Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-862

Weakness Allowed-with-Review

Missing Authorization

Abstraction: Class · Status: Incomplete

The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action.

Dimensions

  • Behavior-Property: Missing
  • Behavior-Type: Authorization
Mapping guidance

This CWE entry is a Class and might have Base-level children that would be more appropriate

Examine children of this entry to see if there is a better fit

Relationships and members
ChildOf: CWE-285 · View CWE-1000
  • Behavior-Property: Improper
ChildOf: CWE-284 · View CWE-1340
  • Behavior-Property: Improper
  • Behavior-Type: Access Control
Modes of introduction
Architecture and Design

OMISSION: This weakness is caused by missing a security tactic during the architecture and design phase.

Authorization weaknesses may arise when a single-user application is ported to a multi-user environment.

Implementation

A developer may introduce authorization weaknesses because of a lack of understanding about the underlying technologies. For example, a developer may assume that attackers cannot modify certain inputs such as headers or cookies.

Operation
Detection methods

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis is useful for detecting commonly-used idioms for authorization. A tool may be able to analyze related configuration files, such as .htaccess in Apache web servers, or detect the usage of commonly-used authorization libraries.

Generally, automated static analysis tools have difficulty detecting custom authorization schemes. In addition, the software's design may include some functionality that is accessible to any user and does not require an authorization check; an automated technique that detects the absence of authorization may report false positives.

Effectiveness: Limited

Automated Dynamic Analysis

Automated dynamic analysis may find many or all possible interfaces that do not require authorization, but manual analysis is required to determine if the lack of authorization violates business logic.

Manual Analysis

This weakness can be detected using tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session.

Specifically, manual static analysis is useful for evaluating the correctness of custom authorization mechanisms.

Effectiveness: Moderate

These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules. However, manual efforts might not achieve desired code coverage within limited time constraints.

Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:

Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:

Web Application Scanner

Web Services Scanner

Database Scanners

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:

Host Application Interface Scanner

Fuzz Tester

Framework-based Fuzzer

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Manual Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:

Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source

Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Automated Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:

Source code Weakness Analyzer

Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer

Effectiveness: SOAR Partial

Architecture or Design Review

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:

Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)

Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction

Effectiveness: High

Notes

Terminology

Assuming a user with a given identity, authorization is the process of determining whether that user can access a given resource, based on the user's privileges and any permissions or other access-control specifications that apply to the resource.

Content history
Submission: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2011-05-24 · CWE 1.13
Contribution: "Mapping CWE to 62443" Sub-Working Group · CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT SIG · 2023-04-25 · CWE 4.11

Suggested mappings to ISA/IEC 62443.

Contribution: Abhi Balakrishnan · 2024-02-29 · CWE 4.16

Provided diagram to improve CWE usability

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2011-06-27 · CWE 2.0

updated Demonstrative_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2011-09-13 · CWE 2.1

updated Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2012-05-11 · CWE 2.2

updated Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples, References, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2012-10-30 · CWE 2.3

updated Potential_Mitigations

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2014-02-18 · CWE 2.6

updated Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2014-07-30 · CWE 2.8

updated Detection_Factors

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2017-01-19 · CWE 2.10

updated Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2017-11-08 · CWE 3.0

updated Applicable_Platforms, Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2018-03-27 · CWE 3.1

updated References

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2019-06-20 · CWE 3.3

updated Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2020-02-24 · CWE 4.0

updated Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2020-08-20 · CWE 4.2

updated Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2020-12-10 · CWE 4.3

updated Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2021-03-15 · CWE 4.4

updated Alternate_Terms, Observed_Examples

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2021-07-20 · CWE 4.5

updated Observed_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2021-10-28 · CWE 4.6

updated Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2022-06-28 · CWE 4.8

updated Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2022-10-13 · CWE 4.9

updated Observed_Examples

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2023-01-31 · CWE 4.10

updated Description, Potential_Mitigations

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2023-04-27 · CWE 4.11

updated References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2023-06-29 · CWE 4.12

updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2024-11-19 · CWE 4.16

updated Common_Consequences, Description, Diagram, Relationships, Terminology_Notes

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2025-09-09 · CWE 4.18

updated Applicable_Platforms, Detection_Factors, Observed_Examples, References

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2025-12-11 · CWE 4.19

updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2026-04-30 · CWE 4.20

updated Applicable_Platforms, Observed_Examples, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2026-10-28 · CWE 5.0

updated Applicable_Platforms, Dimensions, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings

20802 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GCVE-1337-2026-000000000… (CVE-2026-105039)

Vulnerability from gna-1337 – Published: 2026-10-15 20:43 – Updated: 2026-10-15 20:43 Exclusively Hosted Service
VLAI
Title
EnergizeLab Station Middleware Admin APIs Missing Role Checks
Summary
EnergizeLab station-middleware (NestJS) Docker images 1.6.5 through 1.8.2 do not check user roles on administrative APIs. Any authenticated low-privilege user can retrieve AI provider keys and change configuration and object-store contents.
SSVC
Exploitation: poc Automatable: yes Technical Impact: total
CNA · AHA (v2.0.3)
CWE
Assigner
AHA! GNA GNA-1337
GNA scorecard C 73/100 over 11 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
EnergizeLab station-middleware Affected: 1.6.5 , ≤ 1.8.2 (semver)
Create a notification for this product.
Date Public
2026-10-15 12:00

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CVE-2026-133855 (GCVE-0-2026-133855)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-20 14:44 – Updated: 2026-11-20 16:32
VLAI
Title
flowintel: Unauthorized Disclosure of Linked Case References in Case History
Summary
flowintel contains an information disclosure vulnerability in its case history feature. When a user views the history of a case they are authorized to access, the history output includes references to other cases (linked, unlinked, or forked) without verifying whether the requesting user has permission to view those referenced cases. This exposes the identifiers and titles of cases that the user should not be able to discover. The vulnerability affects multiple output paths: - Browser-based case history view - API history endpoint - Plain-text history download - Markdown history download - Report timeline generation An authenticated user with access to any single case can enumerate the existence and identifiers of other cases by reading the history of a case they can access. This bypasses the intended per-case access control model and may reveal the existence of sensitive investigations, their identifiers, and associated metadata to unauthorized users. The raw audit storage is not modified; the issue is solely in the presentation layer failing to filter references to inaccessible cases before returning history data to the user. Affected versions: flowintel prior to 4.1.0.
SSVC
Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial
Supplier · CIRCL (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-11-20 14:43 UTC
Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-11-20 16:22 UTC
CWE
  • CWE-200 - Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
  • CWE-862 - Missing Authorization
Assigner
CIRCL CNA under the ENISA root
CNA scorecard A 92/100 over 310 records in the last 180 days details
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
flowintel flowintel Affected: 0 , < 4.1.0 (semver)
    cpe:2.3:a:flowintel:flowintel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Create a notification for this product.
GCVE extensions
bcp-05-x-01
AI-assisted vulnerability information annotation
GCVE-BCP-05-X-01
Whole record AI-generated Human-reviewed GNA-1

Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.

ai-computer-assisted:llm-generatedai-computer-assisted:classification
Model Source Identifier
qwen3.8:27b ollama qwen3.8:27b
bcp-05-x-02
Patch-to-vulnerability generation provenance
GCVE-BCP-05-X-02
Generator
patch2vuln.py on 2026-11-20 14:43
Model
qwen3.8:27b
Input
https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/c44025ea68109996e3b1a0f01f6333caba190809 407e73d34f15…
Confidence
medium
Commit Subject Patch SHA-256
c44025ea6810 fix: [security] Filter linked case references from case 407e73d34f15…
Fix summary

A new visibility-aware history retrieval function was introduced that parses each history record for case references (link, unlink, fork events) and checks the requesting user's access to every referenced case before including that record in the output. Records referencing inaccessible cases are omitted from the response. The filtering is applied consistently across all history output paths (browser view, API, text download, Markdown download, and report timelines). Administrative users retain full unfiltered access. The raw audit log storage remains unchanged to preserve forensic integrity.

Patch summary

Added a new function get_visible_history() in common_core.py that: (1) verifies the user can view the current case, (2) groups raw history lines into logical records using timestamp-based event boundaries, (3) extracts referenced case IDs from link/unlink/fork messages using regex patterns, (4) checks can_view_case() for each referenced case, and (5) excludes records referencing inaccessible cases. Updated download_history(), download_history_md(), the browser history endpoint, the API history endpoint, and the report timeline generator to call get_visible_history() instead of the raw get_history(). Added helper functions _history_case_references() and _history_record_complete() to handle legacy multiline link records and ambiguous formats. Changed download_history() to serve content via BytesIO instead of reading a file path directly.

CVSS rationale

AV:N - The vulnerability is exploitable over the network via the web application. AC:L - Exploitation requires only viewing the history of any accessible case; no special conditions or race conditions are needed. AT:N - No prior attack or manipulation of the target is required. PR:L - The attacker must be an authenticated user with access to at least one case. UI:N - No user interaction beyond normal application use is required. VC:L - The vulnerable component (case history endpoint) leaks limited information (case IDs and titles of referenced cases). VI:N - No integrity impact. VA:N - No availability impact. SC:L - Subsequent components (other cases) have their existence and identifiers exposed to unauthorized users. SI:N - No integrity impact on other systems. SA:N - No safety impact.

Weakness rationale
  • CWE-200 The case history output exposes identifiers and titles of other cases to users who do not have authorization to view those cases. The sensitive data (case existence, IDs, titles) is disclosed through a legitimate endpoint without proper per-reference authorization checks.
  • CWE-862 The history retrieval functions did not perform authorization checks on the referenced cases embedded within the history records. The primary case access was verified, but the secondary cases referenced in link/unlink/fork events were not checked before inclusion in the response.
Attack pattern rationale
  • CAPEC-128 The attacker leverages a legitimate application endpoint (case history) to discover metadata about other resources (case identifiers, titles, and relationships) that they are not authorized to access. This is the closest CAPEC pattern to the observed information disclosure through a functional endpoint. The mapping is approximate because CAPEC-128 typically refers to version/configuration discovery, whereas here the disclosed metadata is application data (case references) rather than system metadata. No more specific CAPEC pattern for cross-object information disclosure via a legitimate read endpoint exists in the CAPEC catalog.
Assumptions to verify
  • The affected version range is assumed to be all versions prior to 4.1.0 based on the explicit context providing affected_version '0' and fixed_version '4.1.0'. The exact earliest affected version is not confirmed by the patch itself.
  • The CAPEC-128 mapping is the closest available pattern; no CAPEC specifically covers cross-object information disclosure through a legitimate read endpoint. The mapping is approximate.
  • CVSS PR:L assumes the attacker needs at least one valid authenticated session with access to any case. If the application allows unauthenticated history access in some deployment, PR would be N.
  • The patch commit message references 'Tool: Codex' which is noted as the AI tool used for implementation but is not credited as a vulnerability finder or reporter.
  • The vulnerability requires the attacker to already have access to at least one case; it does not allow access to cases with no prior relationship to the attacker's accessible cases beyond those referenced in history.
Model comparison

Selected qwen3.8:27b by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.

Model Score Agreement Confidence Assumptions
qwen3.8:27b 7 11 medium 5
bcp-05-x-03
Vulnerability handling and disclosure timeline
GCVE-BCP-05-X-03
  1. 2026-11-17 12:50 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (c44025ea68109996e3b1a0f01f6333caba190809): fix: [security] Filter linked case references from case https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/c44025ea68109996e3b1a0f01f6333caba190809
  2. 2026-11-20 14:42 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/c44025ea68109996e3b1a0f01f6333caba190809
Show details on NVD website

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CVE-2026-133854 (GCVE-0-2026-133854)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-20 14:44 – Updated: 2026-11-20 16:33
VLAI
Title
flowintel: Information Disclosure of Classification Usage via Missing Access Control
Summary
flowintel contains a vulnerability in the case and task classification usage endpoints that allows authenticated users to view classification data associated with cases they do not have permission to access. The affected endpoints, which provide lists of used taxonomies, tags, galaxies, clusters, and custom tags, did not properly enforce object-level access controls. While the endpoints required authentication, they failed to filter the returned data based on the requesting user's visibility permissions for the underlying cases. This allowed any authenticated user to enumerate classification usage across all cases, including private or restricted cases belonging to other organizations or users. This issue could lead to the disclosure of sensitive information, such as the existence of specific cases, the types of threats or indicators associated with them, and the relationships between different classification elements, potentially aiding an attacker in reconnaissance or targeting. Affected versions: < 4.1.0
SSVC
Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial
Supplier · CIRCL (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-11-20 14:42 UTC
Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-11-20 16:22 UTC
CWE
Assigner
CIRCL CNA under the ENISA root
CNA scorecard A 92/100 over 310 records in the last 180 days details
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
flowintel flowintel Affected: 0 , < 4.1.0 (semver)
    cpe:2.3:a:flowintel:flowintel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Create a notification for this product.
GCVE extensions
bcp-05-x-01
AI-assisted vulnerability information annotation
GCVE-BCP-05-X-01
Whole record AI-generated Human-reviewed GNA-1

Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.

ai-computer-assisted:llm-generatedai-computer-assisted:classification
Model Source Identifier
qwen3.8:27b ollama qwen3.8:27b
bcp-05-x-02
Patch-to-vulnerability generation provenance
GCVE-BCP-05-X-02
Generator
patch2vuln.py on 2026-11-20 14:42
Model
qwen3.8:27b
Input
https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/fa7216e760413f9a3feab9eca710b04cc8f2f630 58589e54911e…
Confidence
medium
Commit Subject Patch SHA-256
fa7216e76041 fix: [security] Scope classification usage to visible cases 58589e54911e…
Fix summary

The vulnerability is remediated by enforcing object-level access controls on the classification usage endpoints. The fix ensures that the authenticated user's identity is passed to the data retrieval functions, which then filter the results to include only classifications associated with cases that the user is authorized to view. This prevents the disclosure of classification data from private or restricted cases to unauthorized users.

Patch summary

The patch modifies the case and task classification usage endpoints to pass the current authenticated user to the underlying data retrieval functions. A new helper function, _classification_usage_ids, is introduced to filter classification usage based on the user's permissions. This function joins the classification link models with the Case model and applies filters to ensure that only classifications associated with visible cases (public, member, or administrator access) are returned. The existing helper functions for retrieving used taxonomies, tags, galaxies, clusters, and custom tags are updated to use this new filtering logic.

CVSS rationale

The vulnerability is exploitable over the network (AV:N) with low complexity (AC:L) and no attack requirements (AT:N). It requires low privileges (PR:L) as any authenticated user can exploit it. No user interaction is required (UI:N). The impact is primarily on the confidentiality of the vulnerable system (VI:H) as it allows unauthorized access to sensitive classification data. There is no impact on integrity or availability (VC:N, VA:N, SC:N, SI:N, SA:N).

Weakness rationale
  • CWE-862 The endpoints lacked proper authorization checks to ensure that users could only view classification data associated with cases they had permission to access. This is a classic missing authorization vulnerability where the system failed to verify that the user had the necessary permissions to access the specific objects (cases) referenced by the classification data.
Attack pattern rationale
  • CAPEC-126 The vulnerability allows an attacker to access classification data associated with cases they do not have permission to view by simply querying the endpoints. This aligns with the attack pattern of accessing functionality or data that is not properly restricted by identifiers or access controls. The uncertainty lies in the fact that the attacker does not need to guess specific IDs, but rather the lack of filtering exposes data across all cases, which is a broader form of improper restriction.
Assumptions to verify
  • The CAPEC mapping is uncertain as the vulnerability is more about missing filtering than accessing specific IDs, but CAPEC-126 is the closest plausible match.
  • The CVSS vector assumes that the impact is primarily on confidentiality and that the vulnerability does not lead to integrity or availability impacts.
Model comparison

Selected qwen3.8:27b by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.

Model Score Agreement Confidence Assumptions
qwen3.8:27b 10 11 medium 2
bcp-05-x-03
Vulnerability handling and disclosure timeline
GCVE-BCP-05-X-03
  1. 2026-11-17 12:03 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (fa7216e760413f9a3feab9eca710b04cc8f2f630): fix: [security] Scope classification usage to visible cases https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/fa7216e760413f9a3feab9eca710b04cc8f2f630
  2. 2026-11-20 14:41 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/fa7216e760413f9a3feab9eca710b04cc8f2f630
Show details on NVD website

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CVE-2026-133852 (GCVE-0-2026-133852)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-20 14:40 – Updated: 2026-11-20 16:33
VLAI
Title
flowintel Privileged Case Task Approval Bypass via Missing User Context and Template Creation
Summary
flowintel is a case management application that enforces an approval workflow for tasks in privileged cases. Tasks in such cases are required to start in a Requested status, meaning they must receive explicit approval before becoming active. A logic flaw in the task-creation path allowed tasks to be initialized with a Created status (bypassing the approval step) in two scenarios: - When a task was created from a template and no acting user was supplied, the privileged-case check was skipped entirely, leaving the task in Created status. - When a case was created from a template, all copied tasks were unconditionally assigned the Created status regardless of the case's privileged designation. An authenticated user with the ability to create tasks from templates or to instantiate cases from templates could therefore place tasks directly into an active state within privileged cases, circumventing the intended approval gate. This may expose restricted case content or permit actions that should require supervisory sign-off. Affected versions: flowintel prior to 4.1.0.
SSVC
Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial
Supplier · CIRCL (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-11-20 14:21 UTC
Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-11-20 16:22 UTC
CWE
Assigner
CIRCL CNA under the ENISA root
CNA scorecard A 92/100 over 310 records in the last 180 days details
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
flowintel flowintel Affected: 0 , < 4.1.0 (semver)
    cpe:2.3:a:flowintel:flowintel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Create a notification for this product.
GCVE extensions
bcp-05-x-01
AI-assisted vulnerability information annotation
GCVE-BCP-05-X-01
Whole record AI-generated Human-reviewed GNA-1

Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.

ai-computer-assisted:llm-generatedai-computer-assisted:classification
Model Source Identifier
qwen3.8:27b ollama qwen3.8:27b
bcp-05-x-02
Patch-to-vulnerability generation provenance
GCVE-BCP-05-X-02
Generator
patch2vuln.py on 2026-11-20 14:21
Model
qwen3.8:27b
Input
https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/fd23a3cb577b1ac64b95f076578994188332b2d1 ef4bf88c9ae2…
Confidence
medium
Commit Subject Patch SHA-256
fd23a3cb577b fix: [security] Require initial approval for privileged ef4bf88c9ae2…
Fix summary

The approval-workflow enforcement for privileged cases is now applied unconditionally at task creation time. The privileged-case check no longer depends on the presence of an acting user, and template-based case creation explicitly assigns the configured Requested status to tasks when the target case is privileged. Ordinary (non-privileged) cases retain the default Created status, preserving existing behavior.

Patch summary

Two one-line changes were made. In app/case/common_core.py, the condition guarding the Requested-status assignment was changed from 'if current_user and case.privileged_case' to 'if case.privileged_case', removing the dependency on a non-null user. In app/templating/TemplateCase.py, the hardcoded 'status_id=1' in the task-copy constructor was replaced with a conditional expression that selects the configured TASK_REQUESTED status when the case is privileged and falls back to 1 otherwise.

CVSS rationale

AV:N: flowintel is a web application accessible over the network. AC:L: the bypass is triggered simply by the absence of a user context or by using the template-creation path; no race condition or special timing is needed. AT:N: no manipulation of a separate attack target is required. PR:L: the attacker must be an authenticated user with permission to create tasks from templates or instantiate cases from templates. UI:N: no victim interaction is required. VC:L: tasks in privileged cases become immediately accessible without approval, potentially exposing restricted case content. VI:L: the integrity of the approval workflow is compromised; tasks are in an unauthorized state. VA:N: no availability impact. SC/SI/SA:N: no secondary impacts on other systems are evidenced.

Weakness rationale
  • CWE-862 The approval workflow (a form of authorization gate) for privileged-case tasks was not enforced under certain code paths (no user context, template-based creation), allowing tasks to skip the required approval step. The narrowest defensible CWE is Missing Authorization because the security control (approval) was simply absent in those paths.
Attack pattern rationale
  • CAPEC-108 The vulnerability is triggered by the absence of a user parameter, which causes the privileged-case authorization check to be skipped. An attacker who can influence whether a user context is supplied (e.g., via an API endpoint that does not enforce authentication for this code path) effectively tampers with the parameter to bypass the control. This is the closest CAPEC available; the mapping is uncertain because the primary defect is a missing check rather than active parameter manipulation, but CAPEC-108 best captures the 'missing/absent parameter leads to skipped validation' pattern.
Assumptions to verify
  • The 'privileged case' designation implies a higher-sensitivity classification requiring supervisory approval; the exact business meaning is inferred from the code context and commit message.
  • PR:L assumes the attacker needs an authenticated account with template-creation permissions; the patch does not specify the exact role or permission required.
  • CAPEC-108 is the closest available mapping; the primary defect is a missing conditional check rather than active parameter manipulation, so the mapping is approximate.
  • The affected version range '0 to <4.1.0' is taken from the explicit analyst context; the patch itself does not encode version boundaries.
  • VC:L assumes that bypassing the approval step exposes task content that would otherwise be restricted; the patch does not detail what content is protected.
  • The commit message references 'Tool: Codex' which is noted as the AI tool used for implementation, not as a credit.
Model comparison

Selected qwen3.8:27b by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.

Model Score Agreement Confidence Assumptions
qwen3.8:27b 6 11 medium 6
bcp-05-x-03
Vulnerability handling and disclosure timeline
GCVE-BCP-05-X-03
  1. 2026-11-17 10:02 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (fd23a3cb577b1ac64b95f076578994188332b2d1): fix: [security] Require initial approval for privileged https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/fd23a3cb577b1ac64b95f076578994188332b2d1
  2. 2026-11-20 14:21 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/fd23a3cb577b1ac64b95f076578994188332b2d1
Show details on NVD website

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CVE-2026-133851 (GCVE-0-2026-133851)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-20 14:40 – Updated: 2026-11-20 16:34
VLAI
Title
FlowIntel Alerting: Missing Private Case Authorization Check Allows Connector Owners to Access Revoked Case Data
Summary
FlowIntel's alerting module contained an authorization bypass in the alert access control logic. When an alert was linked to a private case, the system relied solely on connector ownership (user or organization) to determine access, without verifying that the requesting user still held valid membership in the associated private case. This meant that a user who was a connector owner of an alert could continue to read alert details, review history, raw payloads, and action comments, and could perform review-status updates or case-creation actions, even after their access to the linked private case had been revoked or they were never a member of that case. Additionally, a time-of-check to time-of-use (TOCTOU) gap existed: after a review-status update or a competing case-creation claim was committed, the response could disclose private case identifiers or review history to a user whose access had been concurrently removed by another session linking the alert to a private case. Impact: - Unauthorized disclosure of private case data (review comments, raw payloads, action history) through alert endpoints. - Unauthorized modification of alert review status and creation of cases from alerts the user should no longer access. - Leakage of a competing case identifier to an unauthorized user during concurrent case-creation races. Affected versions: FlowIntel prior to 4.1.0.
SSVC
Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial
Supplier · CIRCL (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-11-20 14:20 UTC
Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-11-20 16:22 UTC
CWE
  • CWE-862 - Missing Authorization
  • CWE-362 - Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Inadequate Locking
Assigner
CIRCL CNA under the ENISA root
CNA scorecard A 92/100 over 310 records in the last 180 days details
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
flowintel flowintel Affected: 0 , < 4.1.0 (semver)
    cpe:2.3:a:flowintel:flowintel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Create a notification for this product.
GCVE extensions
bcp-05-x-01
AI-assisted vulnerability information annotation
GCVE-BCP-05-X-01
Whole record AI-generated Human-reviewed GNA-1

Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.

ai-computer-assisted:llm-generatedai-computer-assisted:classification
Model Source Identifier
qwen3.8:27b ollama qwen3.8:27b
bcp-05-x-02
Patch-to-vulnerability generation provenance
GCVE-BCP-05-X-02
Generator
patch2vuln.py on 2026-11-20 14:20
Model
qwen3.8:27b
Input
https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/68d85c78e464f023f9f77af9af39634d3b811fff e8226318f1d6…
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medium
Commit Subject Patch SHA-256
68d85c78e464 fix: [security] Enforce private case access for alert reviews e8226318f1d6…
Fix summary

The fix enforces private case visibility as a mandatory gate before any connector-ownership check can grant alert access. If an alert is linked to a private case and the user cannot view that case, access is denied regardless of ownership. A post-commit re-verification is added after review-status updates and after detecting a competing case-creation claim, ensuring that concurrent association changes do not result in unauthorized data disclosure in the response.

Patch summary

In can_user_view_alert, the private-case membership check was moved before the connector-ownership checks and made unconditional (no longer gated on case.is_private), so any user lacking case access is denied even if they own the connector. In update_review_status, a can_user_view_alert re-check is performed after the database commit and before returning the serialized alert, returning 403 if access was concurrently lost. In create_case_from_alert, after a competing claim is detected, a can_user_view_alert re-check gates the response that would otherwise return the winner's case_id. The unused import get_present_in_case was removed. 33 regression tests were added covering revoked access, connector scope, concurrent case-link transitions, and authorized-user preservation.

CVSS rationale

AV:N: The vulnerability is exploitable over the network via the FlowIntel web API. AC:L: No special race condition or complex setup is required; a connector owner whose case access was revoked can simply call the alert endpoints. AT:N: No manipulation of the target is needed. PR:L: The attacker must be an authenticated user with connector ownership of the alert. UI:N: No victim interaction is required. VC:L: Confidential impact is limited to alert-level data (review comments, raw payload, action history) rather than full case contents. VI:L: The attacker can modify review status and create cases, but cannot alter case data directly. VA:N: No availability impact. SC/SI/SA:N: No impact on other systems.

Weakness rationale
  • CWE-862 The alert access function did not verify private case membership before granting access based on connector ownership. The authorization check for case-level access was either absent or insufficiently ordered, allowing a user with connector ownership to bypass the private case boundary.
  • CWE-362 The review-status update and case-creation paths did not re-verify authorization after the database commit, creating a TOCTOU window where a concurrent session could link the alert to a private case and the response would still disclose case data to an unauthorized user.
Attack pattern rationale
  • CAPEC-114 The attacker directly requests alert API endpoints (review, case-creation, read) using a known alert identifier. Because the authorization logic did not enforce private case membership, the server returned sensitive case data and accepted state-changing actions. This is the closest CAPEC to the observed pattern of accessing a resource by directly specifying its identifier without the required authorization context. Uncertainty: the attack does not involve guessing URLs but rather exploiting a logic flaw in an existing authorized endpoint; however, CAPEC-114 remains the best available match for direct resource access bypassing intended access controls.
Assumptions to verify
  • The affected version range is inferred from the explicit context (affected_version '0', fixed_version '4.1.0'); no explicit changelog or release notes are available to confirm the exact first vulnerable release.
  • The CAPEC-114 mapping is the closest available pattern; the actual attack is a logic flaw in authorization ordering rather than classic forced browsing, but no more specific CAPEC exists for missing authorization checks in API endpoints.
  • CVSS PR:L assumes the attacker must be an authenticated user with connector ownership; if the product allows unauthenticated access to alert endpoints, PR would be N, but the patch evidence (session-based auth, API keys in tests) supports authenticated access.
  • The TOCTOU component (CWE-362) requires a concurrent session to link the alert to a private case at the precise moment of the response; this is a secondary vector and the primary issue is the missing authorization check (CWE-862).
  • The commit message references 'Tool: Codex' which is noted as the AI tool used to assist in development; no credit is assigned for this as it is not a person or organization.
Model comparison

Selected qwen3.8:27b by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.

Model Score Agreement Confidence Assumptions
qwen3.8:27b 7 11 medium 5
bcp-05-x-03
Vulnerability handling and disclosure timeline
GCVE-BCP-05-X-03
  1. 2026-11-17 09:50 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (68d85c78e464f023f9f77af9af39634d3b811fff): fix: [security] Enforce private case access for alert reviews https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/68d85c78e464f023f9f77af9af39634d3b811fff
  2. 2026-11-20 14:20 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/68d85c78e464f023f9f77af9af39634d3b811fff
Show details on NVD website

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CVE-2026-133850 (GCVE-0-2026-133850)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-20 14:39 – Updated: 2026-11-20 16:34
VLAI
Title
flowintel: Stale Authorization Allows Notification Disclosure After Case Access Revocation
Summary
flowintel contains an authorization flaw in its recurring reminder notification subsystem. When a user is subscribed to recurring notifications for a case, the system does not re-verify the recipient's current access rights to that case before generating or displaying the notification. As a result, a user who previously had access to a private case and later had that access revoked can still: - Receive recurring reminder notifications containing case-related content. - View stored reminder notifications in their notification list, including notification counts, even though they no longer have permission to view the underlying case. The vulnerability affects both the notification creation path (recurring reminder generation) and the notification display path (listing and counting stored reminders). The issue arises because the authorization check performed at subscription time is not re-applied at delivery or retrieval time. Security impact is limited to information disclosure: an unauthorized user may observe case titles, reminder messages, and associated metadata that they no longer have permission to access. No integrity or availability impact is indicated by the patch. Affected versions: flowintel prior to 4.1.0.
SSVC
Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial
Supplier · CIRCL (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-11-20 14:20 UTC
Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-11-20 16:21 UTC
CWE
Assigner
CIRCL CNA under the ENISA root
CNA scorecard A 92/100 over 310 records in the last 180 days details
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
flowintel flowintel Affected: 0 , < 4.1.0 (semver)
    cpe:2.3:a:flowintel:flowintel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Create a notification for this product.
GCVE extensions
bcp-05-x-01
AI-assisted vulnerability information annotation
GCVE-BCP-05-X-01
Whole record AI-generated Human-reviewed GNA-1

Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.

ai-computer-assisted:llm-generatedai-computer-assisted:classification
Model Source Identifier
qwen3.8:27b ollama qwen3.8:27b
bcp-05-x-02
Patch-to-vulnerability generation provenance
GCVE-BCP-05-X-02
Generator
patch2vuln.py on 2026-11-20 14:20
Model
qwen3.8:27b
Input
https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/af6e91c8ac63c7ac0860325582bc2561ca5343ea 433c4d2d3f96…
Confidence
medium
Commit Subject Patch SHA-256
af6e91c8ac63 fix: [security] Recheck private case access for recurring 433c4d2d3f96…
Fix summary

The fix introduces an authorization re-check at two points: (1) before creating a recurring reminder notification, the system now verifies the recipient's current case visibility and skips delivery if access has been revoked; (2) when listing or counting stored notifications, the system now filters out case-related reminder notifications for which the viewing user no longer has case access. This ensures that both the creation and display paths enforce current authorization state rather than relying on a one-time check at subscription time.

Patch summary

In recurring_notification.py, the create_notification function now imports can_view_case and, for each recurring notification subscriber, fetches the User record and calls can_view_case(case, recipient); if the check fails, the notification is skipped via continue. In notification_core.py, the DEADLINE_ICONS tuple is extended to include the clock icon (fa-solid fa-clock), a new helper _is_case_deadline_notification is added to identify case-related deadline/reminder notifications by icon or notification_type, and _visible_deadline_notifications is updated to use this helper so that reminders for inaccessible cases are excluded from the returned list. The test file is updated to create a real Case object for the reminder notification fixture instead of using a hardcoded case_id.

CVSS rationale

AV:N: The application is a web-based platform accessed over the network. AC:L: No special race condition or complex setup is required; the user simply needs to have previously had case access and then have it revoked. AT:N: No manipulation of the target is needed. PR:L: An authenticated user with a valid account and prior case subscription is required. UI:N: Notifications are delivered and displayed automatically without requiring victim interaction. VC:L: Limited confidentiality impact; case-related notification content (titles, reminder messages) is exposed to a user who no longer has case access. VI:N, VA:N: No integrity or availability impact is evidenced. SC:N, SI:N, SA:N: The affected data resides within the same application scope; no cross-scope impact is indicated.

Weakness rationale
  • CWE-285 The system performed an authorization check at subscription time but failed to re-enforce it at notification delivery and display time. The authorization decision was not re-evaluated when the user's access to the case changed, resulting in continued access to case-related notification content. This is a failure to properly enforce authorization at the point of access rather than a complete absence of authorization logic.
  • CWE-862 In the recurring notification creation path, no authorization check existed at all before generating the notification for a subscriber. The check was entirely absent, not merely insufficient, making CWE-862 a defensible secondary mapping for the creation path specifically.
Attack pattern rationale
  • CAPEC-66 The notification subsystem operated with a lower security enforcement level than the case-access subsystem: it did not enforce the same access-control checks that governed case visibility. An attacker (or a user whose access was legitimately revoked) could exploit this misconfiguration to continue receiving case-related notification content. This is the closest CAPEC to the pattern of a component not enforcing the security level configured elsewhere in the application. The mapping is uncertain because no CAPEC specifically describes stale-authorization or missing re-authorization at delivery time; CAPEC-66 is selected as the best available match for a security-level enforcement gap between components.
Assumptions to verify
  • The affected version range is inferred from the explicit context (affected_version: 0, fixed_version: 4.1.0); the patch itself does not contain version strings.
  • The CAPEC-66 mapping is the closest available match; no CAPEC specifically covers stale-authorization or missing re-authorization at notification delivery time. This uncertainty is noted in the CAPEC rationale.
  • CVSS PR:L assumes the attacker is an authenticated user who previously had case access; the patch does not specify whether unauthenticated access is possible.
  • CVSS VC:L assumes the disclosed information is limited to notification content (case titles, reminder messages) rather than full case data; the patch only addresses notification visibility.
  • The patch does not indicate whether the vulnerability is exploitable remotely or requires local access; AV:N is assumed based on the web-application nature of the product.
  • The commit message references 'Tool: Codex' which is noted as the AI tool used for implementation but is not credited as a vulnerability finder or reporter.
Model comparison

Selected qwen3.8:27b by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.

Model Score Agreement Confidence Assumptions
qwen3.8:27b 6 11 medium 6
bcp-05-x-03
Vulnerability handling and disclosure timeline
GCVE-BCP-05-X-03
  1. 2026-11-17 09:16 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (af6e91c8ac63c7ac0860325582bc2561ca5343ea): fix: [security] Recheck private case access for recurring https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/af6e91c8ac63c7ac0860325582bc2561ca5343ea
  2. 2026-11-20 14:19 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/af6e91c8ac63c7ac0860325582bc2561ca5343ea
Show details on NVD website

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CVE-2026-133847 (GCVE-0-2026-133847)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-20 14:38 – Updated: 2026-11-20 16:34
VLAI
Title
flowintel: Missing Authorization Check Allows Organization Admin to Edit Platform Admin Accounts via Browser Interface
Summary
flowintel contains an authorization bypass in the browser-based admin user editing interface. The edit_user view in the admin panel verified that a non-platform-admin user could only edit accounts belonging to their own organization, but it did not verify that the target account was not a platform-admin account. As a result, an authenticated user holding an organization-admin role could open the edit form for any platform-admin account and submit modifications, including changes to credentials, roles, or other account attributes. The API layer already enforced a restriction preventing non-admin users from targeting admin accounts, but the browser-based admin view lacked the equivalent check, creating an inconsistent authorization boundary. Impact: - Unauthorized modification of platform-admin account data (integrity) - Potential lockout or privilege manipulation of platform administrators (availability) - Escalation of an organization-admin role to effectively control platform-level administration Affected versions: flowintel prior to 4.1.0.
SSVC
Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: total
Supplier · CIRCL (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-11-20 14:23 UTC
Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-11-20 16:21 UTC
CWE
Assigner
CIRCL CNA under the ENISA root
CNA scorecard A 92/100 over 310 records in the last 180 days details
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
flowintel flowintel Affected: 0 , < 4.1.0 (semver)
    cpe:2.3:a:flowintel:flowintel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Create a notification for this product.
GCVE extensions
bcp-05-x-01
AI-assisted vulnerability information annotation
GCVE-BCP-05-X-01
Whole record AI-generated Human-reviewed GNA-1

Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.

ai-computer-assisted:llm-generatedai-computer-assisted:classification
Model Source Identifier
qwen3.8:27b ollama qwen3.8:27b
bcp-05-x-02
Patch-to-vulnerability generation provenance
GCVE-BCP-05-X-02
Generator
patch2vuln.py on 2026-11-20 14:23
Model
qwen3.8:27b
Input
https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/db694be89ed47f203937ab97c6fe4b93c1085a90 2fdb8a47ac79…
Confidence
medium
Commit Subject Patch SHA-256
db694be89ed4 fix: [security] Prevent organization admins from editing 2fdb8a47ac79…
Fix summary

The fix adds an explicit authorization check in the browser-based user edit view that rejects the request before rendering or processing the form when the target account is a platform-admin account and the current user is not a platform administrator. This aligns the browser interface with the existing API-level restriction, ensuring that only platform administrators can modify platform-admin accounts.

Patch summary

Three lines are inserted in the edit_user function in app/admin/admin.py, immediately after the same-organization check and before the non-admin permission check. The added code calls user_modif.is_admin() on the target user; if true, it flashes an error message ('Only administrators can edit Admin users.') and redirects to the admin users list, preventing the form from being rendered or processed. No other files or logic are modified.

CVSS rationale

AV:N: web-based admin interface accessible over the network. AC:L: the attacker simply navigates to the edit URL for a known admin account; no race conditions or special timing required. AT:N: no manipulation of a separate attack target. PR:L: requires an authenticated account with organization-admin privileges. UI:N: no victim interaction beyond the attacker's own browser session. VC:N: the primary impact is modification, not disclosure; the attacker already has visibility into the user list. VI:H: the attacker can alter platform-admin credentials, roles, or settings. VA:H: the attacker can disable or lock out platform administrators. SC:N: no impact on separate components. SI:H: integrity of admin account records is compromised. SA:N: no impact on the security authority of other components.

Weakness rationale
  • CWE-862 The edit_user view was missing an authorization check that would prevent a non-platform-admin user from targeting a platform-admin account. The check existed in the API layer but was absent in the browser-based view, constituting a missing authorization control for a specific operation.
Attack pattern rationale
  • CAPEC-100 The attack exploits an incomplete authorization logic in the admin user-edit view: the same-organization check passes for a platform-admin account that happens to share the organization, but the missing admin-target check allows the lower-privileged user to proceed. This is a logic flaw in the access-control flow. CAPEC-100 is the closest available pattern; the exact CAPEC for a single missing check in a multi-step authorization flow is not explicitly defined in the CAPEC catalog, so this is the best plausible match.
Assumptions to verify
  • The affected version range is inferred from the explicit context (affected_version: 0, fixed_version: 4.1.0); the exact starting version is not independently confirmed by the patch alone.
  • The assumption that the API layer already enforced the admin-target restriction is taken from the commit message; the API code is not included in the patch for independent verification.
  • CAPEC-100 is selected as the closest plausible attack pattern; no CAPEC entry precisely describes a single missing authorization check in a multi-step view function, so this mapping carries moderate uncertainty.
  • CVSS VC is set to None on the assumption that the attacker already has visibility into the user list in the admin panel; if the edit form reveals additional sensitive fields not otherwise visible, VC could be Low.
  • The patch does not include the full edit_user function or surrounding context; the analysis assumes the three added lines are the complete remediation for this specific authorization gap.
Model comparison

Selected qwen3.8:27b by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.

Model Score Agreement Confidence Assumptions
qwen3.8:27b 7 11 medium 5
bcp-05-x-03
Vulnerability handling and disclosure timeline
GCVE-BCP-05-X-03
  1. 2026-11-17 07:44 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (db694be89ed47f203937ab97c6fe4b93c1085a90): fix: [security] Prevent organization admins from editing https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/db694be89ed47f203937ab97c6fe4b93c1085a90
  2. 2026-11-20 14:22 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/db694be89ed47f203937ab97c6fe4b93c1085a90
Show details on NVD website

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CVE-2026-133846 (GCVE-0-2026-133846)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-20 14:38 – Updated: 2026-11-20 16:35
VLAI
Title
FlowIntel Missing Authorization Check Allows Unauthorized Revival of Completed Privileged Cases via Task Reopening
Summary
FlowIntel contains an authorization bypass in its task management workflow. When a user reopens a completed task (by toggling its completion state or changing its status to a non-finished value) or creates a new task within a completed privileged case, the parent case is automatically revived (un-completed, status reset to Created, finish date cleared). The system failed to enforce the required Admin or Case Admin privilege check before performing this case revival side effect. A user with basic task-level permissions (e.g., editor, queuer, or queue admin) could trigger the revival of a completed privileged case through the browser interface or the REST API, without holding the elevated role required for case-level operations. This could disrupt case lifecycle management, clear completion metadata, and potentially expose the case to further unauthorized modifications. The vulnerability affects both the browser-based task completion/status-change endpoints and the corresponding API endpoints, as well as the task creation flow. Affected versions: FlowIntel prior to 4.1.0.
SSVC
Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial
Supplier · CIRCL (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-11-20 14:22 UTC
Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-11-20 16:21 UTC
CWE
Assigner
CIRCL CNA under the ENISA root
CNA scorecard A 92/100 over 310 records in the last 180 days details
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
flowintel flowintel Affected: 0 , < 4.1.0 (semver)
    cpe:2.3:a:flowintel:flowintel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Create a notification for this product.
GCVE extensions
bcp-05-x-01
AI-assisted vulnerability information annotation
GCVE-BCP-05-X-01
Whole record AI-generated Human-reviewed GNA-1

Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.

ai-computer-assisted:llm-generatedai-computer-assisted:classification
Model Source Identifier
qwen3.8:27b ollama qwen3.8:27b
bcp-05-x-02
Patch-to-vulnerability generation provenance
GCVE-BCP-05-X-02
Generator
patch2vuln.py on 2026-11-20 14:22
Model
qwen3.8:27b
Input
https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/7eb9fa76d46010548c5552c0a8b1d438d839226c f7e85e27691e…
Confidence
medium
Commit Subject Patch SHA-256
7eb9fa76d460 fix: [security] Enforce privileged case permissions on task f7e85e27691e…
Fix summary

The fix introduces explicit authorization checks (can_reopen_case and can_reopen_task) that require Admin or Case Admin privileges before a completed privileged case can be revived as a side effect of task reopening or task creation. Denial is enforced at the core model layer and at both the browser and API endpoint layers, with audit logging of denied attempts. Legitimate task creation is preserved, but the automatic case revival is suppressed for unauthorized users.

Patch summary

Added can_reopen_case() and can_reopen_task() methods to TaskCore.py that verify Admin or Case Admin role when the parent case is both completed and privileged. Inserted permission checks in complete_task() and create_task() in TaskCore.py. Added 403 denial responses with audit log entries in task.py (browser endpoints for task completion and status change) and task_api.py (API endpoints for task completion and status change). Added 134 lines of regression tests covering role boundaries, UUID aliases, status IDs, API identity, Matrix delegation, denial side effects, and legitimate reopening workflows.

CVSS rationale

AV:N - exploitable over the network via web UI or REST API. AC:L - the attack requires only a standard task completion toggle or status change request; no race conditions or special timing. AT:N - no manipulation of the target system is needed. PR:L - requires an authenticated user with basic task permissions (editor, queuer, or queue admin). UI:N - no victim interaction required. VC:N - no new confidential data is exposed; the case data was already accessible. VI:L - the case state is modified (completed flag cleared, status reset, finish date removed), which is a limited integrity impact on case lifecycle metadata. VA:N - no denial of service; the case remains accessible. SC/SI/SA:N - no secondary system impact identified.

Weakness rationale
  • CWE-862 The system failed to enforce an authorization check before allowing a completed privileged case to be revived as a side effect of task reopening or task creation. The permission check for case-level operations was entirely absent from the task-level code paths.
Attack pattern rationale
  • CAPEC-114 The attacker performs an action (task reopening or task creation) that they are partially authorized to perform, but the system fails to enforce the higher-level authorization required for the side effect (privileged case revival). This is closest to forced browsing in the sense that the user effectively triggers an unauthorized state change on a resource (the case) they do not have full authority over. Uncertainty: the user IS authorized to interact with the task itself; the missing check is on the implicit case-level side effect, making this a partial rather than pure forced-browsing scenario.
Assumptions to verify
  • The affected version range is inferred from the explicit context (affected_version 0, fixed_version 4.1.0); the exact starting version of the vulnerable code is not confirmed by the patch alone.
  • CAPEC-114 (Forced Browsing) is the closest available mapping; the actual weakness is a missing authorization check on a side effect of an authorized action, which does not map precisely to any single CAPEC entry.
  • CVSS VI:L assumes the case state modification (revival) constitutes a limited integrity impact; if downstream workflows depend on case completion state, the practical impact could be higher.
  • The patch references a 'Matrix delegation' mechanism for API identity; the exact trust model for delegated requests is not fully documented in the patch.
  • PR:L assumes the attacker needs at minimum an editor-level account; the patch tests confirm editor, queuer, and queue_admin roles are affected.
Model comparison

Selected qwen3.8:27b by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.

Model Score Agreement Confidence Assumptions
qwen3.8:27b 7 11 medium 5
bcp-05-x-03
Vulnerability handling and disclosure timeline
GCVE-BCP-05-X-03
  1. 2026-11-16 08:28 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (7eb9fa76d46010548c5552c0a8b1d438d839226c): fix: [security] Enforce privileged case permissions on task https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/7eb9fa76d46010548c5552c0a8b1d438d839226c
  2. 2026-11-20 14:22 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/7eb9fa76d46010548c5552c0a8b1d438d839226c
Show details on NVD website

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CVE-2026-133844 (GCVE-0-2026-133844)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-20 14:38 – Updated: 2026-11-20 16:35
VLAI
Title
FlowIntel Case Serialization Exposes Unauthorized Connector Metadata to Authenticated Users
Summary
FlowIntel, a threat intelligence case management platform, contains an information disclosure vulnerability in its case serialization logic. When a case is rendered via the REST API or browser views, all connector instances associated with that case were included in the response regardless of the requesting user's permissions. This means that any authenticated user with read access to a case could observe connector metadata belonging to other users (personal-scope connectors) or other organizations (org-scope connectors), including connector URLs, descriptions, UUIDs, and potentially embedded API credentials. Preconditions: - An authenticated user account with at least read access to the affected case - The case must have connector instances attached that belong to other users or organizations Impact: - Disclosure of personal connector endpoints and credentials of other users - Disclosure of organization-scoped connector metadata across organizational boundaries - Enumeration of connector infrastructure (URLs, UUIDs, descriptions) not intended for the viewer Affected versions: < 4.1.0
SSVC
Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial
Supplier · CIRCL (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-11-20 14:28 UTC
Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-11-20 16:20 UTC
CWE
  • CWE-668 - Exposure of Resource to Wrong Sphere
  • CWE-862 - Missing Authorization
Assigner
CIRCL CNA under the ENISA root
CNA scorecard A 92/100 over 310 records in the last 180 days details
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
flowintel flowintel Affected: 0 , < 4.1.0 (semver)
    cpe:2.3:a:flowintel:flowintel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Create a notification for this product.
GCVE extensions
bcp-05-x-01
AI-assisted vulnerability information annotation
GCVE-BCP-05-X-01
Whole record AI-generated Human-reviewed GNA-1

Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.

ai-computer-assisted:llm-generatedai-computer-assisted:classification
Model Source Identifier
qwen3.8:27b ollama qwen3.8:27b
bcp-05-x-02
Patch-to-vulnerability generation provenance
GCVE-BCP-05-X-02
Generator
patch2vuln.py on 2026-11-20 14:28
Model
qwen3.8:27b
Input
https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/2ff99ca6ed81687fe28d57961d158e0804271416 49d10b72d8d9…
Confidence
medium
Commit Subject Patch SHA-256
2ff99ca6ed81 fix: [security] Filter case connector metadata by viewer 49d10b72d8d9…
Fix summary

The fix introduces viewer-scoped authorization checks during case serialization. Connector instances are now filtered based on the acting user's permissions: administrators and assigned case-administrators retain full visibility, while regular users only see connectors whose sharing scope (personal, org, or global) grants them access. When no authenticated user context is available, connector metadata is omitted entirely. Credential-use checks for module execution remain unchanged.

Patch summary

In app/db_class/db.py, the to_json method's connector serialization was changed from an unconditional query of all Case_Connector_Instance records to a conditional block that: (1) returns an empty list if user is None or unauthenticated; (2) imports can_access_all_case_connectors and is_instance_visible_to_user; (3) filters the connector list so only instances passing the visibility predicate are serialized. A new test file tests/case/test_case_connector_visibility.py (250 lines, 22 tests) validates API responses, browser views, Matrix delegation, scope changes, access revocation, fork behavior, and module-context credential isolation.

CVSS rationale

AV:N - exploitable over the network via standard API or browser endpoints. AC:L - no special conditions; any case view triggers the disclosure. AT:N - no attack-target manipulation required. PR:L - requires a low-privilege authenticated user with case read access. UI:N - no victim interaction beyond the attacker's own request. VC:L - limited confidential data (connector URLs, descriptions, UUIDs, possibly API keys) is exposed. VI:N, VA:N - no integrity or availability impact. SC:N, SI:N, SA:N - no secondary-system impact evidenced.

Weakness rationale
  • CWE-668 Connector metadata belonging to one user or organization (personal or org scope) was exposed to users in a different sphere (other users, other organizations) because the serialization path lacked per-viewer authorization filtering.
  • CWE-862 The to_json serialization method did not perform any authorization check on connector instances before including them in the response, effectively missing the access-control gate that should restrict visibility to the acting user.
Attack pattern rationale
  • CAPEC-1 The closest plausible CAPEC is Software Feature Discovery: an authenticated user can enumerate connector instances attached to a case and learn their URLs, descriptions, UUIDs, and potentially credentials that were not intended for their access level. The attack is passive (simply viewing a case) and requires no special tooling. Uncertainty: no CAPEC specifically models 'viewing an object to discover embedded metadata of other tenants'; CAPEC-1 is the best available match for unauthorized information enumeration through a legitimate interface.
Assumptions to verify
  • The affected version range is inferred from the explicit context (affected_version '0', fixed_version '4.1.0'); the patch itself does not encode version boundaries.
  • PR:L assumes the attacker needs only a low-privilege authenticated account with case read access; the patch does not specify whether anonymous access to case endpoints is possible, but the fix explicitly omits connectors when user is None, implying unauthenticated access to the case object may exist.
  • VC:L assumes the exposed connector metadata (URLs, descriptions, UUIDs, possibly API keys) constitutes limited but meaningful confidential information; the tests reference 'DO-NOT-EXPOSE-GLOBAL-KEY' and 'DO-NOT-EXPOSE-PERSONAL-KEY' suggesting credentials may be present in connector metadata.
  • CAPEC-1 is selected as the closest available attack pattern; no CAPEC precisely models cross-tenant metadata leakage through a legitimate read endpoint.
  • The commit message references 'Tool: Codex' which is noted as the AI tool used to generate the patch but is not credited as a vulnerability finder or reporter.
  • No evidence of active exploitation, public PoC, or in-the-wild abuse is present in the patch or metadata.
Model comparison

Selected qwen3.8:27b by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.

Model Score Agreement Confidence Assumptions
qwen3.8:27b 6 11 medium 6
bcp-05-x-03
Vulnerability handling and disclosure timeline
GCVE-BCP-05-X-03
  1. 2026-11-16 06:56 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (2ff99ca6ed81687fe28d57961d158e0804271416): fix: [security] Filter case connector metadata by viewer https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/2ff99ca6ed81687fe28d57961d158e0804271416
  2. 2026-11-20 14:27 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/2ff99ca6ed81687fe28d57961d158e0804271416
Show details on NVD website

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CVE-2026-133841 (GCVE-0-2026-133841)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-20 14:37 – Updated: 2026-11-20 16:35
VLAI
Title
FlowIntel Information Disclosure of Linked Private Case Metadata via Unfiltered Case Serialization
Summary
FlowIntel contains an authorization bypass in its case serialization logic that allows an authenticated user to view metadata of private cases they do not have access to. When a case is linked to another case, the JSON representation of the source case included the ID, title, and description of every linked case regardless of the requesting user's permissions. This affected multiple access paths: - Browser views (case detail, case info, search, calendar) - REST API endpoints (get case, list cases, search, title lookup, completed/not-completed lists) - Internal tooling and connector module context building An attacker with valid credentials and access to any case that contains a link to a private case could enumerate the private case's identifier, title, and description without holding a membership or role on that private case. The exposure occurred because the serialization method did not receive or evaluate the acting user's identity before including linked-case data in the response. Security impact: - Disclosure of private case identifiers, titles, and descriptions to unauthorized users - Facilitation of further targeted attacks against the exposed private cases - Bypass of the intended per-case access control model Affected versions: FlowIntel prior to 4.1.0
SSVC
Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial
Supplier · CIRCL (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-11-20 14:27 UTC
Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-11-20 16:20 UTC
CWE
  • CWE-862 - Missing Authorization
  • CWE-200 - Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
Assigner
CIRCL CNA under the ENISA root
CNA scorecard A 92/100 over 310 records in the last 180 days details
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
flowintel flowintel Affected: 0 , < 4.1.0 (semver)
    cpe:2.3:a:flowintel:flowintel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Create a notification for this product.
GCVE extensions
bcp-05-x-01
AI-assisted vulnerability information annotation
GCVE-BCP-05-X-01
Whole record AI-generated Human-reviewed GNA-1

Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.

ai-computer-assisted:llm-generatedai-computer-assisted:classification
Model Source Identifier
qwen3.8:27b ollama qwen3.8:27b
bcp-05-x-02
Patch-to-vulnerability generation provenance
GCVE-BCP-05-X-02
Generator
patch2vuln.py on 2026-11-20 14:27
Model
qwen3.8:27b
Input
https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/e6c780d97cd669500d05f1c911b2038f0dc91335 727879b87960…
Confidence
medium
Commit Subject Patch SHA-256
e6c780d97cd6 fix: [security] Filter linked cases by viewer permissions 727879b87960…
Fix summary

The serialization method now accepts the acting user as a parameter and filters linked cases based on the user's authorization. When an authenticated user is provided, only linked cases the user is permitted to view are included. When no user is provided (internal or anonymous callers), the method fails closed by excluding all private linked cases. All call sites across browser views, API endpoints, calendar, search, tools, and internal core operations were updated to pass the resolved user identity, ensuring consistent enforcement regardless of the access path.

Patch summary

Modified the case serialization method in the database model to accept an optional user parameter. When a user is supplied and authenticated, linked cases are filtered through an existing permission-check function. When no user is supplied, only non-private linked cases are returned. Updated approximately 15 call sites across app/case/case.py, app/case/case_api.py, app/case/CaseCore.py, app/calendar/calendar.py, app/tools/tools_core.py, and app/db_class/db.py to pass the current or API-resolved user. In the API single-case endpoint, the user is now explicitly extracted from API headers and passed to both the authorization check and the serializer. Added a new test file (tests/case/test_case_link_visibility.py) with 171 lines covering API and browser filtering, identity separation between session and API key, Matrix delegation, anonymous/anonymous-user fail-closed behavior, and dynamic permission changes.

CVSS rationale

AV:N - exploitable over the network via HTTP API or browser. AC:L - no special race conditions or complex setup; any user with access to a case linked to a private case triggers the disclosure. AT:N - no attack-target manipulation required. PR:L - requires a low-privilege authenticated user with access to at least one case that has a link to a private case. UI:N - no victim interaction beyond the attacker's own request. VC:L - limited confidentiality impact: case IDs, titles, and descriptions are exposed, but full case content, tasks, and objects are not. VI:N, VA:N - no integrity or availability impact. SC:N, SI:N, SA:N - no impact on subsequent components; the data belongs to the same application.

Weakness rationale
  • CWE-862 The case serialization method did not perform an authorization check on linked private cases before including their metadata in the response. The permission model existed for direct case access but was not applied to transitively referenced (linked) case data.
  • CWE-200 The result of the missing authorization check was the exposure of private case IDs, titles, and descriptions to users who had no membership or role on those private cases.
Attack pattern rationale
  • CAPEC-12 The closest available CAPEC pattern. An authenticated user makes a legitimate request for a case they can access, and the application's response inadvertently discloses metadata (IDs, titles, descriptions) of private cases the user is not authorized to view. The uncertainty is that CAPEC-12 typically refers to version or configuration metadata discovery, whereas this is an authorization-failure-driven data exposure. No CAPEC specifically models 'information disclosure through unfiltered relational data in API responses,' making CAPEC-12 the best available approximation.
Assumptions to verify
  • The affected version range is assumed to be all versions prior to 4.1.0 based on the explicit context; no earlier version boundary is specified in the patch.
  • PR:L assumes the attacker needs at minimum a low-privilege account with access to one case that is linked to a private case; if no such link exists in a deployment, the vulnerability is not triggerable.
  • VC:L assumes that exposure of case ID, title, and description constitutes a low (not high) confidentiality impact; if titles or descriptions contain highly sensitive operational details, impact could be higher.
  • CAPEC-12 is the closest available mapping but does not precisely model authorization-failure-driven relational data exposure; uncertainty is noted in the CAPEC rationale.
  • The patch does not indicate whether the vulnerability was reported externally or found internally; no finder or reporter credit is assigned.
  • UI:N assumes the attacker initiates the request themselves; no victim interaction is required.
Model comparison

Selected qwen3.8:27b by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.

Model Score Agreement Confidence Assumptions
qwen3.8:27b 6 11 medium 6
bcp-05-x-03
Vulnerability handling and disclosure timeline
GCVE-BCP-05-X-03
  1. 2026-11-12 16:30 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (e6c780d97cd669500d05f1c911b2038f0dc91335): fix: [security] Filter linked cases by viewer permissions https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/e6c780d97cd669500d05f1c911b2038f0dc91335
  2. 2026-11-20 14:26 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/e6c780d97cd669500d05f1c911b2038f0dc91335
Show details on NVD website

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Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries.
  • Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].

Mitigation MIT-4.4
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

  • Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
  • For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page.
  • One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
Mitigation
System Configuration Installation

Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.

CAPEC-665: Exploitation of Thunderbolt Protection Flaws

An adversary leverages a firmware weakness within the Thunderbolt protocol, on a computing device to manipulate Thunderbolt controller firmware in order to exploit vulnerabilities in the implementation of authorization and verification schemes within Thunderbolt protection mechanisms. Upon gaining physical access to a target device, the adversary conducts high-level firmware manipulation of the victim Thunderbolt controller SPI (Serial Peripheral Interface) flash, through the use of a SPI Programing device and an external Thunderbolt device, typically as the target device is booting up. If successful, this allows the adversary to modify memory, subvert authentication mechanisms, spoof identities and content, and extract data and memory from the target device. Currently 7 major vulnerabilities exist within Thunderbolt protocol with 9 attack vectors as noted in the Execution Flow.