CWE-426
Untrusted Search Path
The product searches for critical resources using an externally-supplied search path that can point to resources that are not under the product's direct control.
Mitigation
Phases: Architecture and Design, Implementation
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
Description:
- Hard-code the search path to a set of known-safe values (such as system directories), or only allow them to be specified by the administrator in a configuration file. Do not allow these settings to be modified by an external party. Be careful to avoid related weaknesses such as CWE-426 and CWE-428.
Mitigation
Phase: Implementation
Description:
- When invoking other programs, specify those programs using fully-qualified pathnames. While this is an effective approach, code that uses fully-qualified pathnames might not be portable to other systems that do not use the same pathnames. The portability can be improved by locating the full-qualified paths in a centralized, easily-modifiable location within the source code, and having the code refer to these paths.
Mitigation
Phase: Implementation
Description:
- Remove or restrict all environment settings before invoking other programs. This includes the PATH environment variable, LD_LIBRARY_PATH, and other settings that identify the location of code libraries, and any application-specific search paths.
Mitigation
Phase: Implementation
Description:
- Check your search path before use and remove any elements that are likely to be unsafe, such as the current working directory or a temporary files directory.
Mitigation
Phase: Implementation
Description:
- Use other functions that require explicit paths. Making use of any of the other readily available functions that require explicit paths is a safe way to avoid this problem. For example, system() in C does not require a full path since the shell can take care of it, while execl() and execv() require a full path.
CAPEC-38: Leveraging/Manipulating Configuration File Search Paths
This pattern of attack sees an adversary load a malicious resource into a program's standard path so that when a known command is executed then the system instead executes the malicious component. The adversary can either modify the search path a program uses, like a PATH variable or classpath, or they can manipulate resources on the path to point to their malicious components. J2EE applications and other component based applications that are built from multiple binaries can have very long list of dependencies to execute. If one of these libraries and/or references is controllable by the attacker then application controls can be circumvented by the attacker.