security/advisories/GHSA-rp42-5vxx-qpwr"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41324"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/patrickjuchli/basic-ftp"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "basic-ftp vulnerable to denial of service via unbounded memory consumption in Client.list()"
}

GHSA-RP64-MPMJ-44XF

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-06-19 18:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 04:57
VLAI
Details

Vulnerability of system restart triggered by abnormal callbacks passed to APIs.Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may cause the system to restart.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-34166"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400",
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-06-19T17:15:12Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Vulnerability of system restart triggered by abnormal callbacks passed to APIs.Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may cause the system to restart.",
  "id": "GHSA-rp64-mpmj-44xf",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T04:57:55Z",
  "published": "2023-06-19T18:30:48Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-34166"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://consumer.huawei.com/en/support/bulletin/2023/6"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-RP72-5V5Q-2446

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-26 21:08 – Updated: 2026-06-26 21:08
VLAI
Summary
@cardano402/mcp-server missing spending limits, LAN-exposed HTTP transport, and SSRF via catalog.server.url
Details

Summary

@cardano402/mcp-server versions <= 0.1.1 ship three security gaps that can lead to unauthorized fund movement when the package is used as designed (an MCP server exposing Cardano payment tools to an

Impact

1. No spending limits on signed payments

An LLM (or prompt-injected LLM) calling tools registered by the MCP server can invoke them in a loop. Each call signs a real Cardano transaction for the catalog-advertised amount. There is no per-call cap, daily ceiling, MCP elicitation/confirmation step, or recipient allowlist. The MAINNET=true env-var guardrail can be bypassed by any LLM with shell-tool access. Worst case: full wallet drain.

2. HTTP transport binds 0.0.0.0 without authentication

cardano402-mcp --transport http listens on all interfaces with no Origin allowlist, no bearer-token requirement, and no CORS check. Anyone on the same LAN can POST MCP tools/call and trigger signed payments from the operator's wallet.

3. SSRF via catalog.server.url

A malicious catalog can declare a server.url pointing at internal infrastructure (e.g. http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data). The allowInsecure guard in 0.1.1 only checks the catalog URL itself, not the server.url it returns. endpoint.path is also not normalized, so .. traversal or absolute URLs work.

Patches

Fixed in @cardano402/mcp-server@0.1.2: - Per-call and per-day spending limits (default 5 ADA / 50 ADA) + optional recipient allowlist + MCP elicitation/create confirmation hook. - HTTP transport defaults to 127.0.0.1; non-loopback requires --http-bearer-token; per-request Origin allowlist + bearer check. - catalog.server.url validated against private-CIDR rules (RFC1918, RFC4193, link-local, CGNAT, multicast, IPv4-mapped IPv6, loopback) unless CARDANO402_ALLOW_INSECURE=true. - endpoint.path rejected if it contains .., NUL, whitespace/CRLF, an absolute URL, or //host/.... - Per-tool mainnet opt-in via --mainnet-confirmed-tools.

## Workarounds for 0.1.1 users - Do not run with --transport http on an untrusted network; use --transport stdio (default). - Only point the server at catalogs you control or have audited. - Use a low-balance hot wallet, never your main wallet. - Avoid MAINNET=true until upgraded to 0.1.2.

Severity
0.0 (None)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.1.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@cardano402/mcp-server"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.1.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-770",
      "CWE-862",
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-26T21:08:06Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n`@cardano402/mcp-server` versions `\u003c= 0.1.1` ship three security gaps that can lead to unauthorized fund movement when the package is used as designed (an MCP server exposing Cardano payment tools to an\n\n## Impact\n### 1. No spending limits on signed payments\nAn LLM (or prompt-injected LLM) calling tools registered by the MCP server can invoke them in a loop. Each call signs a real Cardano transaction for the catalog-advertised amount. There is no per-call cap, daily ceiling, MCP elicitation/confirmation step, or recipient allowlist. The `MAINNET=true` env-var guardrail can be bypassed by any LLM with shell-tool access. Worst case: full wallet drain.\n\n### 2. HTTP transport binds 0.0.0.0 without authentication\n`cardano402-mcp --transport http` listens on all interfaces with no `Origin` allowlist, no bearer-token requirement, and no CORS check. Anyone on the same LAN can POST MCP `tools/call` and trigger signed payments from the operator\u0027s wallet.\n\n### 3. SSRF via `catalog.server.url`\nA malicious catalog can declare a `server.url` pointing at internal infrastructure (e.g. `http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data`). The `allowInsecure` guard in 0.1.1 only checks the catalog URL itself, not the `server.url` it returns. `endpoint.path` is also not normalized, so `..` traversal or absolute URLs work.\n\n## Patches\nFixed in `@cardano402/mcp-server@0.1.2`:\n  - Per-call and per-day spending limits (default 5 ADA / 50 ADA) + optional recipient allowlist + MCP `elicitation/create` confirmation hook.\n  - HTTP transport defaults to `127.0.0.1`; non-loopback requires `--http-bearer-token`; per-request `Origin` allowlist + bearer check.\n  - `catalog.server.url` validated against private-CIDR rules (RFC1918, RFC4193, link-local, CGNAT, multicast, IPv4-mapped IPv6, loopback) unless `CARDANO402_ALLOW_INSECURE=true`.\n  - `endpoint.path` rejected if it contains `..`, NUL, whitespace/CRLF, an absolute URL, or `//host/...`.\n  - Per-tool mainnet opt-in via `--mainnet-confirmed-tools`.\n\n  ## Workarounds for 0.1.1 users\n  - Do not run with `--transport http` on an untrusted network; use `--transport stdio` (default).\n  - Only point the server at catalogs you control or have audited.\n  - Use a low-balance hot wallet, never your main wallet.\n  - Avoid `MAINNET=true` until upgraded to 0.1.2.",
  "id": "GHSA-rp72-5v5q-2446",
  "modified": "2026-06-26T21:08:06Z",
  "published": "2026-06-26T21:08:06Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MorganOnCode/cardano402/security/advisories/GHSA-rp72-5v5q-2446"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/MorganOnCode/cardano402"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "@cardano402/mcp-server missing spending limits, LAN-exposed HTTP transport, and SSRF via catalog.server.url"
}

GHSA-RPMF-866Q-6P89

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-06 19:37 – Updated: 2026-05-13 16:29
VLAI
Summary
basic-ftp allows a malicious FTP server to cause client-side denial of service via unbounded multiline control response buffering
Details

Summary

basic-ftp is vulnerable to client-side denial of service when parsing FTP control-channel multiline responses.

A malicious or compromised FTP server can send an unterminated multiline response during the initial FTP banner phase, before authentication. The client keeps appending attacker-controlled data into FtpContext._partialResponse and repeatedly reparses the accumulated buffer without enforcing a maximum control response size.

As a result, an application using basic-ftp can remain stuck in connect() while memory and CPU usage grow under attacker-controlled input. This can lead to process-level denial of service, container OOM kills, worker restarts, queue backlog, or service degradation in applications that automatically connect to FTP endpoints.

Details

Root cause

The root cause is that incomplete FTP multiline control responses are buffered without an upper bound.

FtpContext stores incomplete control-channel data in _partialResponse:

https://github.com/patrickjuchli/basic-ftp/blob/50827c73ca6c1d786c97276e47be8a33d0f2277d/src/FtpContext.ts#L63-L64

Incoming control-channel data is handled in _onControlSocketData. The implementation concatenates the previous incomplete response with the new chunk, parses the entire accumulated string, and stores parsed.rest back into _partialResponse:

https://github.com/patrickjuchli/basic-ftp/blob/50827c73ca6c1d786c97276e47be8a33d0f2277d/src/FtpContext.ts#L328-L340

The relevant flow is:

completeResponse = this._partialResponse + chunk parsed = parseControlResponse(completeResponse) this._partialResponse = parsed.rest

There is no maximum size check before concatenating, before parsing, or before storing parsed.rest.

The parser accepts incomplete multiline responses and returns the entire unterminated multiline group as rest:

https://github.com/patrickjuchli/basic-ftp/blob/50827c73ca6c1d786c97276e47be8a33d0f2277d/src/parseControlResponse.ts#L15-L43

If a server starts a multiline FTP response:

220-malicious banner starts

but never sends the terminating line:

220 ready

then parseControlResponse() treats the accumulated multiline data as incomplete and returns it as rest.

Because _onControlSocketData() feeds _partialResponse + chunk back into the parser on every new data event, the client repeatedly reparses a growing attacker-controlled buffer. This creates both memory growth and increasing parsing work.

Why this is security-relevant

The vulnerable component is a client library. The attacker does not need to authenticate to the victim system and does not need valid FTP credentials.

The attack occurs automatically when an application using basic-ftp connects to a malicious or compromised FTP server. The malicious response is sent as the FTP server banner before login. No additional user interaction is required after the application initiates a normal FTP connection.

This is realistic for applications that use FTP for:

  • scheduled imports or exports
  • customer-provided FTP endpoints
  • backup or synchronization jobs
  • CI/CD artifact mirroring
  • document ingestion pipelines
  • legacy business integrations

In those environments, one malicious or compromised FTP endpoint can cause the Node.js process using basic-ftp to consume excessive memory and CPU or remain stuck in a pending connection state.

Proof of Concept

The PoC uses a local malicious FTP server that accepts a victim connection and sends an unterminated multiline FTP banner. The banner starts with 220-, but the server never sends the required terminating 220 line.

Reproduction steps

From the root of the basic-ftp project:

npm ci
npm run buildOnly

poc_control_parser_direct.js

CHUNKS=1000 node poc_control_parser_direct.js | tee poc-results/parser_direct_1000.log

parser_direct_1000.log

Run the end-to-end malicious FTP server PoC:

poc_control_multiline_dos.js

CHUNK_SIZE=8192 CHUNKS=1000 DELAY_MS=1 node poc_control_multiline_dos.js | tee poc-results/control_multiline_dos_1000.log

control_multiline_dos_1000.log

Observed result: parser-only PoC

[basic-ftp parseControlResponse incomplete multiline DoS]
Input fed: 7.81 MiB
Retained rest: 7.81 MiB
Initial rss/heap: 54.77 MiB 3.69 MiB
Final   rss/heap: 141.64 MiB 80.77 MiB

This shows that parseControlResponse() retained the full unterminated multiline response as rest.

The retained buffer grew to 7.81 MiB. Heap usage increased from 3.69 MiB to 80.77 MiB, and RSS increased from 54.77 MiB to 141.64 MiB.

Observed result: end-to-end malicious FTP server PoC

[server] listening on 127.0.0.1:34429
[server] victim connected
[progress] chunks=850 sent=6.6 MiB partialResponse=6.6 MiB heapUsed=227.5 MiB rss=292.4 MiB
[progress] chunks=900 sent=7.0 MiB partialResponse=7.0 MiB heapUsed=213.1 MiB rss=278.0 MiB
[final-before-close] chunks=1000 sent=7.8 MiB partialResponse=7.8 MiB heapUsed=82.1 MiB rss=146.8 MiB
[result] client connect() is still pending because the multiline response never terminated

Only 7.8 MiB of malicious control-channel data was sent. The client retained 7.8 MiB in _partialResponse, showed large memory spikes, and remained pending inside connect() because the multiline response was never terminated.

Expected behavior

The client should enforce a maximum size for incomplete FTP control responses. If the accumulated multiline response exceeds a safe limit, the client should close the connection and reject the active task with an error.

The client should not allow a remote FTP server to make _partialResponse grow without bound.

Actual behavior

A malicious FTP server can keep the client in a pending connection state by sending an unterminated multiline control response. basic-ftp continues buffering and reparsing the accumulated data without a maximum response size.

Impact

A malicious or compromised FTP server can cause denial of service in applications using basic-ftp.

Possible real-world impact includes:

  • Node.js process memory exhaustion
  • container OOM kill
  • worker crash or restart loop
  • event loop CPU pressure due to repeated reparsing
  • stuck FTP jobs
  • queue backlog in scheduled import/export systems
  • degraded availability of services relying on automated FTP ingestion

Threat model

The attacker controls, compromises, or can impersonate an FTP server that a victim application connects to.

Examples:

  1. A SaaS application allows customers to configure external FTP endpoints for automated imports.
  2. A backend job periodically pulls files from partner FTP servers.
  3. A document ingestion pipeline connects to FTP endpoints supplied by external users.
  4. A legacy integration uses FTP for scheduled synchronization.
  5. A build or deployment pipeline mirrors artifacts from an FTP server.

In each case, the victim application initiates a normal FTP connection. The malicious server sends an unterminated multiline banner before authentication. The vulnerable client then buffers and reparses the response indefinitely.

No FTP credentials are required for exploitation because the attack happens before login.

Suggested fix

Introduce a maximum control response buffer size, especially for incomplete multiline responses.

Recommended changes:

  • Add a maxControlResponseBytes or maxControlResponseLength limit.
  • Enforce the limit before or immediately after appending new control-channel data.
  • Close the connection and reject the active task when the limit is exceeded.
  • Add regression tests for unterminated multiline responses.

Example defensive logic:

if (completeResponse.length > maxControlResponseLength) {
    closeWithError(new Error("FTP control response exceeded maximum allowed size"))
}

A regression test should verify that a response beginning with 220- and never terminating with 220 is rejected after the configured size limit instead of being retained indefinitely.

Suggested regression test scenario

A test server should:

  1. Accept a client connection.
  2. Send an FTP multiline response opener such as 220-malicious banner\r\n.
  3. Continue sending additional lines without ever sending the terminating 220 line.
  4. Verify that the client rejects the connection once the configured response-size limit is exceeded.
  5. Verify that _partialResponse does not grow without bound.

Credit request

If you publish an advisory or assign a CVE, please credit me as:

Ali Firas (thesmartshadow) - https://www.smartshadow.dev

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.3.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "basic-ftp"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.3.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-44240"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400",
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-06T19:37:33Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-12T21:16:16Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\n`basic-ftp` is vulnerable to client-side denial of service when parsing FTP control-channel multiline responses.\n\nA malicious or compromised FTP server can send an unterminated multiline response during the initial FTP banner phase, before authentication. The client keeps appending attacker-controlled data into `FtpContext._partialResponse` and repeatedly reparses the accumulated buffer without enforcing a maximum control response size.\n\nAs a result, an application using `basic-ftp` can remain stuck in `connect()` while memory and CPU usage grow under attacker-controlled input. This can lead to process-level denial of service, container OOM kills, worker restarts, queue backlog, or service degradation in applications that automatically connect to FTP endpoints.\n\n---\n\n## Details\n\n### Root cause\n\nThe root cause is that incomplete FTP multiline control responses are buffered without an upper bound.\n\n`FtpContext` stores incomplete control-channel data in `_partialResponse`:\n\n\nhttps://github.com/patrickjuchli/basic-ftp/blob/50827c73ca6c1d786c97276e47be8a33d0f2277d/src/FtpContext.ts#L63-L64\n\n\nIncoming control-channel data is handled in `_onControlSocketData`. The implementation concatenates the previous incomplete response with the new chunk, parses the entire accumulated string, and stores `parsed.rest` back into `_partialResponse`:\n\n\nhttps://github.com/patrickjuchli/basic-ftp/blob/50827c73ca6c1d786c97276e47be8a33d0f2277d/src/FtpContext.ts#L328-L340\n\n\nThe relevant flow is:\n\n\ncompleteResponse = this._partialResponse + chunk\nparsed = parseControlResponse(completeResponse)\nthis._partialResponse = parsed.rest\n\n\nThere is no maximum size check before concatenating, before parsing, or before storing `parsed.rest`.\n\nThe parser accepts incomplete multiline responses and returns the entire unterminated multiline group as `rest`:\n\n\nhttps://github.com/patrickjuchli/basic-ftp/blob/50827c73ca6c1d786c97276e47be8a33d0f2277d/src/parseControlResponse.ts#L15-L43\n\n\nIf a server starts a multiline FTP response:\n\n\n220-malicious banner starts\n\n\nbut never sends the terminating line:\n\n\n220 ready\n\n\nthen `parseControlResponse()` treats the accumulated multiline data as incomplete and returns it as `rest`.\n\nBecause `_onControlSocketData()` feeds `_partialResponse + chunk` back into the parser on every new data event, the client repeatedly reparses a growing attacker-controlled buffer. This creates both memory growth and increasing parsing work.\n\n### Why this is security-relevant\n\nThe vulnerable component is a client library. The attacker does not need to authenticate to the victim system and does not need valid FTP credentials.\n\nThe attack occurs automatically when an application using `basic-ftp` connects to a malicious or compromised FTP server. The malicious response is sent as the FTP server banner before login. No additional user interaction is required after the application initiates a normal FTP connection.\n\nThis is realistic for applications that use FTP for:\n\n- scheduled imports or exports\n- customer-provided FTP endpoints\n- backup or synchronization jobs\n- CI/CD artifact mirroring\n- document ingestion pipelines\n- legacy business integrations\n\nIn those environments, one malicious or compromised FTP endpoint can cause the Node.js process using `basic-ftp` to consume excessive memory and CPU or remain stuck in a pending connection state.\n\n---\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\nThe PoC uses a local malicious FTP server that accepts a victim connection and sends an unterminated multiline FTP banner. The banner starts with `220-`, but the server never sends the required terminating `220 ` line.\n\n### Reproduction steps\n\nFrom the root of the `basic-ftp` project:\n\n```bash\nnpm ci\nnpm run buildOnly\n```\n\n[poc_control_parser_direct.js](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/27051425/poc_control_parser_direct.js)\n\n```bash\nCHUNKS=1000 node poc_control_parser_direct.js | tee poc-results/parser_direct_1000.log\n```\n\n[parser_direct_1000.log](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/27051430/parser_direct_1000.log)\n\nRun the end-to-end malicious FTP server PoC:\n\n[poc_control_multiline_dos.js](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/27051385/poc_control_multiline_dos.js)\n\n```bash\nCHUNK_SIZE=8192 CHUNKS=1000 DELAY_MS=1 node poc_control_multiline_dos.js | tee poc-results/control_multiline_dos_1000.log\n```\n\n[control_multiline_dos_1000.log](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/27051397/control_multiline_dos_1000.log)\n\n### Observed result: parser-only PoC\n\n```text\n[basic-ftp parseControlResponse incomplete multiline DoS]\nInput fed: 7.81 MiB\nRetained rest: 7.81 MiB\nInitial rss/heap: 54.77 MiB 3.69 MiB\nFinal   rss/heap: 141.64 MiB 80.77 MiB\n```\n\nThis shows that `parseControlResponse()` retained the full unterminated multiline response as `rest`.\n\nThe retained buffer grew to `7.81 MiB`. Heap usage increased from `3.69 MiB` to `80.77 MiB`, and RSS increased from `54.77 MiB` to `141.64 MiB`.\n\n### Observed result: end-to-end malicious FTP server PoC\n\n```text\n[server] listening on 127.0.0.1:34429\n[server] victim connected\n[progress] chunks=850 sent=6.6 MiB partialResponse=6.6 MiB heapUsed=227.5 MiB rss=292.4 MiB\n[progress] chunks=900 sent=7.0 MiB partialResponse=7.0 MiB heapUsed=213.1 MiB rss=278.0 MiB\n[final-before-close] chunks=1000 sent=7.8 MiB partialResponse=7.8 MiB heapUsed=82.1 MiB rss=146.8 MiB\n[result] client connect() is still pending because the multiline response never terminated\n```\n\nOnly `7.8 MiB` of malicious control-channel data was sent. The client retained `7.8 MiB` in `_partialResponse`, showed large memory spikes, and remained pending inside `connect()` because the multiline response was never terminated.\n\n---\n\n## Expected behavior\n\nThe client should enforce a maximum size for incomplete FTP control responses. If the accumulated multiline response exceeds a safe limit, the client should close the connection and reject the active task with an error.\n\nThe client should not allow a remote FTP server to make `_partialResponse` grow without bound.\n\n---\n\n## Actual behavior\n\nA malicious FTP server can keep the client in a pending connection state by sending an unterminated multiline control response. `basic-ftp` continues buffering and reparsing the accumulated data without a maximum response size.\n\n---\n\n## Impact\n\nA malicious or compromised FTP server can cause denial of service in applications using `basic-ftp`.\n\nPossible real-world impact includes:\n\n- Node.js process memory exhaustion\n- container OOM kill\n- worker crash or restart loop\n- event loop CPU pressure due to repeated reparsing\n- stuck FTP jobs\n- queue backlog in scheduled import/export systems\n- degraded availability of services relying on automated FTP ingestion\n\n---\n\n## Threat model\n\nThe attacker controls, compromises, or can impersonate an FTP server that a victim application connects to.\n\nExamples:\n\n1. A SaaS application allows customers to configure external FTP endpoints for automated imports.\n2. A backend job periodically pulls files from partner FTP servers.\n3. A document ingestion pipeline connects to FTP endpoints supplied by external users.\n4. A legacy integration uses FTP for scheduled synchronization.\n5. A build or deployment pipeline mirrors artifacts from an FTP server.\n\nIn each case, the victim application initiates a normal FTP connection. The malicious server sends an unterminated multiline banner before authentication. The vulnerable client then buffers and reparses the response indefinitely.\n\nNo FTP credentials are required for exploitation because the attack happens before login.\n\n---\n\n## Suggested fix\n\nIntroduce a maximum control response buffer size, especially for incomplete multiline responses.\n\nRecommended changes:\n\n- Add a `maxControlResponseBytes` or `maxControlResponseLength` limit.\n- Enforce the limit before or immediately after appending new control-channel data.\n- Close the connection and reject the active task when the limit is exceeded.\n- Add regression tests for unterminated multiline responses.\n\nExample defensive logic:\n\n```text\nif (completeResponse.length \u003e maxControlResponseLength) {\n    closeWithError(new Error(\"FTP control response exceeded maximum allowed size\"))\n}\n```\n\nA regression test should verify that a response beginning with `220-` and never terminating with `220 ` is rejected after the configured size limit instead of being retained indefinitely.\n\n---\n\n## Suggested regression test scenario\n\nA test server should:\n\n1. Accept a client connection.\n2. Send an FTP multiline response opener such as `220-malicious banner\\r\\n`.\n3. Continue sending additional lines without ever sending the terminating `220 ` line.\n4. Verify that the client rejects the connection once the configured response-size limit is exceeded.\n5. Verify that `_partialResponse` does not grow without bound.\n\n## Credit request\nIf you publish an advisory or assign a CVE, please credit me as:\n\nAli Firas (thesmartshadow)  - https://www.smartshadow.dev",
  "id": "GHSA-rpmf-866q-6p89",
  "modified": "2026-05-13T16:29:59Z",
  "published": "2026-05-06T19:37:33Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/patrickjuchli/basic-ftp/security/advisories/GHSA-rpmf-866q-6p89"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44240"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/patrickjuchli/basic-ftp"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "basic-ftp allows a malicious FTP server to cause client-side denial of service via unbounded multiline control response buffering"
}

GHSA-RQ42-58QF-V3QX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-11-17 21:38 – Updated: 2023-11-20 22:06
VLAI
Summary
LibreNMS vulnerable to rate limiting bypass on login page
Details

Summary

Application is using two login methods and one of them is using GET request for authentication. There is no rate limiting security feature at GET request or backend is not validating that.

PoC

Go to /?username=admin&password=password&submit= Capture request in Burpsuite intruder and add payload marker at password parameter value. Start the attack after adding your password list We have added 74 passwords Check screenshot for more info Screenshot 2023-11-06 at 8 55 19 PM

Impact

An attacker can Bruteforce user accounts and using GET request for authentication is not recommended because certain web servers logs all requests in old logs which can also store victim user credentials.

Severity
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "librenms/librenms"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "23.11.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-46745"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-307",
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2023-11-17T21:38:42Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-11-17T22:15:07Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nApplication is using two login methods and one of them is using GET request for authentication. There is no rate limiting security feature at GET request or backend is not validating that. \n\n### PoC\nGo to /?username=admin\u0026password=password\u0026submit=\nCapture request in Burpsuite intruder and add payload marker at password parameter value.\nStart the attack after adding your password list\nWe have added 74 passwords\nCheck screenshot for more info\n\u003cimg width=\"1241\" alt=\"Screenshot 2023-11-06 at 8 55 19\u202fPM\" src=\"https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/31764504/280905148-42274f1e-f869-4145-95b4-71c0bffde3a0.png\"\u003e\n\n### Impact\nAn attacker can Bruteforce user accounts and using GET request for authentication is not recommended because certain web servers logs all requests in old logs which can also store victim user credentials.",
  "id": "GHSA-rq42-58qf-v3qx",
  "modified": "2023-11-20T22:06:37Z",
  "published": "2023-11-17T21:38:42Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/librenms/librenms/security/advisories/GHSA-rq42-58qf-v3qx"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-46745"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/librenms/librenms/pull/15558"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/librenms/librenms/commit/7c006e96251ae1d32e1a015b361a7bfbb815c028"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/librenms/librenms"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/librenms/librenms/releases/tag/23.11.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "LibreNMS vulnerable to rate limiting bypass on login page"
}

GHSA-RQ6Q-W27X-F9X2

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-08-27 21:31 – Updated: 2025-08-27 21:31
VLAI
Details

An issue has been discovered in GitLab CE/EE affecting all versions from 14.1 before 18.1.5, 18.2 before 18.2.5, and 18.3 before 18.3.1 that that under certain conditions could have allowed an unauthenticated attacker to cause a denial-of-service condition affecting all users by sending specially crafted GraphQL requests.

Severity
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-4225"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-08-27T20:15:32Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "An issue has been discovered in GitLab CE/EE affecting all versions from 14.1 before 18.1.5, 18.2 before 18.2.5, and 18.3 before 18.3.1 that that under certain conditions could have allowed an unauthenticated attacker to cause a denial-of-service condition affecting all users by sending specially crafted GraphQL requests.",
  "id": "GHSA-rq6q-w27x-f9x2",
  "modified": "2025-08-27T21:31:38Z",
  "published": "2025-08-27T21:31:38Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-4225"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://hackerone.com/reports/3100624"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/issues/538983"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-RQJQ-MRGX-85HP

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-05-18 18:21 – Updated: 2023-10-02 14:01
VLAI
Summary
Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling in Hashicorp Consul
Details

HashiCorp Consul and Consul Enterprise include an HTTP API (introduced in 1.2.0) and DNS (introduced in 1.4.3) caching feature that was vulnerable to denial of service.

Specific Go Packages Affected

github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/config

Fix

The vulnerability is fixed in versions 1.6.6 and 1.7.4.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/hashicorp/consul"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.2.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.6.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/hashicorp/consul"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.7.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.7.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-13250"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2021-05-12T22:00:34Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2020-06-11T20:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "HashiCorp Consul and Consul Enterprise include an HTTP API (introduced in 1.2.0) and DNS (introduced in 1.4.3) caching feature that was vulnerable to denial of service.\n\n### Specific Go Packages Affected\ngithub.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/config\n\n### Fix\nThe vulnerability is fixed in versions 1.6.6 and 1.7.4.",
  "id": "GHSA-rqjq-mrgx-85hp",
  "modified": "2023-10-02T14:01:45Z",
  "published": "2021-05-18T18:21:35Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-13250"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/hashicorp/consul/pull/8023"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/hashicorp/consul/commit/72f92ae7ca4cabc1dc3069362a9b64ef46941432"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/hashicorp/consul/blob/v1.6.6/CHANGELOG.md"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/hashicorp/consul/blob/v1.7.4/CHANGELOG.md"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling in Hashicorp Consul"
}

GHSA-RQMR-335H-88PX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:08 – Updated: 2022-05-24 19:08
VLAI
Details

An issue has been found in function vfprintf in PDF2JSON 0.70 that allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service due to a stack overflow.

Severity
5.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-19463"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-770",
      "CWE-787"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-07-21T18:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "An issue has been found in function vfprintf in PDF2JSON 0.70 that allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service due to a stack overflow.",
  "id": "GHSA-rqmr-335h-88px",
  "modified": "2022-05-24T19:08:33Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T19:08:33Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-19463"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/flexpaper/pdf2json/issues/24"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/770.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-RQMV-893J-49P8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:36 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:36
VLAI
Details

An issue was discovered in Xen through 4.14.x. Recording of the per-vCPU control block mapping maintained by Xen and that of pointers into the control block is reversed. The consumer assumes, seeing the former initialized, that the latter are also ready for use. Malicious or buggy guest kernels can mount a Denial of Service (DoS) attack affecting the entire system.

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-29570"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2020-12-15T17:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "An issue was discovered in Xen through 4.14.x. Recording of the per-vCPU control block mapping maintained by Xen and that of pointers into the control block is reversed. The consumer assumes, seeing the former initialized, that the latter are also ready for use. Malicious or buggy guest kernels can mount a Denial of Service (DoS) attack affecting the entire system.",
  "id": "GHSA-rqmv-893j-49p8",
  "modified": "2022-05-24T17:36:35Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T17:36:35Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-29570"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/2C6M6S3CIMEBACH6O7V4H2VDANMO6TVA"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/OBLV6L6Q24PPQ2CRFXDX4Q76KU776GKI"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/202107-30"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.debian.org/security/2020/dsa-4812"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://xenbits.xenproject.org/xsa/advisory-358.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2020/12/16/4"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}
Mitigation
Requirements

Clearly specify the minimum and maximum expectations for capabilities, and dictate which behaviors are acceptable when resource allocation reaches limits.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Limit the amount of resources that are accessible to unprivileged users. Set per-user limits for resources. Allow the system administrator to define these limits. Be careful to avoid CWE-410.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Design throttling mechanisms into the system architecture. The best protection is to limit the amount of resources that an unauthorized user can cause to be expended. A strong authentication and access control model will help prevent such attacks from occurring in the first place, and it will help the administrator to identify who is committing the abuse. The login application should be protected against DoS attacks as much as possible. Limiting the database access, perhaps by caching result sets, can help minimize the resources expended. To further limit the potential for a DoS attack, consider tracking the rate of requests received from users and blocking requests that exceed a defined rate threshold.

Mitigation MIT-5
Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

  • Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
  • When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
  • Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
Mitigation MIT-15
Architecture and Design

For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either:
  • The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question.
  • The second solution can be difficult to effectively institute -- and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply requires more resources on the part of the attacker.
  • recognizes the attack and denies that user further access for a given amount of time, typically by using increasing time delays
  • uniformly throttles all requests in order to make it more difficult to consume resources more quickly than they can again be freed.
Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Ensure that protocols have specific limits of scale placed on them.

Mitigation MIT-38.1
Architecture and Design Implementation
  • If the program must fail, ensure that it fails gracefully (fails closed). There may be a temptation to simply let the program fail poorly in cases such as low memory conditions, but an attacker may be able to assert control before the software has fully exited. Alternately, an uncontrolled failure could cause cascading problems with other downstream components; for example, the program could send a signal to a downstream process so the process immediately knows that a problem has occurred and has a better chance of recovery.
  • Ensure that all failures in resource allocation place the system into a safe posture.
Mitigation MIT-47
Operation Architecture and Design

Strategy: Resource Limitation

  • Use quotas or other resource-limiting settings provided by the operating system or environment. For example, when managing system resources in POSIX, setrlimit() can be used to set limits for certain types of resources, and getrlimit() can determine how many resources are available. However, these functions are not available on all operating systems.
  • When the current levels get close to the maximum that is defined for the application (see CWE-770), then limit the allocation of further resources to privileged users; alternately, begin releasing resources for less-privileged users. While this mitigation may protect the system from attack, it will not necessarily stop attackers from adversely impacting other users.
  • Ensure that the application performs the appropriate error checks and error handling in case resources become unavailable (CWE-703).
CAPEC-125: Flooding

An adversary consumes the resources of a target by rapidly engaging in a large number of interactions with the target. This type of attack generally exposes a weakness in rate limiting or flow. When successful this attack prevents legitimate users from accessing the service and can cause the target to crash. This attack differs from resource depletion through leaks or allocations in that the latter attacks do not rely on the volume of requests made to the target but instead focus on manipulation of the target's operations. The key factor in a flooding attack is the number of requests the adversary can make in a given period of time. The greater this number, the more likely an attack is to succeed against a given target.

CAPEC-130: Excessive Allocation

An adversary causes the target to allocate excessive resources to servicing the attackers' request, thereby reducing the resources available for legitimate services and degrading or denying services. Usually, this attack focuses on memory allocation, but any finite resource on the target could be the attacked, including bandwidth, processing cycles, or other resources. This attack does not attempt to force this allocation through a large number of requests (that would be Resource Depletion through Flooding) but instead uses one or a small number of requests that are carefully formatted to force the target to allocate excessive resources to service this request(s). Often this attack takes advantage of a bug in the target to cause the target to allocate resources vastly beyond what would be needed for a normal request.

CAPEC-147: XML Ping of the Death

An attacker initiates a resource depletion attack where a large number of small XML messages are delivered at a sufficiently rapid rate to cause a denial of service or crash of the target. Transactions such as repetitive SOAP transactions can deplete resources faster than a simple flooding attack because of the additional resources used by the SOAP protocol and the resources necessary to process SOAP messages. The transactions used are immaterial as long as they cause resource utilization on the target. In other words, this is a normal flooding attack augmented by using messages that will require extra processing on the target.

CAPEC-197: Exponential Data Expansion

An adversary submits data to a target application which contains nested exponential data expansion to produce excessively large output. Many data format languages allow the definition of macro-like structures that can be used to simplify the creation of complex structures. However, this capability can be abused to create excessive demands on a processor's CPU and memory. A small number of nested expansions can result in an exponential growth in demands on memory.

CAPEC-229: Serialized Data Parameter Blowup

This attack exploits certain serialized data parsers (e.g., XML, YAML, etc.) which manage data in an inefficient manner. The attacker crafts an serialized data file with multiple configuration parameters in the same dataset. In a vulnerable parser, this results in a denial of service condition where CPU resources are exhausted because of the parsing algorithm. The weakness being exploited is tied to parser implementation and not language specific.

CAPEC-230: Serialized Data with Nested Payloads

Applications often need to transform data in and out of a data format (e.g., XML and YAML) by using a parser. It may be possible for an adversary to inject data that may have an adverse effect on the parser when it is being processed. Many data format languages allow the definition of macro-like structures that can be used to simplify the creation of complex structures. By nesting these structures, causing the data to be repeatedly substituted, an adversary can cause the parser to consume more resources while processing, causing excessive memory consumption and CPU utilization.

CAPEC-231: Oversized Serialized Data Payloads

An adversary injects oversized serialized data payloads into a parser during data processing to produce adverse effects upon the parser such as exhausting system resources and arbitrary code execution.

CAPEC-469: HTTP DoS

An attacker performs flooding at the HTTP level to bring down only a particular web application rather than anything listening on a TCP/IP connection. This denial of service attack requires substantially fewer packets to be sent which makes DoS harder to detect. This is an equivalent of SYN flood in HTTP. The idea is to keep the HTTP session alive indefinitely and then repeat that hundreds of times. This attack targets resource depletion weaknesses in web server software. The web server will wait to attacker's responses on the initiated HTTP sessions while the connection threads are being exhausted.

CAPEC-482: TCP Flood

An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the TCP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service. These attacks exploit the weakness within the TCP protocol where there is some state information for the connection the server needs to maintain. This often involves the use of TCP SYN messages.

CAPEC-486: UDP Flood

An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the UDP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming the available network bandwidth. Additionally, firewalls often open a port for each UDP connection destined for a service with an open UDP port, meaning the firewalls in essence save the connection state thus the high packet nature of a UDP flood can also overwhelm resources allocated to the firewall. UDP attacks can also target services like DNS or VoIP which utilize these protocols. Additionally, due to the session-less nature of the UDP protocol, the source of a packet is easily spoofed making it difficult to find the source of the attack.

CAPEC-487: ICMP Flood

An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the ICMP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming the available network bandwidth. A typical attack involves a victim server receiving ICMP packets at a high rate from a wide range of source addresses. Additionally, due to the session-less nature of the ICMP protocol, the source of a packet is easily spoofed making it difficult to find the source of the attack.

CAPEC-488: HTTP Flood

An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the HTTP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming resources at the application layer such as web services and their infrastructure. These attacks use legitimate session-based HTTP GET requests designed to consume large amounts of a server's resources. Since these are legitimate sessions this attack is very difficult to detect.

CAPEC-489: SSL Flood

An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the SSL protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming all the available resources on the server side. These attacks take advantage of the asymmetric relationship between the processing power used by the client and the processing power used by the server to create a secure connection. In this manner the attacker can make a large number of HTTPS requests on a low provisioned machine to tie up a disproportionately large number of resources on the server. The clients then continue to keep renegotiating the SSL connection. When multiplied by a large number of attacking machines, this attack can result in a crash or loss of service to legitimate users.

CAPEC-490: Amplification

An adversary may execute an amplification where the size of a response is far greater than that of the request that generates it. The goal of this attack is to use a relatively few resources to create a large amount of traffic against a target server. To execute this attack, an adversary send a request to a 3rd party service, spoofing the source address to be that of the target server. The larger response that is generated by the 3rd party service is then sent to the target server. By sending a large number of initial requests, the adversary can generate a tremendous amount of traffic directed at the target. The greater the discrepancy in size between the initial request and the final payload delivered to the target increased the effectiveness of this attack.

CAPEC-491: Quadratic Data Expansion

An adversary exploits macro-like substitution to cause a denial of service situation due to excessive memory being allocated to fully expand the data. The result of this denial of service could cause the application to freeze or crash. This involves defining a very large entity and using it multiple times in a single entity substitution. CAPEC-197 is a similar attack pattern, but it is easier to discover and defend against. This attack pattern does not perform multi-level substitution and therefore does not obviously appear to consume extensive resources.

CAPEC-493: SOAP Array Blowup

An adversary may execute an attack on a web service that uses SOAP messages in communication. By sending a very large SOAP array declaration to the web service, the attacker forces the web service to allocate space for the array elements before they are parsed by the XML parser. The attacker message is typically small in size containing a large array declaration of say 1,000,000 elements and a couple of array elements. This attack targets exhaustion of the memory resources of the web service.

CAPEC-494: TCP Fragmentation

An adversary may execute a TCP Fragmentation attack against a target with the intention of avoiding filtering rules of network controls, by attempting to fragment the TCP packet such that the headers flag field is pushed into the second fragment which typically is not filtered.

CAPEC-495: UDP Fragmentation

An attacker may execute a UDP Fragmentation attack against a target server in an attempt to consume resources such as bandwidth and CPU. IP fragmentation occurs when an IP datagram is larger than the MTU of the route the datagram has to traverse. Typically the attacker will use large UDP packets over 1500 bytes of data which forces fragmentation as ethernet MTU is 1500 bytes. This attack is a variation on a typical UDP flood but it enables more network bandwidth to be consumed with fewer packets. Additionally it has the potential to consume server CPU resources and fill memory buffers associated with the processing and reassembling of fragmented packets.

CAPEC-496: ICMP Fragmentation

An attacker may execute a ICMP Fragmentation attack against a target with the intention of consuming resources or causing a crash. The attacker crafts a large number of identical fragmented IP packets containing a portion of a fragmented ICMP message. The attacker these sends these messages to a target host which causes the host to become non-responsive. Another vector may be sending a fragmented ICMP message to a target host with incorrect sizes in the header which causes the host to hang.

CAPEC-528: XML Flood

An adversary may execute a flooding attack using XML messages with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a web service. These attacks are accomplished by sending a large number of XML based requests and letting the service attempt to parse each one. In many cases this type of an attack will result in a XML Denial of Service (XDoS) due to an application becoming unstable, freezing, or crashing.

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