CWE-918

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-3254"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-04-04T16:15:40Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability was found in xujiangfei admintwo 1.0. It has been classified as critical. Affected is an unknown function of the file /resource/add. The manipulation of the argument description leads to server-side request forgery. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used.",
  "id": "GHSA-8wg4-h2wp-63r5",
  "modified": "2025-04-04T18:31:07Z",
  "published": "2025-04-04T18:31:07Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-3254"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/caigo8/CVE-md/blob/main/admintwo/SSRF.md"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.303324"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.303324"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.548979"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "markhuot/craftql"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "1.3.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-31317"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-18T01:03:36Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-17T14:16:33Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Craftql v1.3.7 and before is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) which allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code via the vendor/markhuot/craftql/src/Listeners/GetAssetsFieldSchema.php file.",
  "id": "GHSA-8wmw-prw8-2ggm",
  "modified": "2026-04-24T21:03:56Z",
  "published": "2026-04-17T15:31:18Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31317"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/markhuot/craftql"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/stormmmg/craftql_ssrf"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/stormmmg/craftql_ssrf/blob/master/craftql-ssrf-en/README_detail.md"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Craftql vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-5510"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-06-03T17:15:22Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability classified as critical was found in quequnlong shiyi-blog up to 1.2.1. This vulnerability affects unknown code of the file /app/sys/article/optimize. The manipulation of the argument url leads to server-side request forgery. The attack can be initiated remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.",
  "id": "GHSA-8wx4-4fr5-g6r8",
  "modified": "2025-06-03T18:30:41Z",
  "published": "2025-06-03T18:30:41Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-5510"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/uglory-gll/javasec/blob/main/shiyi-blog.md"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/uglory-gll/javasec/blob/main/shiyi-blog.md#2ssrf"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.310924"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.310924"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.584489"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.1.69"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "studio-42/elfinder"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.1.70"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-81889"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-31T20:28:06Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "[poc.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/30352020/poc.zip)\n## Summary\n\nelFinder 2.1.69 is vulnerable to a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) protection bypass when PHP cURL is unavailable and URL uploads use the `fsock_get_contents()` fallback.\n\nAn attacker who can submit a URL for server-side upload can use an attacker-controlled DNS hostname that initially resolves to an allowed public IP address and subsequently resolves to a loopback or private IP address.\n\nThe URL validation checks the first resolved IP, but `fsock_get_contents()` opens the actual connection using the original hostname. This causes a second DNS resolution and allows the connection to reach an address different from the one that was validated.\n\nThe response from the internal service is saved as an uploaded file and can be read through elFinder. This makes the demonstrated issue a non-blind SSRF.\n\nThe most accurate classification is:\n\n* Vulnerability: SSRF protection bypass \n* Exploitation technique: DNS rebinding\n* Root cause: TOCTOU/double DNS resolution without IP pinning\n\n## Affected versions\n\nConfirmed affected:\n\n* elFinder 2.1.69, commit `8f2c3ffafcdd52cf4515f1eec172f4eee44552ad`\n* the current `master` branch inspected on 24 July 2026\n\nThe earliest affected version has not been determined.\n\n## Preconditions\n\nThe demonstrated readback path requires:\n\n* PHP without the cURL extension (`curl_exec()` unavailable);\n* access to the URL upload functionality;\n* permission to upload a MIME type returned by the target service;\n* network connectivity from the PHP process to the internal target;\n* DNS resolution behavior compatible with low or zero TTL responses.\n\nAuthentication requirements depend on the application integrating the elFinder connector. The attached reproduction connector is intentionally minimal and unauthenticated.\n\n## Technical details\n\n`validate_address()` resolves the supplied hostname with `gethostbyname()`, rejects loopback and private ranges, and stores the accepted address in `$info[\u0027ip\u0027]`:\n\nhttps://github.com/Studio-42/elFinder/blob/2.1.69/php/elFinder.class.php#L2587-L2655\n\n`get_remote_contents()` then selects cURL when available, otherwise `fsock_get_contents()`:\n\nhttps://github.com/Studio-42/elFinder/blob/2.1.69/php/elFinder.class.php#L2673-L2689\n\nThe cURL implementation correctly pins the validated IP using `CURLOPT_RESOLVE`:\n\nhttps://github.com/Studio-42/elFinder/blob/2.1.69/php/elFinder.class.php#L2709-L2736\n\nHowever, the socket fallback ignores `$info[\u0027ip\u0027]` and connects using `$arr[\u0027host\u0027]`:\n\n```php\n$fp = fsockopen(\n    $ssl . $arr[\u0027host\u0027],\n    $arr[\u0027port\u0027],\n    $errno,\n    $errstr,\n    $connect_timeout\n);\n```\n\nRelevant code:\n\nhttps://github.com/Studio-42/elFinder/blob/2.1.69/php/elFinder.class.php#L2762-L2866\n\nConsequently, the address checked by `validate_address()` is not necessarily the address used by the socket connection.\n\nThe same problem is present after redirects: the redirect URL is validated, but the recursive socket request again connects using the hostname rather than the validated IP.\n\n## Proof of concept\n\nA Docker-based reproduction is attached as `poc.zip`.\n\nThe laboratory:\n\n* downloads the official elFinder 2.1.69 release during the build;\n* verifies that the package version is 2.1.69;\n* verifies that `curl_exec()` is unavailable;\n* does not modify the elFinder core;\n* runs a deterministic DNS server and an HTTP service bound only to loopback.\n\nBuild and run:\n\n```sh\ndocker build -t elfinder-ssrf-repro poc\ndocker run --rm -p 127.0.0.1:8081:8081 elfinder-ssrf-repro\n```\n\nOpen:\n\n```text\nhttp://127.0.0.1:8081/poc/index.html\n```\n\nIn the elFinder interface:\n\n1. Select \"Upload\".\n2. Paste the following URL:\n\n```text\nhttp://rebind.test:9001/secret.txt\n```\n\n3. Wait for the upload to complete.\n4. Open the resulting `secret.txt` file.\n\nObserved content:\n\n```text\nINTERNAL_SECRET_MANUAL\n```\n\nThe PoC DNS server responds as follows:\n\n```text\nfirst A resolution       -\u003e 203.0.113.10\nsubsequent A resolutions -\u003e 127.0.0.1\n```\n\nExpected logs include:\n\n```text\nDNS rebind.test type=1 answer=203.0.113.10 count=1\nDNS rebind.test type=1 answer=127.0.0.1 count=2\nGET /secret.txt\n```\n\n`203.0.113.10` is used only as a deterministic laboratory address that passes the current private-address checks. The actual connection reaches `127.0.0.1:9001`.\n\nA redirect variant is also included:\n\n```text\nhttp://rebind.test:9001/redirect-secret\n```\n\nIt produces the same readable internal content.\n\n## Security impact\n\nAn attacker may cause the elFinder server to issue HTTP GET requests to services reachable from the PHP process, including:\n\n* loopback services;\n* private network services;\n* link-local services where reachable;\n* internal administrative or application endpoints.\n\nBecause the response body is saved and exposed through elFinder, sensitive internal information may be disclosed.\n\nThe demonstrated primitive is limited to HTTP GET requests and does not provide arbitrary request methods, bodies, or headers. Integrity and availability impact would depend on the behavior of reachable internal endpoints and are not claimed by this PoC.\n\n## Suggested CVSS\n\nFor an exposed connector matching the attached PoC:\n\n```text\nCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N\n```\n\nBase score: 8.6 High.\n\nThis assumes:\n\n* no authentication is required by the connector;\n* the internal service represents a separate security scope;\n* disclosure may include highly sensitive internal data.\n\nIf authenticated user access is considered an inherent prerequisite, `PR:L` would result in a score of 7.7 High.\n\n## Suggested remediation\n\nThe socket connection should use the IP address returned by `validate_address()` rather than resolving the hostname again.\n\nFor HTTPS, the original hostname should still be used for:\n\n* the HTTP `Host` header;\n* TLS SNI;\n* certificate hostname validation.\n\nThis may require replacing `fsockopen()` with a connection mechanism that supports connecting to the validated IP while explicitly configuring the TLS peer name.\n\nEvery redirect destination should be independently validated and its validated IP pinned to that specific connection.\n\nRevalidating the hostname immediately before connecting is not sufficient because it would still leave a validation-to-connection DNS resolution gap.\n\nAs a temporary mitigation, URL uploads could be rejected when cURL is unavailable, or deployments could configure `urlUploadFilter` to reject URL uploads.\n\n## Additional observation\n\nAfter a successful URL fetch, the upload path calls:\n\n```php\nget_headers($url, true)\n```\n\nRelevant code:\n\nhttps://github.com/Studio-42/elFinder/blob/2.1.69/php/elFinder.class.php#L3356-L3374\n\nThis performs another request using the original hostname without reusing the validated and pinned connection. It may therefore introduce an additional blind SSRF request, potentially even when the cURL download path is selected.\n\nThis additional request is not required for the attached non-blind `fsock_get_contents()` PoC. It should nevertheless be reviewed during remediation. Ideally, filename and response-header information should be collected from the already validated HTTP response instead of issuing a separate request.\n\n## Disclosure\n\nInitial private report date: `24/07/2026`\n\nReporter contact: `Marco Lunardi - marcolunardi90@gmail.com`",
  "id": "GHSA-8x3q-jpjh-qh5c",
  "modified": "2026-08-31T20:28:06Z",
  "published": "2026-08-31T20:28:06Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Studio-42/elFinder/security/advisories/GHSA-8x3q-jpjh-qh5c"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Studio-42/elFinder/commit/191372c1bbebbd36fb55af79a84b9984861390ff"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Studio-42/elFinder/commit/6d997386cd0f1abab4706c220b46b0aea0ecff51"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/Studio-42/elFinder"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Studio-42/elFinder/releases/tag/2.1.70"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "elFinder: SSRF protection bypass via DNS rebinding in the `fsock_get_contents()` fallback"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "open-webui"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.9.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.11.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-70485"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-04T19:59:36Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nOpen WebUI fetches user-supplied URLs on the server for RAG URL ingestion, URL-to-markdown conversion and web-search content retrieval, and decides whether a destination is allowed by asking whether its IP address is globally routable. That test operates on the literal IPv6 address and does not look at the IPv4 address embedded inside it. On a deployment whose network has a NAT64 gateway, any verified user can wrap an internal or cloud-metadata IPv4 address in the NAT64 well-known prefix, pass the filter, and receive the internal response body back through the API.\n\n## Preconditions\n\n- Any verified (authenticated) user account. No admin role, no elevated permission.\n- Default configuration: `ENABLE_LOCAL_WEB_FETCH` off, the default `WEB_FETCH_FILTER_LIST` metadata blocklist in place. Neither prevents this, because the blocklist matches hostname strings and the NAT64 literal is not one of them.\n- The deployment\u0027s network must provide NAT64 translation for the well-known `64:ff9b::/96` prefix, which is the common default on IPv6-only and dual-stack cloud and Kubernetes networks.\n- Deployments on IPv4-only networks, or on any network without a NAT64 gateway, are not affected: the address has nowhere to route.\n\n## Impact\n\nOn an affected network a low-privilege user can read GET responses from services the server can reach but the internet cannot: cloud instance metadata including IAM role credentials, loopback-bound admin surfaces, and internal APIs in the same VPC or cluster. The response body is returned to the caller, so this is full-read, not blind. Exploitation is not universal, it depends entirely on the deployment\u0027s network providing NAT64 translation, which is why the score carries high attack complexity. Deployments without NAT64 lose nothing here.\n\n## Fix\n\nFixed in v0.11.0 by commit `1717b493d`. Address classification now unwraps the IPv4 embedded in IPv6 transition encodings before deciding whether a destination is global, and applies that at all three checkpoints. NAT64-wrapped public destinations continue to work. Upgrading to v0.11.0 fully resolves the issue with no configuration change.\n\n## Root cause\n\n- `backend/open_webui/retrieval/web/utils.py` \u2014 `validate_url()`, the pre-fetch check on the submitted URL.\n- `backend/open_webui/retrieval/web/utils.py` \u2014 `_ssrf_safe_new_conn()` and `_SSRFSafeResolver`, the connect-time re-checks that defeat DNS rebinding.\n\nAll three decided reachability from `ipaddress.ip_address(ip).is_global` applied to the literal address. That predicate answers whether an IPv6 address sits in globally-routable space, which is a different question from where the packet actually ends up once a transition gateway translates it. The NAT64 well-known prefix is by design a global prefix carrying an arbitrary IPv4 destination, so an internal target wrapped in it satisfies the check while reaching exactly what the check exists to prevent. Because the same predicate backed the connect-time re-checks, no later layer caught it either. The fix inspects every standardized transition encoding rather than only the NAT64 prefix, since the same reasoning error applies to each of them.\n\n## Proof of concept\n\nAgainst the real `POST /api/v1/retrieval/process/web` flow on v0.10.2 as an authenticated user, with internal HTTP services returning a marker string. The plain forms are rejected with HTTP 400:\n\n```\nhttp://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/          -\u003e 400\nhttp://127.0.0.1/                                 -\u003e 400\nhttp://[::ffff:169.254.169.254]/                  -\u003e 400\nhttp://metadata.google.internal/                  -\u003e 400\n```\n\nThe NAT64 encodings of the same targets are accepted, and the response body is returned in the `content` field:\n\n```\nhttp://[64:ff9b::a9fe:a9fe]/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/   -\u003e 200, marker returned\nhttp://[64:ff9b::7f00:1]/admin/internal-status                          -\u003e 200, marker returned\n```\n\nNAT64 translation was modelled by binding the translated addresses locally rather than by routing through a real NAT64 gateway; everything else, including the request flow and the validation code, is the unmodified v0.10.2 path. After the fix both URLs return 400 while `http://[64:ff9b::808:808]/` (8.8.8.8, public) still returns 200, confirming no over-blocking.\n\n## Credits\n\n- tonghuaroot \u2014 reported the transition-form gap in the address classification and supplied the fix approach.",
  "id": "GHSA-8x5v-cpv7-8jjp",
  "modified": "2026-08-04T19:59:36Z",
  "published": "2026-08-04T19:59:36Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-8x5v-cpv7-8jjp"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/commit/1717b493d83c86afa82aa8bc50139250852dd2f3"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/releases/tag/v0.11.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Open WebUI: Any authenticated user can reach internal services and cloud metadata via NAT64-encoded URLs"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-100705"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-26T14:16:55Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Kyverno before 1.19.1 is vulnerable to server-side request forgery. The default egress blocklist (169.254.169.254, 169.254.169.253, metadata.google.internal, 127.0.0.0/8, ::1/128) and the scoped-token control were wired only into the new CEL http.Get/Post library and were never applied to the legacy apiCall service executor (pkg/engine/apicall/executor.go) or to the GlobalContextEntry external-API path, which handle every non-CEL context[].apiCall.service call. Because these paths use a plain net/http client with no egress filtering and no validation of the configured service URL, a ClusterPolicy or GlobalContextEntry author \u2014 or, where a deployed policy templates the service URL from the admission resource, a lower-privileged resource submitter \u2014 can cause Kyverno to issue GET/POST requests to an arbitrary host, including the cloud metadata endpoint, loopback, and any in-cluster service, reading cloud instance credentials and reaching internal endpoints with Kyverno\u0027s network position. The executor also unconditionally attaches Kyverno\u0027s projected ServiceAccount token to the attacker-chosen destination; the token is audience-scoped, limiting its replay value. Fixed in 1.19.1.",
  "id": "GHSA-8x9j-8h3w-5cxq",
  "modified": "2026-09-26T15:31:23Z",
  "published": "2026-09-26T15:31:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/kyverno/kyverno/security/advisories/GHSA-q825-p383-r9v5"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-100705"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/kyverno-before-1.19.1-ssrf-via-legacy-apicall-service-executor"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:H/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-73757"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-01T21:18:42Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability in the web-based management interface of AOS-CX could allow an authenticated remote attacker to conduct a server-side request forgery (SSRF) attack. A successful exploit allows an attacker to enumerate information about the internal structure of the AOS-CX host, leading to potential disclosure and limited modification of sensitive information.",
  "id": "GHSA-8xcx-2phj-g7jh",
  "modified": "2026-09-01T21:31:51Z",
  "published": "2026-09-01T21:31:51Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-73757"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.hpe.com/hpesc/public/docDisplay?docId=hpesbnw05134en_us\u0026docLocale=en_US"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-4974"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-07-28T13:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "IBM Jazz Foundation products are vulnerable to server side request forgery (SSRF). This may allow an authenticated attacker to send unauthorized requests from the system, potentially leading to network enumeration or facilitating other attacks.  IBM X-Force ID:  192434.",
  "id": "GHSA-8xmv-482h-9xqg",
  "modified": "2022-05-24T19:09:17Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T19:09:17Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-4974"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/192434"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/6475919"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-25800"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-07-14T12:15:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "Best Practical RT for Incident Response (RTIR) before 4.0.3 and 5.x before 5.0.3 allows SSRF via the whois lookup tool.",
  "id": "GHSA-8xpw-q9jp-x2c7",
  "modified": "2022-07-22T00:00:33Z",
  "published": "2022-07-15T00:00:21Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-25800"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://docs.bestpractical.com/release-notes/rtir/4.0.3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://docs.bestpractical.com/release-notes/rtir/5.0.3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://docs.bestpractical.com/release-notes/rtir/index.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.8.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "webfinger.js"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.8.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-54590"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-07-28T16:41:06Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-08-01T18:15:55Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Description\nThe lookup function takes a user address for checking accounts as a feature, however, as per\nthe ActivityPub spec (https://www.w3.org/TR/activitypub/#security-considerations), on the\nsecurity considerations section at B.3, access to Localhost services should be prevented while\nrunning in production. The library does not prevent Localhost access (neither does it prevent\nLAN addresses such as 192.168.x.x) , thus is not safe for use in production by ActivityPub\napplications. The only check for localhost is done for selecting between HTTP and HTTPS\nprotocols, and it is done by testing for a host that starts with the string \u201clocalhost\u201d and ends with\na port. Anything else (such as \u201c127.0.0.1\u201d or \u201clocalhost:1234/abc\u201d) would not be considered\nlocalhost for this test.\n\nIn addition, the way that the function determines the host, makes it possible to access any path\nin the host, not only \u201c/.well-known/...\u201d paths:\n\n```javascript\nif (address.indexOf(\u0027://\u0027) \u003e -1) {\n  // other uri format\n  host = address.replace(/ /g,\u0027\u0027).split(\u0027/\u0027)[2];\n} else {\n  // useraddress\n  host = address.replace(/ /g,\u0027\u0027).split(\u0027@\u0027)[1];\n}\n\nvar uri_index = 0; // track which URIS we\u0027ve tried already\nvar protocol = \u0027https\u0027; // we use https by default\n\nif (self.__isLocalhost(host)) {\n  protocol = \u0027http\u0027;\n}\n\nfunction __buildURL() {\n  var uri = \u0027\u0027;\n  if (! address.split(\u0027://\u0027)[1]) {\n  // the URI has not been defined, default to acct\n    uri = \u0027acct:\u0027;\n  }\n  return protocol + \u0027://\u0027 + host + \u0027/.well-known/\u0027 +URIS[uri_index] + \u0027?resource=\u0027 + uri + address;\n}\n```\n\nIf the address is in the format of a user address (user@host.com), the host will be anything\nafter the first found @ symbol. Since no other test is done, an adversary may pass a specially\ncrafted address such as user@localhost:7000/admin/restricted_page? and reach pages that\nwould normally be out of reach. In this example, the code would treat\nlocalhost:7000/admin/restricted_page? as the host, and the created URL would be\nhttps://localhost:7000/admin/restricted_page?/.well-known/webfinger?resource=acct:use\nr@localhost:7000/admin/restricted_page?. A server listening on localhost:7000 will then\nparse the request as a GET request for the page /admin/restricted_page with the query string\n/.well-known/webfinger?resource=acct:user@localhost:7000/admin/restricted_page?.\n\n### PoC and Steps to reproduce\nThis PoC assumes that there is a server on the machine listening on port 3000, which receives\nrequests for WebFinger lookups on the address /api/v1/search_user, and then calls the lookup\nfunction in webfinger.js with the user passed as an argument. For the sake of the example we\nassume that the server configured webfinger.js with tls_only=false.\n\n\n1. Activate a local HTTP server listening to port 1234 with a \u201csecret.txt\u201d file:\n\n```\npython3 -m http.server 1234\n```\n\n2. Run the following command:\n\n```\ncurl\n\"http://localhost:3000/api/v1/search_user?search=user@localhost:1234/secret.txt\n?\"\n```\n\n3. View the console of the Python\u2019s HTTP server and see that a request for a\n\u201csecret.txt?/.well-known/webfinger?resource=acct:user@localhost:1234/secret.txt\n?\u201d file was performed.\nThis proves that we can redirect the URL to any domain and path we choose, including\nlocalhost and the internal LAN.\n\n\n### Impact\nDue to this issue, any user can cause a server using the library to send GET requests with\ncontrolled host, path and port in an attempt to query services running on the instance\u2019s host or\nlocal network, and attempt to execute a Blind-SSRF gadget in hope of targeting a known\nvulnerable local service running on the victim\u2019s machine.\n\n\n### References\nThe vulnerability was discovered by Ori Hollander of the JFrog Vulnerability Research team.",
  "id": "GHSA-8xq3-w9fx-74rv",
  "modified": "2025-08-01T18:36:22Z",
  "published": "2025-07-28T16:41:06Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/silverbucket/webfinger.js/security/advisories/GHSA-8xq3-w9fx-74rv"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-54590"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/silverbucket/webfinger.js/commit/b5f2f2c957297d25f4d76072963fccaee2e3095a"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/silverbucket/webfinger.js"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/silverbucket/webfinger.js/releases/tag/v2.8.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "webfinger.js Blind SSRF Vulnerability"
}