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314 vulnerabilities
CVE-2026-133855 (GCVE-0-2026-133855)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-20 14:44 – Updated: 2026-11-20 16:32| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/c44… | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
2 events
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-11-20 14:43 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/c44025ea68109996e3b1a0f01f6333caba190809
407e73d34f15… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
c44025ea6810
|
fix: [security] Filter linked case references from case | 407e73d34f15… |
Fix summary
A new visibility-aware history retrieval function was introduced that parses each history record for case references (link, unlink, fork events) and checks the requesting user's access to every referenced case before including that record in the output. Records referencing inaccessible cases are omitted from the response. The filtering is applied consistently across all history output paths (browser view, API, text download, Markdown download, and report timelines). Administrative users retain full unfiltered access. The raw audit log storage remains unchanged to preserve forensic integrity.
Patch summary
Added a new function get_visible_history() in common_core.py that: (1) verifies the user can view the current case, (2) groups raw history lines into logical records using timestamp-based event boundaries, (3) extracts referenced case IDs from link/unlink/fork messages using regex patterns, (4) checks can_view_case() for each referenced case, and (5) excludes records referencing inaccessible cases. Updated download_history(), download_history_md(), the browser history endpoint, the API history endpoint, and the report timeline generator to call get_visible_history() instead of the raw get_history(). Added helper functions _history_case_references() and _history_record_complete() to handle legacy multiline link records and ambiguous formats. Changed download_history() to serve content via BytesIO instead of reading a file path directly.
CVSS rationale
AV:N - The vulnerability is exploitable over the network via the web application. AC:L - Exploitation requires only viewing the history of any accessible case; no special conditions or race conditions are needed. AT:N - No prior attack or manipulation of the target is required. PR:L - The attacker must be an authenticated user with access to at least one case. UI:N - No user interaction beyond normal application use is required. VC:L - The vulnerable component (case history endpoint) leaks limited information (case IDs and titles of referenced cases). VI:N - No integrity impact. VA:N - No availability impact. SC:L - Subsequent components (other cases) have their existence and identifiers exposed to unauthorized users. SI:N - No integrity impact on other systems. SA:N - No safety impact.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-200 The case history output exposes identifiers and titles of other cases to users who do not have authorization to view those cases. The sensitive data (case existence, IDs, titles) is disclosed through a legitimate endpoint without proper per-reference authorization checks.
- CWE-862 The history retrieval functions did not perform authorization checks on the referenced cases embedded within the history records. The primary case access was verified, but the secondary cases referenced in link/unlink/fork events were not checked before inclusion in the response.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-128 The attacker leverages a legitimate application endpoint (case history) to discover metadata about other resources (case identifiers, titles, and relationships) that they are not authorized to access. This is the closest CAPEC pattern to the observed information disclosure through a functional endpoint. The mapping is approximate because CAPEC-128 typically refers to version/configuration discovery, whereas here the disclosed metadata is application data (case references) rather than system metadata. No more specific CAPEC pattern for cross-object information disclosure via a legitimate read endpoint exists in the CAPEC catalog.
Assumptions to verify
- The affected version range is assumed to be all versions prior to 4.1.0 based on the explicit context providing affected_version '0' and fixed_version '4.1.0'. The exact earliest affected version is not confirmed by the patch itself.
- The CAPEC-128 mapping is the closest available pattern; no CAPEC specifically covers cross-object information disclosure through a legitimate read endpoint. The mapping is approximate.
- CVSS PR:L assumes the attacker needs at least one valid authenticated session with access to any case. If the application allows unauthenticated history access in some deployment, PR would be N.
- The patch commit message references 'Tool: Codex' which is noted as the AI tool used for implementation but is not credited as a vulnerability finder or reporter.
- The vulnerability requires the attacker to already have access to at least one case; it does not allow access to cases with no prior relationship to the attacker's accessible cases beyond those referenced in history.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
7 | 11 | medium | 5 |
- 2026-11-17 12:50 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (c44025ea68109996e3b1a0f01f6333caba190809): fix: [security] Filter linked case references from case https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/c44025ea68109996e3b1a0f01f6333caba190809
- 2026-11-20 14:42 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/c44025ea68109996e3b1a0f01f6333caba190809
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CVE-2026-133854 (GCVE-0-2026-133854)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-20 14:44 – Updated: 2026-11-20 16:33- CWE-862 - Missing Authorization
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/fa7… | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
2 events
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-11-20 14:42 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
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https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/fa7216e760413f9a3feab9eca710b04cc8f2f630
58589e54911e… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
fa7216e76041
|
fix: [security] Scope classification usage to visible cases | 58589e54911e… |
Fix summary
The vulnerability is remediated by enforcing object-level access controls on the classification usage endpoints. The fix ensures that the authenticated user's identity is passed to the data retrieval functions, which then filter the results to include only classifications associated with cases that the user is authorized to view. This prevents the disclosure of classification data from private or restricted cases to unauthorized users.
Patch summary
The patch modifies the case and task classification usage endpoints to pass the current authenticated user to the underlying data retrieval functions. A new helper function, _classification_usage_ids, is introduced to filter classification usage based on the user's permissions. This function joins the classification link models with the Case model and applies filters to ensure that only classifications associated with visible cases (public, member, or administrator access) are returned. The existing helper functions for retrieving used taxonomies, tags, galaxies, clusters, and custom tags are updated to use this new filtering logic.
CVSS rationale
The vulnerability is exploitable over the network (AV:N) with low complexity (AC:L) and no attack requirements (AT:N). It requires low privileges (PR:L) as any authenticated user can exploit it. No user interaction is required (UI:N). The impact is primarily on the confidentiality of the vulnerable system (VI:H) as it allows unauthorized access to sensitive classification data. There is no impact on integrity or availability (VC:N, VA:N, SC:N, SI:N, SA:N).
Weakness rationale
- CWE-862 The endpoints lacked proper authorization checks to ensure that users could only view classification data associated with cases they had permission to access. This is a classic missing authorization vulnerability where the system failed to verify that the user had the necessary permissions to access the specific objects (cases) referenced by the classification data.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-126 The vulnerability allows an attacker to access classification data associated with cases they do not have permission to view by simply querying the endpoints. This aligns with the attack pattern of accessing functionality or data that is not properly restricted by identifiers or access controls. The uncertainty lies in the fact that the attacker does not need to guess specific IDs, but rather the lack of filtering exposes data across all cases, which is a broader form of improper restriction.
Assumptions to verify
- The CAPEC mapping is uncertain as the vulnerability is more about missing filtering than accessing specific IDs, but CAPEC-126 is the closest plausible match.
- The CVSS vector assumes that the impact is primarily on confidentiality and that the vulnerability does not lead to integrity or availability impacts.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
10 | 11 | medium | 2 |
- 2026-11-17 12:03 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (fa7216e760413f9a3feab9eca710b04cc8f2f630): fix: [security] Scope classification usage to visible cases https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/fa7216e760413f9a3feab9eca710b04cc8f2f630
- 2026-11-20 14:41 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/fa7216e760413f9a3feab9eca710b04cc8f2f630
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CVE-2026-133853 (GCVE-0-2026-133853)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-20 14:44 – Updated: 2026-11-20 16:33| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/9ee… | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
2 events
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-11-20 14:41 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/9eec395cc73c6706362b2c22f1e264406eb8caf8
b2eb7327abee… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
9eec395cc73c
|
fix: [security] Isolate chatbot MCP API identities | b2eb7327abee… |
Fix summary
The shared persistent MCP session and process-wide API key mutation were removed. Each chatbot tool invocation now spawns its own short-lived MCP child process with credentials resolved fresh from the authenticated request context. If the user's identity or API key is unavailable, the invocation is rejected before any child process is launched, preventing fallback to ambient or stale credentials. Each transport is deterministically closed on success, failure, or timeout, eliminating residual credential exposure.
Patch summary
Removed the global _mcp_session, _mcp_loop, _mcp_thread, _mcp_current_api_key state and the _ensure_mcp() / _start_mcp_background() / _run_mcp_session() functions that maintained a single shared asyncio event loop and thread. Replaced with _mcp_environment() which resolves the user's API key from the authenticated session on every call and raises RuntimeError if unavailable, and _call_mcp_tool() which opens a per-invocation stdio transport, executes the tool, and closes the transport in all exit paths. Eliminated all os.environ mutations of FLOWINTEL_API_KEY. Added 33 regression tests in tests/chatbot/test_api_identity.py covering concurrent identity isolation, ambient-credential rejection, detached-user handling, key rotation, transport cleanup on failure/timeout, and real stdio child-process lifecycle.
CVSS rationale
AV:N: the chatbot is a network-accessible Flask endpoint. AC:H: exploitation requires concurrent or carefully timed requests from two different users to trigger the shared-session race, or a specific sequence of credential writes to the process environment. AT:N: no manipulation of a separate target is needed. PR:L: the attacker must be an authenticated user with chatbot access. UI:N: no victim interaction beyond their own request is required. VC:H: a user can read another user's sensitive data (private cases, investigations). VI:N, VA:N: no integrity or availability impact is evidenced. SC:N, SI:N, SA:N: no impact on separate components is demonstrated.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-290 The shared MCP session and process-wide environment variable allowed one user's authenticated identity (API key) to be applied to another user's tool invocation. The per-request identity was not isolated, effectively allowing identity confusion or spoofing between concurrent sessions.
- CWE-200 Because credentials were shared across requests and written to the process environment, a user could access data (e.g., private cases) belonging to another user whose key was cached in the shared session or ambient environment.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-126 The closest available CAPEC. The shared MCP session acted as a single long-lived session whose credentials could be 'hijacked' by a concurrent request from a different user, causing the wrong identity to be used. No CAPEC specifically covers 'shared per-tenant credential state in a multi-user service,' so CAPEC-126 is the best approximation. Uncertainty: the attack does not involve a traditional network-level session token theft but rather a server-side shared-state race.
Assumptions to verify
- AC:H is assumed because reliable exploitation requires concurrent requests from two different authenticated users or a specific timing window around the shared session restart; a single sequential request may not trigger the identity confusion.
- PR:L assumes any authenticated user with chatbot access can trigger the issue; the patch does not evidence a higher privilege requirement.
- VC:H assumes the data accessed (private cases, investigations) constitutes high confidentiality impact; the patch tests reference 'PRIVATE ADMIN INVESTIGATION' as the sensitive resource.
- CAPEC-126 (Session Hijacking) is the closest available mapping but does not precisely describe a server-side shared-credential race; no CAPEC specifically covers multi-tenant credential isolation failures in a shared in-process session.
- The affected version range is taken from the explicit analyst context (affected_version: 0, fixed_version: 4.1.0); the patch itself does not encode version boundaries.
- No evidence of active exploitation, public PoC, or in-the-wild abuse is present in the patch or metadata.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
6 | 11 | medium | 6 |
- 2026-11-17 10:37 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (9eec395cc73c6706362b2c22f1e264406eb8caf8): fix: [security] Isolate chatbot MCP API identities https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/9eec395cc73c6706362b2c22f1e264406eb8caf8
- 2026-11-20 14:41 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/9eec395cc73c6706362b2c22f1e264406eb8caf8
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"patchSummary": "Removed the global _mcp_session, _mcp_loop, _mcp_thread, _mcp_current_api_key state and the _ensure_mcp() / _start_mcp_background() / _run_mcp_session() functions that maintained a single shared asyncio event loop and thread. Replaced with _mcp_environment() which resolves the user\u0027s API key from the authenticated session on every call and raises RuntimeError if unavailable, and _call_mcp_tool() which opens a per-invocation stdio transport, executes the tool, and closes the transport in all exit paths. Eliminated all os.environ mutations of FLOWINTEL_API_KEY. Added 33 regression tests in tests/chatbot/test_api_identity.py covering concurrent identity isolation, ambient-credential rejection, detached-user handling, key rotation, transport cleanup on failure/timeout, and real stdio child-process lifecycle.",
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CVE-2026-133852 (GCVE-0-2026-133852)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-20 14:40 – Updated: 2026-11-20 16:33- CWE-862 - Missing Authorization
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/fd2… | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
2 events
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-11-20 14:21 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/fd23a3cb577b1ac64b95f076578994188332b2d1
ef4bf88c9ae2… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
fd23a3cb577b
|
fix: [security] Require initial approval for privileged | ef4bf88c9ae2… |
Fix summary
The approval-workflow enforcement for privileged cases is now applied unconditionally at task creation time. The privileged-case check no longer depends on the presence of an acting user, and template-based case creation explicitly assigns the configured Requested status to tasks when the target case is privileged. Ordinary (non-privileged) cases retain the default Created status, preserving existing behavior.
Patch summary
Two one-line changes were made. In app/case/common_core.py, the condition guarding the Requested-status assignment was changed from 'if current_user and case.privileged_case' to 'if case.privileged_case', removing the dependency on a non-null user. In app/templating/TemplateCase.py, the hardcoded 'status_id=1' in the task-copy constructor was replaced with a conditional expression that selects the configured TASK_REQUESTED status when the case is privileged and falls back to 1 otherwise.
CVSS rationale
AV:N: flowintel is a web application accessible over the network. AC:L: the bypass is triggered simply by the absence of a user context or by using the template-creation path; no race condition or special timing is needed. AT:N: no manipulation of a separate attack target is required. PR:L: the attacker must be an authenticated user with permission to create tasks from templates or instantiate cases from templates. UI:N: no victim interaction is required. VC:L: tasks in privileged cases become immediately accessible without approval, potentially exposing restricted case content. VI:L: the integrity of the approval workflow is compromised; tasks are in an unauthorized state. VA:N: no availability impact. SC/SI/SA:N: no secondary impacts on other systems are evidenced.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-862 The approval workflow (a form of authorization gate) for privileged-case tasks was not enforced under certain code paths (no user context, template-based creation), allowing tasks to skip the required approval step. The narrowest defensible CWE is Missing Authorization because the security control (approval) was simply absent in those paths.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-108 The vulnerability is triggered by the absence of a user parameter, which causes the privileged-case authorization check to be skipped. An attacker who can influence whether a user context is supplied (e.g., via an API endpoint that does not enforce authentication for this code path) effectively tampers with the parameter to bypass the control. This is the closest CAPEC available; the mapping is uncertain because the primary defect is a missing check rather than active parameter manipulation, but CAPEC-108 best captures the 'missing/absent parameter leads to skipped validation' pattern.
Assumptions to verify
- The 'privileged case' designation implies a higher-sensitivity classification requiring supervisory approval; the exact business meaning is inferred from the code context and commit message.
- PR:L assumes the attacker needs an authenticated account with template-creation permissions; the patch does not specify the exact role or permission required.
- CAPEC-108 is the closest available mapping; the primary defect is a missing conditional check rather than active parameter manipulation, so the mapping is approximate.
- The affected version range '0 to <4.1.0' is taken from the explicit analyst context; the patch itself does not encode version boundaries.
- VC:L assumes that bypassing the approval step exposes task content that would otherwise be restricted; the patch does not detail what content is protected.
- The commit message references 'Tool: Codex' which is noted as the AI tool used for implementation, not as a credit.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
6 | 11 | medium | 6 |
- 2026-11-17 10:02 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (fd23a3cb577b1ac64b95f076578994188332b2d1): fix: [security] Require initial approval for privileged https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/fd23a3cb577b1ac64b95f076578994188332b2d1
- 2026-11-20 14:21 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/fd23a3cb577b1ac64b95f076578994188332b2d1
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CVE-2026-133851 (GCVE-0-2026-133851)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-20 14:40 – Updated: 2026-11-20 16:34| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/68d… | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
2 events
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-11-20 14:20 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/68d85c78e464f023f9f77af9af39634d3b811fff
e8226318f1d6… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
68d85c78e464
|
fix: [security] Enforce private case access for alert reviews | e8226318f1d6… |
Fix summary
The fix enforces private case visibility as a mandatory gate before any connector-ownership check can grant alert access. If an alert is linked to a private case and the user cannot view that case, access is denied regardless of ownership. A post-commit re-verification is added after review-status updates and after detecting a competing case-creation claim, ensuring that concurrent association changes do not result in unauthorized data disclosure in the response.
Patch summary
In can_user_view_alert, the private-case membership check was moved before the connector-ownership checks and made unconditional (no longer gated on case.is_private), so any user lacking case access is denied even if they own the connector. In update_review_status, a can_user_view_alert re-check is performed after the database commit and before returning the serialized alert, returning 403 if access was concurrently lost. In create_case_from_alert, after a competing claim is detected, a can_user_view_alert re-check gates the response that would otherwise return the winner's case_id. The unused import get_present_in_case was removed. 33 regression tests were added covering revoked access, connector scope, concurrent case-link transitions, and authorized-user preservation.
CVSS rationale
AV:N: The vulnerability is exploitable over the network via the FlowIntel web API. AC:L: No special race condition or complex setup is required; a connector owner whose case access was revoked can simply call the alert endpoints. AT:N: No manipulation of the target is needed. PR:L: The attacker must be an authenticated user with connector ownership of the alert. UI:N: No victim interaction is required. VC:L: Confidential impact is limited to alert-level data (review comments, raw payload, action history) rather than full case contents. VI:L: The attacker can modify review status and create cases, but cannot alter case data directly. VA:N: No availability impact. SC/SI/SA:N: No impact on other systems.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-862 The alert access function did not verify private case membership before granting access based on connector ownership. The authorization check for case-level access was either absent or insufficiently ordered, allowing a user with connector ownership to bypass the private case boundary.
- CWE-362 The review-status update and case-creation paths did not re-verify authorization after the database commit, creating a TOCTOU window where a concurrent session could link the alert to a private case and the response would still disclose case data to an unauthorized user.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-114 The attacker directly requests alert API endpoints (review, case-creation, read) using a known alert identifier. Because the authorization logic did not enforce private case membership, the server returned sensitive case data and accepted state-changing actions. This is the closest CAPEC to the observed pattern of accessing a resource by directly specifying its identifier without the required authorization context. Uncertainty: the attack does not involve guessing URLs but rather exploiting a logic flaw in an existing authorized endpoint; however, CAPEC-114 remains the best available match for direct resource access bypassing intended access controls.
Assumptions to verify
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- The TOCTOU component (CWE-362) requires a concurrent session to link the alert to a private case at the precise moment of the response; this is a secondary vector and the primary issue is the missing authorization check (CWE-862).
- The commit message references 'Tool: Codex' which is noted as the AI tool used to assist in development; no credit is assigned for this as it is not a person or organization.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
7 | 11 | medium | 5 |
- 2026-11-17 09:50 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (68d85c78e464f023f9f77af9af39634d3b811fff): fix: [security] Enforce private case access for alert reviews https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/68d85c78e464f023f9f77af9af39634d3b811fff
- 2026-11-20 14:20 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/68d85c78e464f023f9f77af9af39634d3b811fff
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CVE-2026-133850 (GCVE-0-2026-133850)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-20 14:39 – Updated: 2026-11-20 16:34| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/af6… | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
2 events
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-11-20 14:20 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/af6e91c8ac63c7ac0860325582bc2561ca5343ea
433c4d2d3f96… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
af6e91c8ac63
|
fix: [security] Recheck private case access for recurring | 433c4d2d3f96… |
Fix summary
The fix introduces an authorization re-check at two points: (1) before creating a recurring reminder notification, the system now verifies the recipient's current case visibility and skips delivery if access has been revoked; (2) when listing or counting stored notifications, the system now filters out case-related reminder notifications for which the viewing user no longer has case access. This ensures that both the creation and display paths enforce current authorization state rather than relying on a one-time check at subscription time.
Patch summary
In recurring_notification.py, the create_notification function now imports can_view_case and, for each recurring notification subscriber, fetches the User record and calls can_view_case(case, recipient); if the check fails, the notification is skipped via continue. In notification_core.py, the DEADLINE_ICONS tuple is extended to include the clock icon (fa-solid fa-clock), a new helper _is_case_deadline_notification is added to identify case-related deadline/reminder notifications by icon or notification_type, and _visible_deadline_notifications is updated to use this helper so that reminders for inaccessible cases are excluded from the returned list. The test file is updated to create a real Case object for the reminder notification fixture instead of using a hardcoded case_id.
CVSS rationale
AV:N: The application is a web-based platform accessed over the network. AC:L: No special race condition or complex setup is required; the user simply needs to have previously had case access and then have it revoked. AT:N: No manipulation of the target is needed. PR:L: An authenticated user with a valid account and prior case subscription is required. UI:N: Notifications are delivered and displayed automatically without requiring victim interaction. VC:L: Limited confidentiality impact; case-related notification content (titles, reminder messages) is exposed to a user who no longer has case access. VI:N, VA:N: No integrity or availability impact is evidenced. SC:N, SI:N, SA:N: The affected data resides within the same application scope; no cross-scope impact is indicated.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-285 The system performed an authorization check at subscription time but failed to re-enforce it at notification delivery and display time. The authorization decision was not re-evaluated when the user's access to the case changed, resulting in continued access to case-related notification content. This is a failure to properly enforce authorization at the point of access rather than a complete absence of authorization logic.
- CWE-862 In the recurring notification creation path, no authorization check existed at all before generating the notification for a subscriber. The check was entirely absent, not merely insufficient, making CWE-862 a defensible secondary mapping for the creation path specifically.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-66 The notification subsystem operated with a lower security enforcement level than the case-access subsystem: it did not enforce the same access-control checks that governed case visibility. An attacker (or a user whose access was legitimately revoked) could exploit this misconfiguration to continue receiving case-related notification content. This is the closest CAPEC to the pattern of a component not enforcing the security level configured elsewhere in the application. The mapping is uncertain because no CAPEC specifically describes stale-authorization or missing re-authorization at delivery time; CAPEC-66 is selected as the best available match for a security-level enforcement gap between components.
Assumptions to verify
- The affected version range is inferred from the explicit context (affected_version: 0, fixed_version: 4.1.0); the patch itself does not contain version strings.
- The CAPEC-66 mapping is the closest available match; no CAPEC specifically covers stale-authorization or missing re-authorization at notification delivery time. This uncertainty is noted in the CAPEC rationale.
- CVSS PR:L assumes the attacker is an authenticated user who previously had case access; the patch does not specify whether unauthenticated access is possible.
- CVSS VC:L assumes the disclosed information is limited to notification content (case titles, reminder messages) rather than full case data; the patch only addresses notification visibility.
- The patch does not indicate whether the vulnerability is exploitable remotely or requires local access; AV:N is assumed based on the web-application nature of the product.
- The commit message references 'Tool: Codex' which is noted as the AI tool used for implementation but is not credited as a vulnerability finder or reporter.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
6 | 11 | medium | 6 |
- 2026-11-17 09:16 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (af6e91c8ac63c7ac0860325582bc2561ca5343ea): fix: [security] Recheck private case access for recurring https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/af6e91c8ac63c7ac0860325582bc2561ca5343ea
- 2026-11-20 14:19 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/af6e91c8ac63c7ac0860325582bc2561ca5343ea
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CVE-2026-133849 (GCVE-0-2026-133849)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-20 14:39 – Updated: 2026-11-20 16:34- CWE-639 - Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/981… | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
2 events
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
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patch2vuln.pyon 2026-11-20 14:19 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/98196d0523d4e1136014574ff0b526da1d92381b
618096dd6233… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
98196d0523d4
|
fix: [security] Recheck private case access in task calendars | 618096dd6233… |
Fix summary
The vulnerability is remediated by adding explicit case visibility checks to the task calendar queries. The fix ensures that tasks are only visible if the user has permission to view the parent case, in addition to being assigned to the task or belonging to the same organization. This prevents the disclosure of private case data in calendar views and ICS feeds.
Patch summary
The patch modifies the `_tasks_visible_to_user_query` and `_tasks_assigned_to_user_query` functions in `app/calendar/calendar_core.py`. It replaces the previous outer join and filter logic with subqueries for task assignment and organization membership. A new filter condition is added to ensure that the case is not private or that the user has membership in the case's organization. This enforces case-level access control in calendar task queries.
CVSS rationale
The vulnerability is exploitable over the network (AV:N) with low complexity (AC:L) and no attack requirements (AT:N). It requires low privileges (PR:L) as any authenticated user can trigger the issue. No user interaction is required (UI:N). The impact is high on integrity (VI:H) due to unauthorized disclosure of private case data, but no impact on confidentiality (VC:N) or availability (VA:N) of the primary system, and no secondary impacts (SC:N, SI:N, SA:N).
Weakness rationale
- CWE-639 The vulnerability allows access to resources (private case data) based on user-controlled inputs (task assignment or organization membership) without verifying the authorization context (case visibility). This is a classic authorization bypass where the application fails to enforce proper access controls on the parent resource.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-126 The vulnerability allows users to access private case data by interacting with calendar endpoints that do not properly enforce case-level authorization. While not a direct URL manipulation, the effect is similar to forced browsing where the application fails to restrict access to resources based on the user's privileges. The uncertainty lies in the specific mechanism, but the impact is unauthorized access to restricted data.
Assumptions to verify
- The CAPEC mapping is uncertain as the specific attack pattern is not explicitly detailed in the patch, but CAPEC-126 is the closest plausible match for unauthorized access to restricted data.
- The CVSS vector assumes that the primary impact is on integrity (VI:H) due to unauthorized disclosure, but confidentiality (VC:N) is marked as none based on the assumption that the data is not considered highly sensitive in this context. This may need adjustment based on the sensitivity of the case data.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
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- 2026-11-17 08:41 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (98196d0523d4e1136014574ff0b526da1d92381b): fix: [security] Recheck private case access in task calendars https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/98196d0523d4e1136014574ff0b526da1d92381b
- 2026-11-20 14:19 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/98196d0523d4e1136014574ff0b526da1d92381b
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CVE-2026-133848 (GCVE-0-2026-133848)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-20 14:39 – Updated: 2026-11-20 18:31- CWE-285 - Improper Authorization
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/e3d… | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
2 events
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-11-20 14:19 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/e3d0b2ab153d74df72a1f0c417dc2eef74554bcb
05b89a0d2175… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
e3d0b2ab153d
|
fix: [security] Prevent organization admins from deleting | 05b89a0d2175… |
Fix summary
The fix introduces an explicit privilege-hierarchy check in both the browser and API deletion routes. Before any session invalidation or account deletion is performed, the system now verifies whether the target user holds platform-admin capability. If the requester is a pure organization admin and the target is a platform admin, the request is rejected with a 403 response, preserving the intended authorization boundary while leaving legitimate deletion workflows unaffected.
Patch summary
Two lines added in app/admin/admin.py (delete_user function) and two lines added in app/admin/admin_api.py (API GET handler). In each location, after the existing same-organization check for pure org admins, a new condition checks user.is_admin() / user_to_delete.is_admin(). If true, a 403 JSON response is returned with an appropriate error message, preventing the deletion from proceeding. No other logic was modified.
CVSS rationale
AV:N - the vulnerability is exploitable over the network via the web UI or REST API. AC:L - exploitation requires only a standard authenticated request targeting a platform-admin account; no race conditions or special timing. AT:N - no attack-target manipulation is needed. PR:L - the attacker must hold a valid organization-admin account. UI:N - no victim interaction is required; the org admin acts on their own behalf. VC:N - no confidential data is exposed. VI:N - the application's own data integrity is not corrupted; the deletion is a legitimate operation performed by an authenticated user. VA:H - platform-admin accounts and their sessions are permanently deleted, significantly degrading the availability of platform administration. SC:N - no cross-component confidentiality impact. SI:N - no cross-component integrity impact. SA:H - the broader platform administration and oversight functions lose availability when platform-admin accounts are removed.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-285 The authorization logic for the user-deletion endpoint verified organizational scope but failed to enforce the privilege hierarchy between organization admins and platform admins. The missing check allowed a lower-privilege role to perform an action (deleting a higher-privilege account) that should have been restricted, constituting an improper authorization decision.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-126 An authenticated organization admin leverages a missing authorization boundary to perform an action (deleting a platform-admin account) that is reserved for a higher-privilege role. This is a vertical privilege escalation: the actor gains the effective capability of a platform admin by removing platform-admin accounts. The mapping is the closest standard CAPEC; the attack does not involve traditional credential theft or token manipulation but rather an authorization logic gap that permits a lower-privilege actor to act at a higher privilege level.
Assumptions to verify
- The affected version range is inferred from the explicit context (fixed in 4.1.0); the exact earliest affected version is not stated in the patch and is recorded as unspecified.
- The CAPEC-126 mapping is the closest standard pattern; the vulnerability is more precisely an authorization-logic gap than a classic privilege-escalation exploit, but no more specific CAPEC exists for missing privilege-hierarchy checks in multi-tenant admin systems.
- CVSS VA:H and SA:H assume that deleting platform-admin accounts materially degrades the availability of platform-level administration; if the deployment has redundant platform admins, the practical impact may be lower.
- The patch metadata lists affected_version as '0', which is treated as a placeholder; the actual lower bound of affected versions is unknown.
- No evidence of active exploitation or public PoC was found in the patch or metadata.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
7 | 11 | medium | 5 |
- 2026-11-17 08:09 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (e3d0b2ab153d74df72a1f0c417dc2eef74554bcb): fix: [security] Prevent organization admins from deleting https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/e3d0b2ab153d74df72a1f0c417dc2eef74554bcb
- 2026-11-20 14:18 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/e3d0b2ab153d74df72a1f0c417dc2eef74554bcb
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CVE-2026-133847 (GCVE-0-2026-133847)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-20 14:38 – Updated: 2026-11-20 16:34- CWE-862 - Missing Authorization
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/db6… | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
2 events
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-11-20 14:23 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/db694be89ed47f203937ab97c6fe4b93c1085a90
2fdb8a47ac79… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
db694be89ed4
|
fix: [security] Prevent organization admins from editing | 2fdb8a47ac79… |
Fix summary
The fix adds an explicit authorization check in the browser-based user edit view that rejects the request before rendering or processing the form when the target account is a platform-admin account and the current user is not a platform administrator. This aligns the browser interface with the existing API-level restriction, ensuring that only platform administrators can modify platform-admin accounts.
Patch summary
Three lines are inserted in the edit_user function in app/admin/admin.py, immediately after the same-organization check and before the non-admin permission check. The added code calls user_modif.is_admin() on the target user; if true, it flashes an error message ('Only administrators can edit Admin users.') and redirects to the admin users list, preventing the form from being rendered or processed. No other files or logic are modified.
CVSS rationale
AV:N: web-based admin interface accessible over the network. AC:L: the attacker simply navigates to the edit URL for a known admin account; no race conditions or special timing required. AT:N: no manipulation of a separate attack target. PR:L: requires an authenticated account with organization-admin privileges. UI:N: no victim interaction beyond the attacker's own browser session. VC:N: the primary impact is modification, not disclosure; the attacker already has visibility into the user list. VI:H: the attacker can alter platform-admin credentials, roles, or settings. VA:H: the attacker can disable or lock out platform administrators. SC:N: no impact on separate components. SI:H: integrity of admin account records is compromised. SA:N: no impact on the security authority of other components.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-862 The edit_user view was missing an authorization check that would prevent a non-platform-admin user from targeting a platform-admin account. The check existed in the API layer but was absent in the browser-based view, constituting a missing authorization control for a specific operation.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-100 The attack exploits an incomplete authorization logic in the admin user-edit view: the same-organization check passes for a platform-admin account that happens to share the organization, but the missing admin-target check allows the lower-privileged user to proceed. This is a logic flaw in the access-control flow. CAPEC-100 is the closest available pattern; the exact CAPEC for a single missing check in a multi-step authorization flow is not explicitly defined in the CAPEC catalog, so this is the best plausible match.
Assumptions to verify
- The affected version range is inferred from the explicit context (affected_version: 0, fixed_version: 4.1.0); the exact starting version is not independently confirmed by the patch alone.
- The assumption that the API layer already enforced the admin-target restriction is taken from the commit message; the API code is not included in the patch for independent verification.
- CAPEC-100 is selected as the closest plausible attack pattern; no CAPEC entry precisely describes a single missing authorization check in a multi-step view function, so this mapping carries moderate uncertainty.
- CVSS VC is set to None on the assumption that the attacker already has visibility into the user list in the admin panel; if the edit form reveals additional sensitive fields not otherwise visible, VC could be Low.
- The patch does not include the full edit_user function or surrounding context; the analysis assumes the three added lines are the complete remediation for this specific authorization gap.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
7 | 11 | medium | 5 |
- 2026-11-17 07:44 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (db694be89ed47f203937ab97c6fe4b93c1085a90): fix: [security] Prevent organization admins from editing https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/db694be89ed47f203937ab97c6fe4b93c1085a90
- 2026-11-20 14:22 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/db694be89ed47f203937ab97c6fe4b93c1085a90
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CVE-2026-133846 (GCVE-0-2026-133846)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-20 14:38 – Updated: 2026-11-20 16:35- CWE-862 - Missing Authorization
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/7eb… | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
2 events
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-11-20 14:22 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/7eb9fa76d46010548c5552c0a8b1d438d839226c
f7e85e27691e… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
7eb9fa76d460
|
fix: [security] Enforce privileged case permissions on task | f7e85e27691e… |
Fix summary
The fix introduces explicit authorization checks (can_reopen_case and can_reopen_task) that require Admin or Case Admin privileges before a completed privileged case can be revived as a side effect of task reopening or task creation. Denial is enforced at the core model layer and at both the browser and API endpoint layers, with audit logging of denied attempts. Legitimate task creation is preserved, but the automatic case revival is suppressed for unauthorized users.
Patch summary
Added can_reopen_case() and can_reopen_task() methods to TaskCore.py that verify Admin or Case Admin role when the parent case is both completed and privileged. Inserted permission checks in complete_task() and create_task() in TaskCore.py. Added 403 denial responses with audit log entries in task.py (browser endpoints for task completion and status change) and task_api.py (API endpoints for task completion and status change). Added 134 lines of regression tests covering role boundaries, UUID aliases, status IDs, API identity, Matrix delegation, denial side effects, and legitimate reopening workflows.
CVSS rationale
AV:N - exploitable over the network via web UI or REST API. AC:L - the attack requires only a standard task completion toggle or status change request; no race conditions or special timing. AT:N - no manipulation of the target system is needed. PR:L - requires an authenticated user with basic task permissions (editor, queuer, or queue admin). UI:N - no victim interaction required. VC:N - no new confidential data is exposed; the case data was already accessible. VI:L - the case state is modified (completed flag cleared, status reset, finish date removed), which is a limited integrity impact on case lifecycle metadata. VA:N - no denial of service; the case remains accessible. SC/SI/SA:N - no secondary system impact identified.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-862 The system failed to enforce an authorization check before allowing a completed privileged case to be revived as a side effect of task reopening or task creation. The permission check for case-level operations was entirely absent from the task-level code paths.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-114 The attacker performs an action (task reopening or task creation) that they are partially authorized to perform, but the system fails to enforce the higher-level authorization required for the side effect (privileged case revival). This is closest to forced browsing in the sense that the user effectively triggers an unauthorized state change on a resource (the case) they do not have full authority over. Uncertainty: the user IS authorized to interact with the task itself; the missing check is on the implicit case-level side effect, making this a partial rather than pure forced-browsing scenario.
Assumptions to verify
- The affected version range is inferred from the explicit context (affected_version 0, fixed_version 4.1.0); the exact starting version of the vulnerable code is not confirmed by the patch alone.
- CAPEC-114 (Forced Browsing) is the closest available mapping; the actual weakness is a missing authorization check on a side effect of an authorized action, which does not map precisely to any single CAPEC entry.
- CVSS VI:L assumes the case state modification (revival) constitutes a limited integrity impact; if downstream workflows depend on case completion state, the practical impact could be higher.
- The patch references a 'Matrix delegation' mechanism for API identity; the exact trust model for delegated requests is not fully documented in the patch.
- PR:L assumes the attacker needs at minimum an editor-level account; the patch tests confirm editor, queuer, and queue_admin roles are affected.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
7 | 11 | medium | 5 |
- 2026-11-16 08:28 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (7eb9fa76d46010548c5552c0a8b1d438d839226c): fix: [security] Enforce privileged case permissions on task https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/7eb9fa76d46010548c5552c0a8b1d438d839226c
- 2026-11-20 14:22 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/7eb9fa76d46010548c5552c0a8b1d438d839226c
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CVE-2026-133844 (GCVE-0-2026-133844)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-20 14:38 – Updated: 2026-11-20 16:35| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/2ff… | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
2 events
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-11-20 14:28 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
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https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/2ff99ca6ed81687fe28d57961d158e0804271416
49d10b72d8d9… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
2ff99ca6ed81
|
fix: [security] Filter case connector metadata by viewer | 49d10b72d8d9… |
Fix summary
The fix introduces viewer-scoped authorization checks during case serialization. Connector instances are now filtered based on the acting user's permissions: administrators and assigned case-administrators retain full visibility, while regular users only see connectors whose sharing scope (personal, org, or global) grants them access. When no authenticated user context is available, connector metadata is omitted entirely. Credential-use checks for module execution remain unchanged.
Patch summary
In app/db_class/db.py, the to_json method's connector serialization was changed from an unconditional query of all Case_Connector_Instance records to a conditional block that: (1) returns an empty list if user is None or unauthenticated; (2) imports can_access_all_case_connectors and is_instance_visible_to_user; (3) filters the connector list so only instances passing the visibility predicate are serialized. A new test file tests/case/test_case_connector_visibility.py (250 lines, 22 tests) validates API responses, browser views, Matrix delegation, scope changes, access revocation, fork behavior, and module-context credential isolation.
CVSS rationale
AV:N - exploitable over the network via standard API or browser endpoints. AC:L - no special conditions; any case view triggers the disclosure. AT:N - no attack-target manipulation required. PR:L - requires a low-privilege authenticated user with case read access. UI:N - no victim interaction beyond the attacker's own request. VC:L - limited confidential data (connector URLs, descriptions, UUIDs, possibly API keys) is exposed. VI:N, VA:N - no integrity or availability impact. SC:N, SI:N, SA:N - no secondary-system impact evidenced.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-668 Connector metadata belonging to one user or organization (personal or org scope) was exposed to users in a different sphere (other users, other organizations) because the serialization path lacked per-viewer authorization filtering.
- CWE-862 The to_json serialization method did not perform any authorization check on connector instances before including them in the response, effectively missing the access-control gate that should restrict visibility to the acting user.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-1 The closest plausible CAPEC is Software Feature Discovery: an authenticated user can enumerate connector instances attached to a case and learn their URLs, descriptions, UUIDs, and potentially credentials that were not intended for their access level. The attack is passive (simply viewing a case) and requires no special tooling. Uncertainty: no CAPEC specifically models 'viewing an object to discover embedded metadata of other tenants'; CAPEC-1 is the best available match for unauthorized information enumeration through a legitimate interface.
Assumptions to verify
- The affected version range is inferred from the explicit context (affected_version '0', fixed_version '4.1.0'); the patch itself does not encode version boundaries.
- PR:L assumes the attacker needs only a low-privilege authenticated account with case read access; the patch does not specify whether anonymous access to case endpoints is possible, but the fix explicitly omits connectors when user is None, implying unauthenticated access to the case object may exist.
- VC:L assumes the exposed connector metadata (URLs, descriptions, UUIDs, possibly API keys) constitutes limited but meaningful confidential information; the tests reference 'DO-NOT-EXPOSE-GLOBAL-KEY' and 'DO-NOT-EXPOSE-PERSONAL-KEY' suggesting credentials may be present in connector metadata.
- CAPEC-1 is selected as the closest available attack pattern; no CAPEC precisely models cross-tenant metadata leakage through a legitimate read endpoint.
- The commit message references 'Tool: Codex' which is noted as the AI tool used to generate the patch but is not credited as a vulnerability finder or reporter.
- No evidence of active exploitation, public PoC, or in-the-wild abuse is present in the patch or metadata.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
6 | 11 | medium | 6 |
- 2026-11-16 06:56 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (2ff99ca6ed81687fe28d57961d158e0804271416): fix: [security] Filter case connector metadata by viewer https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/2ff99ca6ed81687fe28d57961d158e0804271416
- 2026-11-20 14:27 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/2ff99ca6ed81687fe28d57961d158e0804271416
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CVE-2026-133843 (GCVE-0-2026-133843)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-20 14:37 – Updated: 2026-11-20 16:35- CWE-639 - Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/6a9… | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
2 events
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-11-20 14:27 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
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https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/6a96e374ea1fb7cc547777ac2cd5fa98b6622da9
e50cb204bae2… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
6a96e374ea1f
|
fix: [security] Restrict MISP correlations to visible cases | e50cb204bae2… |
Fix summary
The vulnerability is remediated by enforcing strict access control checks on both the source case and the resulting correlation list. The system now verifies that the acting user has permission to view the source case before processing correlations. Additionally, the resulting list of matching case IDs is filtered to include only cases that the user is authorized to access. This ensures that no unauthorized case identifiers are disclosed to the user.
Patch summary
The patch modifies the check_correlation_attr function in CaseCore.py to accept a user parameter and enforce visibility checks. It introduces a helper function _get_misp_attribute_case_id to correctly resolve case ownership. The function now verifies that the user is authenticated and can view the source case. It also filters the resulting case IDs using CommonModel.check_user_in_private_cases to ensure only visible cases are returned. The API endpoints in case_api.py and case_misp.py are updated to pass the current user to the correlation function, ensuring that access control is consistently enforced across all entry points.
CVSS rationale
The vulnerability is exploitable over the network (AV:N) with low attack complexity (AC:L) and no attack requirements (AT:N). It requires low privileges (PR:L) as any authenticated user can exploit it. No user interaction is required (UI:N). The impact is limited to information disclosure (VI:L) as it reveals case identifiers, but does not affect confidentiality of case contents or integrity/availability. There is no impact on the scope (SC:N) or other systems (SI:N, SA:N).
Weakness rationale
- CWE-639 The vulnerability allows users to access case identifiers they should not be able to see due to missing authorization checks on the correlation results. This is a classic case of authorization bypass where the application fails to verify that the user has permission to access the returned data.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-126 The vulnerability allows users to access resources (case identifiers) they are not authorized to view by exploiting the lack of access control checks in the correlation feature. This aligns with the Forced Browsing attack pattern, where an attacker accesses resources by directly manipulating URLs or parameters without proper authorization.
Assumptions to verify
- The vulnerability is assumed to be exploitable by any authenticated user with access to the MISP correlation feature.
- The impact is limited to information disclosure of case identifiers and does not extend to the contents of the cases.
- The CAPEC mapping to Forced Browsing is the closest plausible match, but the exact attack pattern may vary depending on the specific exploitation scenario.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
9 | 11 | medium | 3 |
- 2026-11-16 06:34 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (6a96e374ea1fb7cc547777ac2cd5fa98b6622da9): fix: [security] Restrict MISP correlations to visible cases https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/6a96e374ea1fb7cc547777ac2cd5fa98b6622da9
- 2026-11-20 14:27 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/6a96e374ea1fb7cc547777ac2cd5fa98b6622da9
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CVE-2026-133841 (GCVE-0-2026-133841)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-20 14:37 – Updated: 2026-11-20 16:35| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/e6c… | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
2 events
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-11-20 14:27 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/e6c780d97cd669500d05f1c911b2038f0dc91335
727879b87960… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
e6c780d97cd6
|
fix: [security] Filter linked cases by viewer permissions | 727879b87960… |
Fix summary
The serialization method now accepts the acting user as a parameter and filters linked cases based on the user's authorization. When an authenticated user is provided, only linked cases the user is permitted to view are included. When no user is provided (internal or anonymous callers), the method fails closed by excluding all private linked cases. All call sites across browser views, API endpoints, calendar, search, tools, and internal core operations were updated to pass the resolved user identity, ensuring consistent enforcement regardless of the access path.
Patch summary
Modified the case serialization method in the database model to accept an optional user parameter. When a user is supplied and authenticated, linked cases are filtered through an existing permission-check function. When no user is supplied, only non-private linked cases are returned. Updated approximately 15 call sites across app/case/case.py, app/case/case_api.py, app/case/CaseCore.py, app/calendar/calendar.py, app/tools/tools_core.py, and app/db_class/db.py to pass the current or API-resolved user. In the API single-case endpoint, the user is now explicitly extracted from API headers and passed to both the authorization check and the serializer. Added a new test file (tests/case/test_case_link_visibility.py) with 171 lines covering API and browser filtering, identity separation between session and API key, Matrix delegation, anonymous/anonymous-user fail-closed behavior, and dynamic permission changes.
CVSS rationale
AV:N - exploitable over the network via HTTP API or browser. AC:L - no special race conditions or complex setup; any user with access to a case linked to a private case triggers the disclosure. AT:N - no attack-target manipulation required. PR:L - requires a low-privilege authenticated user with access to at least one case that has a link to a private case. UI:N - no victim interaction beyond the attacker's own request. VC:L - limited confidentiality impact: case IDs, titles, and descriptions are exposed, but full case content, tasks, and objects are not. VI:N, VA:N - no integrity or availability impact. SC:N, SI:N, SA:N - no impact on subsequent components; the data belongs to the same application.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-862 The case serialization method did not perform an authorization check on linked private cases before including their metadata in the response. The permission model existed for direct case access but was not applied to transitively referenced (linked) case data.
- CWE-200 The result of the missing authorization check was the exposure of private case IDs, titles, and descriptions to users who had no membership or role on those private cases.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-12 The closest available CAPEC pattern. An authenticated user makes a legitimate request for a case they can access, and the application's response inadvertently discloses metadata (IDs, titles, descriptions) of private cases the user is not authorized to view. The uncertainty is that CAPEC-12 typically refers to version or configuration metadata discovery, whereas this is an authorization-failure-driven data exposure. No CAPEC specifically models 'information disclosure through unfiltered relational data in API responses,' making CAPEC-12 the best available approximation.
Assumptions to verify
- The affected version range is assumed to be all versions prior to 4.1.0 based on the explicit context; no earlier version boundary is specified in the patch.
- PR:L assumes the attacker needs at minimum a low-privilege account with access to one case that is linked to a private case; if no such link exists in a deployment, the vulnerability is not triggerable.
- VC:L assumes that exposure of case ID, title, and description constitutes a low (not high) confidentiality impact; if titles or descriptions contain highly sensitive operational details, impact could be higher.
- CAPEC-12 is the closest available mapping but does not precisely model authorization-failure-driven relational data exposure; uncertainty is noted in the CAPEC rationale.
- The patch does not indicate whether the vulnerability was reported externally or found internally; no finder or reporter credit is assigned.
- UI:N assumes the attacker initiates the request themselves; no victim interaction is required.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
6 | 11 | medium | 6 |
- 2026-11-12 16:30 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (e6c780d97cd669500d05f1c911b2038f0dc91335): fix: [security] Filter linked cases by viewer permissions https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/e6c780d97cd669500d05f1c911b2038f0dc91335
- 2026-11-20 14:26 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/e6c780d97cd669500d05f1c911b2038f0dc91335
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CVE-2026-133840 (GCVE-0-2026-133840)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-20 14:36 – Updated: 2026-11-20 16:36- CWE-862 - Missing Authorization
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/be3… | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
2 events
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
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patch2vuln.pyon 2026-11-20 14:26 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/be3ea802d58ae6d71bf4c90f698d53d6080dce40
916e5d7a7034… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
be3ea802d58a
|
fix: [security] Restrict file conversion on privileged tasks | 916e5d7a7034… |
Fix summary
The fix introduces an authorization gate that checks whether the target task is in a restricted state (Requested, Rejected, or Request Review) and, if so, verifies that the current user holds an elevated role (Admin, Case Admin, or Queue Admin) before proceeding with file content reading or note creation. Additionally, a null-check for the task object was added to prevent processing when the task target does not exist, returning a 404 response. Audit logging is recorded on denial.
Patch summary
In app/case/task.py, the convert_file_to_note function was modified to: (1) add a null check for the task object alongside the existing file check, returning 404 if either is missing; (2) insert a new authorization check after the existing case-membership verification that calls TaskModel.is_task_restricted(task) and TaskModel.can_edit_requested_task(current_user), returning a 403 with an audit log entry if the task is restricted and the user lacks elevated privileges. A new test file (tests/case/test_restricted_task_file_conversion.py, 220 lines) adds regression coverage for role-based denial, permitted conversion by elevated roles, unrestricted task conversion, denial side-effect verification, browser identity enforcement, mismatched target rejection, and error-state preservation.
CVSS rationale
AV:N: The vulnerability is in a web application endpoint accessible over the network. AC:L: Exploitation requires a simple authenticated API call with no special conditions. AT:N: No attack target manipulation is needed. PR:L: Requires an authenticated user with at least editor-level case membership. UI:N: No user interaction required. VC:N: The file is already attached to the task and accessible to case members; the primary issue is the unauthorized note creation action rather than new data disclosure. VI:L: Unauthorized notes can be created on restricted tasks, altering task metadata (note count, last modification, case history). VA:N: No availability impact. SC:N/SI:L/SA:N: Secondary impact is limited to the integrity of the case/task data model (notes, history entries) with no cross-component or availability effects.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-862 The convert_file_to_note endpoint lacked an authorization check for restricted task states. The existing case-membership check was insufficient; no role-based verification was performed before reading file contents or creating notes on tasks in Requested, Rejected, or Request Review states. The fix adds the missing authorization gate.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-66 The privilege model for the file-to-note conversion action was incompletely configured: it enforced case membership but did not enforce the elevated role requirement for restricted task states. An attacker with a lower-privilege role (editor/queuer) could perform an action reserved for higher-privilege roles (Admin, Case Admin, Queue Admin). CAPEC-66 is the closest match as it describes exploiting a misconfigured or incomplete privilege enforcement. Uncertainty: no dedicated CAPEC for 'missing role check on a specific endpoint' exists; CAPEC-66 is the best available approximation.
Assumptions to verify
- The affected version range is inferred from the explicit context (affected_version: 0, fixed_version: 4.1.0); no explicit version boundary tag is provided in the patch.
- The CVSS VC:N assumption assumes that file contents attached to a task are already accessible to case members through other means (e.g., file download), so the conversion action does not grant new confidentiality access. If file contents were otherwise inaccessible to editors/queuers on restricted tasks, VC should be raised to L.
- CAPEC-66 is selected as the closest available attack pattern; no CAPEC specifically models a missing role-based authorization check on a single endpoint. The mapping is approximate.
- The patch references TaskModel.is_task_restricted and TaskModel.can_edit_requested_task as existing model methods; their exact implementation is not shown in the patch, so the precise set of restricted states and eligible roles is inferred from the commit message and test cases.
- The commit message references 'Tool: Codex' which is noted as the AI tool used to generate the patch but is not credited as a vulnerability finder or reporter.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
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- 2026-11-20 14:26 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/be3ea802d58ae6d71bf4c90f698d53d6080dce40
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CVE-2026-133839 (GCVE-0-2026-133839)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-20 14:36 – Updated: 2026-11-20 16:36- CWE-862 - Missing Authorization
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/714… | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
2 events
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-11-20 14:18 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/7142a49da22f1079bcbd043bc33eb7cdfabc81a7
de01c727664b… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
7142a49da22f
|
fix: [security] Restrict evidence deletion on privileged | de01c727664b… |
Fix summary
The fix enforces role-based authorization before any file deletion side effects occur. It verifies that the file belongs to the specified task (preventing task substitution) and that, when the task is in a restricted state, the requesting user holds Admin, Case Admin, or Queue Admin privileges. Denial is returned with a 403 status and an audit log entry before any disk, database, timeline, or history modification takes place. The check is applied consistently across the core model, the browser endpoint, and the API endpoint.
Patch summary
Three source files are modified. In TaskCore.py, the delete_file method gains two guards: a file-to-task ownership check (file.task_id must equal task.id) and a restricted-state permission check (is_task_restricted and can_edit_requested_task). In task.py and task_api.py, the respective delete_file handlers insert the same restricted-state permission check after the existing case-membership check, returning a 403 JSON response and writing an audit log entry on denial. A new test file (207 lines) adds 116 regression tests covering role-based denial, permitted deletion by approvers, task-substitution prevention, API identity vs session identity, Matrix delegation, read-only denial, non-member denial, and unrestricted-task deletion by editors.
CVSS rationale
AV:N: The vulnerability is exploitable over the network via the web UI or REST API. AC:L: No special race conditions, timing, or configuration are needed; a simple authenticated request suffices. AT:N: No manipulation of the attack target is required. PR:L: The attacker needs a low-privilege authenticated account with case membership (editor or queuer). UI:N: No victim interaction is required. VC:N: No confidential data is exposed. VI:H: Evidence files are permanently deleted from disk and database, and timeline/history records are altered, severely compromising investigation integrity. VA:N: The system remains operational; the impact is data destruction (integrity) rather than service unavailability. SC/SI/SA:N: No impact on other components or systems is evidenced.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-862 The file deletion endpoints and core method lacked an authorization check for restricted-state tasks. Any case member could invoke deletion regardless of role, which is a textbook missing authorization control. CWE-862 is the narrowest defensible mapping because the specific check (role-based restriction for privileged restricted tasks) was simply absent.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-126 The attacker accesses a resource (file deletion endpoint) that they are not authorized to invoke based on their role. While CAPEC-126 typically describes URL guessing, the underlying pattern is the same: the application fails to enforce authorization on a known endpoint, allowing an authenticated but low-privilege user to perform an operation they should not. This is the closest CAPEC to a missing role-based authorization check on a known API/browser endpoint. Uncertainty: a more precise CAPEC for 'missing authorization on a known endpoint' does not exist in the CAPEC catalog, so CAPEC-126 is the best available match.
Assumptions to verify
- The affected version range is inferred from the explicit context (affected_version 0, fixed_version 4.1.0); no intermediate version boundaries are confirmed.
- CAPEC-126 is selected as the closest available attack pattern; a more specific CAPEC for missing role-based authorization on a known endpoint does not exist in the catalog.
- CVSS VI is rated High based on the permanent destruction of evidence files and alteration of investigation records; if the deployment context limits the scope of affected tasks, the impact could be lower.
- The patch references a 'can_edit_requested_task' permission and 'is_task_restricted' state check; the exact role hierarchy and whether Queue Admin is a distinct role from Case Admin is assumed from the commit message and test fixtures.
- No evidence of active exploitation or public disclosure is present in the patch; SSVC exploitation is set to none.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
7 | 11 | medium | 5 |
- 2026-11-16 09:15 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (7142a49da22f1079bcbd043bc33eb7cdfabc81a7): fix: [security] Restrict evidence deletion on privileged https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/7142a49da22f1079bcbd043bc33eb7cdfabc81a7
- 2026-11-20 14:17 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/7142a49da22f1079bcbd043bc33eb7cdfabc81a7
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CVE-2026-133838 (GCVE-0-2026-133838)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-20 14:36 – Updated: 2026-11-20 16:36- CWE-862 - Missing Authorization
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/cbc… | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
2 events
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-11-20 14:17 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/cbc1a72fd3a343ca288617b5ff70065a19c7c8c7
829a9498c0f0… - Confidence
- high
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
cbc1a72fd3a3
|
fix: [security] Require approver permissions for restricted | 829a9498c0f0… |
Fix summary
The fix enforces approver-level permission checks (is_task_restricted and can_edit_requested_task) before any state change on restricted tasks across all affected code paths. Checks are applied at both the model layer (TaskCore, CaseCore) and the API/view layer (case_api, case_misp, task), rejecting forbidden operations with a 403 response before any partial writes occur. Reordering additionally validates every affected restricted sibling task, and module execution requires approver permission before dispatch.
Patch summary
Added a new check_task_link_permissions method in CaseCore that validates approver permissions for all tasks whose MISP links will change. Added is_task_restricted/can_edit_requested_task guards in TaskCore.remove_assign_task, TaskCore.change_order (including sibling task validation), and TaskCore.call_module_task_no_instance. Wrapped API handlers in case_api.py, case_misp.py, and task.py with try/except PermissionError blocks returning 403. Added permission checks to MISP object/attribute creation (create_misp_object, create_standalone_attribute), deletion (delete_object, delete_standalone_attr), task linking/unlinking, and task reordering endpoints. Refactored task ID resolution into get_misp_link_task_ids to centralize authorization before writes.
CVSS rationale
AV:N - web application accessible over network. AC:L - straightforward API calls, no race conditions or special timing. AT:N - no attack target manipulation. PR:L - requires authenticated case member account (not admin). UI:N - no user interaction needed. VC:N - no data disclosure. VI:L - task state (assignments, ordering, MISP links) can be modified, bypassing approval workflow. VA:N - no denial of service. SC:N - no cross-component confidentiality impact. SI:L - MISP objects/attributes linked to tasks can be created, deleted, or relinked. SA:N - no cross-component security impact. Overall impact is limited to workflow integrity within a single case.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-862 Multiple code paths that modify restricted task state (unassignment, reordering, MISP link changes, module execution) lacked the authorization check that other paths enforced. The fix adds the missing is_task_restricted/can_edit_requested_task checks to these paths, confirming the root cause was absent authorization validation.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-100 The attacker leverages their legitimate case member role to perform operations (task state changes, MISP link modifications) that should require approver-level privileges. The system incorrectly trusted the case membership check as sufficient authorization for all task-related operations, failing to enforce the higher privilege requirement on restricted tasks. CAPEC-100 is the closest match as it describes exploiting a system's trust in a user's privilege level to perform actions beyond what that level should allow. Uncertainty: no CAPEC specifically covers 'missing authorization on secondary code paths'; CAPEC-100 is the best available approximation.
Assumptions to verify
- Assumes the application is deployed as a network-accessible web service (AV:N).
- Assumes case member access is the minimum privilege required (PR:L); the patch references Admin, Case Admin, and Queue Admin as the required roles for restricted task modification.
- Assumes no data confidentiality is exposed through the affected paths (VC:N, SC:N); the operations modify state but do not return restricted data.
- CAPEC-100 is the closest available mapping; no CAPEC specifically describes 'missing authorization on secondary code paths'.
- The affected_version '0' from metadata is interpreted as 'all versions prior to 4.1.0' per semver convention.
- Assumes the vulnerability requires an authenticated user with at least case member access; unauthenticated access is not indicated by the patch.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
7 | 11 | high | 6 |
- 2026-11-17 13:54 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (cbc1a72fd3a343ca288617b5ff70065a19c7c8c7): fix: [security] Require approver permissions for restricted https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/cbc1a72fd3a343ca288617b5ff70065a19c7c8c7
- 2026-11-20 14:17 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/cbc1a72fd3a343ca288617b5ff70065a19c7c8c7
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CVE-2026-133837 (GCVE-0-2026-133837)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-20 14:35 – Updated: 2026-11-20 16:36- CWE-862 - Missing Authorization
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/dbd… | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
2 events
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-11-20 14:17 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/dbd58d8762c824bcc27f912fe3f8497f416a7c16
1febf5744025… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
dbd58d8762c8
|
fix: [security] Require approver review to complete | 1febf5744025… |
Fix summary
The fix enforces approver-level authorization (Admin, Case Admin, or Queue Admin) before allowing task completion in privileged cases across all code paths (browser, API, and shared core). It also prevents status changes to "Finished" from bypassing the denied completion check, and blocks creation of privileged tasks with the completed flag pre-set. Audit logging is added for all denied attempts.
Patch summary
Added a new can_complete_task() method in TaskCore.py that checks whether the user has approver permissions for privileged cases. Inserted authorization checks in complete_task(), change_task_status(), and create_task() in the core model. Added corresponding 403 responses with audit logging in task.py (browser) and task_api.py (REST API) for both completion and status-change endpoints. Modified create_task() to force completed=False for privileged cases. Added 224 lines of regression tests covering role enforcement, UUID aliases, API identity, Matrix delegation, denial side effects, and standard task workflows.
CVSS rationale
AV:N - exploitable over network via API or browser. AC:L - no special conditions; any authenticated editor/queuer can invoke the endpoint. AT:N - no attack target manipulation needed. PR:L - requires a low-privilege authenticated user (editor or queuer). UI:N - no user interaction required. VC:N - no confidentiality impact. VI:H - the attacker can mark privileged tasks as completed, bypassing the mandatory approval workflow, which is a significant integrity violation. VA:N - no availability impact. SC/SI/SA:N - impact is confined to the vulnerable component (flowintel task management); no cross-component scope impact is evidenced.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-862 The task completion and status-change endpoints did not verify that the requesting user held approver-level permissions before allowing privileged tasks to be marked as completed. The authorization check was entirely absent for the privileged-case completion path.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-126 The closest plausible CAPEC is Forced Browsing, as the attacker accesses a functionality (task completion in privileged cases) that is restricted to approver roles. The user invokes the completion endpoint or status-change endpoint without holding the required privilege level. Uncertainty: this is not a classic URL-guessing scenario but rather a missing server-side authorization check on an accessible endpoint; CAPEC-100 (Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Security Levels) is also plausible but CAPEC-126 better captures the act of accessing restricted functionality.
Assumptions to verify
- The 'privileged_case' flag is the sole mechanism distinguishing cases that require approver review; no other access-control layer is implied by the patch.
- The affected version range is inferred from the explicit context (fixed in 4.1.0); the exact earliest affected version is not stated in the patch.
- CAPEC-126 (Forced Browsing) is the closest available mapping; the actual weakness is a missing server-side authorization check rather than a classic forced-browsing URL-guessing scenario.
- CVSS VI:H assumes that bypassing the approval workflow for privileged cases constitutes a high integrity impact; if the organization considers this a lower-severity workflow violation, VI could be reduced to L.
- The patch does not indicate whether the vulnerability was reported externally or discovered internally; no finder or reporter credit is assigned.
- The commit message references 'Tool: Codex' which may indicate AI-assisted development but does not constitute a credit role.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
6 | 11 | medium | 6 |
- 2026-11-16 08:00 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (dbd58d8762c824bcc27f912fe3f8497f416a7c16): fix: [security] Require approver review to complete https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/dbd58d8762c824bcc27f912fe3f8497f416a7c16
- 2026-11-20 14:16 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/dbd58d8762c824bcc27f912fe3f8497f416a7c16
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CVE-2026-133667 (GCVE-0-2026-133667)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-20 10:58 – Updated: 2026-11-20 18:26| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/5f7… | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
2 events
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-11-20 10:50 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/5f745040d79d2f08d4a06512a91313c5a4eb346b.patch
5352fc62c6a6… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
5f745040d79d
|
fix: [security] Timeline and search rendering preserve text | 5352fc62c6a6… |
Fix summary
The vulnerability is remediated by eliminating the three injection paths: (1) autolinking is disabled on every timeline event so the library no longer rewrites sanitised HTML; (2) search and auto-highlight marks are now created by walking the DOM text nodes and setting textContent, which cannot alter existing attributes or split character entities; (3) the three selection endpoints now decode the stored JSON once, respond with application/json and X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff, and reject malformed or excessively nested payloads with a 400 JSON error, preventing the browser from interpreting the body as HTML.
Patch summary
In case_history.js and timeline_view.js, an autolink: false property is added to each TimelineJS event object to suppress linkification. In smart-render.js, the previous regex-based string replacement (html.replace(/>([^<]*)</g, ...)) is replaced with a DOM TreeWalker that iterates text nodes, builds <mark> elements via document.createElement and textContent, and splices them into a DocumentFragment, preserving all existing attributes and entities. A new count_html_matches helper counts matches across text nodes. The plain-text fallback branches that performed raw regex replacement on escaped strings are removed. In misp_modules.py, a new _selected_json_response helper decodes the session value with json.loads, wraps it in jsonify, sets X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff, and returns a 400 JSON error on TypeError, ValueError, or RecursionError. The three get_*_selected endpoints are updated to call this helper instead of returning the raw session string.
CVSS rationale
AV:N – the application is a web service reachable over the network. AC:L – crafting quote-bearing text in case notes or MISP attributes is straightforward; no race or special timing is needed. AT:N – no active attack or prior compromise is required beyond normal authenticated use. PR:L – the attacker needs an authenticated account to create or import the malicious content (endpoints are login_required). UI:A – the victim must actively open the case timeline, run a search, or request a selection endpoint for the injected markup to execute. VC:L – XSS can expose case data, session tokens, or other sensitive information visible in the browser. VI:L – the attacker can modify displayed content or trigger actions in the victim's session. VA:N – no evidence of denial-of-service impact beyond the nested-JSON guard. SC:N – no cross-component or cross-origin impact is demonstrated. SI:L – other authenticated users viewing the same case could be affected by the stored malicious content. SA:N – no elevation of security authority is indicated.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-79 All three sub-issues (autolinking rewriting sanitised HTML, regex-based highlight injection corrupting attributes, and serving JSON as text/html) result in attacker-controlled content being interpreted as HTML/JavaScript in the victim's browser, which is the defining characteristic of DOM-based XSS.
- CWE-799 The content-type confusion (serving application/json data as text/html) is a secondary weakness that amplifies the XSS by causing the browser to parse the response body as HTML. This is a narrower, supporting CWE.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-6 The primary exploitation path is client-side: attacker-controlled text (case notes, MISP values, search terms) is processed by JavaScript in the browser (TimelineJS autolinking, regex-based highlight injection) and the resulting DOM manipulation injects executable markup. The content-type confusion endpoint is a secondary vector but the dominant pattern is DOM-based script injection. CAPEC-6 is the closest standard attack pattern; the mapping is confident because the patch explicitly addresses client-side HTML rewriting of user-supplied content.
- CAPEC-1 The three selection endpoints that returned session JSON as text/html could be leveraged as a reflected XSS vector if the session content is influenced by a prior request parameter. This is a secondary, less certain mapping; CAPEC-6 remains the primary pattern. Included because the content-type confusion path is a distinct mechanism from pure DOM manipulation.
Assumptions to verify
- The affected_version field in the metadata is recorded as '0', which is treated as a placeholder meaning all versions prior to 4.1.0 are affected; no earlier version boundary is specified.
- The CVSS PR:L assumes the attacker needs an authenticated account to create the malicious case content; if unauthenticated import paths exist, PR could be N.
- The CVSS UI:A assumes the victim must navigate to the affected page; if the malicious content is auto-loaded in a dashboard or notification, UI could be N.
- CAPEC-1 (Reflected XSS) is included as a secondary mapping for the content-type confusion path; the primary and more certain mapping is CAPEC-6 (DOM Based XSS).
- The nested-JSON rejection (RecursionError guard) suggests a potential DoS vector via deeply nested JSON, but no separate DoS impact is scored because the primary vulnerability is XSS.
- No public exploit or PoC is referenced; exploitation status is assumed to be 'none'.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
6 | 11 | medium | 6 |
- 2026-10-30 11:49 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (5f745040d79d2f08d4a06512a91313c5a4eb346b): fix: [security] Timeline and search rendering preserve text https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/5f745040d79d2f08d4a06512a91313c5a4eb346b.patch
- 2026-11-20 10:49 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/5f745040d79d2f08d4a06512a91313c5a4eb346b.patch
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CVE-2026-133665 (GCVE-0-2026-133665)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-20 10:58 – Updated: 2026-11-20 18:26| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/144… | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
2 events
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-11-20 10:47 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
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https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/1445157891add7c04a63e0014cd96bf9802cac66.patch
ee51a7b891c2… - Confidence
- high
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
1445157891ad
|
fix: [security] Alert secrets and webhook logs stay | ee51a7b891c2… |
Fix summary
The vulnerability is remediated by enforcing role-based access control on data serialization and template rendering. Non-admin users are now restricted to receiving only public enable flags and do not have access to webhook URLs, secrets, or delivery logs. The shared alert serializer explicitly removes sensitive fields for non-admin users, ensuring that both the notification page and the alerts API preserve administrative diagnostics while protecting sensitive data from unauthorized access.
Patch summary
The patch modifies app/alerts/alerts_core.py and app/notification/notification.py. In alerts_core.py, the alerts_to_json function now checks if the user is an admin and removes the webhook_url field from the JSON response for non-admin users. In notification.py, the index route now checks the current user's admin status. For non-admins, it passes a restricted configuration object containing only public enable flags (CASE_CREATE_ALERT_ENABLED, WEBHOOK_ENABLED) instead of the full ConfigModule, and it passes an empty list for alert_logs instead of the actual log data. This ensures sensitive configuration and logs are not embedded in the template context for unauthorized users.
CVSS rationale
Attack Vector is Network (AV:N) as the application is web-based. Attack Complexity is Low (AC:L) as it requires only standard HTTP requests. Attack Requirements are None (AT:N). Privileges Required are Low (PR:L) as any authenticated non-admin user can exploit this. User Interaction is None (UI:N). Vulnerable Component Impact is None (VC:N) as the server itself is not compromised. Vulnerable Component Integrity is High (VI:H) because sensitive secrets and logs are exposed, which can lead to further compromise. Vulnerable Component Availability is None (VA:N). Subsequent Component Impact is None (SC:N, SI:N, SA:N) as the direct impact is limited to information disclosure within the vulnerable component, though downstream impacts are possible but not directly measured by the base vector.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-200 The application exposed sensitive configuration data (webhook URLs, secrets, logs) to authenticated users who did not have the necessary privileges to view them.
- CWE-862 The application failed to enforce authorization checks when serializing alert data and rendering the notification page, allowing non-admin users to access admin-only data.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-126 The attacker leveraged their authenticated non-admin role to access data (webhook secrets, logs) that was not properly restricted to the administrator role, despite the UI hiding the configuration form.
Assumptions to verify
- The affected version is assumed to be all versions prior to 4.1.0 based on the fixed_version metadata.
- The CAPEC mapping is based on the general pattern of accessing restricted functionality, as the specific attack vector is a standard HTTP request to an existing endpoint.
- The CVSS vector assumes that the exposure of secrets leads to a high impact on integrity of the vulnerable component, as these secrets can be used to impersonate the application or access other services.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
10 | 11 | high | 3 |
- 2026-10-30 13:18 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (1445157891add7c04a63e0014cd96bf9802cac66): fix: [security] Alert secrets and webhook logs stay https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/1445157891add7c04a63e0014cd96bf9802cac66.patch
- 2026-11-20 10:47 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/1445157891add7c04a63e0014cd96bf9802cac66.patch
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CVE-2026-133663 (GCVE-0-2026-133663)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-20 10:58 – Updated: 2026-11-20 18:25| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/fec… | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
2 events
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-11-20 10:47 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/fecba79506dea2886118fe5cd686d4edfdef60ae.patch
5d78368cb0dd… - Confidence
- high
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
fecba79506de
|
fix: [security] Child records stay bound to their authorised | 5d78368cb0dd… |
Fix summary
The fix enforces ownership validation by requiring the authorized parent case or task ID in every core method that reads or writes child records. Before returning data or performing writes, each child record's case_id or task_id is explicitly compared against the resolved parent. Mismatched records are rejected with a 404 or 403 response. Connector module context building now verifies connector-to-case ownership before preparing module data, resolving credentials, or executing sync operations. Instance visibility checks are applied consistently across both web and API routes.
Patch summary
Added case_id or task_id ownership checks in CaseCore.py methods (remove_connector, edit_connector, edit_timeline_event, edit_timeline_event_link, _build_case_connector_module_context) by passing the authorized parent ID and comparing it against the child record's foreign key. Updated case.py get_assigned_users to verify task.case_id matches the resolved case. Updated case_api.py EditConnectorsCase and RemoveConnectors to validate connector ownership and instance visibility before delegating. Updated case_misp.py timeline and connector endpoints to pass case.id to core methods. Updated task_api.py note, subtask, and URL-tool GET handlers to verify the child's task_id matches the authorized task.
CVSS rationale
AV:N - exploitable over the network via HTTP API. AC:L - the attacker only needs to know or enumerate valid child record IDs; no special race conditions or complex setup required. AT:N - no attack target manipulation needed. PR:L - requires an authenticated user with access to at least one case or task. UI:N - no user interaction required. VC:H - full read access to sensitive threat intelligence data in other cases. VI:H - ability to modify or delete timeline events, links, and connectors in other cases. VA:N - no denial-of-service impact. SC/SI/SA:N - impact is confined to the flowintel application's own data store; no external system impact is evidenced.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-639 The vulnerability is a classic IDOR: user-supplied identifiers for child records (notes, subtasks, connectors, timeline events) are used to fetch or modify objects without verifying the object belongs to the authorized parent case or task. The authorization check on the parent does not constrain the child lookup.
- CWE-862 Several endpoints performed the operation on a child record without any ownership or authorization check tying the record to the user's authorized case, effectively missing the authorization step for the specific object being accessed.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-1 The attacker manipulates URL path parameters or query string identifiers (note_id, subtask_id, url_tool_id, connector instance ID, timeline event ID) to reference objects belonging to other cases or tasks. The application did not validate that the referenced object belonged to the authorized parent, allowing cross-tenant data access. This is the closest CAPEC pattern; the attack does not involve protocol-level tampering but rather parameter substitution in REST-style URLs, which falls under the broader 'tamper with URLs' category.
Assumptions to verify
- The affected version range is inferred from the explicit context (affected_version: 0, fixed_version: 4.1.0); no earlier version boundary is confirmed.
- PR:L assumes the attacker needs at least one valid case or task membership; the patch does not clarify whether anonymous access is possible.
- CAPEC-1 (Tamper with URLs) is the closest available pattern; the actual attack is parameter substitution in REST endpoints rather than classic URL tampering, but no more specific CAPEC exists for IDOR via REST identifiers.
- VC:H and VI:H assume the data in other cases is sensitive and that modification/deletion constitutes full integrity loss; the patch does not specify data classification.
- The patch does not indicate whether the vulnerability was disclosed publicly or under embargo; exploitation status is assumed to be 'none' based on absence of evidence.
- Instance visibility enforcement (can_interact_with_case_connector) was added to the API route in case_api.py but was already present in case_misp.py; the patch ensures consistency rather than introducing a new check in all locations.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
7 | 11 | high | 6 |
- 2026-10-30 13:58 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (fecba79506dea2886118fe5cd686d4edfdef60ae): fix: [security] Child records stay bound to their authorised https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/fecba79506dea2886118fe5cd686d4edfdef60ae.patch
- 2026-11-20 10:46 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/fecba79506dea2886118fe5cd686d4edfdef60ae.patch
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CVE-2026-133662 (GCVE-0-2026-133662)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-20 10:57 – Updated: 2026-11-20 16:37| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/90e… | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
2 events
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
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patch2vuln.pyon 2026-11-20 10:49 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/90e2845cf6239ed38962ce96c3003881f73c713e.patch
5d485ef0a573… - Confidence
- high
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
90e2845cf623
|
fix: [security] Analyser saves and results respect case and | 5d485ef0a573… |
Fix summary
The patch enforces authorization on both read and write paths for analyzer results. A new ownership/admin check gates result retrieval in both the web view and the API. Before any write operation, the target case is resolved and the caller's membership (or admin role) is verified; restricted-task permissions are additionally enforced. Input validation rejects malformed or conflicting destination selections, and task-note errors now abort the save. The front-end template was updated to surface 403 permission errors instead of silently treating them as generic failures.
Patch summary
Added can_read_result() in misp_modules_core.py to verify result ownership or admin role; called from both analyzer_api.py Result.get() and misp_modules.py misp_module_result_data(). Rewrote manage_notes_selected() to validate request structure, resolve the target case before any mutation, check case membership and restricted-task permissions, reject conflicting destinations, and propagate task-note errors. Updated the HTML template to check !res.ok instead of res.status==400 so 403 responses are displayed to the user.
CVSS rationale
AV:N – the vulnerability is exploitable over the network via the web UI or REST API. AC:L – exploitation requires only a valid session and a known or guessable UUID/ID; no race conditions or special timing. AT:N – no attack-target manipulation is needed. PR:L – any authenticated (non-admin) user can exploit. UI:N – no victim interaction required. VC:N – the application's own configuration/secrets are not exposed. VI:H – unauthorized writes corrupt another organization's case data (notes, tasks, MISP objects). VA:N – no denial-of-service impact. SC:H – another user's analyzer results are fully readable. SI:H – another organization's case integrity is compromised by injected data. SA:N – no security-authority impact.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-639 Both the read path (result UUID) and the write path (case_id, task_id) accepted user-supplied identifiers without verifying that the caller was authorized to access the referenced resource. This is a textbook IDOR / user-controlled key authorization bypass.
- CWE-862 The save handler performed writes to cases and tasks without any membership or role check, and the result-read endpoints returned data without any ownership check. The authorization logic was simply absent rather than bypassed via a crafted key, making CWE-862 a complementary mapping.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-129 The attacker manipulates the case_id, task_id, or result UUID parameters supplied in API or form requests to reference resources belonging to other users or organizations. This is the closest CAPEC pattern to the observed IDOR behavior. The mapping is a best-fit; CAPEC does not have a dedicated 'IDOR' pattern, and parameter tampering is the standard classification for user-controlled identifier abuse.
Assumptions to verify
- The affected version range is inferred from the explicit context (affected_version '0', fixed_version '4.1.0'); the patch itself does not encode version boundaries.
- PR:L assumes that any authenticated non-admin user can exploit the IDOR; the patch does not indicate additional role gates beyond authentication.
- AC:L assumes UUIDs are guessable or discoverable (e.g., via logs, other endpoints, or sequential enumeration); if UUIDs are truly random 128-bit, AC could be H, but the case/task ID path uses integer IDs which are trivially enumerable.
- CAPEC-129 is the closest available pattern; CAPEC lacks a dedicated IDOR entry, so parameter tampering is used as the best-fit mapping.
- The SSVC 'automatable: yes' assessment assumes integer-based case/task IDs are enumerable; UUID-based result reads may be harder to automate without prior knowledge of the UUID.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
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- 2026-10-30 15:02 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (90e2845cf6239ed38962ce96c3003881f73c713e): fix: [security] Analyser saves and results respect case and https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/90e2845cf6239ed38962ce96c3003881f73c713e.patch
- 2026-11-20 10:49 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/90e2845cf6239ed38962ce96c3003881f73c713e.patch
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CVE-2026-133661 (GCVE-0-2026-133661)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-20 10:57 – Updated: 2026-11-20 16:37| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/112… | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
2 events
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
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patch2vuln.pyon 2026-11-20 10:51 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
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https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/11263af5a84f27cb342fa80343c708d44f42e840.patch
55e725f916cd… - Confidence
- high
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
11263af5a84f
|
fix: [security] Connector credentials stay within their | 55e725f916cd… |
Fix summary
The patch enforces strict visibility and ownership checks on all connector instance access paths, including metadata retrieval, connectivity tests, and case listings. It ensures that case templates only expose and copy connector instances visible to the acting user. Additionally, it mandates API key re-entry when changing instance URLs or sharing scopes to prevent credential leakage or unauthorized reuse. Finally, it decouples outbound MISP keys from incoming alert authentication, requiring distinct credentials for alert ingestion.
Patch summary
Added `is_instance_visible_to_user` checks to connector API endpoints, tool helpers, and template serialization logic. Modified `normalize_instance_sharing_scope` and `edit_connector_instance_core` to detect URL/scope changes and enforce API key re-entry via `instance_edit_requires_api_key`. Updated `connector_from_key` in alerting to skip outbound MISP instances. Adjusted template JSON serialization to filter connector instances based on user visibility. Updated tests to use authorized global instances.
CVSS rationale
The vulnerability is exploitable over the network (AV:N) with low complexity (AC:L) and no attack target (AT:N). It requires low privileges (PR:L) as any authenticated user can exploit it. No user interaction is required (UI:N). The impact is limited to confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the local system (VC:L, VI:L, VA:L) as it involves unauthorized access to data and potential credential misuse, but does not compromise the entire system or other systems (SC:N, SI:N, SA:N).
Weakness rationale
- CWE-862 The primary issue is the lack of authorization checks when accessing connector instances and template data, allowing users to access resources they do not own or have visibility to.
- CWE-287 The system incorrectly accepted outbound MISP keys for incoming alert authentication, failing to properly distinguish and validate the source of credentials.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-126 The vulnerability allows users to access connector metadata and case data without proper authorization checks, fitting the pattern of accessing functionality without proper authentication/authorization.
- CAPEC-100 The credential scope confusion and lack of visibility checks allow users to leverage trusted context (e.g., shared keys or template attachments) to access resources in a multi-tenant or multi-user environment.
Assumptions to verify
- The CVSS vector assumes that the vulnerability requires low privileges (PR:L) as it affects authenticated users.
- The CAPEC mapping to CAPEC-100 is based on the multi-tenant nature of the credential scope confusion, but the exact attack pattern may vary.
- The affected version is assumed to be < 4.1.0 based on the fixed version provided in the metadata.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
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- 2026-10-30 16:41 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (11263af5a84f27cb342fa80343c708d44f42e840): fix: [security] Connector credentials stay within their https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/11263af5a84f27cb342fa80343c708d44f42e840.patch
- 2026-11-20 10:50 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/11263af5a84f27cb342fa80343c708d44f42e840.patch
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CVE-2026-133660 (GCVE-0-2026-133660)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-20 10:56 – Updated: 2026-11-20 16:38| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/ff9… | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
2 events
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-11-20 10:49 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/ff9a45f22aaf94297720b7f8f6800900276f3822.patch
bcca620d304d… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
ff9a45f22aaf
|
fix: [security] User directories and assignments respect | bcca620d304d… |
Fix summary
The fix introduces a centralised visibility-scoping function that applies the configured organisation limit consistently across all user directory queries (by ID, name, Matrix ID, and role). Assignment endpoints now verify that the requested user belongs to the caller's organisation and that the underlying cases are visible to the caller before returning any task data. Revoked case access also removes corresponding tasks from assignment views and statistics. Admin access and the global directory (when the limit is disabled) are preserved.
Patch summary
Added a get_visible_users(viewer) helper in admin_core.py that returns an organisation-scoped User query based on the LIMIT_USER_VIEW_TO_ORG setting and the viewer's role. Refactored get_users_page, get_user_by_lastname, and get_user_by_matrix_id to accept a viewer parameter and use the scoped query. Updated admin.py and admin_api.py endpoints to pass the authenticated user and use the new scoped queries instead of unfiltered lookups. In my_assignment_core.py, added a _visible_assignments(user, viewer) function that filters tasks by case visibility (public or organisation membership) before pagination. Updated my_assignment_api.py to verify the requester's organisation matches the target user's organisation and to pass the viewer into assignment queries. Updated get_task_info to skip cases the viewer cannot access. Updated the test that previously expected cross-organisation profile access to now expect a 404.
CVSS rationale
AV:N - exploitable over the network via API endpoints. AC:L - no special conditions; any authenticated user can call the endpoints with a different user identifier. AT:N - no attack target manipulation required. PR:L - requires a low-privilege authenticated user (OrgAdmin or regular user with a valid API key). UI:N - no user interaction needed. VC:H - high confidentiality impact: user profiles, task assignments, and private case titles from other organisations are exposed. VI:N, VA:N - no integrity or availability impact. SC:N, SI:N, SA:N - no impact on other systems; the data resides within the same FlowIntel instance.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-862 The directory and assignment endpoints lacked consistent authorization checks to enforce organisation boundaries. User lookups by ID, name, and Matrix ID did not verify the caller's organisation membership, and assignment retrieval did not verify that the target user belonged to the caller's organisation or that the underlying cases were accessible.
- CWE-200 The primary security impact is the disclosure of user profiles, task assignments, and case titles to users who should not have access to that data due to organisation boundaries.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-100 The closest plausible CAPEC is Parameter Tampering: an authenticated user supplies a user_id (or last name / Matrix ID) belonging to another organisation, and the application returns that user's data without verifying the caller's organisational access. The uncertainty is that this is fundamentally a missing-authorization issue rather than a classic parameter-tampering scenario, but CAPEC-100 best captures the pattern of manipulating a request parameter to reference an out-of-scope resource.
Assumptions to verify
- The affected version range is assumed to be all versions prior to 4.1.0 based on the explicit context fixed_version; the exact earliest affected version is not stated in the patch.
- PR:L assumes that any authenticated non-admin user (including OrgAdmin) can exploit the directory disclosure; the assignment disclosure specifically requires OrgAdmin or Admin role.
- CAPEC-100 (Parameter Tampering) is the closest available mapping; the underlying issue is more precisely a missing authorization check (CWE-862) rather than classic parameter tampering, but no CAPEC entry directly models 'missing org-scope authorization on a lookup endpoint'.
- The LIMIT_USER_VIEW_TO_ORG setting must be enabled for the directory disclosure to be a violation of intended behaviour; when disabled, cross-organisation visibility is by design. The assignment disclosure, however, appears to be a bug regardless of that setting.
- CVSS VC:H assumes that exposure of user identities, task assignments, and case titles constitutes a high confidentiality impact in the context of a multi-tenant case-management platform.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
7 | 11 | medium | 5 |
- 2026-11-02 08:20 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (ff9a45f22aaf94297720b7f8f6800900276f3822): fix: [security] User directories and assignments respect https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/ff9a45f22aaf94297720b7f8f6800900276f3822.patch
- 2026-11-20 10:48 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/ff9a45f22aaf94297720b7f8f6800900276f3822.patch
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CVE-2026-133659 (GCVE-0-2026-133659)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-20 10:55 – Updated: 2026-11-20 16:38| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/a39… | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
2 events
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-11-20 10:46 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/a39038de93a46911e0d13283d5fa7812e114538b.patch
af2c034661f8… - Confidence
- high
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
a39038de93a4
|
fix: [security] SSO identities and organisations respect | af2c034661f8… |
Fix summary
The fix enforces strict identity and organisation trust boundaries across all SSO providers. Keycloak now requires a verified email claim and no longer falls back to preferred_username. A new shared identity-resolution function rejects any email that maps to an account registered under a different sign-in provider, preventing cross-provider account collision. Entra ID role mapping now requires configured group object IDs (UUIDs) instead of display names, eliminating the name-duplication escalation vector. Default organisation creation always allocates a new organisation rather than reusing one by name match. Case sharing via the API now rejects ambiguous organisation names and requires an explicit organisation ID.
Patch summary
Added app/account/sso_identity.py with a find_sso_user() helper that resolves an email only within its existing auth_provider and returns an error on cross-provider collision. Keycloak token validation now requires email_verified to be true and removes the preferred_username fallback. Entra group resolution switched from displayName to object ID (UUID) with regex validation; default group names removed from config. create_default_org() in admin_core.py now always creates a new Org instead of querying by name. get_org_by_name() in common_core.py changed from .first() to .one_or_none() to raise MultipleResultsFound on ambiguity. case_api.py catches MultipleResultsFound and returns a 400 error directing the caller to use oid. Configuration defaults, template.env, and installation documentation updated to reflect UUID-based group configuration and new SSO identity rules.
CVSS rationale
AV:N: SSO endpoints are network-accessible. AC:L: the attack requires only a valid SSO identity or tenant membership; no race conditions or special timing. AT:N: no manipulation of a separate attack target is needed. PR:L: the attacker needs a low-privilege SSO account or tenant membership. UI:N: no victim interaction is required; the collision occurs server-side during provisioning or login. VC:H: unauthorized access to private case data and account information. VI:H: privilege escalation via group name duplication and account takeover via cross-provider email collision. VA:N: no denial-of-service impact. SC:N: all impacts are confined to the Flowintel application. SI:N: no impact on other components. SA:N: no safety impact.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-287 Keycloak accepted unverified email claims and all SSO providers resolved emails to accounts regardless of the original sign-in method, allowing an attacker to authenticate as a different user's identity. This is a failure to properly validate the identity assertion during authentication.
- CWE-639 Entra ID role mapping used user-controllable group display names as the authorization key, and organisation provisioning used user-controlled profile names as the lookup key. An attacker could duplicate these names to gain unauthorized roles or organisation membership.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-126 The vulnerabilities arise from the application incorrectly handling edge cases in identity resolution: unverified email claims, cross-provider email collisions, duplicate group display names, and duplicate organisation names. The application assumed these identifiers were unique and trustworthy when they were not. CAPEC-126 is the closest available pattern; a more specific CAPEC for identity-confusion or name-collision attacks does not exist in the CAPEC catalogue, making this the best available match.
Assumptions to verify
- The affected version range is assumed to be all versions prior to 4.1.0 based on the explicit context; the patch does not contain version-specific markers.
- PR:L assumes the attacker already possesses a valid SSO identity or Entra tenant membership; the patch does not specify whether SSO is enabled by default.
- CAPEC-126 is selected as the closest available attack pattern; no CAPEC specifically covers identity-confusion or name-collision attacks, so this mapping is approximate.
- The CVSS vector assumes the SSO endpoints are reachable over the network without additional network segmentation; the patch does not specify deployment topology.
- The patch does not indicate whether the vulnerabilities were disclosed under a coordinated disclosure program or whether a CVE has been assigned.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
8 | 11 | high | 5 |
- 2026-11-02 09:44 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (a39038de93a46911e0d13283d5fa7812e114538b): fix: [security] SSO identities and organisations respect https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/a39038de93a46911e0d13283d5fa7812e114538b.patch
- 2026-11-20 10:45 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/a39038de93a46911e0d13283d5fa7812e114538b.patch
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CVE-2026-133658 (GCVE-0-2026-133658)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-20 10:55 – Updated: 2026-11-20 16:38| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/48e… | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
2 events
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-11-20 10:45 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/48e9e1b847ecd22da11e70829f1ecfaa0df3791d.patch
dbf4ccb08942… - Confidence
- high
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
48e9e1b847ec
|
fix: [security] Matrix relays use the represented user's | dbf4ccb08942… |
Fix summary
The fix introduces a protected, non-editable is_bot database marker to identify trusted relay accounts, replacing the previous reliance on editable name and email fields. The user resolution function now returns the same principal for both authentication/permission checks and request handlers, ensuring that a represented user's actual role governs all operations. Relay requests without a valid MATRIX-ID, bot-to-bot requests, and ordinary API keys carrying a MATRIX-ID header are all refused. New bot accounts are assigned the Read Only role instead of Admin. Only administrators can edit or delete registered bot accounts, preventing OrgAdmins from resetting bot credentials. An operator script (bin/register_matrix_bot.py) provides explicit, ID-based bot registration without relying on profile fields.
Patch summary
Added an is_bot Boolean column to the User model via a new Alembic migration (default false). Replaced get_user_api() calls with a new get_user_from_api(headers) function that resolves a single acting user for both permission checks and handlers, enforcing that bot requests require a valid MATRIX-ID and that the resolved user is not itself a bot. Updated all API endpoints (admin, calendar, assignment, templating, tools) and permission decorators to use the new resolution function. Added is_bot checks in admin edit/delete handlers to restrict bot account management to administrators. Modified init_db.py to assign new bots the Read Only role and set is_bot=True. Added bin/register_matrix_bot.py for explicit operator registration by database user ID. Updated installation and user documentation to describe the new relay security model and upgrade procedure.
CVSS rationale
AV:N: The vulnerability is exploitable over the network via the Flowintel REST API. AC:L: Exploitation requires only sending a standard API request with the relay's API key and a MATRIX-ID header; no race conditions or special timing are needed. AT:N: No manipulation of the attack target is required. PR:L: The attacker needs a valid Flowintel user account with a restricted role (e.g., Read Only) and access to the relay's API key or the ability to send relay-formatted requests. UI:N: No user interaction is required; the attack is fully automated via API calls. VC:N: No direct confidentiality impact on the vulnerable component is evidenced. VI:N: The vulnerable component's own integrity is not directly compromised. VA:N: No availability impact. SC:N: No impact on other systems. SI:H: The primary impact is on data integrity, as restricted users can create, modify, or delete cases, tasks, calendar events, templates, and directory entries they should not have access to. SA:N: No impact on other systems' security.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-285 The primary vulnerability is that permission/role checks evaluated the relay bot's Admin role while the actual request handlers acted as the represented (lower-privileged) user. This mismatch in the authorization principal allowed restricted users to perform actions beyond their granted permissions.
- CWE-287 The relay bot's identity was established by matching editable user profile fields (first_name, last_name) rather than a protected credential or marker. This allowed ordinary users to modify their profiles to match the expected bot identity and be recognized as the trusted relay, constituting an authentication weakness.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-126 The relay bot held Admin-level privileges that were incorrectly applied during authorization checks for requests intended to act on behalf of a lower-privileged user. An attacker with a restricted account exploited this privilege misalignment to perform unauthorized write operations. The secondary vector (editable name-based bot identification) further enabled privilege escalation by allowing impersonation of the high-privilege relay account. CAPEC-126 is the closest match as it covers scenarios where a system's privilege assignment or enforcement is misconfigured, allowing a lower-privileged actor to leverage higher privileges.
Assumptions to verify
- The affected version range is inferred from the explicit context (affected_version 0, fixed_version 4.1.0); the exact earliest affected release is not confirmed by the patch alone.
- CVSS PR:L assumes the attacker needs a valid user account and access to the relay's API key; if the relay's API key is trivially obtainable, PR could be lower.
- The CAPEC-126 mapping is the closest available pattern; the vulnerability combines authorization confusion (CWE-285) with weak identity binding (CWE-287), and no single CAPEC captures both aspects precisely.
- The assumption that the Matrix relay is an external service sending requests with a shared API key is inferred from the code structure and documentation; the exact deployment topology is not fully specified in the patch.
- CVSS SI:H is assigned based on the ability to perform unauthorized write operations; if the relay also exposes read operations beyond the user's scope, VC could be elevated, but the patch evidence primarily demonstrates write-privilege escalation.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
8 | 11 | high | 5 |
- 2026-11-02 11:09 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (48e9e1b847ecd22da11e70829f1ecfaa0df3791d): fix: [security] Matrix relays use the represented user's https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/48e9e1b847ecd22da11e70829f1ecfaa0df3791d.patch
- 2026-11-20 10:44 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/48e9e1b847ecd22da11e70829f1ecfaa0df3791d.patch
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CVE-2026-133652 (GCVE-0-2026-133652)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-20 10:24 – Updated: 2026-11-20 16:39| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/a7f… | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
2 events
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-11-20 10:20 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/a7f025ecfdf60dc0ea3438c79b21a8edc2449836.patch
cc71c944b258… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
a7f025ecfdf6
|
fix: [security] Revoke browser sessions when credentials | cc71c944b258… |
Fix summary
The fix binds browser session identifiers to the account's current credentials using an HMAC-SHA256 token derived from the user ID, auth provider, creation date, and password hash. All login paths (local, SSO, remembered) now rotate the server-side session ID. Self-service email and password changes require the current password. A self-service password change refreshes the owner's session while revoking all other browser sessions and remembered logins. Administrator password resets additionally rotate the user's API key. Legacy bare-ID session identifiers are rejected by the user loader, and session housekeeping code is updated to parse the new format safely.
Patch summary
Added a session_token() method to the User model that computes an HMAC-SHA256 over the user ID, auth provider, creation date, and password hash; get_id() now returns a composite identifier of the form 'id:token'. The load_user callback validates the new format and rejects legacy bare IDs using constant-time comparison. A _start_user_session() helper clears the session, logs out, logs in, and regenerates the session ID; it replaces all prior login_user() call sites across local, Entra ID, Keycloak, and SimpleSAML login flows. A user_loaded_from_cookie signal handler triggers session ID rotation on remembered-login restoration. A current_password field and validator were added to the EditUserForm, requiring the existing password for email or password changes on local accounts. The admin_edit_user_core function now regenerates the API key on password reset. The _invalidate_user_sessions and list_active_user_sessions helpers were updated to parse the new identifier format via a session_user_id() helper. Test logi
CVSS rationale
AV:N: The vulnerability is in a web application accessible over the network. AC:L: Exploitation requires only a valid session or remember-me cookie and knowledge of the user ID (often sequential); no special race conditions or complex timing are needed. AT:N: No manipulation of the attack target is required. PR:L: The attacker needs a low-privilege valid session (any authenticated user) or a stolen remember-me cookie; no administrative access is required. UI:N: The session persists without any further user interaction; the victim does not need to perform any action for the attacker to retain access. VC:L: An attacker with a persistent session can view data accessible to the compromised account, but this is a secondary effect. VI:H: The attacker can change the account's email and password without knowing the current password, resulting in full account takeover and persistent unauthorized access. VA:H: The legitimate user's access is undermined by the attacker's persistent session, and the attacker can maintain indefinite access. SC/SI/SA:N: The impact is confined to the Flowintel application itself; no other components are directly affected.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-613 The primary weakness is that browser sessions and remembered logins were not invalidated when credentials changed. The session identifier (a bare user ID) did not incorporate any credential state, so sessions outlived password changes and could be restored after deletion. This is a textbook insufficient session expiration issue.
- CWE-384 Server-side session IDs were not rotated upon any login event (local, SSO, or remembered). An attacker could fix a known session ID before the victim authenticated and retain access afterward. The patch adds session ID regeneration on all authentication transitions.
- CWE-287 The session identifier was a bare, predictable numeric user ID with no cryptographic binding to the account's credentials. This allowed session identifiers to be trivially guessed or forged by anyone who knew a user's ID, constituting improper authentication. The uncertainty is that the primary impact is session persistence rather than direct forgery, but the root cause is the lack of credential binding in the authentication token.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-18 The session identifier was a bare sequential user ID, making it trivially predictable. An attacker who knew or guessed a user's ID could construct a valid session identifier without any cryptographic secret. This is the closest CAPEC to the root cause: the session token lacked unpredictability and was not bound to any secret. The uncertainty is that the patch's primary fix is credential binding and session rotation rather than increasing token entropy, but the predictability of the bare ID is the enabling condition for the session persistence and fixation issues.
- CAPEC-60 An attacker who obtained a valid session or remember-me cookie (via XSS, network sniffing, or other means) could maintain access after the legitimate user changed their password, effectively hijacking the session indefinitely. The lack of session revocation on credential change and the absence of session ID rotation made this hijack persistent. This is a secondary mapping; CAPEC-18 is preferred as the root cause, but CAPEC-60 better describes the attacker's end-to-end goal.
Assumptions to verify
- The affected version range is inferred from the explicit context (affected_version '0', fixed_version '4.1.0'); the patch itself does not enumerate specific prior versions.
- CVSS PR:L assumes the attacker already holds a valid session or remember-me cookie; if the attacker must first obtain one via a separate vulnerability, the effective privilege requirement may be higher.
- CVSS VC:L is assigned because a persistent session grants data access, but the primary impact is integrity (account takeover) rather than direct data exfiltration.
- CAPEC-18 (Session Prediction) is selected as the closest match because the bare user ID is the root cause of the predictability; however, the patch's primary remediation is credential binding and session rotation rather than increasing token entropy, so the mapping is approximate.
- The patch does not specify whether the vulnerability was reported through a coordinated disclosure process or a public channel; elhoim is credited as reporter based solely on the commit message.
- The SSVC 'automatable: yes' assessment assumes the attacker can script session reuse or credential modification via HTTP requests; no evidence of an existing automated exploit is present.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
6 | 11 | medium | 6 |
- 2026-11-02 13:43 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (a7f025ecfdf60dc0ea3438c79b21a8edc2449836): fix: [security] Revoke browser sessions when credentials https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/a7f025ecfdf60dc0ea3438c79b21a8edc2449836.patch
- 2026-11-20 10:19 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/a7f025ecfdf60dc0ea3438c79b21a8edc2449836.patch
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CVE-2026-133651 (GCVE-0-2026-133651)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-20 10:24 – Updated: 2026-11-20 18:23- CWE-352 - Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/c29… | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
2 events
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
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patch2vuln.pyon 2026-11-20 10:16 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/c29a27c4973f0e47cb235cdfbeb8743bd11a3bbc.patch
8d58806814d8… - Confidence
- high
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
c29a27c4973f
|
fix: [security] Require CSRF-protected POST for destructive | 8d58806814d8… |
Fix summary
The vulnerability is remediated by restricting all fourteen affected web routes to accept only POST requests, ensuring that Flask-WTF's CSRF token validation is enforced. All fifteen client-side callers (JavaScript fetch calls and HTML template scripts) were updated to send POST requests with the page's CSRF token in the X-CSRFToken header, preserving legitimate user interactions while blocking cross-site forged requests.
Patch summary
Backend: Changed the methods parameter on fourteen Flask route decorators from methods=['GET'] or methods=['GET','POST'] to methods=['POST'] across app/admin/admin.py, app/case/case.py, app/case/task.py, app/connectors/connectors.py, app/custom_tags/custom_tags.py, app/templating/templating.py, and app/tools/tools.py. Frontend: Updated fifteen fetch() calls in JavaScript files and HTML templates to include method: 'POST' and headers: {'X-CSRFToken': $('#csrf_token').val()}. No changes to permission decorators, query parameters, or API-key-authenticated routes.
CVSS rationale
AV:N - exploit is over the network via a web browser. AC:L - crafting a link or page that triggers a GET request is trivial. AT:N - no attack target manipulation beyond the victim's browser. PR:N - the attacker requires no account; the victim's existing session is used. UI:A - the victim must actively navigate to or click a crafted link (commit message references 'cross-site navigation'). VC:N, VI:N, VA:N - no direct impact on the application's own confidentiality, integrity, or availability. SC:N, SI:H, SA:N - the impact is on the integrity of the victim's data (deletion/modification of cases, tasks, templates, connectors, tags, taxonomies, galaxies) with no cross-system impact.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-352 The routes accepted GET requests, which are not subject to Flask-WTF's CSRF token check. This allowed a cross-site navigation to invoke destructive state-changing operations using the victim's authenticated session, a textbook CSRF scenario.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-124 The attack pattern involves an attacker crafting a request (in this case a GET navigation) that is sent to the target application using the victim's authenticated session cookie, causing the application to perform an unintended state-changing action. This is the closest and most direct CAPEC match for a GET-based CSRF bypass of token validation.
Assumptions to verify
- The affected_version '0' from explicit context is treated as a placeholder indicating all versions prior to 4.1.0; the exact earliest affected version is not specified in the patch.
- UI:A is selected based on the commit message referencing 'cross-site navigation'; if an attacker could use a passive vector (e.g., an auto-loading image tag), UI could be P, but the evidence specifically describes navigation.
- PR:N assumes the attacker does not need their own account; the victim's authenticated session is sufficient. If the application requires the victim to have editor or admin role, this is a precondition on the victim, not a privilege requirement for the attacker.
- CAPEC-124 is the closest standard mapping; no more specific CAPEC exists for GET-based CSRF bypass of framework token validation.
- The patch does not indicate whether the CSRF token was previously absent from the page or only not enforced on GET; the fix implies the token was available in the DOM but the GET method bypassed validation.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
8 | 11 | high | 5 |
- 2026-11-02 14:03 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (c29a27c4973f0e47cb235cdfbeb8743bd11a3bbc): fix: [security] Require CSRF-protected POST for destructive https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/c29a27c4973f0e47cb235cdfbeb8743bd11a3bbc.patch
- 2026-11-20 10:15 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/c29a27c4973f0e47cb235cdfbeb8743bd11a3bbc.patch
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"dateUpdated": "2026-11-20T18:23:19.024Z",
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CVE-2026-133648 (GCVE-0-2026-133648)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-20 10:23 – Updated: 2026-11-20 18:22- CWE-295 - Improper Certificate Validation
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/b8e… | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
2 events
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-11-20 10:15 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/b8e257ab17632eb37c912485cbd78ee7514b764f.patch
286e145e7697… - Confidence
- high
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
b8e257ab1763
|
fix: [security] Verify TLS certificates for MISP and mail | 286e145e7697… |
Fix summary
The fix introduces a shared TLS utility module that enforces certificate and hostname verification by default for all MISP and mail connections. MISP clients now receive a proper SSL verification context instead of ssl=False, and IMAP/SMTP connections use a verified ssl.SSLContext. Operators may configure a private CA bundle path or explicitly disable verification (which fails closed on malformed input). The previous urllib3 warning suppression is removed, and upgrade documentation warns that previously accepted self-signed or mismatched certificates will now cause connection failures.
Patch summary
Added new file app/utils/tls.py providing misp_ssl() and mail_ssl_context() helpers that read MISP_VERIFY_SSL and MAIL_VERIFY_SSL config values (default True) and return appropriate verification settings or SSL contexts. Replaced all ssl=False arguments in PyMISP constructor calls across 8 files with ssl=misp_ssl(). Replaced bare server.starttls() with server.starttls(context=mail_ssl_context()) and added ssl_context=mail_ssl_context() to IMAP4_SSL calls. Removed all urllib3.disable_warnings() calls. Added MISP_VERIFY_SSL and MAIL_VERIFY_SSL to the default config template. Added installation documentation for TLS configuration and upgrade notes. The _verify_setting() helper raises ValueError on invalid input, ensuring fail-closed behavior.
CVSS rationale
AV:N - The attack is performed over the network by intercepting traffic between Flowintel and MISP/mail servers. AC:L - No special race conditions or complex setup are needed; the attacker only needs a network position on the path. AT:N - Flowintel is a server application; no active user on the target is required for the connection to be made. PR:N - The attacker does not need any credentials or account on Flowintel. UI:N - No user interaction is required. VC:H - All data in transit (API keys, mail credentials, full threat intelligence content) is readable by the attacker. VI:H - The attacker can modify or inject threat intelligence data returned to Flowintel. VA:N - No denial-of-service impact is indicated. SC:H - The MISP instance's data and the mail server's data are exposed to the attacker. SI:H - Forged or modified data can be injected into the MISP instance via the compromised channel. SA:N - No security authority impact is evident.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-295 The application explicitly disabled TLS certificate verification by passing ssl=False to all MISP client connections and by using unverified SSL contexts for IMAP/SMTP. This is a textbook case of improper certificate validation where the client accepts any server certificate without verifying the chain or hostname.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-119 The disabled certificate verification directly enables a classic man-in-the-middle attack: an on-path attacker presents a self-signed or rogue certificate, Flowintel accepts it without validation, and the attacker reads and modifies all traffic. CAPEC-119 is the closest standard attack pattern describing interception and modification of communications between two parties. The patch commit message explicitly references an 'on-path attacker' impersonating the server, confirming this mapping.
Assumptions to verify
- The affected version range is inferred from the explicit context (affected_version '0', fixed_version '4.1.0'); the patch itself does not enumerate all prior releases.
- CVSS VI:H assumes the attacker can successfully inject or modify threat intelligence data in transit; if the MISP API enforces additional integrity checks server-side, the practical integrity impact may be lower.
- CAPEC-119 (Man-in-the-Middle) is selected as the closest standard attack pattern; the patch does not reference a specific CAPEC, and the attack could also be described under CAPEC-123 (Session Hijacking) or CAPEC-107 (Web Service Cross-Site Request Forgery) in a broader sense, but CAPEC-119 most directly matches the described on-path interception scenario.
- The patch assumes MISP connector URLs use HTTPS; if an operator configures a plain HTTP MISP URL, TLS verification is not applicable and the vulnerability does not manifest in the same way.
- PR:N assumes the attacker does not need any Flowintel account; the vulnerability is in the outbound connection from Flowintel to MISP/mail, not in Flowintel's own authentication.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
8 | 11 | high | 5 |
- 2026-11-02 14:48 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (b8e257ab17632eb37c912485cbd78ee7514b764f): fix: [security] Verify TLS certificates for MISP and mail https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/b8e257ab17632eb37c912485cbd78ee7514b764f.patch
- 2026-11-20 10:15 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/b8e257ab17632eb37c912485cbd78ee7514b764f.patch
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CVE-2026-133631 (GCVE-0-2026-133631)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-20 09:10 – Updated: 2026-11-20 18:18| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/34d… | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
2 events
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-11-20 09:04 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/34d151b8dceb1fea925b353f04a9483aba0a22b1.patch
c2ffe93f6a63… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
34d151b8dceb
|
fix: [security] Keep note references and AI tooling within | c2ffe93f6a63… |
Fix summary
Three remediations are applied: (1) Note variable resolution now enforces an audience-based authorization check so that cross-case and cross-task references only expand when the destination case's assigned organisations can read the referenced case; (2) the chatbot API tool is restricted to an explicit allow-list of reviewed read-only and search operations, with administrative endpoints always blocked, path validation against injection and SSRF, and write operations gated behind an explicit CHATBOT_ALLOW_WRITES configuration flag; (3) AI report requests are delivered to the child process via a private anonymous temporary file on stdin instead of argv, keeping credentials and case content out of the process listing.
Patch summary
In note_variables.py, a new _audience_can_view() function verifies that the destination case's organisations are a subset of the referenced case's organisations before resolving cross-case or cross-task references; case_notes.py passes the resolved case object instead of a raw integer ID. In chatbot_core.py, a _chatbot_api_request() validator and a _READ_API_PATHS regex allow-list are added; unsupported methods, external URLs, path traversal, admin routes, and non-allow-listed operations are refused before the MCP call. In CaseCore.py, the subprocess invocation for AI reports is changed from passing URL, payload, and headers as argv to writing them as JSON into a tempfile.TemporaryFile and feeding it via stdin. A CHATBOT_ALLOW_WRITES flag is added to the default config, and documentation is updated in the installation and user manuals.
CVSS rationale
AV:N: FlowIntel is a network-accessible web application. AC:L: An authenticated user can craft note references or interact with the chatbot without special conditions. AT:N: No specific attack target is required. PR:L: A low-privilege authenticated user with access to a shared note or the chatbot is sufficient. UI:N: No victim interaction beyond normal use is needed. VC:H: Private case data (titles, notes, MISP objects, user data) is exposed to unauthorized viewers and external AI/MISP systems. VI:L: The chatbot can invoke state-changing endpoints, allowing limited data modification. VA:N: No availability impact is evidenced. SC:L: Sensitive data is forwarded to external AI (Ollama) and MISP instances. SI:N: No subsequent integrity impact is demonstrated. SA:N: No subsequent availability impact.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-862 Note variable resolution did not verify that the destination case's audience had read access to the referenced case, allowing an authenticated user to pull private data from cases they are not authorised to view.
- CWE-284 The chatbot API tool lacked an allow-list or restriction on which API endpoints the model could invoke, permitting access to administrative and state-changing routes.
- CWE-200 The Ollama bearer token and case content were passed as command-line arguments, visible in the local process table to any user on the host.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-126 The note variable resolution relied solely on the viewer's own privileges without checking the destination case's audience, effectively an incorrectly implemented authorization scheme. An attacker crafts cross-case references in a note they can view to exfiltrate data from cases outside their access scope. This is the closest CAPEC to the missing audience-based authorization check.
- CAPEC-12 The chatbot API tool was configured to permit unrestricted API calls without an allow-list, representing an application configuration error that exposes administrative and write endpoints to model-driven requests. The fix introduces a restrictive default configuration. This mapping is approximate; no CAPEC specifically covers LLM-driven API over-permissiveness.
Assumptions to verify
- The affected version range is inferred from the explicit context (affected_version 0, fixed_version 4.1.0); no specific prior version boundary is confirmed in the patch.
- PR:L assumes the attacker is an authenticated FlowIntel user with access to at least one shared or imported note and the chatbot interface; unauthenticated access is not evidenced.
- VI:L for the chatbot assumes CHATBOT_ALLOW_WRITES is disabled by default; if enabled, the integrity impact could be higher.
- SC:L assumes AI report data and MISP sends reach external systems; if the deployment is fully air-gapped, SC could be N.
- CAPEC-126 is the closest available pattern for the missing audience-based authorization; no CAPEC specifically models cross-entity reference resolution authorization gaps.
- CAPEC-12 is used for the chatbot over-permissiveness; no CAPEC specifically covers LLM-driven unrestricted API invocation.
- The credential-in-argv issue (CWE-200) is a local information exposure and may not be exploitable in containerized or single-user deployments; its contribution to the overall CVSS is minor.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
5 | 11 | medium | 7 |
- 2026-11-03 10:53 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (34d151b8dceb1fea925b353f04a9483aba0a22b1): fix: [security] Keep note references and AI tooling within https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/34d151b8dceb1fea925b353f04a9483aba0a22b1.patch
- 2026-11-20 09:03 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/34d151b8dceb1fea925b353f04a9483aba0a22b1.patch
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CVE-2026-133630 (GCVE-0-2026-133630)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-20 09:09 – Updated: 2026-11-20 18:17| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/6b2… | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
2 events
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-11-20 09:03 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/6b26b3f8cf9fab13244d1496443f822114ce4d05.patch
6cdbee24e7fd… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
6b26b3f8cf9f
|
fix: [security] Keep checkout credentials out of Docker build | 6cdbee24e7fd… |
Fix summary
The checkout step is configured to not persist credentials into the workspace, and the full branch history is fetched during the authenticated checkout phase. This ensures the job token is never written to the Git configuration file that enters the Docker build context, eliminating the credential from build cache layers while preserving the ability to resolve release tags against the main branch.
Patch summary
In .github/workflows/docker.yml, the actions/checkout@v4 step is updated with persist-credentials: false to prevent the job token from being stored in .git/config, and fetch-depth: 0 to retrieve full history during the authenticated checkout. The subsequent git fetch origin main command in the branch-check step is removed since the origin/main reference is already available locally from the full-depth checkout.
CVSS rationale
AV:L: Exploitation requires local access to the CI/CD build environment or exported build cache; it is not remotely exploitable over a network. AC:L: Once build cache access is obtained, extracting the token from .git/config is straightforward. AT:N: No active user interaction is required. PR:H: The attacker needs high privileges (access to the CI/CD build infrastructure or build cache storage). UI:N: No user interaction is needed. VC/VI/VA:N: The CI/CD system itself is not directly compromised. SC:H: The exposed token grants full read access to the private repository, a separate system. SI:N: The job token typically has read-only scope by default; no evidence of write access. SA:N: No availability impact on the secondary system.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-522 The GitHub Actions job token (a bearer credential) was persisted in .git/config and included in the Docker build context and cache layers without being removed, constituting insufficient protection of credentials in a build artifact.
- CWE-200 The credential was exposed in Docker build cache layers accessible to anyone with access to the build environment, constituting information disclosure of a sensitive authentication token.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-1 The closest plausible CAPEC is Session Hijacking: the exposed job token functions as a bearer credential that, if obtained from the build cache, allows an attacker to impersonate the CI/CD system's authenticated session and access the private repository. This is an imperfect mapping because the token is a CI/CD job token rather than a user session cookie, but the underlying mechanism (stealing a valid credential to assume an authenticated identity) aligns with the CAPEC-1 pattern. No CAPEC specifically covers credential leakage in build artifacts, so CAPEC-1 is the best available match.
Assumptions to verify
- The GitHub Actions job token has read-only scope to the repository by default; if write scope is configured, SI could be elevated to Low.
- The build cache is accessible to a limited set of actors (CI/CD operators or platform administrators); broader exposure (e.g., public Docker registry with cached layers) would change AV and PR ratings.
- CAPEC-1 (Session Hijacking) is the closest available mapping; no CAPEC specifically addresses credential leakage in CI/CD build artifacts.
- The affected version range is inferred from the explicit context (affected_version: 0, fixed_version: 4.1.0); the exact first vulnerable release is not confirmed by the patch alone.
- The vulnerability is specific to the GitHub Actions Docker build workflow and does not affect the flowintel application runtime.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
7 | 11 | medium | 5 |
- 2026-11-03 12:17 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (6b26b3f8cf9fab13244d1496443f822114ce4d05): fix: [security] Keep checkout credentials out of Docker build https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/6b26b3f8cf9fab13244d1496443f822114ce4d05.patch
- 2026-11-20 09:02 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/6b26b3f8cf9fab13244d1496443f822114ce4d05.patch
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"cweId": "CWE-522",
"description": "CWE-522 Insufficiently Protected Credentials",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
},
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-200",
"description": "CWE-200 Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-20T09:09:40.890Z",
"orgId": "5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8",
"shortName": "CIRCL"
},
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"name": "Security patch",
"tags": [
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],
"url": "https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/6b26b3f8cf9fab13244d1496443f822114ce4d05"
}
],
"solutions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "The checkout step is configured to not persist credentials into the workspace, and the full branch history is fetched during the authenticated checkout phase. This ensures the job token is never written to the Git configuration file that enters the Docker build context, eliminating the credential from build cache layers while preserving the ability to resolve release tags against the main branch."
}
],
"title": "flowintel CI/CD Workflow Exposes Checkout Credentials in Docker Build Cache",
"x_gcve": [
{
"extensions": {
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"ai_annotations": [
{
"ai_level": "generated",
"description": "Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.",
"gna_source": 1,
"models": [
{
"gna_source": 1,
"identifier": "qwen3.8:27b",
"name": "qwen3.8:27b",
"source": "ollama"
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"bcp-05-x-02": {
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"The GitHub Actions job token has read-only scope to the repository by default; if write scope is configured, SI could be elevated to Low.",
"The build cache is accessible to a limited set of actors (CI/CD operators or platform administrators); broader exposure (e.g., public Docker registry with cached layers) would change AV and PR ratings.",
"CAPEC-1 (Session Hijacking) is the closest available mapping; no CAPEC specifically addresses credential leakage in CI/CD build artifacts.",
"The affected version range is inferred from the explicit context (affected_version: 0, fixed_version: 4.1.0); the exact first vulnerable release is not confirmed by the patch alone.",
"The vulnerability is specific to the GitHub Actions Docker build workflow and does not affect the flowintel application runtime."
],
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"capecId": "CAPEC-1",
"rationale": "The closest plausible CAPEC is Session Hijacking: the exposed job token functions as a bearer credential that, if obtained from the build cache, allows an attacker to impersonate the CI/CD system\u0027s authenticated session and access the private repository. This is an imperfect mapping because the token is a CI/CD job token rather than a user session cookie, but the underlying mechanism (stealing a valid credential to assume an authenticated identity) aligns with the CAPEC-1 pattern. No CAPEC specifically covers credential leakage in build artifacts, so CAPEC-1 is the best available match."
}
],
"commit": "6b26b3f8cf9fab13244d1496443f822114ce4d05",
"confidence": "medium",
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "reporter",
"value": "elhoim"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "remediation developer",
"value": "David Cruciani"
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],
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"fixSummary": "The checkout step is configured to not persist credentials into the workspace, and the full branch history is fetched during the authenticated checkout phase. This ensures the job token is never written to the Git configuration file that enters the Docker build context, eliminating the credential from build cache layers while preserving the ability to resolve release tags against the main branch.",
"generatedAt": "2026-11-20T09:03:23.235755Z",
"generator": "patch2vuln.py",
"model": "qwen3.8:27b",
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"potentialErrors": [],
"rankings": [
{
"agreementScore": 11,
"assumptionCount": 5,
"confidence": "medium",
"model": "qwen3.8:27b",
"score": 7
}
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"selectedModel": "qwen3.8:27b",
"selectionMethod": "deterministic-consensus-v1",
"selectionNotice": "The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required."
},
"patchSha256": "6cdbee24e7fdf8bec92a1ccaa19b9f8c7fbf5229080dfb4029456b9fe84cf493",
"patchSummary": "In .github/workflows/docker.yml, the actions/checkout@v4 step is updated with persist-credentials: false to prevent the job token from being stored in .git/config, and fetch-depth: 0 to retrieve full history during the authenticated checkout. The subsequent git fetch origin main command in the branch-check step is removed since the origin/main reference is already available locally from the full-depth checkout.",
"patchTruncated": false,
"patches": [
{
"commit": "6b26b3f8cf9fab13244d1496443f822114ce4d05",
"date": "Tue, 3 Nov 2026 13:17:37 +0100",
"patchSha256": "6cdbee24e7fdf8bec92a1ccaa19b9f8c7fbf5229080dfb4029456b9fe84cf493",
"retrievedAt": "2026-11-20T09:02:44.223116Z",
"source": "https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/6b26b3f8cf9fab13244d1496443f822114ce4d05.patch",
"sourceUrl": "https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/6b26b3f8cf9fab13244d1496443f822114ce4d05.patch",
"subject": "fix: [security] Keep checkout credentials out of Docker build"
}
],
"source": "https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/6b26b3f8cf9fab13244d1496443f822114ce4d05.patch",
"ssvc": {
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{
"Exploitation": "none"
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{
"Automatable": "no"
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{
"Technical Impact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "Supplier",
"timestamp": "2026-11-20T09:03:23Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
},
"subject": "fix: [security] Keep checkout credentials out of Docker build",
"weaknessRationale": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-522",
"rationale": "The GitHub Actions job token (a bearer credential) was persisted in .git/config and included in the Docker build context and cache layers without being removed, constituting insufficient protection of credentials in a build artifact."
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-200",
"rationale": "The credential was exposed in Docker build cache layers accessible to anyone with access to the build environment, constituting information disclosure of a sensitive authentication token."
}
]
}
},
"bcp-05-x-03": {
"x_timeline": {
"events": [
{
"description": "Corrective change authored (6b26b3f8cf9fab13244d1496443f822114ce4d05): fix: [security] Keep checkout credentials out of Docker build",
"id": "evt-fix-developed-1",
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"timestamp": "2026-11-03T12:17:37Z",
"type": "fix-developed"
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{
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"timestamp": "2026-11-20T09:02:44.223116Z",
"type": "fix-available"
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"recordType": "advisory",
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"dateReserved": "2026-11-20T09:09:38.574Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-20T18:17:10.037Z",
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